tail rotor failure at hover

[gootybalajiniranjan]

wat i think as a point of discussion is tail rotor failure is the gravest of all the emergencies.pl fwd some valuble inputs to how to recover successfully recover from a TR Failure at hover. regards

[Wageslave]

er...land?

[Geoffersincornwall]

immediately !!!

G

[Fun Police]

before the rate of rotation gets too high!

[GipsyMagpie]

But don't get confused with Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness. Shame to dump a perfectly serviceable aircraft on the ground. Of course better to be on your side with a serviceable tail rotor than still flying with a broken one - but knowledge of your aircraft should help work out what's happened.

If in a Gazelle or other Fenestron aircraft you need to understand how a Fenestron puts out its power so you can fly it appropriately and not getting into what is incorrectly called Fenestron stall. I know the Guimbal service letter on the topic is excellent if you can get your hands on it.

[Two's in]

You might want to cut the power first, it slows down the spinning sensation.

[hueyracer]

First-what is a "tail rotor failure"?

Pitch link failure?
Tail rotor drive shaft failure?
High Power failure?
Low Power failure?

It makes a HUGE difference.....

But if you´re talking about a full tail rotor (thrust) failure:
Autorotate-IMMEDIATELY.

There is NO "fly away" possible...

[TipCap]

Had one in the Zagross mountains in 1970 just coming into the hover in a AB204. Tail drive shaft coupling went. Lever down but still spun 270 degrees and bounced twice from what I can remember:ok: The aircraft remained upright and we all climbed out unhurt

[BOBAKAT]

Read the manual and train one more time...

[SilsoeSid]

tail rotor failure is the gravest of all the emergencies

I'm sure not everyone would agree with that statement.

[Aerobot]

I had six T/R failures in the RotorWay 162POS, uh, I mean 162F. Most of them were recoverable by getting the tailrotor to stop stalling (yes it can) and nursing it back.
The most exciting was one in which I didn't take it away from the student until it had already wandered halfway off the asphalt and was halfway over the desert - a drop of about six inches.
If I'd chopped it then we'd have hit while turning on that uneven surface and rolled.
So I had to keep it in the air, while keeping the cyclic pointed East, until I had black blur on both sides. Then I chopped it and sat it down. No worries.
They told me later that the guys in the sales office were diving under their desks as I came spinning toward their floor-to-ceiling window.
Fun! ;)

[Vertical Freedom]

I had six T/R failures in the RotorWay 162POS, uh, I mean 162F. Most of them were recoverable by getting the tailrotor to stop stalling (yes it can) and nursing it back.Hey Aerobot....a Tail-Rotor failure; recoverable by stopping stalling? WTF & I always thought a TR failure meant loss of thrust due to the TR drive-shaft or some other failure which could be recovered by closing the throttle & holding off ground contact with collective, hopefully till the spinning stopped. Hmmmmm :\

Happy Happy :ok:

[MightyGem]

I had six T/R failures in the RotorWay 162POS, uh, I mean 162F. Most of them were recoverable by getting the tailrotor to stop stalling (yes it can) and nursing it back.
AKA loss of tail rotor effectiveness. :rolleyes:

[Flying Bull]

@ Two´s in

you don´t have time to cut power if the tail rotor quits working - just slam the collective down, if you wan´t to live another day.....

[chopjock]

you don´t have time to cut power if the tail rotor quits working - just slam the collective down, if you wan´t to live another day.....

Not sure that's a good idea. Unless you have throttle levers and can not get to them or are flying someone else's machine and don't care about damaging it.

[Reely340]

In HIGE: land immediately.

In HOGE: how about pointing the cyclic towards a fixed point of the horizon, which means - with the cabin spinning - moving the cyclic in a counter rotating cyclic fashion, so that it points "away from tree/building/offshore-rig" towards the "desired direction". :8

W/o touchng the pitch the rotormast should inclinde towards "desired direction",
the a/c will pick up speed in that direction, and weather vane effect will stop rotation.
continue run on landing according to AFM. :hmm:

Never done that of course, never heard of someone trying it either := ,
but RC-helo pilots do a butt load of maneouvers with the cabin deliberately spinning,
hence they're rused to "rotating the cyclic". search for "prio",
Paul's Helicopter Pages (http://www.rchelicopter.co.uk/moves.htm#)see Piroloop Paul's Helicopter Pages (http://www.rchelicopter.co.uk/move/oploop.htm)

Then again they don't sit inside a spinning cabin...

[Soave_Pilot]

It is important to mention to never let the turning rate build up so high that the pilot would lose situational awareness and/or dificulty to reach the controls of the helicopter. The pilot must act quickly and promptly to avoid this scenario, so one must know how the aircraft would respond to different emergencies such as tail rotor failure, stuck controls (with positive and negative pitch) and LTE.

[SASless]

In most helicopters....does the thrust produced by a full application of right pedal(American direction of rotation) equal or exceed the amount of torque (turning force) of the Main Rotor System in a hovering aircraft?

Question being....if a full right pedal application equals or exceeds the Turning Moment of the Main Rotor system....one could test various techniques to control the spinning of the aircraft.

I guess if one were brave enough....one could apply full right pedal at a Hover and attempt to fly away and establish some sort of controlled flight with the nose of the aircraft yawed from the direction of flight.

In flight, we know if one reduces the MR RPM to the bottom of the Green Arc (Power On Limit) the resulting yaw is minimized or removed.

You CFS Rotor Scholars might answer the question about the amount of Torque applied to the Rotor System when RPM is reduced....does the Torque decrease with the decrease in RPM even though more pitch is applied to the Rotor? In my younger days I would offer my own calculations but I am well beyond that in my old age. CRS (Can't Remember Squat) has firmly set in and prevents me from throwing out the answer.

Any thoughts on this?(The flying parts...not my CRS!)


Brother John Dixon or Professor Lappos would be great sources of thinking on this!

[ShyTorque]

CAA PAPER 2003/1
Helicopter Tail Rotor Failuresis a very good publication to read.

Unfortunately, since the CAA website was changed, I cant find the download link.

Edit: now found it!

http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?catid=1&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=1127

[ShyTorque]

SASless, I tend to think that there are too many variables to give a "one size fits all" answer to your question.

During my time as a simulator instructor we were tasked by Boscombe Down to experiment with tail rotor malfunctions in order to provide further guidance on tail rotor failures for RAF Puma pilots.

Until that time the only tail rotor "failure" covered in the FRC checklist was drive shaft failiure. We flew many different scenarios in the sim which enabled us to provide guidance on other types of failures. We were careful not to give actual drills to follow by rote because correct diagnosis of the actual type of malfunction was critical and we were "flying" a simulator, not the real aircraft and the response of the sim may not have been exactly as per the real airframe.

