UK Carrirer Qualification for F-35C

[ThinkTanker]

Evening,

I appreciate that this is (currently!) a question which won't arise. But I'm writing a thinktank paper (hence new and exciting handle) which looks at returning to F-35C, EMALS and traps on the QE-class.

Question, therefore is: when the decision to going down the F-35C route was taken in 2010 (before being reversed in 2012 :ugh:), what was the plan for training aircrew to land on the carrier? Was it simply to send WAFUs off to train with the USN, or was any thought given to a T-45 Goshawk buy for carrier training?

Many thanks,

TTr

[Lima Juliet]

Crikey old stick - don't you know there is a funding defecit? Even if the B model fell over, I cannot see cats and traps ever being funded and fitted now. It would just become a helicopter carrier instead!

LJ :ok:

[Finnpog]

Sorry that I cannot give a definitive answer.
Don't the Marine Nationale send their folk through USN flght schools even though they will end up in Rafales, Super Etendards and Hawkeye?

That might not have been a bad solution without access to UK decks in the early stages.

However - what does the current flght training contract say?
Is the Ministry already tied into a service provider with clauses? I genuinely do not know - so not being provocative for the sake of it.

[orca]

It's hard to answer the exact question because 'thought' is hard to capture. When the announcement was made all eyes naturally turned west because the USN was the obvious source of cat and trap training and, as already posted, the Marine Nationale already sent their pilots there - so no competition really. Other things wrt training did bubble up, for example scoping work to see if a fresnel lens at Yeovilton could be of any use to get boys still flying in the UK used to flying the ball.
Interestingly enough the French were keen to use the new CV presence East of 'The Pond' to reduce its total dependence on the US and one of the proposals was a Meridian-sequel training base, aircraft, syllabus etc in either France or UK.
I remember there being (at star level) meetings about how we could tailor Valley to the new direction of march, but again think we stopped at Fresnel lens level, not new aircraft.

[Background Noise]

I think Leon might have missed the point. There was no plan to purchase additional training aircraft. Training was being looked at and I think there were plans for the training initially to involve the USN.

[KPax]

Surely it would be cheaper to train existing RAF FJ aircrew than star ta whole new system up from scratch.

[dat581]

I suspect the RN may have used a similar system to that used for carrier pilots in the 1970s. First carrier landing is done in the end of pipeline aircraft so no carrier capable advanced training aircraft are required. Messing about with YouTube using HMS Ark Royal or sailor series will bring up this very scene.

With modern day training aids such as simulators and the ease with which the F-35C appears to land on the ship ( yes I know, early days ) it would not have been a problem.

[sandiego89]

I recall quite a few FAA aircrews, including ex-Sea Harrier pilots went to the USA and were assigned to F/A-18 E/F squadrons, and more were to follow. I believe they were recalled/cancelled when the UK went back to the B.

I imagine there are a few FAA/RAF pilots on exchange with the USMC AV8B squadrons currently?

Would have been interesting to see the T-45 in UK service, but I do not recall it being looked at either.

[sandiego89]

With modern day training aids such as simulators and the ease with which the F-35C appears to land on the ship ( yes I know, early days ) it would not have been a problem

I very much doubt a UK pilot would have done his/her first carrier landing in a F-35C. Just because they did that in the 1970's, I am quite sure they would have wanted the new crews to have gone through initial carrier qualification curriculum first, most likely via the USN in the T-45. There is much to learn, and the training and keeping crews current was cited as one of the major factors in re-selecting the B.

Those folks that did the F-35C sea trials recently, and made it look "easy" were VERY expereinced naval pilots with hundreds of carrier landings in thier log books.

[Courtney Mil]

And with Delta Path to make it easier.

[Bob Viking]

SD89.
The FAA (USMC) Harrier pilots were sent away but many other FAA guys remain in Hornet jobs.
BV

[SpazSinbad]

Yes carrying out a first arresting DL in own op aircraft is great (my A4G experience in the early 1970s). I recall reading some stories online about Vixen? pilots doing their first DL after travelling half way across the planet to embark on some distant UKcrarrier. NOW that must have been something. I myself did only touch and goes hook up for the very first time ever aboard HMS Eagle in lateish 1971 as she was farwelling all near our Oz south-east coast. I thought the flight deck was incredibly rough (from what I never found out - did not stop) compared to the old smoothie MELBOURNE.

