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Geoffersincornwall
17th Dec 2015, 08:05
I made the mistake of including this in my previous post about Vmini so it was lost along the way. Now it has it's own thread.

The EHEST document has the flavour of one of the 'old hands' talking as it refers to the notion that it's a good idea to enter a turn by pushing against the trim motor springs because an unusual attitude can be recovered by simply letting go of the cyclic.

I hope this is not taken seriously. In the AW139 you should trim into a turn. This is just what the AP does when a turn is commanded during 'auto' flight. If you have an AP failure in an AW139, for example, it's likely to occur because some wise guy has disguised the AP OFF button on the cyclic by calling it the 'SAS RELEASE' consequently it is often confused with the (nearby) button called 'FD SBY'. One single push of the SAS REL button removes both the AP's in one fell swoop. Statistically this is the single most common way that AP OUT flight mode is entered during my recurrent training sessions in the sim.

As a general rule you need (IMHO) a recovery strategy for unusual attitudes that deals with all eventualities given than you wouldn't have much time to play around if the aircraft is threatening to treat you to a touch of inverted flight. Best not to rely on the AP to play a part in your strategy so please ignore those that invite you to push against the springs or for that matter to use the GA mode to help.(RFM suggests it has a use in this respect - not very smart though).

You may have only a few seconds to get it right so stick to the tried and trusted method, wings level, balance, pitch - nose on the horizon then as required by the IAS, power as required when pitch is sorted.

I wonder if EHEST could publish a correction? I guess an SFI who's been doing this stuff for more than 3000 hours may not have quite the clout required but you never know.

I get the impression that the EHEST team is more familiar with the Airbus AP systems than they are with the AW139. There are dangers in generalisation I believe.



G.

212man
17th Dec 2015, 09:16
I hope this is not taken seriously. In the AW139 you should trim into a turn.

Why, specifically? Is this really how the aircraft is flown in practice, or a 'simulatorism' to assist accuracy in training? As an example, we used to get pilots back from FSI with their new S92 ratings who tried to lift into the hover using the collective beep trim and their feet on the floor!

Apart from any discussion about the ability to release the controls and return to wings level trimmed flight (sounds like a reasonable concept to me), there is the practical reality that pilots tend to spend too much time looking in at the ADI to check the angle of bank and then 'tweeking' the beep trim back to wings level.

Geoffersincornwall
17th Dec 2015, 10:08
S92 story - horrific. The SFI's teaching that need a word in their shell-like. I hope someone has spoken to FSI about that. We had a similar problem with instructors removing the TAWS CB because the 'TAIL LOW' audio warning was driving them nuts when trying to teach in the hover. We then found that students were taking this bad habit away with them thinking it was the OK thing to do. We have to be alert to this kind of problem.

I hope this is not taken seriously

Refers to the notion that recovery from unusual attitudes can be assisted by the AP. If the AP's are not functioning then all this technique does is delay recovery at a time when things are becoming divergent - rapidly!

I spend less time checking the angle of bank because the AP will manage this for me if I have HDG engaged. Even without once set it will maintain until you get to the heading required allowing you to attend to your lookout. :)

Flying against the springs is OK but do it for too long and you get a "MISTRIM' CAS message. letting the springs roll you out is also OK but that's not how the aircraft was designed to be flown.

The beautiful thing about the AW design is that the beeper trim does not move the cyclic, just the aircraft attitude.

Looks like the Airbus guys went in one direction and AW in another.

G.

17th Dec 2015, 11:21
The problem with this fascination with automation is that pilots rely more and more on it and lose their handling skills - look at airline pilots as an example.

I'm not saying that knowledge and use of the AP systems (whichever flavour you have) is bad, it should be encouraged so that pilots don't get lost in the levels of automation but regular practice in the 'raw' aircraft should be equally encouraged.

I expect my pilots to be able to hold an accurate angle of bank manually and roll out on specific headings the same way - but also be able to use the higher AP functions to achieve the same thing when required.

The whole point of an AP is to reduce the workload on the pilot but if that workload becomes so low that there is no arousal level then reacting to something like an unusual attitude will be slower.

If a pilot is in the habit of letting the AP drive him round the sky and stops monitoring the AI, it doesn't take much turbulence in actual conditions, especially if he is head down reading a plate for example, to induce the leans.

Frankly the issues of trimming or not trimming into the turns will depend very much on which flavour of AP you have and your personal preferences as a pilot - trying to dictate which is 'right' or 'wrong' isn't an argument you can win.

Bravo73
17th Dec 2015, 12:52
In the AW139 you should trim into a turn.


Is the 'official' Agusta advice? If so, I imagine that a lot of AW139 TRIs need to be informed.

Sir Korsky
17th Dec 2015, 14:26
How is AP loss annunciated on the 139?

HeliComparator
17th Dec 2015, 15:17
Quite a few old duffers on here then! I am with Geoffers on the principle that a lot of old hands in high places resist progress. You are not a real man unless you can fly the whole IR AP out etc.

However I would question why on earth you would want to fly a turn in IMC manually? This is what HDG mode (or higher level) is for. The HDG mode ensures the bank angle and rate of turn is correct, the exit heading is set and cross checked between the crew, whilst the PF is concentrating on the big picture. I suspect those who like to fly IF procedures manually also like to go home and whip themselves with nettles.

If you look at the FMEA it's effectively impossible to lose HDG mode whilst the AP continues to work normally in ATT so there is no need to maintain such a Luddite and pointless skill.

Whilst the 225's AP is excellent in nearly every way, it is surprisingly difficult to hold a steady angle of bank against the springs, much harder than the L or L2. Apart from anything else it tends to be quite wobbly-uncomfortable for the pax and a moments distraction risks large angles of bank. It is ABSOLUTELY NOT the way to fly safely.

Trim into the turn if you must, but why bother?

Personally I always flew visually with the cyclic trim pressed (if I was moving the controls) and if IMC, I used the buttons, which is what they are there for.

CAR42ZE
18th Dec 2015, 04:00
How is AP loss annunciated on the 139?"Autopilot" voice + either an AP FAIL or a few other miscellaneous AP related cautions.

Non-PC Plod
18th Dec 2015, 06:42
Torquestripe: There is a fix for the AHRS mounting, which should fix the problem of the AP tripping out with vibration. Ask your freindly neighbourhood engineer to fit it!

Geoffersincornwall
18th Dec 2015, 06:57
Actually there are two types of CAS message '1 AP FAIL' if the AP has failed in some way, plus the audio warning and a second CAS message is possible '1 AP OFF' if the AP system has not been selected ON. In both cases the audio warning will occur - 'AUTOPILOT - AUTOPILOT', and a second CAS 'AFCS DEGRADED'.

G.

18th Dec 2015, 07:45
However I would question why on earth you would want to fly a turn in IMC manually? because we are supposed to be pilots and, if the AP fails IMC who is best placed to make a safe recovery - the pilot who has practised AP out or the systems manager who hasn't

Geoffersincornwall
18th Dec 2015, 10:00
.... but guess what? The passenger in the back does NOT expect you the pilot to be practicing ANYTHING on his flight from Timbuktu to Walumboola Base. He expects you to be doing everything in your power to deliver him/her/them without fuss or bother, as smoothly as possible. So please don't tell him.her/them that you plan to practice your AP out flying at any stage during the flight or he just might say something to your boss .... and when your boss finds out that you have been practicing your driving skills on a public transport flight he will dump so much CRAP upon your head so as to be extremely UNKIND.

Please save your practicing for training flights and not when doing your normal daily job. I suppose if you have never had to carry VVIPS or even VIPS around you won't have much idea about their capacity for being UNHAPPY with excessive attitudes, angles of bank greater than 20 degrees and for heavens sake don't go anywhere near those blasted CAT A profiles which scare the **** out of the head honcho's wife and kids and and don't please his girlfriend much either.

CRAB - we, most of us, inhabit a world where the guy down the back pays and he gets treated to the best our expensive AP can deliver including modifying the RoC and RoD to no more than 500 feet per minute.Even the SLF we call BEARS get that treatment because they are GOOD GUYS and deserve the BEST. I guess SARBOYS carry people who are grateful and don't care much what their carriage looks like or smells like or if the head set ear covers are snow white.

One day, when you get to work CAT with non-mil pax you will find out what I mean.


G. :)

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2015, 10:52
because we are supposed to be pilots and, if the AP fails IMC who is best placed to make a safe recovery - the pilot who has practised AP out or the systems manager who hasn't

You miss the point. Setting aside the fact that if you ever get to fly a modern helicopter you will come to know that the levels of redundancy are such that AP failure is almost inconceivable, there is only any point in training for a scenario that could actually occur. As I said, on the 225 at least, it's not feasible to have a failure where HDG doesn't work but the AP works normally in ATT mode (ie the mode it's in normally, without any other "upper modes being engaged). So why conduct lots of training in ATT mode? A complete waste of time.

Certainly, train for realistic failures such as SAS mode and complete autopilot out, but let's target training on what could realistically happen, not just on something "because we've always done it that way", ie mindlessly.

As an aside, the primary and as far as I know only ever occurring reason for loss of AP functionality on the 225 is the pilot pressing the AP disengage button accidentally. I've certainly done it! So as well as training for that specific event (requires PM to swiftly re-engage the AP) why not put a bit of effort into making that event less likely to happen.

Helicopters crash for various reasons, often on a repeating theme, but these are not single engine failure nor an inability to fly with the normal AP engaged but without use of the upper modes. So why do we continue to expend so much training time on these things and so little on the things that repeatedly cause crashery?

SK92A
18th Dec 2015, 11:18
Geoff, You are exactly correct! In todays world they the SLF will report back to their manager, supervisor or higher of anything they deem to be irregular. Which intern means the crew gets called into the Chiefs office the very next day to explain.

Hand flying is fast becoming a lost art in the offshore environment. On a 2.5 to 4 hour flight how much does a crew actually jiggle the wiggly bits. Well FDM data show about 3 to 4 minutes at max if you abide by the written procedures in most of the procedures that I have seen and witnessed on highly automated aircraft. To state that you can practice this in training or on training flights is again incorrect. When was the last time your organization allowed you to take a large offshore heavy aircraft out a training flight. I can tell you that it does and will not happen in our part of the world, again economics.
As for the practicing hand flying on simulator missions given the structure of syllabuses as of late most of it revolves around use of automation and CRM. Which is fine but the times allotted are no suffice to cover everything especially handling without modes engaged. The funny part is most of this is being driven by outside entities ie: the customer / aviation advisors but yet they are the ones whom are first to challenge the company or crew when there is a excursion of any form. Facts be known the operators are losing control of how to manage their own aircraft and crews and the big oil folks are dictating who we will all fly our aircraft.

Off topic but the SAFETY word is becoming a huge joke now in the industry in North America anyway. We are finding that we are more worried about what boots, protective eyewear, proper and approved undergarments, following the right pathway to aircraft, correct high vis outwear to get to aircraft, fatigue management scores the list goes on and on. Yes, these are all important and valid concerns but during audits or reviews by big oil they seem more focused on these issues then the REAL issue – FLYING. All of our training budgets are predicated on the contracts we have agreed upon with the client which in turn means lowest price wins, hence training is always a major player in the cost. Given the current economic crisis the oil companies say they are in (joke) I can only forsee more things becoming more degraded as we move forward.

Geoffersincornwall
18th Dec 2015, 12:32
HC

To prevent inadvertent removal of both AP's why don't we ask the designers to put a relay in the line such that the first button push on the SAS REL (remember that on the AW139 this removes both AP's) just one AP is dropped and on the second button push the second AP is removed. This would go someway to prevent simultaneous, inadvertent loss off both AP's.

Goose

Unfortunately there is a real world out there and very little of it can even spell 'Cat A' let alone understand it. In the global helicopter pilot context most of the time spent teaching Cat A is wasted.It's easy to forget that to be Cat A compliant you must not only be at the correct WAT weight for the prevailing conditions and use the appropriate profile you must also know how long your take off area is, your reject area is and the height and position of every obstacle with the FATO. I'm afraid that's just a little too much wishful thinking for most.

SK92

The fixed wing world are getting to grips with 'Upset Training' following the spate of accidents related to pilots who cannot fly manually. I think you are absolutely right and more time should be set aside for good old manual flying but then who is going to pay if it is not mandated by the regulator??

G. :ugh:

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2015, 12:45
Geoffers, regarding the AP out button they have done something similar on the EC175 ie IIRC the first press puts it into SAS, the second press dumps it altogether. It sounds a trivial change but I suspect there are some certification issues at play. After all, why have the AP cancel button under your thumb unless it is requirement to be able to quickly dump the AP?

I suspect that once again it stems from old fogies who don't trust new-fangled electronics whilst maintaining that of course the pilot should never screw up!

Outwest
18th Dec 2015, 13:03
After all, why have the AP cancel button under your thumb unless it is requirement to be able to quickly dump the AP?

I have wondered as well why we have that button, is it in fact a certification requirement?

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2015, 13:36
I have wondered as well why we have that button, is it in fact a certification requirement?

Probably not a certification requirement as such, but certification requirements often relate to the outcome rather than the way to achieve it. So for example there might be some requirement relating to safety being ensured with some sort of AP runaway, and an easy way of achieving that is to have a fast disengage button. So it's probably a means of compliance rather than a requirement in itself. But if you have "hung your hat" on that as a means of compliance, it could be difficult to find another means.

MightyGem
18th Dec 2015, 17:09
Hand flying is fast becoming a lost artWhich could be why Air Asia and Air France aircraft ended up in the sea for no reason other than the crew couldn't fly the aircraft in manual.

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2015, 17:45
Which could be why Air Asia and Air France aircraft ended up in the sea for no reason other than the crew couldn't fly the aircraft in manual.

Yes it's funny, there were never any accidents when aircraft had to be flown exclusively manually.

Anyway sarcasm aside retaining relevant manual skills is important, but no more important than good management of automation which in general stops you getting into a situation where your superior manual handling skills are required.

Bladestrike
18th Dec 2015, 23:02
I think the PF should be able to fly any level of automation at any time, and if he hasn't practiced it....well....

If I came back into Halifax (Canada's East Coast) at mins or worse, I expected the PF to stay fully coupled, but if it was a few hundred feet and vis was decent, hand flying was fine, and even recommended to keep the skills sharp. Actually our SOPs spell out when the plot can choose the level of automation. Going from hand flown 61s to 4-axis Pumas I could see a deterioration in my scan after a few months.