The FRCs said that in the event of a tail rotor driveshaft failure the pilot should "find a speed and power combination which will enable the aircraft to be flown to a suitable area for an engine off landing" - total rubbish! It isn't safely possible to do that in a Puma; the only suitable speed power combination with no driveshaft is nil power and best auto speed.

I do know that we probably saved one aircraft after it suffered a tail rotor pitch control failure, rather than a drive shaft failure. Using the guidance we provided and later taught, the aircraft was successfully ditched in the North Sea. The crew escaped unscathed and the aircraft was recovered, despite floats not being fitted. The pilot told us that had he not received the training we provided he would have just pulled both throttles, which would probably have caused total loss of aircraft control in the circumstances.

[Reely340]

SASless Question being....if a full right pedal application equals or exceeds the Turning Moment of the Main Rotor system....one could test various techniques to control the spinning of the aircraft.Check tail rotor blade pitch min. angle of attack acc. AFM
If it's 0° or even negative, I'd say full right pedal would result in zero "counter thrust",
e.g. same "counter torque" as if tail rotor fell off.

[Marly Lite]

Flying bull,

If you are in the low hover, you should not just dump the lever. Chop the throttle and cushion with remaining lever.

If you are in the high hover, then yes, dump lever AND chop throttle. Then endeavour to get forward airspeed. Unless you are very quick here, then it's curtains; irrecoverable unless you are quick.

[AAKEE]

Flying bull,

If you are in the low hover, you should not just dump the lever. Chop the throttle and cushion with remaining lever.

If you are in the high hover, then yes, dump lever AND chop throttle. Then endeavour to get forward airspeed. Unless you are very quick here, then it's curtains; irrecoverable unless you are quick.


Im with Flying Bull.


If you're sitting in a type with twist throttles on the collective, and you can react and cut all engines within 0,5s: then do it in the same time as you dump the collective.
Otherwise, dump collective as Flying bull said, or crash.


Never experienced this live, but a lot in Full Flight Sims, different types. All Sims teach the same = if you dont react quick, the rotation speed will be very high very soon.

[Marly Lite]

AAKEE,

Next time you are in the sim, try both techniques, with a reasonable delay for pilot reaction.:)

[SASless]

if you dont react quick, the rotation speed will be very high very soon.

As a front seat passenger in a US Army Huey (I was a Chinook Pilot) on a free ride to Saigon for a bit of R and R....I had the occasion to participate in one of these events.

At first, I thought the guy flying was making a right hand pedal turn to look for a parking place....as the rotation was quite mild as the Tail Rotor wound down. The first full revolution as we passed what I considered our entry point heading was not too bad but was gaining in rate. As we went by the second time...the rate was very significant and noticeably increasing at a faster rate than the on the first trip around the mast. I had now tweaked to it being a for real problem and not the doing of the Dunderhead who was driving.

As I was a passenger and not part of the crew I was deferring to his Duty Status but began to suggest a course of action....by clearly stating over the Intercom..."Chop the Throttle!".

He did not...and we started around yet another time and on the third time past the starting point....things were becoming a blur...and my suggestion to chop the Throttle was now an emphatic plea!

As we went around on the fourth rotation...my Aviator Ray Bans were leaving my face propelled by my bulging eyeballs...and I elected to take matters into my own hands and chopped the throttle myself.

We were still rotating but at a much reduced and slowing rate...things were coming into focus again...and eyeballs were returning to what seemed a normal position.

I suppose I could have helped with the Collective Pull but then he was signed for the aircraft and was at the controls and one would think he would just instinctively do what was necessary at this point. I was wrong...he did not...and the Skids nicely cushioned our Landing and at the same time made it much easier to get out of the Cockpit as there was no need to climb down but rather to step up just a short bit.

I thanked him for the Ride....and lied when I said I would look forward to a return flight with him in a few Days.

Long story....but should help to describe how quickly things happen when the Tail Rotor decides to take a Holiday.

Getting the power off is the key. Get that right and the rest is pretty much an after thought. Don't and you are in for the ride of you Life that even Disneyworld cannot beat.

[Flying Bull]

Hi Marly Lite,

as AAKEE says, if you don´t dump the collective immediately, you get a very high rate of rotation, which increases the risk of being killed.

You have to condition yourself to accept a hard landing in case of hoverfailures in favour of surviving.
The tendency of pilots is to try to control the bird - which leads to desaster.

I actually know a pilot, who got a big reinforced plastic bag into his fenestron - and he said, his simulatortraining - putting the bird instantly down - saved his day.
Christoph 13 nach Zwischenfall nicht mehr flugfähig (2x ergänzt) | rth.info - Faszination Luftrettung | Rettungshubschrauber online (http://www.rth.info/news/news.php?id=1314)

Surf the internet and see, what happens, if pilots try to cope with tail rotor problems...

so7H9XSwLhQ

should have accepted the fate of being in the water - but you can see, how fast the spinng starts...

and that french army puma could still be flying, when the pilot would have accepted a hard landing - instead....

3F2k-GWKW-w

So I won´t spend any time in trying to kill an engine - before being on the ground.
Rather have some bend skids/wheels and walk away - as you know, every landing, you can walk away from is a good landing...
every landing, you still can use the aircraft - is a very good landing :E

[John Eacott]

In (almost) any machine with overhead speed selects or a fuel control away from the collective grip you must dump the collective as soon as you identify the problem. There is no time to faff around letting go of the collective to wind back the engine(s).

That covers most types, and those with a collective twist-grip throttle would still find you dithering around whilst the rotation builds up. Lower the lever and accept the machine will still be building up a head of rotational steam on the way down.

Been there, done that, in a BK117 where I stuffed the tail into a tree at night in a high (20-30ft) hover. Collapsed the skids but only turned about 120 degrees in all: if I'd hesitated before dumping the lever it may have been far, far worse.

[ShyTorque]

I agree with FB and JE.

The most appropriate immediate actions really have to be type specific (which is why I replied to SAS's post by saying that were were too many variables to give a "one size fits all" answer).

The favourite saying of some is "lucky left, rotten right" when it comes to TR failures / malfunctions. That only works if you fly "American Rotation" rotor bladed aircraft.

It's more accurate to say that the "lucky" side is the retreating blade side.

[Marly Lite]

ST and JE,

I'll happily agree with you for single pilot operation with awkward speed selects in the roof etc. And sure, twin pilot requires a switched on P2!

Certainly for twist grip I maintain that you are better off chopping the throttle. SASLESS's example explains why. Unfortunately in his case the driver forgot the 'cushion' part!

FB

says, if you don´t dump the collective immediately, you get a very high rate of rotation, which increases the risk of being killed.


FB, IF you close the throttle, the rate rotation stops accelerating, and starts to slow. Only now, you still have the ability to cushion.

