Crash after TKOF due engine fire

[AerospaceTechnology]

There was an airliner crash that resulted from an engine fire after TKOF. CVR revealed that the Captain ignored First Officer pleading to return to base, Captain refusing to extinguish fire and comply with standard procedure. This Captain in this case, was extremely incompetent and had complete disregard for CRM principles. Is there any reader who might 'remember' this crash investigation reference / date / title .... ?

I have tried keywords in duckduckgo but without success. Hence I thought there maybe a PPRUNE member familiar with this case ?

Cheers

[Capn Bloggs]

That was me, but trust me, I have changed! :ok:

[Di_Vosh]

The only incident I can think of that is even remotely familiar is the DC-8 on a Hajj flight.

And that incident had some significant differences to what you've described.

DIVOSH!

[Spotlight]

The Winton Viscount accident contained an element; of pushing on, with an unextinguishable fire. Though through the AFAPs efforts, collective memory did not dwell on this point!

[LeadSled]

Not the one you are asking about, but a G- registered DC-4 crashed on final short of the runway at Liverpool Speke, late 1950s or early 1960s.

The company (Starways?) was finally absorbed into what became British Midlands Airways, BMA.

The aeroplane did not fly on three, because the Captain refused to feather the prop. on the failed engine. As far as he was concerned "feathering propellers were yankee horse****, makes no difference" (a rough quote from the said Captain on a previous flight).

Needless to say, the accident investigation showed the aircraft would have easily completed the approach safely if the failed engine had not been disking, and had been feathered.

Interestingly, this pilot was not the only one of his background who thought anything that came out of the US was rubbish, the attitude is alive an well in Australia to this day, including in (or should I say especially in) CASA.

It took another 30+ years for the idea of SOP and CRM to really take root.

I had a quick Google to see if I could find reference to the above, but no luck, but it was still talked about when I was working for BMA.

Tootle pip!!

[Old Fella]

LeadSled

Would you care to enlighten us further on your allegations regarding "anything coming out of the US was rubbish". Your statement below needs to be substantiated I think.

"Interestingly, this pilot was not the only one of his background who thought anything that came out of the US was rubbish, the attitude is alive an well in Australia to this day, including in (or should I say especially in) CASA.

It took another 30+ years for the idea of SOP and CRM to really take root".

I'll look forward to some further info.

[Aussie Bob]

Old Fella, I know exactly what Leady is talking about but I think the situation has changed or died out with fresh blood at CASA.

As a newby Chief Pilot in the late 80's I recall being somewhat stunned at the anti American aeroplane attitude displayed by whatever CASA called themselves back then.

I was like WTF? What else is there? Pommie stuff? Aussie stuff? Come on guys! On another note, I also recall a new C210 circa the same era that continually had minor problems. Fittingly its rego was VH-FYR and on more than one occasion it was referred to as Fu#*ng Yankee Rubbish on the air.

[Noeyedear]

I believe you may be referring to a Saudi Arabian Airlines L-1011 out of Riyadh circa 1980. I believe the re-enactment/movie was based on supposition though as the CVR was destroyed in the accident.

[Centaurus]

I believe you may be referring to a Saudi Arabian Airlines L-1011 out of Riyadh circa 1980

That accident sequence was started by a cargo hold fire warning - not an engine fire warning.

[LeadSled]

I believe you may be referring to a Saudi Arabian Airlines L-1011 out of Riyadh circa 1980. I believe the re-enactment/movie was based on supposition though as the CVR was destroyed in the accident. For those who want to see politics of an absolute monarchy intrude on air safety investigation, this is a good example. If I remember correctly the authors of the basic report were expelled from the kingdom, and a proper (ICAO) final report was never completed. The Saudi report was laughable.

I have seen one reconstruction that relied pretty faithfully on the above report, the psychology of what happened in the cockpit was very interesting, including the contribution of the dyslexic expat. flight engineer. The part played by the tower was critical in a serious situation being turned from a survivable into a fatal situation.

Never widely publicized, but a BOAC (BA) crew that witnessed the who thing, including the radio traffic, were also expelled from the kingdom, and could never again be rostered to anywhere in Saudi. What was happening in the 1011 cockpit relied on the testimony of the BOAC crew about the radio traffic.

Old Fella,
Where would you like me to start??

The CASA fiercely anti- the US approach to aviation regulation, the US approach has given us the world's best air safety outcome, versus the Australian approach of regulating most of GA to a standstill, with rather indifferent safety outcomes, the Australian GA accident record being something over double the US.

The Australian aviation community has, by and large, been passive to negative (the unions again) on the subject. Re. passive, despite all the whinging, why were there so few contributions to the recent ASRR (Forsyth) report. 10% of the alleged pilot community would have been around 3000 submissions, include the MRO community, should have been around 5000, what did we get, under 300!!

