Andy Hill interviewed [Archive]

Just This Once...

21st Dec 2015, 13:14

You could take the view that Martin Baker ceasing all support for the seats in Feb 2015 effectively grounded a brace of different aircraft types from civilian operation well ahead of the accident.

There are raft of engineering and airworthiness issues in that bulletin and is reminiscent of the SA Lightning crash with a bit of H-C thrown in for good measure.

The CAA looks like it was totally asleep at the wheel. As to how it had been satisfied over the airworthiness, maintenance and safety of a type with no OEM support for the aircraft, its escape systems or even a process to ensure the technical documents were up to date just beggars belief.

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

21st Dec 2015, 13:24

While I can see that the presence of live seat components in the wreckage certainly posed a hazard to the first responders, I can't really see why the report is fixating on the serviceability of the seat in the aircraft. It seems to me that the ability or not of the pilot to have exited the aircraft prior to the accident is of minor concern, when we are looking at the type of accident, and the casualties caused on the ground. Does the pilot escaping make something like this any less of a tragedy? Perhaps they are concerned that they would have no one to interview.

tucumseh

21st Dec 2015, 13:33

Agree with A&C. If he was on meds, an interview isn't worth the paper it's written on. I suspect the police did the right thing waiting.

The CAA looks like it was totally asleep at the wheel. As to how it had been satisfied over the airworthiness, maintenance and safety of a type with no OEM support for the aircraft, its escape systems or even a process to ensure the technical documents were up to date just beggars belief.

You've just described formal MoD policy for most of the last 30 years! Hawk XX177? No SC for seat.

Merry Xmas.

GeeRam

21st Dec 2015, 14:01

You could take the view that Martin Baker ceasing all support for the seats in Feb 2015 effectively grounded a brace of different aircraft types from civilian operation well ahead of the accident.

It was this reason that the RAAF grounded it's airworthy Sabre early in the year.....
Temora cited they had enough stock of MB seat equipment for 'Winston' for another season or two of flying, but hinted that too could be grounded after that unless an approved suitable alternative could be found in light of MB's decision.

Above The Clouds

21st Dec 2015, 14:30

Courtney Mil
Latest AAIB Report here.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-offic...015_G-BXFI.pdf

I dread to think, but this is starting to look like a mirror image of the "Thunder City" accident.

There are going to be a lot of people including those in the CAA who will be doing some deep soul searching.

Two's in

21st Dec 2015, 14:56

I can't really see why the report is fixating on the serviceability of the seat in the aircraft.

Any type of BOI invariably looks at the organization and culture surrounding the accident. In an aircraft accident, the regulation and supporting documentary evidence are key pieces of the puzzle. What the CAA are saying here is that enthusiasm and good intentions are no substitute for regulation and control. What the CAA have unwittingly revealed, and as Tucumseh and JTO mention, is that for these omissions and oversights to have been quite as systematic across vintage FJ operations as they appear to be, nobody at the CAA was paying attention until 2 tragic accidents occurred in a short space of time.

Al-bert

21st Dec 2015, 15:13

There are going to be a lot of people including those in the CAA who will be doing some deep sole searching.

sole searching - isn't that a job for a trawler or chiropodist? :sad:

PhilipG

21st Dec 2015, 15:21

Roughly how many ex military swept wing jet aircraft with ejector seats is the CAA granting Permits to Fly to?

I wonder what the decision by MB to stop supplying technical support and replacement parts to aircraft that no longer operate in a military role will have to those ex military jets flying in the USA?

In a way XH558's retirement due to other regulatory issues could also have been brought about by the MB decision, although it would have been an interesting argument, with only half the crew having ejection seats.

Sad day for jet displays I think.

RAFEngO74to09

21st Dec 2015, 16:10

PhilipG,

Many of the ex-military aircraft flying in the USA are registered in the Experimental category and are not required to operate with functioning ejection seats, although some may be eligible to do so and the requirements are stated here:

Experimental Airworthiness Certificates (http://www.faa-aircraft-certification.com/experimental-airworthiness-certificates.html)

Examples of Experimental registration:

Draken: Platinum Fighter Sales | Warbird and Classic Aircraft For Sale (http://www.platinumfighters.com/#!draken/c1v8j)

Mig 29: Mig 29UB / Fulcrum B by Raptor Aviation, Inc. (http://www.raptoraviation.com/aircraft%20spec%20pages/Mig29.html)

For those that are interested, the FAA pilot qualification requirements are here:

http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/8900.1/v05%20airman%20cert/chapter%2009/05_009_002rev1.htm

NutLoose

21st Dec 2015, 16:20

It looks like a lot of smoke and mirrors and actually appears to have not a lot to do with the accident itself, simply the maintenance recording and operation, and that follows the general wording of the original fleet grounding in that it inferred more a maintenance grounding than an aircraft failure.

The maintenance organisation informed the AAIB that it considered the decision to extend the cartridge lives was taken within the privileges of its maintenance approvals and therefore it did not consider it necessary to seek formal approval from the CAA to extend the cartridge lives. The CAA stated that any extension of ejection seat cartridge lives would require written approval, and would be based on a technical justi cation and proof that new cartridges had been ordered.

And that appears to be a failing of the CAA in putting in place clear and unambiguous instructions, it does not surprise me as the CAA are a shadow of their former selves in that they have few qualified experienced aircraft engineers amongst their core staff.
They bleat on about how one must follow the maintenance programmes for the type, yet in another breath tell me I can ignore sections of the manufacturers maintenance manual, dangerous ground because once you take that stance it is open to interpretation by individual companies as to what they comp,y with and what they don't!.

Jayand

21st Dec 2015, 16:39

Whilst NOT pre-judging the enquiry, police findings or any potential criminal proceedings has there been any incidents in the past where surviving crew have been prosecuted for negligent,careless flying etc?

PhilipG

21st Dec 2015, 16:40

Thanks RAFEng,

I had a quick trawl through the CAA website's G-INFO database and it looks to my untrained eyes that there are only about 20 ex military swept wing jets with ejector seats, 15 Hunters already grounded and 6 Gnats, not all of which are flying.

If my numbers are correct, it does seem surprising that the CAA did not have a better handle on what I understand are the most complex aircraft that they issue Permits to Fly to.

NutLoose

21st Dec 2015, 17:08

I wonder if they are all grounded, are any still operated on behalf of the Navy?

vintage ATCO

21st Dec 2015, 17:44

Civil Hunters are grounded, those military ones operated by Hawker Hunter Aviation based at Scampton, are still operating.

Hawker Hunter Aviation | (http://hunterteam.com)

MPN11

21st Dec 2015, 19:12

As a complete outsider ... that interim AAIB report seems to focus totally on the ejection seat aspects, which might have saved the pilot the severe injuries he encountered [yet miraculously survived] but does nothing to progress the investigation into the deaths on the ground. An empty Hunter would, presumably, have had the same or similar effect.

As to "swept wing" flying, does one assume that a civil JP or whatever poses no similar risk when being displayed? I am more confused than usual.

As others have noted, the CAA seems to have been sleeping peacefully.

LOMCEVAK

21st Dec 2015, 20:14

MPN11,

If aspects related to safety have been uncovered and affect other aircraft types that are currently flying, there is a duty to highlight them as soon as possible whether or not they are causal to the accident under investigation.