[FH1100 Pilot]

As someone who actually has had a complete loss-of-thrust t/r failure at an IGE hover in a Bell 206 I can speak to this issue from a practical standpoint not theoretical. Once the anti-torque is gone, the yaw rate builds up blindingly fast.

First, get rid of the torque if you can. In my case I chopped the throttle. After that it's just a hovering auto. If the throttle/FCL is not on the collective, then yes, dump the lever and fast. Recognize it early and get the landing gear on the ground before the rate of rotation gets too high. Do not wait.

[hueyracer]

During my time as a simulator instructor we were tasked by Boscombe Down to experiment with tail rotor malfunctions


Sorry to say this-but this is where a lot of "false advise" comes from, as the simulator only simulates whatever someone programmed into it (usually based on facts and data fed from live aircraft, but-in case of emergency procedures-mainly from "pilot tells" stories)..


To simulate the effects of a tail rotor failure, someone would have to hook up computers to a helicopter in flight EXPERIENCING a tail rotor failure.....
Even then, this data can only be used for this specific model (although general procedures might result out of it).

For many years, pilots were told that one is able to "fly away even with a separated tail rotor", as long as one has enough airspeed.....this is slowly changing now due to studies carried out like the one in the UK....

[ShyTorque]

Sorry to say this-but this is where a lot of "false advise" comes from, as the simulator only simulates whatever someone programmed into it (usually based on facts and data fed from live aircraft, but-in case of emergency procedures-mainly from "pilot tells" stories)..We were fully aware of that. We were in very close liaison with the person who wrote the software we were dealing with and he was able to keep us very well informed.

Did you not read the rest of my post? Especially this paragraph:

Until that time the only tail rotor "failure" covered in the FRC checklist was drive shaft failiure. We flew many different scenarios in the sim which enabled us to provide guidance on other types of failures. We were careful not to give actual drills to follow by rote because correct diagnosis of the actual type of malfunction was critical and we were "flying" a simulator, not the real aircraft and the response of the sim may not have been exactly as per the real airframe.

[hueyracer]

No, i read the whole thing....sorry, i should have made that more clear...

I was intending to issue a warning to all pilots thinking that-because they handled things well in a simulator, they now know everything about what's happening in the real aircraft......and that´s not the case...

[ShyTorque]

HueyRacer, that was the advice we gave. It was meant as guidance and food for thought. It was never meant to be a complete answer but it later proved far better than that previously taught, or rather, what had been previously glossed over, by the UK military and civilian training organisations alike. At least, three Puma pilots who subsequently suffered tail rotor malfunctions for real said so.

The CAA paper which I provided a link to in my earlier post shows that the conclusions of the later trials team were very similar to what we had found some years previously and passed on to Puma pilots during their sim. training with us. The TRCF incident I referred to is incident #27 in that document. Pages 151/152 gave further information on the training we provided.

[sycamore]

Not had one go in the hover,but about 50-60 knots in formation climb;whole tail-rotor and gearbox departed,about 90 deg yaw,and the stick on the back stop,as the C of G was now over the nose as well.Entered auto,then chopped the engine and eol`d into a clearing.Aircraft was lifted out by Belvedere,bits of t/r were found,caused by a fatigue crack in the t/r blade spindle.New g/box and t/r replaced,aircraft flew again a couple of weeks later.

Few pics in `Rotorheads around...cockpit views(not video),p15...

A couple of days later an American Flight Safety magazine turned up with an article about`How to handle a tail-rotor failure`.....

[SASless]

Folks used to look at me cross-eyed when I announced my preference for an aircraft that had its CG at the rear limit. I asked them what it would feel like to have a very forward most CG location and experience what you did.

The venerable old Huey had some teething pains early on when the D and H models were coming into service.

It started with entire Tailbones leaving the attach point on the Fuselage....moved back to the 42 Degree Gearbox attach points....then to the 90 Degree Gearbox attach points....and in time after more than a few Tail Rotors got shucked.....the Bell Engineers got it all sorted out.

Fort Rucker had two Tail Boom separations in a single day....it was that bad.

[Paul Cantrell]

FH1100 Pilot says:
As someone who actually has had a complete loss-of-thrust t/r failure at an IGE hover in a Bell 206 I can speak to this issue from a practical standpoint not theoretical. Once the anti-torque is gone, the yaw rate builds up blindingly fast.


Well, I've never had LTE or a TR failure, so take this with a grain of salt, but:

When I was first instructing, we had another CFI who had an LTE on top of a mountain and crashed the R22 he was flying. A few weeks later I flew with him and he demonstrated a very fast rotation (still probably not as fast as if you have a TR failure but still pretty damn fast). He pointed out that if you don't try to look at individual items out the windshield, but instead treat the trees/houses/whatever as a blur representing the horizon, you can at least maintain a level attitude for a short time.

I find that most people who have never seen this demonstrated tend to drop a wing or the nose and start doing a pirouette, the danger being that not only are you spinning, you are now starting to translate so you are even more likely to tip the machine over upon landing.

Oh, and someone mentioned LTE vs TR failure. My feeling is that if torque is spinning me, I don't have time to diagnose the cause. I'm gonna get rid of the torque and put it down and we can figure that stuff out later. Not sure why LTE would be any less serious than a mechanical failure. (Yeah, maybe you could have prevented it, but once it happens seems like it's just as deadly). Not sure whether you'll get the same rotation rates out of LTE vs TR fail. Hoping not to find out!

We practice this stuff, but I have no illusions that a real life TR failure will be as benign as when we practice.

I have to say, though, that I have a strong preference for machines with throttle(s) on the collective because of this.

[chopjock]

P C
Not sure why LTE would be any less serious than a mechanical failure.

Well for one thing, LTE is temporary. Lowering the lever and nose should lead to recovery (if you have enough height that is).

[John Eacott]

For the Hover TR Failure we have been teaching "DON'T DUMPT THE LEVER". Accept the rotation, keep level disc attitude and slowly lower to the surface allowing the wheels/skids to generate friction to slow the rotation. Dumping the lever with a rapid yaw rate we think will cause the wheels/skids to dig in an lead to a roll over crash.

How are other instructors teaching this failure?

I am now wondering how the Hover technique we are peddling above would translate to what is effectively at TDP, a zero speed hover?[/COLOR]

I'm intrigued at your rationale to justify such a teaching? There is no way that I'd have held the hover and gently lowered the collective following my loss of tail rotor in a high hover, at night, in my BK117. I'd have been in a world of hurt: instant dumping of the collective and a spread set of crosstubes gave a minimal rotation on the deck.

If I'd made contact with a higher rate of rotation then a roll over would have been almost guaranteed.

Apologies for the thread drift.

