Aerospace Project Management Woes - Why?

[Mechta]

Most aerospace projects of the last twenty years seem to be behind schedule, over budget and in some cases stalling over seemingly ridiculous issues. In theory we should have learnt from the first 100 years of aviation and we should now have the project planning tools in place to get it right; so where is it all going wrong?

Which, if any of the following are to blame:



Lack of clarity of project goal
Over optimistic budget
Insufficient early stages R&D in an effort to pare down costs
Interference from Politicians/VSOs/Ex-VSOs/others
Lack of engineering/scientific knowledge amongst project planners
Insufficient input from hands-on end users
Project participants who don't intend to be in-post at the into-service point, so they don't care if they are wrong
Suppliers more interested in profit margin than a viable product
Component designers without sufficient hands-on experience
Over-reliance on computer outputs (Garbage In/Garbage Out)
Striving for the cheapest rather than the best
Too many 'yes-men'
Something else?

In the military arena, F-35, KC-46, Nimrod MRA.4, Eurofighter and A400M immediately spring to mind. In the civil world, A380 and B787 are the obvious candidates.

Are there any financially large aerospace projects in the last thirty years or so which have come in near to time and price with a good product as well? If so, what was their secret?

[KenV]

Are there any financially large aerospace projects in the last thirty years or so which have come in near to time and price with a good product as well? If so, what was their secret?

It seems the only on-cost on-schedule projects were derivative programs and even some of them had trouble. P-8 (basaed on 737) was a successful derivative project. But Wedgetail (also based on 737) took much longer and cost way more than expected. But P-8 used mostly off-the-shelf technology. It was not bleeding edge. Wedgetail was very bleeding edge in the sensor and processing areas. I don't know what the excuse is for the KC-46. Nothing bleeding edge there that I can see. H-53K was a big success. But H-53E was a mess. Longbow Apache was a success.

[camlobe]

Dare I suggest RAF E3D.

On time, on budget, and the end user got exactly what they needed/wanted. And is wasn't tarnished with the need to accomplish many and varied different mission profiles I.e. Not a multi-role frame.

'Course, the fact that it was predominantly an RAF managed project, and more than one Senior Officer involved came from an AEW background probably made a large contribution.

Add to this, it wasn't hijacked by political vote-chasing decisions.

The less ingenious might suggest its total programme success lay in the fact BAe weren't involved, but that might just be seen as sour grapes.
Camlobe.

[ORAC]

Nowadays a Project Manager is hired as wiz kid who is expert in PRINCE II, DOORS, DODAF etc etc, and all the other buzzwords. Engineers who learned other skills working on projects don't even get considered.

The only problem - they don't know what they're talking about on the programme. So problems don't get an engineer fix when they arise, they get a schedule fix and the hRd problems get slipped toward the end. Then the decision is made to start working concurrently on design, development and production.

If you're a smart PM, at that stage you move onto a new start up programme for "career development" and leave the minor clean up problems to your junior successor.

Guess what happens.......

[Lonewolf_50]

H-53K was a big success. Ken, H-53K got moved three years to the right. Not saying it isn't a good bird, and it seems that the government and Sikorsky made good with GAO on the "why is this moving right" deal, but it did suffer schedule setbacks.

EDIT: Link from a few years ago, Rotorheads forum discussion on CH-53K (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/448854-ch-53k.html#post6393322).

[Flap Track 6]

In the military arena, F-35, KC-46, Nimrod MRA.4, Eurofighter and A400M immediately spring to mind. In the civil world, A380 and B787 are the obvious candidates.

I was heavily involved as a member of the design team with two of those projects you quote. In both cases there was a massive and fundamental underestimation of the time, effort and cost involved in delivering the project, which was the main reason they ran badly late.

[Mechta]

Camlobe, To the casual observer the E-3D is little more than an off the shelf product with different engines. How far, within the bounds of public knowledge, is this from the truth?
The fact that it was only three years from order placement to aircraft delivery presumably meant that most decisions would have been taken within one tour of any particular RAF project officer post. Was this a significant contributor to its success?

ORAC wrote,If you're a smart PM, at that stage you move onto a new start up programme for "career development" and leave the minor clean up problems to your junior successor.

Guess what happens.......That certainly rings true. I have vivid memories of asking a programme director where the time for re-testing failed first articles was in her plan; only to be told, 'There won't be any failures, we don't have time for failures'. Strangely enough she left for an 'opportunity too good to miss', a few weeks before testing started.

