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js1964
29th Mar 2015, 04:35
...no lives lost apparently. Hit electrical wires on landing?

Nothing on news yet, but twitter:

https://twitter.com/hashtag/AC624

https://twitter.com/AirCanada/status/582037344494174209

"Confirms AC624, YYZ-YHZ exited runway upon landing at Halifax. All passengers have deplaned, going to terminal. More updates to come."

akerosid
29th Mar 2015, 04:38
An Air Canada A320, inbound from YYZ, apparently clipped power lines and "crash landed" at Halifax early this morning. Unconfirmed reports suggests the aircraft overran. Apparently sustained substantial damage.

CBC.ca News - CBC Nova Scotia (http://live.cbc.ca/Event/CBC_NS)

tbaylx
29th Mar 2015, 05:04
Rumors of hitting powerlines, runway excursion and significant airframe damage..i'd call that a crash

training wheels
29th Mar 2015, 06:46
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CBPqHFnWoAAPXy9.jpg

Appears like the nosewheel collapsed?

Pic Source: Twitter

Snowcat
29th Mar 2015, 06:54
Air Canada flight leaves runway in Halifax, 23 sent to hospital - Nova Scotia - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/air-canada-flight-leaves-runway-in-halifax-23-sent-to-hospital-1.3013979)

six7driver
29th Mar 2015, 07:07
"leaves runway"..."exits runway"...pretty much looks like a CRASH to me. The Air Canada PR department and CBC are not understating, they are delusional:mad::ugh:

airdogalpha
29th Mar 2015, 07:33
Clipped wire on appoarch to 23

https://twitter.com/KSundahlCTV/status/582074965815611393

metar show cross wind 29- 54knots in the hour before and after incident

Notam:

[DOD PROCEDURAL NOTAM] INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURE CHANGED,
ILS OR NDB RUNWAY 23 (GNSS), ORIGINAL, 05MAR15.
CHANGE GLIDE PATH ANGLE FROM 2.70 DEGREES TO READ 3.00 DEGREES.
CHANGE THRESHOLD CROSSING HEIGHT FROM 57 TO READ 59.
05 MAR 13:33 2015 UNTIL 02 APR 05:00 2015. CREATED:
05 MAR 13:35 2015

airdogalpha
29th Mar 2015, 07:39
Cyhz csb2 awos temperature, dp, altimeter setting, precipitation, cloud hgt and cover unreliable. 28 mar 07:43 2015 until 03 apr 23:59 2015. Created: 28 mar 07:51 2015

RAD_ALT_ALIVE
29th Mar 2015, 07:47
Hmmm....sounds remarkably familiar, but I can't put my finger on it;

1. Legacy carrier with a local reputation for arrogance,
2. Overrun/crash (the 'c' word),
3. PR department refusing to acknowledge the 'c' word,

The only thing missing will be the spending of 10's of millions of dollars in fixing what appears to be a write-off.

DaveReidUK
29th Mar 2015, 07:54
Great quote:

"Spurway [spokesman for the Halifax Stanfield International Airport] said the incident was not a crash because it is believed the plane was under control as it came in. He said there's no indication what caused the hard landing and he did not know the condition of the plane."

Air Canada flight leaves runway in Halifax, 25 sent to hospital - Nova Scotia - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/air-canada-flight-leaves-runway-in-halifax-25-sent-to-hospital-1.3013979)

N707ZS
29th Mar 2015, 08:17
Hope that's not cable marks/burns on the fuselage.

six7driver
29th Mar 2015, 08:19
May well be. Passengers on board that were interviewed on TV have already said there was a large flash before landing with several saying they hit a power pole or cables before landing.

N707ZS
29th Mar 2015, 08:31
Google earth shows wooden power poles on each end of the runway.

BoyFly
29th Mar 2015, 08:56
SPECI CYHZ 290414Z 34024G33KT 3/4SM R14/P6000FT/U -SN DRSN BKN010
OVC018 M06/M07 A2965 RMK SF7SC1 SLP046=
CYHZ 290400Z 34019G54KT 3/4SM R14/5000VP6000FT/D -SN DRSN BKN007
OVC010 M06/M07 A2964 RMK SF7SC1 SLP045=
SPECI CYHZ 290313Z 35020G26KT 1/2SM R14/3500V4500FT/N SN DRSN VV003 M06/M07 A2963 RMK SN8 SLP040=
CYHZ 290300Z 34019G25KT 1/8SM R14/P6000VM0300FT/N +SN DRSN VV003 M06/M07 A2962 RMK SN8 /S09/ SLP038=


If CBC news is reporting correctly (That's a big if!) then the accident occurred at 03:35Z landing on runway 05 which is a LOC only approach. If Jetplan is accurate the METAR above shows a significant windshear near that time.


Glad nobody was seriously injured!

jack11111
29th Mar 2015, 09:35
So if the aircraft took out the airport power, does that mean the runway lights went dark? How quickly can emergency generators power-up? Maybe not quick enough.
Landing with only aircraft landing lights. In blowing snow, at night.

DaveReidUK
29th Mar 2015, 09:37
More pics here, view of the trailing edge.MLG gone, engines presumably in situ but half buried.

No hurry with the hard landing checks, then ...

Mark in CA
29th Mar 2015, 09:51
Air Canada plane leaves Halifax runway on 'abrupt' landing (http://news.yahoo.com/air-canada-plane-leaves-runway-upon-landing-halifax-044255936.html)

tupungato
29th Mar 2015, 09:52
http://i.imgur.com/tOHY2aS.png

http://i.imgur.com/WExBdQd.jpg

Right wing torn off. Engine was somewhere else.

firefish
29th Mar 2015, 10:10
Either you crash or you land - there's no such thing as a crash landing. A landing implies control, in this case it appears that they had none.

If you're on an un-stabilized approach and you're so low that you hit power lines coming in and the only two obvious factors that allowed everyone to walk away is that 1. there happened to be a hard and flat surface in the aircrafts trajectory and 2. the slush and snow acted as a fire extinguisher, I'd say that this absolutely qualifies as a crash. Unless they had a major malfunction and this was the best they could do.

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 10:59
It will be interesting to hear if the pilot followed a "proper" slope to the RWY or ducked under or whether perhaps wind shear played a role.

Also of interest is whether they hit that pole or wire causing the electrical black out in the area.


And unlike what AC is calling it; "a runway excursion", I call this a crash.

Liffy 1M
29th Mar 2015, 11:03
Photo of the right-hand side here:
Photos: Airbus A320-211 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Air-Canada/Airbus-A320-211/2613292/L)

DaveReidUK
29th Mar 2015, 11:15
Right wing torn off.

Photo of the right-hand side here:
Photos: Airbus A320-211 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net

They glued that starboard wing back on again quickly. :O

tupungato
29th Mar 2015, 11:25
That's what I get for believing the news...

Loose rivets
29th Mar 2015, 11:37
Those power cables look very typical of the ones we have in Texas. The voltage is only reduced for domestic consumption by the use of a sizable transformer often up a nearby pole - voltages on the skinny wires can be in the thousands before being dropped to c 115 0 115. Despite being thin, by necessity, the wires are very strong - doubtful they'd shear any significant metal parts however. Perhaps the pole was part of the equation.

Some of the arching from damaged lines has to be seen to be believed. Looks like there was at least some luck about.

Capot
29th Mar 2015, 11:53
How quickly can emergency generators power-up? Maybe not quick enough.There's nothing to say, from what I've read, that the power cables were indeed the main supply to the airport, so the question may not be relevant.

Time to cut over to emergency power/alternative main supply is a function of the airport Category, with Cat III, for sure, requiring "no-break cut in", ie generators permanently running (if they are the alternative supply) and automatic switch-over on sensing a loss of main supply

I can't remember the requirements for other Categories, but I'm sure someone can.

Back to the main topic.

Mudman
29th Mar 2015, 11:57
Transportation Safety Board (TSB) Flickr Page (https://www.flickr.com/photos/tsbcanada/16342568434/in/photostream/)

https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7626/16342568434_689534d42a_c.jpg


https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8716/16777466050_7579bab2ed_c.jpg

Severe Clear
29th Mar 2015, 12:01
Videos

Air Canada Airbus A320 Skids off Halifax Runway, Sending 25 to Hospital - NBC News (http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/air-canada-plane-runs-runway-during-landing-halifax-n332026)

de facto
29th Mar 2015, 12:13
Wondering about the crew experience:E

FullWings
29th Mar 2015, 12:29
I don’t see how you could describe this as anything other than a crash. I’ve seen better looking write-offs!

jaytee54
29th Mar 2015, 12:50
Did a previous post not say he was approaching runway 05 on a localiser approach?

Mudman
29th Mar 2015, 12:55
Street view from 05 end of runway.

https://www.google.ca/maps/@44.89619,-63.496295,3a,90y,268.3h,84.12t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sV6nira3KO_5Q4QUaUHkjjw!2e0

BoyFly
29th Mar 2015, 13:07
It was runway 05. Localizer approach.

TylerMonkey
29th Mar 2015, 13:13
"This is same place that a 747 cargo crashed several years ago."

Negative, the 747 crashed off the end of the longer runway 23 heading SW.

phiggsbroadband
29th Mar 2015, 13:14
Wit this Notam:

[DOD PROCEDURAL NOTAM] INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURE CHANGED,
ILS OR NDB RUNWAY 23 (GNSS), ORIGINAL, 05MAR15.
CHANGE GLIDE PATH ANGLE FROM 2.70 DEGREES TO READ 3.00 DEGREES.
CHANGE THRESHOLD CROSSING HEIGHT FROM 57 TO READ 59.
05 MAR 13:33 2015 UNTIL 02 APR 05:00 2015. CREATED:
05 MAR 13:35 2015


Does it mean the Radio Engineers had recently altered the ILS Glideslope angle? Not that it was a factor; the cross wind gusts were most likely the cause.

John James
29th Mar 2015, 13:19
Lucky, could have been much worse.
I understand that they circled for a while waiting for a good wind window and the airport power was off as well after midnight.
A definite crash in spite of the PR word spin.

Air Canada has a terribly spoiled reputation on all fronts and capped this episode by leaving the pax waiting in a snowstorm.

thparkth
29th Mar 2015, 13:31
There is quite precise tracking and reporting of power outages in this area. Here is a record of the outage at the airport earlier this morning:

Nova Scotia Power Outages - Bedford/Sackville (http://www.nspoweroutages.com/index.php?region=5&oid=23905950289101006)

Outage Area
Halifax Stanfield International Airport & Areotech Buisness Park (105 impacted)
Cause
Caused by damage to our overhead equipment
Start Date/Time
March 29, 2015 @ 12:30 AM
End Date/Time
March 29, 2015 @ 1:49 AM
Duration
1 hours 19 mins

The timing does seem to match very closely.

Eminence Grise
29th Mar 2015, 13:36
John James

Aside from the fact that the crew from this recently evacuated aircraft have absolutely zero control over the distribution and sheltering of the passengers (and I challenge you to do any better) do you have any fact to back up your closing statement? Any at all? Troll!

clunckdriver
29th Mar 2015, 13:37
Many moons ago in very similar weather conditions , on the same runway, we had to go from about one point four EPR to "Through the gate" in a DC9-32 series just to make the runway, {50 flap selected} it is also a bit of a deceptive perspective one gets when breaking out at mins on this end. About a year ago we landed on the same runway in our small corporate aircraft CAVU weather but with very strong winds, had the same "sink" about half a mile back from the button. Glad the chap from OZ [ Rad Alt Alive} has it all figured out, who needs the TSB with folks like this using ESP to solve every aviation problem?

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 13:52
Air Canada has a terribly spoiled reputation on all fronts and capped this episode by leaving the pax waiting in a snowstorm.


That must be one of the stupidest comments I have seen in a while!

I'm sure Air Canada planned with the Halifax airport management to have all its equipment not available at that time, on a Saturday night and also told its pilots to crash the aircraft in Halifax on a cold winter night in very windy/snowy conditions on purpose so as to freeze their passengers and get bad publicity out of it… Brilliant!

NigelOnDraft
29th Mar 2015, 14:02
Hi TylerMonkey
"This is same place that a 747 cargo crashed several years ago."

Negative, the 747 crashed off the end of the longer runway 23 heading SW.I might be sticking my neck out here, but there is a chance that runway 23 and runway 05 are the same ;)

Especially when one is an overrun / takeoff accident, and the other approach end :ok:

Pratt X 3
29th Mar 2015, 14:28
"This is same place that a 747 cargo crashed several years ago."

Negative, the 747 crashed off the end of the longer runway 23 heading SW.
Actually, it is almost the exact same spot, just this aircraft was landing on runway 05 to the NE while the 747 was taking off on runway 23 to the SW. In fact, it would seem that both aircraft hit the same power lines which knocked out the power to the airport on both occasions. The lights going out was the first indication something was up almost 11 years ago when the 747 crashed followed by the orange glow lighting up the pillowing smoke, something I will never forget seeing. Sadly, while they didn't contibute to the cause of the first crash, as fate was sealed by the time the power lines came into play, if they had been placed underground at some point before last night, this whole incident may have played out differently.

uffington sb
29th Mar 2015, 14:31
Mudman.