[megan]

Throttles in the roof - during one sim session in a 76 level D we were taught, if single pilot (we always were), a tail drive failure in the hover could be handled, if power available, by climbing vertically to height (1,000 suggested), nosing over to gain airspeed, accept side slip, and fly to suitable, spot for auto. It worked in the sim, but in real life? Always had my doubts having seen a fully loaded Huey lose drive in the hover. First question is sim modelling accuracy. John Dixon might give his considered opinion.

Helicopter flying is not inherently dangerous, it's only as dangerous as you want to make it. Three decades with an offshore operator and they never had an accident, nor injured anyone.

[Ascend Charlie]

Megan, that sounds REALLY scary and a mite unsurvivable outside the sim. Look at some videos of tail fails in a hover and see how fast those things spin - and very rapidly some nose down pitch comes in, or the aircraft rolls, and the aircraft is no longer level, it is rotating tail low/tail high/tail low and very disorientating. Tail then hits the ground. In the Huey in the 70s, we used to practice slamming the right pedal forward to demo how fast it could spin - the feeling of being thrown forward against the seat belt is strange and upsetting.

In the sim, it would be interesting to see the coupling that happens after a high-powered spinning climb to 1000' and then trying to poke the nose over. Splat follows soon after.

In the 76B sim at WPB, they just taught me to grab the throttles back and make some sort of controlled LEVEL crash.

[John Eacott]

Megan, that sounds REALLY scary and a mite unsurvivable outside the sim. Look at some videos of tail fails in a hover and see how fast those things spin - and very rapidly some nose down pitch comes in, or the aircraft rolls, and the aircraft is no longer level, it is rotating tail low/tail high/tail low and very disorientating. Tail then hits the ground. In the Huey in the 70s, we used to practice slamming the right pedal forward to demo how fast it could spin - the feeling of being thrown forward against the seat belt is strange and upsetting.

In the sim, it would be interesting to see the coupling that happens after a high-powered spinning climb to 1000' and then trying to poke the nose over. Splat follows soon after.

In the 76B sim at WPB, they just taught me to grab the throttles back and make some sort of controlled LEVEL crash.

I can only keep coming back to my own experience: no way on God's earth that I would contemplate retarding overhead speed selects, nor climbing out. If you don't get that collective down in a heartbeat then you're along for the ride.

Previously unpublished images the morning after the night before:

[megan]

AC, was in the 76A at WPB back in the 80's. Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved, as I said the sim would do it, but as I further said, placed absolutely no faith in the procedure. As John says, collective down, no time for procrastination.

[Bell_ringer]

First question is sim modelling accuracy. John Dixon might give his considered opinion.
.

One aspect that would be missing would be the lateral forces experienced in the cockpit from the rotation, that could make control more difficult.

[John Eacott]

One aspect that would be missing would be the lateral forces experienced in the cockpit from the rotation, that could make control more difficult.


Not if you dump the collective and stop the spin before it builds up :ok:

[212man]

AC, was in the 76A at WPB back in the 80's. Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved, as I said the sim would do it, but as I further said, placed absolutely no faith in the procedure. As John says,collective down, no time for procrastination.

I wouldn't place a lot of faith in realism in the S76 sim for these kinds of failures. For a start, it was demonstrated after the 2009 GoM S76 fatal accident that the rotor decay modelling in the simulator was miles out - I think about 7 seconds to unrecoverable Nr if the collective wasn't lowered following dual power loss, vs about 2-3 in reality.

I also used to fly in the FSI B212 sim in DFW, and was on the receiving end of all kinds of strange instructor-derived advice on handling TR failures - based on how the sim was replicating it. To illustrate how fictitious it was, in some extra time at the end of a session, where we were 'playing' on an aircraft carrier model at night, I asked for a TR drive failure soon after transitioning from the deck. I was able to catch it using sideslip, find an airspeed/power combination that allowed me to carry out a wide climbing circuit and then autorotated back down to the deck from around 1,000 ft. Lots of whooping from the back, and congratulations, but all I could think was "are you serious? Do you really think that's how the aircraft would behave in real life?"

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Throttles in the roof - during one sim session in a 76 level D we were taught, if single pilot (we always were), a tail drive failure in the hover could be handled, if power available, by climbing vertically to height (1,000 suggested), nosing over to gain airspeed, accept side slip, and fly to suitable, spot for auto. It worked in the sim, but in real life? Always had my doubts having seen a fully loaded Huey lose drive in the hover. First question is sim modelling accuracy. John Dixon might give his considered opinion.

Helicopter flying is not inherently dangerous, it's only as dangerous as you want to make it. Three decades with an offshore operator and they never had an accident, nor injured anyone.

I was also given that exercise in the D sim. From personal experience of a low level drive failure (Pulling power in the flare to land in a different type) I didn't believe the spin rate. The C++ sim was I believe more realistic in terms of spin rate.

However I got away from a control failure in another different type (355) after a teleflex failure at a similar point. The TR was providing some thrust, the spin was extremely uncomfortable, and used an aggressive nose over at somewhere near 500', I'm not sure, just took what I could see out of the window. The reason for doing it was I was into a crowded, congested area, with clear space in very short supply. The flight to safety was flown at a bank angle higher than I expected, but the run on landing was exactly as the trainers and manuals described.

Someone mentioned earlier the RFM point about controlling pitch and roll on the cyclic as you attempt to put the aircraft down after a drive failure, If the failure occurs in the cruise and you get into auto safely then from sim experience I can believe that, BUT, in the low level drive failure the spin was so violent there was no chance, the yaw/roll couple was bad and I believe that being chucked about in the cockpit I was into PIO due to the lateral G forces, but I'm not sure. Certainly it took a lot of T Cut before the aircraft was flyable again.

After those two experiences I've often considered the positioning of FCL's and engine control swithches, a pair of guarded kill switches on the P1 collective seem to be probably the best option, but in a drive failure in the S76 sim reaching up and cocking the FCL's certainly stops the spin, the aircraft then flopping onto the ground before your hand is back to the collective, the 332 and S61 did something similar, but those sims were early and there were a lot of differences between them and the aircraft.

SND

[gulliBell]

Throttles in the roof - during one sim session in a 76 level D we were taught, if single pilot (we always were), a tail drive failure in the hover could be handled, if power available, by climbing vertically to height (1,000 suggested), nosing over to gain airspeed, accept side slip, and fly to suitable, spot for auto..

No. S76 TR drive failure in hover. Just promptly lower collective, keep it level, no need for any finesse at the bottom and accept the abrupt arrival. If you can get the engine levers OFF before touchdown even better, then you can apply an ounce of finesse with the collective at the bottom. With practice you can catch it before it's done a 180. This works in the sim. In real life you might roll off a MLG tyre. The FSI teaching as mentioned would not yield a successful outcome in a CAE3000 Level D FFS with current modelling (which is much better than the modelling of 20+ years ago).

