Question for the offshore experts

[Geoffersincornwall]

EHEST (European Helicopter Safety Team) have published an excellent and thought-provoking document called 'Automation and Flight Path Management'. It begins with an example of how autopilot mismanagement can lead to near disaster. It involved an unknown helicopter type in what I assume was a night take off from an offshore platform in what was clearly night IMC.

I did my annual CRM refresher this week and the topic for discussion was the AW139 crash in Norfolk. This also involved a night IMC take off attempt which we know ended in disaster. One issue discussed was the Flight Manual requirement to have an IAS of at least 50 knots before entering IMC (Vmini = 50kts).

This rather begs the question how is it possible to operate offshore at night when many departures pitch you into instant blackness (in pouring rain?) the second you leave the glare of the platform lighting. After all these years this is the first time this anomaly has occurred to me. How do we square this particular circle?

G

[212man]

I think the key point is that the departure is a dynamic situation with an acceleration through Vmini, whereas the original requirements for Vmini revolve around longitudinal stability in trimmed flight. AC29 already makes provision for speeds below Vmini in the approach phase.

[HeliComparator]

There doesn't seem to me to be any practical difference between being IMC or being in the pitch dark with zero visual reference. So the point is on a "legal technicality" rather than anything practical. As 212 say the important thing is to maintain the appropriate accelerative attitude and in the case of something like the 225, engage GA as soon as there is positive airspeed showing.

[Non-PC Plod]

If you are not in sight of the surface ( pitch black over the oggin), then you are by definition IMC! They have to be careful writing the RFM too proscriptively, otherwise they effectively make OGP work illegal at night!

[[email protected]]

I think the key point is that the departure is a dynamic situation with an acceleration through Vmini, whereas the original requirements for Vmini revolve around longitudinal stability in trimmed flight. AC29 already makes provision for speeds below Vmini in the approach phase. but you are flying with sole reference to instruments below Vmini - doesn't matter whether it is dynamic or not (in fact that is more hazardous than steady state with things like somatogravic illusions to contend with).

And this is a departure not an approach.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Looks like there is a rock to be rolled over here. Our man in Norfolk did something many condemn as foolish even illegal but certainly his departure was in IMC by any definition of those conditions but what, in essence, was different from the guy in the EHEST booklet?

Both took off at night, both were unable to ensure that the take off could be completed using external references until a safe Vmini could be achieved.

We condemn one and choose to 'tolerate' the other. Do we have our house in order? When disaster strikes the lawyers have a field day. Shouldn't things be a little less 'wooly' for all our sakes. If the overall verdict on the Norfolk crash is one that comes out against departures without visual reference we could see pilot's representatives or those who represent offshore workers offering advice to avoid take offs offshore at night where there is insufficient visual reference in case they have an accident or incident.


G.:confused:

[212man]

Neither of these events were a consequence of being below Vmini and in fact developed once above it, so I think it's a red herring. It was a concept drawn up long before tripple redundant digital AFCSs so the only valid argument I would see is that it should no longer be a limitation. Just to further muddy things, if you read Part 29/AC-29 you will see it's minimum IFR speed so in those countries with night VFR it is irrelevant as a limitation!

[RVDT]

with night VFR it is irrelevant as a limitation

Until you dig up what constitutes visual references for NGT VFR.

[HeliComparator]

Until you dig up what constitutes visual references for NGT VFR.

Depends which state of course! On the subject of being able to see the surface, I suspect it is normal to have some sight of the surface when the lights are pointing down at it, but whether that gives any useful reference, especially if it's calm, is another matter.

[Geoffersincornwall]

I guess we will soon see the arrival of multiple FCOM's and I'm sure these grey areas will be addressed. I'm also sure that with so much expertise to hand they will do so in such a way that reinforces the OEM's view on the average piloting skills available to deal with those real but uncommon situations where the ability to maintain sufficient surface contact and useful (?) forward visibility overtake the unsuspecting offshore aviator.

What we don't want, of course, is for the OEM to come to the opinion that the night environment is universally benign or universally impossible. Thank goodness that OEM's have at their disposal copious numbers of offshore experienced pilots that thoroughly understand the feeling you get when you pitch ten degrees nose down on a dark, moonless rainy night and the overwhelming desire to keep looking outside is overcome by the need to get on the dials as you accelerate through the flicker of 20 knots and stare at the VSI daring it to read less than zero.