[SpazSinbad]

Good first person accounts from USN/USMC sprog pilots 'wot is it like'. Although the editing process (not me) is likely to have not matched their comments in order with what they say or we see. A bolter is not a wave off for example however the LCDR does explain a bolter later.

T-45C New (Nugget/Sprog) USN USMC Pilots CarQual

T-45C New (Nugget/Sprog) USN USMC Pilots CarQual - YouTube

[orca]

BV,

You are quite correct, but in the cold light of day (after USMC ruffled feathers were smoothed - perhaps when they remembered that they were themselves C customers as well) we ended up with both RAF and RN aircrew in Hornet, Super Hornet, T-45 (creamie equivalent) and AV-8B.

I think current count is siro 30 all told. (Lion's share RN, a handful light blue)

We also have guys on staffs, flight decks and met offices.

[ThinkTanker]

Many thanks to all for their contributions.

I was assuming that it would be something similar to the FN @ Meridian, but in the longer term it is interesting to see that the French may also have been up for something other than USN alone. The proposal we're looking at is replacing Trident with F-35C carrying B61-12, and reinvesting the savings in the conventional forces (after buying the weapons, an additional 5 Astutes, converting both carriers, buying 8 x P-8, 6 x E-2D and 4 x C-2, you still save £5-13bn versus Trident).

I'm pulling the paper together now, and it'll be published in the next 6 - 8 weeks, and will post a link when it's done.

Thanks again,

TTr

[GreenKnight121]

Make that 3 additional Astutes and 2 more T45s!

[ThinkTanker]

GK121,

Noted; the driver here is to keep the nuclear submarine industrial base intact to allow Astute replacement in the 2030s. Too frequently the backup argument for Trident is that Successor is required to maintain the industrial base - a case of £100bn tail wagging dog.

More T45s would of course be welcome. £1bn a copy?

TTr

[sandiego89]

replacing Trident with F-35C carrying B61-12

Interesting, look forward to the link to your article.

I would wonder if the B61 is viable for release from US stores, or are you thinking UK built under licence? I am aware of the unique realtionship between the USA and UK, and the previously "shared" programs and the physics pacakges on the Trident, but I wonder if the political climate would be there for such sharing, and for the return to air dropped weapons. SSBN's seem to be more palitable for the general public, perhaps being more out of sight and mind.

If your paper is addressing cost savings as a major factor, perhaps you should address RAF carriage of air dropped stores as well, unless you want this to be a UK Navy show only. RAF has more recent experience with such weapons. Tomahawk may be worth talking about as well (SSN launched).

Trident replacement (in both the UK and USA) does carry a huge price tag. Yes you get hidden deterance and survivability, but will be interesting to see how much SSBN's will play in future plans.

[ThinkTanker]

Thanks for your interest, Sandiego89

I would wonder if the B61 is viable for release from US stores, or are you thinking UK built under licence? I am aware of the unique relationship between the USA and UK, and the previously "shared" programs and the physics pacakges on the Trident, but I wonder if the political climate would be there for such sharing, and for the return to air dropped weapons.

The NPT rules out the transfer of weapons, so the warheads would be built at AWE. No obvious problem with the purchase of non-nuclear US components, but that would await an official request.

If your paper is addressing cost savings as a major factor, perhaps you should address RAF carriage of air dropped stores as well, unless you want this to be a UK Navy show only. RAF has more recent experience with such weapons.

Quite right, it would be an RAF/FAA show - all F-35 orders would become F-35Cs (nb, significant unit cost and through life savings, ignoring the superior performance of the C) and nuclear IOC would be RAF from Marham, before nuclear IOC from carriers after reconstruction to take EMALS and traps.

Tomahawk may be worth talking about as well (SSN launched).

We've looked at Tomahawk and it presents both a nuclear signalling problem (ie, if you're XYZ country of interest, how do you tell then difference in the warhead) and with the USN retiring Tomahawk-N (itself a Block I design, IIRC) there's no obvious synergies with the US. B61-12, however, will become the NATO DCA weapon, and the US standard free-fall weapon (some B61-11s will remain for the B-2 force).

Cheers,

TTr

[Heathrow Harry]

"replacing Trident with F-35C carrying B61-12" :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

Trident range = 12,000 km

F-35C combat radius = 1100 km

to hit Moscow we'd have to park our carrier in Helsinki harbour..................... and overfly the target as well.........