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I'm intrigued at your rationale to justify such a teaching? There is no way that I'd have held the hover and gently lowered the collective following my loss of tail rotor in a high hover, at night, in my BK117. I'd have been in a world of hurt: instant dumping of the collective and a spread set of crosstubes gave a minimal rotation on the deck.

If I'd made contact with a higher rate of rotation then a roll over would have been almost guaranteed.

Apologies for the thread drift.

Hi John, this techniques is described in out flight manual and the FSTD with OEM Data pack is sympathetic to such handling. I am not suggesting this could work from anything but an IGE hover. The technique reduces the chances of a rollover but needs practice and patience to overcome the Startle reaction. It works when done correctly.

Where my interest lies, is I have not given much consideration to an abrupt loss of anti-torque during the later stages of a VTOL departure. I am keen to learn from others who may have some ideas on the most favourable technique. My feeling is that a rapid throttle chop and attempted AUTO from 120-200 feet and zero IAS may not be the obvious answer.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I can only keep coming back to my own experience: no way on God's earth that I would contemplate retarding overhead speed selects, nor climbing out. If you don't get that collective down in a heartbeat then you're along for the ride:

That's not true in an IGE hover! Dumping the collective will likely result in a roll-over even if the rotation is recognised immediately. And rollovers kill lots of people. Lower the lever slowly, maintain level attitude and cushion the impact.
"Throttles in hand helicopters". The theory of chopping the throttle and pulling the lever to cushion the landing is a really good idea...…..however, with the throttle frictions on and the necessary hand actions required, it adds an unnecessary degree of complexity to a simple procedure. Just don't dump the collective!

For bad TR events OGE like this accident, my ideas are somewhat limited as to the best action to take.

[SASless]

DB....I come from the Throttle Friction bfull on School.

I have no problem winding both of them off....and that is during normal times.....add some Adrenalin and it would get easier yet.

Having been in a Huey that had a tail rotor drive failure.....the rate of acceraltion of the spin is unbelievable.

by the third rotation the world outside becomes a blur.....and with the throttle chop the spin almost stopped by the time we touched the ground.

[ShyTorque]

The problem with trying to maintain a level attitude in a rapidly rotating helicopter for more than a very brief period is (as SND wrote from personal experience) that cyclic inputs may not have the expected effect, even if the pilot was able to overcome the visual confusion caused by the rotation. Think about the trimmed position of the cyclic. The normal reference point for the fixed main rotor swashplate constantly changes once rotation begins. After 90 degrees of fuselage rotation, what was a pitch is now a roll, and vice versa. After 180 degrees of rotation, what was a pitch up is now a pitch down.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

The problem with trying to maintain a level attitude in a rapidly rotating helicopter for more than a very brief period is (as SND wrote from personal experience) that cyclic inputs may not have the expected effect, even if the pilot was able to overcome the visual confusion caused by the rotation. Think about the trimmed position of the cyclic. The normal reference point for the fixed main rotor swashplate constantly changes once rotation begins. After 90 degrees of fuselage rotation, what was a pitch is now a roll, and vice versa. After 180 degrees of rotation, what was a pitch up is now a pitch down.

Shy, I am not suggesting there is anything like an absolute answer. However, I am convinced that exposure to TR Drive failures in the hover, in the FSTD, to overcome the initial "Startle Effect" will significantly improve the chances of success in the real helicopter. Of course all the hooded horsemen of the FSTD apocalypse rise up when we defeat the flight loop in the FSTD. Modelling is problematic as OEM data for these events are generally not available for obvious reasons. However, even if the FSTD modelling is dodgy, teaching a reaction to the event is still important.

In my experience of even the most reluctant learning students in the FSTD, plenty of practice and exposure will produce a favourable reaction from the pilot before the helicopter nose has passed through 90 degrees. And I mean not only during the recurrent training but on a repeat visit 6 months later with little prompting.

Whatever the outcome here, it provides another "hobby Horse" for me try ride in that the current EASA regulations allow us to spread the Emergency Procedures syllabus over a 3 year period. Many operators therefore, only schedule retrain and check TR malfunctions every 36 months. Clearly this sucks a bit. I would like to see regulations make a more discerning requirement to the effect that some emergency procedures should be practised and checked at every OPC. Lord knows we flog the sh*t out of the CAT A OEIs at every OPC, which lets be honest, are probably the easiest exercises we do.

Many TREs I know, despite the syllabus they are given, are doing this already and rightly so.

[gulliBell]

DB....I come from the Throttle Friction bfull on School.


I've seen plenty of 212/412 pilots crank on the throttle friction so tight that you need a pipe wrench to undo them. I don't know why, it's just dumb. No hope of winding both throttles off with one hand if the TR drive fails whilst in hover. Certainly not if the guy in the left seat is the one driving. I'd get the throttles off in a 76 well before said 212/412 driver can wind theirs off.

[jellycopter]

Shy wrote: "The problem with trying to maintain a level attitude in a rapidly rotating helicopter for more than a very brief period is (as SND wrote from personal experience) that cyclic inputs may not have the expected effect, even if the pilot was able to overcome the visual confusion caused by the rotation. "

In my first hand experience of two tail rotor events; one was a fenestron "stall" incident on a Gazelle where we probably span in excess of 15 revolutions before I got the yaw stopped. The other was a slipping tail rotor drive belt on an Exec where the onset of yaw was quite gentle but the rate of yaw built up until the world was a blur.

Is was lucky on both occasion because the wind was calm and had no difficulty keeping either aircraft level. However, had there been much of a breeze, the outcomes of both events would almost certainly have been very different.

JJ

[SASless]

I've seen plenty of 212/412 pilots crank on the throttle friction so tight that you need a pipe wrench to undo them. I don't know why, it's just dumb. No hope of winding both throttles off with one hand if the TR drive fails whilst in hover. Certainly not if the guy in the left seat is the one driving. I'd get the throttles off in a 76 well before said 212/412 driver can wind theirs off.


Let's talk about what is really Dumb.

I've seen plenty of 212/412 pilots crank on the throttle friction so tight that you need a pipe wrench to undo them.

How many times did you actually use a Pipe Wrench to undo the set throttles?

How many times did you have to pull the Tee Handles or use the fuel switches to shut down the aircraft with those Throttles held full open by the Pipe Wrench tight Throttles?


​​​​​​​No hope of winding both throttles off with one hand if the TR drive fails whilst in hover.

How small must one's hands be in order not to get hold of both Throttles?

How many hovering autorotations have you actually done without rolling both Throttles off simultaneously?

How do you execute a Hovering Autorotation in a Bell 212/412?

As to the S-76....explain how you can be quicker in moving the Engine Levers over your head and getting back to the Collective Lever than simply rolling the Collective Throttles on the 212/412 to the Ground Idle position with your hand on the Collective mounted throttles to begin with?