As far as trimming into turns or not, I remember seeing a good article comparing the US Navy SOPs to push against the force trim vs. the Army's trim into turns, or vice versa, but I can't locate it. If you've trimmed into the turn and you lose the plot, you are still in a rate one turn so I don't see an issue. I think the pilot should be fully capable of either.

SK92A
19th Dec 2015, 04:36
I agree Bladestrike!

I could skipper should be capable of bringing the AC and pax home with everything off!

19th Dec 2015, 08:54
Hmmm . -don't recall ever suggesting that you do training with pax on board - maybe people should stop reading things that aren't there.

On one hand we have Geoffers who constantly complains about the standard of pilots coming through his sim and then on the other hand we have the fact tha no-one is allowed to do any training in the helos because no-one will pay for it - how is this not more accidents waiting to happen

Bladestrike
19th Dec 2015, 10:35
I don't consider flying the bugs or even hand flying to be training, it should be all in a normal's day work. You do what is required and hopefully your SOPs allow for some choices to be made by the Captain. Pax on board or not, you hand flew, flew the bugs or were fully coupled, depending on the weather conditions and what the crew desired. Our SOPs dictated when you should be fully coupled, basically anytime on approach with weather below; cloud base of 600 feet/4000 m vis/200 above DH/MDA. You could "practice" anytime otherwise....

Geoffersincornwall
19th Dec 2015, 13:48
I can see that the brevity of our submissions has led to a oversimplification of the debate and the selective use of quotations.

CRAB
We all tend to use our own experiences as a guide to our opinions and of course our perception is also our reality. Let's cut each other some slack and I'll attempt to clarify one or two things. Firstly you are quite correct you didn't say anything about practicing with pax on board but then again you SAR guys don't get to fly many bona fide fare paying (paid?) passengers around so excuse me for making that assumption.

My complaints about the competence levels I see from the global diaspora of helicopter pilots has a lot to do with a lack of the basics and many are new to automation so need to max their work with it to try and get them up to speed. With the tick-box system (practice until you can do it then slap a tick in the box before moving on) there is a nagging doubt about overall competency and I am one of those 'glass-half-empty' guys when it comes to my opinion on that.I personally believe there is a dreadful malaise in the helicopter industry and that maybe Evidence Based Training might be our saviour. But I'm not holding my breath.

BLADESTRIKE & SK92
All presumptions about pushing against the spring fall apart if you encounter the worst of nightmares and suffer (or give yourself) a double AP fail. Any unusual attitude recovery strategy that relies on the AP to help is doomed if you have no AP's. Best use a more basic strategy. In any case modern helicopters have been designed to be flown using the automatics and flying manually goes against this ethos. Yes we need to have that skill but we should not disguise the need by pretending that a little bit here and there is a substitute for a properly designed, conducted and assessed lesson. As long as we play that game then we will not get what we need.

G

zalt
24th Dec 2015, 13:15
maybe Evidence Based Training might be our saviour

Haven't the dinosaurs in OGP fought hard for years to keep hours based requirements rather than competence based requirements?

Of course I realise that its easy for lazy auditors to check hours and for certain unscrupulous OGP members to always contract for minimums a bit more that the OGP standard so junior crew fly for their fellow OGP colleagues not them.:ugh:

Variable Load
24th Dec 2015, 19:02
EBT has nothing to do with OGP. It is the regulators waking up and realising that the checking regime based on 1960s failure modes does not apply to modern aircraft.

http://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2014-AQP/EBT%20ICAO%20Manual%20Doc%209995.en.pdf

TipCap
24th Dec 2015, 19:57
I know it was a few years back now but on the Super Puma occasionally we came back empty or freight only in the North Sea and I certainly allowed my Co-Pilots to fly manually if they so wished - weather and pilot skill depending

fadecdegraded
24th Dec 2015, 21:23
I sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong but if you are hand flying or coupled up the punters should not know the difference.
If they do I would have thought there might be some currency/competency issues.
Why is hand flying regarded as training?.

oleary
25th Dec 2015, 03:03
Modern equipment is truly great and it certainly is a fatigue reducer, but there was a day (before flight and duty limits) we would fly 180 hours a month in aircraft (212, 61, 76A-) that didn't have autopilots. In the Beaufort Sea during the summer (fog time) that sometimes meant 20 ADF/RADALT approaches a day.

Point is, you should be able to hand fly the aircraft all day long doing on limits takeoffs and approaches and the lads in the back shouldn't know the difference.

As someone mentioned earlier 500 fpm climbs and descents and no more than (smooth) rate one turns. In fact, when we got the first Bell 212s with Sperry autopilots when flying an ILS we would turn the VOR/LOC off and use BRG and the manual turn knob to intercept the LOC because the auto capture was too abrupt.

I reckon it doesn't hurt to still be able to actually fly the damn things :O

Bladestrike
25th Dec 2015, 21:08
Fadecdegraded - "I sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong but if you are hand flying or coupled up the punters should not know the difference.
If they do I would have thought there might be some currency/competency issues.
Why is hand flying regarded as training?."


Exactly.

HeliComparator
25th Dec 2015, 22:26
Dear oh dear. It's not about whether the pax notice the difference or even how big one's balls are, it is about what is the safest course of action. Most pilots can fly manually if required to a competent standard and it seems doubtful whether the pax would notice the difference. However by flying manually we are exposing the pax to human frailty which tends to show itself when the weather is bad etc. Of course it depends on the technology, but in most modern helicopters the technology is far more reliable than the pilot. Why should the pax have to suffer increased risk during a night flight in bad weather just so that the pilots can demonstrate to each other what heroes they are?

Fly manually when there are adequate safety margins by all means (ie reasonable weather) but not when safety margins are at their minima.

Any SAR pilot auto-hovering over the ocean at 40' on a foggy night who says "never mind this phenomenally clever and robust inertial auto-hover system, I'm going to take it all out and fly manually" (just to show how clever I am) should be sacked immediately, and the same philosophy extends to any sort of flight near published limits for helicopters with modern and robust autopilot systems.

tistisnot
26th Dec 2015, 03:58
HeliComparator ..... told you a million times not to exaggerate.

People are not deliberately going out in poor weather and flying manually / by hand ..... unless of course you are not equipped with flight director or equivalent when they have no choice (some S76A++ etc) ...... but that is the crux of the matter - people are noticing a degradation of the scan and skills learned in those types when nowadays they continually fly coupled from gear up or whatever until gear down etc .....

So they will usually fly a departure profile till established and bored in the cruise ..... then those slightly braver might also attempt an IFR recovery probably onshore - simply to hone those skills in danger of being lost. Not a drama, surely?

Most operators have deemed you should be fully coupled (though some are not capable of being fully coupled) for most ops following certain incidents/accidents and thus training / recency is also now encouraged ...... quite removed from the days of 332L's being flown AP's off for all the flight back from distant platforms.

oleary
26th Dec 2015, 05:53
"Any SAR pilot auto-hovering over the ocean at 40' on a foggy night who says "never mind this phenomenally clever and robust inertial auto-hover system, I'm going to take it all out and fly manually" (just to show how clever I am) should be sacked immediately, and the same philosophy extends to any sort of flight near published limits for helicopters with modern and robust autopilot systems."
___________________________

I don't believe anyone in this discussion has suggested such a thing.

Two's in
26th Dec 2015, 13:58
Nobody here is suggesting for a minute that hand flying skills are maintained in marginal or hazardous conditions. Obviously judicious use of all the aids available will increase safety and reduce the pilot workload. But the day all those aids decide not work is not the day day to discover your basic general handling skills are significantly lacking. It probably won't be 8/8 blue when you need to get back down manually, so you had better be reasonably competent at it.

The "how big one's balls are" comment is indicative of maybe being exposed to some old school thinking where real men (and woman) don't use autopilots. That attitude is as outdated and dangerous as the opposite "never hand fly" approach. Both are stupid, and that is why once again on this forum we return to the issue of sound captaincy. If you can't make safe, consistent decisions, you shouldn't be in the front. As others have mentioned, the Air France and Air Asia accidents did not involve "big balls" decisions that exposed the aircraft and passengers to a perilous fate. They both started with completely innocuous and easily solvable problems (airspeed indications and rudder trim), but the subsequent actions or inactions rapidly took the aircraft into irrecoverable situations through a lack of situational awareness and inability to hold or recover a straight and level trimmed attitude. There isn't a more basic but more essential flying skill than that. In a helicopter you won't have 38,000 feet to figure out where you screwed up, so being able to recover to stable flight better be second nature. If you have inadvertently become a button pusher instead of a pilot, you might be in for an interesting trip one day.

Any why are we encouraged to be button pushers? Because it's safer. Statistically if you can get aircraft to operate with less human intervention, you get less mistakes. But don't be a slave to it. When the bean-counters figured out it was far less costly to throw everyone in a sim rather than have steely-eyed check pilots pulling back levers on a whim, training became focused on systems and system management. The assumption was all the handing skills would be maintained during operations and the emergency drills were covered in the sim rides. That wasn't true. Many pilots now complain that sim rides are unrealistic in terms of emergencies, and handling skills are hugely variable. That is not a constant approach to safety.

The bottom line is basic handling skills are essential, so keep them sharp, but you don't need to expose you or your pax to any additional risks keeping them up. Simulators are essential, but they are only a piece of the overall puzzle. Use sound judgement and all the tools available.

ShyTorque
26th Dec 2015, 17:11
Having read this thread, I'm happy to be in a position where I can choose whether I fly coupled or manually. Sometimes it's better for me to fly coupled up, sometimes not. But it's up to me to make the decision.

Geoffersincornwall
26th Dec 2015, 22:13
I feel for the Chief Pilot who has to put the company policy on the use of automation in writing and then stand by it. How do you ignore the fact that using it (correctly of course) is much safer than not. Open the door to pilot discretion and you open yourself to the kind of incidents we have seen punctuating operations around the world.

When I read a TR syllabus and observe the absence of 'effects of controls' and 'trim management' in Lesson One I despair that we will ever get things right. Maybe I'm old school but to me success begins with getting the basics right.

To enable the SFI to check that the controls are being used correctly the sim instructor needs to be able to see the pilot's hands from his IOS and a simulator that does not allow that shows a worrying ignorance on the part of the sim designers and those that certified it.

G.

HeliComparator
26th Dec 2015, 23:40
I am of course not against practicing manual flying skills to retain some degree of competency. However I come back to "let's make that practice useful, for a reasonably foreseeable scenario". I know I have said this before but...

When I was a baby pilot I learnt on a Bell47. To start with, 99% of concentration was taken up with controlling the throttle so as to maintain 3050-3100 rpm. That only left 11% for operating the flight controls (yes, I was working hard!). Eventually rpm control became easier and almost subconscious as I had acquired the skill. But when I progressed onto a type that had no manual throttle control at all, that "skill" was completely redundant and useless.

Certainly by the time I had retired and I suspect to date, there has never been an occasion when an EC225 had to be manually flown on an ILS with the autopilot otherwise working normally (there was one occasion when the autopilot was only working in SAS mode. Oh and that failure was a software bug long since fixed). So why do people feel the need to fly an ILS in ATT (ie normal uncoupled) mode? It is a completely pointless, useless and redundant skill for an EC225 pilot.

If you really want to train for the only foreseeable failures of the aircraft to auto-fly an ILS, then fly them manually in SAS or AP out altogether. That way you will be well prepared for that one event in tens of lifetimes. But personally I think you just need to be able to do it with sufficient accuracy to "get away with it" not to keep the GS and Loc bang on all the way to DA. There are so many more important things to train for, and there is not unlimited training time.

So my message is that one should expend effort and training on those things that are feasible failures. It seems obvious but it's not what we seem to do. Of course the human is probably the most failure prone bit of a modern helicopter!

tistisnot
27th Dec 2015, 01:35
Point taken - but then that training can only be done in the sim or non-revenue as per your desire not to expose the passengers to risk. Normal pilot reaction and most checklists advise de-couple and fly manually in the event of any AP / FD failure .... so why not practise it?! And incidentally, as several others have done it, practise is the verb, practice the noun. So there.

Thridle Op Des
27th Dec 2015, 02:56
We have been struggling with this issue for some time over in the fixed wing world as has been alluded to earlier. Regrettably the argument about the level of automation and the maintenance of manual handling skills is something inherent to the introduction of automation. There are several different approaches and positions that can be laid out, most of which have been discussed with reasonable sobriety on this thread. In general my team has opted for the 'use of maximum automation' strategy as defined within the OM-A. This is pretty common I'm the 'other teams' as well. In general 'manual flying' above 10,000' is not allowed unless something stops working - then we cannot go into RVSM airspace and may not get to destination. We cannot disconnect the auto thrust/throttle (unless the MEL permits dispatch!).

So what to do? Well for one, we do something called a 'manual handling sim' where we practice those prohibited skills twice a year for an hour. One of the interesting things in these events is the first ten minutes is usually pretty ropey and then miraculously the sleeping brain seems to recollect the muscle memory required to stay upright, so all is not lost and beaming pilots emerge from the simulator. The limitation with this strategy is the Air France syndrome (btw I suggest someone actually reads the report rather than rely on National Geographic), where they did not have time to 're-discover' their dormant skill. The slightly sad thing about the AF447, is that if the pilots had not been pilots and left the aircraft alone for 2m:30s then they would probably only have had to change their underwear. The natural stability of the aircraft would have generally maintained the flight trajectory until valid anemometric data had returned. It is worth nothing that things happen very quickly in both versions of flying machine.

Now for the additional 'squirrily' bits: the things I have flown since 1999 do not usually have the same level of manual reversion that most helicopters possess - there is too much redundancy. Fly by Wire gives us Normal Law which is like an advanced version of SAS (with the AP out) It is very smooth and remarkably agile, the 575 tonne version flies much the same way in terms of attitude change as the 75 tonne version. The chance of dropping out of this Normal Law is very small - but not so small as to be invisible. One of our pilots on his first operational was bringing his 575 tonne version back from Seoul and en-route suffered a dual independent failure that left him still in Normal Law. However during an ILS approach into the one thunderstorm a year we get in this part of the world, a third independent failure dropped him straight into Direct Law, bypassing the usual pause at the intermediate Alternate Law which is now the closest we get to helicopter AP off. Our man then had to do a go-around from the ILS, reposition for a vectored manually flown raw data ILS at night and IMC with special lighting effects. Now his experience has saved the day, from the FDR trace we could see that there was a distinct ropiness to his flying that once again recovered pretty quickly.