That's the 23 end.
Street View of the 05 end shows the orange aerials ILS on a berm.
I take the orange bits on the A-320 are what's left of it.

They were very lucky to make it onto the field.

Mudman
29th Mar 2015, 14:31
A couple of daytime pics from TSB Flickr Page (https://www.flickr.com/photos/tsbcanada/16779026680/in/photostream/)

https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7630/16779026680_5ef0fa261e_b.jpg

https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8729/16965551761_0f85dd50bb_b.jpg

https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8736/16346398863_75900728bd_b.jpg

TylerMonkey
29th Mar 2015, 14:38
I was replying to a post (now deleted) that referred to runway 32.
Yes you are correct, threshold of 05 is where the 747 crashed. Sorry for confusion.

N707ZS
29th Mar 2015, 15:06
Was it a belly landing no sign of any undercarriage.

Bonzo777
29th Mar 2015, 15:16
Accident: Air Canada A320 at Halifax on Mar 29th 2015, touched down short of runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=483e7337&opt=4097)

Aeroncabat
29th Mar 2015, 15:19
The front gear bay appears open, with what remains of that gear evident in some pics.

uffington sb
29th Mar 2015, 15:21
The guy who posted some pics on airliners shown in post 23 said the U/C was by the road. Guess it got torn off along with the engines.

Mudman
29th Mar 2015, 15:30
Was it a belly landing no sign of any undercarriage.

Here is a twitter photo (https://twitter.com/KSundahlCTV/status/582083733815193600/photo/1) of one of the gear in a snow bank. Looks it hit the antennas on the berm at the end of 23 (you can see parts of it embedded in the nose and starboard wing) the gear might have been sheared off at the berm or collapsed when the plane hit the ground.

Lightened up the twitter image (https://twitter.com/murdomesser/status/582202529250979840/photo/1)

Street view of same location: (https://www.google.ca/maps/@44.863615,-63.529343,3a,72.3y,42.45h,88.46t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sH-7TPcvYqnydJx9cynzGVw!2e0)

nubote
29th Mar 2015, 15:45
Accident: Air Canada A320 at Halifax on Mar 29th 2015, touched down short of runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=483e7337&opt=1024)

nose has parts from ground lighting imbedded in it.

Dave's brother
29th Mar 2015, 15:47
Either you crash or you land - there's no such thing as a crash landing


Oh, for goodness sake. Why so precious about the semantics? You can crash while taxiing, you can crash on take-off, you can crash in mid-air - and you can crash on landing. QED, a crash landing.

oceancrosser
29th Mar 2015, 15:50
Having flown off and on into YHZ for the last 18 years, I have never understood why 05 does not have an ILS. I never liked doing the backcourse LOC in low ceilings, and I have experienced downdrafts/windshear coming in there.
Looking at the METARS from last night, a divert would have been a serious consideration.
Incredible luck somehow scuttling onto the runway surface, sans all gears and an engine and half ripped off.

Pure luck.

DaveReidUK
29th Mar 2015, 15:52
Was it a belly landing no sign of any undercarriage.

A belly (ie deliberate, gear-up) landing would have been preceded by a passenger safety briefing. If that had been the case, we would have heard about it by now.

JFZ90
29th Mar 2015, 16:00
looks like a chunk of something foreign/orange/silver in the radar bulkhead - perhaps the ground antenna?

that would be quite near the crews feet!

good that all are ok, could have been alot worse looking at the damage.

Retired DC9 driver
29th Mar 2015, 16:13
I agree with oceancrosser
Having flown that LOC approach in DC-9, 767 and Airbus 319/320,
Runway 05 needs a ILS approach

er340790
29th Mar 2015, 16:16
Just an interested comment from a S&R Nav...

I notice the forward right door does not appear to have been used in the Evacuation. Not sure what the pax load was, but is there a Cabin Crew SOP to get ALL DOORS opened in such an (on-land) evacuation???

DaveReidUK
29th Mar 2015, 16:25
Not sure what the pax load was, but is there a Cabin Crew SOP to get ALL DOORS opened in such an (on-land) evacuation???

Reportedly 133 pax and 3 cabin crew, presumably the reason 3 doors (plus overwing exits) were used.

JammedStab
29th Mar 2015, 16:31
Last time I was in YHZ was about 3 years ago. That berm that ripped off the tail of the MK 747 was still there. It sticks up to be level with the runway fo instrument approach equipment. If still there, it is a huge hazard for an aircraft touching down short.

Busboyz
29th Mar 2015, 16:31
In 1982 a DC 10 departed the runway in BOS and ended up in 30 degree water. Many folks who ended up in the shallow water avoided significant exposure injuries by a quick thinking police officer who diverted city buses to provide shelter for those wet folks. I wonder if this option is considered in any major airport disaster response manuals or would security concerns preclude it.

Diamond Bob
29th Mar 2015, 16:35
Reportedly 133 pax and 3 cabin crew

All lucky to be alive. This was a major crash, and news reports of a "runway excursion" are ridiculous.

Not that this would necessarily have made much difference, but the power lines should have been moved underground years ago - at least in the stretch at the end of the runway.

Pratt X 3
29th Mar 2015, 16:58
Last time I was in YHZ was about 3 years ago. That berm that ripped off the tail of the MK 747 was still there. It sticks up to be level with the runway fo instrument approach equipment. If still there, it is a huge hazard for an aircraft touching down short.
That berm was removed when the runway was extended from 8800 feet to the current 10500 feet.

6000PIC
29th Mar 2015, 17:09
The local , provincial and federal politicians should insist that the airport infrastructure be upgraded to include an ILS on Rwy 05. Long overdue.

Loose rivets
29th Mar 2015, 17:14
Not that this would necessarily have made much difference, but the power lines should have been moved underground years ago - at least in the stretch at the end of the runway.


I'm afraid I can't remember the voltage used - that found across the top outer wires - but I'm fairly sure it's in the thousands. It's hard to bury that kind of voltage, and to drop it, and then raise it again, would be horribly expensive.

I'm kind of puzzled. Even using say, 4,000 volts, the amount of power used by an airfield would be vastly more than those lines could carry - even if they came in from four different directions and then combined.

I think it's more likely the lines were shorted and that shut down some larger sub-station. That should mean the main power could be reinstated fairly quickly. Possibly.

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 17:34
The local , provincial and federal politicians should insist that the airport infrastructure be upgraded to include an ILS on Rwy 05. Long overdue.

There is a RNAV (GNSS) Z approach to runway 05 with LPV minimums to 720' MSL or 257' above ground and requires 1 mile visibility.

There is no reason why the crew could not have used that approach and have Vpath info to touch down on the RWY.

This airport is also CAT II certified with an approach to CAT II minimums on RWY 23.

IIRC when in CAT II/CAT III operation, airports (in Canada) have to be on their own internal power using their own generators and not rely on an outside source for power.

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 17:41
Q1. What is the decision height for the localiser appr on that runway?


The minimums for the LOC or LOC/DME RWY 05 are 740' MSL or 277' above ground by it requires a 1 mile visibility.

But like I said above there is a more stable/precision RNAV (GNSS) approach with Vpath to RWY 05.

llmavll
29th Mar 2015, 17:46
That Fin didn't have GPS, and you wouldnt do a Cat II on 23 with those winds.

Capot
29th Mar 2015, 17:52
Jet Jockey...

It's not quite like that, in Europe at least; they are (usually) on mains power, but with a "no-break" stand-by.

The stand-by can be an alternative source of mains power (obviously coming from a completely independent distribution) or a diesel or turbine-driven generator that is kept spinning 24/7.

The standby cuts in as soon as a loss of power is sensed; I don't remember the so-called no-break period allowed but it is a very few seconds, such that a landing aircraft is not seriously discommoded. If in the last 50 -100 ft or so, it is "hoped" that the landing lights will help complete a safe touch-down before AGL is restored, if the aircraft is committed. A GA may be an option if not.

The stand-by will normally power the AGL, radars (approach at least), navigation and comms, essential ramp lighting, emergency systems and safety lighting in terminals etc.

There's no law that I know of that says it must be mains supply backed by local generator rather then the other way round, but the bean-counters would have a strong view on the cost of running full-time on a private generator. The spinning generator requires very little power unless and until it takes the load.

PS A quick reminder look at ICAO Annexe 14 Chapter 8.1 (http://www.icao.int/safety/Implementation/Library/Manual%20Aerodrome%20Stds.pdf) tells us that for Cat II/III the switch-over time, to use ICAO terminology, is 1 second for the really essential AGL, eg runway centre line, TDZ, end lighting etc, and 15 seconds for the rest. It's a rivetting read.

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 17:53
Air Canada's A320 don't have GPS approach capability?

Of course I wouldn't do a CAT II approach on RWY 23 with those winds.

I just brought it up because I wanted to mention if the airport is CAT II certified it should have a backup power supply.

llmavll
29th Mar 2015, 17:56
No not all of the 320 fleet has GPS. That Fin didnt have it. Might accelerate the upgrade now though.

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 18:01
LOL...

You've got to be kidding me! A modern aircraft with no GPS approach capability

Once again the el cheapos (bean counters) in the company decided safety could take a back seat.

I remember when I flew for an Air Canada feeder on the Dash 8 it always astounded me that they would order a brand new aircraft with only one FMS.

Snowcat
29th Mar 2015, 18:02
There is a RNAV app rwy 32 . MDA 840 and 1 1/4 vis. That was well into the wind but higher minimuns

CanadaKid
29th Mar 2015, 18:08
There are so many holes in the 'Swiss Cheese' for a LOC 05 approach.

Runway 05 has virtually non-existant approach lights, descent is predicated on DME (from another rwy) which reads 1.7 at the threshold, cold weather corrections, as well as crap weather and middle of the night, etc.

The pilot reads on his NavDisplay the distance to threshold, and on the PFD the DME distance manually input in the RAD/NAV page for a different rwy.

For the A320 pilots reading this ... an aircraft without any GPS, would this approach be flown in LOC/FPA or V/S? Descent planned on a raw data DME vs altitude table?

llmavll
29th Mar 2015, 18:10
LOC/FPA with cold wx correction (Based on a step down to FAF, and FPA after passing). Wind was getting close to xwind limits for a 320 depending on the runway condition.

fox niner
29th Mar 2015, 18:16
Those power lines will interfere with an ils signal, as they traverse the extended centerline. Therefore the presence of those power lines preclude the installation of an ils on rwy 05.

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 18:17
We don't have the info for the runway conditions but I wonder why they didn't use RWY 32 with those winds?

Jet Jockey A4
29th Mar 2015, 18:22
There are two ways to see this...

You can ask Hydro to burry the wires and then install an ILS approach to the runway and then ask the local, provincial and federal governments to pick up the tab for all that work (tax payers).

OR

Ask Air Canada to install GPS in their aircrafts so they can do a RNVA/LPV approach with a 50 foot higher DA when compared to an ILS.

FullWings
29th Mar 2015, 18:27
It will be interesting to see if this was an NPA that went wrong (like UPS at Birmingham) or nasty sink/windshear on short finals. Or a bit of both. I wonder what the picture was like at MDA? None of the actuals reproduced here are above minima...

To collect what looks to be part of the 23 ILS localiser array with the radome they must have touched down a fair distance short of the threshold.

Trailbreaker
29th Mar 2015, 18:37
Runway 05 has virtually non-existant approach lights,

There is even fewer now!

west lakes
29th Mar 2015, 18:39
The power line

From Google earth seems to be lower than the runway threshold in any case

But
Looking at the insulators it could be anything up to 11,000V and looks to be about 32mm2 (.058 sq in)
To underground three spans (about 300yds) would be in the region of about £30,000 - hardly a huge expense, though the cost of the telecomms cables on the same poles is unknown.

But to actually hit that line the aircraft was below the height of the runway threshold which suggests that the line isn't really the problem!

dave.rooney
29th Mar 2015, 18:41
The damage to that one slat on the right wing's leading edge looks suspiciously hydro pole shaped.

number0009
29th Mar 2015, 18:43
To collect what looks to be part of the 23 ILS localiser array with the radome they must have touched down a fair distance short of the threshold. Looks like the RH wing also collected debris which The Aviation Herald site suggests to be from approach lights.

Mudman
29th Mar 2015, 18:46
Damaged equipment at the end of the runway....

Twitter (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CBSME0tW4AARmbr.jpg)

cdnfssgal
29th Mar 2015, 18:51
Jet Jockey A4 We don't have the info for the runway conditions but I wonder why they didn't use RWY 32 with those winds?
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1/8IN

electric-chris
29th Mar 2015, 19:07
I'm afraid I can't remember the voltage used - that found across the top outer wires - but I'm fairly sure it's in the thousands. It's hard to bury that kind of voltage, and to drop it, and then raise it again, would be horribly expensive.I'm assuming that the power lines hit were the ones found in the street view posted earlier (https://www.google.ca/maps/@44.863615,-63.529343,3a,72.3y,42.45h,88.46t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sH-7TPcvYqnydJx9cynzGVw!2e0). If so, in a city, most commonly, the top 3 wires with those types of insulators would be operating at 12.9kV (12,900 volts) phase to phase. In rural areas, they can sometime be a little higher voltage to compensate for longer distances, perhaps up to around 20-25kV, but the insulators on the poles in that streetview would not be sufficient for voltages over about 20-25kV. This would be a standard distribution circuit. A circuit of this voltage would be able to supply several megawatts (probably enough for around 1,000 homes) and although I don't know the average power consumption of an airport, I would imagine it should be sufficient to power an airport of that size in addition to some of the surrounding area. Airports are sometimes fed by multiple circuits for redundancy though and I don't know the details of this airport.

