Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

[ORAC]

Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say (http://aviationweek.com/defense/typhoons-need-midair-collision-avoidance-system-safety-officials-say)

LONDON – Military air safety officials have described as "unsustainable" a decision not to install an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) on the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons.

In its annual safety report from last August – made public on Jan. 13, the director general of the U.K. Military Aviation Authority (MAA), Air Marshal Richard Garwood, said that an airborne collision warning system for the Typhoon needed to be pursued with "great haste," particularly in light of the MAA’s findings in the midair collision of two Panavia Tornado GR4s in Scotland in July 2012. Three airmen were killed.

The MAA’s report on the crash criticized the U.K. defense ministry for "consistently deferring, reprogramming and reprioritizing the introduction of a collision warning system for the aircraft." The U.K. Tornado fleet is finally getting such a system, but only four years before the type exits service and after the loss of more than 40 lives in midair collisions alone since the Tornado’s introduction to service.

Garwood said that Defense Science and Technology Laboratory studies showed the Typhoon was potentially at a higher risk of midair collision because of its role and performance levels. The report says that the aircraft is perhaps the most likely – though improbable – of the U.K.’s fast jet aircraft to potentially collide with a commercial aircraft, and that under U.K. health and safety rules, any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."

Garwood says that he has informed Secretary of State for Defense Michael Fallon of his concerns, adding "ultimately, the Typhoon will be [in] service for many years and if the MoD [defense ministry] elects not to fit an ACAS, the decision will need to be well documented and the risk held at the highest levels of defense."

In addition, the report raises concerns that the F-35 Lightning II also does not have an ACAS. "We must also be clear on how this capability might be delivered on (F-35) Lightning II, which will provide a whole range of technical and JSF partner-related challenges to any potential program," Garwood writes.

The U.K. Airprox Board, which reports and advises on near misses between aircraft in British airspace, reports there were 14 incidents between U.K. military and commercial aircraft, one of which was reported as posing a real risk of collision.

Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.

Major investments in collision avoidance systems for the U.K.’s helicopter fleet are already underway, with much of the front-line helicopter fleet due to be retrofitted by late 2017.

For the second year in a row, Garwood has also warned about the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in aircraft engineering trades. The report also describes a psychological impact of crews coming back from Afghanistan who no longer have to deal with in-theater battlefield threats, but may take flying risks to seek what the report calls "inappropriate stimulation through their flying activities."

The report also alludes to the loss of the Airbus Zephyr pseudo satellite as being the subject of an MAA investigation, but details of when and where the incident occurred have been redacted. The U.K. defense ministry was testing the Zephyr in the winter in the Southern Hemisphere to prove the system’s ability to operate during shorter winter days.

[Double Hush]

Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it. It must be considered as a 'no go' item if u/s. It is beyond comprehension that it is not mandatory on all Service aircraft.

[Marco]

It beggars belief. A Tucano collided with a Police helicopter near Wookey in Somerset in 1997 and still nothing has been fitted to RAF jets.

[Basil]

TCAS saved us at FL330 over Germany in a B747 when, another transport, on a plan view collision course was cleared to FL320 and - well, you've guessed already :ooh:

[jayteeto]

I now fly air ambulance in the southern lake district, you have NO idea how close a FJ looks as it flies over you as you are landing.........

[Chugalug2]

The Director General of the MAA should not be pleading with the Military Air Operator (the MOD) to fit such an essential safety system as TCAS, he should be compelling it to do so. The reason he cannot do so of course is that the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD, and just as bizarrely the MilAAIB is a subsidiary of the MAA. Unless and until all three are separate and independent of each other, the MOD can do, or not do, as it pleases.

As to the severe shortages of qualified and experienced personnel in RAF Engineering Trades, there is an even greater shortage of engineers, both Service and CS, qualified and experienced in airworthiness provision. As the DG well knows, that was as a direct result of the MOD's deliberate policy of replacing them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers in Haddon-Cave's so called 'Golden Period'. Why doesn't he say so? Because the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD!

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Granted, but at least Dick is making it as plain as possible that any accidents are on the Minister's head.

[Fortissimo]

Chug

You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other. For civil aviation, the AAIB and CAA are independent of each other but both belong to the Dept of Transport and answer to the same minister. (Yes, EASA is an added layer, but it is DofT that acts on behalf of the State with EASA, not the CAA.)

I am not quite clear how you think an independent MAA would be able to compel the MOD - a Department of State - without elevating its ownership to Cabinet level. And if you put the MAA with the CAA in DofT, you then have the spectacle of an OGD telling the MOD what its spending priorities are, which would definitely not be a good thing. This is not the same as Treasury having a say in affordability or budgetary control.

I can see there may be an argument for separating the MilAAIB from the MAA, though again I am not sure where you would put it, but you still end up with the risk being held by SofS as the point where all this meets.

For now, you have an MAA (and a DG prepared to say what he thinks) that is at least independent of the single Services and answerable through PUS to SofS. I do not see how you are going to get a better arrangement by taking the regulatory function outside the MOD, when control of their own specialist regulation is a core function of all Govt Departments.

I think what we may all be agreed on is that key safety measures should be treated separately within the overall resourcing process.

ff

[tucumseh]

Well done Distant Voice. Further proof, in any is needed, that the MoD/MAA need look no further than pprune for its Corporate Knowledge.

Well said Chug.

Well said Dick Garwood, although an acknowledgement that (a) you're simply repeating evidence to Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip and (b) it was the RAF's Chief Engineer who began the decimation and marginalisation of engineering posts in 1991, wouldn't have gone amiss.

Why so long to release the report? Coincidence that last week the chair of the HoC Defence Committee (Rory Stewart MP) called forward a report into another accident, which made all the above points and was summed up by one be-knighted MP as "I fear we are faced with another Chinook situation"?



I think what we may all be agreed on is that key safety measures should be treated separately within the overall resourcing process

Well said. Yet another old policy ditched by the RAF Chief Engineer in 1991! Resurrection was recommended to DPA's DCE in January 2000, and again to H-C and Philip. Hopefully the MAA will change its mind and support you. So far, they've sided with their MoD bosses.

[Chugalug2]

Fortissimo:-
You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other.I repeatedly say so because the MOD and its subsidiary, the RAF, have repeatedly demonstrated their ability and willingness to subvert the Regulatory and Investigation processes (which are presently vested in the MAA and the MilAAIB).

You cite the DoT as an exemplar but of course they are not a major operator as is the MOD, let alone an air operator. I notice though that even then the DoT contains executive agencies, the DVLA and the DVSA (Driver & Vehicle Safety Agency). If the MAA and MilAAIB were outwith the MOD but responsible to the SoS for Defence (who could thus be briefed by them as well as by the MOD) perhaps a lot of the disinformation that is the MOD's forte could be confronted.

I do not know what the answer to this bureaucratic tangle is, it's well above my pay grade, but lives have been lost, much money wasted, and defence capability compromised or completely lost. Trenchard came up with a solution to a similar dilemma nearly 100 years ago. Time perhaps for another Trenchard to appear? Is there such a one?

[Herod]

any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."
:mad:

What if it kills 40?

[KenV]

Transponders with Mode S have been around for years and are not that expensive. If security is a problem, Mode 5 (a cryptographically secure version of mode S) transponders are available for not much more. A single mid air collison prevented will more than pay for all the transponders.

[Vendee]

You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other. For civil aviation, the AAIB and CAA are independent of each other but both belong to the Dept of Transport and answer to the same minister. (Yes, EASA is an added layer, but it is DofT that acts on behalf of the State with EASA, not the CAA.) Yes but in civilian aviation, the regulatory bodies (CAA, EASA, AAIB etc) are completely independent of the aircraft operators. This is not the case with the MAA.

[Evalu8ter]

One word of caution; Transponders and TCAS/NDS-B will not stop Mid Airs from happening. An awful lot of users in Class G airspace (light aircraft, gliders, microlights etc) don't have a transponder, and are often the hardest to acquire visually. TCAS is a massive improvement, but it is not a total solution.

[just another jocky]

Ok, so the inevitable argument for a totally independent MAA rears its head again, but putting that to one side for now and focussing on the system we currently have to work with, what Dick Garwood has done is clearly put the responsibility for the next none-TCAS equipped RAF FJ mid-air squarely on the shoulders of the Defence Minister. Which is where it should lie. It's his decision, put up or take responsibility.

Yes, the RAF have delayed, prevaricated and delayed again, but surely this is an example of exactly how the MAA can put pressure on specific people outside their domain?