KenV, From the projects you were closest to, can you recall anything which stood out from the early stages of the most successful ones?

Flaptrack wrote,

I was heavily involved as a member of the design team with two of those projects you quote. In both cases there was a massive and fundamental underestimation of the time, effort and cost involved in delivering the project, which was the main reason they ran badly late.

Was that because the experts in their fields underestimated from the beginning, or because the programme managers pushed them into corners to give unrealistic timescales and budgets, as, 'The customer won't like the original figures'?

[Wander00]

Well, if we cannot get AEF flying into Wittering effectively without forgetting fire cover and ATC at weekends, what chance has anything more complicated got................OK, hat, coat, black Omega.................

[Flap Track 6]

Was that because the experts in their fields underestimated from the beginning, or because the programme managers pushed them into corners to give unrealistic timescales and budgets, as, 'The customer won't like the original figures'?

All of the above.

In my experience, the team which delivers the forecast is not the team who has to deliver the project. Also, I find that we engineers are rubbish at estimating how long tasks take, usually wildly under estimating.

Recently, I have been involved with a 'lessons learned' for a non-aerospace military project I was involved with that went completely pear shaped and the main points were total underestimation of timescales and costs and that all the bad decisions were taken right at the start.

[Lonewolf_50]

Flaps, as you get near the edges of tech, to go from leading edge to new stuff, the risk in a program grows ... and sadly, one can only estimate what that risk is as one doesn't know until one gets there.

AS the level of tech increases in complexity, so too does the price of the unknown and failures induced by same as project push back the edges of the possible.

There are things that can be done, but there are also things that can't be planned away. What I think happens most often is that a groupthink occurs in order to get started. Management, funders, and those in the trenches conceptually minimize how hard the unknown can be on us during a project. It is hard to quantify, as we don't have the data points yet, but we have to get started or we never get there.

Damned if one does, damned if one doesn't.

[NutLoose]

I thought the Airbus helicopters Lokota helicopter programme for the U.S. Military had been both on time and on budget.

[fltlt]

I thought the Airbus helicopters Lokota helicopter programme for the U.S. Military had been both on time and on budget.

I think you will find after the Army keeping the Comanche money then basically saying we want a commercial derivative, the all singing/all dancing steps were skipped.
Allegedly the recommendation from the testing community was no.
However that was ignored, but did not negate the scrambled rush to cool avionics that were not rated for hot places. Caused quite a stir in high places that one did.
Where you buy is oft times more important than what.
Just my tuppence worth.

[NutLoose]

However that was ignored, but did not negate the scrambled rush to cool avionics that were not rated for hot places. Caused quite a stir in high places that one did.


Not totally correct, the avionics presented no problems, however the US military having a "we do not have air conditioning in our military helicopters" stance had airbus remove it for the Lakota, the air conditioning was not just there for the crew, but for avionics cooling as well, hence they had problems early on until the system was restored.

However a 300 plus helicopter programme with every one delivered on time or early and on budget from a purpose built facility employing a large percentage of veterans is something to be proud of.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uh-72-lakota-hot-n-high-04247/


Nov 10/07: The LUH program encounters its first spot of trouble. The Associated Press reports that during flight tests in Southern California in 80-degree weather, cockpit temperatures in the UH-72A Lakota (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uh-72-lakota-hot-n-high-04247/) soared above 104 degrees, the designated critical point for communication, navigation and flight control systems. In response, the Army will be installing air conditioning in many UH-72s, something that’s common on the EC145 civilian helicopters it’s derived from, but rare on military machines.


http://tacticalmashup.com/uh-72-lakota-light-helicopter-lands-airbus-in-us-defense-market/


.

[Fluffy Bunny]

however the US military having a "we do not have air conditioning in our military helicopters" stance
Which proves the OP's point 4 quite nicely Nutty....

[VinRouge]

Each project will have a combination of the above, however, don't underestimate the impact of politicians, workshare and the customer changing the requirement. We will probably end up with the mpa solution we should have if it weren't for BAE lobbying government for a new solution.

[camlobe]

Mechta,
A very short précis.