It is extremely common and is very feasible to bury 12.9kV or 20kV conductors. This is done all the time for commercial underground service drops in more urban areas. An airport near where I live has several 34.5kV circuits that are in fact buried just at the point that they cross the runway even though they are several hundred feet past the airport fence. The bottom line is it would be very, very feasible to bury the lines around the ends of the airport (or simply route them in a different route away from the runways.) That said, the top of the power lines appear to be about level with the runway in this case and I imagine that the designers figured that hitting the power lines was probably the least of their concerns on this particular approach since there appears to be terrain and antennas that the plane would also impact if it were that low.

Sawbones62
29th Mar 2015, 19:14
Even less expensive would be clearing a new right-of-way and running that line further downhill. However, those lines are already significantly below threshold height.

Maybe a better investment would be RNAV capability in all AC 320s?

npsh
29th Mar 2015, 19:33
The burm on which the LOC antenna is placed is aprx 1000ft from the runway threshold. This aircraft had to be quite low to clean out portions of the antenna. This investigation will be interesting for sure.

Retired DC9 driver
29th Mar 2015, 20:13
cdnfssgal posted
CYHZ CRFI 05/23 -5C .36 1503290115

that's not a great JBI for the crosswind, .36

Ancient-Mariner
29th Mar 2015, 20:21
In the UK, 33 kV 3-phase on wooden poles are common. Similar height. And often re-routed underground for new housing or other development.


Typically, the 33 kV then reduced to 11 kV for local distribution to either ground or pole mounted 11 kV to 400/230 volt for houses and commercial use.


(When at sea, on my last few containerships we generated at 6.6 kV with a total capacity of about 10 MW - not that we would have all running at once! This was for cargo refrigeration etc NOT for propulsion, we had a circa 30 MW slow speed diesel for that)

Flyintrim
29th Mar 2015, 20:26
Please, can someone post an image of the Jeppesen approach chart for runway 05.

I'd like to do some calculations.

Non Precision Approaches continue to present problems, and are statistically responsible for the majority of CFIT accidents.

Someone mentioned earlier UPS and Birmingham. There seem to be many similarities.

Does the approach chart have a height/distance table? I would guess not. This would have greatly helped situational awareness, as it would have in Birmingham.

Mike-Bracknell
29th Mar 2015, 20:36
Was it a belly landing no sign of any undercarriage.

Air Canada plane passenger: 'I thought we were goners' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32108581) and specifically the second interview with a passenger seems to imply that it was forced up into the belly of the aircraft during one of the bounces.

Lost in Saigon
29th Mar 2015, 20:39
Air Canada uses Jepp charts....
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/LOC%20NDB%2005.jpg~original



Here is the Canada Air Pilot version.
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/010bb.jpg~original

thcrozier
29th Mar 2015, 21:23
Google Earth shows the road being about 2290 feet southwest and 31 feet below the TDZ. I wonder if they mistook something else for the runway and descended below MDA too soon. Or it could have been power loss, or, or, or.......

Field In Sight
29th Mar 2015, 21:31
Looking at the chart, I can't, immediately, see any difficulties.
Interesting to note, MSA 2800 ft within 100nm. i.e. pretty flat.

That doesn't mean that there aren't obstacle threats close to the runway.

It will be interesting to see what went wrong on this particular day.

Flyintrim
29th Mar 2015, 22:00
It is interesting to note that if the threshold distance was used in error instead of the localizer distance, then when following the height/distance table, the aircraft would be approx 550' low at every height/distance check point.

The figures look like this:

Using THR 05 distance, this is the required height/distance:
6/2470, 5/2150, 4/1820, 3/1490, 2.4/1298.

Using IHZ DME, this is the required height/distance:
6/1900, 5/1580, 4/1250, 3/920, 2.4/740.

So by using threshold distance and flying the corresponding height for localizer distance, the aircraft will fly a similar descent angle but will be approx 550' low.

Not saying this is what happened, but it is a possible scenario.

TheInquisitor
29th Mar 2015, 22:14
IHZ DME is the reference quoted on the plate descent profiles, ending at 2.4 miles @ 740' - seems right for a std 3 deg appch. The plates don't make it obvious, however, that the DME isn't zeroed @ threshold.

Still, shouldn't one level @MDA if you don't have vis refs? And if you have vis refs, it's difficult to explain landing short in the absence of any other problem?

Lost in Saigon
29th Mar 2015, 22:15
@N707ZS,

If the plane was doing about 150mph at the time, that's 240km/h, approx 60meter/sec. With 60Hz mains in Canada that would be a full cycle of AC mains electricity every meter travelled by the aircraft. If there were an arc generated at the peak +ve & -ve voltage that would occur at 120Hz, or about every 50 centimeter travelled by the aircraft.

I'd say that's a pretty close correlation to the apparent spacing between the "burn marks" in that photo, so I fear that that is what they actually are.

Where do you see burn marks on the aircraft?

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/16965551761_0f85dd50bb_b.jpg~original

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CBPqHFnWoAAPXy9.jpg

thcrozier
29th Mar 2015, 22:26
Flyintrim, don't you mean..

1370, 1000, 720(40), 198?

thcrozier
29th Mar 2015, 22:30
The row of diagonal lines under the door in the night photo. Interesting they don't seem to be there in daylight. Is this a Photoshop job?

Lost in Saigon
29th Mar 2015, 22:42
That is a very poor photo and those "marks" were not there on any other photo. My guess is they were never actually on the aircraft.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/001_1.jpg~original

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/003_1.jpg~original

llmavll
29th Mar 2015, 22:43
FlyinTrim....the FPA isnt calculated off the DME. This approach would be flown in LOC/FPA. You would descend down to 2000' for the FAF and then at the FAF it would be FPA -3.0 (plus temp correction) down to your MDA. The only DME you would need is where you can descend down to 2000' but that doesn't seem to be the problem here.
Or am I missing what you are saying?

737er
29th Mar 2015, 23:06
http://youtu.be/pN41LvuSz10

Best 25 minites you can spend on this.

formationdriver
29th Mar 2015, 23:13
'We're all lucky' : Passengers recount crash of AC624 | The Chronicle Herald (http://thechronicleherald.ca/metro/1277414-were-all-lucky-passengers-recount-crash-of-ac624)

log0008
29th Mar 2015, 23:36
Very lucky that no-one was killed, the aircraft could easily have rolled or a post crash fire occurred. Don't think the aviation industry could handle 2 deadly a320 crashes in a week regardless of cause.

Rockhound
29th Mar 2015, 23:55
There was a totally unbelievable announcement made by Air Canada's Chief Operating Officer, Klaus Goersch, at a press conference somewhere (Halifax airport?). Well, unbelievable if it wasn't for the fact that the announcement was recorded. Here's the link:
Air Canada AC624 crash: Plane hit antenna array before crash (http://a.msn.com/01/en-ca/AAaarpi)
I quote:
The aircraft had a hard landing and has incurred some damage and is sitting at the end of the runway. After some hard landings the airplane can continue taxying to the gate. That was not the case here.

Words fail me.

skyhighfallguy
30th Mar 2015, 00:18
a hard landing would require a satisfactorily passed inspection to return to service.

I don't think this plane will require an inspection, I don't think it will fly again any time soon.

Antimatter347
30th Mar 2015, 00:22
The latest from Air Canada, looks to be a bit of a whoopsie.

Air Canada AC624 touched down 335 metres short of runway, TSB says - Nova Scotia - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/air-canada-ac624-touched-down-335-metres-short-of-runway-tsb-says-1.3013979)

thump
30th Mar 2015, 00:27
That is a very poor photo and those "marks" were not there on any other photo. My guess is they were never actually on the aircraft.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/001_1.jpg~original

It's a reflective paint they put on parts of the aircraft and the flash used at night makes it shine like that.

gasbag1
30th Mar 2015, 00:40
It is always interesting that YHZ Airport Authority can find money for a shinny new terminal but no money for proper airport navaids, and they are not alone in Canada.

I suspect that runway 32 was not available as it had not been cleared of snow, the airport operations mgr. would make that decision.

The weather was horrible and the strong wind gust at the approximate time will likely be a factor. I have flown into YHZ in really crappy weather and it is not a great airport in winter storms. Too many holes in the swiss cheese model for an accident last night.

604guy
30th Mar 2015, 00:41
Posted on CNN site at 22:14Z today Video distributed by CNN partner CTV Network appeared to show the plane stationary, with part of the nose missing and a nick in one wing.

Bloody hell, if that's a "nick"............

maninbah
30th Mar 2015, 01:16
SPECI CYHZ 290414Z 34024G33KT 3/4SM R14/P6000FT/U -SN DRSN BKN010
OVC018 M06/M07 A2965 RMK SF7SC1 SLP046=
CYHZ 290400Z 34019G54KT 3/4SM R14/5000VP6000FT/D -SN DRSN BKN007
OVC010 M06/M07 A2964 RMK SF7SC1 SLP045=
SPECI CYHZ 290313Z 35020G26KT 1/2SM R14/3500V4500FT/N SN DRSN VV003 M06/M07 A2963 RMK SN8 SLP040=
CYHZ 290300Z 34019G25KT 1/8SM R14/P6000VM0300FT/N +SN DRSN VV003 M06/M07 A2962 RMK SN8 /S09/ SLP038=

Am I missing something? The approaches to Rwy 05 need 1sm Vis. There is no RVR listed but it would be 5000 RVR?

From the time period 0300z. Onward I do not see 1sm advertised unless it was called 1sm by Approach Control when the flight was just outside of the FAF and dropped back down to 1/2sm on the 0313z SPECI. Would the be inside the FAF before 0313z? The viz was worse earlier? Crash at approx 0330z and I still dont see the legal approval to be inside the FAF. Ideas?

Flyintrim
30th Mar 2015, 01:16
FlyinTrim....the FPA isnt calculated off the DME. This approach would be flown in LOC/FPA. You would descend down to 2000' for the FAF and then at the FAF it would be FPA -3.0 (plus temp correction) down to your MDA. The only DME you would need is where you can descend down to 2000' but that doesn't seem to be the problem here.
Or am I missing what you are saying?Hi llmavll,

I'm not familiar with how Airbus carry out their Non Precision Approaches.

Can you still use LOC/FPA on aircraft without GPS? Would they not use LOC/VS?

Using LOC/FPA and 3.08 degrees should set things up nicely without any problems.

I think that somewhere during the approach, and for some reason, there was a loss of situational awareness.

balsa model
30th Mar 2015, 01:59
@N707ZS,

If the plane was doing about 150mph at the time, that's 240km/h, approx 60meter/sec. With 60Hz mains in Canada that would be a full cycle of AC mains electricity every meter travelled by the aircraft. If there were an arc generated at the peak +ve & -ve voltage that would occur at 120Hz, or about every 50 centimeter travelled by the aircraft.

I'd say that's a pretty close correlation to the apparent spacing between the "burn marks" in that photo, so I fear that that is what they actually are.

Where do you see burn marks on the aircraft?

Never mind missing burn marks. Wavelength (distance between peaks) of an 60 Hz AC power waveform is on the order of 2000 to 3000 miles. (Closer to 3000, if I had to guess - it's pretty much a waveguide in open air.)

Edit added upon reflection: Wavelength has nothing to do with what msbbarratt is saying. My misunderstanding.

bzh
30th Mar 2015, 02:19
In Canada vis on the plates are not limits, approach bans are lower and depend on company sops and equipment used....

llmavll
30th Mar 2015, 02:39
Hi FlyinTrim.

Doesn't matter if the aircraft have GPS or not if they are doing a LOC approach, the LOC is the lateral Nav engaged (and tracking) and the vertical is done using FPA (Flight Path Angle), its not recommended to use V/S inside the FAF. So without looking at the plate, I believe you could descend to 2000' around 7-8 NM back from the FAF. Then at the FAF (you are already tracking in LOC, you would then engage FPA (actually the same button as V/S but in a diff mode) and dial down to -3.0 (plus cold wx corr). You can only put in whole numbers and one decimal place, so I believe its 3.0 for that approach. FPA is better than V/S due to not having any effect on G/S or wind. Actually makes it pretty simple, draw a 3.0 degree line from FAF to runway and thats the airplane "should" do.

Again, just my 2 cents, I'm very interested to hear what the outcome is as well.

If anything comes of this I hope both the airport upgrades Rwy 05 or Rwy 32 approach and second that AC upgrades their GPS program faster. Might have been a different outcome if either was in place.

Cheers



manibah:

As stated above, approaches in Canada aren't visibility limited. I believe AC and WJ would both have lower ops specs, somewhere around 1/2-3/4 mile. So I believe they were legal to shoot approach, landing is limited on seeing the runway (or lights) at MDA/DH. I think everything was legal from that stand point.