Here we have the conundrum: how do you train the new generation to fly these modern automated machines and yet still expose them to the unexpected events? If you need to train for the improbable, what do you train? In a sense this is what Evidence Based Training is attempting to address, we all know the engine failure shortly after what ever TDP is used, has little application apart from delivering a flight manoeuvre validation 'tick in the box'. The newest versions of conversion training currently in the pipeline emphasise the management of flight trajectory for the first events in the full flight simulator (what it was really designed for). The subsequent course then expands these manual skills to include Upset Recovery.

It is vital however that automation is trained properly and the implication of the different modes fully understood. We have some interesting examples from San Francisco and 'other places' that managing the flight trajectory during an approach with automation still causes extreme confusion. If the automation does not have a sound procedural basis then it would be probably better to remove it and install SAS with a beep trim again - turn the clock back 30 years and say what we had in the past was best (it wasn't). Without proper SOPs that specifically define the roles of both the PF and PM, you are back to 'pilot and helper' or person who flies and person who does the radios. If the PM does not have a comprehensive understanding of the PFs intention and 'what should happen next' then the PM cannot challenge any deviation. Similarly, the role of PF changes dramatically with the disengagement of the auto flight system, their area of responsibility expands to monitor things they were not monitoring as carefully before. When you brave souls decide to do a raw data ILS in IMC 'for the practice' then your PM is probably struggling to catch up.

The key to this training however (IMHO) lies with the attitudes of the trainers and evaluators. We all know it is possible for a pilot to 'fail' in a simulator within 10 minutes, however trainee and experienced pilots need to be allowed to 'fail safely' in the simulator without jeopardy to their careers or licences so they can learn from their own experience of how easy it is to mishandle any flying machine. Hopefully these lessons in the training environment will translate to the line. Personal reflection on personal experience has an enormously powerful influence on the trainees abilities.

TOD

oleary
27th Dec 2015, 05:02
I recall times (this was the early days, mind) when some pilots found themselves wrong way up they resorted to engaging the FD (HDG/ALT) to recover control.

This usually happened during our (cough, cough) "night VFR" slinging operations in the Canadian Arctic. Usually it just made things worse because swinging loads confused the hell out of the stabilization system.

But it also happened sometimes with passengers.

As an ex-Chief Pilot I must say the idea that we have people in this industry who will give up a just "push buttons" scares the hell out of me.

I surely appreciate the wonders of modern technology, but you still gotta be able to fly the rocket.

If you can't, or won't, you are in the wrong job.

If you doubt me, check this guy out: Chesley Sullenberger

Geoffersincornwall
27th Dec 2015, 05:20
I believe Captain Sullenberger's success was down to the aircraft's FBW system rather than any manual handling skills - which I'm sure he had and if he had been flying a 737 he would have needed them. Luckily he was in an Airbus!

G.

27th Dec 2015, 09:50
Two's in - great post.

HC - I am of course not against practicing manual flying skills to retain some degree of competency. That depends on how you want to define the level of competency and what tasks you expect that competency to cover.

In the offshore world it may simply be to fly a manual ILS to recover to base - in other areas of heli aviation the manual competencies may be many and varied.

Try using automation to get a winchman onto a pitching fishing vessel in the dark and see how much use it is! Even the rad-alt hold might not be good enough to give the precision required.

I have been lucky to fly and teach the whole gamut of general handling exercises on every type I have converted to and spent much of my life assessing and honing the pure handling skills of many pilots as well as their use and monitoring of AP systems - both are vital skills and equally perishable.

Let's not pretend that we don't need to be able to fly the aircraft.

RVDT
27th Dec 2015, 13:49
G.

This probably helped as well -

Sullenberger enrolled at the United States Air Force Academy in 1969. He was selected as one of around a dozen other freshmen for a cadet glider program, and by the end of that year, he was an instructor pilot. In the year of his graduation, 1973, he received the Outstanding Cadet in Airmanship award, as the class "top flyer". Following graduation with a Bachelor of Science and his commissioning as an officer, the Air Force immediately sent Sullenberger to Purdue University.

Sullenberger served as a fighter pilot for the United States Air Force, piloting McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs from 1975 to 1980. He advanced to become a flight leader and a training officer, and attained the rank of captain, with experience in Europe, the Pacific, and at Nellis Air Force Base, as well as operating as Blue Force Mission Commander in Red Flag Exercises. While in the Air Force, he was a member of an aircraft accident investigation board.

Sullenberger was employed by US Airways or its predecessor airlines from 1980 until 2010. (Pacific Southwest Airlines was acquired by US Air, later US Airways, in 1988.) In total, he has more than 40 years and 20,000 hours of flying experience. In 2007 he became the founder and CEO of Safety Reliability Methods, Inc. (SRM), a management, safety, performance, and reliability consulting firm. SRM provides strategic and tactical guidance to enhance organizational safety, performance, and reliability. He has also been involved in a number of accident investigations conducted by the USAF and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), such as Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1771 and USAir Flight 1493. He served as an instructor, Air Line Pilots Association Local Air Safety Chairman, accident investigator, and national technical committee member. His safety work for ALPA led to the development of a Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular. He was instrumental in developing and implementing the Crew Resource Management course that is used by US Airways, and he has taught the course to hundreds of airline crew members.

Working with NASA scientists, he co-authored a paper on error-inducing contexts in aviation. He was an air accident investigator for a NTSB inquiry into a major accident at Los Angeles International Airport, which "led to improved airline procedures and training for emergency evacuations of aircraft". Sullenberger has also been studying the psychology behind keeping an airline crew functioning during a crisis. He holds an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate for single and multi-engine airplanes, and a Commercial Pilot Certificate rating in gliders, as well as a flight instructor certificate for airplanes (single, multi-engine, and instrument), and gliders.

Sullenberger was active with his union, serving as chairman of a safety committee within the Air Line Pilots Association.

He was a featured speaker for two panels, one on aviation and one on patient safety in medicine, at the High Reliability Organizations (HRO) 2007 International Conference in Deauville, France, from May 29 to 31, 2007.

HeliComparator
27th Dec 2015, 14:22
Two's in - great post.

HC - That depends on how you want to define the level of competency and what tasks you expect that competency to cover.

In the offshore world it may simply be to fly a manual ILS to recover to base - in other areas of heli aviation the manual competencies may be many and varied.

Try using automation to get a winchman onto a pitching fishing vessel in the dark and see how much use it is! Even the rad-alt hold might not be good enough to give the precision required.

I have been lucky to fly and teach the whole gamut of general handling exercises on every type I have converted to and spent much of my life assessing and honing the pure handling skills of many pilots as well as their use and monitoring of AP systems - both are vital skills and equally perishable.

Let's not pretend that we don't need to be able to fly the aircraft.

I think trying to merge a discussion about relevant handling skills for CAT and SAR into one conversation is always going to cause confusion. But knowing how you can't see beyond SAR I'll humour you. Yes for SAR there are a couple of different factors, one is that as you say it's generally necessary to manually fly a winch man onto a pitching fishing vessel. And it's quite tricky too, although like anything it gets easier with practice. Although even I know that radalt height hold is pants and so last century.

And secondly with SAR, in a call out if you get a minor malfunction it harder to terminate the mission whereas eg with offshore CAT it's easy and normally the best thing, to RTB. So like any design (physical or strategic) if you want to make the discussion about all things and all people, it will inevitably be diluted and dysfunctional. Therefore since this thread is about automation management and you are a manual flight apologist, perhaps you should start your own thread on manual flying skills in which all your big-balled hero colleagues can participate? No doubt when you eventually reach civvy street we will all benefit from your "right stuff"(!).

Geoffersincornwall
27th Dec 2015, 15:18
I'm sure Capt Sullenberger is a great guy and a fine pilot. It was his fortune on that day to be teamed up with the right equipment. The AP system did a fine job for him I am told by those that know about such things.

G.

CRAB - HC is right we are too diverse an industry to get up tight about one aspect. Of course if there were such a thing as an SAR 'rating' or for that matter an 'offshore' rating (and others similar ratings along the lines of professional skills and knowledge) then maybe we could provide more applicable training during the 'pre-hire' or immediate 'post-hire' phase of employment. Then we could address many pertinent issues in an appropriate context.

Just an idea. :E

G.

27th Dec 2015, 16:14
I always love it when you guys bang on about how little other than SAR I know - I presently fly and instruct on a single pilot IFR, glasscockpit, helo with a reasonably well appointed (although only 3-axis) AP so guess what - I do understand automation as I teach it and assess its use.

You also fail to see past the steam driven Sea Kings of old and still think of it in Mk31 AFCS terms because you weren't flying and instructing on the Mk3A with its duplex digital AFCS that was a very big step up in flexibility and capability.

Automation and the management of it in helicopters isn't new, cutting edge or a black art - believing that it is the only safe way to fly the helicopter is a worrying new fashion though.

Trying to belittle those that have a contrary view to the ivory tower offshore Gods is not a good basis for improving skills or safety but doubtless you know better than me about that as well.

I have been a civilian pilot for over a year now and seem to be managing quite nicely - the unfortunate thing I keep seeing is that civilian flyers often look down on the military way of doing things - don't ask me why.

HeliComparator
27th Dec 2015, 18:40
... the unfortunate thing I keep seeing is that civilian flyers often look down on the military way of doing things - don't ask me why.

Why?


But no, I don't think civilian flyers look down on the military was of doing things, they just get riled when the military guys steamroller in and say "no, you don't want to be doing it like that, you want to do it like we do in the military (because we are steely-eyed gods of the sky)". We had one like that in my company, nearly every sentence he uttered started with "when I was in the military we did it like x y z...". He grew out of it eventually.

Al-bert
27th Dec 2015, 18:58
But no, I don't think civilian flyers look down on the military was of doing things, they just get riled when the military guys steamroller in and say "no, you don't want to be doing it like that, you want to do it like we do in the military (because we are steely-eyed gods of the sky)". We had one like that in my company, nearly every sentence he uttered started with "when I was in the military we did it like x y z...". He grew out of it eventually.


I used to visit the guys in Aberdeen quite often (in the past). Some of them were well balanced in their opinions, they had a chip on both shoulders - did we meet back then HC? :}

fadecdegraded
27th Dec 2015, 19:32
Thats the second time in this thread you have mentioned the size of peoples balls HC.
Just wondering if you have some sort of inferiority complex to do with either hand flying a helicopter or the size of your balls in comparison other peoples.
Maybe that's where the comparator comes from

27th Dec 2015, 21:24
HC - I think very few mil pilots consider themselves to be steely-eyed gods of the sky but I can understand the frustration they feel moving to civil flying where there is limited training (compare a conversion to type between mil and civ) compared to that they enjoyed in the mil.

The mantra in the mil is to train hard and fight easy so you don't do the enemy's job for him - this clearly doesn't translate to civilian flying where the bottom line governs everything but when you have enjoyed the freedoms of mil flying, civilian stuff seems tame, over-regulated and under-resourced by comparison.

As for growing out of it - I think it is more like banging your head against a brick wall - it's nice when you stop as there is no way the system will change whilst beancounters control everything.

cattletruck
28th Dec 2015, 01:59
Great post TOD, but I think the be-all intent of that automation in them shiny big jets is to turn you lot into money saving accountants.

There was a great post on these forums a long time ago that went along the lines of something like this: "The difference between fixed wing pilots and rotary wing pilots is that for fixed wing pilots the job ends when they reach their destination, whereas for rotary wing pilots the job starts."

Automation is always improving and getting better at doing all that mundane stuff. The goal of automation has always been safety and efficiency, and when it is all working I do believe that's the result that is produced.

Degraded automation is an encyclopaedic volume all its own where the pilot has to fault find, improvise, challenge, ignore, crosscheck, etc a system that he/she has little insight into it's inner workings. It is in my experience that some people are just miles better at fault finding than others.

Thridle Op Des
28th Dec 2015, 06:49
Hi CT, yes I would agree, however I would also suggest that we are all in the business of the aviation business. We promise to get our load of warm pink bodies to destination together with any baggage or cargo they throw at us, whether it is 13 in the back of a VFR fixed rod B212 (if there are any left these days) or our 615 destined for BKK. Automation has been a response to that contract. We add automation and levels of redundancy that increases the chances of being able to fulfil the mission, I suspect that the professional SAR guys are in the same situation though within different economic context. You rightly highlight the mundane, automation has been previously described as making the boring bits more boring and the exciting bits more exciting, or more properly decreasing the workload when the workload is already low and increasing it dramatically when the workload is high. Switching from landing on runway 16 to 23 at ABZ involved a simple change of trajectory in a 332L, now I have to plan the three runway changes into PEK by setting up my secondary flight plans in the cruise. I know if I'm down in the weeds and they reassign my arrival, the two of us up front will be doing the one-armed-paperhanger impression if we have not covered our bases properly.

You also touch upon another interesting aspect, that is the diagnostics of trouble in the automation. I have plenty of personal examples where the normally very reliable automation in its rare moments, attempts to deceive me. Having an understanding of the basic parameters is essential to filter out these misleading cues. The trouble is established and rigorous procedures are essential for the safe operation of automation, the difficulty then arises as to when to drop those procedures because they either are not or will not work (in this specific, previously unimagined situation). Back to the fundamental conundrum: how to train this suspicion into the new crews.

BTW, try and get 30 crew through JFK or DME - I envy the post flight duties in the rotary world. The nice thing though is the engineers do the wash and drying runs for us - no loitering to wait for engines to cool down!

HeliComparator
28th Dec 2015, 09:07
HC - I think very few mil pilots consider themselves to be steely-eyed gods of the sky but I can understand the frustration they feel moving to civil flying where there is limited training (compare a conversion to type between mil and civ) compared to that they enjoyed in the mil.

The mantra in the mil is to train hard and fight easy so you don't do the enemy's job for him - this clearly doesn't translate to civilian flying where the bottom line governs everything but when you have enjoyed the freedoms of mil flying, civilian stuff seems tame, over-regulated and under-resourced by comparison.

As for growing out of it - I think it is more like banging your head against a brick wall - it's nice when you stop as there is no way the system will change whilst beancounters control everything.

I'm sure the ratio of training to operational flying in mil vs civvy is massively different, after all we aren't at war that much these days. The mil can do this because it is all paid for out of my taxes and isn't expected to make a profit. However it is unhelpful to keep banging on about it because as I said earlier, mil and civvy are different kettles of fish, and always will be. Of course the down side of all that expensive mil training is that they become too expensive to do anything mundane like non-combat transport (think Falklands) and of course non-combat SAR, hence the recent total privatisation.

I'd liken it to the thought that there is no point in being the safest airline / helicopter operator if you go out of business.