G. :E

[[email protected]]

it should no longer be a limitation. but it is in plenty of RFMs it would seem - if you crash operating outside the RFM (even briefly) how are you placed legally? Rather poorly I would have thought.

In the Norfolk crash, the impact may have happened above Vmini but the actions that caused that crash were initiated below it and that is the whole issue.

We all know you can fly/hover a helicopter on instruments below Vmini - providing you have been trained (and tested) to ensure you can do it safely.

[Bravo73]

In the Norfolk crash, the impact may have happened above Vmini but the actions that caused that crash were initiated below it and that is the whole issue.


In the accident you reference, Vmini is a red herring. The pilots in question quite obviously weren't flying on instruments.

[[email protected]]

Yes, but why????

Because Vmini is a limitation (whether it should be or not is a matter for discussion), they had not been trained to fly below it nor been tested in their ability to fly below it on their IR or any subsequent checks.

When they tried it, they screwed it up because they weren't looking in the right place (AI) for the information they needed to safely conduct the transition.

Therefore, the Vmini is not a red herring.

It seems to be regarded by the manufacturers and the regulators as illegal yet the offshore community do it as a matter of course for night rig departures.

Isn't that what Geoffers was referring to about squaring the circle? It is widely done yet not within the rules so something of a catch 22.

[Same again]

Geoffers question was for 'Offshore experts' Crab. Are you now one of those too?

[Never Fretter]

That EHEST guide is here: HE9 Automation and Flight Path Management (http://easa.europa.eu/essi/ehest/2015/09/he9-automation-and-flight-path-management/)

[[email protected]]

Same again - really??

Night DLs are very similar to rig departures and I have done quite a few of those.

I don't claim to be an offshore expert but I do have lots of pertinent experience.

[Geoffersincornwall]

... and the educated ex-mil world may well offer a fresh view on the matter.

and another thing.....

The EHEST document has the flavour of one of the 'old hands' talking as it refers to the notion that it's a good idea to enter a turn by pushing against the trim motor springs because an unusual attitude can be recovered by simply letting go of the cyclic.

I hope this is not taken seriously. In the AW139 you should trim into a turn. This is just what the AP does when a turn is commanded during 'auto' flight. If you have an AP failure in an AW139, for example, it's likely to occur because some wise guy has disguised the AP OFF button on the cyclic by calling it the 'SAS RELEASE' consequently it is often confused with the (nearby) button called 'FD SBY'. One single push of the SAS REL button removes both the AP's in one fell swoop. Statistically this is the single most common way that AP OUT flight mode is entered during my recurrent training sessions in the sim.

As a general rule you need (IMHO) a recovery strategy for unusual attitudes that deals with all eventualities given than you wouldn't have much time to play around if the aircraft is threatening to treat you to a touch of inverted flight. Best not to rely on the AP to play a part in your strategy so please ignore those that invite you to push against the springs or for that matter to use the GA mode to help.(RFM suggests it has a use in this respect - not very smart though).

You may have only a few seconds to get it right so stick to the tried and trusted method, wings level, balance, pitch - nose on the horizon then as required by the IAS, power as required when pitch is sorted.

I wonder if EHEST could publish a correction? I guess an SFI who's been doing this stuff for more than 3000 hours may not have quite the clout required but you never know.

G. :ok:

[Gray 14]

Geoff,

Some old stuff here. In the 365 series, I always operated and advocated the night/IFR takeoff to be initiated from the get-go hard on the instruments. The old ITO if you may.

I always placed the heading bug on the expected initial turn to heading and activated the heading hold after take off and normal climb attitude was attained plus known obstacle clearance altitude reached.

This worked well for me for many years. But when *** took over SAW, their training department shot me down with vengeance. Their stance was to have the heading bug on the take off heading and activate the heading hold as soon as airspeed allowed then let "George" manage things.

In my opinion, a pilot who is solid on the scan from initial power application through climb to cruise flight attitude is less likely to lose situational awareness than one who uses automation so early on in the take off run.

Cheers,


Gray

[Geoffersincornwall]

It's always a problem when the discussion is about the latest generation of helicopters for they appear to have some divergent design characteristics. Airbus use one philosophy and AW another and from what I understand Sikorsky is somewhere in between. Bell may well have another when we get to know the '555' a little better.

Comparing them with previous generations is where we run into problems for those brought up on those machines will find it difficult to take on board the news that you must change your technique as well as your prejudices about how to interact with automation.

The AW139 is designed to be flown using maximum automation. It is capable of single pilot operation so this has influenced the designers. Airbus, I believe, has a very sophisticated autopilot and so should also be operated in a way that makes most use of the automation.