There are two separate aspects to consider when looking across different types such as Hunter and JP. The first relates to flying with live or inhibited ejection seats and that is a function of glide approach speed and whether or not it is feasible to forced land off airfield as per a light piston. The second relates to the complexity of a historic type and the robustness of the maintenance manuals.

Rgds

L

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

21st Dec 2015, 21:56

I missed this bit when reading the linked report. Explains why it focuses on areas seemingly extraneous to this particular accident. It is as LOMCEVAK says:

This Special Bulletin is published to highlight findings of the AAIB investigation regarding
ejection seat safety and the maintenance of ex-military jet aircraft, and to assist the Civil
Aviation Authority in its ‘Review of UK Civil Air Displays’ announced on 9 September 2015.
A final report will be published in due course.

As such, it is pretty much irrelevant and sheds no more light on what happened this time.

APG63

21st Dec 2015, 21:59

MPN11,

There is no sinister significance to the fact that this bulletin majors on the escape system. It is simply that the part of the investigation dealing with that equipment has reached a point where conclusions can be drawn and recommendations made. The AAIB does not casually sit on one set of findings just because other areas have not reached that stage. So it is normal to release bulletin at various stages of the investigation. This area was more straightforward than some and is, in some respects more pressing than certain others in that it deals with an area which could have repercussions in current flying activity - groundings notwithstanding.

All of that does not mean that ALL other aspects of the investigation are not progressing. As for your statement,

does nothing to progress the investigation into the deaths on the ground

you are way off the mark and, frankly, out of order. The work must continue in all areas. How would you know that a problem with the escape system hadn't been a contributory factor to the accident until that area had been fully investigated? There are other areas which are currently being worked that may equally disappoint you, or maybe they will prove to be cosequential. We won't know until the work on them is complete.

You seem to think that there is some magic thread in the investigation that could be followed to give you the answers to the questions that you think are most pressing. There is very seldom such a path and you can probably safely think that the bit you're clearly particularly interested in will come at or very near the end. Apart from anything else, the title of this thread and the date it was started may give you a clue as to why your questions cannot yet be answered.

Traffic_is_er_Was,

It is not irrelevant to the investigation as a whole. As I said to MPN, until this part was completed it was unknown if it was a factor. The same will go for the next couple of areas.

MPN11

22nd Dec 2015, 09:53

Thanks for those responses, gentlemen. I am enlightened.

GeeRam

22nd Dec 2015, 11:00

Thanks RAFEng,

I had a quick trawl through the CAA website's G-INFO database and it looks to my untrained eyes that there are only about 20 ex military swept wing jets with ejector seats, 15 Hunters already grounded and 6 Gnats, not all of which are flying.

The Gnats don't have MB seats, so are not affected by the MB decision specifically.....but I would imagine the Sea Vixen, G-CVIX would be, which you didn't include.

FAStoat

22nd Dec 2015, 11:01

I seem to remember some time ago Boz Robinson put a civilianised Gnat down in a field with minor injuries,or was it a different incident involving Boz and a Gnat??

treadigraph

22nd Dec 2015, 12:09

FAStoat: Gnat at North Weald (https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422fe82e5274a131400094f/Folland_Gnat_T_Mk_1__G-BVPP_8-05.pdf).

kaitakbowler

22nd Dec 2015, 15:38

XR721 Jan. 1966. Fatal outcome thanks to the tree(s), but a landing that was said to be impossible.

ISTR the canopy was prevented from jettisoning by a bolt fitted incorrectly.

PM

bvcu

22nd Dec 2015, 16:35

My impression of this bulletin is the basic question of was it 'airworthy' at the time of the accident. This appears to suggest it wasn't as per seat and engine issues. These had been apparent for some time according to the info but the CAA continued to take the money and issue a permit to fly . My impression is this is pointing the finger at the CAA for these issues , not the operator. The ejection seat issue is a bad one in that the CAA has never got to grips with what is a specialised trade in the services so it isn't properly covered in the engineer licencing system , treating it the same as the tiny cartridges fitted in a fire bottle or overwing slide system on an airliner. Don't think this is unique as i have a friend who set up a business doing this in NZ and is travelling worldwide to carry out work as a result of his air force qualifications. Think the lawyers will be rubbing their hands as even though probably no effect on the accident the airworthiness issue is a very basic one.

Courtney Mil

22nd Dec 2015, 17:15

Think the lawyers will be rubbing their hands

Oh, here we go again! Why should they be? Unless this is later found to have a bearing on the accident, all this does is to highlight shortcomings in a civil aviation niche, which will now be sorted - one way or another.

No need to be too gleeful about potential prosecutions. AAIB does not apportion blame.

Mandator

22nd Dec 2015, 17:22

The CAA made it clear in its press release yesterday that from an engine perspective the aircraft was airworthy:

"We have received the AAIB's latest special bulletin from its ongoing investigation into the Shoreham Air Show accident and will study it in detail. We will continue to fully co-operate with the AAIB investigation and provide expertise and advice.

The AAIB Special Bulletin does not contain any information regarding the cause of the Shoreham Air Display accident.

The CAA is continuing its own review of Air Show safety which is due to be published early in the New Year and our thoughts remain with all those affected by this tragic accident.

In relation to the validity of the alternative means of compliance (AMOC) for ongoing maintenance of the aircraft, we have already informed the AAIB that this was in place and was valid at the time of the accident.

Work under the alternative means of compliance was carried out in January 2014 with the next inspection due in January 2016 making the organisation and the aircraft compliant with the Mandatory Permit Directive."

dsc810

22nd Dec 2015, 17:38

The lawyers will/may be having a field day as some insurance company will now say as the aircraft should not have been flying in their opinion due to the out of date parts fitted in the seat - we will not by paying.
Whether or not the out of date parts had any bearing on the accident will be immaterial to them.

The Old Fat One

22nd Dec 2015, 18:00

^^

Idle bar room speculation. Suddenly lawyers and insurance companies are all villains once more. Childish drivel. FYI for the future, the final decision on whether or not and insurance company pays out, does not rest with the insurance company (unless the beneficiary accepts the rejected claim), it would rest with a law court....on no!! it's them damn villainous lawyers at it again.

Courtney Mil

22nd Dec 2015, 21:17

Spot on, TOFO.

There seems to be another sudden rush of people capable of fortelling the outcomes before the AAIB have even completed the information gathering phase of the investigation.

Cows getting bigger

22nd Dec 2015, 21:28

I think if there is any legal hand-rubbing to be done, it will centre on the organisation and supervision of air displays.

The latest bulletin highlights an embarrassing issue regarding airworthiness oversight. Perhaps the CAA needs to take a close look at itself and the manner in which it continues to audit. Legal wrangling? I think not, unless there is a definite airworthiness related causal issue still to be found in the pile of twisted metal.

andrewn

22nd Dec 2015, 21:55

I think if there is any legal hand-rubbing to be done, it will centre on the organisation and supervision of air displays.

Agreed cows, and I said as such in the original thread. The relevant findings and recommendations will relate to the venue itself and I suspect the granting and maintenance of PDAs, in particular for ex-mil jets in private hands.