What we have to do is look carefully at what training we do and why, so as to optimise the limited training time we have. Make it all count.

Anyway a suggestion, why don't you stop telling us how wonderful the mil was (since nearly everything you say is not transferable to civvy) and I'll stop banging on about the size of the balls and ego of the mil pilots?

HeliComparator
28th Dec 2015, 09:18
Degraded automation is an encyclopaedic volume all its own where the pilot has to fault find, improvise, challenge, ignore, crosscheck, etc a system that he/she has little insight into it's inner workings. It is in my experience that some people are just miles better at fault finding than others.

This is the important point (if slightly missed!) - does the addition of new fangled automation increase or reduce training requirement? Answer of course is that it increases it big time. So something has to give and this is my point, the need to be able to fly immaculately AP out or with just the basic AP is becoming a redundant skill. You just need to be able to get by without actually hitting fsd on the loc and gs for that once in several lifetimes need to fly manually. (I am of course talking about the latest generation with multiple redundancies, not the 20 year old tech that is not that reliable or redundant.)

And all that endless engine failure on takeoff / landing training - something that NEVER happens in reality - just how much time should we be spending on that vs the complexities of partial automation?

Al-bert
28th Dec 2015, 09:30
HC said

after all we aren't at war that much these days.

is that supposed to be ironic or just plain f:mad:in thick? :ugh:

I'm sure a nice cultured Chinny crewman might pop along to enlighten you soon HC

HeliComparator
28th Dec 2015, 10:32
is that supposed to be ironic or just plain f:mad:in thick? :ugh:

I'm sure a nice cultured Chinny crewman might pop along to enlighten you soon HC

Do enlighten us as to the amount of military helicopter flying within a war zone vs that not within a war zone, say over the last 6 months?

But anyway, let's not allow your chip to derail a thread about automation.

Geoffersincornwall
28th Dec 2015, 12:57
HC - I think you might be surprised by what is going on behind the scenes, maybe not squadron strength ops but meaningful stuff anyway - but that's another very different story.

The gist of all this is that training in civvy street needs to be more focussed and task oriented so that we ease gently away from the generic crap of yester-year that was only designed that way because we took 20 years to fall in love with flight simulators and had to be able to do EVERYTHING on the real aircraft.

Back in the eighties the UK CAA mandated autopilots for light twins working night ops in the police segment of helicopter aviation. They neglected to mandate the necessary training that should accompany the introduction of this equipment so the inevitable happened and a helicopter crashed (mercifully with no fatalities) due entirely to mismanagement of the autopilot. The lesson is there to be learned so we need to look at the ratio of training in a TR syllabus (remember a TR is a professional pilot transitioning on to a new, and usually similar,type) spent teaching how to do all those profiles and associated engine failures and spend some more time on getting to understand the automation. The engine failure exercises should be moved to the (context related) operational TR section that (should) follow the basic licence rating.

Now you can see why there are advantages in role related training leading to role related ratings. If money is tight then let's focus it on the areas needed most.

My New Year's Wish - Please deliver us into a world where Evidence Based Training has arrived for real.

G.

28th Dec 2015, 14:37
So what you are saying is the training given in the civilian sector has been pared to the bone to reduce costs (and therefore keep HC happy) yet is not actually fit for purpose.

The training in the military is far too extensive and therefore far too expensive (according to HC) and dares to produce people who can actually fly the aircraft quite well, with or without automation and who then have the audacity to question the other training ideas.

I am sure there is a happy medium but those of us who enjoyed a thorough and extensive training in varied military roles (rather than A to B and back again straight and level) both in the real aircraft and simulators will continue to wonder at where the civil aviation system is heading - fully automated aircraft with no pilots at all would seem to be the logical extension of the argument.

Let's hope not:ok:

HeliComparator
28th Dec 2015, 14:47
So what you are saying is the training given in the civilian sector has been pared to the bone to reduce costs (and therefore keep HC happy) yet is not actually fit for purpose.

The training in the military is far too extensive and therefore far too expensive (according to HC) and dares to produce people who can actually fly the aircraft quite well, with or without automation and who then have the audacity to question the other training ideas.

I am sure there is a happy medium but those of us who enjoyed a thorough and extensive training in varied military roles (rather than A to B and back again straight and level) both in the real aircraft and simulators will continue to wonder at where the civil aviation system is heading - fully automated aircraft with no pilots at all would seem to be the logical extension of the argument.

Let's hope not:ok:

Why not put your money where your fingers are and set up your own CAT undertaking - with lots of training of course. Then you can be the safest operator - for a few weeks until you go bust!

As to your "wonder", why not consider contributing something useful to this thread. I wouldn't go so far as to say civvy training isn't fit for purpose but of course it needs to evolve as the helicopters evolve,and it's certainly lagging behind at the moment. But I suspect you will be too busy telling us how wonderful it was in the mil to actually contribute anything useful and practicable. Please prove me wrong.

Al-bert
28th Dec 2015, 15:23
HC

we aren't at war that much these days

I wasn't comparing hours flown, you were stating the above.

Chip? Don't have any old chap - just enjoying the banter - I hope your flying (diagnostic automation management and real manual flying) is more accurate than your statements on here! :ok:

28th Dec 2015, 16:03
HC - I can't give you the training system you need because you won't pay for it - the argument about going bust is the malaise of the helicopter industry from what I read on this forum - someone will always do the job cheaper and it will always be about short-term gain rather than long-term planning.

As long as the industry accepts this status quo, all the wailing and gnashing of teeth about training falling short of needs will never change anything.

It seems the industry can't pull together to raise standards (because they are statistically pretty safe and the bean counters won't pay the extra) and the regulators are reactive rather than proactive.

The reality is that we will continue to accept crashes like Norfolk and Sumburgh as an acceptable attrition rate for the money that customers are prepared to pay. You only get as much Flight Safety as you are prepared to pay for.

This thread started as a discussion about mismanagement of automation - the answer is clearly - more training ; the question is 'who will pay for it'? Until you solve that dichotomy then things will continue to steadily decline.

I agree that the luxury of the mil system being allowed to throw more hours at any similar problem - although not as easy to do nowadays (even the mil has budgetary constraints) - isn't likely to happen in the civil market but there doesn't seem any push to even try.

One thing that might help is if pilots designed AP systems rather than engineers, then we might have less complicated failure modes, degraded modes, diagnosis of system failures and an industry standard for naming things.

Big buttons and bright lights works for me:ok:

My nephew has just finished his MCC with a well-known budget airline and the AP system on a modern airbus has so many warnings, both visual and aural, even of minor system malfunctions, that it is easy to miss something important when wading through the niff naff.

Fareastdriver
28th Dec 2015, 16:07
The big advantage of flight automation is the savings in training and continual practice. There will be a time where a basic helicopter course followed by a Flight Management Systems course will enable one to be qualified to fly, sorry, operate helicopters on the North Sea. Then as individual costs go down then there will be glut of pilots available. The costs will then be reduced yet again because they can be offered peanuts for salaries as they are only automated bus drivers.

Until something that the pundits haven't dreamed up in the checklist happens.

HeliComparator
28th Dec 2015, 22:15
Crab - so your line is "we (in civvy street) can't have a similar amount of training as the mil do, so might as well gives up and go home". Seems rather defeatist to me. In my (old) company at least, we did significantly increase recurrent and conversion training time in response to the new technology. But also that new time tended to get filled with knee-jerk extra items following crashery (eg simultaneous double engine failure in the cruise) that were put in for, predominantly, political reasons.

We may not be able to increase training time to match the mil, but there is a huge amount of scope to make better use of what time we do have. We need to dump extra stable-door-closing political rubbish, we need to dump historically important but no longer relevant stuff. In fact we need to look at the task, the failure modes (human and technical) and the reasons why we still crash, and devise training plans accordingly. Oops, I do believe I am sounding like Geoffers! Well, nothing wrong with that!

Anyway, it's a shame you want to be defeatist rather than being part of that debate.

29th Dec 2015, 08:00
HC - I suggest you re-read your own posts before you declare who is being defeatist in this matter.

I have no power to change what happens in the offshore world - you were in it for a long time as a very experienced operator and instructor I believe - how much did you manage to change it?

I don't mean to sound defeatist, I am just reflecting the comments made here by you and others - as you never tire of telling me, I know little of the offshore job.

You have lots of good ideas but who is going to implement them?

HeliComparator
29th Dec 2015, 13:18
Crab - well my time is done (a little prematurely) but in my time I think I made some differences to both the usage of automation and the training for it. It was certainly an uphill struggle with resistance to change from many quarters including some crusty trainers, the older generation of pilots, and the CAA.

But for example we ceased doing a manual ILS on every check, instead doing approaches with partial automation to tick the "manual" box. That being infinitely more useful. Engine failure on takeoff after DP was presumed to be flown hands off by the automation. We started flying overlay approaches (ie coupling to FMS to fly a VOR or NDB approach down to DA (and through the missed approach)). And lots more.

It was quite interesting to see the slow but inexorable shift in line pilots' attitude from "can't I just fly it manually, it's so much easier" to loving the automation, to getting a bit close to "automation dependancy". And that of course brings up another point which is that optimising training depends amongst other things on where the company is in its cultural transformation from steam to automation, and the provenance of each pilot. So for example converting a crusty old line pilot onto the 225, nearly all the emphasis was on the systems and automation. It was presumed that they had basic flying skills. However doing a type rating on a baby CPL, one had to include lots more manual flying so that the trainee would gain confidence and skill in flying something much bigger than a Hughes 300.

So looking back on the period 2005 to 2012 which was when we got the 225 to when I had to retire, I'd say the culture regarding automation and the training for it changed dramatically in our company. Jobs like that are never complete though, but I suspect it is continuing.

Fareastdriver
29th Dec 2015, 19:35
But for example we ceased doing a manual ILS on every check, instead doing approaches with partial automation to tick the "manual" box. That being infinitely more useful. Engine failure on takeoff after DP was presumed to be flown hands off by the automation. We started flying overlay approaches (ie coupling to FMS to fly a VOR or NDB approach down to DA (and through the missed approach)). And lots more.

I'm glad I packed up flying when I did.

29th Dec 2015, 21:44
FED - with you completely, it stops being flying and starts being watching - not the same thing at all:ok:

Al-bert
29th Dec 2015, 22:54
stops being flying and starts being watching - not the same thing at all

I'm struggling to understand how it helps on a dark and stormy night round the back of the Ben, updraughts, downdraughts, cloud base, snow shower........

I must be lacking in imagination to not grasp the benefit of being able to conduct an auto ILS, as opposed to being able to fly the aircraft :E

Geoffersincornwall
30th Dec 2015, 02:49
It may have escaped your notice but CAT is about flying A to B and delivering the goods as safely as possible with maximum customers satisfaction. It is not meant to be nor can it deliver happy smiley pilots grateful for the 'workout' and opportunity to broaden or polish their skills. If you want to do that then go find a job that requires near constant application of those skills, fire bombing, SAR, police ops, etc. CAT is what it is. The only saving grace is that so far we have no Cat 3 Autoland so at least we get to do that part of the flight and in the offshore world that can be quite stimulating, especially at night and/or in bad weather.

It of course is a shame that nobody seems to recognise that hand flying skills DO require practice as they are easily lost with the passage of time. Quite what the regulators imagine that a generic series of OEI exercises that have remained virtually unchanged for 45 years will do to help I don't know. We need to get the word out to the rest of the world. The current model for pilot training in helicopters is not working as I continue to see pilots who by no stretch of the imagination can be described as truly competent but they continue to make it through the system because the 'tick-box' approach is dysfunctional.

I am fascinated by HC's ability to twist the CAA into agreeing that there is no need for a manual raw data ILS. I wonder how widely known that little wrinkle is? Such enlightenment is most uncharacteristic not to say out of step with the rest of EASA-land. Of course, if we were using an Evidence Based Training model there would be time and opportunity for both manual and 'modified' AP based approaches but don't get me on that. (i'll just give myself a slap for being so 21st century).

G.

Geoffersincornwall
30th Dec 2015, 03:51
For months I have been searching for a suitable analogy to explain why the current (tick-Box) approach to License Skill Tests (LSK) and LPC/OPC's is dysfunctional.

Imagine that you are seeking a to qualify as an expert in English Literature. The test (LSK) is to recite verses from various Shakespeare plays as required by your examiner (TRE). The verses are detailed on a test sheet and there are 55 of them in two sections, Comedy & Tragedy, In each section the examiner will select twenty verses and ask you to perform them.

Knowing this you will receive instruction and practice at all 55 verses and chances are that with a bit of hard work the day before the test you can get things together enough to get a pass.

Now to my mind this doesn't even make you an expert in Shakespeare let alone English Literature.

If you can think of a better analogy please let me know for I will use it in place of Shakespeare if it will do the job and explain to those that need to know why we need to change the way we do things.

G :ok:

30th Dec 2015, 06:52
It may have escaped your notice but CAT is about flying A to B and delivering the goods as safely as possible with maximum customers satisfaction. No it hasn't but dumping customers in the sea probably doesn't do much for your satisfaction feedback ratings;)

The CAT industry seems to want bus drivers and it appears they have trained exactly what they want.

Geoffersincornwall
30th Dec 2015, 08:14
You're not going to get any arguments from me on that score but it is a little harsh to imply that giving our SLF a free bath is a habit. The occasional reality check maybe but don't forget the millions of flight hours we have delivered safely since the 1970's (1960's for a few).

It is a desire not to be complacent that drives us to do it better but you don't have to be a rocket scientist to recognise the huge difference between the dear old S61 and the EC225/AW139/AW189/S92 yet little has changed in the way we go about training and testing save that simulators are IN and have a huge potential to make a (cost effective) difference as part of a revised, updated, modernised, clear thinking, context driven pilot training system.

Keep up the good work but try to be a bit more constructive or understanding of our dilemma if you can find it in your heart to do so.

I read this morning that Cranwell's 11 week terms are being chopped to 8 weeks in the interest of ....... god forbid ...... brevity (not money of course)! The Light Blues will never be the same. They'll be taking away those nice brown leather gloves soon. :)

G. :ok:

DOUBLE BOGEY
30th Dec 2015, 08:19
Crab - All incidents of dumping passengers into the sea have been caused directly by lack of automation, lack of automation skills and/or lack of adequate automation policies.

It is for precisely this reason that in offshore land ( no paradox intended) much progress is being made in providing automation, training properly how to use it and mandating when it should be used.