JMHO.

[tucumseh]

Herod

Quite right.

Make no mistake, there are some in MoD who chose to interpret this HSE definition as meaning MoD don't need to bother if the aircraft holds under 50. The same people who continue to advise Ministers that, if a safety related fault or defect is identified in an aircraft, only that tail number need be fixed.

But well done, again, Dick Garwood for daring to voice these opinions. And, of course, they only are opinions, because the MAA does not get funding to mitigate the risks, so is really only a monitor, not a true Authority (or manager or leader). As it took great delight in pointing out during the Mull Review when asked by Minister about safety. I wonder if DG will now ask his MoD masters and Ministers to change the official line that only one MoD employee has thought it proper to have safe aircraft, and that this employee was utterly wrong. A line reiterated last year, yet again, by DE&S Secretariat. And copied to the MAA.


Para 9 The Secretary of State will have been informed of the societal concern with regard to Typhoon MAC by the Chief of the Air Staff in accordance with MAA requlations.

Slightly odd wording. Surely he'd just phone CAS and ask "Have you written to SoS?", and then make a firm statement in the report?

My main concern upon reading this report? Reinventing the wheel. Does his staff not know that many of the intiatives are mandated policy? The section on Def Stan 00-970 completely ignores the fact 00-970 was mandated in every aircraft related contract by Controller Aircraft. The problem is that direct entrants to MoD (the majority now) have been taught for over 20 years that no Def Stan is mandated. Trouble is, they use this as an opportunity to save money, by removing the standard from the contract and allowing the contractor to deliver sub-standard designs. There is no appreciation that if you waive one relevant standard, you must invoke another, because standards are one of the 4 pillars of airworthiness (along with Compliance, Independence and a Safety Management System).


Ah, Independence. Defined by MoD as;

“Being commercially and managerially independent of the (insert body) both to preserve objectivity and to minimise pressure for premature acceptance.”


Does the MAA satisfy this definition?

[Lima Juliet]

It beggars belief. A Tucano collided with a Police helicopter near Wookey in Somerset in 1997 and still nothing has been fitted to RAF jets.

Err, Tucano has got TCAS I fitted - for about the last 10 years or so! See page 6 of the following link:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/RAFpublications/sota_vol3_no4.pdf

As for Typhoon, it rarely flies at low level as it p!sses fuel out the back! It has a good air-to-air RADAR that allows it to detect other aircraft and this is coupled to an interrorgator that can detect Mode A (Mode 3) and Mode S. It has an IRST that can also spot anti-col lights, engine heat and aircraft-in-poor-weather. So TCAS would only really augment a good amount of sensors anyway. Also, as some have already pointed out, TCAS will only detect those that transpond - the primary means for all aircraft avoidance in Class G is 'See and Avoid' until the Air Navigation Order mandates transponder carriage in all aircraft in Class G. The lookout in Typhoon is better than many FJs.

So I would say that this is a nice-to-have rather than a must-be-fitted item. I applaud AVM Dick for raising this, but if it means slowing up operational capability (like a full weapons drop clearance), and there is a finite pot of money, then TCAS/ACAS should wait in my opinion.

Lj

[downsizer]

Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it.

Genuine question, what mil fast jets have TCAS?:8

[Lima Juliet]

Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.


So when did ANNUAL BUDGET CYCLE change its name then! :ugh:

LJ :cool:

[Lima Juliet]

Quote:
Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it.
Genuine question, what mil fast jets have TCAS?

Hawk T2 has it fitted, I believe?

LJ

[Bob Viking]

The Hawk T2 has TCAS. It has it's limitations but it has proved its worth several times over already.
BV:ok:

[Kengineer-130]

Tcas (especially the latest versions)is such a good system it would be foolhardy & almost criminally negligent NOT to fit it to any mil aircraft that are capable of carrying it. Obviously it has its limitations & does not remove the need for a good lookout, but it is another layer (and a thick layer it is) of safety that is always welcome.

[Tourist]

Having flown military aircraft with and without TCAS, I am not convinced that it is so obvious.
It is quite good for your SA, and definitely helps you achieve visual contact with other aircraft, however it leads to complacency in my opinion, and the RA has no relevance to military flying. It is vastly over cautious for military operations and essentially puts a stop to all normal military operations with multiple aircraft.

Everybody's first thought is always "it wants me to manuever for that tiny aircraft in the distance?!?! Ridiculous!!"
A military optimised system would have to be developed that could cope with an aircraft that can move like a Typhoon or it would be pointless.
TCAS is designed for airliners and it is reasonably good at that, though it still leads to lookout complacency.

As always, the aim must be kept in mind.
The ultimate aim of the military is operational effectiveness, not safety.
Just because fitting TCAS might reduce collisions with civil aircraft is not enough of a reason in itself to fit it if in doing so we reduce our ability to operate multiple aircraft in close proximity.
Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety.....

[alfred_the_great]

Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety.....

Which I think is quite attractive to some people.

[tucumseh]

As for Typhoon, it rarely flies at low level as it p!sses fuel out the back! It has a good air-to-air RADAR that allows it to detect other aircraft and this is coupled to an interrorgator that can detect Mode A (Mode 3) and Mode S. It has an IRST that can also spot anti-col lights, engine heat and aircraft-in-poor-weather. So TCAS would only really augment a good amount of sensors anyway. Also, as some have already pointed out, TCAS will only detect those that transpond - the primary means for all aircraft avoidance in Class G is 'See and Avoid' until the Air Navigation Order mandates transponder carriage in all aircraft in Class G. The lookout in Typhoon is better than many FJs.These are all perfectly valid points.

What would concern me is, despite the raft of sensors listed, it remains stated MoD policy that they need not be properly integrated and proven functionally safe before being released for training or operational use. This basic requirement has been fully funded on every programme I've ever known (so lack of funding isn't an issue), but the Gods have consistently ruled it can be waived if it means meeting time. Or chopped if something else runs over budget. This remains common today in MoD, as many here will confirm.

This all comes under Technology and System Integration Maturity. Just look at the losses we've had because of FLAT REFUSAL to attain such maturity, with FALSE declarations made that it has been achieved. Tornado ZG710. Chinook ZD576. Sea Kings XV650 & 704 (a mid-air). And so on. The Wg Cdr Spry thread says it all. The MAA can't even get the basic definitions right, so what chance the job being done properly.

Sorry, I do not react well when two 2 Stars tell me to my face that they do not care about the risk of collision, that they'll look at it again if it happens. And when it happened, they still did nothing. This is the background one needs to appreciate when reading Dick Garwood's report. I'd bet my house no-one told him of it.


Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety..... The point you miss is that false declarations have been made to the effect aircraft are safe, when they were not. That is completely different from you being told the truth and being able to make allowances and informed decisions.

You're ex-RN. You lost 7 colleagues in 2003. The 3 main contributory factors noted by the BoI wholly coincided with the 3 main areas of degradation between the AEW Mk2 and ASaC Mk7. That degradation was not noted in the RTS. All 3 directly and adversely affected collision avoidance. All 3 had been recognised years before and mitigation put in hand. All 3 were cancelled. Not replaced by alternate mitigation, but CANCELLED because someone (an unqualified civilian who had self-delegated airworthiness authority - again, something Dick Garwood doesn't mention because it would open MoD to legal action) decided the risk would only be addressed if the risks materialised. When they did, 7 died. THAT ethos is what concerns me.

[Tourist]

Tuc

Give it a rest.
Your knowledge of military aviation in general and Seaking ops in particular reminds me of reading the Far East air crash threads. Lots of well intentioned amateurs who are very knowledgeable in areas that have some tertiary relevance to aviation, but totally lacking in the big picture and spout bollocks.
In your case I honestly think you believe the process is more important than the end result.
Military flying can be safe or effective. I have yet to see any evidence it can be both.

[Wensleydale]

Question... Does TCAS keep firing off if flying as a 2 (or more) ship at the same altitude? If so, then surely is it only good for individual aircraft?

[tucumseh]

Thanks Tourist.

Why don't you tell me what was incorrect about my post, instead of denigrating someone who wants you to have a safe aircraft.

First, I recommend you read the BoI and RNFSAIC and understand what they got wrong because information was withheld or they didn't understand. But more importantly, read the report on the investigation conducted in Jan/Feb 2004 that MoD denies took place. That denial is key.

And please tell us what process YOU would like to see undertaken to ensure your aircraft are safe as reasonably possible and fit for purpose. You obviously disagree with the regulations but never say why.