Right now....my opinion is you are talking Dumb...... I am willing to listen to your responses and change my mind.

[tottigol]

Throttles in the roof - during one sim session in a 76 level D we were taught, if single pilot (we always were), a tail drive failure in the hover could be handled, if power available, by climbing vertically to height (1,000 suggested), nosing over to gain airspeed, accept side slip, and fly to suitable, spot for auto. It worked in the sim, but in real life? Always had my doubts having seen a fully loaded Huey lose drive in the hover. First question is sim modelling accuracy. John Dixon might give his considered opinion.
Helicopter flying is not inherently dangerous, it's only as dangerous as you want to make it. Three decades with an offshore operator and they never had an accident, nor injured anyone.

Megan, really? pulling straight up with no anti TQ control? Have you ever stopped to think about that?
Next argument, Chopjock, your statements demonstrates that you have absolutely no idea of what you are talking about when it comes to CatA.
Height Velocity diagram is for basic certification requirements.

[SASless]

Throttles in the roof - during one sim session in a 76 level D we were taught, if single pilot (we always were), a tail drive failure in the hover could be handled, if power available, by climbing vertically to height (1,000 suggested), nosing over to gain airspeed, accept side slip, and fly to suitable, spot for auto


Folks....please do not try this at Home!

Care to tell us where you were taught that?

Had they ever tried to replicate that in an actual aircraft?

My experience in teaching at two different Sim Training facilities located at different manufacturers delivery locations would challenge both the technique being taught and the basis upon which it would even be discussed as the training is supposed to be based upon the RFM, the applicable Operators SOP's etc, and National Aviation Regulations (FAA, CAA, EASA, etc).

Show me anywhere that suggested technique fits under any of the above?

[ShyTorque]

DB,
Shy, I am not suggesting there is anything like an absolute answer. However, I am convinced that exposure to TR Drive failures in the hover, in the FSTD, to overcome the initial "Startle Effect" will significantly improve the chances of success in the real helicopter. Of course all the hooded horsemen of the FSTD apocalypse rise up when we defeat the flight loop in the FSTD. Modelling is problematic as OEM data for these events are generally not available for obvious reasons. However, even if the FSTD modelling is dodgy, teaching a reaction to the event is still important.

I didn't mean to imply anything else - I don't think there is an absolute answer to this type of failure because of differences in aircraft design and how, when and where the failure occurs.

In the case of an IGE hover, in a helicopter where there is no immediate way of "rolling off" the "throttles", I think I'd lower the lever asap, as you say, and accept the yaw rate at touchdown. If I had a second crew member who could either retard the ECLs or switch the engines from flight to "Off" it would be a bonus, but he'd have to be very quick!

Edit: Just checked my S-76 RFM (more than a bit dusty now - I've not flown the type for well over ten years). The advice therein is to lower the collective then select both engine levers to OFF at about ten feet and use the collective to cushion the touchdown. You need two left arms to do that, or be lightning fast if you're at a ten foot hover!

Obviously, as an ex-sim instructor I totally agree with the rest of your post. Any sim training is of benefit but it was sadly neglected in the past by the UK military and elsewhere.
As I've posted on the forum before, I know of at least one RAF helicopter crew who said that without the sim training they had received, they probably wouldn't have survived 'their' tail rotor malfunction (albeit in this instance a loss of tail rotor control, rather than a total loss of drive). They ended up in the North Sea and the aircraft was recovered almost intact despite it not having floats fitted - although I'm led to understand that it suffered fire damage after recovery and never re-entered service!.

[Thomas coupling]

The beauty of teaching in the sim is that one meets all walks of life. [And the experiences they recall].
I have briefed (or should I say been briefed by) several crews over my years who have experienced TRF in the hover and/or in the cruise.
The hover left the 2 crews I dealt with - with a very easy dilemma: dump the lever and accept ones fate and trash the cab (which in their cases was that the crews survived) or pull for height - prolong the agony and die a violent death.
The cruise is more easily survivable because of the torque setting at which it happens - giving time to discuss matters.
ANY TRF at a high torque setting will lead to rotational disorientation either immediately or when the power is reduced. This causes complete loss of SA leading to loss of control of the aircraft invariably. Not to mention gravitational effects preventing the pilot [not handling] from reaching the throttles in one case!

[SASless]

Delaying landing the aircraft without removing engine power during a tail rotor failure at a hover is exactly the wrong thing to do....in my sometimes less than humble opinion.

I fall back on adage of "Ass, Tin, Ticket!".

The helicopter is a reusable shipping container designed to protect its contents....and can be used for that purpose when needed.

The Boss Fellah can buy another Helicopter.

The Authority can only take your License.

Do what serves your best interest in minimizing injury or death for you, your crew, and your passengers and don't worry about the rest.


An example....had the crew landed immediately upon realizing they had lost tail rotor control and got the Throttles moved back to ground idle or shutoff....they might have avoided going swimming.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCsTheqvF7o

If you get hit with a commercial....my apologies but this is the run-up to our Midterm Elections!

[megan]

Care to tell us where you were taught that?Post #66 SAS. To repeat I said, "was in the 76A at WPB back in the 80's. Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved, as I said the sim would do it, but as I further said, placed absolutely no faith in the procedure. As John says,collective down, no time for procrastination"Megan, really? pulling straight up with no anti TQ control? Have you ever stopped to think about that?tottigol, If you read my post #66, repeated in the para above, you will see that, yes I gave it very serious thought, and came to a conclusion. I've highlighted the relevant part so that it doesn't escape your notice.

[SASless]

I taught at that location very early in the Program.....I do not recall that being part of the approved curriculum.

[megan]

As I said SAS, "Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved". Instructor was not you BTW, though can't recall who it was, had a number over the years. :ok:

[Sir Niall Dementia]

As I said SAS, "Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved". Instructor was not you BTW, though can't recall who it was, had a number over the years. :ok:

Megan;

you weren’t the only person shown that. I was on D transition 5 years ago. I never believed in it especially as the RFM said “at 10 feet retard both FCL’s” or very similar words.

Certainly the hover failure, if you pulled both FCL’s single pilot stopped the spin and the aircraft sank to the deck.

SND

[RVDT]

Another thing to consider is your subsequent NR relative to the cab versus terra firma.

Having a TR lets you "wind your way into the sky" - lack of a TR unwinds it relative to terra firma but not the cab.

A rotation of 1.5 turns per second = 90 RPM which in the recent AW169 incident would equal 26-27% of your NR!

Your face mashed into the panel or the windscreen may be the least of your problems by then!

It is most important to not let the rotation develop. This enhances self-preservation!

I have experienced TR drive failure simulation (level D manufacturer owned with manufacturers data but appreciating the caveats.)

OGE Hover 2000'.