Helicomparitor is correct that in some types a manually flown ILS on a PC is rather pointless as this mode of AP operation is not a possible failure mode. It is better to fly this requirement in "Degraded" mode, whatever that might be and in some types there are numerous degraded modes to practice and test.

In my small world I often see poor HMI skills when these modern AP aircraft are flown in ATT mode such that the pilot does not fully benefit from the stabilisation properties inherent in the system, in my opinion this is a symptom of automation dependency and can be managed by knowledge and training followed by sensible automation policies during line flights. ATT mode is the mode used at the very start and the very end of all flights even when automation has been mandated to maximum application. Therefore the time we spend in ATT mode can be minimal. No surprise then that many of the latest accidents/ incidents have occurred with the AP, or some axis of the AP in ATT mode.

Crab I understand your comments that the pilot is not "flying" but reduced to "watching". We call this "Monitoring" and it is a vital skill that needs strategy and in depth training to ensure safe flight trajectories. However, the pilots require in depth systems based training to understand the deployment phase of AP higher modes in respect to; Indications, Prioritisations and AP Behaviours otherwise not only are these monitoring phases rendered ineffective but lack of understanding may lead to interference in the flight control system by the PF.

Flight by automation requires significant and important skill sets if safe operations are to be assured. Theses skillsets are not divorced from hand from hand flying but they are different.

DB

HeliComparator
30th Dec 2015, 08:58
I am fascinated by HC's ability to twist the CAA into agreeing that there is no need for a manual raw data ILS. I wonder how widely known that little wrinkle is? Such enlightenment is most uncharacteristic not to say out of step with the rest of EASA-land.

G.

The tick box says "manual" but what does that mean? In FW it would mean autopilot out. Oh but not if its FBW of course! In helicopters does it mean AP out? I don't think so! It means AP in with partial automation. I say that because the attitude and heading hold of ATT mode (ie basic autopilot) is clearly thus. But who's to say it shouldn't be a slightly more enhanced partial automation? You have to fly one bit of it (ie cyclic or collective) manually, the AP does the other bit. You're manually flying, just not all of it!

Anyway that isn't the argument we used - we had an enlightened FOI who also flew the type and could see the point. Part of which is that having to fly an ILS in ATT mode is not a feasible failure. And he soon realised that partial automation could be a can of worms and thus best trained for thoroughly.

Although tacit acceptance was probably as far as it got! With some of the Mesozoic folk at CAA having retired such flexibility is easier.

DOUBLE BOGEY
30th Dec 2015, 09:20
HC - in modern AH products, SEMA. or SAS mode makes for a more pragmatic "manual" ILS requirement!

HeliComparator
30th Dec 2015, 09:31
HC - in modern AH products, SEMA. or SAS mode makes for a more pragmatic "manual" ILS requirement!

Yes I agree and it's a good way to keep / check "proper" manual flying skills. It is just the routine flying of ILSs in ATT mode (basic AP) during LPC etc that I rile against, that being just a mindless continuation of AS332L practices.

ShyTorque
30th Dec 2015, 09:57
Back in the eighties the UK CAA mandated autopilots for light twins working night ops in the police segment of helicopter aviation.

It was quite a bit later than that. I was working as a police CP from the late 1990s until early 2000s when it came in. At that time we were operating an unstabilised (floppy stick) aircraft, not even a stick trim was fitted. Interesting night flying and we latterly trained for instrument approaches in that aircraft.

The accident mentioned about the police helicopter (Scottish EC135) was caused mainly by the pilot not understanding the autopilot and fighting it all the way to the ground, rather than allowing it to help him as intended. Surely that accident was caused by a lack of initial TR training if ever there was one.

It's only in the last few years that I've been checked on my ability to fly a coupled ILS. I think this was because some of the dinosaurs at the CAA didn't understand the systems themselves and somehow saw use of them as "cheating"!

Thankfully, the folks now in the CAA have a more modern mindset and an understanding of modern aircraft and how they need to be flown.

Sir Niall Dementia
30th Dec 2015, 10:09
Try this one........

At my home base we have a nice shiny ILS. Due to a problem with the glideslope the UKAIP (and now the charts) says "No auto-coupled approaches to be flown" On the smaller end of our fleet, that basically means hand fly the bugger to minima, at the larger end it means really knowing the VNAV set up, but still be able to do it the old fashioned way, basically as the wildly out of date LPC requires.

However, we are a small company, we fly together often enough to be able to notice slips in skill sets. One area those slips formed a pattern was in very basic tracking and the mental arithmetic around it. Three years ago one of our trainers suggested that when aircraft were positioning, and the pilot had time then drop the upper modes and hand fly the old fashioned way. It has made a noticable change to the IF skills of all the pilots, especially those new to SP/IFR on-shore.

As a result we have seen a change in priorities with a move away from importance of the "set piece" LPC/OPC/IRR to Line Training becoming the more important area.

While an ability to fly the profiles and numbers to the required standard still exists, the ability to manage automation, and then seamlessly cope when it takes a walk has a higher priority here. My last major mechanical snag in an aircraft happened in 1995, since then I have lost count of the times the auto-pilot has decided to let me down in some way, in aircraft varying from the 332 to the 355 and quite a few types in between, from letting go each axis at a time on a 332, to a hard over on a 355, to the whole lot taking a duvet day on an S76 as the glideslope came in at Gatwick.

One exercise we carry out in the sim is to hand fly a precision approach just on the standby instruments. We do it because I once had to do it for real. It is unnassesed as far as final reports go as it isn't required anywhere on any of the CAA/EASA forms. However, it is a massive confidence booster for the pilots, and quite often results in the handing over of dollars from the sim instructors at FSI to the pilot on training as depending on confidence levels a $50 dollar bet is fairly usual.

Another area that I believe is letting pilots down is lack of robust SOP's. I have watched JAR replace CAP 360 and a level of SOP's disappeared, to compare a current EASA OM with a CAP 360 OM reveals a shocking reduction in both guidance and operational instruction to pilots. I certainly believe that a couple of the more recent off-shore accidents in the UK could have been avoided had the crews had the SOP's that existed under CAP 360 rather than JAR.

I have now turned into all the captains I used to get so frustrated with. Bald, greying, reading glasses and banging on about how much better it was in the old days. All I need now is a crew room chat about pension entitlements and golf.

A happy and safe New Year to all RotorHeads.

SND

FloaterNorthWest
30th Dec 2015, 15:55
SND,

I hope that trainer was rewarded highly for his words of wisdom?

FNW

31st Dec 2015, 08:51
Hand flying an ILS on standby instruments!!!!!!!!!!!OMG don't let HC know about that......how could that possibly help you manage your automation;);):E

Anyone would think you were trying to keep your pilots skills up:ok:

Sir Niall Dementia
31st Dec 2015, 08:56
FNW;

I think he got the usual level of thanks the MD gives out! Have a good New Year, and go safe.

Crab;

I used to fly A320's. Skill fade was a problem in the early days, we are just seeing it happen later in rotary. I love all the stuff that makes it easy, but when it goes wrong I like to be able to fly it properly.

SND

Geoffersincornwall
31st Dec 2015, 08:59
I try to include a total screen failure, manual raw data ILS on the ESIS (S/by horizon system) when doing a TR on the 139. It is primarily a way of convincing the candidate that the instrument is easier to use than they might initially think and is a confidence booster. The ILS is a usually a bit ragged but as HC so rightly says anyone who has trained on a basic ILS system retains that basic skill to a level that will get you home safely even if it might make the IRI cry a little.

:E

Just read HC, next contribution and have to agree wholeheartedly

HeliComparator
31st Dec 2015, 09:01
Hand flying an ILS on standby instruments!!!!!!!!!!!OMG don't let HC know about that......how could that possibly help you manage your automation;);):E

Anyone would think you were trying to keep your pilots skills up:ok:

No, this is clearly a good idea and something I've certainly done on the L2, after all what's the point of having standby instruments if you can't use them? The only trouble is that they are usually orientated for RHS only and also it's not a mandated item so if you get them to do it and they make a mess you can't fail them. You probably will demoralise them though. On the other hand if they do it well it's a confidence booster. So for me it was a judgement call and only do it if you think the pilot is likely to succeed.

But once again I'd suggest that it should be done in a realistic failure scenario. So for the 225 it's hard to think of something short of a complete aircraft electrical failure that would require reversion to the standby instrument (the standby instrument's data can be put onto the normal screens). So if you are down to the standby instrument only, that means no AP at all. Tricky to then fly an ILS not least because the ILS receiver boxes will be dead! But fortunately an extremely improbable scenario that you would have both a complete electrical failure and a desperate need to fly an ILS.

31st Dec 2015, 09:02
SND and Geoffers - with you both 100% - train hard fight easy - ASE out ILS was part of a standard IRT on the Sea King - often not pretty but proved the basic skills worked.

Fareastdriver
31st Dec 2015, 09:29
As my old Polish instructor used to shout as I was wracking it around on the buffet to ram or avoid being rammed.

"Do not let the aeroplane fly you. You fly the aeroplane, YOU are the master."

HeliComparator
31st Dec 2015, 23:51
SND and Geoffers - with you both 100% - train hard fight easy - ASE out ILS was part of a standard IRT on the Sea King - often not pretty but proved the basic skills worked.

Train hard and fight easy - so you ARE still in the mil after all!

Nothing wrong with proving basic skills work, but why not spend the time doing that AND doing it in a feasible scenario. So yes that probably was a feasible scenario in a 1960s era helicopter but it isn't in many 21st century helicopters.

Put it like this the next N Sea crash won't be a consequence of an inability to fly an ILS AP out. So why waste valuable training time on it with the consequence of limiting time on the scenarios that ARE going to be the cause of the next crash?

Geoffersincornwall
1st Jan 2016, 07:09
The conclusion we are forced to come to given the conflict between resources and requirements is that we have to compromise. That means that we recognise that HC is right about training for extremely remote (black swan even) events and focus what little we have in the way of training budget on building RESILIENCE.

Resilience is going to be the new watchword because we cannot train pilots to practice every one of the close to 300 failure modes the new generation of helicopters is capable of generating. It's pointless to even try for the machine is capable of throwing up just as many that aren't even in the manuals.

The current training and testing methods are incapable of either delivering resilience or propagating it for they are generic and do not, for the most part relate to the daily work environment.

Scenario based training is the key for it allows (a suitably trained instructor/examiner) to see beneath the veneer of acceptability and get a feel for the underlying competency.

After doing the same exercises with close to 400 students I can tell pretty quickly if they will have the kind of resilience I am talking about. By exposing those that are weak in this respect to mind-developing, skill-expanding scenarios with comprehensive post-flight discussions we can raise the standards across the board and replace mind-numbing irrelevance with focussed, challenging and high quality training and testing.

There is only one hurdle to overcome, and it's a big one. The sharp end of aviation management is dominated by individuals who have never taught in a modern flight simulator day in day out so they need to understand something very important. The simulator is not a magic box, you don't send people to 'the box, put them inside, set the timer for two hours then when the 'dinger' goes 'ding' bring them out 'cured'. What makes the difference is what goes on inside the box out of sight of everyone but the three people inside. The quality of training is totally dependent on the quality of the instructor and his instruction. To achieve high quality the SFI/SFE needs to be valued, trained to a high standard, and given the recognition and respect by management that they truly deserve.

Happy New Year


G. :ok:

1st Jan 2016, 09:57
Geoffers - completely agree with your comments ref sim instructors - I have benefited for many years from outstanding instruction in sims both mil and civil.

In particular, the THALES staff at Valley produced excellent, informative, challenging yet realistic scenarios to combine aircraft malfunctions with day and night SAR scenarios.

The problem is that as a sim instructor, you need to see people regularly to assess how they develop and how that resilience is being built - not a constant stream of training sausage machine once or twice a year for repetitive box-ticking - in that respect I sypmathise with what HC has said about making what training time is available well spent and correctly focussed.

Good luck in 2016 and Happy New Year to all aviators.:ok:

HeliComparator
1st Jan 2016, 18:35
The quality of training is totally dependent on the quality of the instructor and his instruction. To achieve high quality the SFI/SFE needs to be valued, trained to a high standard, and given the recognition and respect by management that they truly deserve.

Happy New Year

G. :ok:


Amen to that!


It is a sad fact that, whilst this doesn't apply to any contributors to this thread afaik, to be a Sim instructor just requires a relevant type rating. That it doesn't require one have any flying instructor experience, any role experience, any experience actually flying the type or any familiarity with the SOPs and Ops Man of the trainee's employee, is criminal IMO.


Just to re-iterate fortunately most SFI have way above the minimum requirements, but unfortunately not all.

Non-PC Plod
2nd Jan 2016, 10:42
It is important to remember that a simulator instructor generally does two main types of training: Training for a type rating, and recurrent training.

Training for a type rating is concerned purely with converting to type, and does not need familiarity with any particular role or operators SOPs. It leads to a skill test in a standard generic "commercial" environment to check that the pilot understands basic operation of the machine. Role training is a different kettle of fish, which needs to be achieved by very specific training using the appropriate procedures for the type of operation. Of course, if you can integrate some of that with the type rating training you can make the process more efficient.

Recurrent training is the area which could be much better targeted to give enhanced value. At the moment, much of it is generic: a re-hash of type rating training revising abnormal & emergency operations. There is plenty of competition out there between training providers, and operators should be taking the opportunity to demand more specific training for their own needs, which will give added value over and above basic type training.
The tragedy is that generally apart from a few savvy operators, nobody bothers: they just want their pilots to go away for a couple of days and come back with signatures in the LPC box on their licence!

HeliComparator
2nd Jan 2016, 11:07
Don't forget that as well as the initial type rating, these days there is also the initial operator conversion training. Anyway my feeling is that if the instructor has never flown the type, has no instructor qualification, just a type rating done in the sim, and if the SOPs, checklists etc used are not those of the operator, this can hardly be described as optimal use of a sim for type ratings.

Ticks the boxes though.

megan
2nd Jan 2016, 11:18
Fixed wing, but some of you may find it of interest re automation.

Should Airplanes Be Flying Themselves? | Vanity Fair (http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash)

notar
2nd Jan 2016, 11:33
Again FW but very interesting from back in 1997!!!

Children of Magenta

pN41LvuSz10

oleary
3rd Jan 2016, 03:53
TC report A04W0200

3rd Jan 2016, 06:55
Pyschologist Lisanne Bainbridge, in ìIronies of Automation,î4
and as quoted by James Reason,5
states that: ìSkills need to be practised continuously in order to preserve them. Yet an automatic
system that fails only very occasionally denies the human operator the opportunity to practice
skills that will be called upon in an emergency. Thus, operators can become de-skilled in just
those abilities...î

The report is here http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2004/a04w0200/a04w0200.pdf

Geoffersincornwall
3rd Jan 2016, 07:19
Yes, that's our dilemma, compromise and be mediocre at everything or learn to handle the automatics so that you stay out of trouble and hope that basic skills learnt long ago will keep you alive if you run into a 'black swan'.