That you apparently don't want or need a safe aircraft puzzles more than a few here. The comment about my experience, in safety and airworthiness, having tertiary relevance to aviation is a cracker. Without it, you can have no aircraft to fly. Or are you saying we should ignore the subject altogether? That would please many in MoD!

[RetiredF4]

Mil Low Flying in W-Germany 1980 was 90.000 hours (slow and fast movers)
Mil Low Flying was possible on 120 days (WX, holidays).
That gives 750 Mil LL hours/ day.
About 100 military aircraft in LL / hour.
Dispersed over about a 1/4 of the BRD (airspace, ADIZ, WX, Notams)
In an altitude band from 250-1500 feet AGL
Accumulating in good WX areas (where civil traffic was flying as well)
No advisory service, no TCAS, no IFF, limited on board radar, no coordination.

How did we survive?

Today the traffic is about 1/20 of those figures in much more airspace (W+E- Germany), think they would compare to other western nations as well.

[anotherthing]

Today the traffic is about 1/20 of those figures in much more airspace (W+E- Germany), think they would compare to other western nations as well.ilitary traffic maybe... but civilian traffic has increased...

[Tourist]

Tuc

You consistently and deliberately overstate findings from the board to give the impression that they were the cause of the accident whereas in reality they were errors in process.

You are always excited about the Mk7 HISL because it was never properly trialled on the Mk7.

The fact that it was properly trialled on the Mk6 means nothing to you, because they are as far as you are concerned different aircraft.

Do you know how long the conversion course is for a pilot from the Mk6 to the Mk7?

The answer will give you a clue as to importance of a Mk7 HISL trial.

The fact that you state that without a safety and airworthiness dept there would be no aircraft shows how far from the pointy end you are.
You are aware that we had aircraft before safety and airworthiness even existed?

I fully support whichever senior officers have repeatedly blanked/ignored you. Despite your obvious best intentions (I'm sure you are a lovely bloke), you would have negative influence on operational capability and have no business in military aviation.

I do actually believe that safety and airworthiness are important, but they are a long way from the most important aspect of any effective military.

Incidentally, for those who think that F35 is naked without TCAS, go and have a little look at the open source info on the F35 systems and have a think for a moment.

Something else to think on is of course that TCAS is only useful in peacetime for obvious reasons, and TCAS has the unfortunate effect of making people trust and rely on it. This is a bad thing in wartime when it is suddenly turned off....
Train as you fight.

[Tourist]

TCAS RA is designed to remove thought and decision making from the pilot.

In civil aircraft I think this is a great idea implemented quite badly.

The system tells the pilot what he must do to avoid the other aircraft by the proscribed margin.
He is also told that he is not to think, not to look but just to obey instinctively.

Personally, If that is the way you want to go I have never understood why the pilot is not removed from the scenario altogether.
If the pilot is to be merely a conduit, then he can only add errors.
Remove him from the system.
Let the autopilot control the TCAS RA. It's what they are good at. It's only a gentle climb, gentle, descent or level.
Funnily enough, TCAS RAs in the civil world are handled extraordinarily badly. On of the UKs largest carriers admits to a less than 50% rate of correctly handled TCAS RAs.
Fortunately, there are quite correctly huge margins built into the system to protect the soft bodies of passengers.

My personal opinion is that this sort of thing has no place in a military aircraft. The pilot should make the decisions or why is he even there, plus why limit yourself to height change only?
Even the transport fleet will have to turn off the TCAS in wartime so best not to get used to relying on it.

[Chugalug2]

Even the transport fleet will have to turn off the TCAS in wartime so best not to get used to relying on it. By the same token they'll have to switch off their HISLs and Nav Lights, so best to not get used to them either, Tourist?

Your Lord Flashheart's dialogue no doubt goes down well with the 20 minuters, but that is rather the point isn't it? The "Safety and Airworthiness" people, whom you speak of so dismissively, seek to extend those 20 minutes to allow you to at least close with the enemy and destroy him or be destroyed. A rather more meaningful outcome than colliding with another of your own side, spontaneously exploding, suffering a UFCM, getting blown out of the sky by a Blue on Blue SAM, or any other airworthiness associated nasties on the way there. At least I would have thought so, though perhaps you don't...

[Tourist]

Chugalug

Taking your comments at face value for a minute.

HISLs and Anti Cols on my aircraft don't in any way affect the way I operate. I cannot see them. They enable others to see me.
Thus they don't require me to change my procedures whether they are on or off.
Thus they are all gain when available and no pain in procedure/skills changing.

TCAS, as any pilot knows, is good enough that you start to rely on it. I think that subconsciously you start to trust it and your lookout gets worse. Perhaps not everybody, but certainly me. I am back to flying an aircraft without TCAS at the moment and I have had to really work on getting my lookout back up to speed.

I, like you, firmly believe that safety and airworthiness has an important role to play. The difference is that I don't think that it should rule the roost. Operational effectiveness should be the god we worship, not safety at all costs.

I can tell that my lack of worship of safety and airworthiness dept irks you, but please don't imagine that being referred to as a twenty minuter upsets me for a moment. If only I had the balls.

[tucumseh]

You consistently and deliberately overstate findings from the board to give the impression that they were the cause of the accident whereas in reality they were errors in process. I have cited the findings of the BoI. In the past YOU have called into question the competence of the Board members. I share SOME of your concerns. I have questioned why vital information was withheld from them that proved, beyond any doubt, that the 3 main contributory factors THEY cited were also the 3 main areas of degradation between Mk2 and Mk7. That is a simple fact. Had the BoI been aware, I like to think they'd have altered some of their findings and placed emphasis elsewhere.

You are always excited about the Mk7 HISL because it was never properly trialled on the Mk7. Again, the BoI cited HISL, not I. I followed the evidence that showed, again, the BoI were not told that HISL was not permitted in the aircraft and the process (yes!) whereby only properly authorised staffs are permitted to accept the design was systematically abused by a non-technical civilian, who self-delegated an authority to dictate and approve (!) the design.
Read the reports. HISL was never endorsed by the RN, but a late decision was made to fit it AFTER trials had commenced. That is one long way into the programme, and some 6 years after the contractor was instructed by the RN that HISL would NOT be in the design. Contrary to what MoD now claim, photographic evidence proves it was not fitted to the first Trials Aircraft. Why not? Because there was no requirement and the aircraft was delivered without it! Very simple, verifiable facts.



Also, you confuse the HISL lights themselves with the Installation Design. The lights are fine in isolation, although most would say the wrong type were fitted. (I’d speculate the dimmable ones would have been more suitable, to avoid having to switch them off, but trials would determine that). The installation is very different in form, fit and use to the Mk2 (again, MoD claim HISL is exactly the same as Mk2’s red/rotating ACLs – it isn’t, by a long way), therefore trials are required to establish performance and limitations. (Sorry, not my rules, mandated by SofS). The BoI conducted such a trial and found the installation design, not the lights, wanting. By the way, testing (not trials) determined a serious EMC failure caused by DHSA's installation.


The fact that it was properly trialled on the Mk6 means nothing to you, because they are as far as you are concerned different aircraft You say there was a Mk6 trial and I cannot disagree as I wasn’t there, but why then did DHSA REFUSE to provide any evidence of these trials when it was requested; or evidence that the trials results had been incorporated into the Mk2 Safety Case and RTS? If the Mk2/6 Authority (DHSA) refuses to provide this safety evidence, then the Mk7 Authority (the PE programme manager) has NOTHING to read across from! You may be able to help there – do you know why DHSA would not provide such evidence? The 2004 investigator, your fellow officer (Lt Cdr John B#####ll), could not find it either and was told by the very same people (by now the Sea King IPT) that they knew NOTHING of HISL or why it was fitted to Mk7. Think about that. He could find no reference whatsoever to HISL in the files of the Sea King IPT at Yeovilton. Now ask why MoD deny this investigation took place!

Do you know how long the conversion course is for a pilot from the Mk6 to the Mk7? Haven’t a clue. The question at the time would have been conversion between Mk2 and Mk7. There were significant differences in form, fit, function and use, so I assume some conversion was needed; not least because the final decision had been made on who controlled swing arm deployment. Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made? Perhaps you could say why, throughout the programme, the RN insisted that the entire FAE of Mk2s, plus the additional 5 aircraft, and all aircrew, would be converted over a single week-end. That was utterly deranged, and it lies at the root why your ASE then withdrew altogether from the programme in 1995. In the event, both Marks were in service together for about 3 years. That’s a hell of a miscalculation. You ask a good question, but mine is a cracker.