Perhaps the Australian approach to airspace management. When we wanted to emulate the very successful US implementation of ICAO airspace management SARPs, the opposition here was fierce, from ATC, CASA and one (largely) domestic pilot union.

Indeed, I was present at a meeting when the then Technical Director of said pilot union stated words to the effect; "I don't care how good the American system is, we are not going the have it here".

Interestingly, the pilot union whose members were familiar with the US system were happy with the intended reforms, it was those completely ignorant of the US system who defeated it.

Of course, the most important reform features were eventually defeated ( and not on safety grounds, for those of you who know of the infamous "bottom drawer letter"), and we have retreated to an inefficient and dysfunctional system, with every section of the industry paying the price, but disproportionately GA paying the price.

This is only going to get worse as the real cost of the unnecessary ADS-B mandate bites.

Outstandingly, we have a far higher rate of loss of separation incidents than the US (or Eurocontrol) systems, with a fraction of the traffic.

The latest change to CAR 166 is yet another example of ratbag change, with absolutely no regard to proper risk analysis, and again moving away from the proven system of the US, despite the previous system working safely for years.

The changes to the reform of Australia's certification standards in 1998 was fiercely fought, again, withing CASA airworthiness it was aid to me that we (CASA) will never accept US standards, and we don't care what Government policy might be.

We changed the certification standards, the CASA opposition had to lump it, but 15 years later, "they" are still trying to chip away.

I could go on, but you get the general drift.

The anti-septic attitude in the UK was even worse than here, and to a large degree (as in Australia) there is a very strong anti-US sentiment to this day, not limited to the aviation sector.

If you read D.P.Davies' "Handling the Big Jets" (more correctly Mishandling the Big Jets) the anti- US prejudice comes through loud and clear.

Tootle pip!!

Re. feathering propellers in the UK, read the wartime history of DeHavilland being forced by Lord Beaverbrook (a Canadian) to implement a license from Hamilton Standard. Even (early 1960s) when I was first flying in the UK, quite a number of UK designs had "two speed" props, not V-P, and the advantages of fully feathering V-P props was not universally accepted, hence the DC-4 at Speke.

[Fris B. Fairing]

The Winton Viscount accident contained an element; of pushing on, with an unextinguishable fire. Though through the AFAPs efforts, collective memory did not dwell on this point!

I'm surprised that nobody has sought clarification of this. I was always of the belief that he was heading for the nearest airfield. Is there a suggestion that he should have attempted a forced landing in the bush?

[Fred Gassit]

What about the BOAC B707 from London in 1968? Could it be that one you're thinking of, fire was never put out and engine fell off (as they're meant to).
It didnt crash but there was some loss of life.
I think there were issues of crew coordination in that incident, it was a check flight and the fire warning was cancelled but never acted upon, too many chiefs maybe.

[flywatcher]

Aussie Bob, said C-210 FYR was first registered 1974. Would be interested in which period of its life you were referring to.

[Stanwell]

LeadSled,
Excellent post. I'll bet Dick Smith is slowly nodding his head.


Fris B.
Quite right - I mean, what were they gunna do?
The pucker-factor would have been extreme, and they nearly made it. :sad:

[Dora-9]

Spotlight - do you care to amplify your comment about VH-RMI at Winton??

[Fantome]

Sounds like he might have "a little knowledge:, Dora. There's a wealth of info obtainable by googling Vickers Viscount VH-RMI
The Frank Yeend summary is particularly interesting

The company sent a DC-4 straight up from Brisbane to Winton. One of the pilots was recounting recently how he and the captain
were given the job of helping to wrap up the bodies of the 24 who perished in the crash, truck them to Winton then fly them to Brisbane. (Not likely they had much to say, formally, to the AFAP)

[LeadSled]

but there was some loss of life.

As I recall, just one stewardess, who did a heroic job getting her passengers and stayed a little bit too long. If my memory served me correctly, she got a posthumous George Medal.

An old mate of mine was one of the F/Os on the crew, the whole story of the balls-up on the flight deck could only be true, because a rational person could not think up such a sequence.

Tootle pip!!

[Dora-9]

Fantome:

I think we may well be at crossed purposes. I have never seen any indication or comment that the crew of VH-RMI displayed a "press on" attitude, as Spotlight states. And yes, I've read most references to this accident, thanks. Bear in mind here that the Blower Overheat lights came afterwards, as a consequence of this accident.

Is Spotlight on an AFAP bashing exercise? If indeed Spotlight does have "a little knowledge", would he care to share it instead of making sweeping unsupported statements?

[Centaurus]

If you read D.P.Davies' "Handling the Big Jets" (more correctly Mishandling the Big Jets)

Interesting comment about "Mishandling". I always regarded "Handling the Big Jets" as by far the best book I have read on the subject. What were the perceived technical errors in the book that aroused your ire?