The RAF E3D's weren't strictly off the shelf as the E3 production line had been shut down years before. The build line wasn't there. However, Boeing had the facility and the plans. The RAF team knew exactly what they wanted, and how much the total budget allowance was. One of the slightly bizarre issues covered the American favoured boom refuelling system. The RAF didn't want this, just probe and drove, but to design the boom system out would have cost circa $500,000 per airframe. The E3D's have both refuelling systems. Saved money and increased capability. The only notable carry over from the AEW3 was the one good piece of kit the RAF liked, and the Loreal pods were removed from Nimrod and installed on to the E3D's at production. Utilising this piece of proven kit gave further financial savings.
First-hand knowledge of mission requirements along with experience on the NATO E3 fleet helped this programme run smoothly from inception to delivery without any of the 'normal' delays and cost overruns we have become used to.
There are others on here who could help with deeper explanations on how well executed this whole acquisition project was accomplished without crossing the OPSEC boundary.
Camlobe

[triboy]

Was that over budget/time compated to what was realistic or what the customer demanded? I can think of many examples.

[Ian Corrigible]

H-53K was a big success
Development is currently 45% ($2.1 Bn) over budget (http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668986.pdf#page=77), and the program is already four years behind schedule, a figure likely to slip further.

Flap Track 6 covers many of the causes. Others include a disconnect between top management and engineering in many firms where engineers are overlooked by the management development process; a tendency by CFOs (esp. in publicly traded firms) to adopt the best-case program schedule as the most likely schedule; and the usual proclivity towards firefighting -- i.e. day-to-day milestones being missed, leading to heroic efforts to recover schedule down the road -- in the absence of strong management.

[Pontius Navigator]

And remember the E3F was procured in parallel.

[Martin the Martian]

camlobe-

The production line for the 707 airframe was still going in the late 1980s, albeit at a low rate, with US Navy E-6s taking up most of the slots. Bearing in mind that most airframes off the line were basically empty, do you mean the 707-to-E-3 gubbins installation line?

I could be wrong, but I believe the last RAF E-3 may have been the last 707 built.

[Lonewolf_50]

Not totally correct, the avionics presented no problems, however the US military having a "we do not have air conditioning in our military helicopters" stance had airbus remove it for the Lakota, the air conditioning was not just there for the crew, but for avionics cooling as well, hence they had problems early on until the system was restored.
Sorry, mate, the SH-60B / F had AC from the get go. Vintage early 1980's. Reason? Computers and avionics. Looks like your "US military" is off base.
It was called "Environmental Control System" which is a fancy way of saying "air conditioning" though you could get heat through the ducts as well. The MH-60R has it as well.

From a years old description of the system ... yes, it does indeed have scuppers, it's a Navy aircraft! :}
Cabin, cockpit, nose avionics compartment, and transition section temperature is controlled by the Environmental Control System (ECS). The system provides both heating and air conditioning within a range of 2 to 71 °C. Supplementary air circulation is provided in the cockpit by manually controlled air inlets (scuppers).

@Ian
where engineers are overlooked by the management development process; a tendency by CFOs (esp. in publicly traded firms) to adopt the best-case program schedule as the most likely schedule; and the usual proclivity towards firefighting -- i.e. day-to-day milestones being missed, leading to heroic efforts to recover schedule down the road -- in the absence of strong
management.
People not listen to engineers? Perish the Thought (https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#safe=active&q=seven+blue+lines)!

[NutLoose]

Unfortunately, the LUH has just encountered its first spot of trouble. The Associated Press reports that during flight tests in Southern California in 80-degree weather, cockpit temperatures in the UH-72A Lakota rose above 104 degrees, the designated critical point for communication, navigation and flight control systems…

A July 2007 report to the Army said that no cockpit equipment failed during testing, but the aircraft is considered “not effective for use” in hot environments until the military adds air conditioners to the helicopters. Civilian helicopters like the EC145 from which the Lakota is derived use air conditioning, and experience no problems with hot environments as a result. In contrast, military helicopters generally do not include air conditioning because adding them reduces available power, and increases their maintenance overhead.
The issue is the first example of the Army mis-estimating the factors involved in taking a commercial off the shelf helicopter and adapting it for military use – an issue that has plagued the Bell 407-derived ARH-70A helicopter almost from its inception. While the LUH program was designed to buy helicopters solely for use at home and far away from combat zones, there had been talk of changing that and creating a more flexible fleet of UH-72 helicopters that could fill various roles as needed. The latest issue, and the proposed resolution, makes that flexible fleet future less likely.