Pittsextra

22nd Dec 2015, 22:15

If aspects related to safety have been uncovered and affect other aircraft types that are currently flying, there is a duty to highlight them as soon as possible whether or not they are causal to the accident under investigation.

Nothing to disagree with in that but by the same rational it would suggest that no other conclusive technical issues have been found to date.

In any event it would seem that the report highlights one of process than material causation of an accident and from today's CAA statement seems they found some paperwork they couldn't find yesterday.... You couldn't make it up!

treadigraph

22nd Dec 2015, 22:44

You couldn't make it up!

Quite, and I wouldn't draw conclusions from it either.

APG63

22nd Dec 2015, 22:51

Nothing to disagree with in that but by the same rational it would suggest that no other conclusive technical issues have been found to date.

It may suggest that to you, Pittsexta, but it certainly does not mean that is the case.

I have no intention of getting into further conversation on this, but I will explain briefly. The special bulletins are purely vehicles for issuing recommendations arising during an investigation on issues that are relevant to current aviation activity. The investigation needs to complete enough in the area concerned to be able to draw conclusions.

It certainly does not follow that no other "conclusive technical issues" have been found to date. For example, stating that an accident occurred because the engine failed is not particularly useful if the cause(s) of the engine failure, subsequent drills and means of mitigating the same or similar failures in the future are still being identified. Determining the cause on an engine failure may require detailed forensic examination of wreckage - a particularly time-consuming and difficult activity especially after significant fire; where access to the wreckage is limited, hazardous or affected by environmental factors; where an explosion or disintegration has occurred at altitude and numerous other circumstances. The investigation does not stop just because a single cause appears to have been found. Furthermore, all contributory factors need to be subject to the same scrutiny for the same reasons.

The lack of an announcement in one area of an investigation certainly does not mean that an important line of investigation has not been identified.

Pittsextra

23rd Dec 2015, 04:59

APG - so when you read nothing conclusive to date, you'd agree with that? You might also agree that elements of the recent AAIB report when compared with the CAA statement that came out less than 24hrs later seems odd or was it just a very unfortunate coincidence of timing?

A and C

23rd Dec 2015, 07:15

Mach Two

23rd Dec 2015, 08:03

APG - so when you read nothing conclusive to date, you'd agree with that?

Try reading his post again, properly this time. He clearly disagrees with your statement. There is also a big difference between, "nothing conclusive to date" and "no other conclusive technical issues have been found to date."

If aspects related to safety have been uncovered and affect other aircraft types that are currently flying, there is a duty to highlight them as soon as possible whether or not they are causal to the accident under investigation.

It's easy to see from you bold where your erroneous supposition has lead you to the wrong conclusion. Let's try it another way,

If aspects related to safety have been uncovered and affect other aircraft types that are currently flying, there is a duty to highlight them as soon as possible whether or not they are causal to the accident under investigation.

If the technical [or other] issues identified thus far do not affect other types currently flying or it is not POSSIBLE to report them yet, then they will not do so. That does not mean that aspects related to safety have not been uncovered; they have simply not been reported yet for reasons I would not expect you either to understand or to agree with - you are, after all one of the experts here that appear all over PPRuNe whenever there has been an accident. IIRC, you were able to deduce all sorts of conclusive findings just from a single hand held video back on 25 August.

You seem to thrive on speculation that someone did something wrong. You should write for the daily mail. You certainly should not consider a career in accident investigation.

APG63

23rd Dec 2015, 21:13

PittsExtra,

Let me be specific. There are other lines of developed enquiry. They will not be reported upon until necessary or until they are sufficiently mature. The CAA has not received criticism in the report. I do not agree with your supposition and I think I was clear about that in my previous post.

You may think that your opinions and suppositions are helpful, but they are not as you may find out in a few months. But I'm sure you will continue to use PPRuNe as a soapbox for your spoutings.

Above The Clouds

23rd Dec 2015, 21:18

APG63
I have no intention of getting into further conversation on this

But you are, let the troll "Pittsextra" go

Courtney Mil

23rd Dec 2015, 21:40

ATC,

It's unusual that APG responds. But you make a good point. This is a selection of PPRuNe threads that Pitts Extra has frequented this year. It's the result of an automated search so I apologise for any duplication. I think you will all form a picture. Not bad for a recreational wannabe.

AAIB Report A109E accident at Vauxhall, and Inquest Verdict

Hawker Hunter down at Shoreham

Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report

Reports of A400 Crash, Saville, Spain

Andy Hills interviewed

Hawker Hunter Loss at Shoreham Airshow

Differing reactions to accidents - Why?

Crash at Austrian Airshow, pilot killed

Light Aircraft crash at Blackbushe.

Plane crash near Basingstoke UK

Re-visiting the 1999 Hawk 200 Crash

AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk

AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

London heli crash jan 2013

Heli ditch North Sea G-REDL: NOT condolences

Rigga

23rd Dec 2015, 22:08

A&C said:
"Once you start operating the aircraft occasionally without the temp cycles of high level flight and store the aircraft in a comfortable environment the safe life of such devices is likely to extend, it is for those who extend the life of these devices to base this decision on reliable data.

It is vital that the black and white attitude to shelf life is not taken and the date on the packet is viewed in the light of current operational conditions as this can move the date in ether direction to ensure reliable performance."

Wow! I think I'd dislike working under that ethos. For an operator to consider the Life Expiry Date as a mere guide to be varied on the heat of the building invites all sorts of rogue practices. Are you sure that's what you meant?

Courtney Mil

23rd Dec 2015, 22:17

Riggs,

Agreed. We have two treads running on the same topic now, which means dual, overlapping posts. I recently posted on the same issue on the other thread:

http://www.pprune.org/9218673-post956.html

Where I said:

Whilst it is true that the operating conditions for the components have changed, which MAY affect installed life, you will also note that the shelf life remains a limiting factor and I doubt storage conditions are significantly different. Moreover, as there are neither data nor a proper evaluation of installed life under the new operating condition it is not possible to calculate a new installed life.

I am commenting here purely on the practicalities of component life, NOT any process that is, or has been, in place.

Pittsextra

24th Dec 2015, 18:37

Isn't this:-

Originally Posted by PittsExtra
...no other conclusive technical issues have been found to date.
and this

Originally Posted by APG63
The investigation needs to complete enough in the area concerned to be able to draw conclusions. Similar/same?!?

Originally Posted by APG63
It certainly does not follow that no other "conclusive technical issues" have been found to date. For example, stating that an accident occurred because the engine failed is not particularly useful if the cause(s) of the engine failure, subsequent drills and means of mitigating the same or similar failures in the future are still being identified. This point ignores (for example) this interim bulletin for G-SPAO

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f20340f0b613460003fd/AAIB_S2-2014_G-SPAO.pdf

I refer you to the final page under the heading "ongoing investigation".

Now of course it assumes there is some element of consistency in all of these reports and methodology (is that an unreasonable assumption?).
When you say

Originally Posted by APG63
Let me be specific. There are other lines of developed enquiry. They will not be reported upon until necessary or until they are sufficiently mature. You don't see the words developed and maturity two different words for the same thing? I guess in any event the lines are not developed enough to have a strong opinion.

