Flight control check a320

[Speedwinner]

I folks,

A training captain told me that Airbus wants to do the flight control check in the exact order as written in the fctm. Is there any reason why?

[vilas]

Speedwinner
Can you explain what you mean by exact order?

[tom775257]

I suspect (s)he mean full up full down neutral, full left full right neutral, rudders.. full left full right neutral.

To answer that, our company recommends random direction/order of check so it isn't just 'mouth music'. The only stipulation being hold the controls on the stops for a few seconds to allow self diagnosis of problems by the FCCs (not just control direction check).

[Ollie Onion]

My airline in OZ insists on doing the flight control check EXACTLY as published in the FCOM. Having flown elsewhere in other airlines that didn't enforce this I can say doing it the same way every single time is terrible for SA. I find myself sometimes just saying the words without paying 100% attention to the check, at least when you don't know how it is going to be carried out you do have to pay attention.

[Denti]

We do the flight control in the exact order, however without verbal confirmation, it is basically a silent check. But we seem to use a much more silent version of the SOPs than the OEM procedures. No FMA callouts for example, and no checklists from after start until parking. On A319/A320 i confirm the aileron by a check out of the window as well, on the A321 it is kinda hard to see though.

[vilas]

Denti
When you do things silently there is no guarantee it is being done. No FMA call out? How do you know whether it is checked at all? There are at least three incidents during go around because FMA was to be checked after gear up according these airlines. This is definitely not safe and is against Airbus philosophy.

[Metro man]

My employer wants it done in the stated order, I believe EasyJet do it randomly for the reasons given above.

Be careful of holding the side stick over for too long, I managed to trigger an ECAM Aileron servo fault by doing that.

[Dan Winterland]

Probably because there was a fault! The control systems go through self diagnostics which take 2.8 seconds, which is why some A procedures have you hold full deflection for a minimum of three seconds.

My company like the 'mouth music' as per the FCOM because that's the was we work and airmanship/common sense are not required these days :rolleyes:. Not my choice - for reasons stated.

[Bubi352]

I don't doubt you but do you have a reference for it regarding the 2.8 seconds? All it says in our manual is that deflection must be of sufficient time.

[Bus Driver Man]

I folks,

A training captain told me that Airbus wants to do the flight control check in the exact order as written in the fctm. Is there any reason why?
If that training captain claims that Airbus wants it that way, why didn't he (or she) give an explanation for it?

As a trainer, he should clarify this, since it is nowhere written in what order you have to do the flight control check. (The FCOM mentions the call-outs to be made, but to me that doesn't mean that it has to be in that order.)
Maybe that training captain knows more than us, or he's just making things up by wrongly interpreting the FCOM. (Like so many instructors at my company who, without reasoning, make up some procedure from what they have read somewhere. Common sense is becoming something rare in aviation.)

Personally, I'm in favor of doing it randomly for the reason already mentioned in this thread.
But in the 3 companies I've worked for, I've only seen 1 or 2 pilots doing it randomly. Probably because in all 3 companies there are instructors who tell everybody that it always has to be in the same order as mentioned in the FCOM.

A captain in the first company I've worked for, told me that he once performed the flight control check in a random order with an instructor in the right seat. The instructor started his "full up, full down, ..." routine without properly checking the deflection. He was surprised when the captain told him to try again and have a better look. Point proven!

[NigelOnDraft]

A training captain told me that Airbus wants to do the flight control check in the exact order as written in the fctm. Is there any reason why?If that is the level of trivia the TC is willing to go to, then you must have had a good check/sim :ok:

2x A320 (AFIK) series have had (serious) issues post takeoff due inadequate checks. The first led to a (temporary) requirement to hold full control for 3s (the issue would have been alerted had they done so), the second required great airmanship after takeoff that could have been prevented by the correct checks IIRC?

Key to me is do the checks slowly (don't bang the control surfaces) and meticulously. Only read out "Left" etc. when you are sure - your (and other) lives depend on it, esp 1st flight of the day / post maint. I find my colleagues in a rush to complete it, and have often started to return the control before I speak... it takes time to check my PFD, the control page, the other PFD and they all correlate with where I check their sidestick is being held.