UH-72 Lakota: Hot n? High (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uh-72-lakota-hot-n-high-04247/)

LUH-72 Issues
The issue is not that EC sold the Army a bad bird. The issue is that bean counters at higher levels within DA considered the A/C a luxury item and deleted it. The A/C does not keep up out there, because there is not one. There is a ventilation system, but not an A/C like the rest of us are used to. Not to mention 2 other key issues. The avionics are not certified to work above 95F OAT and the doors cannot be open in flight except when performing hoist ops. The TH-67 initially came with A/C. The Army then paid to have them removed before acceptance. Due to airframe issues caused by the doors being removed multiple times per day, they then paid to have A/C reinstalled on the initial fleet and all future deliveries. :D

The AH-1 and the AH-64 systems were sold as an Environmental Control Unit (ECU). These 2 aircraft have no window that can be opened in flight. The OH-58D started out with an ECU, but some nitwit changed the wording to reflect an A/C. Yet, it is loaded with avionics that constantly overheated during Desert Storm. := Early OH-58Ds still have a mount for the A/C on the power accessory gearbox. It was direct drive, and not piggybacked off of the TR driveshaft like the TH-67.

There are a lot of missions in the hot months due to heat injuries of course. Too bad the bean counters valued a few dollars over people's lives. :ugh:

Fortunately, many of these aircraft are going to VIP units. It will not take but a few VIP flights before we get an A/C. I just wonder how much more it will cost for it to be installed as an add-on. :confused:

On another note, as readers posted, this is not the 1st venture into FAA certified aircraft by the Army. There are currently about 200 N numbered (FAA registered) TH-67s at mother Rucker. And, they have not been maintained to FAA standards; but that is a whole other issue. :mad:


Air conditioning is standard in commercial versions of the aircraft, which have not had overheating problems. But the military usually avoids air conditioning in military aircraft to reduce weight and increase performance.
"We don't need air conditioning in the Blackhawks, so we didn't think it would be an issue" in the Lakota, McCuin said. "But when we got the helicopter into the desert, we realized it was a problem."

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/288268-us-army-screws-up-uh-72a-lakota-merged-threads.html


.

[tucumseh]

Lack of clarity of project goal
Over optimistic budget
Insufficient early stages R&D in an effort to pare down costs
Interference from Politicians/VSOs/Ex-VSOs/others
Lack of engineering/scientific knowledge amongst project planners
Insufficient input from hands-on end users
Project participants who don't intend to be in-post at the into-service point, so they don't care if they are wrong
Suppliers more interested in profit margin than a viable product
Component designers without sufficient hands-on experience
Over-reliance on computer outputs (Garbage In/Garbage Out)
Striving for the cheapest rather than the best
Too many 'yes-men'
Something else?

Yes, all of the above. Caveats...

"Budget" and "predicted cost" are seldom the same thing. I've had many projects where fair and reasonable cost was many times the budget sought by London. This almost always leads to delay.

Suppliers' profit margin. Not as big an issue as many think, especially on the main development and production contracts, due to post-costing. While many try to make their money on support, MoD policy actually hands them far more on a plate.

Most successful whole aircraft project I ever managed was down to 4 significant factors.

1. The Service (RN) Support Authority withdrew, refusing to support it. Great. Left me to do their work for them, which I was trained for. They weren't.

2. The Service users (front line operators and maintainers) were embedded in the team from day 1. The RN Appointer was brilliant. Double tours for continuity, aligned to the programme plan.

3. Early decision to completely ignore 1 and 2 Stars. If I'd followed their orders, the aircraft wouldn't be in service yet, 15 years after first flight. Others obeyed their orders, hence MRA4 and Chinook Mk3. (Which is why MoD told the PAC they couldn't be identified, despite their names and phone numbers being prominent in the MoD directory).

4. Follow the regulations. They're written by people who've got the t-shirt. (But cancelled in 2008, without replacement. A wise man has kept his own copy, as have sensible contractors).



The initial Post Project Evaluation report of 11th January 2001 is a gem of a read (if I say so myself). MoD deny its existence. :ok:

[Lonewolf_50]

@ Nut Loose, I suggest you understand the distinction between the word "army" and "military." I also flew in Blackhawks, which were not air-conditioned.

That is all.