The answer will give you a clue as to importance of a Mk7 HISL trial. Given the above, and that the Mk2 TI aircraft pitched up without HISL, then one assumes the conversion would include use of HISL, and operating with it at night. But because HISL was NOT required, there were no night flying trials scheduled.

The fact that you state that without a safety and airworthiness dept there would be no aircraft shows how far from the pointy end you are.
You are aware that we had aircraft before safety and airworthiness even existed? Just because MoD only mandated Safety Cases for modifications (e.g. Mk2 to Mk7) in the early 90s, doesn’t mean it was ignored before that. It was simply called the Safety Argument, and probably something similar for decades before. You misunderstand engineering if you think someone suddenly recently dreamed up safety of design and aircraft certification.

I fully support whichever senior officers have repeatedly blanked/ignored you. Despite your obvious best intentions (I'm sure you are a lovely bloke), you would have negative influence on operational capability and have no business in military aviation. You fully support the officers who made false declarations that military aircraft were safe and compliant, knowing they were not? Your prerogative but forgive me if I don’t break the law. They're allowed to, I'm not.



You misunderstand airworthiness and fitness for purpose. That is not a criticism; the MAA/MoD are the same. Attaining airworthiness should be largely invisible to you, and for a long time was. What you see discussed now is only because the senior officers you support decided not to bother, so it came to the fore when aircrew died in what MoD (not me) stated were airworthiness related accidents. The catalyst was the raft of Chinook losses that led to CHART in 1992. Read the very first paragraph. Like many, when you talk about “airworthiness” you actually mean Fitness for Purpose. By definition, attaining airworthiness must precede FFP. Without airworthiness certification, you simply do not see the aircraft. (Chinook Mk2 being the obvious exception!). But I’m afraid you do get aircraft that are improperly certified. The Mk7 is a good example; the RTS in 2003 was error-strewn. I would like the process you hate to be largely invisible to you again, because that would mean the regulations have been implemented. Leaving you to make other difficult decisions on FFP.

[Tourist]

Again, a total lack of understanding.

Do you know what a Mk7 pilot is?

A Mk7 pilot of the crash era is a Mk5/6 pilot that pissed off the appointer and has to spend a tour in purgatory bagging before being allowed to escape. From the pilots perspective it's just a pinger with the fun/interesting stuff and somebody to chat to removed.

Mk7 pilots might come from a Mk2 (if they had really pissed off the appointer!)but more likely from a mk5/6

I know what a HISL is. I have flown Seakings with them and without them. I don't need a trial to know what they do and how they work. They are a flashing light.

Empires can get out of hand, and safety and airworthiness is just such an empire.

[212man]

Let the autopilot control the TCAS RA. It's what they are good at. It's only a gentle climb, gentle, descent or level.

New Airbus' do (including RW EC225s). Why spill your coffee, drop your paper and disconnect the AP when it'll do it for you? :E:E (fly the RA that is, not drop your coffee....)

[Tourist]

212man

That's good to know! About time. Seems crazy the old system.

[Chugalug2]

A Safety and Airworthiness Empire? Yer avin a larf, aintcha? The whole point of tuc's testimony is that the process of UK Military Airworthiness provision was broken (mainly by RAF VSO's I'm sad to say, though hopefully that makes your day Tourist) in the early 90's.

So what, that's decades ago, time has moved on and so have we, etc etc. Unfortunately the short term gains that those idiots sought then came at the price of the loss of corporate knowledge, never mind the poor sods who paid the price in resultant fatal air accidents. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness because it doesn't understand it. It may bother you with lots of form filling, courses, papers, definitions, etc, etc. Unfortunately those are the actions of a bureaucracy, not an Authority (because they have none!). Some Empire, if only!

As tuc says, all this stuff should be invisible. It is part of Air Safety when all you should be concerned about is the other part of Air Safety which is Flight Safety. That is all I had to concern myself with as a Sqn FSO back, ...well a long time ago. The reason why the Mk10 seat that killed Flt Lt Cunningham never had a Safety Case was because of the deliberate sabotage carried out against the Royal Air Force by its own Very Senior Officers, and you say that they have your full support? Says it all really.

[Tourist]

Chug

More silly rhetoric.

I'm not surprised you get ignored.
In amongst the explosion of words you two produce at the drop of a hat are no doubt some reasonable points in your areas of knowledge. You lose all credibility when you stray into others areas and talk about sabotage.
Sabotage is deliberately damaging to the service.
I don't know the rights or wrongs of the case to which you refer, in fact I know nothing about it, however I am entirely 100% sure that if mistakes/breaks from the rules were made they were well intentioned in what the person or persons thought were the best interests of the service.
To suggest otherwise is childish.

[dervish]

Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made?


Pretty good question from someone who knows nothing about how aircraft operate. As usual, tourist prefers personal insult over substance. The reports tuc alludes to admit the aircraft leaving the carrier didn't have functioning radar, jtids or iff and half the comms weren't yet working. All were No Go kit. So when is the decision made? The same reports say this was all new kit in the Mk7 so the decision process must have been different. If they'd aborted early, they wouldn't have collided. Not blaming any crew but would want to know what they were taught, or was the conversion course as brief as Tourist implies.

[tucumseh]

To be fair, I accept Tourist knows more about operating aircraft than me. Of course he does. The difference is, when I spot an obvious question like that I ask those who should know, I don't dictate the answer. Nor do I automatically rubbish them if they provide an answer I don't understand. I await an answer, or an opinion, by the way. Should be a no-brainer to a Sea King operator who is wholly familiar with all those new systems and changes in operating procedures brought about by a completely different Statement Operating Intent and Usage. Or maybe not, given the necessary contract was cancelled on the grounds they should just make up procedures on the fly!

[Chugalug2]

if mistakes/breaks from the rules were made they were well intentioned in what the person or persons thought were the best interests of the service. Would those 'breaks from the rules' include the issue of illegal orders, Tourist? One such order issued by an RAF VSO, to ignore the mandated regulations yet declare them complied with, has been declared proper by the MOD up to and including the SoS ever since, and insists that refusal to comply with it was an offence. That was presumably in the best interests of the Service in your view?

[Tourist]

Tuc

The problem with your posts on your pet crusade are that sometimes I find myself reading them and nodding along because of the work you put into them.......


And then I balance that against the one area of which you talk where I have some knowledge and I find you twisting reality to fit your opinions and I doubt the rest of it all...

[Tourist]

Dervish

This again just like the enthusiastic amateur crash investigation threads.

You don't even know what is relevant!

IFF u/s you say.
Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks.

IFF on off broken fixed who cares! Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!?


Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really?
An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar?
I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?

This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe.
How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for?

An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar....

[dervish]

Accepted tuc. I’ve got a few questions of my own I don’t understand but Tourist will know. Lifted these from the report as I don’t really understand them myself.

Why did the Board criticise the crew for not seeking a Radar Advisory Service despite the RTS forbidding it?

Could a carrier provide a RAS if it didn’t have IFF and the aircraft didn’t have radar or IFF?

Why did the RTS allow use of NVG when the aircraft wasn't fitted for it? They weren’t using NVG but the problem I see is the Board didn’t know what the RTS said and recommended its use is considered.


Lots of similar questions come out of that report and it bothers me no one seems to have asked them before. All collision related so not thread drift.

[dervish]

Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really?
An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar?
I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?


Just quoting MoDs own reports tourist. The outgoing aircraft didn't have her mission system fired up because of a software loading snag meaning no radar (switch on standby), no JTIDS (the problem software) and limited IFF as the radar wasn't working. No JTIDS meant no JTIDS voice and there was a fault in the GPS so not known if UHF radios working. I guess thats why the question was asked about how long you put up with this before aborting. If you know better...

Puzzled you keep denying MoD have said things in open source reports.

[Tourist]

Ah, that's more like it.

So, the radar was not u/s as stated, it just wasn't up and running yet.
The IFF was perfectly servicable.
The Radar was not able to see IFF yet because it was not up and running yet.
JTIDS voice has no possible bearing on the accident. The pilots would not be on it anyway.
UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship.

So in the space of a few posts we have gone from:-

Radar IFF and JTIDS u/s

To:-
Radar not turned fully on yet
IFF perfectly servicable
JTIDS generally servicable and nothing to do with anything anyway.

This is exactly what I'm talking about.
Attempts to skew reality. It no wonder you get ignored.

Let's talk further about it.