To apply the techniques of the previous generation of helicopters to the current one is not recommended so I would tend to favour the early use of automation during the departure but the key here is that the example used by EHEST resulted in a near miss because automation was used incorrectly. Had the crew received proper training then they would have understood this.The reality is that a night offshore take off is a high risk event requiring the pilot to use maximum skill to achieve a safe departure. On a moonlit night you wonder what the fuss is about but when the opposite is the case we are forced by custom and practice to treat it as routine.

These days we have at last admitted that it was a bad idea to fly around over a Sea State 6 with floatation equipment certified for Sea State 4. Will we one day have a night operating limit that takes account of the Vmini limitation and restricts such flights to genuine night VMC?

G.

[26500lbs]

There is a lot of tricky legal speak going on and in some cases the RFM’s do not help the cause. As we all know, lawyers these days will have an input in the design and construction of procedures and manuals, so that in the event of something going wrong the blame can be mitigated.
The solution from the operators side lies squarely in the training departments and thorough, detailed, standardized techniques to as far as possible alleviate the risks during a night departure. I would not say VMini is a red herring, but TDP during the departure is the more relevant and the setup immediately after TDP as well as performance characteristics at any given departure. The move toward P2E is step in the right direction, and should effectively remove exposure time. Therefore as long as one is visual at TDP, which is a height reference over the deck, the key is to accurately achieve the correct attitude at this point. This needs to be a “climbing, accelerative attitude”. The single biggest flaw in technique I witness during night takeoffs is when pilots are too dynamic with the nose forward attitude, resulting in degrees of over-controlling and often in purely accelerative attitude with little or no climb initially and quite often a descent. The lack of aerodynamic understanding and especially with reference to the non-linear properties of drag effects, has, IMO led to a belief that it is important to slavishly attain speed as an ultimate priority during departure. In so doing one has a greater power demand during the higher pitch forward attitude and further increase in the possibility of disorientation and further over controlling. Trying to get pilots to understand the value of smooth control inputs during departure is the greatest challenge.
Assuming one has visual references (rig/deck) up until TDP and P2E, at TDP one has to “smoothly" set the climb/accel attitude with minimum additional control input, toward VTOSS/VY. Up to TDP (height) any failure has the required visual references to ensure a rejected takeoff. With P2E ensured there should in theory be no requirement for visual references as a water landing is not a calculated performance risk in the event of power loss. Yes we all know an engine failure is not he only failure, however during a departure it is the greatest risk of a resultant ditching from a purely technical standpoint. Therefore immediately after TDP pilots must already be in the correct flight attitude to maintain the climb and acceleration toward Vmini/VToss.
Perhaps its is wording of certain RFM’s that should be adjusted, but I am also of the opinion that during a dynamic phase of flight such as departure, the time spent below VMini is at an absolute minimum and the aircraft, at the time of IMC is set up in a configuration to achieve this in a very short space of time and hence in the case of an ITO should not be interpreted as prohibitive assuming correct techniques are in use.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Yes but you are still flying by sole reference to instruments below Vmini and no matter how many people tell me 'it's OK' I want to see that in writing. I'm one who has been once bitten and is now most definitely twice shy.

G.

[26500lbs]

Geoffers,
yep I agree with you. I think it is now on the operators to lobby the manufacturers to be a little more proscriptive in their writing. We all know the reality, but as you rightly state, that in a blame culture it is a nasty game when things go wrong, and every word will be looked at.

[EESDL]

Call me a cynic .....CYNIC!.......but I wonder if this wool-ey(?), grey area exists to enable the O&G sector to operate and therefore to provide the tax required for this country to be so wasteful in e first place.........
The question has been asked numerous times before and has deliberately not been dealt with. Stemming from the days of old - that 'fudge' might have worked - I was hoping EASA would have meant we got a bit more grown-up about it........or atleast meant OEMs print lower Vmini............

[[email protected]]

Therefore as long as one is visual at TDP, which is a height reference over the deck visual with what exactly?? You will have no visual horizon in the dark without NVD and that is the point about visual flying - you have to be able to control the attitude of the aircraft without reference to the instruments, otherwise you are instrument flying.

[Geoffersincornwall]

I wouldn't have started this thread if it weren't for the fact that in the same week I was part of a CRM class discussion about the Haughey accident in Norfolk and then handed a copy of HE9.