:p:p:p:p:p

[ThinkTanker]

HH,

Look forward to your comments when you've had a chance to read it. As the Trident Alternatives Review showed, the Moscow Criterion is no longer the essence of deterrence. We are quite clear about that - though you could hold St Petersburg, Samra, Kazan, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ekaterinburg and Volgograd at risk, which should be plenty to concentrate minds in the Kremlin.

Can you come up with a credible scenario where the UK is taking on the Russians alone, and where the US has explicitly stated that NATO Art V didn't apply (collapsing NATO in the process)?

TTr

[ThinkTanker]

Sandiego89, many thanks for your interest.

I seem to have lost my response to you in the ether somewhere - apologies. Take II:

I would wonder if the B61 is viable for release from US stores, or are you thinking UK built under licence? I am aware of the unique realtionship between the USA and UK, and the previously "shared" programs and the physics pacakges on the Trident, but I wonder if the political climate would be there for such sharing, and for the return to air dropped weapons.

Complete weapons cannot be transferred without breaking the NPT. However, design and non-nuclear components can be transferred, and the weapons would be built at AWE.

If your paper is addressing cost savings as a major factor, perhaps you should address RAF carriage of air dropped stores as well, unless you want this to be a UK Navy show only. RAF has more recent experience with such weapons.

Yes, it would be a role fit for all of the F-35Cs. IOC would first be from Marham (with reactivation of the WS3s in the HAS clutches), and then from the carriers after they had been reconstructed for CATOBAR operations.

Tomahawk may be worth talking about as well (SSN launched).

We've looked at Tomahawk, and it poses a couple of problems. First, there is a nuclear signalling problem - ie, in country X, Tomahawk and Tomahawk-N will look identical on radar. Second, the USN withdrew Tomahawk-N from the fleet in the early 1990s, and are now being withdrawn from use. It's a Block I/II missile, and there are issues about the warhead that do not arise with B61-12.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

ThinkTanker

We've looked at Tomahawk, and it poses a couple of problems. First, there is a nuclear signalling problem - ie, in country X, Tomahawk and Tomahawk-N will look identical on radar. Second, the USN withdrew Tomahawk-N from the fleet in the early 1990s, and are now being withdrawn from use. It's a Block I/II missile, and there are issues about the warhead that do not arise with B61-12.

Surely a nuclear armed F-35 looks the same on radar as a conventionally armed one. No?

Anyway - why do you think it sensible to replace a hardened platform (SSBN) dedicated to the deterrent role, with no ambiguity, with a long range delivery system that provides a very high probability of penetrating defences (SBLM), with gravity weapons dropped by a tactical aircraft?

The discussion here on the same topic may interest you and other readers.

The nuclear deterrent and reasons for its replacement (ARRSE) (http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/the-nuclear-deterrent-and-reasons-for-its-replacement.197102/)

[cobalt42]

Yes, it would be a role fit for all of the F-35Cs. IOC would first be from Marham (with reactivation of the WS3s in the HAS clutches), and then from the carriers after they had been reconstructed for CATOBAR operations.

Don't forget that the 'bomb shops' on the RFA's would also require 'significant' modification or a complete rebuild... not cheap.

[ThinkTanker]

Surely a nuclear armed F-35 looks the same on radar as a conventionally armed one. No?

Which is where declaratory policy comes in.

Anyway - why do you think it sensible to replace a hardened platform (SSBN) dedicated to the deterrent role, with no ambiguity, with a long range delivery system that provides a very high probability of penetrating defences (SBLM), with gravity weapons dropped by a tactical aircraft?

Simply, the cost of Successor is vast, and will consume 25-33% of the EP budget each year, every year, for 15 years. At a time when the procurement budget is under immense pressure moving away from single role platforms is good. The point about deterrence is whether it is sufficient to deter a nuclear aggressor - it's not the Moscow Criterion, as the TAR makes clear.

[ThinkTanker]

Not cheap, but not as expensive at Trident successor or through life costs. Would you care to hazard at guess at the cost of the RFA rework, cobalt42?

[cobalt42]

I'm not a Marine Architect... A former colleague in what was once ILS(N) was a Senior Stores Officer on on of them and he described the vaults as being in the same league as the BoE vaults.

Also, the 'Bomb Shops' on the carriers would need to be modified along the same lines...

Two carriers plus six RFA conversions? That's several hundreds of millions, as a guesstimate... for a very dubious tactical, not strategic, capability.