Originally Posted by APG63
The CAA has not received criticism in the report. I didn't say that it had. My comments were merely reflecting upon the two communique within 24hrs which at best seemed uncoordinated. I'm sure you don't agree.

CM - Since when can't someone hold a view on an internet forum? You'd be surprised wouldn't you if you agree with everything everyone wrote on here, it would certainly make for very short posts.

As for the accident threads I've posted on. I'm fairly sure if you have nothing better to do that stalk others posts then a vast number of people have posts on all kinds of accident threads, after all they grab attention and unsurprisingly people will have a view. As it happens the North Sea helicopter accidents were near the bone as a good friend was affected. The London heli accident was within walking distance to my London apartment and G-LBAL seemed similar human factors.

G-SPAO is just an incredulous situation as was Blackbushe, as well as a local airfield.

I didn't comment upon the A400M accident merely posting a professional news feed I have access to and was actually trying to be helpful and the remainder related to this accident. I'm not sure what mystery that unveils.

If you take the Austrian airshow pilot accident for some reason nobody raised an eyebrow when human factors got raised, perhaps he was viewed as a recreational wannabe.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZgns7CXeUI

Bigbux

24th Dec 2015, 21:11

The decision to extend the life of the ejection seat pyrotechnics is an interesting one.

The original manufactures will have considered a number of factors when setting the limitation, these are likely to be based on the harshest military operation environment with a good measure of safety and a bit of allowance for the deep pockets of the military budget. Once you start operating the aircraft occasionally without the temp cycles of high level flight and store the aircraft in a comfortable environment the safe life of such devices is likely to extend, it is for those who extend the life of these devices to base this decision on reliable data.

It is vital that the black and white attitude to shelf life is not taken and the date on the packet is viewed in the light of current operational conditions as this can move the date in ether direction to ensure reliable performance.

Actually, the shelf life of the pyrotechnic is determined by batch testing samples. Explosive substances degrade with time, and as you mention, environmental conditions, so the 2-year life will be based on a risk-averse projection of the explosive substance's condition. Extension of the 2-year life will be granted if a sample from the same batch and lot (as identified on the canister) is tested and achieves the specification result.

The 6 -year total life will be a safeguard, but also a cost controller as without representative samples (which have to be withheld from sale and stored securely) you cannot authorise a further life extension.

The OEM's withdrawal of support for the ejection seat is not the stick-out here; equivalent support can be provided. The continued use of time-expired cartridges in the ejection seat is the alarm bell for me, it tells us something of the culture of the organisation operating this aircraft. They should have grounded the aircraft until new cartridges were fitted.

I raised the cultural point in the original thread - but as it had nothing to do with gate-heights, aerobatics and personal hours it was largely rebuffed.

It will be interesting to see what further risks were taken, if any, and whether this is common practice.

Given the howls of denial on this site that flying vintage aircraft could pose any greater risk than military ones, and that flying decommissioned military hardware is likely to remain popular, it would be nice to think that we could learn some valuable lessons from this unfortunate accident.

Arfur Dent

24th Dec 2015, 21:46

It's quite interesting AFTER THE EVENT that so many opinions are brought forward about flying old aircraft, ejector seat cartridges etc etc.
Basically, Mr Hill commenced a looping manoeuvre at too low an altitude to complete it safely.
We all know that. The problem is nothing to do with ejector seats - it's to do with airline pilots turning up at air shows expecting skills that they once had - and practiced regularly (weekly in the season) to still be there.
They aren't - and until the CAA stops this blatant abuse of the 'old boys ' network , such events will happen.
If you want to fly a Fast Jet as a display pilot - look at the requirements of a serving officer. 10 hours on type in 2 years - I don't think so.

Mach Two

24th Dec 2015, 21:57

Pittsextra,

Nice defensive rant. You clearly have firmly held beliefs about a number of accidents. Given that you had made your mind up about this one before any confirmed evidence had been presented, you'll forgive me if I don't take your suppositions too seriously. Wait for the evidence and findings from those that have access to the facts and then make considered opinion based on those facts.

I'm more inclined to value APG63's offerings here, given his role in this.

Mach Two

24th Dec 2015, 22:03

Basically, Mr Hill commenced a looping manoeuvre at too low an altitude to complete it safely.

Can't believe I'm responding to this given the number of similarly uninformed comments.

You can plan to start a vertical manoeuvre well below exit height as long as you have enough energy and that is the basis for many display aerobatics. Conversely looping manoeuvres can have an entry height higher than the exit height. It's all to do with energy management and designing displays.

wokkamate

24th Dec 2015, 22:47

I am curious then, this being a 'rumour network' what do the great majority of SMEs on here think the root cause of this accident was then? I'm not an SME in this field but IMHO it seems pretty clear to me, why does no one want to actually discuss what caused this crash?

PS Happy Christmas PPruners one & all, safe flying in 2016!

NutLoose

24th Dec 2015, 23:28

Wokkamate, basically it's down to sh*t happens, a myriad of things that can all align to create an accident.
The legislation, life ex cartridges etc, did not cause the accident nor have any relevance to it, it is simply the way the CAA / AAIB operate in the blame culture we all now live in, which hopefully will bring forth tangible and constructive changes...
Far from the blame game the above bodies play, one would hope it brings about changes where they clarify exactly the requirements, because reading that report it reads as if the organisation was attempting to get the definitive answer from the CAA, but they were lacking in clarifying them early on... Not that they would have effected the outcome one iota.
I totally agree with A&C re life of items and their environment. I do not know how much experience you all have on the Civilian side of things re lifed items etc, but they do vary.
As an example Lycoming life the 0-235 engine at 2400 hrs / 12 years before overhaul, the CAA under GR24 allow you to extend that life by 20% for commercially operated engines to 2880 Hrs, but if you operate it privately then the CAA under GR 24 then give it an unlimited life on condition.
What I am trying to put across is not all original manufacturers lives are mandatory on the civil side of things.
The likes of Warbirds etc certain companies can and do relife seals, bolts etc.. they are simply not made anymore and where I have to bin seals at their lives, be it 10, 15 or 20 years, they can reinspect them and recertify them, unless things have changed.

..

O-P

24th Dec 2015, 23:36

Nutloose,

That, perhaps, is the best...and most articulate, post I have read in a very long time.

CM, you get second.

B2N2

24th Dec 2015, 23:53

Unfamiliar with airshow requirements.
Pulled this form the accident report mentioned earlier:

of which 40 were on type

Flying an airshow routine with only 40 hrs on type?
Is that normal/usual?
It would seem you wouldn't necessarily be fully aerobatics proficient and having intimate knowledge of the air frame after 40 hrs on type.

O-P

25th Dec 2015, 00:04

wokkamate,

If I may elaborate. At the start of this thread (Sorry, the original thread) we were asked NOT to speculate on the root cause of this tragic event (I refrain from calling it an accident).

When the CAA publish their findings, we may still not have a definitive cause...only possibilities. We can speculate 'till the cows come home but, we don't know if the crash occurred due to:

Engine failure
Control restriction
Airframe failure
Pilot error
Etc, Etc

What we can say is that the aircraft did not crash because the bang seat cart was out of date.