EHEST selected an incident that was used to highlight autopilot mismanagement but in fact that particular flight began to unravel as a result of no visual references below Vmini. I was surprised that nothing was made of this so maybe you are right, maybe there has been an industry conspiracy to ignore this little wrinkle?

David Beaty (author of the 'must read' THE NAKED PILOT) would turn in his grave as he laid bare the origins of todays AAIB in a former conspiracy connected to the De Havilland Comet. That one involved the manufacturer, regulator, government and operator so we know that the system is quite capable if given enough rope. Thank goodness those days are past.... probably.

Christopher Tugendhadt (head of the CAA in the '80's) wrote a speech that was so revealing I kept a copy. He stated that the country was obliged to the helicopter industry for delivering the ability to produce oil and gas from the North Sea and that the quasi-military operations necessary were a tribute to the industry's resourcefulness - words to that effect anyway.

G :E

[Bravo73]

Yes but you are still flying by sole reference to instruments below Vmini and no matter how many people tell me 'it's OK' I want to see that in writing. I'm one who has been once bitten and is now most definitely twice shy.

visual with what exactly?? You will have no visual horizon in the dark without NVD and that is the point about visual flying - you have to be able to control the attitude of the aircraft without reference to the instruments, otherwise you are instrument flying.


Here's another little 'fizzing grenade' for the discussion:

In the AW139 (and other types), arguably every Class 1 departure (Clear Area, Helipad, Offshore), even in CAVOK conditions, is with 'sole reference to instruments'.

Otherwise, how else can one fly the profile accurately? You certainly can't by looking out of the window.

[HeliComparator]

visual with what exactly?? You will have no visual horizon in the dark without NVD and that is the point about visual flying - you have to be able to control the attitude of the aircraft without reference to the instruments, otherwise you are instrument flying.

Your lack of offshore experience showing here crabbers, one must be visual up to tdp, how else would one find the deck again on a reject if not? If you'd ever been offshore you'd know that there are lots of tall sticky-out bits all lit up. One gets visual reference from them. Sometimes it's best to takeoff slightly out of wind so as to get a better reference and of course one chooses the PF according to who has the best reference.

[26500lbs]

Crab,
without wanting to be drawn into an overly pedantic argument, after several thousand such departures, in my view there are enough visual references and light right next to you on the rig/ship to allow you to visually set an attitude up to and immediately after TDP. Whilst not always guaranteed a clear horizon ahead, the point is that at TDP you are still visual with the rig structure, deck lights, and this is sufficient to set the correct attitude and make an immediate transfer on to instruments. This is more challenging on small decks and bow decks, however we train all crews to be visual with the deck up to TDP and thereafter fly solely on instruments as per an ITO once there are no more visual cues. Of the thousands conducted every winter, the fact remains very very few issues are encountered. What is interesting is when there is an incident, is to know why it went wrong and i would argue that it is very likely an incorrect technique/handling being the root cause. This may be triggered by AFCS mismanagement other technical failures or CRM breakdown. It is here the focus should be. However the point remains that assuming one is stable up to TDP, it is thereafter an ITO, and this is not beyond the limits of the aircraft or the crews if trained properly. We have all the means and facilities to carry this out perfectly safely and have done for many years. Can it be safer? Yes probably. Have all the risks been correctly identified and mitigated? Possibly - no. I do not believe being more restrictive to night operations is the answer. Correct training and testing of skills and techniques and an clear allowance in the RFM is effectively what is required to clear up the argument.

[26500lbs]

OK...HC just beat me to it whilst I was writing. I always have been slow on the keyboard with my thumbs.

[[email protected]]

Chaps, I do get that - but by your own admission This is more challenging on small decks and bow decks, however we train all crews to be visual with the deck up to TDP and thereafter fly solely on instruments as per an ITO once there are no more visual cues therefore you make the transition on instruments but not the vertical or rearwards climb, exactly as I expected and exactly what I have done in the past from rigs, grey funnel liners, cliffs, mountains etc.

It is that transition (below Vmini unless there is a strong wind) that is the fudged issue - we all know it but Geoffers has highlighted that there is an anomaly between what is done and what is approved/legal.

The military teach and test an IFTO - civil IR training and examination does neither (apparently because RFMs don't allow it) yet it is a widely used procedure.