OTT? Probably... but at least 2 crews would have been less embarrassed had they done it that way ;)

[tubby linton]

i disagree John Smith. On the ground the PFD displays the sidestick order indication which should be in agreement with the direction the surfaces are moving in

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/806.pdf BFU report on a LH A320 with control problems

[tubby linton]

At a convenient stage, before or during taxi, and before arming the autobrake, the PF silently applies full longitudinal and lateral sidestick deflection. On the F/CTL page, the PNF checks and calls out full travel of elevators and ailerons, and correct deflection and retraction of spoilers. As each full travel/neutral position is reached, the PNF calls out:
"Full up, full down, neutral"
"Full left, full right, neutral"
The PF silently checks that the PNF calls are in accordance with the sidestick order. -FCTM

The note referred to by John Smith implies ,imho ,that if a spoiler for example has failed the position of the surface cannot be deduced from the sidestick order symbol, however the direction the stick has been moved, and the order symbol should be in agreement with the surface deflection.

[vilas]

john_smith and Denti
You are correct about flight control check but not correct in suggesting FMA call out unnecessary. Silent check of FMA is unsafe. As I mentioned before there have been three incidents due to improper observance of FMA during GA. They could have been accidents. Air blue committed many sins but the last straw that caused the fatal crash was because Capt. kept dialling in NAV mode without checking FMA and when the HDG curser came to other side he realised he was in NAV and pulled HDG to cause the aircraft to turn shorter way into the hill.
Below is from Performance and Operations conference 2011.
QUESTION 6 – BRITISH AIRWAYS
Prioritization of FMA calls versus “positive climb” and “gear up”?
AIRBUS ANSWER
The FMA is the “heart and soul” of the aircraft and should be checked first when changes of guidance are done. If a go- around is performed with AP ON, it is the only way to check that the guidance will perform a go-around with specific guidance (SRS). The call “positive climb and gear up” is to check that the aircraft is climbing and thus drag can be reduced to increase the climb performance.

[pineteam]

In my company like most airlines, any change of FMA must be called and the PNF must acknowledge by a verbal "check". But that check from the PNF is irrelevant cause we all know sometimes the PNF will call "check" and not actually look at it. xD

I personally think that the less we talk the best it is in the cockpit and you feel less fatigue. When I flew single crew I was not talking loud it does not mean I was not doing my job properly. Same as in an Airbus, I don't feel the need for the PF to read it loud the FMA for me to actually check the FMA. We have been trained to monitor and understand it all the time isn't it? Like a captain told me once:"Never keep your eyes away from the FMA more than 5s" But well, I'm not an expert and if reading the FMA loud has been proven safer, then well let's continue this way then.:E

[TurnOne]

Safety First, The Airbus Safety Magazine have two good articles on the flight control check.
Issues Jan 2005 and July 2008 which can be viewed by downloading the Safety First App.
Both articles stress the importance of a proper flight control check. I for one will stick with the manufaturers recommendation, guarding against complacency especially on the fourth leg of the day.

[Speedwinner]

Turnone, where can I get the safety first magazines of Airbus? Do they come every month?

[tubby linton]

How can the pnf tell that the sidestick has been moved in the same direction as the controls are moving in as the one manipulating the stick doesn't actually say anything during the check, unless the resultant movement is not in agreement?

[tubby linton]

Erm that is what I wrote !

[tubby linton]

if you are going to be truculent about it then there is no point in continuing this discussion.

[Goldenrivett]

Hi Speedwinner,
where can I get the safety first magazines of Airbus?
Try https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/airbus-safety-first/id839632065?mt=8

[vilas]

JS
The silent procedure is against Airbus procedure not mine or yours. I am familiar with 15 different airline procedures including Airbus and I have trained at least 12 of them and none of them follow this silent procedure. When under pressure pilots do fail to check FMA and if both of them are silent then I don't know how any one can be sure that it is checked. And you don't simply say checked you actually read the changes

[swh]

The PFD order symbol is completely irrelevant for the flight control check and should not be checked. The only screen that's relevant is the flight control SD page.

Completely correct, PFD has the input, the SD the output. What you want to check is the output of the input after it goes via the computers and the controllers and hydraulics, i.e. the SD.

Same is done for a rigging check, check the upper/lower ECAM.

I am familiar with 15 different airline procedures including Airbus and I have trained at least 12 of them and none of them follow this silent procedure.

Airbus these days is half/half from what I understand, the PNF calls the SD display when the PF does the FLT CTL check, and silent when the PNF does their unless it is not normal.

This is to keep the PF heads up while taxing.