You mentioned the HAS vaults... what about the SSA? ...and the Forward Ops locations, e.g., Lossie...? And the 'Depot', not AWE? And the convoys? You can't send those things 'Next Day' by Yodel! Other distribution agents are available. The costs just keep going up... and up... and up..............

I look forward to having a look at the paper.

[ThinkTanker]

Thanks Cobalt42.

We've been told that the carrier conversion shouldn't be too complex, but won't be cheap (this is a BAES product, after all). How "not cheap" is not clear.

On the SSA, Marham first, and as JSF is now not going to Lossie, it would depend on where a second operating station was located. Marham's HASs actually could hold 100 weapons, and the SSA is said to be in good nick.

No-one is claiming that this will give Trident levels of capability - indeed, that is part of the point in providing a definite step down in line with our NPT obligations. The key driver, though, is to provide budgetary headroom for the conventional forces, which otherwise face a very grim outlook (especially the RN) out beyond 2030 to pay for Successor.

The question is does F-35C/B61-12 provide us with sufficient capability to take on states of concern - Iran, Pakistan (both sovereign UK bases and carrier), North Korea (carrier only) and potentially Saudi as well. We've modelled all of them, and run the rule over a target defended by SA-21/S-400 at brigade level, and like the old days with Chevaline through the Moscow ABM screen, we're confident that at least 1 and probably 2 50kt warheads gets to target under a reasonable worst case.

Thanks again,

TTr

[Archimedes]

TTr - under that model, how many weapons don't get to the target? And is it one weapon per aircraft?

[Not_a_boffin]

Are you or have you ever been a member of either UKIP or the Phoenix Think Tank? I ask because this looks exactly like a pop-quiz answer to the question "how are you going to pay for all the extra regiments, ships and aircraft that you're going to save / buy in your super-duper defence policy?" Not entirely convinced by the 25-33% of EP line for 15 years either. At current profile that would be £2.5-3Bn per year for a total of £37-45Bn, which is a tad over the programme costs I've seen.

Incidentally, the TAR does not make any statement about the "Moscow criteria" that I can find. It merely uses a methodology to compare alternatives, primarily because the cost of meeting the same capability for any other delivery system would skew the comparison from the off.

Your list of potential target states is all very well, but I can't quite see the UK taking any of them on alone. However the UK deterrent (as the TAR clearly says) is declared to NATO and adds to the uncertainty facing a potential foe. Given the life span of the system and the way intentions and capabilities can be seen (demonstrably) to change, that's a big gamble.

[ThinkTanker]

Archimedes,

TTr - under that model, how many weapons don't get to the target? And is it one weapon per aircraft?

78 or 79 of the 80 launched, with one or two weapons per aircraft, and assuming double targeting of each weapon by missiles with a Pk of 85%. No assumption is made on using an EMP to blind the radars- this is a conservative model, so all are assumed to airburst at 3900ft AGL to maximise the area of the 5psi pressure wave.

The RCS of the B61-12 is obviously not in the open source, so it is assumed that it is picked up by the GRAVESTONE at the time of launch. (This may well be wrong, but if it is, the benefit will likely be in favour of the attacker.)

N-a-B

Are you or have you ever been a member of either UKIP or the Phoenix Think Tank?

Ouch. Neither, Liberal Democrats and CentreForum (http://www.centreforum.org).

For a total of £37-45Bn, which is a tad over the programme costs I've seen

I should be clearer on the numbers. A fuller explanation is here (https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.centreforum.org%2Fassets%2Fpubs%2Fdropp ing-the-bomb.pdf&ei=vvB2VLG2FeW_ywPNuYH4CA&usg=AFQjCNGuyrGiZpGkHJqoTBvLqNmO00WJtw&sig2=3uCMDmQAc3_uVzeSumCAWA&bvm=bv.80642063,d.ZWU): We're deriving the capital costs from the £15-20bn (2005 prices) plus optimism bias based on the overruns of the first batch of Astute (+30.4%) for a range of £24.8 – 33.1 in 2014 prices.


HTH, happy to discuss.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Which is where declaratory policy comes in.

A what? Please explain?

[ThinkTanker]

WEBF,

A what? Please explain?

Telling people in advance how and when you'd use the nuclear force. Here's a RUSI paper on it: https://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehallreports/ref:O4BFD56421A39C/

Cheers,

TTr

[LowObservable]

Interesting. Have you run an alternative of Shornet/Growler + Storm Shadow-N?