Thankfully, the man at the centre of this is still alive, and may hold the answer.

I am not trying to gloss over this tragic event, I just, like others, do not wish to lay blame where it is not justified (Yet?).

NutLoose

25th Dec 2015, 00:06

Thank you, what annoys me is a companies procedures, company exposition, etc are audited by the CAA and approved, in fact they go over the top and tear them apart insisting on amendments etc until they are satisfied, then they when the company, and I am presuming they were, operate to that exposition, the CAA / AAIB flag up failings.

This is all when the CAA to save money shut regional offices and cut surveyors, they introduced a light aviation section to deal with all of the companies operating below 2730kg... Think of it how many companies that involves throughout the uk, staffing wise they had about 5, some I believe quit resulting in about 3 to cover the country auditing hundreds if not thousands of companies all from Gatwick, now the staffing has probably increased, but to audit a company in say Newcastle, that's a day travelling, two at least to audit it then a days travelling back.... It just does not add up. And you wonder why the turn over of staff, I'd hate to be in that family.

Above The Clouds

25th Dec 2015, 07:14

Nutloose
Thank you, what annoys me is a companies procedures, company exposition, etc are audited by the CAA and approved, in fact they go over the top and tear them apart insisting on amendments etc until they are satisfied, then they when the company, and I am presuming they were, operate to that exposition, the CAA / AAIB flag up failings.

That is all the CAA's own doing; over the years they have been protecting their gold plated world by burying everything in complicated paperwork, as soon as something goes wrong they point the finger at the organisations who have to spend thousands just to have the privilege of being audited, so I have no sympathy for the CAA what so ever. The sooner that glass house at Gatwick gets a shake up and a sense of reality the better.

Valiantone

25th Dec 2015, 11:01

While sorting out the masses of stuff I collected in the days of being in Publishing I found a news article from Aeroplane Monthly in December 2005

Titled
Government enquiry into CAA - But latest bureaucratic bombshell from the regulators could ground all historic --- aircraft

I wonder, did anything happen then

V1

A and C

25th Dec 2015, 11:59

The U.K. CAA may have its shortcomings but the root of the problem is east by few hundred miles in Cologne, the U.K. CAA ( that is just a local office of EASA) is a rank amateur at paperwork and stupid decision making in comparison with EASA.

NutLoose

25th Dec 2015, 12:21

Totally agree, I remember destroying tons of AD's etc from MAMIS etc, we went from one of the finest regulators in the world to a system dumbed down the the lowest European denominator, as it was easier to dumb it down than to lift the other regulatory authorities up to the same standard.
EASA is just another bureaucratic nightmare that seems to exist purely to generate self sustaining legislation.

JointShiteFighter

25th Dec 2015, 17:24

Why do the same old people have to beat their chests on (emotionally) sensitive issues, when they have have never called a cockpit their office or haven't maintained one?

Andy and/or the engineers are innocent until proven guilty here - lets wait on the final publication and in the meantime, lets give our condolences to the victims' families over the festive period, and also to Andy and his family. PLEASE?!

kaitakbowler

25th Dec 2015, 17:48

JSF, can I, as a penguin who was around aeroplanes for 7/8ths of his working life just say thank you for THE best post on this (and many other) forums.

Merry christmas and a safe new year.

PM

JointShiteFighter

25th Dec 2015, 18:01

Merry Christmas, Kaitakbowler. Have a good one!

wokkamate

26th Dec 2015, 14:38

Ok, thanks all. No worries, just interested in the speculation, but if we have been asked to refrain, then refrain I shall. WM out.

salad-dodger

26th Dec 2015, 15:12

Why do the same old people have to beat their chests on (emotionally) sensitive issues, when they have have never called a cockpit their office or haven't maintained one?
JSF (or should I say Typhoon 93). How ridiculously ironic, coming from you who I suspect by your other posts has never had any professional involvement in the operating, maintaining, supporting, procurement etc of military aircraft.

There are points made or questions asked by wokkamate and Arfur Dent which are perfectly reasonable to raise. I don't think that they have been answered and as for wokkamate's, certainly not by Nutloose's reply, which showed a firm grasp of (some of) the issues identified post accident, but not the causes.

As for O-P's point about not speculating, why? The closed shop that some on this forum would like to see is not healthy. If I can just remind everyone that this accident killed 11 people, some of whom had absolutely no involvement with the airshow.

I will be hounded for this, but I for one think that it's about time the accident pilot was interviewed. I certainly feel that he has many questions to answer. In the same way that anyone else at the heart of such a tragic event would have questions to answer. If I was involved in a hobby or pastime that hazarded the lives of others when it goes wrong, then I would expect to have to face the consequences.

Merry Christmas all.

S-D

Caramba

26th Dec 2015, 21:49

I've refrained from any comment on any of the related threads so far, but it's all getting pretty senseless with the exception of JSF's recent post.
What speed do you think AH hit the ground at and how quickly or within what distance did the aircraft decelerate? Deceleration G? Even without direct head trauma his brain will have endured considerable shearing forces. I suspect he can remember nothing at all about the accident so don't sit up expecting any revelations.
This might be a rumour network but couldn't the speculation about speculation just be left aside? Please?
Caramba

Courtney Mil

26th Dec 2015, 22:36

The closed shop that some on this forum would like to see is not healthy.

Uninformed speculation by visitors here who's sole source of ideas is the Daily Mail Online and who are hungry to see someone hung out to dry - that's not healthy. What you describe as "closed shop" is purely a desire to try to stop that naive, vindictive, speculative rubbish that is all too prevalent at times like this. If it were not for the fact that we have seen what happens when the accident chasers appear out of the woodwork here, I suspect we could have a useful, well-informed debate about it. As it is, any such discussion would rapidly descend into speculative, not to mention libellous, accusations. We've already seen how some of you have determined that the "figure" was poorly flown, that the entry height would certainly have resulted in a crash and that the lack of any technical faults being found by the inquiry equates to pilot error. And you wonder no one wants to encourage that kind of debate here.

If I can just remind everyone that this accident killed 11 people, some of whom had absolutely no involvement with the airshow.

It doesn't matter how many many people died and how involved or otherwise they were, no amount of speculative debate here is going to make any difference to them nor (more importantly) is it going to find any substantiated answers.

It is the fact that you and others cite how tragic the outcome of the accident was that convinces me that reasoned, dispassionate debate is not on your menu.

salad-dodger

27th Dec 2015, 12:14

It is the fact that you and others cite how tragic the outcome of the accident was that convinces me that reasoned, dispassionate debate is not on your menu.

Courtney, I can't speak for the others that you refer to, but you are certainly misinterpreting my interest and the reason I restated the consequences of this event. I suspect deliberately so, as it suits your desire to prevent any form of sensible discussion that might start to get at why this happened.

If you read back through the original thread you will see that I have made no reference to how the display was flown or to any potential technical failures. On the former, I am not qualified, and on the latter, that really would be pure speculation. As I have said on the original thread, I am more interested in what took place before the display, eg, management, planning, training, experience, currency, authorisations etc, etc. Surely that it not an unreasonable area to discuss.

You and many others with your background, understandably I suppose, come across as keen to close ranks and protect the pilot involved, rather than have a frank and open debate about why this happened and how future such losses can be prevented. This feels very much like the criticisms that have often been levelled at the medical profession.