Eboy
30th Mar 2015, 02:57
Never mind missing burn marks. Wavelength (distance between peaks) of an 60 Hz AC power waveform is on the order of 2000 to 3000 miles.

Yes but that has no bearing on msbbarratt's calculations. I checked them and his (her?) numbers are correct. The distance between what look like burn marks corresponds to peaks of an AC cycle at the speed the aircraft would be flying. The peaks are where you'd get the worst arcing.

balsa model
30th Mar 2015, 03:11
My misunderstanding, entirely.
My apologies.

peekay4
30th Mar 2015, 03:51
I doubt those stripes are burn marks at all.

Some digital video cameras will produce similar marks (called "zebras") on over-exposed image areas to help the camera operator dial in the proper exposure. The picture might be a screen grab (or screen shot) of a video camera's LCD.

maninbah
30th Mar 2015, 03:59
@ llmavll
Many thanks - its been a long time since Inhave used my Canadian ATPL and since then the CARS Approach Ban requirements have been updated.

CARS 705 Air Carrier can attempt an approach with 50% of the published visibility for Non-Precision, APV and SCDA non-precision approaches as long as the crew, aircraft, approach and setup (including a calculated planned descent angle) are met aling with an identified missed approach point.

Ref: Advisory Circular: COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS AVIATION ADVISORY CIRCULAR
No. 0237 2006.09.08

flyingtincan
30th Mar 2015, 06:47
Definitely looks like camera 'zebra' marks. They show the overexposed (brightest) parts of the picture. There is another patch on the highlight just over the wing.

mickjoebill
30th Mar 2015, 06:55
It does seem rather odd that those marks are very obviously not there in the later photos. I cannot think of any plausible way in which 'burn' marks could disappear so cleanly yet be highly noticeable in that first photo. I think your explanation is correct.
I concurr that the diagonal lines are "zebras" to aid cameramen in monitoring the exposure.
As well as the viewfinder, such info can be selected so it is overlaid on the camera output or the recording.

phiggsbroadband
30th Mar 2015, 10:15
What are the chances that this accident wouldn't have happened if the Glideslope was operational?
Also why the Notam saying there was a change in the Glideslope angle (2.70 to 3.00 degrees.)

Jet Jockey A4
30th Mar 2015, 10:57
What are the chances that this accident wouldn't have happened if the Glideslope was operational?

There is no G/S available on RWY 05, it is a LOC or LOC/DME approach.

UncleNobby
30th Mar 2015, 13:42
There is no GS for this runway.

This approach is one of the most challenging I've flown in the past couple of years. Bad Wx, non precision, night time black hole approach after a long day of flying.

Thunderbird4
30th Mar 2015, 13:50
Not the first time for this runway......

http://http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1996/a96a0035/a96a0035.asp (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1996/a96a0035/a96a0035.asp)

Lost in Saigon
30th Mar 2015, 14:21
What are the chances that this accident wouldn't have happened if the Glideslope was operational?
Also why the Notam saying there was a change in the Glideslope angle (2.70 to 3.00 degrees.)


There is no G/S available on RWY 05, it is a LOC or LOC/DME approach.

Okay, lets rephrase that question....


What are the chances that this accident wouldn't have happened if that runway had a Glideslope, like they do at most international airports in most civilized countries?

UncleNobby
30th Mar 2015, 14:31
If it was the result of a blown approach then with an ILS chances are significantly reduced (near zero). Wx or equipment failure etc not so much.

As far as equipment goes YHZ has 2 ILS approaches and RWY 5 also has an RNAV approach with LPV mins (1 mile vis and 257 above). It's also up to the airline to keep up with the times.

Mudman
30th Mar 2015, 14:54
Photo of the rear.
https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7632/16771055337_dcd45f2823_b.jpg

TWT
30th Mar 2015, 15:19
Have they removed it from the runway yet ?

Loose rivets
30th Mar 2015, 15:22
electric-chris and others. Given your name, I'll have to accept what you say, but I'm left bewildered by having that potential power across an extended centreline. As mentioned a short circuit - even downstream of a transformer - was alarming. It lit our road up and set light to trees. More importantly, it fired lengths of the carrying cable/ground cable six feet into the ground like white hot arrows.

Mudman
30th Mar 2015, 15:31
@TWT Have they removed it from the runway yet ?

TSB said the wreck would be there for the better part of the week. Twitter post (https://twitter.com/NatashaPace/status/582548920347299840)

dicks-airbus
30th Mar 2015, 16:45
Crash (not overrun) and hull loss.

Good nobody got seriously hurt, could have had a very different outcome.

de facto
30th Mar 2015, 16:52
An interesting "hard landing" that tore off part of the stabilizer/elevators...:}

I guess the "it really doesnt look good" feeling go around type didnt happen that night:hmm:
It doesnt matter how bad the weather,how tricky the approach,if you are not 100% sure that you are safely set for a landing then up you shall go again.

aterpster
30th Mar 2015, 16:54
UncleN:

There is no GS for this runway.

This approach is one of the most challenging I've flown in the past couple of years. Bad Wx, non precision, night time black hole approach after a long day of flying.

But, there is a PAPI.

short bus
30th Mar 2015, 17:00
The empennage has significant damage as well. I would have guessed that the stuctures were clipped by the bottom surfaces of the a/c, but now I wonder if it was low enough that the wings cut through the middle of the lighting/antenna and the top of these structures struck the empennage.

J.O.
30th Mar 2015, 17:03
If the nose was being pulled up in an attempt to avoid ground contact, the tail would have been at such a trajectory as to go through the approach lighting stanchions, thus explaining the damage to the horizontal stab.

DaveReidUK
30th Mar 2015, 17:12
Crash (not overrun) and hull loss.

It was never going to count as an overrun, given that the aircraft came to a halt with 8000ft+ of runway ahead of it. :O

Most AIBs use the CICTT's Occurrence Category definitions, and under those the event would be likely classified as both a CFIT ("includes collisions with those objects extending above the surface (for example ... power lines ...)" followed by a Runway Excursion.

"Crash" doesn't appear anywhere in the definitions.

http://www.intlaviationstandards.org/Documents/OccurrenceCategoryDefinitions.pdf

DHC6tropics
30th Mar 2015, 17:18
I'd be willing to bet my house that this is not a case of continuing the approach below minimums without visual reference. If the pilots hit minimums (or lost visual contact after minimums) there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that a go-around would have been initiated.

So, yes, a improper vertical path is possible but I'm sure that it would not have been followed blindly to impact. It may have left the pilots in a unexpected position upon breaking out and then a mixture of optical illusion (black hole effect, snow streaming by the landing lights, crab angle, insufficient approach lighting, etc), turbulence and possible windshear may have led to the aircraft coming in too low. Personally, I think unreported severe windshear will be a primary cause.

I will be very interested to see if the PAPI's were working properly (or at all) as the final visual segment would have been significantly more difficult without them.

And, while low in probability, a loss of power or unresponsive throttle fault (ala British Airways) also could have occurred.

gasbag1
30th Mar 2015, 18:19
I would not disagree with your post. Given the crosswind and snow the PAPI may have been snow covered or drifted in snow. I have had that happen on 32 at a different time.

7478ti
30th Mar 2015, 18:33
Oh how many more hull losses and lives to we need to lose, before ANSPs and operators alike finally realize we need RNP and GLS, to serve every runway end served by air transport? For years now, with LAND3, and AIII modes (and the misnamed CAT III mode in Airbusses), and both GLS and RNP, there is never any need any more to ever land on any runway not best aligned with the wind, as long as it is length and mu adequate. In fact, if needed (as for length or mu), it is now technically possible to safely even do it for many modern types up to the maximum demonstrated capability of the airframe, notwithstanding some present authority imposed conservative AFM values that may apply. There should and can ALWAYS be a guided path both laterally and vertically, to the TDZ, and safely back out, with RNP and GLS, 100% of the time. RNP with GLS can serve all runways at any applicable airport, is vastly better than ILS, is much less expensive than ILS, and is now already available on or could readily be retrofit on relevant modern transport types. Events from from Asiana 214, to the A330 in Nepal on 4 March, to UPS at KBHM, to even the LGA MD88 not potentially landing using Rwy 04 into the wind, instead of facing the XW on Rwy 13 in low mu, could have likely prevented each accident. We are long past the point where flight crews need to ever again be faced with high minima visual illusions, or XWs or TWs on mu limited runways, or needing "duck-unders" for mu. So the authorities, ANSPs, and airlines also own "a piece of this one" for culpability, and not just as always, "blame it exclusively on the pilots".

Hummingbird
30th Mar 2015, 19:37
Yes, this airport should have been equipped with an ILS on that runway long time ago. Weather there is very marginal at times so I don't understand why not spending on proper equipment. It's easy to blame the pilots. Yes, diverting was a choice (I've done it before under those circumstances) but doesn't stop the fact that infrastructure is to blame as well. Even many developing Countries have better equipped airports.

hr2pilot
30th Mar 2015, 19:41
+1
Imrich: Best post in this thread...well said

and by the way.. I agree with those that are forced to use this approach... it can be a scary one on a dark and stormy night!

FullWings
30th Mar 2015, 19:49
That’s fair comment from Tom and I’d really like for it to happen but as a professional operating in the transitional period, you have to work with what you’re given and apply appropriate safety margins.

The forecast and actuals at CYHZ seem pretty grim for the day of the accident. It’s reported that they held for some considerable time, so it looks like extra fuel was taken. With 280’ above the runway and 1sm as the minima, chances were high that the non-precision approach would fail.

I’d really like to know what the view out of the cockpit looked like in the last 20-30s after they went below MDA. What convinced them to continue with such a drastic undershoot?

Jilted
30th Mar 2015, 19:59
I notice the unusual sharing of LOC frequencies on 05 and 23. I wonder if the reason there is no GS is that sharing the channel would cause some instability in the vertical guidance for either RWY. Just a thought. I would hate to think that the reasoning was purely financial.

GlobalNav
30th Mar 2015, 20:06
The 1996 767 accident, reported by TSB, noted the optical illusion of the sloping runway. Its not that this approach needed a glide slope - to what several hundred feet HAT, or a GPS, because the same illusion would affect the final few hundred feet of the visual segment - but it may indeed be helped in the visual segment - so why not PAPI/VGSI?

Mudman
30th Mar 2015, 20:22
Some photos from the crash scene here (https://picasaweb.google.com/109251525937586384476/AC624Crash?authuser=0&authkey=Gv1sRgCPj_mOPHvOuYQA&feat=directlink)

https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-jjcgCNi0WJ8/VRmuYo092tI/AAAAAAAAbBg/PPwfX4nyAq0/s912/IMG_0328.jpg (https://picasaweb.google.com/109251525937586384476/AC624Crash?authuser=0&authkey=Gv1sRgCPj_mOPHvOuYQA&feat=directlink)

TheInquisitor
30th Mar 2015, 20:25
It had PAPIs the last time I flew in there - and according to the plates, still does.

GS profile runs straight to the threshold, and you would hit MDA 0.7nm (0.6SM) from the threshold.... if flying the profile. Looking at the METARS suggest they may not have been visual at MDA?

Incidentally, am I reading this Actual right, or is this a typo:

CYHZ 290400Z 34019G54KT 3/4SM R14/5000VP6000FT/D -SN DRSN BKN007

????

If that's correct, it's one hell of a gust factor!

Retired DC9 driver
30th Mar 2015, 21:03
Imrich,
Another thing to consider, they were probably clearing snow on 14-32. So this favored runway, 32 into wind was released for snow removal.
Then YHZ arbitrarily open up 05/23 with a 30 knot crosswind. How long would it have taken to get an approach to 32? It's another coupled/selected approach; LOC BC but at least they would be landing into the wind.

737er
30th Mar 2015, 22:32
86000 views for what could have prevented for a few thousand bucks on an ILS and relocation of power lines...a lesson that could be used all over to improve safety.

Over 3 million views for a fluke occurance that's basicallly unpreventable.

Meanwhile, bombs threats on Turkish, passengers storming the cockpit on United.....on and on.

But the problem is suicidal pilots. It's amazing.

aterpster
30th Mar 2015, 22:39
Tom Imrich:

...to the A330 in Nepal on 4 March...

The A330 in Nepal had just finished its second RNP AR to Runway 02, when the excursion occurred. I posted the Jepp chart in that thread.

aterpster
30th Mar 2015, 22:40
Jilted:

Sharing of ILS frequencies is done at many airports.

jdawg
31st Mar 2015, 00:36
I dont know Tom, count me in the minority perhaps.

I suppose government officials and the flying public would ask the same question rhetorically, how many more airframes...., until pilots learn to use proper judgement in conducting their operations?

The LS system in place may be all that is budgeted for service to remote locations and I am sure folks would be glad to keep the service the way it is and not suffer additional taxes and levies to improve the field, given the assumption that good judgement will be used by the pilots and the worse passengers might expect would be the inconvenience of a bus ride from an hour or two away, not a crash landing
In a perfect world, yes, all runways should have precision approaches but the resulting consequence of having non precision approaches should not be hull losses (pilots fault) but rather more diversions and missed approaches (added airline expense).