Or ASMP-A, even?

[ThinkTanker]

LO,

Interesting. Have you run an alternative of Shornet/Growler + Storm Shadow-N?

Or ASMP-A, even?

Interesting question. In short, no, we haven't.

Tbh, the reason was cost, though data was also an issue with the Storm Shadow-N (e.g., the TAR tells us that a new cruise warhead would take 24 years, allegedly (TAR para 18 p. 6) but it isn't clear if this is SS-ER-N, a new weapon or something else.)

We wanted to leverage existing investments (F-35, B61-12) wherever possible to maximise the savings (ie, SHornet/Growler as well as JSF/Dave would be much more expensive). By using the existing investments, we also wanted to enhance the conventional force in the process (i.e., CATOBAR CVF, E-2D, C-2, 5 x Astute, 8 x MPA (P-8 costed) could be argued to be required for carrier nuclear strike, but would transform CVF conventional power projection).

Cheers,

TTr

[LowObservable]

Gotcha. In that instance F-35C is nuke-wired for B61-12, whereas I don't think Shornet is wired for anything.

[ThinkTanker]

Indeed, LO.

But at the moment neither Dave-A or Dave-C is wired for the nuclear mission either but the NATO DCA mission means that Dave-A will have to be. We've budgeted the full amount estimated for Dave-A conversion ($350m) for Dave-C avionics conversion to support B61-12 in case it doesn't happen, though this will probably be shared with NATO.

It would also provide a freebie to the USN if they wanted a B61-12 option on their Dave-Cs.

Cheers,

TTr

[Archimedes]

TTr, thanks for your reply; I should also have asked: how many aircraft are lost under the model?

[ThinkTanker]

Archimedes wrote:

TTr, thanks for your reply; I should also have asked: how many aircraft are lost under the model?

All have a viable route out, but I'm expecting a 25% loss rate. In policy terms as a one-off mission against an existential threat (and remember, this is against the most capable IADS without making assumptions about effect EW or defence suppression) UK declaratory policy would accept a 50% loss rate. How many V-Force crews actually expected to come back? Sobering stuff.

TTr

[Not_a_boffin]

As the Trident Alternatives Review showed, the Moscow Criterion is no longer the essence of deterrence. We are quite clear about that - though you could hold St Petersburg, Samra, Kazan, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ekaterinburg and Volgograd at risk, which should be plenty to concentrate minds in the Kremlin.


I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing - as mentioned previously it did not compare actual capability, because the answer would have been a foregone conclusion. That is not the same as dropping the Moscow criterion. At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf. Declaratory policy nonsense or not you don't think a potential nuclear launch platform would go unmolested do you? That's why carriers are not part of a strategic delivery capability.

Would it be fair to say that despite having been given the TAR as price of coalition, you guys really didn't like the answer and so have decided to change the question?

[Jimlad1]

Have you remotely considered the C2 arrangements for this construct?

Similarly, the moment nuclear weapons go on ships, you impinge on their ability to go to certain places and do certain things?

Then you need to consider the profile of how you generate squadrons at readiness for this role - the nuclear delivery mission is remarkably complex, and needs a lot of practise to get right. You are realistically talking about taking multiple squadrons off their normal roles and away from relevant tasking into doing this role instead? How will you pay for the uplift to the airframe and pilot numbers required?

What about the issue of planning for the strike mission - its not a case of jump in a plane and fly and drop the bomb. Its a mission which needs a lot of specialist assets in the ISR world to make happen, and near total dedication for many years to do from scratch. By contrast the work required for Trident to do this has been done. We'd have to foot the bill ourselves - are you paying for the uplift in ISR assets, or are you taking extant ones off task

Ultimately delivery of nuclear ordnance is a complex issue which isnt just about the means of delivery, but about being able to do so in a manner which gurantees delivery on the right target at the right time. This is remarkably expensive and can't be done quickly - we've spent nearly 20 years doing it via Trident and the cost of regenerating all the assets from scratch while still meeting existing outputs is going to be far more expensive than like for like replacement.

[ThinkTanker]

N-a-B

I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing

We can agree to disagree on this one.

Would it be fair to say that despite having been given the TAR as price of coalition, you guys really didn't like the answer and so have decided to change the question?

On a party level, no - Nick Harvey et al have piloted a 2/3 optionally armed SSBN policy through. CentreForum is independent of the party and is taking another look (not that this is popular in some circles.) The TAR as published doesn't actually price up a free-fall option, presumably because it would be cheaper than the Trident-based options.