[Cpt_Pugwash]

Wot Tuc said above.:ok:

I would also note that a PPE is mandated for all projects, but is seldom produced, hence no chance of learning from mistakes.

[superplum]

I seem to recall that the three RAF E3Ds were Ex USAF KC-135R of c mid-60's vintage. Must have been a cost-saving there!

:rolleyes:

[Willard Whyte]

I think you're getting confused between the (originally 7, now 6) E-3Ds, which were new builds, and the RJs - which are indeed 'refurbished' '135Rs.

[t43562]

I don't know if you find this to be true but in the software world its often the unglamorous projects which do best and my theory is that it is because they attract less idiots and people who want to stick their oar in.

Plus you can get away with doing what's right more often.

[Hempy]

imo, it's all about 'performance based salaries' and 'risk reduction'.

No 'manager' is prepared to take a 'risk' by accepting that someone lower on the payscale ladder might know something more than they do. It might make them look bad!

The issue is that said 'manager' isn't put in place solely by competence anymore. The capitalist system has self destructed thanks to greed (which is the basis of it's outlook anyway)

As much as we hope for altruism, it just doesn't exist anymore

[tornadoken]

OP's Q was to flush out a (complex) aerospace product on time/price/Spec. We have responded with some diatribes about Waste-of-Space (we could have added Wastelands). Missing the point.

For-profit businesses do not relish R&D - high resource, low return. They want pea-in-pod volume at high margin - any colour you like as long as it's black. They don't need necessarily to make it, just to Prime it and take the mark-up - what does Daimler actually make in their Mercedes products? Early 787s had next-to-zero Boeing fabrication. So, Aerospace Prime Contractors now see themselves as integrators, not whittlers, of boxes and tin. If...a firm has the resilience to define its product, find the money, do it, and stand or fall on its market attractiveness, then, so. General Aviation offers many As, to OP's Q. But this is the Military Aviation thread.

Military Buyers think they know what they want and how to cause that to happen. In the 30 (>40!) years put forward by OP, only once has "success" accrued to a UK military Aero product: HSAL Hawk. The Spec. was clear, was put out to industry on a proposition of I pay, you do, was all-up contracted at a fixed package price; Customer left industry to get on with it. So that's the A to what is the secret.

But that cannot be read across to front line combat kit. If... Hawk had floundered in R&D, options (now COTS) were readily available. DoD and all the other hopeful Users for F-35s have no choice but to persevere and pay. While time goes by, they have no choice but to fund Customer-Initiated Change Proposals, scuttling the time/price basis of the original bid, because iPhone Old is of no use to our boys facing bad guys with iPhone Next. So, drift, bloat, until a Buyer says something NOW! please, not better, tomorrow, maybe.

RN made much of its management success in commissioning its Polaris/SSBNs on time (ordered 5/63, first patrol 15/6/68), on-Spec., on-budget. Well...but...this was as close to COTS as a weapon system could be (thank you, USN/DoD); it went to sea with a partial weapon load, and, as for on-budget, well what did that actually mean? “I hadn’t the
faintest idea (of hull build cost) so I took projected cost of Valiant (SSN) and doubled it.” (UK Polaris Executive Programme Manager...but I've lost the source!)

[Hempy]

You forget that 'the Military' (i.e. VSO's and 'the Government'..after all, who else gets a say?) IS a 'business' in 2015. They may as well be named RAF.inc (etc..)

[Mechta]

From reading the replies there is evidently a wealth of project management experience here. One wonders how many billions could be saved in defence procurement if this knowledge was distilled and taught to would-be programme managers.

Thank you Camlobe for expanding on the E-3D differences. Lonewolf_50's 'Perish the Thought' video link :ok:is far too painfully close to the truth of the average project meeting that I've attended.

Tucumseh's point that if one group are left to get on with it with the minimum of outside interference, then a better product usually results. This is backed up by what Tornadoken said about the Hawk.

Perhaps the problem is the sales people want to offer the earth, and the customers are only to happy to buy what they are offered. When it comes to actually producing a new aircraft with all the new engines, sensors, weapons and other hardware there are just too many unknowns. Maybe we should be more willing to accept mid-life or even quarter-life updates from the word go, rather than insisting on every part of the system being ready at the intended entry into service?

Is part of the problem that too many programmes are put in the hands of, or at least influenced by, 'high-flying whizz kids' who have only had superficial contact with earlier programmes, and don't have the depth of understanding to appreciate the implications of their decisions?