[TurnOne]

Hi Speedwinner, besides the link to the App store that was posted you can also download and save pdf backissues. I find them very informative with pictures :ok:
Try this link
Airbus Safety First Magazine (http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/information/safety-briefings-presentations/335-airbus-safety-first-magazine)

[vilas]

tubby linton
According to airbus pilot silently applies full side deflection and checks that the PNF calls are in accordance with the side stick orders and PFD has nothing to do with it. PF does not indicate left or right to avoid a conditioned response. How ever since the airline has paid for the aircraft if they want to disagree nothing can be done. Although time and again airbus has insisted that they should be consulted prior to any changes are envisaged, which I agree because manufacturer is in touch with all operators, airlines only know their own operation they don't have access to hardware, software that goes into the machine. Three years ago two airlines started in Japan from the same base and their procedures were 180 degrees apart. As far as accidents are concerned nothing has happened so far is not much valued philosophy.

[vilas]

swh
I am talking about silent FMA check and not flight control check.

[jdawg]

Hello Ladies and Gents,
In the world of man/machine interface there is often a "best" way to accomplish objectives. I would tend to agree with the notion that having done something the same way for a quarter century in no way translates as a "best way" to accomplish an objective.
Flight controls in airbus have been cross controlled and the only way to guard against a second occurrence is to scan the Maltese cross or glance over at the PF's SS which is even more taxing to your scan. Sure the odds are you will never encounter a cross controlled situation but if you do and the PF is experiencing fatigue on that leg you better hope he catches the fact that he's holding SS opposite your call out.
Also, for those flight departments mixing it up with the flight control sequence in hopes of keeping everybody on their toes, you lose a lot for such a gimmicky reason. By testing the same sequence every time you are more likely to catch the cross controlled situation mentioned above if you know what's coming first.
Lets assume two things shall we?
First, that the PM is actually able to tell the difference between full left vs full right and full up vs full down on the SD.
Second, that every pilot in either seat actually performs the checks and doesn't just respond in cadence alone.
Were adults paid to do one thing, lets bring it safely from point A to B.
Last, if you look over at the other guy when he's supposed to say "check" to a call out you'll know what kind of professional you are working with.
I will sometimes look out of the corner of my eye and I noticed that most guys look before responding, a very few guys actually look at the FMA or SD but sometimes after they have already replied "check" and fewer still will not look at all. They are rare and a well know few at my airline.

[Metro man]

Early on in my Airbus flying I was cautioned to be more gentle when doing the control check on the rudder as this was a large heavy piece of metal swinging around at the back of the aircraft.

Now I cringe if the other pilot stamps on the pedals too hard.

[Fly3]

Speedwinner.
Contact Airbus via their website and ask to be put on the mailing list for the magazine.

[vilas]

The LH incident happened because the crew only checked full deflection but not for the correct direction of deflection. After the inquiry recommended a more detailed check procedure, the present procedure was introduced. The PNF announces amount and direction of travel and the PF checks that it coincides to the side he has moved the stick.It does not include PFD nor is it required.

[mcdhu]

As a slight 'aside', I have often wondered why this 'crosswired' malfunction is not available in the sims I work in (CAE and Thomson/Thales/L3). I did suggest it to the trg mgmt, but......
mcdhu

[Stone_cold]

JS , first let me preface this by saying that as with many OPs here , the questioning of an Airlines SOP's should be directed to the relevant Airlines FOP's department as we all operate Airbus under various degrees of differences and generally the Aircraft don't fall out of the sky because of these idiosyncrasies . We operate as our particular airline dictates .

The FCTM seems to indicate at least the Rudder check IS to be accomplished in a particular sequence, maybe some could infer that the other flight controls checks follow the same sequence ? Semantics?
The FCOM states that the Maltese cross must not be used for making the check , it doesn't state that it cannot be used to supplement it ? The stipulation is that the SD is the only verification method. If memory serves , (it may have been a "company procedure " long ago) , the Maltese cross was included as an Airbus SOP some time ago ,so perhaps some have kept it in their scan ? Maybe it gives some like Tubby more awareness ?
The FCTM also states under "NO-10 General", "cross cockpit communications" , that modifications to the Flight path , FMGS and changes in speed/Mach MUST be notified by the CM making the mod and MUST be acknowledged by the other CM . I guess some companies have found a way to do this without the "chatter", but most seem to figure that the FMA calls are a good simple way to go .
LH do it their way , it works for them . That Airbus may have issued an NTO doesn't necessarily indicate that they are happy , but merely as it states " they have no tech objection' . That Airbus has kept their procedure intact seems to imply that LH have assumed any responsibility for any incident arising outside of the Manufacturer's recommended procedures .
The "MUSTS v/s MUST NOT's , should and should not's go on and on in Airbus . One example ,is it a must to have Perf TO and Flt Pln pages set to PF/PNF(PM) for take off ? What would you tell your F/O, Capt , Training Capt?
Simple answer to the OP is : check what your Airline wants , not PPrune .