Look forward to your detailed thoughts idc - PM me if you'd like a draft.

Cheers,

TTr

[Heathrow Harry]

as boffin said

"At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf"

are you seriously proposing sending a single carrier, declared as carrying N weapons, to those places in a time of internal tension with Russia?

They'd hit it with everything they had the moment in got close and no-one else would blame them.....................

[Not_a_boffin]

N-a-B

Quote:
I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing

We can agree to disagree on this one.


Er. No I don't think we can. Reproduce the exact part of the TAR that supports your statement. It's crucial to the whole argument. Paragraphs 1.6

The level of damage that the UK needs to be capable of inflicting is not absolute; it will vary depending on how critical a target the UK is perceived to be: if attacking the UK is essential to achieving an adversary‟s goal, deterring is likely to require a system capable of delivering greater damage than if the UK was a discretionary target. It does not depend on the scale of military capability that a potential aggressor possesses. For that reason, the study did not set a level of damage that a system must be able to cause in order to be "credible‟. Rather, the analysis aimed to show what level of capability could be delivered by different systems that are likely to be affordable.

and 1.9

The factors described above were distilled into a set of baseline assumptions, performance requirements and constraints. The key overarching requirement, which did not aim to replicate existing policy, was:
“A minimum nuclear deterrent capability that, during a crisis, is able to deliver at short notice a nuclear strike against a range of targets at an appropriate scale and with very high confidence.”
The study deliberately did not define “minimum”, “short notice”, “scale” or “very high confidence” as that could have overly-constrained the list of system options for analysis.

do not support your assertion.

It is probable that as noted in paras 3.7, 3.8, the short-range issue means the free-fall bomb fails the credibility criteria - and also compounds the vulnerability of the system referred to at 3.20.

Blithely assuming that it was not considered further "presumably because it would be cheaper than the Trident-based options" contradicts 1.6 above and is inconsistent with some of the cruise based options that did get comparisons, never mind being the option you want to believe.

If I were suspicious, I'd almost think you're hoping to offer an option that puts the LD on the same page as the SNP in Scotland, which would make coalition there easier and avoid wipeout. The likelihood of any LD ringfencing any Trident funding saved and putting it towards defence also fails any credibility criteria...

[Jimlad1]

TT - I would strongly advise that the free-fall option is NOT cheaper than the current SSBN option. As I noted above, it would mean regeneration of a lot of capabilities and skills we've not done for decades, and would lead to either capability whithering in other areas to sustain the deterrent, or it would need to enlargement of the forces at substantial cost.

In terms of numbers, there are some good websites out there on the history of the WE177, and its got some ballpark figures on how many went to sea. Suffice to say your proposed deterrent figures are higher than we ever managed in the 50s and 60s and would represent a significant increase over what we've managed to do in the past. This in itself represents a cost and challenge.

I would say that this option seems initially sensible, but rapidly falls apart when you add in the myriad of issues which come when you start to look at nuclear issues.

[ThinkTanker]

Jimlad1

I would strongly advise that the free-fall option is NOT cheaper than the current SSBN option. As I noted above, it would mean regeneration of a lot of capabilities and skills we've not done for decades, and would lead to either capability whithering in other areas to sustain the deterrent, or it would need to enlargement of the forces at substantial cost.

Interesting, many thanks. The paper as it stands sees a predominately land-based force, with the carriers to provide flexible basing. When was the last time free-fall operated off the carriers? We were told it was Harrier FRS1s through to the end of the Cold War.

HH,


"At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf"

are you seriously proposing sending a single carrier, declared as carrying N weapons, to those places in a time of internal tension with Russia?

As above, it is envisaged as a largely land based force, with the carriers providing flexibility. Most of the targets are modeled from Akrotiri, actually.

Speaking personally, I cannot foresee any realistic scenario under which the UK and Russia would engage in a nuclear standoff with no-one else involved, nor, with Russian conventional forces no longer in the GDR, can I see a situation developing in anything other than decades-long timescales where the UK would face the risk of nuclear decoupling from the US. I accept that this was a possibility in the Cold War, and would have backed Trident on that basis. Can you see the difference?

N-a-B,

I've not got my TAR & notes in front of me. If I may, I'll get back to you.