So yes, reasoned, dispassionate debate is very much on my menu. Assessment of the consequences, including who is affected when if an accident were to occur is very much part of that.

S-D

Courtney Mil

27th Dec 2015, 14:45

I suspect deliberately so, as it suits your desire to prevent any form of sensible discussion that might start to get at why this happened.

That's the whole point, SD. Without access to the facts no one here has a hope at getting at why this happened. All anyone can do with what little has been released is to speculate. Im pretty sure I could write you a three paragraph post on what we know that would make perfect sense (and COULD be right), but I won't because it could lead to all sorts of other readers here turning it into gospel truth. I you want to have a debate based on a handful of newspaper reports, go ahead - I can't stop you. But speculating won't "start to get at why this happened".

You and many others with your background, understandably I suppose, come across as keen to close ranks and protect the pilot involved, rather than have a frank and open debate about why this happened and how future such losses can be prevented.

Again, I feel no need whatsover to close ranks and I look forward to a time whan we know the facts so that we can discuss them - openly and frankly. To do so now would have to involve so much supposition that it would be meaningless at best, based on false premise at worst. The only thing I am keen to avoid is the same sort of thing that always happens here; poorly informed guests stating their pet theories as facts. It is especially likely in an incident like this where there is so much strong feeling due to the high casualty count - exactly the point you made and exactly why dispassionate, logical debate is unlikely without the facts.

But, if you feel the need, you go ahead. Don't be surprised if I and others mention it when the woodworms start spouting rubbish and trying to form a virtual lynch mob..

Trim Stab

27th Dec 2015, 16:15

That's the whole point, SD. Without access to the facts no one here has a hope at getting at why this happened

This is an internet forum, not the AAIB. The numerous "speculative" threads on other incidents on other boards on this forum are informative. Why you think this incident should be any different - except that maybe you have a personal connection to the pilot?

SD's questions were perfectly reasonable.

UWAS

27th Dec 2015, 16:21

Re Caramba #72 above. This is my first ever post. Thank you for letting me take part. Long since a pilot but 35 years of accident investigation. I have interviewed many who have received head injuries or lost consciousness because of traumatic events. One thing I did learn is, most of them, if not all, could not remember what actually happened to them, even when it was in their financial interest to do so, or mine as a prosecutor.

I learned this lesson before I rolled a car at speed and crashed. I was out cold for 20 minutes. Lying in hospital later, being an investigator, I tried to piece together the accident fragments "left" in my mind. I remembered the last thing as seeing a car in my rear view mirror coming up to a junction behind me in the sunshine.

The accident actually happened in the rain. I realised I had recalled the exact same time the previous week when I had driven the same road in the sunshine. Beware what those with head injuries tell you. It must be independently corroborated and that is one of the benefits of Scottish law as I understand it, at a distance.

Pontius Navigator

27th Dec 2015, 16:38

UWAS, illuminating, thank you.

glad rag

27th Dec 2015, 16:56

Indeed if AH was, as we were told, put into an artificial coma as part of the treatment to save his life after the accident then, really, how can he be expected to have any reliable memories??

I say that with the greatest of respect for the gentleman, he is also a casualty of that event.

gr.

Alber Ratman

28th Dec 2015, 14:32

A&C.. EASA have sod all to do with PtF matters in this country. It is all covered by BCARs and specific CAPs as you well know.

Never Fretter

28th Dec 2015, 15:01

A&C.. EASA have sod all to do with PtF matters in this country. It is all covered by BCARs and specific CAPs as you well know.

Either A&C has no clue or is peddling his own warped agenda.

Ex-military aircraft fall within the new CAA GA Unit, set up in early 2014 (about the time that the communication breakdown highlighted in the AAIB report).

This was formed to make regulation less 'gold plated' at the behest of then Government Minister Grant Shapps. After Shoreham I wonder how successful that can be have seen to have been.

Courtney Mil

28th Dec 2015, 16:07

Never Fretter and Alber Ratman,

I have no quarrel with the point you make, but I suspect you may have read too much into A and C's post. The way I read it was that he was remarking on the regulatory differences (efficiency) between EASA and CAA. I may have missed it, but I'm not sure he was blaming EASA for the Civi Hunter PtF.

A and C?

Alber Ratman

28th Dec 2015, 18:18

CM, I was pointing out that rants against the EU system (that by god, has massive faults in it IMHO, certainly as far as PART 66 and other countries grandfather rights are concerned) had nothing to do with the regulations concerning British ex war birds. Nothing more.

Having been both sides of the fence as an engineer, I do not believe some of the things I am hearing or reading. Life limited means exactly that, regardless of military or civil aviation remits.

Courtney Mil

28th Dec 2015, 19:14

Alber, I agree. That was my point exactly and I don't think A&C was saying anything different.

A and C

28th Dec 2015, 20:55

As you correctly understood I was just pointing out that the UK CAA may have their faults but these are minor when compared to EASA. ( with a hint that if you make unjustified criticism of them and the press run with it you may end up with something far worse )

Some on these forums are too fast to read and too slow to understand what is written some times, as to the "warped agenda" I have no idea what that is all about !??!

Alber Ratman

28th Dec 2015, 22:42

A & C.. I cannot understand your judgement on life limited pyrotechnics and the fact that life expiry extension decisions can be decided by the operators maintainer as seems to be the case here. Explosives fail, even if they are within life. The type I am employed on has more explosive devices on it that just fire bottle squibs (explosive separation bolts) and we did have a case of one fail in emergency use. Martin Baker have a strict guidance policy that such charges in their equipment should be discarded either if shelf life or installed life is reached (always the first date to be hit was MoD policy). CAP 533 A3-7 Para 12 makes interesting reading on the matter of service lifed components and airworthiness reviews for C of V, seems fairly black and white.

Mach Two

29th Dec 2015, 00:08

Strange that you should pick para 12 there, Alber, as it deals with what the CAA will check in the operator's documentation. It isn't the most relevant reference for what the requirements are for lifing equipment. Just the one reference to lifted items there:

"all service life limited components installed on the aircraft are properly identified, recorded and have not exceeded their approved service life limit;"

And, again, that is what the CAA should audit, not what the regulations are regarding lifed items, what the operattor's responsibilities are beyond identifying and documenting items, nor does it explain who approves the service life limit.

Not really a relevant reference, Alber Ratman.

AtomKraft

29th Dec 2015, 01:04

Meanwhile in Switzerland, their civilian Hunters fly on happily.

How DO they manage?

NutLoose

29th Dec 2015, 01:24

Exactly atomkraft, so what do we "think" we know, well at the moment nothing points towards anything but pilot error? To low an entry for the manoeuvre ? Faulty procedures at the maintenance company? Life expired components? The need to revise air show procedures?

If that is simply the case then surely they would audit other companies also carrying out Hunter flying and if everything checks out maintenance, pilot currency, and lifed components wise, why are they not being released to resume flying?
After all, the planet is littered with pilot error wrecks, and one does not see the myriad of other types from 737's to Spitfires grounded.

It just all seems strange that resumption has not been resolved all be it for a limited amount of operators, carts etc could be months old on some jets, not years, or did every company miss understand the life limits, and if they did, then that speaks volumes as to any ambiguity.