When you have formulated your plan your only headache is the execution thereof.

If you were unlucky enough to have poor instruction, partially or intermittently serviceable, out of date simulators and a management that doesn't understand either then I can imagine that you will struggle with even that meagre objective. I am fortunate in that respect..

The regulators are known for being reactive rather than proactive so maybe we need a few more accidents to prove the point.

As long as we believe that 'EASA/FAA certified' or 'EASA/FAA Approved' mean that everything is OK we will forever have problems. The next time my students pickle off the AP's in a rush to put the FD to standby I will remind them that the design was EASA/FAA certified and the system EASA/FAA approved.

G. :ugh:

Geoffersincornwall
6th Jan 2016, 07:53
...... following my original post which drew attention to a paragraph in the otherwise excellent attempt by EHEST to address the Mismanagement of Automation. I therefore feel obliged to amplify the notion that they are wrong to assert that 'flying against the spring' or 'flying through' as it known is a 'good thing' and adds to the pilots ability to recover from an 'upset' situation. It doesn't.

Everything has a context and the context relevant here is that pilots come to the AW139 from other twin turbines and a few from singles. With their previous experience comes their previous habits and one of those is 'flying through'. The AW139 is tolerant of this technique but it was never designed to be flown in this way. If we do not discourage this method of flying then we will actually increase the risk of autopilot mismanagement. How so? Let me explain.

The incident related in para 1 of the EHEST booklet was caused by holding the cyclic forward (against the spring) then engaging an AP mode in the mistaken believe that the AP datum has been reset. It wasn't, and such is the case on the AW139. The effects of this error are critical for when the cyclic is released the aircraft will pitch up, airspeed will be lost and then as speed reduces below 55 knots the AP modes will drop out. Combined with this will be the tendency to over react to the attitude change by trying to put the FD to S/BY and this is where the inadvertent selection of the SAS REL will pitch the pilot into a seriously uncomfortable 'AP out' situation. No amount of letting go of the controls will resolve that 'upset' so a very sound recovery technique is an essential 'tool' in a pilots 'toolbox'.

To be clear, an experienced 139 pilot can use the fly through technique with impunity so long as he is aware of the trips and traps. I have no problem with that but I do have a problem with teaching or encouraging it at the TR stage.

Other types have a cyclic button for cancelling CAS warnings (NH 90, some EC types) adding to the potential for confusion. Other types have a 'fly-through' system that DOES reset the AP datum but we just have to accept, in my opinion, that to to teach or encourage the 'fly-through' technique in a TR is to ignore...

a. the potential for dangerous situations is increased due to lack of familiarity with the consequences during FD management.
b. the fallacy that it in some way will enhance unusual attitude recovery does not apply in an environment where an otherwise perfectly serviceable and reliable dual AP system can be removed with a single touch of one cyclic button with (IMC) extreme consequences.

I am not a helicopter designer, nor a test pilot, I am just an SFI but one that has observed many hundreds of pilots at work in the AW139 cockpit. I hope that my experience has allowed me to remove any distortions the sim environment may have created leaving me with some fairly clear ideas about how pilots interact with this magnificent helicopter, the best I have ever come across, despite it's faults. I have yet to come across a pilot who isn't a fan of the 139 but at the same time they would also like some design issues to be addressed. What are those issues? Another time and another place. :)

G. :ok:

Bravo73
6th Jan 2016, 09:09
Geoffers,

I would argue that the incident that you refer to above wasn't an issue because the pilot was 'flying against the spring' but because he effectively handed over an 'untrimmed aircraft'.

You wouldn't hand over control of an untrimmed aircraft to another human pilot so why hand it over to the autopilot? A quick dab on the FTR before engaging the upper modes is all that is needed.

212man
6th Jan 2016, 10:24
B73, I tend to agree with you. The 139 incident appears to be a repeat of Cougar 851 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11h0001/a11h0001.pdf).

Non-PC Plod
6th Jan 2016, 10:41
Bravo -

"A quick dab on the FTR" (as you put it), - if the pilot is pushing significantly against the springs at the time (eg overcoming flapback during transition to forward flight ) will potentially result in a sudden nose-down jerk through the controls as they de-clutch. Clearly this could have serious negative consequences.

Geoffersincornwall
6th Jan 2016, 10:44
I agree but what happened happens. Only last week I sat in witness of it during a recurrent training session. The crew also operated a EC type and fell into their old habit.

You must be aware of those three certainties in aviation - the three laws...

1. Sod's Law - If it can happen then it will happen
2. Murphy's Law - If it's possible for someone to put something together the wrong way then they will.
3. The Jammy Toast Law - If you drop a piece of jammy toast then it will land jammy side down. (which, translated means if you trust to luck then don't be surprised if you are disappointed.)

I beg you to drag yourself away from your Eurocentric understanding of our world. My 394 students come from 52 different countries and whilst you may have a standard of competency equivalent to 'acceptable' most out there do not and only escape the need for more training courtesy of a world that uses a 'tick-box system in a'compliance' dominated world.

I would like to keep my boss happy by keeping pictures of wrecked AW139's off the front pages of the newspapers and to do that we need to keep those that are new to complex helicopters clear of areas that 'bite'.

What say you of the notion that springs can save you in an 'upset' scenario?

Non PC PLOD - Thank you - I forgot to mention that aspect which of course would be flying the aircraft contrary to the way it was designed to be flown.

G.

Bravo73
6th Jan 2016, 11:20
Bravo -

"A quick dab on the FTR" (as you put it), - if the pilot is pushing significantly against the springs at the time (eg overcoming flapback during transition to forward flight ) will potentially result in a sudden nose-down jerk through the controls as they de-clutch. Clearly this could have serious negative consequences.

I agree that there is often a 'jerk' through the controls when the FTR is pressed on the AW139. However, I disagree that this 'could have serious negative consequences'. It is mildly uncomfortable, at most.

If you don't advocate 'flying against the springs', what technique would you suggest for manual flying? a) Continually pressing the FTR (i.e. 'floppy sticking')? Just like in the G-LPAL accident? No thanks. Or b) by continuously trimming the attitude with the 'cooly hat'? Unfortunately, trimming the aircraft like that is too sluggish for many of the more, dynamic manual manoeuvres. Is there another option? If so, I'd love to hear it.



What say you of the notion that springs can save you in an 'upset' scenario?


I suspect that is another case of poor terminology in the EHEST report. Will the springs help with an unusual attitude? No. But might they help with the onset of disorientation? Yes, maybe. (i.e. releasing the pressure on the cyclic will return the aircraft to a wings level attitude).

Geoffersincornwall
6th Jan 2016, 11:29
Dabbing the FTR with cyclic displaced - I repeat, not the way the aircraft was designed to be flown.

G-LPAL - if you are blaming that accident on the use of FTR then I suggest you re-read the AAIB report. FTR played a part but only because it was used inappropriately (i.e. in IMC without careful attitude monitoring).

The 139 is designed to use the FTR for 'manoeuvring' and the beeper for the corrections or small attitude changes.

When you are trimmed into a turn and suffer disorientation you can safely let go of the cyclic and - hey presto you are in a stable turn with no sudden change of attitude to further upset those canal things in the middle ear.

G.

Bravo73
6th Jan 2016, 11:54
G-LPAL - if you are blaming that accident on the use of FTR then I suggest you re-read the AAIB report. FTR played a part but only because it was used inappropriately (i.e. in IMC without careful attitude monitoring).


I'm not 'blaming' the accident solely on the use of FTR but it was certainly a contributory factor.



The 139 is designed to use the FTR for 'manoeuvring' and the beeper for the corrections or small attitude changes.


Sorry for labouring the point but can you confirm that this is the 'official' Agusta advice? When the aircraft is flown manually then the FTR must be pressed at all times whilst 'manoeuvring'.

Non-PC Plod
6th Jan 2016, 12:20
The 139 helicopter is designed in such a way that you can use any of the three trim techniques:

1. Pressing the FTR, selecting the required attitude, and releasing the FTR again.
2. Using the beeper trims on cyclic and collective to change reference attitudes (and other data)
3. Pushing against force trim springs (fly through).

Each technique has its place in different circumstances - none of the three is always the most appropriate in every situation. I use all three. I think the key is working out which technique is best in which circumstance.

6th Jan 2016, 12:34
Just like the 365 (apart from no collective FTR on mine) - so not completely unique to 139.

Geoffersincornwall
6th Jan 2016, 13:04
I'm not going to enter a battle with my colleague because I have only my experiences to go on. I was the very first SFI to be trained by AW and had the benefit of being taught by the then CSFI. I teach as I was taught and do not teach the 'fly through' technique, in fact I try to stamp it out and teach as I was taught. This business of 'fly through' has gained added resonance (in my opinion) as a result of the debate about the mismanagement of automation. As I said in an earlier post I sat and watched last week whilst a recurrent training 'student' took off against the spring and then engaged the ALT A, the IAS, the NAV and let go of the cyclic. The nose pitched up, the airspeed dropped enough for the FD modes to drop out and we very nearly bought the farm. I'm sure you are all aware of the 'design for success' concept rather than accepting a 'latent error' in the shape of an inappropriate technique. If we teach the right way at the beginning of the course there is a good chance they won't need the 'fly through at all but as I say, I am no expert, I just have some experience. An expert is someone who knows everything and only my wife knows everything (and maybe my mother).

As always rules are for the obedience of fools (newbies in this case) and the guidance of wise men (experienced 139 folk). I will not argue that point. I also, for the record, teach that upon entering IMC you come off the FTR and use the beeper. I find that the who are weak in IMC ops often try to engage AP modes with the FTR depressed resulting in an unintentional roll input (and sometimes a pitch one too) that gets scarily out of hand. I've even seen pilots getting close to inverted in the few seconds to took to understand their error.

Please don't refer to the use of the FTR as a 'floppy stick' technique. As soon as you remove your hand the stick will remain in that position unlike a true floppy stick a la B206 for example. SAS remains to make the use of FTR whilst manoeuvring an entirely pleasant experience, more so in the real aircraft than the sim. You should give it a go instead of thrashing the trim system to death by using fly through for the only way to return the aircraft to the trimmed state is then to use the FTR. As I say, not the way the aircraft was designed to be used.


G.

Never Fretter
6th Jan 2016, 15:10
Are AW going to produce an AW139 FCOM any time soon?

Non-PC Plod
7th Jan 2016, 15:27
Geoffers,

I just think its a bit strong to say you should never use fly-through. EG.: I find it the perfect way to fly a manual ILS. Gentle pressure against the cyclic for a couple of seconds then release is a much easier way of making a 1 or 2 degree heading correction than by using either of the other techniques.
You just need to use it at appropriate times!

I think the FCOM is in hand, but it is a massive undertaking for the poor bloke who has to write it! Probs be a while yet!!

Geoffersincornwall
7th Jan 2016, 18:48
I don't think I said NEVER use it and even went along with the idea that in the hands of the experienced it is not a problem as they have worked out when it can be handy, as you say. They are also fully at home in the 139 by this time.

The problem comes with teaching it. The times when it is appropriate are nuanced and applied to gain benefit not just because 'I always fly this way'. If you have taught those coming from a background flying Russian helicopters then I'm sure you know what I mean. I believe it is one step too far in the context of a very tight syllabus that only just manages to cope with the marginal candidate and is severely tested when teaching via an interpreter. The pressure of learning to fly in a glass cockpit with 3-axis AP/FD with FMS already makes the learning curve pretty steep.

My recent experience with the two recurrent training pilots convinces me that I am on the right track. In the context of autopilot mismanagement the 'fly-through' is a trap waiting to capture those unfamiliar with the implications of an mistake in IMC conditions. As we know most of our charges are most definitely unfamiliar with flight in IMC.

As I said earlier I am not setting myself up as an expert on this matter, I only wish to pass on the benefit of my experience and seek to hear the views of others. As I was taught to fly this way I assumed everybody else was too. Maybe I was wrong.

G.

Geoffersincornwall
8th Jan 2016, 12:33
.... in particular the last line has been worrying me. From the responses so far I am getting the impression that here may be many AW139 pilots out there who are using the 'fly-through' technique perhaps more than they should.

The argument in EH9, The EHEST document on Management of Automation asserts that the fly through technique is to be used in preference when making a turn because a stable condition with wings level can be assured simply by letting go of the cyclic. This may have been logical thing to do in the days of helicopters that rely on a simple SAS but it is not logical when you are flying a coupled 3 axis AP/FD system in a latest generation helicopter.

For a start the way to fly the aircraft is primarily by using the coupled modes. If you choose to use the beeper (no HDG mode engaged) instead of the HDG knob (in HDG mode) you are in fact doing exactly the same thing as using the HDG mode. In both cases the cyclic remains in the same position throughout.

The 139 has the added facility of being able to 'drive the heading bug to a new datum via the beeper trim in which case it will use the appropriate angle of bank for a rate 1 turn until settling on the new heading.

The idea that whilst using 'fly-through' you can respond to an upset by letting go of the cyclic is fatally flawed in the 139. The most common way we see pilots arriving at an AP-OFF situation is by their mis-selection of the SAS REL button whilst going for the FD S/BY button. We, at the same time as teaching how to manage the FD Modes, teach the industry standard response to an apparent failure of the system to do as we ask of it and that is to revert to 'manual' flying until we have understood what went wrong. What I witnessed recently was a pilot doing exactly as we wanted him to do except he found the wrong button and took out his AP's. Very nasty as he was IMC. The subsequent red screen was acutely embarrassing.

The answer as to why there is a propensity to make this mis-selection may lay in the way other types make use of cyclic buttons. Some have CAS Message cancellation buttons for example. If you are flying two types and they are very different in this respect (i.e. they have buttons in the same place but they do different things) then we have accidents waiting to happen.

The question of 'Flying-through' being in any way logical in today's complex helicopters is called into question insofar as we do not apply the same logic to the collective. If the power is set at 'cruise' and the collective moved against the spring for any climb or descent then the EHEST logic would allow us to take our hands off the controls when we encounter an 'upset' and we would be returned to 'wings level in level flight'. We don't though, do we! Do we? I hope not.

