Americas 1950 Nuclear target list released

[NutLoose]

Details here..


Strategic Air Command Declassifies Nuclear Target List from 1950s (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-War-Nuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/)

[Two's in]

Solihull strangely absent...

[racedo]

Solihull strangely absent...

Don't worry I reckon Chelmsley Wood South would have been looked after :E

[Wander00]

Slough????

[glad rag]

Right so you drop Hydrogen bombs around the cities on airfields etc then go back and bomb the urban targets with Atomic bombs..like there's going to be anything left of the civilian infrastructure after the multimegatonage dropped around it.

With friends like that who needs enemies said the West Berliners...etc..

[Courtney Mil]

H Bombs and Atomic Bombs. That terminology rather dates the "document". Not too may surprises in the 1959 target list. Let's hope we never see the 1989 target list in our lifetimes.

[rjtjrt]

Presumably you would send more than one weapon to each target to ensure it was engaged.

[ShotOne]

It's interesting that it expressly differentiates between mass civilian casualties as a consequence of attacks on a military target, as opposed to targeting them. But later in the document "population" is listed expressly as one of the targeting categories.

[wanabee777]

"There are no innocent civilians. It is their government and you are fighting a people, you are not trying to fight an armed force anymore. So it doesn't bother me so much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders."

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Curtis_LeMay_%28USAF%29.jpg/330px-Curtis_LeMay_%28USAF%29.jpg

[Capt H Peacock]

There are more informative analyses of the SIOP and its evolution available.

There are quite a few on my side of the pond who never had much sympathy with the UK's alliance with Uncle Sam, and frankly would have felt much more comfortable being part of the USSR. (Many over here still do) It's unsurprising therefore that much of NATO strategic policy was developed firmly within the US administration, and that the UK was a necessary, useful, but ultimately risky place to put the confidence of SAC strategists during the formulation of 'the plan'.

Nevertheless, the SIOP's inception represented the most complex, detailed, and in-depth target survey ever accomplished. The characterisation of SAC and the US by many commentators in Europe as swivel-eyed war mongers belies the lengths to which the USA went to ensure that - if asked - SAC would systematically, clinically, and efficiently dismantle the enemy's ability to fight by taking away their miltary-industrial complex brick by brick.

Each target was categorised by its vulnerabilty, hardness, sensitivity to attack via overpressure or radiological effect, post attack effect and likely casualty consequences. This would have given the NMCA a number of Major Attack Options which could be executed if the prerequisites had been achieved.

The scenarios and attack profiles are massively complex, and required a level of coordination and control hitherto unseen in the execution of warfare. The UK's participation in that plan was necessary because of that complexity, the number of individual targets to be engaged, and the ability of the V force to reach its target within 2 hrs of T zero. It is because of the credibility of SIOP that the Soviet Union was given pause for thought.

Remember that in the days leading up to Cuba in 1962, Kruschev believed that Kennedy was an idiot, and that the might of Soviet IRBMs would soon bring the Americans to heel.

It wasn't Kruschev's realisation, but that of the Generals and Admirals around him, who knew the multipronged retaliation that would surely follow any precipitant action, that FORCED Kruschev into the withdrawal that saved the World.

The newborn Trotskiites and looney lefties in the UK should be grateful that the people who were called upon to stand eye to eye with the Soviets had done their homework. Every I dotted, every T crossed.

Merry Christmas - be grateful we have one.

[Chugalug2]

gladrag:-
With friends like that who needs enemies said the West Berliners...etc.. The West Berlin authorities were in no doubt about the perilous fate of their population should cold war look as if it were likely to become hot. Little that could be done other than to evacuate as many as could be moved in whatever time was left, if the political outlook was going pear-shaped.

To that end the then new airport terminal at Tegel was designed for the rapid check-in and boarding of pax from a central circular access road, through a dedicated check-in, boarding gate, and jet-way to the aircraft. An identical terminal alongside would have doubled that capacity, but in the event was never built. No doubt road and rail links through East Germany would suddenly have been unavailable, and certainly the safety of Allied aircraft in the three corridors was never guaranteed by the Soviet Government, witness words to that effect stamped in Cyrillic script on each and every Air Safety Centre notification to them of an Allied air movement.

Entirely possible of course that the first hint of things going hot would have been the Red Army tanks pouring through Check Point Charley, in which case ignore all of the above...

[Arclite01]

A thought

If we had the A bomb would we have used it against Germany in 1945 ??

Arc

[Jimlad1]

Yes - the original project was intended for use against Germany. Their surrender saw the plans change to focus on Japan.

[Pontius Navigator]

And if Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo and Nun May hadn't given the atom secrets to the Soviets, what might have happened?

Certainly in 1947 the need for a pre-emptive strike by B29s in 1957 was considered.

[ShotOne]

It wasnt just considered in1947; none other that Winston Churchill lobbied forcefully for one to be carried out, on the grounds that the alternate might have been to fight a nuclear war on equal terms a few years later.

It's hard to see how the, no doubt meticulous, work of the target planners can be specifically credited with the success of deterrence, Capt Peacock, by loonie lefties...or loonie neo-cons, come to that. Their work was top secret -until now, in fact. Both sides working on the assumption that the enemy would do their worst.

[Pontius Navigator]

Shot, deterrence was based on the known unknown. They knew but they knew not the detail. You could have argued that the depth of analysis was unnecessary.

In addition to the general detail of the targets they also created TARPA centered on each DGZ within each target area. This was latter amended when they realised that production of an analysis centered on ever target was too much and changed to ARPA*. This consisted of detailed base map and a series of overlays and associated data books. These contained detail of target structure and height. Using this it was possible to calculate the decibel level of its radar return compared to the background. A calm lake or river would be zero. A 3-4 story structure of steel or concrete may be 45 db, a perfect reflector contrast and ideal for direct radar attack or as an offset.

*TARGET AREA RADAR PREDICTION ANALYSIS

[Backinblack]

Why in this list are none Siberian city? Much Soviet industry was there.

[Pontius Navigator]

Maybe lack of deep reconnaissance?

[Kubarque]

This list was tabulated in mid-1956. There was little or no solid data on targets east of the Urals. The best source at that time was Luftwaffe recon film from WWII. The U-2 began over flying the USSR in July 1956 and began to fill in some of the blanks. The actual target list for 1959 probably would have reflected the U-2 acquisitions.

[Pontius Navigator]

Kub, I can back that up. Our target photos were very clear but some bits were clearly hand drawn. I asked the target librarian and he said they were German recce photos updated. He didn't' say what sort but it could have been low grade recce or attache reports etc