A and C

29th Dec 2015, 03:23

Once again I don't think that you are reading my post correctly and jumping to conclusions based on a very black and white reading of manuals.

Tha fact that historic military aircraft have had a substantial change of role from being avalable for service world wide in any environmental conditions to being occasionally flown museum exhibits requires a review of ALL maintenance practices to ensure they are appropriate to the current operating environment.

If you take the trouble to carefully read the last paragraph of my post # 45 rather than picking out bits and jumping on the outrage bus you will understand that a review of the operating conditions may well involve new and or tighter restrictions than the original manufacturers imposed.

Heathrow Harry

29th Dec 2015, 10:52

Nut

I suspect that everyone is hanging back waiting for someone (anyone) to move things along officially

No-one will want to pre-empt the police investigation publically - they decide if there is a case or not, then there is the inquest etc etc - keeping a few old aircraft grounded through the winter is acceptable to the authorities compared to gettting a bollocking from m'Learn'd friends for screwing up some legal process

Alber Ratman

29th Dec 2015, 19:11

A&C.. Reading the special report by the AAIB. The CAA requirements are stated in the report. The maintenance provider used a completely different approach to the life requirements outside the guidelines specified by the CAA, that really WAS a requirement for the continued validity of the PtF and may prove to be in a court of law. The operating organisation should also have been aware of the issues, they have the technical records for continued airworthiness. Of course none of this remotely caused the accident to happen, however what legal implications arise because of this, only time will tell.

One shot hard life calendar items like a seat cartridge. OEM has tested the hell out of them and came up with 6 years on a shelf (storage conditions) or 2 years in a seat in a cockpit (installed). Chief Engineer who is not legally a specialist on the equipment then gives them a 6 year installed life, way passed their total life expiry time?? I just am thinking... WTF?

A and C

29th Dec 2015, 19:27

Do you ever read things and take the trouble to understand or do you just jump to conclusions based on just skimming the data and an interpretation that fits your agenda ?

Please take care to read what I said about extending the life of items in post #45
The last as the last sentence is critical to my views on the subject I shall repeat it......................."it is for those who extend the life of these devices to base this decision on reliable data."

From this statement most people would assume that it follows that if you have no data to support the life extension of an item of equipment then you should not do it.

Alber Ratman

29th Dec 2015, 20:50

Your statement.. "It is vital that the black and white attitude to shelf life is not taken and the date on the packet is viewed in the light of current operational conditions as this can move the date in either direction to ensure reliable performance."

Think the CAA will disagree with you there. If I knowingly fitted out of date components and certified the CRS, my company management and quality would take a dim view on it indeed. There is no way that Martin Baker agree to cartridge extensions, never did with air force equipment unless in exceptional circumstances. The David Stock death in ZU-BEX was due to out of date cartridges not functioning correctly. I would seriously doubt that MB would consider extensions for any British civil seat or give the CAA formal OEM approval to issue variations for that reason alone, not worth their corporate image or reputation. All I will say now on the matter, if you disagree, so be it, everyone has an opinion.

Anyway the CAA no doubts will examine all the details and make changes to CAPS and BCARs if they see fit.

Courtney Mil

29th Dec 2015, 23:24

Alber Ratman, again I feel I must say something because this is getting tedious. It is quite obvious that A and C is NOT advocating the use of our of date components. He is suggesting that, as the conditions under which a component is used change, there may be a case for the manufacturer (for example) to re-evaluate the in use life of the item. It may be that changes in conditions affect the safe life of the item.

If the manufacturer were to collect and analyse new data, they may wish to declare a different in-use life. Frankly, I doubt this will happen, especially for equipment that is no longer supported, but that is not the point.

The point is, Alber, you are clearly not reading A and C's posts and are arguing against something he's not saying. I would drop it there if I were you, you are massively disrupting the thread.

A and C

30th Dec 2015, 09:04

A big thank you !

Mr Ratman clearly has not taken the trouble to read or understand my posts on the subject especially the part of post #45 that said that while reviewing maintenance practices the life of components could be moved in ether direction.

The problem with maintaining old aircraft is that some of the manufacturers assumptions about component life was based on hours flown in the type of service that the aircraft was designed for. In 1944 the manufacturer of a military transport aircraft components would never have expected them to be on the shelf for more than a few years and set the service life with this in mind, in 2015 I find myself with new and unused parts with serviceable labels dated in the mid 50's that if I took Mr Ratmans view would be OK to fit to an aircraft.

I take great care to look at old but unused parts as the passing of time could well have rendered the bit of paper that says it is serviceable worthless.

On the other hand some components had been given calendar lives for military service ( to fit into servicing schedules ?) that should have been based on cycles or flying hours and result in over maintaining the aircraft for no reward in reliability. The DHC-1 is a prime example of this, following the withdrawal from military service and DH support becoming the type certificate holder maintenance practices have been reviewed and maintenance data changed to be more appropriate to the operational conditions of the fleet in private hands.

As someone who is currently certifying the maintenance of two pre 1945 aircraft to public transport standard ( one on an AOC ) I have found the UK CAA very supportive of the flexible attitude all aspects of maintenance to ensure that it is appropriate to the current service environment of the aircraft.

I do hope that this realistic attitude to maintenance at the CAA will continue and they are not forced by the lawyers to retreat in to a position dogmatic adherence to inappropriate or out dated maintenance practices.

FAStoat

30th Dec 2015, 16:31

With regard to the SWISS!!!When Swissair went bust several years ago,they did the dirty allegedly on their Creditors and started up again with same aeroplanes and crews,having repainted them all white!Then after a short period they were "SWISS",which of course stands for "SO WHAT I AM STILL SWISS"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Their Hunters have never stopped flying,as far as I recall.Just repainted them after being in the Newspaper Print Scheme!

Slow Biker

30th Dec 2015, 21:10

A word about life extension to RAF escape system explosives, not necessarily related to non RAF aircraft. Extension of installed life was a fairly common event as I remember. Provided a justifiable operational reason was given, an extension of installed life could be granted up to the limit agreed by the OEM, but never to exceed the storage life. Of course things may have changed by now.
Regarding ex RAF aircraft, I was once asked, asked! after a lot of 1* name dropping, it was almost demanded of me to provide a copy of the OEM authority to extend a set of AAES explosives installed in an ex military jet, otherwise I would be responsible for that ac not completing the display season.
Having demurred on this I suggested the retired RAF officer contact the OEM. The full story could almost fit the 'Deference to Senior Officers' thread.

A bit off thread, but does anyone remember an unarmed seat falling out of an inverted JP (I think) over Suffolk late 80s early 90s?

EGNH Flyer

30th Dec 2015, 21:18

Think this is the one you're talking about. Mr Maloneys brother.

Jet passenger tells of fall from 3,000ft: Ejector-seat malfunctioned during victory roll | UK | News | The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/jet-passenger-tells-of-fall-from-3000ft-ejector-seat-malfunctioned-during-victory-roll-1367928.html)

EGNH Flyer

30th Dec 2015, 21:22

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f44fe5274a1317000505/Jet_Provost_T3A__G-BVEG_07-94.pdf

PrivtPilotRadarTech

31st Dec 2015, 00:06

I was pretty bored with this irrelevant "out of date ejection seat pyrotechnic" nonsense, but damn, EGNH Flyer, that's a hell of a yarn! Plus, I'm a sucker for a happy ending.