[26500lbs]

Oh Crab - we do train it old boy. Very regularly, and test it. I have been through the same training system as you, and managed to transition into civilian ways later in my career, so drop the old civi vs military crap. I have no idea what your idea is of the civil training that goes on in the offshore companies, but dont be too amazed when you hear that we do train our crews in all the skills they need and the standard of training is exceptional amongst all the North Sea companies. I say North Sea companies, as I will not comment on the other areas of the world in which I have no experience. And please don’t tell me that the so-called “mandated IFTO” training in the RAF had prevented a disorientation on takeoff and fudged technique resulting in CFIT because we both know that is not true.
Transition below VMini is not the inherent problem in itself. All crews are trained and capable of this and do it regularly. There are areas of flight that contain a higher risk level than others, but the departure on instruments when flown correctly and as trained, with correct technique and CRM is a safe procedure. Things do go wrong in this world for all sorts of reason, but this is a very rare event during a departure. The crux of this argument is a pedantic one and over the details of fluffy wording in a manual that may or may not mean a crew if operating legally, not one of military trained crews being better than civil. Geoffers made a very good point and the real difference in the civilian world is the very real threat of litigation when things go wrong and this is what needs to be addressed. I dont even think it is very clear or even likely that a crew will be judged flying illegally in a court because they conducted a departure at night, however as Geoffers says, it is in theory a possibility and maybe better to get that clarification that in writing. I dont think any of us who fly regularly offshore at night believe a departure from a rig at night to be an unacceptably risky or dangerous activity.

[Geoffersincornwall]

CAP 1145 came out of a fatal accident. There are many changes introduced by CAP 1145 that in some ways are similar to the dilemma that we face with Vmini. Everyone agrees that it's do-able and what is more is necessary. This is an opportunity to get rid of some 'grey' areas before an accident sets one group of lawyers against another and forces one more CAP.

So who is going to step forward. Will a solution appear in the FCOM? My guess is that this would be unlikely. The OEM has it in the Part 1 of his RFM as a limitation and would be sticking his neck out to embrace a zero Vmini.

Maybe HeliOffshore should lead this particular matter as it is an operating difficulty peculiar to this sector of the business and they are in a position to convince the regulators that a 'Letter of No Objection' to a zero Vmini provided it is trained for and featured in all OPC's. We have a history of successfully dealing with this phase of night ops so I don't see a big problem.

Clearly this site is visited by members of the offshore community beyond us aviators so we can't run and hide. They will want to look after their interests and should be happy if we are seen to be treating this matter seriously and professionally.

G.

[HeliComparator]

... civil IR training and examination does neither ...

You are quite correct, civil IR training is about IFR from airport to airport. However you would be foolish if you didn't realise that there is in addition mandatory training for all the other bits that are role specific, such as airborne radar approaches, night rig landings and take offs etc. It's called the OPC or was until they renamed it (again!). You are going to get a right shock when you eventually have to go civil!

[[email protected]]

Nice patronising replies gents but you can dismount those high horses.

We know the techniques are taught and tested in the offshore world.

The point of this thread is that those procedures are in contravention of the RFM - ie at TDP you are transferring to instruments to control the helicopter BELOW Vmini.

[ShyTorque]

Seeing as there has been reference to the Haughey accident, in view of the last few posts it's probably worth mentioning that the pilots involved might not have been required to pass an OPC.

[Geoffersincornwall]

I'm not sure the OPC is relevant in the context of the Haughty departure as nobody to my knowledge has a night take off in zero vis in their Ops Manual. Maybe the SAR boys have one but no CAT organisation would be allowed to abuse Vmini to that extent - legally..... unless, as we have pointed out, you are working from an offshore platform of some kind in which case legality seems to be a peripheral issue.

G. :confused:

[ShyTorque]

Geoffers, yes I agree, i was responding to post #33 regarding the reference to role training. There is no role training required by law in the private category. My annual LPC is the only "training" I get and paradoxically it's just about the only time I operate single pilot!

The AAIB, in the G-LBAL accident report, noted that some private owners require two pilots up front but those SPIFR pilots are not required to be tested in the multi-crew role and they aren't unless an external auditor is used by the operator. It's a ridiculous anomaly still to be addressed by EASA.

It's little wonder that the AAIB found that there were no formal briefings or "standard" callouts between the crew, again as noted on G-LBAL's CVR. Essentially, two SPIFR pilots can be put together and left to get on with it. How well it works depends on the individuals concerned rather than subsequent training, regulation or testing.

Additionally, if the aircraft is certificated for SPIFR and is not operated under an AOC, the second pilot is not recognised as such by the CAA, he is at best a pilot's assistant and cannot claim any time as crew.

Apologies for the thread drift!