We have come a long way and the last couple decades and if you have flown internationally you would know just how good we have it in North America.

Off the cuff, sir, I totally agree with you but its just not that easy. As professional pilots we need to make proper decisions and that was not the case with this airframe loss.

Zeffy
31st Mar 2015, 00:40
Imrich:...from from Asiana 214, to the A330 in Nepal on 4 March, to UPS at KBHM, to even the LGA MD88 not potentially landing using Rwy 04 into the wind, instead of facing the XW on Rwy 13 in low mu, could have likely prevented each accident.

The A330 at Kathmandu was flying an RNP AR procedure.

JFK -- not LGA -- drives the runway configurations for the rest of the NYC metroplex.

When/how is the "big switch" to RNP going to be made all at once? Which airplanes will be left out?

What should be done with the Airbus and Boeings manufactured in the early 1990s?

...So the authorities, ANSPs, and airlines also own "a piece of this one" for culpability, and not just as always, "blame it exclusively on the pilots".

:hmm:Somehow the airplane mfgs got left out of that culpability roster. :hmm:

Has Boeing ever posted a $$$ quote for retrofitting MD-88s to fly RNP?

jdawg
31st Mar 2015, 00:46
Good post Zeffy, I left so much out rushing to the obvious.

RESA
31st Mar 2015, 01:03
I can't find the link who said the runway extension removed the berm/burm (about 12' AGL).
Plus the antennae on a concrete cap.
The antennae shown are an extexsion array . . . berm removed or lowered?

Apparently the same berm MK 747 encountered in 2004

Throttle Arms
31st Mar 2015, 01:09
86000 views for what could have prevented for a few thousand bucks on an ILS and relocation of power lines...a lesson that could be used all over to improve safety.

Not to minimize your point 737er, but an ILS isn't a few thousand dollars. An ILS and associated approach lighting is easily $3+ million.

ehwatezedoing
31st Mar 2015, 02:28
Not to minimize your point 737er, but an ILS isn't a few thousand dollars. An ILS and associated approach lighting is easily $3+ million.

If I remember correctly, some studies were done back in the days in Halifax for an ILS on 05.
I believe mineral deposits prevented that (terrains too!?)
This have been mitigated later on, if we look at the current published RNAV(GNSS) 05 it shows a WAAS LPV component of 720 DA (257ft HAT)

Maybe it has been already mentioned but I think this particular A320 is not GPS equipped.

7478ti
31st Mar 2015, 02:35
@aterpster (WR?) It doesn't matter even if it was RNP AR in Nepal. The point sticks. RNP helps as a start to get one effectively to the best runway, but it only gets you down the FAS to a relatively low DA. However, when RNP is is used with GLS, as well as use of full autoflight, FMGC, or HUD (LAND3 or AIII modes), with a vertical and lateral path to the TDZ, these serious landing events will virtually stop. Yes, pilots can always save the day, since the days of the four course range, back to when Ed B, and L DeC, and the All-WX-Flying Committee were still fretting about Tom Goldsmith and the Martin at KIPT... but there is no need to do any of that any more. It is time to take stock, bit the bullet, dump these obsolete approach types, and start to expeditiously move to 100% RNP and GLS. It is vastly better, less expensive, and you wouldn't even need the ALSF-I/II or MALSRs any more. As to the MD series getting RNP, they already could have low RNP now, with systems like the HT-9100, if they'd just invest the money instead in upgrading those systems wisely, and not waste it on useless things like obsolete WAAS/LPV, or FAA's over-specified and still dysfunctional 91.227/DO-260 flawed ADS-B, at least until and unless it is re-specified with sensible NIC and NAC.

Mudman
31st Mar 2015, 02:42
@RESA I can't find the link who said the runway extension removed the berm/burm (about 12' AGL).
Plus the antennae on a concrete cap.
The antennae shown are an extexsion array . . . berm removed or lowered?

Apparently the same berm MK 747 encountered in 2004

Different berm if you look at page 30 of the MK747 accident the new location is much closer to the road after the runway was extended.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2004/a04h0004/a04h0004.pdf

TheInquisitor
31st Mar 2015, 02:52
I dont know Tom, count me in the minority perhaps.

I suppose government officials and the flying public would ask the same question rhetorically, how many more airframes...., until pilots learn to use proper judgement in conducting their operations?

The LS system in place may be all that is budgeted for service to remote locations and I am sure folks would be glad to keep the service the way it is and not suffer additional taxes and levies to improve the field, given the assumption that good judgement will be used by the pilots and the worse passengers might expect would be the inconvenience of a bus ride from an hour or two away, not a crash landing
In a perfect world, yes, all runways should have precision approaches but the resulting consequence of having non precision approaches should not be hull losses (pilots fault) but rather more diversions and missed approaches (added airline expense).

We have come a long way and the last couple decades and if you have flown internationally you would know just how good we have it in North America.

Off the cuff, sir, I totally agree with you but its just not that easy. As professional pilots we need to make proper decisions and that was not the case with this airframe loss.

jdawg, you can count me in with that minority.

I disagree with the conclusion you have reached, in the face of few available facts at present - it's too early in this one to castigate the crew. There could well have been a tech issue with the aircraft; we simply don't know yet. And the weather was bloody awful - Vis aside, I wouldn't discount windshear as a distinct possibility.

However, I am in total agreement with the rest of your sentiment - I don't agree with the complainants about approach aids. Pilots have been flying non-precision approaches for decades without major issues.

Frankly, if you can't fly a safe NPA to minimas, using the correct procedures, there is a serious competence / training / practice issue. The cardinal rule on a NPA is DO NOT descend below MDA until you have the required visual references. Pilots seem to have gotten far too used to precision approaches.

7478ti
31st Mar 2015, 03:26
For air transport, there is no reason to be doing anything but RNP and moving expeditiously toward use of GLS based approaches any more, globally. They are vastly better than any other approach options, including even ILS, they can be much less expensive, and vastly more reliable, especially if properly designed and produced. GBAS and especially RNP can be cost effective for any airport, even rarely used locations like ETOPS alternates. The installation costs for GBAS can be vastly lower than any other navaid type, and in the long run, we don't even need off runway approach lighting any more, if the airplanes are using their autoflight systems properly (including options like HUD AIII if desired, for pilots to still use manual control through rollout). The very same refrain that "All that we need are good pilots with good training" was heard at the sunset of the bi-plane, tailwheel, radio operators, navigators, 4-course range, DR, star shots, ADF, VOR, VORTAC, Tacan, MLS, Talar, State, A-Scan, C-Scan, Co-Scan, Microvision, VAM, Consolan, Loran, Decca, mag-checks, ILM, PAFAM, BCRS, circling approaches,....and now finally MDA(H)s and LOC approaches. But who now would go back to any of those bygone eras, except for perhaps some historic DC-3 nostalgia? Instead, there is a vastly better, safer, less expensive way, ....even for good well trained professional pilots. So let's not stay on this present course of losing perfectly good jets, and passengers, and thoughtful pilots not otherwise trying to crash, for no good reason whatsoever. It is time to move on, to 100% RNP and GLS, globally. Then we'll finally see these unnecessarily hull losses abate.

7478ti
31st Mar 2015, 03:41
The MD88s FMSs could have likely had RNP at the time... but for an initial operator opting out in discussions with the (former) OEM. Same happened to the original MD11s, and their still RNP challenged and potentially problematic VNAV.

phiggsbroadband
31st Mar 2015, 13:01
It is said that the FO did not see the PAPIs... Could it be, that with a large crab angle, the pilot could also not see the PAPIs, as they could have been obscured by the nose of the A320?

DHC6tropics
31st Mar 2015, 13:21
phiggsbroadband

Are you talking about AC624 and if so where did you hear that information?

If the F/O could not see the PAPIs then it is likely that they were off/broken/obscured.

training wheels
31st Mar 2015, 13:27
It is said that the FO did not see the PAPIs... Could it be, that with a large crab angle, the pilot could also not see the PAPIs, as they could have been obscured by the nose of the A320?

Either that or their forward view was being obscured by the LOC antennas..

Smott999
31st Mar 2015, 13:52
Passengers stating there was engine throttle-up at the last moments.
So perhaps they did realize how short they were...

Incredibly lucky no fatalities.

aterpster
31st Mar 2015, 14:03
Tom Imrich:

It is time to move on, to 100% RNP and GLS, globally. Then we'll finally see these unnecessarily hull losses abate.

Perhaps it was after you departed the FAA, but they have had for some time the glide-slope qualification surface (GQS). If the GQS is penetrated then the runway is disqualified from having any approach with vertical guidance, whether it be ILS, GLS, LNAV/VNAV, RNP AR, or LPV. Then there is the FAA's visual segment, which is wider than the GQS, and which every approach has. The visual segment can have obstacles but only to a point. That became much stricter after the Lear hit the trees one night.

Also, the cost of converting a large fleet's FMS and avionics to RNP AR feathering to GLS would be huge. (many of those approaches would have to be "dual string" because of low RNP requirements.) You know that Boeing, for one major OEM, charges an arm, leg, and your first born child to make such modifications.

Finally, there are airports where decent minimums cannot be obtained because of significant terrain in the missed approach segment. Related to that, the commercial operator has to also have a viable OEI path for the missed approach.

BTW, have you flown LPV? It is a great system where it can be sited. The accident runway at Halifax has a great LPV approach but apparently the airline wanted to keep their first born child. :)

sandiego89
31st Mar 2015, 14:50
737er:
86000 views for what could have prevented for a few thousand bucks on an ILS and relocation of power lines...a lesson that could be used all over to improve safety.

Over 3 million views for a fluke occurance that's basicallly unpreventable.

Meanwhile, bombs threats on Turkish, passengers storming the cockpit on United.....on and on.

But the problem is suicidal pilots. It's amazing.


Unusual events with interesting human factors will always trend higher on forums, the media, and in the general public.

Suicide, a vanishing airliner, a CAVU prang at a major airport, etc will always have more interest than say a night, bad weather cras....sorry, heavy landing....without a fatality any day. Rather more routine.

langleybaston
31st Mar 2015, 15:05
Incidentally, am I reading this Actual right, or is this a typo:

CYHZ 290400Z 34019G54KT 3/4SM R14/5000VP6000FT/D -SN DRSN BKN007

????

If that's correct, it's one hell of a gust factor!

Yes it is indeed, if true. I am a retired professional meteorologist, and such factors as about 2.8 are, as pilots will know, very rare but possibly associated with thunderstorms or indeed city centres. Very unlikely that anyone would write it in a TAF, for example.

langleybaston
31st Mar 2015, 15:14
UK Met Office Handbook says:

Table 6.4(a). Ratio of maximum (3-second) gust to mean hourly speed (for
strong, steady 10 m winds)
Surface type, Range of Estimated
ratios, average
Open sea 1.3, 1.3
Isolated hill tops 1.4-1.5, 1.4
Flat open country 1.4-1.8, 1.6
*Rolling country (few wind-breaks) 1.5-2.0, 1.7
Rolling country (numerous wind-breaks),
forest areas, towns, outskirts of large cities 1.7-2.1, 1.9
Centres of large cities 1.9-2.3, 2.1
Local variations, using this commonly used category, often give gusts varying widely in space and time from the estimated values, making airfield forecasting difficult, especially under isallobaric surging.

GlobalNav
31st Mar 2015, 16:03
My apologies for failing to notice there is indeed a PAPI at the runway. Why it didn't provide the essential vertical path cues, I don't understand.

ILS, LOC, NBD, RNP AR etc, may have their contribution, no doubt. But if there is a visual segment - an MDA, DA/DH - then the pilot still has to land visually.

I won't try to conclude what exactly went wrong - but it has to do with flying the visual segment - or choosing not to and going around. I am afraid that except for autoland, the safety of the instrument approach absolutely depends on this point.

Challenging wind conditions, lousy visibility conditions, no doubt. You still must have ALL the criteria met for descent and operation below the decision altitude.

Denti
31st Mar 2015, 16:06
You know that Boeing, for one major OEM, charges an arm, leg, and your first born child to make such modifications.

I guess it depends. As a retrofit both big OEMs do that, however, boeing offers it basically for free on its 737NG, 747-8 and 787 types. Probably will as well on the coming reengined versions of the 737 and 777.

We have GBAS capability since 2006 on our boeings (and those have RNP 0.1 as well) and when the decision was made to phase out the boeings in favour of airbii one of the questions was how much it would cost to install GBAS on them. But with around 250k per airframe for a narrowbody airbus there simply wasn't a business case. However, we have to start getting RNP AR approval now, previously we could simply boeings only on those limiting flights.

fireflybob
31st Mar 2015, 16:28
Am just interested do Air Canada fly monitored approaches?

Jet Jockey A4
31st Mar 2015, 16:45
Am just interested do Air Canada fly monitored approaches?

As in PMA? The answer is no.

Jet Jockey A4
31st Mar 2015, 16:49
My apologies for failing to notice there is indeed a PAPI at the runway. Why it didn't provide the essential vertical path cues, I don't understand

Several possibilities here...