Iron Duck

31st Dec 2015, 14:40

The problem is nothing to do with ejector seats - it's to do with airline pilots turning up at air shows expecting skills that they once had - and practiced regularly (weekly in the season) to still be there. They aren't - and until the CAA stops this blatant abuse of the 'old boys ' network , such events will happen. If you want to fly a Fast Jet as a display pilot - look at the requirements of a serving officer. 10 hours on type in 2 years - I don't think so.

I'm no aviator, merely someone who once wanted to be, and being of a certain age enjoys watching Hunters, Gnats and Sea Vixens fly. I became a musician; we subscribe to the great maxim 'if you don't use it, you lose it.' With regard to staying current to display fast jets, 'using it', whilst not being paid to use it (in the form of display fees, sponsorship, etc.) must be very costly.

It strikes me that the fundamental underlying problem is the cost in both £/hour and remaining aircraft life of flying them. How can that be squared with the requirement for proper practice?

I can see that you might practice to fly a piston warbird by flying something similar with comparable performance, such as an Extra or Sukhoi. But how do you stay current in a vintage fast jet without flying it? I'd imagine the types serving pilots fly now are rather different and not necessarily comparable, and even so, someone still has to pay for that practice.

Opinions?

Treble one

31st Dec 2015, 15:47

Is there not a requirement to perform a full iteration of your display routine at fixed intervals throughout a display season?

I may well be wrong but I had the feeling that In Season Practices had to be weekly/fortnightly to ensure you are 'current' for the display routine?

I'm pretty sure this applies to Military displays? The reds often talk about ISP's during their quieter times in the display season to remain current. I also believe that this years Typhoon Display pilot had to perform ISP's after the end of the UK/European display season as he had a Far East commitment late in 2015?

Does this not apply to civilian operators?

TO

Mike51

31st Dec 2015, 16:23

Does this not apply to civilian operators?
It does not

LOMCEVAK

31st Dec 2015, 16:27

Treble one,

CAP403 requires 3 displays or practices in the previous 90 days, at least one of which must be on type.

Treble one

31st Dec 2015, 16:33

Thank you.

Is there no regulation covering this at all in the Civilian World? Surprising.

I regularly watch warbird pilots 'practice' display routines at Duxford prior to show days-or is that to obtain Display Authority in a different jurisdiction perhaps?
TO

LOMCEVAK

31st Dec 2015, 17:06

CAP403 is the civilian regulation.

Treble one

31st Dec 2015, 17:45

Thank you LOMCEVAK-off for a little light reading then...

Treble one

31st Dec 2015, 17:54

Then you may only need to have demonstrated 1 display sequence in Type in the 90 days preceding the display, as long as you have demonstrated 3 display sequences in total?

Although this is meant to be a minimum.

Am I right in thinking this is considerably less than would be required by a Military display pilot?

BossEyed

31st Dec 2015, 18:33

One other detail:

We're 6 pages in now, and the point made at Post #4 that the gentleman's name is mis-spelled in the thread title still hasn't been acted on. :(

salad-dodger

31st Dec 2015, 19:06

Within the space of only a few posts, such a contrast between what is really significant and the trivia....
CAP403 requires 3 displays or practices in the previous 90 days, at least one of which must be on type.
If I'm reading this right...CAP403
Then you may only need to have demonstrated 1 display sequence in Type in the 90 days preceding the display, as long as you have demonstrated 3 display sequences in total?

Although this is meant to be a minimum.

Am I right in thinking this is considerably less than would be required by a Military display pilot?
We're 6 pages in now, and the point made at Post #4 that the gentleman's name is mis-spelled in the thread title still hasn't been acted on.

S-D

Treble one

31st Dec 2015, 19:12

Apologies, saw your earlier post regarding CAP403, didn't see the one regarding the 3 displays in 90 days.

Mike51

31st Dec 2015, 19:50

From CAP403:

5.33 In addition to a valid Certificate of Test and Competence, a Display Pilot is required to meet certain recency requirements before his DA is valid. In the 90 days preceding a demonstration at a flying display for which an Article 162 Permission is required, a minimum of three full display sequences must have been flown or practised, with at least one display sequence flown or practised in the specific type of aircraft to be displayed.

5.34 A log book entry is sufficient proof that the display sequences or practices have been flown.

cats_five

31st Dec 2015, 20:27

Afaik only a mod can change it.

salad-dodger

31st Dec 2015, 22:00

We're 6 pages in now, and the point made at Post #4 that the gentleman's name is mis-spelled in the thread title still hasn't been acted on.

It looks like someone has fixed it BossEyed. I think we all knew whom and what the thread referred to. Perhaps we can we can now concentrate on genuine discussion related to this tragic event.

It is petty obfuscation such as this that makes some of us suspect that some folk are more interested in keeping the ranks tightly closed rather than getting at what really went wrong.

S-D

lmgaylard

31st Dec 2015, 22:21

I assume that even though MB no longer aids maintenance with older type ejection seats I believe they recommend SES.
They performed the ejection seat overhaul on Sea Vixen XP924 and their work is excellent. So I can't really see a problem moving forward.

Stitchbitch

1st Jan 2016, 00:35

Did SES maintain the seats in the accident aircraft Imgaylard and are they MB approved?

Edit: I understand MB pulled out of the legacy seat market so do the seat 'servicing' companies need authorisations to maintain seats from the OEM?

BossEyed

1st Jan 2016, 01:10

It looks like someone has fixed it BossEyed. I think we all knew whom and what the thread referred to. Perhaps we can we can now concentrate on genuine discussion related to this tragic event.

It is petty obfuscation such as this that makes some of us suspect that some folk are more interested in keeping the ranks tightly closed rather than getting at what really went wrong.

S-D

Thank you, whoever amended the thread title.

I thought the detail more about respect than petty obfuscation, so we'll have to differ on that.

Have a positive New Year, everyone - especially anyone affected by this tragedy.

lmgaylard

1st Jan 2016, 02:40

I've no idea about who maintained Andy Hill's Hunter ejection seat, sorry.

As far as I know, but don't quote me on it, I believe MB recommended SES.

Nige321

1st Jan 2016, 19:54

According to THIS (http://www.ses-safety.com/Ejection-Seats.html)SES supply seat cartridges for a number of early jets...

ExAscoteer

2nd Jan 2016, 13:40

Salad Dodger, please explain to me how the desire to have someone's name spelled correctly is in any way petty obfuscation or keeping the ranks tightly closed?

Graham Drinkell

2nd Jan 2016, 16:43

Basically, Mr Hill commenced a looping manoeuvre at too low an altitude to complete it safely.
We all know that. The problem is nothing to do with ejector seats - it's to do with airline pilots turning up at air shows expecting skills that they once had - and practiced regularly (weekly in the season) to still be there.
.

Or too slow a speed to achieve a top height. The point here is surely designing a display with enough margin in it to forgive the odd error or variation without disastrous consequences. An obvious point in hindsight.