We never move the collective without pressing the FTR button first. All I'm saying is that we should be applying the same philosophy with moving the cyclic. When a stable condition has been achieved then it's over to the beeper.

I am mindful of the fact that there are many 139 pilots who achieved their TR somewhere other than at a factory school. Maybe that's why they didn't get the message. Maybe you did attend a factory school or were taught by a factory TRI or SFI and were taught the 'fly-through' technique, If so please let me know. It would be handy to know the size of the problem.

G.:ok:

8th Jan 2016, 13:46
The most common way we see pilots arriving at an AP-OFF situation is by their mis-selection of the SAS REL button whilst going for the FD S/BY button. If this is so common, is it because the pilots are poorly trained or could it be that the design and layout of the cyclic buttons is simply less than optimal? Rather sounds like the latter.

Max Contingency
8th Jan 2016, 13:59
I try to include a total screen failure, manual raw data ILS on the ESIS (S/by horizon system) when doing a TR on the 139.

Ah... the old simultaneous failure of 6 independent systems emergency.

In my next life I am hoping to come back as a sim instructor, if there are no vacancies I will settle for God.

Geoffersincornwall
8th Jan 2016, 15:24
Crab - I think there is an unfortunate combination of factors. I would have thought a wiser approach would have been to reduce the impact of inadvertent selection by making it a single push for one AP and a second to remove both. The training is a matter of practice but if the course is thin on the use of FD modes then you don't get much practice. It's then up to the individual to do what he/she can to improve familiarity. The fact that other types either flown previously or simultaneously have cyclic buttons that add to the confusion doesn't help.

Max - I could of course be realistic and fail one screen but that would pointless if the objective is to train on the ESIS for the main DH is available in composite format. Less realistic would be to fail both screens on the pilot side but then the staff answer is to pass control to the co-pilot. Better all round to bite the bullet and imagine a poorly managed Double DC Gen fail scenario in which the voltage falls below the threshold for the DU's and there you have it - the ESIS alone to get you home.

I only give that to those that are well able to deliver something approaching success. That success gives their confidence a boost as well as an idea about the usefulness of the ESIS. Of course if you have a better way of teaching the use of the ESIS during an ILS approach then I would love to hear it. Those of us that have studied accidents and incidents can point to many instances when multiple systems have failed despite their apparent invulnerability.

http://www.caa.si/fileadmin/user_upload/pageuploads/AD-NOTE/AD-2004/074_DGAC_F-2004-104_B__R1.pdf

The AP system on the 139 has already demonstrated some vulnerabilities in this respect.

G.

Non-PC Plod
8th Jan 2016, 16:52
I believe I heard about a 4 x DU fail due to a wiring loom issue behind the instrument panel somewhere in Scandinavia. Fortunately the crew was just coming out of the cloud as it happened. So, its not a completely far-fetched scenario! I like to get students to do at least one approach on ESIS during the training - it helps to give confidence in their operation of the helicopter if they know they can get home using just one small part of the equipment!

Crab - you are right: most dangerous button on the helicopter! Trouble is, it is a certification requirement - (probably again a throwback to stoneage AFCS). Most experienced pilots say they have accidentally pushed it, or been on board when someone else has accidentally pushed it at least once! ......So, guess where the button is on the new 169??? Answers on a postcard!

Max Contingency
8th Jan 2016, 22:07
Better all round to bite the bullet and imagine a poorly managed Double DC Gen fail scenario in which the voltage falls below the threshold for the DU's and there you have it - the ESIS alone to get you home.

If that's what you are trying to simulate then don't you need to plunge the cockpit into darkness, unplug the pilots headsets, knock out their autopilots and remove the ILS and Nav information as well? Which would probably be un-survivable if IMC.

If I understand it correctly, a 139 pilot will only need to fly an ILS on the ESIS in the event of a failure of either both AHRS or all 4 Display Units ? (All independent systems)

Would it not be better to introduce and teach the ESIS as a tertiary instrument for cross checking information from the primary and secondary systems and acting as an umpire in the event of conflicting information between them.

Of course, recurrent students should be made to fly on it just for ****s and giggles........

Geoffersincornwall
9th Jan 2016, 04:54
My apologies for an earlier post, I took offence at your last comment but then thought better of it. I fear you have been brutalised by poor sim instruction which is sad but I know it goes on. If you wish to PM me with some details I'll add it to my list of horror stories. It is a shame that so little auditing of sim instruction goes on For that reason this kind of abuse goes undetected. I'm thinking of becoming an auditor when I retire :E

The objective of the 'screens-out' exercise is to familiarise the student with an unusual instrument that he has probably never come across before. The ESIS is not just an AH. It's also an IAS indicator, a VSI, an Altimeter and a compass and is also capable of providing VOR/ILS data/guidance.

When the student is forced to use it as the sole means of reference he/she appreciates just how straightforward it is so the concept of a total screen failure becomes less intimidating.

I don't teach that exercise to recurrent students unless requested. I take your point about using the ESIS as a referee but there is only so much time in a TR course and so many pilots require some remedial IF training during that segment of the course. Perhaps we can talk about that kind of thing on another thread. Right now I am trying to create a good enough argument for EHEST to at least add a correction to their booklet to say that their list of 'good tips' applies only to the EC225 for it certainly doesn't apply to the AW139. Maybe they would also reconsider advising pilots to rely on the stabilisation system to deliver recovery during a 'fly-through' manoeuvre. It is an archaic concept now that we are discussing the mismanagement of automation in the context of the latest generation of complex helicopters.


G.

HeliComparator
9th Jan 2016, 08:17
Flying against the springs is not a good tip for the EC225 either.

Can you post a link to these EHEST "tips"?

Geoffersincornwall
9th Jan 2016, 10:12
http://easa.europa.eu/essi/ehest/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/198961_EASA_EHEST_HE9.pdf

You will observe in para 2.4.3 that it advises pilots not to trim into the turn when using the basic AFCS systems. Later in a subsequent paragraph about 3 & 4-axis systems it doesn't provide any similar 'tips'. This leaves pilots with the impression that the 'do not trim into a turn' philosophy remains as the FD modes are built upon a basic AFCS system.

It certainly seems that there are many AW139 pilots who haven't got the message that trimming into the turn in normal stabilised flight is the preferred way to go. The French have even made trimming into a turn during a flight test a 'fail' point according to many of my French students.

We need the HE9 booklet to expressly say that trimming into the turn is the preferred way to go if the HDG mode is not being used directly.

G.

9th Jan 2016, 11:01
Geoffers - I'm not quite sure why you expect EHEST to include a sentence specifically for 139 pilots.

The document is fairly generic, as it has to be, and deals adequately with the different types and levels of automation. The advice about not trimming into turns is only in the section dealing with basic stabilsation mode with AFCS - nowhere else, so why would you assume they mean it applies to upper mode 4-axis?

The model illustrates that good (simple, intuitive, user‑friendly) design requires less competences and/or
procedural guidance (instructions) to be operated, and conversely that poor design requires more guidance
and/or competences from the user.
The model also shows that identifying only one element of the system in case of performance breakdown
is reductive and that overall system performance can by enhanced by improving any of these three basic
components, individually or in combination. So, if the 139 has issues with the design (2 AP controls in close proximity causing confusion) then the answer, surely, is better training (unless you get AW to change the cyclic) - not adding a line in an EASA document.

Geoffersincornwall
9th Jan 2016, 11:31
You will see from HC's comments that it's not just the 139 that has a problem with the concept of flying against the springs.

I appreciate that the 'tips' I referred to are neatly confined to the section on the basic AFCS and one could be forgiven for leaving it at that but the reality is that trying to get pilots to break with old habits that originate with this (out of date?) thinking means that if you find the time and space to specifically advise those using a basic AFCS not to trim into a turn then EHEST could do us all a favour and put a few 'tips' under the other sections too. The danger is that seeing those words - "do not trim into the turn" - provides a crutch for those whose preference is to stick with the techniques they grew up with.

If you take Bravo 73's comments as a measure of what is going on out there then clearly there are many 139 pilots beyond those that I see at work, who believe that the fly-through technique is preferred. Apart from any design issues there is the associated problem of mismanaging the upper modes whilst 'flying-through'.

The detailed section at the back of the booklet is all Airbus related but it doesn't say so. The AW 139 is different so it behoves the author to make that clear or at least to say that other types are different.

G.

HeliComparator
9th Jan 2016, 11:41
Thanks Geoffers, in fact I'd seen that before but missed the bit about trimming into turns. Yes it's definitely an AS332L dinosaur hangup. On the AS332L in basic AP mode there are two feedback components when flying against the trim in roll, a rate limiting (SAS) type element and another element trying to return the attitude to datum (wings level, normally) with the magnitude of the latter being proportional to the angle of bank. So in other words there is a pretty direct correlation between stick displacement and angle of bank, eg 1" for 20 deg bank, 2" for 40 deg (just making up those numbers to give the general idea). It is thus pretty easy to hold a steady angle of bank.

On the 225 if the latter element exists it is very weak. When you bank against the springs the bank angle tends to increase and you have to reduce the stick displacement to control it so that you can be at 45 deg bank and yet have the stick just a few mm displaced. It is very very easy to over bank and very difficult to hold a steady angle of bank.

Thus for IMC / night flight it is ABSOLUTELY AND DEFINITELY COMPLETELY THE WRONG WAY TO DO IT AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS.

As I've said before, why fly it like this anyway night / IMC anyway? - use HDG mode or higher.

Sigh! I suppose this is the problem with things like EHEST, they are composed of folk who no longer fly and are not fully up to speed with the latest tech.

At least it is only giving general advice on the matter and not making categorical statements. The rest of the doc is, in general, quite good I thought, if a little verbose.

9th Jan 2016, 11:57
It is very very easy to over bank and very difficult to hold a steady angle of bank. HC the 365 is very similar in that respect but you just have to practise it rather than reverting to HDG all the time. I teach my students to do both and pick the most suitable according to what they are doing at the time.

There are plenty of situations (night circuits and NVD approaches for example as well as chasing an NDB in bouncy conditions) where the upper modes are little use until you are straight and level and using the HDG requires one hand off the controls to keep twiddling the bug - not really practical as it is too slow a process compared to just correcting it manually.

There are plenty of us dinosaurs who can appreciate the use and flexibility a good AP gives you and we utilise the upper modes constantly when appropriate - but not everyone spends hours in the cruise.

HeliComparator
9th Jan 2016, 12:57
Of course I am not suggesting to never fly with the stick. My point was that when visual references are poor or non-existent, flying against the springs is the worst way to do it (on the 225 at least). When it is necessary to fly manually (the circumstances you describe plus loads more) the better way is to press the trim release and "fly it properly" in order to select the angle of bank or whatever, then release the trim and the aircraft holds that atttitude. This also applies to fore-aft cyclic which is required during takeoff, landing, changing speed etc.

The joy of doing it that way is that, as I said, you only need to make a control input to change bank/pitch/speed, once you have achieved the desired attitude you simply let go and the current attitude is then held precisely whilst you concentrate on the big picture.

It also eliminates any possibility of giving control to an upper mode with the cyclic not in trim, which is a recipe for disaster on many types.

Unfortunately there is a lot of resistance from ex-332L pilots who are not analytical enough to appreciate the fundamental difference between how ATT mode works on the 332L/L2 vs the 225. They like to wobble around I suppose.

Geoffersincornwall
9th Jan 2016, 13:17
The truth is old habits are hard to leave behind, especially when under pressure.

G.

Variable Load
9th Jan 2016, 13:52
All of the above holds true for the S92 as well. Shortly after introduction into service Sikorsky were surprised that the operators were reporting numerous AP and FD Degrade cautions were being generated. They quickly realised that pilots were constantly flying 'against the springs' rather than flying the aircraft in a trimmed state. I recall Sikorsky issued some sort of notice to operators highlighting that this was the likely cause of the nuisance cautions.

It looks like we have consensus that modern types should generally not be flown against the springs when in a degraded visual environment.

HeliComparator
9th Jan 2016, 14:20
as well as chasing an NDB in bouncy conditions) where the upper modes are little use until you are straight and level and using the HDG requires one hand off the controls to keep twiddling the bug - not really practical as it is too slow a process compared to just correcting it manually.




Oops, nearly missed that one. Why on earth would you want to "chase an NDB in bouncy conditions" when you can couple to the FMS, sit back and watch it fly an overlay approach? Another redundant skill! Some people do like to make life hard for themselves (and their passengers). S'pose I'd better not mention gonad size again.


But anyway, two points:


1/ modern helicopters allow you to beep the heading bug with the cyclic beeper and


2/ why the obsession with keeping hands on the stick? Many problems occur due to pilots fiddling with the stick instead of letting the aircraft fly itself - which it does much better than the pilots can ever do (modern helicopters, that is). OK you will want to keep your hand on the stick when the ground is near, but not for an NDB approach to a typical MDH.


You are still lingering in the dark ages crabby!

9th Jan 2016, 15:19
when you can couple to the FMS, sit back and watch it fly an overlay approach? are you allowed to do that on your IR? Or is it another case of automation-dependence degrading basic flying skills - I can auto couple the ILS all day long but it doesn't make for better piloting skills - remember I am in the business of training pilots, not preparing systems monitors to chauffeur passengers.

I fully agree that pilots need to fully understand their AP systems and select the appropriate modes when desired but to completely rely on automation all the time is to pretend you don't get skill fade or that you are an aviation God who just never gets it wrong.

If living in the Dark Ages means managing automation AND still being able to do it all manually then that's where I will stay thanks.

Ex Machina
9th Jan 2016, 15:48
We have to move away from the notion of 'managing automation' and of being a 'systems monitor'. It is all flying; it's just the way you control the flight path that changes with the specific context or phase of flight.

We need to expand our definition of what it means to 'fly' to one that encompasses full automation, manual flight and everything in between. If a pilot can't adapt to that reality, he has no place in a modern commercial helicopter.

HeliComparator
9th Jan 2016, 17:28
are you allowed to do that on your IR? Or is it another case of automation-dependence degrading basic flying skills - I can auto couple the ILS all day long but it doesn't make for better piloting skills - remember I am in the business of training pilots, not preparing systems monitors to chauffeur passengers.

I fully agree that pilots need to fully understand their AP systems and select the appropriate modes when desired but to completely rely on automation all the time is to pretend you don't get skill fade or that you are an aviation God who just never gets it wrong.

If living in the Dark Ages means managing automation AND still being able to do it all manually then that's where I will stay thanks.