Perhaps it was out of service, or it was not switched "ON" or with all that snow, drifting snow with the strong winds maybe it was covered it up.

oldchina
31st Mar 2015, 16:56
"Perhaps it was out of service, or it was not switched "ON" or with all that snow, drifting snow with the strong winds maybe it was covered up"

A somewhat amusing image: Papy couldn't get out to clear the PAPI.
There's one hell of a disconnect between the cababilities of a $100m plane and that of the airport

mach2.6
31st Mar 2015, 17:11
Found this on American TV network abcnews.com. Text says that the aircraft TOUCHED DOWN 1100 feet short of the runway. If accurate, would that not put the aircraft below the line of sight to the papis?
Officials Examining Why Plane Landed Short of Halifax Runway - ABC News (http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/wireStory/officials-examining-plane-landed-short-halifax-runway-30025155)

geneman
31st Mar 2015, 18:01
"... says that the aircraft TOUCHED DOWN 1100 feet short of the runway. If accurate, would that not put the aircraft below the line of sight to the papis?"

Exactly.
The point 1100 ft short, where the AC first hit the ground, is actually BELOW the level of the end of the runway. That's why it hit the power lines.

Lost in Saigon
31st Mar 2015, 18:07
Yes, the aircraft first hit in an area that is actually about 40' BELOW the runway elevation.

From there they went through a power line, continued across a road, and then up a hill where they hit the localizer antenna. They continued up the hill and onto the runway.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/aca_a320_c-ftjp_halifax_150329_map.jpg

https://www.google.ca/maps/@44.863733,-63.530175,3a,75y,91.88h,87.43t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sQQqLJ4g8BRtLUmLyZZONTA!2e0

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/011aa.jpg~original

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/010dd.jpg~original

7478ti
31st Mar 2015, 18:28
Good to hear from you aterpster!!!... All good and partially valid points, ...but there are still reasonable and useful low cost and high capability ways forward, with both RNP and GLS.

First, there are vastly better ways to do the GQS than FAA did, just as we did with many "near in" issues at [real] RNP sites. If an aircraft can safely operate visually at all, then there are ways to do both real RNP, as well as to even qualify the runway for using LAND 3/AIII or equivalent through rollout, as well as addressing safe OEI balked landing protection from the TDZ. There are VERY few true and real "one way" in and out runways globally, which may need to use an explicit commit point. As to cost, neither GLS nor RNP needs to be expensive. They are presently only priced the way they are for largely non-technical commercial reasons, that the marketplace could easily solve, and likely will eventually solve.

Yes, I've flown LPV, as well as FLS and IAN,... (extensively) as well as nearly every other All-WX-Ops idea (good or bad) from the days dating back to the '60s. Col. Carl Crane and I even discussed it back in '73, while flying with him at Wright Field, with a demo of his "All-Weather-Flight-Gage" dating back to the '30s! So while LPV might have been a reasonable idea back in the period of 1969 through '71, at the advent of autoflight systems like the SPZ-1, PB-100, or FCS-110, and the related nav systems like the TERN-100 and AINS-70, ...LPV is still obsolete trapezoidal, angular, straight-in, and horrendously airspace wasting criteria. As a concept, it no longer makes any sense at all, since we first first did linear RNP .15 around the corners at KEGE back in 1991, and later at the first real "published" formal RNP at PAJN in 1994. RNP is ALWAYS better, safer, more usable, and a better long term solution than any LPV (especially when combined with GLS/GBAS). RNP could have been (and still could) be done for FAR LESS COST and far more benefit than WAAS/LPV, for everyone from tiny UAVs, to GA, to the largest wide body's and DoD vehicles. Unfortunately, it was largely AVN, AIR-130, and later AFS-400 that set GA on this foolish course, with having had no vision, or credible experience, or technical capability, or understanding of the true system and operations level risks involved whatsoever (versus their naive and seriously limited and flawed CRM assessments) ...that screwed this subject all up for over two decades for nearly all the world. So now WAAS(SBAS)/LPV is an entirely obsolete waste of money for everyone, with a lost generation of avionics that will never solve NextGen economically, safely, or efficiently, that needs to simply be phased out at the earliest opportunity, before it further fouls up major portions of global airspace and ANSPs. When we're already landing "critical risk to ship" UAVs on pitching rolling moving decks within 1 ft laterally, and 8 ft longitudinally with these concepts or equivalent, while safely and routinely missing nearby obstructions by a few feet, as well as safely and softly landing other UAVs for pennies per landing (with systems like Portabas), ...then still continuing to unnecessarily lose A320s at CYHZ, or A330s at VNKT, or B777s at KSFO is absurd.

cactusbusdrvr
31st Mar 2015, 18:37
I think this is a more compelling incident than the Germanwings crash. This has a larger bearing on how we operate the Airbus. I will be very interested in the final report from the TSB to see what they set for FPA, when they started down from the FAF, or even if they inadvertently started down before the FAF.

People here have questioned why they didn't use the PAPi. With a half mile of visibility even on the proper descent angle to the runway it would have been difficult. At a 3 degree glide path 300' above field elevation puts you a mile out. PAPis are usually about 500' down from the end of the runway. So that's just over a mile from the missed approach point to the PAPi. Hard to pick up with blowing precipitation.

Groucho
31st Mar 2015, 18:56
Anyone extracted any figures for actual fuel reserves at the time of the crash?

Numero1
31st Mar 2015, 19:44
https://www.google.ca/maps/place/1740+Old+Guysborough+Rd,+Halifax+Stanfield+International+Air port,+Goffs,+NS+B2T+1E4/@44.880187,-63.489512,3a,75y,242.6h,74.67t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sXDGqEfg0RKtar_ixh1sHuQ!2e0!4m2!3m1!1s0x4 b59807641d0992d:0xcb0dacf504f2b7bf

lost in saigon, why are the power line on the wrong side of the road on your picture? You described the scene correctly in your narrative.

GlobalNav
31st Mar 2015, 19:47
cactusbusdrvr "People here have questioned why they didn't use the PAPi. With a half mile of visibility even on the proper descent angle to the runway it would have been difficult. At a 3 degree glide path 300' above field elevation puts you a mile out. PAPis are usually about 500' down from the end of the runway. So that's just over a mile from the missed approach point to the PAPi. Hard to pick up with blowing precipitation."

I'm one that asked the question. I'm not intending to blame the pilot here, but surely if the pilot had the visual references required, and sufficient flight visibility to proceed (not just talking about rules now, talking about practical necessity for safe landing) the PAPI would have been visible soon enough and high enough to be useful in the visual segment. Unless of course it was snow-covered or otherwise affected by the conditions.

The decision to proceed below minimums is not merely a one-time deal. Conditions must continue to be sufficient - not marginal, sufficient - or the pilot should go-around.

So, my question becomes - if it appeared to the pilot at the time that visual conditions were sufficient for a safe landing and that the airplane was in an appropriate position to land then why would the airplane touchdown 1000 ft or so short of the runway?

Chuck Canuck
31st Mar 2015, 19:49
This flight had the most lucky and blessed of passengers and crew. Had there been a sea wall or concrete berm at the approach end of the runway, the result would have been worse than that of OZ214 at KSFO.

This accident prove one thing; no one is infallible despite all the great equipment onboard, the so called super duper trained crew, etc.:uhoh:

Lost in Saigon
31st Mar 2015, 20:01
https://www.google.ca/maps/place/1740+Old+Guysborough+Rd,+Halifax+Stanfield+International+Air port,+Goffs,+NS+B2T+1E4/@44.880187,-63.489512,3a,75y,242.6h,74.67t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sXDGqEfg0RKtar_ixh1sHuQ!2e0!4m2!3m1!1s0x4 b59807641d0992d:0xcb0dacf504f2b7bf

lost in saigon, why are the power line on the wrong side of the road on your picture? You described the scene correctly in your narrative.

Your Google map location is near the approach end of Runway 32. Try this location instead: https://www.google.ca/maps/@44.863427,-63.527716,3a,75y,251.32h,82.77t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1s9sC8a1NsKH2_1mCLXA0URA!2e0!6m1!1e1

I edited my text to read: "went through a power line, continued across a road, and then up a hill"

NigelOnDraft
31st Mar 2015, 20:10
So, my question becomes - if it appeared to the pilot at the time that visual conditions were sufficient for a safe landing and that the airplane was in an appropriate position to land then why would the airplane touchdown 1000 ft or so short of the runway? I suspect there were 2 pilots on board to assess those requirements ;)

An NPA in an Airbus has certain challenges, one of which is you are likely using AP and FD to minima - then if you continue, it's AP and FDs off to a manual / visual landing.

Fine if it's a calm day, and the NPA leaves you in a good position. But with snow, a significant crosswind, and by all accounts, some significant windshear effects on that approach, the holes have the potential to align. Add in the L time, the long hold etc. etc.

Of course in theory if everything was followed to the letter of the rulebook, and with 20:20 hindsight, no accident would have occurred. The alternative is 2 skilled and well intentioned pilots got caught out, or better (for them) some technical issue arose.

This one I think is worth awaiting a report.

Mudman
31st Mar 2015, 20:42
@lost in saigon Yes, the aircraft first hit in an area that is actually about 40' BELOW the runway elevation.

I'm not sure the Aircraft touched down in the area you indicate. I saw no evidence of that when I was there yesterday. Here is a photo looking away from the runway along the few approach lights. As far as I could see the first contact was the power lines, the second was the last light stand at the fence, the third was the fuselage contacting the antenna array and the gear contacting the snow/ground.

If hey had I expect I would have seen TSB guys there marking it with orange paint.
Guess we'll know for sure when they plot the data.

Looking away from the runway, standing just below the powerlines that were clipped.
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-fgkSuoxgu6k/VRmuoLbrhQI/AAAAAAAAbGw/ZNJtkk4UgFA/w1155-h770-no/IMG_0362.jpg

Light stand
https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-ncBcFRWB29E/VRmummCnNJI/AAAAAAAAbH0/tfjpmsxKsWw/w1155-h770-no/IMG_0361.jpg

Berm, Snow and array
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-iUN_I4i-yz0/VRmulMqqCgI/AAAAAAAAbGo/qqJ52LV96mY/w1155-h770-no/IMG_0359.jpg

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-cnbInIn-O_M/VRmupdO8sWI/AAAAAAAAbHk/LyP2wVT1ifo/w1155-h770-no/IMG_0363.jpg

Groucho
31st Mar 2015, 20:52
Do we know if the ILS was working on 23?

Lost in Saigon
31st Mar 2015, 21:08
@lost in saigon

I'm not sure the Aircraft touched down in the area you indicate. I saw no evidence of that when I was there yesterday. Here is a photo looking away from the runway along the few approach lights. As far as I could see the first contact was the power lines, the second was the last light stand at the fence, the third was the fuselage contacting the antenna array and the gear contacting the snow/ground.

If hey had I expect I would have seen TSB guys there marking it with orange paint.
Guess we'll know for sure when they plot the data.




Cheers
Mudman

Looking away from the runway, standing just below the powerlines that were clipped.


Thanks for the photos. They do seem to show first contact with the wires.

I was just going by this map posted in AvHerald: Accident: Air Canada A320 at Halifax on Mar 29th 2015, touched down short of runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=483e7337&opt=0)

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/aca_a320_c-ftjp_halifax_150329_map.jpg

Mudman
31st Mar 2015, 21:26
@lost in saigon
No worries. I could be wrong. I tweeted TSB to see if they would clarify.

Also if you measure from the berm to the end of the white area (rather than the end of the asphalt) the distance is about 1100'. Guess it depends on how one defines the end of the runway.


Incidentally the RVR info at Nav Canada shows the end of 05 to be at the old taxiway prior to the extension. Touch out of date.

http://atm.navcanada.ca/images/iwv/CYHZ-282-09-0.png

number0009
31st Mar 2015, 21:30
I was just going by this map posted in AvHerald:Looks like the touchdown point on their view was derived by measuring from beginning of threshold pavement. Outcome would've been different had the initial TD been that short.

stefan_777
31st Mar 2015, 23:20
A few things I gathered from an archived ATC recording:

AC624 requested maximum aerodrome light intensity early in the approach, it was 4/5 at the time, supposedly going up to 5/5 later but it's hard to tell from the recording.

When the tower controller cleared AC624 to land, he reported winds 010 20G30. Nothing out of the ordinary for CYHZ. The visibility was probably the dominant weather factor, 1/2sm or less due to the blowing snow.

My ATC recording stops presumably when the aircraft contacted the power lines, knocking out the local scanner.

The aircraft certainly did not touchdown before the power lines, it would have nosed into the embankment leading up to the antenna array. Otherwise the story would have been much worse.

CYHZ has a reputation for frequent IFR conditions. Maybe it's a good time to install a proper ILS system on both ends of its longest runway.

I'll have popcorn ready for the explanation of going below the MDA.

Lost in Saigon
31st Mar 2015, 23:28
Some good photos on the TSB/RCMP Flickr page: https://www.flickr.com/photos/tsbcanada/sets/72157651565742766/with/16940541286/

These photos show the aircraft beyond Bravo taxiway and by my calculations that is about 2000' from the runway threshold.

https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8699/16806977109_a37291da80_b.jpg

https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7601/16992279831_42d43f360f_b.jpg

jdawg
1st Apr 2015, 00:31
Never meant to suggest any judgement here. Could have been any of us if you throw in a bit of fatigue.