Exactly when would a helicopter turn on the radar on leaving the ship in an operational scenario? Do you imagine under normal circumstances a helicopter turns on the radar at takeoff? Can you just for a moment imagine that we have developed procedures that allow aircraft in and out with the radars, IFF, HISLs off so as not to give the position of the carrier away?
Is there another helicopter in the entire British military that even had the capability to see other IFF?

Do you honestly think that radar in the military is like on telly where a little blip on the screen moves towards you and you tell the pilot and he makes a miraculous manuever and all is well?

This does seem like a personal attack, but that is purely because this is a personal and misguided crusade rather than a topic for discussion.

[Chugalug2]

the radar was not u/s as stated,Er, it was you who stated it was u/s, Tourist. Read the thread! Oh, if I'm not already on your ignore list (if only!), could you please answer my question above re illegal orders?

[tucumseh]

Based on MoD’s reports and admittedly with my non-aircrew limitations;


IFF u/s you say. Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks.
IFF wasn’t functioning fully, it at all, because the Mission System wasn’t initiated. Ark Royal’s IFF was U/S. The Inbound Sea King’s IFF and radar was limited due to enforced change in radar mode.


IFF on off broken fixed who cares!

Aircrew should, as it is a No Go item. The RAF lost a Tornado the same day because the IFF system design implementation wasn’t correct.



First you say no-one would get airborne without Mode 4, then Who Cares if it isn’t working. The Tornado crew got airborne because they thought it ok, and died not knowing it wasn’t.

Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!?
According to MoD, the other Sea King was capable, although limited in range. The HMS Liverpool Lynx, which had encroached into the CCZ, was radiating in the sense her radar was working as was her I Band transponder. Don’t know about the US aircraft. The lack of IFF return from Outbound was concerning the sole observer in the rear of Inbound. A minor distraction perhaps, but maybe significant at a time when the pilot and other observer were desperately trying to locate her.


Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really? An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar? I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?
Inbound was limited, as above. Outbound was in Standby.

This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe. How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for?
The Mission System (radar/JTIDS) is fully integrated with the IFF. Each relies upon the other. The screens display IFF data. The interface is facilitated by the Mission System Interface Unit. Neither Sea King could get accurate information from Ark Royal due to her radar limitations and IFF being U/S. Thus, the Defences in Depth against the risk of collision were eroded completely. As stated by the BoI.

An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar... The operating procedures are written on the assumption both are serviceable, but it is important that they (and hence Safety Case) also include possible deviations. (Equally, I assume, the assets it is controlling must know what to do if Mk7 falls offline). This gets to the root of the original question. What instructions was Outbound working to while waiting to see if the Mission System could initiate? And what did the instructions say about what to do and where to go while waiting, and when to abort?
And had they trained for this yet in both Full Mission Trainer and Sim, given the RTS only provided a Switch On Only clearance (“not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever”)? I’ll be honest and say I think this was an error, but it’s a hell of an error to make in the Master Airworthiness Reference and indicative of this entire area not being managed properly.
The Mk7 differs enormously from the Mk2. Both RadHaz and time to initiate software meant the radar could never be fully operational deck to deck. Essentially, the Mk2 could radiate as soon as the interlocks were freed when the swing arm deployed. But the Mk7 would have to wait longer. The BoI refers to this at length. What is also clear from the reports is that in certain respects the ship’s procedures hadn’t changed from Mk2, despite the aircraft form, fit, function and use being completely different. The need to change designation from AEW Mk2 to AEW Mk7 (ASaC was a late affectation) was THE big clue.



Here’s another question for you. Why do you think the Comms/GPS passed full integration testing and trials in 2000, yet in 2003 Time of Day was not integrated with UHF radios? Who agreed to de-specify or de-modify the aircraft to such an extent? And were the Trainer, Sim and Aircraft Specifications (and hence Safety Case) modified to reflect this new Build Standard? Was there a problem with Time of Day in general? Bearing in mind the GPS was only capable of providing 2 ToD loads without a Buffer Unit, was this Buffer unit serviceable, or even fitted? In which case JTIDS, IFF and/or Comms may not work or have intermittent problems. When trying to load software, does the routine include looking for and verifying ToD? If there was a problem, that MAY explain why JTIDS didn’t load. Just a thought, not addressed by MoD.


Edit

UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship.

I think the reference was to the 2 ARC164 HQII radios, which weren't integrated properly, meaning the system wasn't working to spec, and that assumed by the Trainer and Sim. The AD3400 V/UHF radio was, I assume, working. You'll know which one they used to speak to ship. I'd speculate it wouldn't be UHF2. The Mk7 was the first aircraft to home through an encrypted hopper and this entire area was fraught with political machinations, as the US had de-modified the ARC164 without telling MoD, meaning you lost 50% functionality. Mk7 restored it, but the RN let it slide and didn't resurrect other ARC164 users, so if there was migration of LRUs due to maintenance, the Mk7 could suddenly find itself with a very limited comms fit. Same applied to crypto, which was to spec in the Mk7, but not on the Merlin or Lynx. Migration meant degradation. Sorry, details details, but it all adds up and must be understood by investigators.

[Tourist]

Sometimes I want to give up.....

One last try.

Both the pilots were pingers by trade.

That means that they were trained from the crib to operate from carriers in a Mk6

Mk6 normal ops would be to lift from a carrier with the radar off. Lights off. Radio silent. IFF mode4 only. No JTIDS.

The loss of all those items would not be a big deal. It's normal ops. Even radar on in a MK6 it is blind in the front aspect would you believe.

On this flight, they were nav lights on, lower HISL off, (normal with both the controversial HISL and the previous strobe due to distracting reflections off the sea) radio on, two way comms with the ship. Hardly operating outside their comfort zone.
Was everything thing perfect?
No, they were constrained in their use of height separation which is not ideal, but these things happen operationally.

IFF is necessary to not get shot down or even be allowed into the operational area but had no effect on the accident, thus who cares.

Re the JTIDS.
DONT CARE!
Nothing to do with me flying the aircraft.

Re operational on the deck
DONT CARE
Nothing to do with me flying the aircraft.

Your points are all about bagging capability which is irrelevant, not flying the airframe safely which is relevant.

[tucumseh]

Tourist, I have no problem with what you've just said. But I sincerely do recommend you read the reports.

previous strobe due to distracting reflectionsNow, this is where you and I definitely agree. Would you believe that the Reviewing Officers (FLEET) rejected the BoI President's recommendations because they said REFLECTIONS were completely irrelevant, and absolutely NOT to be considered when assessing a distraction. That one can only take into account DIRECT light. (The regs, which I tend to like implementing, much to your chagrin, say both Direct and Reflected/Glare). Another example of MoD re-writing the regs to suit the situation. Now, if you were evr in the position of having tyo accept a design, what would you say if the designer ignored reflected light? You'd bloody jump.

Of course, the irony is that FLEET's stance means they disagreed with the Service Deviation permitting lower forward to be switched off if the pilot saw reflected light. According to them, the reflected light had to be ignored.

Glad you agree there was a "previous strobe". I agree too. The IPT told the investigator there was no such thing. A quick look at any Sea King told him they told porkies. (In fact, I understand he was standing next to a series of photographs on the IPT office wall when they told him this!) Presumably one reason why his report was destroyed. :ugh:

We're getting there.

[Basil]

The system tells the pilot what he must do to avoid the other aircraft by the proscribed margin.
He is also told that he is not to think, not to look but just to obey instinctively.
I understood that mindset was to guard against confusing an aircraft seen by the pilot with the aircraft which TCAS is avoiding.

[dervish]

Of course, the irony is that FLEET's stance means they disagreed with the Service Deviation permitting lower forward to be switched off if the pilot saw reflected light. According to them, the reflected light had to be ignored.

I can't get my head round that at all. Are you saying Fleet thought the HISL should not have been switched off, because it was under the cockpit and behind on the tail so not in the pilot's direct line of sight?

Tourist, surely some of that bagger capability you mention contributes to the ability to fly the aircraft safely, especially if he's trying to locate another aircraft in darkness? The board discussed the mission tape a lot and that the incoming pilot was relying on information from the rear. Are you saying he shouldn't have been? From what i read it seems he was a bit limited where he could go due to the tlam corridor. Would that make him more reliant on other sensors apart from his eyes?

[Tourist]

Basil, yes that is correct.
You should not assume the TCAS contact is the one you see since the positions are very inaccurate. You should just follow the RA.
All very well in a airliner cockpit with poor visibility and manoeuvrability but not really military compatible.