You aren't allowed to do it on your initial IR because it's not type specific. However you are of course allowed to do it on recurrent training/testing for eg a 225 because that is how the aircraft is normally flown. You need to get away from this ludicrous idea that using the automation is somehow cheating / not doing it properly. I can assure you that there are just as many ways to cock up an overlay approach as there are for a manually flown one, they are just different cockups. One should concentrate training on ensuring that the normal way of operating is covered most, with the somewhat esoteric reasons to fly it manually covered just enough to get by.

That said of course you can get the best of both worlds by starting out with an overlay approach and then eg failing the FMS so they have to revert to "manual" ie HDG, IAS and VS/ALT.A. Well that's pretty manual as far as I'm concerned! Of course they get their revenge on you by electing to go-around whilst they sort it out, so you then run out of Sim time!

Anyway it is interesting to note that you are always looking for ways and reasons to fly it manually, I am the opposite. Until you get the hang of the fact that the automation is the main way to fly these types of helis and therefore the most important thing to get right (and the thing with lots of pitfalls and therefore a big training requirement) you are going to remain part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

It is like insisting that most of the flying is done using the emergency throttles because you don't trust those new fangled governor things.

Sir Niall Dementia
11th Jan 2016, 08:25
HC and Crab;

Re-reading your posts on this thread I suspect you are thinking the same things, but from different directions. Automation is now a massive part of flying modern rotary and it carries with it potentially massive pitfalls. The last type conversion I did spent a couple of days on how the thing was bolted together, what the limits are etc. and then ten days on the automation. The sim was a day of how it flies, followed by several days of how to programme it. Line training was really about the automation (new type, same job and routes)

BUT, a pilot still has to be a pilot, he still has to be able to fly the thing. Every six months we all go through OPC/IRR which really doesn't cover automation, but in those six months unless a pilot has been practising how to fly without the automatics then his skill will fade to an extent.

I believe that due to time and budgetary constraints not enough is given on conversion to automation, and scarily a single pilot is then reliant on line training and crew room help. The other snag is that the requirement for OPC/LPC really does not apply to a hugely automated aircraft. That is the main reason that we changed training here. OPC/LPC as per the requirement, line training covering the rest, but a good chunk of manual flying in between LPC/OPC to ensure that manual skills don't fade so that when the automatics do go wrong it is not a crisis to deal with it.

SND

11th Jan 2016, 08:50
SND - yes I think you are right.

I have scant regard for a pilot that can't fly the aircraft manually and HC has similar disdain for those that don't know the AP modes, submodes, degraded modes, FMS programming etc - the solution is somewhere in between as you suggest.

We both want the guys/gals in the cockpit to be as good as possible at their jobs, we just differ in our perspective since our jobs are/were different.

HeliComparator
11th Jan 2016, 10:06
HC and Crab;

Re-reading your posts on this thread I suspect you are thinking the same things, but from different directions. Automation is now a massive part of flying modern rotary and it carries with it potentially massive pitfalls. The last type conversion I did spent a couple of days on how the thing was bolted together, what the limits are etc. and then ten days on the automation. The sim was a day of how it flies, followed by several days of how to programme it. Line training was really about the automation (new type, same job and routes)

BUT, a pilot still has to be a pilot, he still has to be able to fly the thing. Every six months we all go through OPC/IRR which really doesn't cover automation, but in those six months unless a pilot has been practising how to fly without the automatics then his skill will fade to an extent.

I believe that due to time and budgetary constraints not enough is given on conversion to automation, and scarily a single pilot is then reliant on line training and crew room help. The other snag is that the requirement for OPC/LPC really does not apply to a hugely automated aircraft. That is the main reason that we changed training here. OPC/LPC as per the requirement, line training covering the rest, but a good chunk of manual flying in between LPC/OPC to ensure that manual skills don't fade so that when the automatics do go wrong it is not a crisis to deal with it.

SND

Do you not see the fallacy of that - ie you accept that the role is mostly about automation management, with all its pitfalls, and yet you accept that the OPC/LPC is completely unrepresentative of the way the aircraft is normally flown, such that pilots have to learn automation management skills by means of crew room gossip?

Of course pilots have to maintain basic skills, and indeed in the case of those with a brand new shiny CPL(H) done on a puddle jumper, have to acquire those skills. But surely the OPC/LPC should reflect the normal way the aircraft is operated. Manual flying skill checking should be a small part of that, not the major part.

And yes of course we should practice manual flying skills under the right circumstances, but it seems to me that most of the industry is still lingering in the dark ages. It just doesn't "get" automation even now, still seeing it as cheating.

The only surprise is that gangs of pilots are not rampaging the hangars at night smashing up the new fangled machinery that is depriving them of their birthright to fly manually.

HeliComparator
11th Jan 2016, 10:10
SND - yes I think you are right.

I have scant regard for a pilot that can't fly the aircraft manually and HC has similar disdain for those that don't know the AP modes, submodes, degraded modes, FMS programming etc - the solution is somewhere in between as you suggest.

We both want the guys/gals in the cockpit to be as good as possible at their jobs, we just differ in our perspective since our jobs are/were different.

I suspect the difference is that I have scant regard for pilots who can't fly manually when required, and can't fly using the automation to its greatest advantage.

Whereas you have scant regard for pilots who can't fly manually, but if they don't understand the automation or make best use of it then it's a case of "Never mind at least they can fly properly".

Sir Niall Dementia
11th Jan 2016, 10:19
HC;

The situation will remain while the only changes that happen to the LPC form are that it is periodically re-numbered. Industry "gets" automation, personally I like the way it frees up my cockpit time, but despite changes from CAP 360 to JAR to EASA the test and training requirements haven't changed. The people cerifying the aircraft and the kit are not paying due attention to the way aircraft are now flown. Changes are on their way, but they are late, and in my view in the SP/IFR world too late.

SND

HeliComparator
11th Jan 2016, 10:56
Well it's funny how we in Bristow managed to shape our LPC/OPCs for the EC225 around how the aircraft are actually used, rather than some anachronistic steam driven idea. Yes the tick box forms are tediously out of date and lacking in modern thinking, but in fact we didn't find that much of an impediment, and that included the regular training and testing we did for a CAA FOI / FTSI who flew the line with us. If it was the CAA's intention to stop us doing it that way, that would have been the opportunity, but they didn't. Ditto during TRE renewals conducted by CAA.

So whilst I'll agree that the CAA/EASA are way behind the drag curve and following meekly instead of leading, ultimately at least in the UK it is not a significant impediment for an operator, it is just an excuse.

11th Jan 2016, 11:27
Whereas you have scant regard for pilots who can't fly manually, but if they don't understand the automation or make best use of it then it's a case of "Never mind at least they can fly properly". Now you are just making stuff up to try and reinforce your feelings of superiority - I have repeatedly highlighted that I expect my pilots to be able to do both - fly manually AND utilise the automation correctly and appropriately.

Were you bullied by dinosaur QHIs early in your flying career?

HeliComparator
11th Jan 2016, 12:05
Were you bullied by dinosaur QHIs early in your flying career?


No, I never flew with a QHI.

But anyway, perhaps you can't see the point, I suppose it is a bit subtle. Perhaps I can explain it better like this:

And for clarity I'm not talking about manual skills where only manual skills are appropriate eg offshore deck landings, winching etc, but such things as instrument approaches.

Your way of thinking seems to be that the most important thing is the manual flying skills to, say, fly an ILS and you expect them to be able to do it to a high standard. If you can do it using the automation that is a bonus, but not a core skill.

For me the most important thing is to be able to use the aircraft's equipment optimally to have it fly the approach whilst you sit back and see the big picture. In the highly unlikely event that you have to fly a manual ILS, that is a backup skill that you have to be able to get by with. So for me, most of the time and effort should be spent on the former, and it should demonstrated to a high standard. For the latter you just have to survive.

I'd liken it to a heli designer who spent a huge amount if time, effort and money on the standby instruments, whilst not really caring if the main instruments were pretty crappy. I think we'd both agree that was a bad approach to design.

Oh and as for feelings of superiority, I'm a retired old codger who lost his medical, you are the (relatively) young hope for the future, with all the power. That's why I'm trying to move you out of the 1980s!

Same again
11th Jan 2016, 14:45
Dinosaurs become extinct - eventually. What most of us mere pilots want is simply consistency.

When conducting a pre-employment sim check in (an unfamiliar) 225 simulator recently I was told by the company TRE/SFI not to trim into turns as 'I know it is easier and more accurate but this company don't do it that way'.

Shortly afterwards when flying with an AW139 SFI I was castigated for not trimming into turns as 'It is far easier and more accurate to do it that way so why don't you do it?'

Geoffersincornwall
11th Jan 2016, 15:27
One of the reasons for starting this thread was to put this issue 'out there' for clarification.

The argument begins with what the manufacturer recommends in his primary literature. The Flight Manual is not totally clear on this subject but the language chosen may give some credence to the idea that the intentions were for the aircraft to be flown 'hands-off' using the ATT mode in combination with any FD mode required. It can then be 'manoeuvred' by the pilot in SAS mode by using the FTR button for short term manoeuvres or by selecting SAS mode on the GCP for longer periods of manoeuvring. It then says that the pilot can at all times 'override' the system and fly as required. I take this to be a reference to the 'fly-through' procedure. The word 'override' does seem to imply that it is not the normal or preferred technique.

I detect in my day to day relationship with those attending our school that there are those that elect to fly using 'fly-through' as a 'primarsy'means of flying. I don't believe this is correct and others from the S92 and EC225 world have reported similar problems of 'misuse'.

We definitely need some words of wisdom from the OEM's. Let's hope the FCOM's will be with us soon.

G.

Thridle Op Des
11th Jan 2016, 15:41
I would be very surprised if the OEMs go into that kind of detail in either an FCOM or even a FCTM (based on an OEM that has published guidance for 30 years)

TOD

11th Jan 2016, 17:37
Geoffers - I think the override concept for 'fly through' is exactly what is intended - if the AP is flying the aircraft you would normally monitor it and let it do its job, but if it does something you don't like or rapid alteration of the flight path is required, the pilot can always move the controls to achieve this without having to disengage the upper modes. Until we get to fly by wire with no physical connection between controls and flying surfaces then this seems the way to go on helos.

HC
For me the most important thing is to be able to use the aircraft's equipment optimally to have it fly the approach whilst you sit back and see the big picture. In the highly unlikely event that you have to fly a manual ILS, that is a backup skill that you have to be able to get by with. So for me, most of the time and effort should be spent on the former, and it should demonstrated to a high standard. For the latter you just have to survive. how do you demonstrate, to a high standard, the aircraft's ability to fly itself - it simply does what you have asked by pushing some buttons...or is there a special high standard way of pushing those buttons?;)

No, I never flew with a QHI. ahhhh,, now I understand:E

HeliComparator
11th Jan 2016, 18:05
HC
how do you demonstrate, to a high standard, the aircraft's ability to fly itself - it simply does what you have asked by pushing some buttons...or is there a special high standard way of pushing those buttons?;)


I think you are being rather norty and you know it!


Its funny how no-one has ever come to grief in the Sim using the automation ... NOT! But as you say, it was all down to the way they pressed those buttons.


I did fly with some QFIs (UAS) and some ex-QHIs (Bristow) but never a real live QHI. This is clearly why I have to fly an automated type.

Same again
11th Jan 2016, 19:34
did fly with some QFIs (UAS) and some ex-QHIs (Bristow) but never a real live QHI

Consider yourself lucky HC.

Geoffersincornwall
11th Jan 2016, 20:19
I agree. That's a logical conclusion. But it does seem to indicate that the use of the 'fly-through' technique, at least in the 139, is not intended to be a 'normal' or 'routine' way of operating the aircraft.

I make this point for I am trying to build a case against it's routine use on the basis that whilst experienced pilots who are 'in practice' can differentiate between 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' use those who are neither could find it leads to mismanagement of the automation with some serious consequences.


G.

slow n low
12th Jan 2016, 05:51
Hi crab..

if the AP is flying the aircraft you would normally monitor it and let it do its job, but if it does something you don't like or rapid alteration of the flight path is required, the pilot can always move the controls to achieve this without having to disengage the upper modes. Until we get to fly by wire with no physical connection between controls and flying surfaces then this seems the way to go on helos.

NH-90 comes to mind...

I can not comment on machines that are not FBW, but in the FBW machine, I have tended to see more 'instability' when pilots try to 'push against' any upper modes that are engaged, usually quickly followed a flurry of 'uncoupling' of said modes, a mini UA or two before they get back on track.
'Push against' / 'fly-through' technique in ATT made has mixed results in my observation. NHI was nice enough to give us a 'TAC' mode just so we would not have to fly-through. (auto trim follow up) I think its quite neat actually..

As I say, nil experience with other types but in the "1" and "0" machine, I would say does not "like" it. I guess I would describe my own approach as either:

(1) Give "George" long term commands and let him fly,
(2) Manipulate "George" via short term commands and let him fly, or
(3) Boot "George" off (completely de-couple upper modes) and fly ourselves.

But try not to fight George...

Maybe our jobs are evolving toward knowing more about exactly what the upper modes will give us (before we engage it) so we don't get caught with the old "um...whats it doing now?" then having to intervene. In the case of rapid flight path alteration, I have found (on this type) banging off the automatics back to ATT mode tends to work best.

I bring this up because eventually FBW surely will be the standard, bringing us closer to our fixed wing cousins. The future is nearly here!!

12th Jan 2016, 07:08
I make this point for I am trying to build a case against it's routine use on the basis that whilst experienced pilots who are 'in practice' can differentiate between 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' use those who are neither could find it leads to mismanagement of the automation with some serious consequences. Geoffers, then surely 'inappropiate' use of fly through would be any time the upper modes are engaged and normal manoeuvring is required - then 'appropriate' use of fly through would be when conditions change rapidly (avoiding birds, drones, gliders - any sort of late spot of a hazard) and using the upper modes just isn't quick enough. or when the upper modes aren't engaged.

HC - I think you are being rather norty and you know it! me??? surely not:)



Same again - oh dear, not good enough to do the QHI course then????:E


slow and low I bring this up because eventually FBW surely will be the standard, bringing us closer to our fixed wing cousins. The future is nearly here!! I'm not entirely sure that is a good thing - there have been lots of interesting incidents when the computer thinks it knows best.

tistisnot
12th Jan 2016, 13:34
Surely cannot be as many incidents as when the pilot knew best!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Same again
12th Jan 2016, 17:10
Same again - oh dear, not good enough to do the QHI course then????

Apparently I was. That is how I know.

12th Jan 2016, 20:18
Good for you - I hope your instructional manner is better than your internet one;)