My point is that the pilots on this thread need to maintain a focus on the crew's decisions and options available while the smart guys that design the IAP's work out the cost/benefit analysis of a strictly RNP AR / autoland industry. we are commercial operators not corporate flight departments for the most part so feasibility is an issue.

Poor decisions are made, this crew got caught up in it pretty bad. Im taking it as a wake up call to stay focused and divert or go around and let the accountants deal with service to that field.

My apologies to anyone offended.

RESA
1st Apr 2015, 01:40
To MudMan
Thanks for the info.
I wondered why LOC-23/24 had the extension kit. The original was on the standard ~10’ mounts – current appears to be the ~20’ extension kit. The “old berm” was over 12’ AGL. I suspect the existing is likely in the order of 3-4’? I guess nobody will see it until the snow melts!? A prudent move to reduce the berm height on relocation, too bad that they probably didn’t grade the backside as I suspect they did on the RWY side, given past experience with MK-747. Unfortunately, I suspect that the existing installation is “capped” with tons of concrete, as was the original berm. The passengers of this flight are sooooo luck that the original berm was no longer in place . . . as that is where this entire a/c would have likely stopped . . . not just the undercarriage !!?

. . . Sorry, this site won't allow me to post photo of the enormous slab of concrete on-top the berm.

RatherBeFlying
1st Apr 2015, 02:10
The snow at the berm shows two deep impact marks, likely from the gear, which the photos show lying between the berm and the threshold.

These folks had a really narrow escape.

dave.rooney
1st Apr 2015, 03:06
Looking at that pic, I see the large "gouge" where the fuselage impacted, but there's a smaller one just to the left of it. Since the port engine sheared off rather cleanly, it seems to me that the smaller gouge is from the engine not the landing gear.

If that's the case, there's no matching gouge for the starboard engine. That suggests to me that the a/c was in a left bank attitude when it hit. Could a 50+ kt wind gust force the a/c the size of an A320 even lower?

Capi_Cafre'
1st Apr 2015, 03:29
It is always interesting that YHZ Airport Authority can find money for a shinny new terminal but no money for proper airport navaids, and they are not alone in Canada.

Reflective paint for runway markings

Jilted
1st Apr 2015, 03:30
Lost in Saigon: I don't see any indication of a PAPI in any of the TSB photos. Is it just me (I cleaned my glasses today)?

Capn Bloggs
1st Apr 2015, 04:25
This approach would be flown in LOC/FPA. You would descend down to 2000' for the FAF and then at the FAF it would be FPA -3.0 (plus temp correction) down to your MDA. The only DME you would need is where you can descend down to 2000' but that doesn't seem to be the problem here.
Or am I missing what you are saying?
I've never been in favour if this technique. Geometrically, it is impossible to fly down the final 3.08° path if you cross the FAF in level flight, because of the time it takes "wind in" the 3.08° because you're in level flight to start. You'll probably end up at least 100ft high, and that's if you get the aeroplane established on the 3.08° pronto, travelling at 250ft per second (150GS). Of course, now that you are high (and you have less than 1300ft to go to the MDA), you have to increase the descent rate/FPA otherwise you'll pop out way above the PAPI and have to go around. Not to mention the aeroplane dragging itself along at 2000ft, Vapp to the FAF, and potentially mucking about with the ALT SEL as well.

IMO, far better to set up the 3.08° further back and clip the FAF/2000ft on a steady descent path with minor FPA adjustments to go down the charted Altitude/Distance profile.

cactusbusdrvr
1st Apr 2015, 05:43
I don't know how Air Canada does it, but at my airline we set the FPA .4 before the FAF. At the FAF we pull the knob and we start down at that preset angle.

If you are late, as you said, you can adjust the FPA to recover to the "doughnut" which is the vertical guidance path indicator. Withing a few hundred feet you should be stabilized at the correct FPA.

There is an article in the FAA IFR magazine from last year that talks about the lack of terrain clearance guarantee on a non precision approach after the MDA down to touchdown. I will try to post it here when I get back off this trip and I can get on my computer. My iPad skills do not allow me to copy and past a long article.

The Birmingham Alabama UPS crash is a result of a flight crew assuming they had adequate terrain clearance after acquiring the runway at the MDA. Unfortunately, at night they didn't have sight of obstacles in that final approach path and they continued on their descent path into terrain.

As I said above, I will be very interested in the final outcome of this incident. We may all learn a valuable lesson from the cause of this accident. Thankfully the only lasting damage was to the jet.

Airbubba
1st Apr 2015, 06:19
The Birmingham Alabama UPS crash is a result of a flight crew assuming they had adequate terrain clearance after acquiring the runway at the MDA.

No, they never had the runway in sight at minimums, never properly sequenced the approach in the FMC and went sailing through minimums at 1500 fpm down.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew's continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft's altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain.

Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to properly configure and verify the flight management computer for the profile approach; (2) the captain's failure to communicate his intentions to the first officer once it became apparent the vertical profile was not captured; (3) the flight crew's expectation that they would break out of the clouds at 1,000 feet above ground level due to incomplete weather information; (4) the first officer's failure to make the required minimums callouts; (5) the captain's performance deficiencies likely due to factors including, but not limited to, fatigue, distraction, or confusion, consistent with performance deficiencies exhibited during training; and (6) the first officer's fatigue due to acute sleep loss resulting from her ineffective off-duty time management and circadian factors.

Aircraft ACcident Report AAR1402 (http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1402.aspx)

Ultra Glide
1st Apr 2015, 06:20
How do you get the DME from IHZ when you're tuned to IGX?

The only way to do that on the A-320 would be to use the abnormal procedure for loss of both MCDUs and select Back Up tuning on the Radio Management Panel.

(The A-320 displays each ILS on the respective PFD and the other ILS on the ND.)

One should not have to revert to an abnormal procedure to do a published approach.

After looking at the approach plate (displayed on a previous post by another person) I think I would be better off doing the NDB approach in those conditions because I wouldn't have to deal with the abnormal radio tuning procedure and I would benefit from a higher MDA in the crappy weather. Too bad if I don't get in.

I always try to put it into perspective. You will hardly ever do any diversions in a normal career and it's always preferable for all concerned to have a few diversions and no crashes than vice-versa.

Two things I will say about flying the A-320 in gusty conditions, you better add a few knots to that Vapp and you better know how to handle that sidestick. You don't get any feedback from it like you do from an airplane that you have to trim yourself.

I was joking with a friend of mine the other day that you can't blame Airbus because a lot of pilots don't seem to know how to fly these days (NOT talking about this crash!) but then I realized what I just said. :O :)

(But I still prefer Airbus over Boeing cuz I can cross my legs and eat off a table in cruise.)

NigelOnDraft
1st Apr 2015, 07:34
How do you get the DME from IHZ when you're tuned to IGX?

The only way to do that on the A-320 would be to use the abnormal procedure for loss of both MCDUs and select Back Up tuning on the Radio Management Panel.Might be being dim, but you'd have the LOC Freq (109.1) auto-tuned in the ILS field, and manually enter the IHZ (109.1) in one or both VOR fields on the RAD NAV page? Then ND displays as required...

FullWings
1st Apr 2015, 08:17
A couple of times in my career so far I’ve gone-around from below decision altitude/height due to inadequate references, having acquired them before that.

I have to say they were difficult decisions to make, especially off a CAT I or NPA. I remember on one approach I could still see lights and things (enough to technically continue) but I was becoming more and more uncertain about exactly where I was, especially on the vertical profile. As I went around, the tower reported the RVR as 200m and decreasing (the minimum was 800m).

I think what finally made me throw it away was the lack of a definite aiming point and the question: “how am I going to land this thing if I can’t see much in front?” which had popped up in my mind. The years of doing standard IRR/LPC/OPC hadn’t helped much as they were all of the standard yes/no at (M)DA.

05 at YHZ appears to have a significant terrain upslope in the latter stages of the approach, which sets up a possible undershoot from the ‘too high’ visual illusion. Also, the rad. alt. calls won’t give a clue until too late. At least in this case the investigators have two people to talk to in order to find out what they saw and how it all went wrong. Should be an interesting report...

NigelOnDraft
1st Apr 2015, 08:47
cactusbusdrvr If you are late, as you said, you can adjust the FPA to recover to the "doughnut" which is the vertical guidance path indicator. Withing a few hundred feet you should be stabilized at the correct FPA.
I might be misunderstanding your post, but I hope you would ignore the "doughnut" on an NPA, with no GPS? It bears no relation to reality and just reflects where the aircraft "thinks" it is.

As Capn Bloggs says:IMO, far better to set up the 3.08° further back and clip the FAF/2000ft on a steady descent path with minor FPA adjustments to go down the charted Altitude/Distance profile

phiggsbroadband
1st Apr 2015, 11:01
Would their Radio Altimeter have been calling out the height above the approach lights instead of the runway, which is on a 40ft higher plateau?


Looking at the damage to the last approach light, it looks as if they just clipped the light-bulb part, and not the mast on which it was located.

Zeffy
1st Apr 2015, 11:48
How do you get the DME from IHZ when you're tuned to IGX?

The only way to do that on the A-320 would be to use the abnormal procedure for loss of both MCDUs and select Back Up tuning on the Radio Management Panel.

(The A-320 displays each ILS on the respective PFD and the other ILS on the ND.)...

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/photo16/LOC%20NDB%2005.jpg~original


If it is not possible to read the raw DME from IHZ while tuned to the IGX localizer, could the (1.7 nm) bias in the FMS distance to the RW05 waypoint make more difficult the use of the VDA altitude ribbon just above the profile view?

Retired DC9 driver
1st Apr 2015, 12:50
cactusbusdrvr wrote
"I don't know how Air Canada does it, but at my airline we set the FPA .4 before the FAF. At the FAF we pull the knob and we start down at that preset angle.

If you are late, as you said, you can adjust the FPA to recover to the "doughnut" which is the vertical guidance path indicator. Withing a few hundred feet you should be stabilized at the correct FPA. "

Air Canada procedure,so I was told is (or was when I flew the A320) to descend to FAF crossing altitude. Once you have ALT capture select FPA at zero. .3 nm before the FAF select desired FPA value in the window. If you crossed the FAF a little high, you can increase the FPA.

tubby linton
1st Apr 2015, 15:42
A problem has been identified with the Thales FMGC where if an ILS frequency is entered into the VOR fields the FMGC will instead tune108.0 rather than was has been hard tuned.
I am not saying that is what happened here, I am merely posting to make other posters aware of this issue.

Zeffy
1st Apr 2015, 17:21
Air Canada procedure is (or was when I flew the A320) to descend to FAF crossing altitude. Once you have ALT capture select FPA at zero. .3 nm before the FAF select desired FPA value in the window. If you crossed the FAF a little high, you can increase the FPA.

And would the MDA be treated as a DA… i.e., no level off, no loitering... just bounce the airplane off of the minimum altitude and fly the missed if the required visual references were not available?

NigelOnDraft
1st Apr 2015, 18:14
And would the MDA be treated as a DA… i.e., no level off, no loitering... just bounce the airplane off of the minimum altitude and fly the missed if the required visual references were not available? ... tis how we do it...

CONF iture
1st Apr 2015, 18:15
A few things I gathered from an archived ATC recording:
Is it mentioned if they used the LOC/DME 05 approach, or the RNAV 05 ?

Ok, sorry, disregard the question, just saw that :
http://www.pprune.org/8924867-post70.html

viking767
1st Apr 2015, 23:00
The pilot also warned passengers he was thinking of diverting to Moncton, New Brunswick before he decided to land in Halifax.

Might have been a good idea.

CanadianAirbusPilot
2nd Apr 2015, 15:18
Might have been a good idea.

Might have been. We are unsure of the reasons for the crash at this point. They had the required vis to shoot the approach, other than a stiff cross wind coupled with a runway that was contaminated there were no other huge red flags. Poor conditions? Yes, but not breaking any of the rules flying that approach. Regardless they ended up short of the runway, it would appear right on centreline.

You add 50 feet to your MDA gives you about 320 AGL. There would be time to decide you have no runway insight and go around. If at 320 feet AGL you break out right at minimums (on path) I doubt you'd have enough room to dive it down to where they hit the ground. If you broke out a little earlier with the "lights only" you would thing the vis good enough (I know it was fluctuating) to see that the path the airplane was on was not working.

Perhaps there was an illusion with the road? Perhaps parked cars looking like runway edge marking?

When looking at this accident my biggest concern coming in would have been the runway surface condition and frankly that was never an issue because they didn't make the runway. You shoot the approach to legal minimums and if you don't have anything it's off to YQM.

While everything seems to have been done legally here the shame is that there was no ILS onto 32 and it being open/plowed. Both 32 and 05 don't have a precision approach and frankly while that may be okay in the prairies where weather patterns are such that if an ILS is required you know where the winds are coming from, in YHZ the weather patterns can vary so much it would make sense to have at least a cat 1 to all runways.