[Lima Juliet]

You see now you've got the Daily Mail started now: Typhoon jets could smash into airliners, RAF chief warns* | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2911407/Typhoon-jets-smash-airliners-resulting-massive-loss-life-fighter-not-fitted-key-piece-equipment-RAF-chief-warns.html)

What a completely moronic headline. Do you know what, my Mini Cooper could smash into an airliner as well!!! :ugh:

Anyway, if we are to fit TCAS, or other such anti collision detection devices, into the military fleet then let's think about it. How about a non-cooperative collision avoidance device that helps you stop hitting non-squawkers (ie. Aircraft with a transponder on standby or not fitted) or large birds/balloons/model aircraft etc...? Also, let's start fitting the fleet that doesn't have air to air sensors first and thus Typhoon should be one of the last - logically. Fitting a non-cooperative system would also have utility in war time and peacetime.

Finally, if I can't see an airliner with my RADAR, datalink picture, my IRST, my transponder interrogator all sensor fused to my helmet mounted sight with my Mk1 eyeballs then there is something massively wrong!

As you can probably work out, I do not support the idea of TCAS for Typhoon as I think that it will probably cause more problems than it will cause as TCAS was never designed for the type of dynamic manoeuvring a Typhoon can do - there will be Resolution Advisories all over the place as the Typhoon manoeuvres!! :ugh:

LJ

[KenV]

Here's an interesting tidbit: The F-35Bs bought by the UK don't have TCAS either!!
Is that crazy, foolish, short sighted, or what?

[salad-dodger]

Here's an interesting tidbit: The F-35Bs bought by the UK don't have TCAS either!!

Which bit of that is interesting Ken, you repeating what the OP included in post 1 or have I missed something else?

S-D

[ShotOne]

I'd like to hear how your mini-cooper could smash into an airliner, Leon. Seriously though, it would be interesting to examine the arguments against fitting a standard commercially available TCAS to most (all?) current RAF types. Sure, it won't cope with all eventualities like formation and high g manoeuvres. But it's inexpensive, available now, and is a very useful piece of kit, surely better than waiting for a yet-to-be-invented all dancing version which may never come.

[jonw66]

Leon
You made the mistake of going back on thread bang on though.

[bakseetblatherer]

So those who have flown with the system, how does it go with formation flying? The RHWR goes off enough with a/c in close, I can't imagine what manoeuvring formation jets in and out of close would do to TCAS. Then if you turn it off when in formation, for mil jets virtually all the time, what is the point? Also is the system keyed into the performance of the jet or is it generic thinking a typhoon is going to turn like an airliner trying to avoid spilling coffee?
My first thought is false positives would make it a pointless system.

[JFZ90]

Interesting views, I had a feeling this would not be considered a cut and dry "no brainer" decision by some here. As such it is questionable whether the MAA was right to go so public on this - now the scope for a debate on its importance has effectively been taken out of the decision makers hands and it has become a political/red top presentational issue.

Presumably they have done the numbers on risks and usefulness of something like ACAS and are confident that they have scored the trade off correctly.

I hope so.

[Lima Juliet]

I'd like to hear how your mini-cooper could smash into an airliner, Leon.

http://home.bt.com/images/three-austin-minis-leap-a-rooftop-in-the-film-the-italian-job--picture-credit-everett-collectionrex-136390116260403901-140512152121.jpg

An airliner doesn't have to be in the air to crash into it...:cool:

You see the problem with TCASII - ie. The one that most jet airliners use is that they 'talk' to other TCAS II units to give resolution advisories (RAs). Typically, an RA will be issued 20-30 seconds from collision, so if you have a Typhoon climbing at 15,000ft/min and there is an airliner 7,500ft above it then it will alert even though the Typhoon can see the airliner, is going to stay outside the controlled airspace the airliner is flying in and is a perfectly safe manoeuvre. The airliner will get an RA to climb, or even descend, rapidly to break the collision in the vertical - now how safe is that? In the horizontal it can be just as bad, a jet flying at 500kts+ IAS near an airliner doing 300kts+ IAS can have a closure rate of 800kts+ at lower levels or over 1100kts at medium/high level - that is 18 nautical miles a minute of closure. So everytime the Typhoon flies within 9 miles of the centreline of the airway it could trigger an alert to the airliner; even though it will be no-where near a mid air collision if it is pulling 9g.

Fitting TCASI would only give traffic advisories and only really does the job that the Typhoon's RADAR/Interrogator/IRST/MIDS will do. An airliner's TCAS will see the Typhoon's Mode S or Mode 3/A and does not 'handshake' with other TCAS Is like the later and more capable TCASII (which we discussed above is unsuitable for FJ type performance in my opinion).

So, that is why we have been trying to develop an Airborne Collision Awareness System for the Tornado GR for the past 15 years or so. It was as easy as plopping in a TCAS into a high performance FJ then it would have been done years ago!

LJ

[Onceapilot]

Sorry folks, but the advantages of TCAS are being ignored. The RAF has/(and had!) several types that easily integrate TCAS function into their operations. It is not beyond the wit of man to write SOP's that get the best from the system and avoid most of the pitfalls. :)

OAP

[Bob Viking]

TCAS in the Hawk T2.

I started on the jet when it was still at a reasonably early stage of syllabus development in the RAF and the integration caused a few headaches.
Since the kit is in the jet it is very hard to justify ever turning it off. Formations in segregated airspace operating visually with each other would be one time this could be done.
It did create a few problems especially at times when you didn't want your student to know there was another jet coming (low level evasion for instance). It was also quite annoying that it would steal your left hand screen whenever it issued a warning.
I wasn't the biggest fan of it initially and was happy that I had a fairly effective lookout scan but with the best eyes in the world you can still miss things.
The bottom line is that since a couple of guys I knew died in the GR4 midair I believe it is getting harder to justify not fitting it to all FJs. TCAS II is not a perfect system and I would much rather see something that is optimised for FJ use but in the meantime I would just fit it anyway. It would be much easier to sleep at night for some folks. It almost certainly would have prevented the midair in question but who knows if it could prevent more in future. Once it's fitted you'll never know.
The problems it causes can be mitigated against and despite what I've said on previous threads I'd take the rough with the smooth personally.
BV

[Tourist]

Bob.

Would you also us the RA functionality?

[Bob Viking]

We would always turn it on in controlled airspace and then select it off when exiting. Never had an RA to respond to though.
As an aside it always struck me as worrying that a TCAS RA could happily tell you to descend regardless of height. Unless I've misunderstood something.
BV

[Tourist]

Yes, though in an airliner the EGPWS would protect you in that circumstance.

No issue with turning it on in controlled airspace shared with civilian traffic.
Entering the MATZ is a different matter though.
As I remember it initially the brief was "ignore RA if positive visual ID"
This was then changed to "always obey an RA" which I strongly disagreed with.

The problem is that even a hawk has the ability to operate well outside the limits that TCAS was ever designed to cope with, so often the RA is just wrong.

It was designed for an airliner, not something that can produce rates or turn/climb like a fast jet.
It also has huge protection bubbles, and in my opinion a military pilot has to be comfortable in close proximity to other aircraft.

RAs are reasonably regular at Heathrow when a departing aircraft has a slightly high rate of climb on the SID. It sound like a big deal, but when you look at the separations involved very few would be worthy of comment or even notice in a MATZ.

[ShotOne]

Of course a military pilot has to be comfortable in close proximity but that's hardly an argument against TCAS. I did acknowledge most of those limitations about ten posts ago. But are we really better off with nothing? Or are we holding out for a (not yet invented) catch-all "magic bullet" system which may not arrive for years, or in context of Tornado, ever?

PS Leon, airports these days are circled by barriers that are more robust than a mini-cooper... But I suppose you could drop one out of a herc!

[Distant Voice]

TCAS II is not a perfect system and I would much rather see something that is optimised for FJ use

That is what was said back in 1992, and why a bespoke system was developed for Fast Jets. It was tested and proved to be a success during flight trials. Recommendations were made in 1997 to produce a production model with an in service date fo 2004 (Information not mentined inSI report). Nothing happened. We are now attempting to install TCAS in Tornado, and perhaps Typhoon, some twenty years after declaring it far from ideal, and only because three people died on 3rd July 2012.

In a reply to a recent written PQ on risk MoD declared that the Typhoon's overall risk to life is "0 in 1000", simply because no one has died, yet. This approach on risk assessment, within the MoD (which includes the MAA), has remained unchanged for years. How does this sit with the DG's report? Perhaps the DG has the Tornado FAI in mind, which appears to have gone from "Unlikely" to "Probable" over the last six months, and he is just trying to protect his back. If he wants to be really brave he should declare the risk of collision for Typhoon as not being ALARP.