Kind regards to all,

TTr

[Jimlad1]

TT - in terms of using Akrotiri, I would see this as a strategically very vulnerable move. If the Russians saw us using the base, chances are they'd apply enormous diplomatic pressure on the Cypriots to shut the SBAs - while this may be sovereign soil, can you imagine the diplomatic fall out if it emerged the UK planned to deploy the bulk of its nuclear capability in a foreign nation? Secondly, the site is very vulnerable to a strike - an early shot and you've lost your deterrent, end of. There are no dispersal airfields at all. Thats without considering how you move the devices around, get them to site, and move them back again for maintenance.

In practical terms, the V Force relied on around 60 airfields all in to disperse to in crisis to deliver approximately 60 warheads to the target (I could be wrong, but I am sure to be corrected!), and this was at a time when the UK was flush with airbases. Each of these needed a reasonable level of support and maintenance and a lot of manpower to keep it going.

To run a deterrent properly you'd need to reopen a lot of these airfields to maximise the dispersal value - stand by for incoming NIMBYISM as people realise their quiet country location is now a prime nuclear target again. Then try to find the airfields to use - we currently have a total of three airfields running fast jet operations, all of which are certainly targets in any reasonable sized exchange. You'll also need to consider tanker aircraft, as the extant fleet is busy doing other things - last time I looked the FSTA contract was coming in at about £10.5 Billion for 13 aircraft for 30 years all in.

You'll need a similar sized fleet and capability again just to support V Force 2, so where is the £10.5 billion coming from for new tankers?

The next issue is people - the RN is bleeding itself dry maintaining the right level of manpower for an smallish detterent to ensure there are no stores or personnel shortages on the duty bomber. To ensure 100% availability of a required number of aircraft to be credible, you'd need to completely revamp the entire supply chain, move a lot of manpower around and be prepared to increase manpower considerably to ensure you had the right people in the right place. Note this isnt just pilots, but ground crew, maintenance technicians, armourers etc - then you need to retain them for long enough, and keep the RAF doing its normal roles too.

Bottom line is that if you want to create a 21st Century V Force, be prepared to pay an obscene amount of money more than if you just wanted to replace Trident like for like.

[Thelma Viaduct]

I don't know why we bother with nuclear, if it goes tits we're fu@&£d either way, probably improve the country and our future prospects if London was flattened (assuming it was a weekday and parliament wasn't in recess).

Best just spending the budget on conventional weapons, so we can continue to invade oil rich states for BS reasons and pretend we're a big player with half a dozen JSFs on a floating tin pot, I mean can.

[Biggus]

I'll admit that I haven't read all 48 posts on this thread - so has anyone pointed out yet that the word "carrier" is spelled incorrectly in the title?

Pedantic and irrelevant? Perhaps, but it is no more irrelevant than all the comments made about replacing SSBNs with F-35s on a thread which was intended by the OP as a way to discuss how the UK will train its F-35 pilots to land on a carrier!!

[Archimedes]

Biggus - I'm guessing you didn't get to post #15?

In which the OP explains that his opening question is set in the context of a research/policy paper which contemplates replacing the SSBN with nuclear weapons delivered by F-35Cs sometimes based upon the QE-class...

Although hesitant to speak for him, I suspect that the OP hasn't seen the thread drift as being irrelevant.

[Biggus]

Archimedes,

Thanks for pointing that out, my error! :(







(you see, pprune can be civilized!)

[ThinkTanker]

Many thanks to all, and apologies for not reverting sooner - a combination of things, exacerbated by password reset incompetence on my part.

The thread drift has been very helpful, and has helped shape our thinking.

TTr

[PeterGee]

All crazy talk. Despite believing in the value of the deterant, if we were to determine that we cannot afford it, this "proposal" does not seem a deterant at all. As I understand it, ICBM was implemented because of the low probability of an aircraft based system getting through. Why do we think that has changed. SLBM was introduced to reduce the chance of first strike removing you strike capability. What changed!

This proposal removes our deterant in the context of first rate nuclear powers. If we think our main purpose of a deterant now is avoid the new nuclear powers threatening us by somehow delivering a bomb, great, but is that really the threat?

We need to decide if we can afford the deterant properly, or not all all. If we choose to remove this capability, and rely on the U.S. like most of Europe, then so be it, but think the savings are more likely to be used to reduce the debt! Personally, I think that if we want a deterant and want to reduce costs, we need to try and do a deal with France!

Doubt I would ever be a liberal voter but this type of nonsense ensures it stays that way.