CONF iture
2nd Apr 2015, 16:10
In SEP 1999
The Airbus A320, C-FKCO, operating as Air Canada flight 630, was on a scheduled flight from Toronto, Ontario, to St. John=s, Newfoundland. During the night localizer approach to runway 29, which had a relocated threshold, strong gusty winds were encountered. The aircraft touched down approximately 250 feet short of the relocated threshold, striking sawhorse-type construction barriers. The aircraft sustained damage to two brake lines and one brake temperature sensor. There were no injuries to any of the occupants. The aircraft touched down at 0053 Newfoundland daylight time.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1999/a99a0131/a99a0131.pdf

flyingchanges
2nd Apr 2015, 16:35
Don't know about Air Canada, but we would not be doing a 30+KT crosswind to a contaminated runway.

CONF iture
2nd Apr 2015, 17:05
13kt cross wind component, nothing wrong here.

flyingchanges
2nd Apr 2015, 17:41
SPECI CYHZ 290414Z 34024G33KT 3/4SM R14/P6000FT/U -SN DRSN BKN010
OVC018 M06/M07 A2965 RMK SF7SC1 SLP046=
CYHZ 290400Z 34019G54KT 3/4SM R14/5000VP6000FT/D -SN DRSN BKN007
OVC010 M06/M07 A2964 RMK SF7SC1 SLP045=
SPECI CYHZ 290313Z 35020G26KT 1/2SM R14/3500V4500FT/N SN DRSN VV003 M06/M07 A2963 RMK SN8 SLP040=
CYHZ 290300Z 34019G25KT 1/8SM R14/P6000VM0300FT/N +SN DRSN VV003 M06/M07 A2962 RMK SN8 /S09/ SLP038=

Not sure how you only get 13KTS out of these reports. 60 degrees of would get you 90% of those values as a crosswind.

NigelOnDraft
2nd Apr 2015, 17:46
When the tower controller cleared AC624 to land, he reported winds 010 20G30. Nothing out of the ordinary for CYHZ. The visibility was probably the dominant weather factor, 1/2sm or less due to the blowing snowposted earlier...

flyingchanges
2nd Apr 2015, 17:57
In the USA, if you report the current ATIS, and it contains gusts, the tower controller is not required to report gusts to you.

CONF iture
2nd Apr 2015, 18:13
The SPECI at 0313Z shows 35020G26KT which is 010 degrees in MAG.
40 deg off gives 13KT crosswind component.

stefan_777
2nd Apr 2015, 20:04
Agreed. The crosswind as reported by the controller moments before the crash was nothing extreme.

My guess is that they mistook the localizer array as the beginning of the runway, due to whiteout conditions. The approach lights for 05 are few and far between, but there are a few lights on the localizer array.

A very unlucky/fatigued pilot might mistake those as runway end lights, a false visual reference.

The actual runway endlights could have been obscured by snowbanks, especially due to a shallow (botched) approach angle.

phiggsbroadband
3rd Apr 2015, 10:58
Does anyone know what the crew have to say about this, and are they still flying?

FullWings
3rd Apr 2015, 11:23
My guess is that they mistook the localizer array as the beginning of the runway, due to whiteout conditions. The approach lights for 05 are few and far between, but there are a few lights on the localizer array.
A possibility but my chart shows three white flashing lights on the approach centreline and one either side of the threshold. Difficult to mistake for the runway as the runway end lights are green and don’t flash. :confused:

As they were already on the ground when they went through the localiser (witness the aerial stuck in the nose), they’d have touched down short of the what they were interpreting as “runway” anyway.

CONF iture
3rd Apr 2015, 15:11
Does anyone know what the crew have to say about this, and are they still flying?
Most probably not flying these days, but talking with TSB and trying to understand how they ended up in such a situation.
Can be a good pilot all your life until you're not anymore ... That's our job.

CONF iture
4th Apr 2015, 12:48
At this point, except that the airplane hit the ground 1000ft before threshold, we know nothing. Is it due to human error, technical malfunction or characteristic, environmental issue, mix of everything ... ?
The crew must have a good idea, and probably TSB by now.

Astra driver
5th Apr 2015, 01:46
The lowest required visibility for this approach according to the Jepp charts is 1sm, the reported visibilities from the METARS taken just before and just after the accident are 1/2sm and 3/4sm respectively. Am I missing something here?

Lost in Saigon
5th Apr 2015, 02:14
The lowest required visibility for this approach according to the Jepp charts is 1sm, the reported visibilities from the METARS taken just before and just after the accident are 1/2sm and 3/4sm respectively. Am I missing something here?


Post 114: http://www.pprune.org/8925370-post114.html
In Canada vis on the plates are not limits, approach bans are lower and depend on company sops and equipment used....


Post 115: http://www.pprune.org/8925377-post115.html
As stated above, approaches in Canada aren't visibility limited. I believe AC and WJ would both have lower ops specs, somewhere around 1/2-3/4 mile. So I believe they were legal to shoot approach, landing is limited on seeing the runway (or lights) at MDA/DH. I think everything was legal from that stand point.

West Coast
5th Apr 2015, 04:19
Flying changes

In the USA, if you report the current ATIS, and it contains gusts, the tower controller is not required to report gusts to you.

Can you provide a reference in FAAO 7110.65 or some other govt document?

CanadianAirbusPilot
5th Apr 2015, 10:12
75% of required vis is standard with 50% available as an OPS Spec AC, WS, QK etc would all have the 50% ops spec.

Astra driver
5th Apr 2015, 16:19
Lost in Saigon and Canadianairbuspilot, thanks.

Phantom Driver
5th Apr 2015, 20:15
75% of required vis is standard with 50% available as an OPS Spec AC, WS, QK
etc would all have the 50% ops spec.


Pilots or Lawyers writing this stuff? Anyway, no matter what, it always boils down to the old saying--"Captain, it's your baby".

malabo
6th Apr 2015, 05:12
Canadaairbuspilot said

You add 50 feet to your MDA gives you about 320 AGL. There would be time to decide you have no runway insight and go around. If at 320 feet AGL you break out right at minimums (on path) I doubt you'd have enough room to dive it down to where they hit the ground. If you broke out a little earlier with the "lights only" you would thing the vis good enough (I know it was fluctuating) to see that the path the airplane was on was not working.

Not necessarily 320'.
EXEMPTION FROM PARAGRAPH 602.128(2)(b) OF THE CANADIAN AVIATION REGULATIONS - Transport Canada (http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/Regserv/Affairs/exemptions/docs/en/2509.htm)

Most operators apply the exemption above to use the MDA as the DA. The 50' figure commonly thrown around relates to the height above the runway threshold intended by the constant descent angle, and is about where the flare should begin. Agree that not much 'diving' could take place even if the crew wanted to. Impact was at least 2000' short of target.

Capn Bloggs
6th Apr 2015, 05:54
You add 50 feet to your MDA gives you about 320 AGL.

The 50' figure commonly thrown around relates to the height above the runway threshold intended by the constant descent angle, and is about where the flare should begin.
No, in other countries, the 50ft is added to the MDA to create a "derived decision altitude" at which the go-around must be commenced if not "Visual". It is designed to ensure that the aircraft does not go below the MDA (or if it does, not by very much) during the go-around manoeuvre. You won't catch me flaring at 50ft!

chimbu warrior
6th Apr 2015, 09:04
No, in other countries, the 50ft is added to the MDA to create a "derived decision altitude" at which the go-around must be commenced if not "Visual".

Maybe in some countries, but not all. Doesn't happen where I work.

CanadianAirbusPilot
6th Apr 2015, 09:22
I am not going to confirm where I work, but looking at my name and other Canadian Airbus operators come up with your own conclusions. :suspect:

Where I work we add 50 feet to the MDA and treat it like a DA and make a landing/go around decision at that point.

Jet Jockey A4
6th Apr 2015, 10:24
Where I work we add 50 feet to the MDA and treat it like a DA and make a landing/go around decision at that point.

No, in other countries, the 50ft is added to the MDA to create a "derived decision altitude" at which the go-around must be commenced if not "Visual". It is designed to ensure that the aircraft does not go below the MDA (or if it does, not by very much) during the go-around manoeuvre. You won't catch me flaring at 50ft!


Exactly!

At least in Canada, TC does not want you to go below a DA at anytime unless visual with the landing environment.

So when a CDA is used on a "non precision" type approach with only a MDA published, one must add the 50 foot increase to that MDA and now use that "new DA" minimum as the point where a "visual/landing or Go Around" decision is taken.

This “DA procedure” must be part of an operator’s SOP and must have been approved by TC prior to conducting this procedure.

Now perhaps some operators have different approvals or in some other jurisdictions this is not required at all but I wouldn’t know.

Retired DC9 driver
6th Apr 2015, 13:34
I agree with CanadianAirbus Pilot..sounds like I flew Airbus for the same Airline :oh:
MOT required us to add 50 feet to the MDA, so that during a Go Around, on a coupled/selected approach we would not descend through the published MDA.. The MDA was (is?) considered a hard floor. Descend though it on a Sim ride during the Go around (with no runway in sight) and it could be a Failure, or at least an RS..

flyingchanges
6th Apr 2015, 15:42
Can you provide a reference in FAAO 7110.65 or some other govt document? Working on it, this is something that came out of a discussion on the CO 1404 accident at KDEN.

peekay4
6th Apr 2015, 18:22
@flyingchanges

There was a change to 7110.65 last year (version "V") following NTSB safety recommendations after the CO1404 accident. Gusts are now to be included when reporting surface winds (when applicable).

See paragraph 2-4-17(g). The new wording in bold:
g. Surface wind. The word “wind” followed by the
separate digits of the indicated wind direction to the
nearest 10−degree multiple, the word “at” and the
separate digits of the indicated velocity in knots, to
include any gusts.

jaytee54
11th Apr 2015, 14:59
It is always interesting that YHZ Airport Authority can find money for a shinny new terminal but no money for proper airport navaids, and they are not alone in Canada.

I suspect that runway 32 was not available as it had not been cleared of snow, the airport operations mgr. would make that decision.


A shiny new terminal is a fine place for high rent retail opportunities. Navaids on the other hand are an unnecessary expense, whose maintenance is a constant drain on resources.

I never flew buses, but the bottom line is that you cross the NDB at 2000 feet (QNH used I assume), then descend to 740 feet at which time somebody calls DECIDE and somebody else calls "Go-around", unless he/she has an adequate view of the runway and its lighting system to allow a safe landing.
So how come the aircraft touched the ground 40 feet BELOW the TDZ and 1100 feet before it? I await the report on that one. All else is of little relevance.

peekay4
11th Apr 2015, 17:50
A shiny new terminal is a fine place for high rent retail opportunities. Navaids on the other hand are an unnecessary expense, whose maintenance is a constant drain on resources.
And as I understand it:

New terminal = investment by the airport authority
New navaid = cost to NavCanada

Considering the transition to RNAV GNSS approaches, there's going to be very little appetite to invest in net-new ILS equipment, even though a large fraction of commercial aircraft in Canada cannot perform precision GPS approaches.

fireflybob
11th Apr 2015, 18:47
So how come the aircraft touched the ground 40 feet BELOW the TDZ and 1100 feet before it? I await the report on that one. All else is of little relevance.

Windshear, microburst?

de facto
11th Apr 2015, 18:52
The MDA was (is?) considered a hard floor. Descend though it on a Sim ride during the Go around (with no runway in sight) and it could be a Failure, or at least an RS..

With the old "Dunk and Drive"...MDA was a hard floor...times have changed and so have procedures...

jaytee54
11th Apr 2015, 23:09
So how come the aircraft touched the ground 40 feet BELOW the TDZ and 1100 feet before it? I await the report on that one. All else is of little relevance.

fireflybob:- Windshear, microburst?

Yes, or a technical problem, or whatever. At least they have the crew, aircraft and recorders to tell us what.

TheInquisitor
12th Apr 2015, 01:18
With the old "Dunk and Drive"...MDA was a hard floor...times have changed and so have procedures...

The methodology of getting to MDA may have 'evolved', but it is STILL a hard floor - unlike a DA, you do NOT go below it unless you have the required visual references. It is not the altitude at which you initiate the MAP.

vilas
12th Apr 2015, 02:15
This accident could be similar to the one that happened to a 744 at Frankfurt where the pilot was flying the approach manually and drifting fog started covering the runway from the far end causing an illusion of overshoot and he inadvertently kept adjusting by pushing the nose down and in the rapidly reducing visibility got fixated and failed to notice GPWS warnings resulting in an undershoot and hit the raised approach lights 700 mtrs. short but was successful in executing a go around.

peekay4
12th Apr 2015, 02:42
The methodology of getting to MDA may have 'evolved', but it is STILL a hard floor - unlike a DA, you do NOT go below it unless you have the required visual references. It is not the altitude at which you initiate the MAP.
No, it depends -- many operators in US / Canada have approved op specs to treat MDA as DA when performing SCDA approaches. Approval is granted to dip below the MDA floor during a missed approach.

West Coast
12th Apr 2015, 05:03
Perhaps in Canada. My company and others I surveyed at other carriers add 50 ft to MDA to ensure one doesn't dip below MDA on a missed. Can't say with any certainty there isn't a US carrier out there that allows you to dip below, but they're the exception.