DV

[Tourist]

I fail to see how TCAS can be very useful in a military aircraft in terms of safety.

In controlled airspace the risk of collision is already very low and TCAS RA could be selected without any real problems, but it is a solution without a problem in controlled airspace.

In the open FIR, jets cause all kinds of problems for current TCAS equipped aircraft with RA selected, so I fail to see how fitting it to jets would help.

If left in TA mode it can be quite useful at times, but as anyone who has used it knows it is very rough and ready as a kind of map view. Not convinced the time spent looking at it wouldn't be best spent looking out.

I found it most useful for spotting reaper/pred in their orbits at medium level. Tricky things to spot visually, but I would mention that they can take a long while to find. longer than you would have steaming through at speed.

[alfred_the_great]

The HMS Liverpool Lynx, which had encroached into the CCZ, was radiating in the sense her radar was working as was her I Band transponder.

That transponder is not IFF. Don't get the two mixed up.

[Minnie Burner]

If Typhoon or Lightning II need TCAS to achieve SA, we the taxpayers have been duped.
If there is a current front-line Typhoon driver who would rather have TCAS than improved operational sensors (and fusion) then let him/her speak up and I'll get back in my box.
Tonkas, trainers & truckies? Well that's a different story.

[Onceapilot]

There is some utter, utter xxxx being spouted by some on here. ;)

OAP

[downsizer]

Dude, it's the Internet, 99% of it is utter xxxx, 76% of people know that :ok:

[Tourist]

OAP

Not exactly the most constructive post you have ever made.....

We don't even know which side of the argument you come down on.

[Distant Voice]

Minnie Burner, you say;

If there is a current front-line Typhoon driver who would rather have TCAS than improved operational sensors (and fusion) then let him/her speak up and I'll get back in my box.

What would you prefer when driving at night, a better Satnav, or headlights? With all due respect to Typhoon "drivers", I do not think they have all the facts in order to carry out a meaningful risk assessment. The guys on Ninrod XV230 believed that their aircraft was safe.

Beware of adopting the same mentality as MoD of no deaths, so no risk; so lets ignore all the near misses and keep going until something goes wrong.

DV

[Tourist]

DV

I think you are being unreasonable.

Do you imagine for a moment that the Typhoon drivers are likely to be unaware of TCAS?

It is a spectacularly simple system which is why the idea is very clever and very effective in the environment it is designed for, ie unmaneuverable aircraft that proceed in a stately manner about the skys operating in a system designed to ensure that they never get close to each other.

That does not really describe a modern military aircraft.

[Distant Voice]

Do you imagine for a moment that the Typhoon drivers are likely to be unaware of TCAS?


What, in my posting, give you that impression?

DV

[Tourist]

The bit where you said that they were not in possession of the facts perhaps?

Since the relative safety advantages of TCAS or operational sensors was what was being discussed, the only facts I could see you might think they were not aware of was the usefulness or otherwise of TCAS.

[Minnie Burner]

I guess DV has made up his mind, based on a PQ and whether he wants headlights in his car or satnav. The drivers (OK, I understand the source of the metaphor now) will not be heard because they can't tell whether their aircraft is safe or not. :mad: me, we're doomed.

[Distant Voice]

Sorry, I was addressing collision risk assessment, which involves an understanding of Hazard logs, Risk registers and Risk clasifications (Frequency and Severity) etc.

I am sure that you appreciate it is not just a case of understanding the functioning of TCAS but what protection it provides when the risk of collision is realised (Loss of safe seperation with another aircraft in class G airspace). At that point TCAS is the only "recovery control" that can prevent a collision/near miss from occurring. I am please to note, from the lastest MAA "bow tie" diagram of Nov 2014 (After the event of 2012), that this has now been recognised by the MAA.

DV

[Distant Voice]

The drivers (OK, I understand the source of the metaphor now) will not be heard because they can't tell whether their aircraft is safe or not. :mad: me, we're doomed.

Minnie Burner, I did not say that, nor did I imply it. I simply pointed out that aircrew do not always have the full picture when it comes to safety.

I should add that SAFE means ALARP and tolerable, and the collision risk for Typhoon is not ALARP. Even the DG believes it is "questionable"; not a firm endorsement.

DV

[Tourist]

Distant Voice

That ranks as one of the most ridiculous posts I've read in a long long time.

TCAS is far from being the last line of defence from collision. It operates at huge distances, usually pre visual.

If TCAS fails there is still the old fashioned version called "eyes"
It has worked surprisingly well for a really long time.

[Tourist]

"Sorry, I was addressing collision risk assessment, which involves an understanding of Hazard logs, Risk registers and Risk clasifications (Frequency and Severity) etc."

I am absolutely staggered by that statement.

No.

Collision risk assessment is what pilots do when flying continuously.

What you are doing is called "bigging your part up"

[Kitbag]

Collision risk assessment is what pilots do when flying continuously.

And just occasionally (but sadly and fatally) f@ck it up.

The prime, and flawed, thrust of your argument seems to be leave it to the pilot because they won't make the fatal error.

TCAS is not the ultimate solution, but surely it adds to SA which probably is the solution.

[Distant Voice]

That ranks as one of the most ridiculous posts I've read in a long long time.


Wow! Tourist, clearly you have a limited understanding of hazard/risk assessment and management, so let me explain in a little more detail what I am talking about.

Hazards become risks when the "Prevention Controls" fail. In our case flying in Class G airspace is the hazard, and loss of safe separation with another aircraft is the risk. Prevention Controls take the form of ATC facilities, onboard radar and passive detectors, deconfliction planning and TCAS (if fitted). In this role one is using the Traffic Advisory (TA) function of TCAS.

However, if the Prevention Contols fail and the risk is realised then we have to rely on "Recovery Controls" in order to prevent a collision/near miss. The Resolution Advisory (RA) fuction of TCAS (if fitted) is the only meaningful Recovery Control. And that is what I am talking about. And that is why two Tornado aicraft collided over the Moray Firth in 2012; NO RECOVERY CONTROL. The Mk 1 eye ball was useless, as many near miss AIRPROX reports will testify

The Risk assessment and management that I am talking about is at Duty Holder level.

DV

[Tourist]

DV

This is a perfect example of desk sitters believing that paperwork has a positive effect on flight safety.

It reminds me of the time I had to cancel my final display practise because the paperwork was not correct. How could I possibly be safe without the correct paperwork?

TCAS is not and has never been the only recovery control.
The pilot is the primary and final recovery control. He is highly trained and has far more sensors and options to maneuver than TCAS will ever have and he can to it in very fine tolerances to the last second before collision. He has options until very close proximity and he is specifically trained to operate in a military aircraft unlike TCAS which has 2 dimensional options optimised for civil airliner profiles.

Pointing out a time where TCAS may have helped is obtuse. Aircraft fitted with TCAS collide/have airprox all the time.
The fact that it is possible for an aircraft to collide despite all the clever air to air sensors and eyesight carried on a fighter does not mean that TCAS would be an improvement.

TCAS is designed for a particular application. Some of the reasons that make it useful for an airliner are invalid.
An airliner has exceptionally poor viz compared to a fighter.
An airline pilot very rarely looks out of the cockpit. I'm estimating less than 1% of the time an airliner cockpit has a pilot actively looking out rather than reading the paper, programming the FMS, chatting up hosties etc.
An airliner can't agressively maneuver like a fighter

A 1hz refresh rate is fine for an airliner, but at the accelerations of a fighter this can cause the system to fail and not give an RA.

For TCAS to work the pilot has to be trained to trust it and do as it says. There are various instances where TCAS has led aircraft into close proximity where eyes might not have. Usually this is in the case of one aircraft being TCAS fitted and one not and RA reversals have come too late.

I think this push for TCAS is post holder ass covering and nothing more.
Nobody wants to be asked the asinine question at a board of inquiry "I've heard of TCAS. How come you have not given our boys this kit?"
The fact that it is inappropriate to the application is by the by.
Next will come "we must all have EGPWS!"
It's a fantastic bit of kit for an airliner and has saved countless lives. Why not fit the civvy version to all military kit? Surely it will work fine?.......

[Distant Voice]

He is highly trained and has far more sensors and options to maneuver than TCAS will ever have and he can to it in very fine tolerances to the last second before collision. He has options until very close proximity and he is specifically trained to operate in a military aircraft unlike TCAS which has 2 dimensional options optimised for civil airliner profiles.