[vilas]

Stone_cold
There is no dispute that one will have to be loyal to his pay cheque. I said it differently in post 32. Procedures may differ but English language is not different. How something that must not be done is to be interpreted as can be done? In Rudder check PNF also follows the movement so it is not same as other controls check and importantly rudder is not FBW. Airlines when chooses a procedure that is against the recommendation of the manufacturer they must at least refer it to them to know there are no other complications.

[stable_checked]

What do you do if during the aileron check the deflection is just outside the limit? The deflection is too little and on the SD page it does not quite make it all the way up in the box. Suggestions please

[Uplinker]

Well, I have learnt something. Our company tells us to hold each control demand for 3 seconds to "allow the control surfaces to reach full deflection", which has always seemed a bit nebulous to me, since I can see the full deflection on the SD after about 1 second. They did not tell us that the system performs a self check at full deflection and might therefore flag up a fault if one is found.

For what it's worth, I personally watch the Maltese cross move, then look at the SD and confirm verbally 'full left, full right, neutral' etc, checking also that the Maltese cross and the controls are moving in the same direction. This is not SOP, but given that pilots sometimes just say the words without looking, I personally feel this is a check worth doing. NOTE: I don't use the Maltese cross to confirm full deflection, just the direction of control input.

One only has to watch footage of horrendous, preventable crashes where control locks have not been removed before flight, or a full and free control check has obviously not been done, to realise that a control check is a most vital thing to do before every take-off, and should never be rushed or waived.

[vilas]

Uplinker
If you follow Airbus you will notice they have given the job of detection of improper operation of FLT CTLS only to the PF, PNF only calls what he sees on SD without knowing what is the correct call. The purpose of this is to avoid a conditioned reflex reaction from the PNF. If you take a cue from Maltese Cross or look at PF's hand it is same as PF announcing the side he is moving the stick . It defeats the purpose. But if your company wants it you will have to do it. One should not make personal additions. Three seconds is no more required as after a modification it detects a fault in half a second.

[Stone_cold]

Vilas ,

Not sure which "must " you refer to , but I agree it says the maltese cross must not be used for the check . Maybe english language , but it doesn't say that I can't scan it . I interpret it that I can scan whatever I want , as long as I use the indications on the SD as validation . Denti said he looks outside on the surfaces , and is said to operate for a highly recommended operator , I see nothing wrong either as long as they use the SD for validation .

As you say , don't make up things , so for me Airbus( & my company) says call the FMA and use the SD .

I think if the LH guys had not made up things with the AOA issue , we would have had a different outcome . There is nothing wrong with adding to ones situational awareness whilst staying within the ambit of the SOP's .

I said that they state a particular sequence is mentioned ( for the Rudders) and it may lead some flight departments to follow the same for all surfaces . There is nothing to indicate that because the Rudders are not FBW that a rigid sequence is required or vice versa . You are trying to interpret why ? Why is not in the FCOM/FCTM . It just states left then right .

Genuine question here , do the operators who allow "flexible" flight control checks also randomize the rudders ( LH,Easy )???

Giving the NTO obviously gives technical ( no complications) approval , but my point , if you missed it was ,it still goes against the Manufacturer's recommended SOP's . They do not change Airbus SOP's while issuing an NTO whenever a company applies for one ( I do know the process ) . Which indicates that were an incident to occur , Airbus will state that while they had no technical reasons to object to the application , it was against their recommended practices . LH are strong enough to go with that .

If one has such a great issue mitigating conditioned reflex , then perhaps one doesn't belong on the flight deck as our profession IS largely conditioned ,trained and very repetitive in nature . Yes , all of us do make the odd error , but at the same time , a lot of us "add " things and develop methods outside of the music of the SOP's to keep things safe .