Aircraft with collective mounted throttles and a very large fin (EC135) - no briefing or forewarning and average ability on my part - recovered it but saw ~ 200' on the RAD ALT.

Most of todays machinery with skinny little pylons to enhance TR performance - good luck getting it straightened out with forward speed. You will need a lot of room on your side.

IGE - chop the throttles (if you can) and hold it off as long as possible. If you cant chop the throttles just plant it. To quote Sasless - ATT!

[Thomas coupling]

SASless - I take issue with your comments associated with the Canadian frigate crash.
Taking into account the "WTF" factor for pilots, this could add up to 3 seconds ish of delay. For a TR failure this could equate to 2 x complete revolutions of the aiframe before the crew accepted the cause.
1. The G forces are enormous - the NH pilot may not be able to get to the throttles.
2. Taking this particular incident into account. Even assuming the the throttles were chopped almost immediately - this would result in the CH124 sinking and colliding head first with the back of the ships superstructure, probably causing even more of a mess and definitely missing the deck!

Sometimes (naturally or otherwise) it works out best if the pilot(s) don't have time to react properly....

[SASless]

TC,

This is what I posted:

An example....had the crew landed immediately upon realizing they had lost tail rotor control and got the Throttles moved back to ground idle or shutoff....they might have avoided going swimming.

When you are that close to landing on a Deck (elevated helipad, roof top helipad....or anywhere for that matter) and you are unable to stop a yaw to the right (American design)....how long does it take to know you have a problem....45 degrees of yaw....90 degrees....180 degrees....360 degrees 720 degrees?

Yes there is a delay before you realize you have a problem.....yes....there is a delay while you process that recently learned knowledge.....then you have to formulate your plan....execute your plan....and then see if your plan is working.

My point in presenting the video was to demonstrate how quickly the situation gets out of hand.....if retarding the Engine Levers is delayed.....FOR WHATEVER REASON!

Boy Scout Motto is "Always Prepared!".....that works for Helicopter flying too.

From personal experience....when my left foot touched the chin bubble and the aircraft was still turning right.....even my slow thinking Red Neck Brain grasped there was a problem....instantly!

That same slow thinking brain worked better if it was like the old fashioned water well pump....the kind that had to be "primed".

That is where training and SOP's (Cockpit Procedures) come into play.

I do firmly believe....had the Handling Pilot firmly bottomed the Collective before the aircraft or as the aircraft rotated past the starboard side of the ship....they might possibly have stayed on the deck and had a better outcome.

(As we do not know for real at what point the ECL's were retarded....we can only guess they were still powered when the aircraft rolled over onto its side and spinning like a Top.)

As it was....they had one heck of story to tell in the Bar later....all survived and only one crew member was injured with a broken arm.

The teaching point is simple....at or near a hover and you lose Tail Rotor Drive/Thrust....holdiing the Collective up is not going to end well.....but landing the helicopter and getting the power off as quickly as possible is the far better course of action.

In the specific case of Helicopters with Collective mounted throttles....I would reverse that order.....meaning roll off the Throttle(s) then carry out an EOL.

[Thomas coupling]

Better still - if this "north American" approach had been replaced by the european one (where we bring the cab to the hover alongside the ship FIRST and then transition sideways, the whole episode would have been better resolved for all concerned, as the TR failure in the approach or hover would have resulted in contact with the ocean - relatively safely and as importantly, the subsequent crash would NOT have impacted the damn ship causing untold damage to its superstructure.
What "eejit" designed an approach to land on a ship - directly from behind, with thousands of tonnes of steel blocking any possible escape route?????
IF someone had died either from the impact with the deck or falling off it, the chances of this being avoided would have been greatly enhanced by hovering alongside first before deciding all was well and then transitioning sideways.
Concur with teaching point - a TR failure in the hover is best dealt with by selecting down motion on the collective, taking power off and forcing a positive landing.

[SASless]

TC,

Perhaps your allergy to Spam is causing you some indigestion.

Even using your method....the aircraft has to approach the ship in order to land aboard.

When the Tail Rotor decides to go is not up to any procedure used and if it goes as you are crossing onto the deck or over the deck....as small as most Frigate Decks are....you are in a very bad position to land aboard or not roll off the deck into the Sea.

Ship Decks are just unstable pinnacles in reality....aren't they?

Do your Navy Pilots hover alongside the mountain top then transition sideways to land?

[Lonewolf_50]

TC, the audio in that film clip indicates USS Cushing, which was a LAMPS MK III capable ship in 2002 when that accident happened.
(I am pretty sure my log book indicates a few landings on that ship when it was in the PAC fleet ... but it's been a while).

The up the backside approach was designed in the early 1980's for the RAST/BEARTRAP crapola that the USN decided was needed for recovery on rough seas.
I preferred the 30 degree offset approach from LAMPS MK I, but that's no matter.
Good friend of mine was in a hover, about to put a LAMPS MK III (SH-60B) onto a ship via that silly RAST thing when his TR let go. At night.
He just got away from the ship, then chopped throttles (CP did that) and spalshed it in wet. All over very quickly. All swam out. HEEDS was helpful to all.

The approach wasn't the problem in this case. it appears to me that the approach had stopped/paused over the NATO SeaSparrow/SeaChicken launcher aft of the flight deck. The usual method was to keep the relative motion > 0 until over the spot, however, carrier folks weren't as used to those approaches as LAMPS folks.

The H-3 in that video is in dirty air coming into the spot, and IMO not being a LAMPS guy was coming in at too low of an angle, technique wise, in terms of angle measured from the vertical. (My perception of that might be due to the video angle of the camera, so I may not be right about that).
Typical Carrier based habit for an on board ship landing.

Beyond that, SASless is right, even if he is an Army guy.
If the tail lets go there, it's a worst case scenario; you ain't flying that one away, dump the collective and stay dry.
Uncle will get a new bird.

Back in the day, our 30 degree offset kept you clear of the ship until over the deck, but that's an ax to grind that does nobody any good, since RAST was this magical fkucing thing ... never mind me, just a curmudgeon here, grumbling into his beer.

As to your "European Approach" crap, bollocks to it being "better." Did it a few times in a NATO ex due to STANAGS and HOSTAC rules.
Going into a HOGE hover next to the ship and sliding actually increases some risks, although if the tail lets go before the slide, cut gun into the water and Robert's your mother's brother. Yeah.

If it lets go as you slide over the deck you get into the same pickle that Sea King guy did. Momentum is a thing.