Tourist, I suggest that you read Appendix C to AAIB report into the collision of a Tornado aircraft and Jetranger in June 1993. I think you will be surprised at the amount of time that is needed in order scan, recognise an approaching aircraft, recognise a collision course, decide on action, exicute the control movement and allow the aircraft to resond. According to the report, see and avoid has been described as a maritime concept originally developed for slow moving ships which is now out of place in an era of high speed aviating.

DV

[Tourist]

DV

I don't think anyone has ever successfully won a debate with any argument beginning with "I suggest you read Appendix C"

Eyeballs are by no means perfect, but that is not the point. TCAS is a good early stage system for preventing collisions in suitable aircraft profiles. It is certainly not the last line of defence even in an airliner.

You will note, that despite the vast amounts of cash always available in military contracts, they never advertised it as suitable for military jets........

[glad rag]

[QUOTE]
It reminds me of the time I had to cancel my final display practise because the paperwork was not correct. How could I possibly be safe without the correct paperwork?
/QUOTE ]

'nuff said.

[Bob Viking]

DV and Tourist.
Your discussion reminds me a little of the 'whale is heavier, but the dinosaur was longer argument'. You're never going to reach a resolution.
Neither of you is really looking at it from the others viewpoint. Tourist you clearly have a lot of airborne experience which I respect. DV your crusade is both admirable and well intentioned.
Please allow me to be the man that bridges the gap. I've never flown the Typhoon or Tornado, but I have operated the Hawk T1, T2, 115 and Jaguar (similar to the Tornado for the sake of this argument). I also served as the UFSO for the Hawk T2 so I know a thing or two about risk matrices and ALARP etc.
Trying to justify TCAS to a pilot by citing paperwork is never going to get you very far. Likewise citing unsubstantiated testimony without evidence to support it won't cut the mustard.
However based on what I have experienced I would rather we fitted TCAS to all FJs now.
As I have said previously TCAS II is not perfect for FJ use. I just fail to see a good reason not to fit it in this day and age. Some people will grumble and we'll never really know if it prevented any accidents but we can't keep prevaricating whilst we wait for the gold plated solution. If it is not fitted then I hope the SoS has the balls to own the risk. After all money will be the reason why and you can't really blame the military for that.
Honestly I think many Typhoon guys would laugh at the limitations of the current system but they'd soon get over it. It's not always 9G and vertical climbs.
I don't expect this to be the final word, just my two penn'orth as they say.
BV

[AdLib]

For my two penn'orth, some TCAS facts:

It doesn't provide a response with closure rates >10,000fpm and/or >1200kts - software limit. i.e. it won't 'see' traffic doing that.

Different kinds of RA's are inhibited at 'low level', of the order of 1400ft and below (rad alt), e.g. RA 'Descend' inhibited below 1100ft

TCAS broadly uses time to 'collision' (tau) as the measure of when to alert (TA or RA). The tau limits change with altitude - gets bigger - to compensate for the IAS/TAS relationship I think. A head to head RA is the same time to collision with a Typhoon at 800kts as it is with another airliner at 250kts. I recommend using your favourite search engine to find the FAA document 'Introduction to TCAS II, Version 7.1'. Especially if you're having trouble sleeping - actually has a few useful nuggets of info.

There may be some conflation with TCAS (the only current implementation of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) standard) and a Traffic Advisory System (TAS). TCAS tells you how to get out of the way (in pitch only) whereas a TAS just tells you where the other traffic is (+/- angle of arrival errors). Studies have indicated that cued lookout is much more effective than a '360' scan - no surprises there.

The point I'm trying to make is that the blanket use of the term 'TCAS' indicates a system that provides an RA that (in the civvy world) the pilot is obliged to follow. That may well not be the case in the military environment, where the system could easily be used in the TAS sense to cue lookout. It's not really important what it's called, just how it's used, but it is important not to get wrapped around the axle due to misconceptions caused by calling something TCAS when it may not be used in the same way or indeed be the same thing.

Also, pilots may be reluctant to use it but while MAC remains the number one risk the relevant AOC will no doubt be keen to explain why such reluctance may be misplaced ... :ooh:

[Tourist]

Bob

I'm interested how the information is displayed to you in a Hawk?

Certainly in the various aircraft I have flown fitted with TCAS the contacts sometimes have a habit of roaming around the screen a little. (Sometimes 30 degrees and a few miles in position)

In the TA phase of any encounter, in an airliner there are two of you to look out as you try to discern where the screen contact is in the real world.
Are you head down in the hawk, or is there a clever HUD integration?

I'm surprised that you find it generally positive in the Hawk, as in the military aircraft I have flown fitted with it, while it had it's undeniable uses, it was a pure irritation in RA mode.
There is the problem that RA is all or nothing. What I mean by that is that unless I'm mistaken, the system expects both of you to follow the RA and plans accordingly. If you choose to ignore it the plan is compromised. This means that military aircraft cannot opt in but give ourselves options to ignore if visual etc.

[Bob Viking]

Google will show you an image of how the cockpit looks. TCAS can be displayed on any of the three MFDs but in the event of an RA or TA it will 'steal' your left hand screen. It gives a colour coded display on a black background with each tag presented with height information. From what I can tell it is pretty similar to other comercially available displays. You can also select various range options.

It currently doesn't (or at least didn't in 2012) have a HUD function but it wouldn't be impossible to incorporate into software upgrades.

It has similar angle of arrival issues to which you mention (it was recognised as a risk in fact in the risk register), hence it cannot completely replace visual lookout.

As a Jaguar and Hawk T1 man I was clearly sceptical about the need for it initially. It has it's drawbacks but can be useful at times. Puddle jumpers flying through Wales whilst you're engaged in a spot of low level evasion can be tricky to spot and it's nice to have an advanced warning of their presence. Yes I know, provided they're squawking.

Some people swear by it and will even keep it on in the visual circuit to see people joining etc but I preferred to turn it to standby once inside the MATZ.

The way that it would trip off when you exceeded the AoB or climb angle limitations was annoying but at least in the latest software update it would self reset every time (it didn't stop the repetitive AVBIT warnings though).

As for the RA thing it never really affected me. You would clearly be presented with one in the sim from time to time to test your knowledge of the system but we used it very infrequently in the air. If I were to fly in airways or busy airspace and it were to issue an RA then I would follow it but it is not something that will affect the FJ guys very often. That is not to say there aren't airliners being forced to follow an RA on an aggressively manoeuvring FJ outside of CAS however. Put simply it didn't annoy me sufficiently that I would rather operate without it.

On that note how often would your average civilian pilot expect to be hearing RAs? It can't be that often surely?

Anyway, as I have said I am aware of it's limitations but, despite these, it is not a bad comfort blanket to have. It is hardly going to max out a Typhoon pilot to have a TCAS working in the background and even they, with a RADAR, can still miss things.

It's bad enough that Tornado didn't have it fitted in 2012 but can we really still be debating the issue three years later?

BV:confused:

[JFZ90]

Sounds a reasonably balanced and considered opinion/assessment BV.

Sold.

Out of interest, what is the false alarm rate like on fast jet GPWS? (TERPROM based). Low enough to ensure trust in the system and react without hesitation to a warning? Or do the tolerances make it a distraction in low level flight?

[Bob Viking]

Mostly pretty good. I had total confidence in the Jaguar system (but maybe I was too inexperienced and trusting to know any better!).

The Hawk T2 GPWS is also good. Occasionally you will get erroneous warnings mostly on entrance to valley systems (the ski toe looking out the front will react to valley walls and such). Many of those photos from the mach loop you see are accompanied by in-cockpit "pull up" warnings!

BV:cool:

[advocatusDIABOLI]

BV.......:D


A Well reasoned and structured argument, to which I fully agree. TCAS has limitations, but in 'helping' to mitigate the main risks of MAC GA & MAC CAT (From a societal perspective) It could play a big part.


In the future, I would be very surprised if TCAS or similar systems were not mandated for all commercial and military types above certain weights.


I wonder what the Lightning II team feel about this........


Advo

[Onceapilot]

BV, Big Mil TCAS. I never had an RA in civilian ATC environment, quite a few TA, usually conflicting and climbing/descending traffic breaking the ROC/ROD closure thresholds. Military environment, had a couple of RA from other traffic not accurately flying their assigned altitude. Also, many thousand TA during AAR, which was expected (TA only selected) and easily worked into the routine. However, several occasions saw (on TCAS) joining/departing traffic at incorrect levels and kit allowed safe resolution of the situation.:ok:
Cheers

OAP