[vilas]

Stone_cold
I understand your views but it is not that simple. You can do anything to save your life, sure like AOA issue but not everything you do in the air qualifies as an emergency. If everybody added a little his own then what is the meaning of SOP. Is every co-pilot supposed to keep track of his captain's habits? If company decides to do is different but every pilot adding his own is quiet another. When a company deviates from airbus SOP it has to keep track of all the modifications that take place because the company procedure may need change accordingly which is really the manufacturer's job. Also you are wrong about conditioned reflex it is very much kept in mind while developing procedures. That is why in Airbus procedure there no 70KTS call in reject take off to prevent the pilot from habitually bringing reverse to idle when RW length is critical. For the same reason pilots are not permitted to fly two different type of aircraft because it led to a fatal accident and some incidents.

[vilas]

For those who think that airlines know what they are doing when they change their procedures:
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/jetstar-changes-operating-procedures-after-mishandled-a320-339110/
This is Jet Star Australia but this incident has happened to three different airlines. So just because it hasn't happened proves nothing. Procedures have to take into consideration human behaviour, airplane design and operating environment.

[No Fly Zone]

Pre-T.O. flight control checks are not unique to Ab/B types; any responsible pilot will examine the full range of control surface motion before TO, to 'feel' for unusual resistance (although the tactile feedback may not be available on all airplanes). In addition to flight deck 'feel,' some operating environments provide a ground observer who can see control surfaces that cannot be seen from the driver's seats. That case argues for the in-order sequence, such that the observer knows what to look for.
I'm not clear about why an operator would want them done in random order, but I'm sure someone will clarify for me.
That pre-departure control checks MUST be done is evidenced by countless losses of otherwise healthy airplanes, large and small, that attempted TO with their physical gust-lock restraints still in place. Clearly, they are preventable accidents. When one reaches Vr with an elevator lock still in place, the options are few and, in some cases of limited value. (Hollering, "Oh :mad:," wont' stop the airplane, nor make it fly properly.)
I guess I'd also add that if the aircraft is CVR equipped, having a reliable record that the control surface checks WERE accomplished with satisfactory results, may help to eliminate some of the "Pilot Error" reports that would be more accurately labeled as "Unknown."
Very much like aircraft maintenance procedures (and countless medical procedures,) if the complete, step-by-step routine is not documented (in this case recorded on the CVR), we correctly assume that It Was Not Done. If you do (whatever procedure is required), record or document it as appropriate for the task. As much a we may dislike having to fly by too many rules that seem to override the individual pilot's in-air rights, that is our world. If you perform a given, you'd better have some way to prove it. At the end of the day, boys and girls, if we expect to keep our certificates and job until mandatory retirement.

[Uplinker]

Hi vilas, I take your point about not using the maltese cross in case of confirmation bias, and have modified my own method to now look at the SD FIRST and announce the control movement that I see - in accordance with Airbus SOPs - but then I check that the maltese cross agrees in the correct sense. This is a gross error check, in case the Captain does not pick up a wrong call or selection because they are distracted by taxying events.

Interestingly, when the F/O does their 'silent control check', no verbal or visual check is made by the Captain of that process, which is interesting, especially if the take-off is performed by the F/O. How does the Captain know and cross check that the F/Os controls are wired correctly?

[mcdude]

Uplinker, the flight control check is role specific not rank specific. Can you ask your question again using the terms PF & PM?

[J.L.Seagull]

Guys, I don't know why this is becoming so complicated! The only reason for the cross check in the case of the PF's check is because he's looking outside, and not at the screens!

The PM doesn't need to look outside for those few critical seconds that it takes to do the check (under normal circumstances).

During LVO, when Airbus recommends both CMs look outside, the checks must be done with the aircraft stationary!

Simple, no?!

[Stone_cold]

Mcd . Perhaps some companies have a rank specific policy ? Some don't subscribe 100% to AI full PF/PM(PNF) philosophy .

[Uplinker]

In my company the control checks are rank specific. The captain does the initial control checks, and I, the F/O, announces them, and does the secondary silent checks.

But how does the captain know that my control checks are correct, since I don't announce the checks, and the captain, who is eyes outside taxying cannot see what I am doing??

If I am PF, how can the captain be sure my controls are wired correctly for the take-off?

[Stone_cold]

Uplinker, As PM I guess airbus assumes that you can check them yourself. The CM1/PF doesn't have the luxury of verifying the SP page. Just as the PM can check the gear/flaps up etc., i.e. read & do. Don't know the philosophy behind it, but thinking aloud, seems to be ok as is.

[Uplinker]

Well, you say that, but it seems odd to me that while I am supposed to carefully double check and verbalise the Captain's controls, they do not check mine at all. It would be a bit embarrassing - to say the least - if I did not notice that my side stick was cross-wired and proceeded to take off as PF.........