Taped to a desk I saw the following:



The Cowboy Proverb:

Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.
(http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/will_rogers.html)



As Tornadoken says:
Customer left industry to get on with it. So that's the A to what is the secret.

This seemed to work for General Atomics with the Predator A. Make a product that works and you know the customer will need, put it out there, and when they have a burning need they will come banging on your door. It just takes the financial resilience to be able to wait until they need it.

[t43562]

Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.

Then perhaps the "answer" is to try to have a lot of small, cheap projects so that people can cut their teeth on those.

[ShyTorque]

I also flew in Blackhawks, which were not air-conditioned.


Me too. When you arrive at your aircraft, put the battery on and both "windscreen hot" (overheat) captions are already lit (50 degrees C?) you know you are in for an uncomfortable day.

Could have been prevented if the aircraft were kept inside longer, but apparently it was more important to wash the hangar floor every day than to consider crew comfort.

[andyy]

If you think that Aerospace PM is bad, you try the rail industry.:suspect::eek::ugh:

[Willard Whyte]

E. Midlands too, andyy? They started Great Western electrification about 18 months ago, and are currently almost 18 months behind schedule!

[andyy]

WW, Yes East Mids Airport is a very near neighbour!

I'm not surprised about the electrification.

NR usually fail to issue a scope of requirement and tells industry that they are the experts so tell us what you are going to do, stating all your assumptions.

They require a budgetary price to get authorisation for the spend.

Because there is no proper scope, the budgetary priced offered up by different contractors will differ markedly as each has a different understanding of what is required.

NR picks the cheapest budgetary price and issues an ITT. Again, there will be a lot of documents but no defined scope. Industry tries to navigate its way through and prices against an assumed scope but invariably this scope is wrong and requires lots of re-work causing delays and increased cost. Sometimes new documents are issued that change the interpretation of the scope late in the day, or even after a bid has been submitted.

If a contract is awarded there will then be a period where the scope is defined again in order to complete outline designs; and industry has to re-price. During project delivery there will be numerous variation orders as the scope is refined. and on it goes.

NR is supposed to have a planned maintenance and upgrade programme but does not have the people who appear to know what the detail of that requires. And their planned programme always seems to come as a surprise to them with stupid deadlines and unrealistic expectations.

They have framework contractors who are supposed to deliver against the scopes but the scopes are poor. When the contractors issue designs for authorisation, NR hands them over the a design consultancy like Atkins or Jacobs to do the review and this all takes time and money and results in different understanding of the scope, so the Scope changes and the design has to change etc etc etc.

And then the contractors probably dont have enough of the trained resources and project managers to deliver etc etc

You could not make it up. It would be cheaper to rip up the railways and concrete over the Permanent Way for the exclusive use of Coaches and HGV.

[Shaft109]

May I suggest OP you find a copy of "The Skunk Works" by Ben Rich - Kelly Johnson's successor.

A great read but when you stop to think about how they got the Blackbird flying from first sketches to wheels up in under 5 years (in the '50's and '60's) it's was effectively down to experienced designers working literally next to the machinists with important decisions taken quickly and decisively with no interference from outside.

[Mechta]

Thanks Shaft109 for the tip. I'll get myself a copy.


it's was effectively down to experienced designers working literally next to the machinists with important decisions taken quickly and decisively with no interference from outside.

It does beg the question, if this is the way to get a complex project completed in a short space of time, which must be cheaper in the long run, then why don't we do this all the time? I appreciate that there is a huge difference between building a prototype and tooling up for a production run, but the basic principle is there either way.

[SWBKCB]

If you think that Aerospace PM is bad, you try the rail industry

Was just thinking something similar - never been near an aerospace project (or a rail one!), but it's all very familiar. Think it's a "projects" issue, not an "aerospace" one.

Occasionally, just occasionally, you get a project manager who gets it and then you think "ah, that's why you get 'x' times more than me".

The rest of the times it's micro management by timewasters who don't know what they are talking about.

[triboy]

The current mod procurement process starts with a URD that never gets tested against reality until sometime after the budget is set. From the user's perspective anything less than this URD is inferior and therefore mostly never delivered for the budget available. The reason the examples mentioned above are successful is that the user has taken a product that already exists then changed how they operated to make the most of it. There is a lesson there somewhere:-/