[Thomas coupling]

SAS - I am/was a navy pilot for decades. Lonewolf I operated off Canadian frigates for 3 years during my exchange tour and used the beartrap hundreds of timesd. What a fantastic piece of kit (by the way the Brits invented it but never used it).
Bringing a cab alongside first kills several birds with one stone:
1. NO dirty air to worry about.
2. A permanent escape route dead ahead and to the offside.
3. At night, the PH has continuous visiuals with deck lighting throughout the landing procedure. Approaching from over the stern can and does (because I did many cross deck ops with the yanks) cause visuals to "disappear" as the ship pitches out of limits.
For example: Pitch limits for a frigate at night, for a FREE landing: +/- 1-3 degrees. Roll limits: 5-10 degrees. Haul down: Pitch: up to 10 degrees. Roll: 25 degrees. These limits are impossible to sustain if one approaches over the stern. Alongside - you can simply wait forever until the ship enters 'quiessence' and then you can land. This is impossible coming in over the back.
4.. Pilot can trim, relax and get ready for the final landing assessing everything in relative calm before relying on 100% looking out.
5.. Any T's and P's issues can be identified and resolved before "committing".

In this particular incident described here - the TR let loose just as he cleared the edge of the aft portion of the deck. Failure occuring 1 second earlier would have driven the cab right into the back of the frigate making matters MUCH worse for all concerned including the ship. Hovering alongside at a high power setting might actually trigger the TR failure resulting in a downward trajectory into the ogging WITHOUT hitting the ship. Once committed to moving sideways over the deck however - of course the scenario would be the same as the one described here but the amount of time spent over the ship during this manouevre would have been reduced to a minimum, so too - harm to the crew.
It's a no brainer - hovering alongside is by a long chalk the safest option. [Which is why the vast majority of other country's naval ops deploy it.]

Another reason why an approach from the astern or "30 degrees" is ridiculous:
This would never have happened if one approached to the hover alongside |FIRST!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DDDpI263qE

[MightyGem]

TC, I always wondered why you did it that way.

[SASless]

TC,

The 46 crash was not a standard ship landing.....it was a Counter Terrorist Assault Landing gone awfully wrong.

Seven people died in the crash.

It was clearly a pilot error accident.

The Pilot under shot the deck, stuck one rear landing gear through the wire netting and experienced dynamic roll over.

[Thomas coupling]

We all know the story behind this vintage piece SAS. The cause of the crash was power settling by the way.
Dynamic rollover eh? WTF will you think of next?
The rigging and wheel tangling was a by product.
i say again: This could NOT have happened if he'd shot an approach to the hover alongside.
7 people would be alive today if this jerk hadnt shot a zero/zero.

[SASless]

TC.....let's take it very slowly so you might grasp what is being said.

It was not a standard deck landing.

The aircraft landed short of the deck.

The landing gear got hung up in the deck edge skirting preventing the aircraft from maintaining controlled flight.

With the landing gear tangled as it was.....the aircraft rolled over on its side as it departed the deck.

Alongside per UK method or a Standard USN approach would not have allowed this to happen.

Crapsakes....you have a video to watch to see what happened AND you are the one that posted it.

Watch it again......carefully......perhaps you can accept that it was not a standard approach in any regard.

You do see the two SEAL Assault Craft following the Helicopter to the Ship...right?

That give you a clue as to what was going on in that evolution?

It was a fast aggressive approach and attempted landing that went all wrong.

It has nothing to do with "Standard" in the manner you wish to apply that concept.

When you do a Direct Action Assault....pull up alongside the Target and wait for the ship to enter whatever the hell you called it.....when assaulting a vessel with armed terrorists aboard and see how long you last.

Why can you not just accept the RN does it one way and the USN. uses a different method.

I submit they each have reasons for doing what they do that are valid to each.

Of course you will not want to argue who does more of these things.....considering the size of the two fleets and its associated helicopter force.

[Thomas coupling]

SAS the pilot was a grunt, probably never seen a ship before.
His "brain" thought: I'll do a zero/zero approach offering minimum exposure time on finals, except, ships MOVE and they move when least expected, so an attempt to land on a hard surface, when that hard surface has just moved down or up 6 feet in a matter of seconds before landing, suggests this is NOT, repeat NOT the way to land on a ship. But when grunts drive, others dive.
Secondly: AFTER, repeat AFTER the helo hit the deck (not before) having made a (shall we say) positive landing, only then did the helo find itself short and the rear gear tangled in the rigging. The pilots then action was to lift away from the short landing by applying collective and voila - the helo pivoted about the gear tipping the cab over.
Make no mistake SAS, this was an approach which led to him approaching too qiuckly for the circumstances and finding at the end of the approach that he didn't have the power to cancel the fwd momentum of the helo (Ergo: Power settling). This is the ONLY reason he collided with the superstructure. Post collision - he tried to reverse away and got snared up.
PS: i love the dynamic rollover idea though - that's a cracker! Were you a grunt too, I guess?

[MightyGem]

SAS the pilot was a grunt, probably never seen a ship before.
Hmm..TC. I thought that CH46s were flown by Marines. Probably seen a few ships, I would think.

[nigelh]

TC ...I think you will find that if a wheel hooks up , just the same as a skid catching something ....you will revolve over that point and that is called dynamic roll over .
Ps . So based on that video he was a grunt . ..... I would love to see what a **** you will look when we discover the pilot had 10x the number of deck landings than you have !!!!!!!!!

[SASless]

TC.....time for you to quit digging that foxhole you are in!

Please do explain how you reckon the Pilot was a “Grunt”.

I’m beginning to think you need a guide book to tell the difference between that thing you have hidden your head in.....and a foxhole!

You do understand the Navy AND the Marines operate helicopters from ships routinely with Marine Aviators in the Cockpits and have done so from the late 1940’s?

Or is this news to you?

Also...it was a USMC 46...the sea was calm....and the wind was light..

Now as to the “Grunt”. .....run that by us again please.

http://www.check-six.com/Crash_Sites/SeaKnight-USMC-1999.htm

[megan]

Now as to the “Grunt”. .....run that by us again pleaseTC obviously didn't have his glasses on, so had trouble reading the video title "Navy CH-46 Helicopter....."

Wonder what TC would have made of some of my approaches when doing ship borne survey work. Fierce wind, big seas, get the ship to run downwind to cancel deck motion (very shallow draught), hover up alongside the deck, pick the moment, slide across and put it down facing the stern and into wind.

The ship.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x826/m_cd00964cb7f1fcab1d7fc038c84775c3db83bae5.jpg

[Thomas coupling]

Megan.
downwind landings on frigates within SHOL were common place when the ship was either vertrep or refuelling.
Bring cab to the hover into wind facing the oncoming frigate(s), trim flight for rearwards motion until in formation and abeam the deck.
Land on facing aft with chin bubble off the stern deck edge.
All in a days' work for some.
However if you're looking for sheer "balls" look no further than this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p1xx0ysfeM&feature=youtu.be

Now this is 'seat of the pants' flying and some.
Now try the same at night.
No SAR cover.
No NVD.
Real flying by the best aviators in the world.......RCN.