VOYAGER AIRPROX

[BEagle]

Widely reported in the local media, but this report makes interesting reading:

http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/docs/423/2014078%20-%20v2.pdf

My gut feeling is that unfair comments have been levelled at the ATCO on this occasion.....

You'll have to open the link to know more as it would seem that excerpts may not be posted....:mad:

[KenV]

For whatever its worth, I agree with the majority decision, no risk of collision.

[ShotOne]

Perhaps, but they got much closer than they should have. Try timing 18 seconds. It's a very very long time between an instruction to turn and it's commencement. I agree with beagle inasmuch as had the ATC turn instruction been complied with, the Voyager would have remained inside the control zone and passed well clear. But the ATCO took no action when his instruction was not complied with which surely warrants criticism. It would be interesting to see the full transcript. Was the 340hdg instruction acknowledged?

[wiggy]

So as I read it this never got beyond a "TA"..is that correct?

[iRaven]

Would this have anything to do with the expected RAF Brize Airsoace Change Proposal or the Oxford/Kidlington RMZ (https://sites.google.com/site/oxfordairportrmz/)?

It would appear as a bit of "Safety Case Building" to me.

iRaven

[Aynayda Pizaqvick]

"The pilot... reported being in receipt of a Traffic Service.... The aircraft was level in the BZN CTR at 2300ft.." Ah, isn't that an impossible combination inside controlled airspace, the clue being in the name, ATC Service OUTSIDE Controlled Airspace?!

[whowhenwhy]

There are many issues here.

2 Gp crews tending to report every TCAS event (RA and TA) as an airprox, with a little ACP evidence building on the side.

The Voyager crew's understanding of the UK FIS and, thus possibly, the classification of airspace in which they were flying at the time.

The slow compliance by aircrews to instructions by ATCOs to turn and descend has been a contributory factor in a number of miltary airprox in recent years - formation turns and descents in IMC I understand but not single aircraft; however large.

At 1658L during the week there should have been an ATC Supervisor maintaining oversight, rather than distracting an ATCO from their primary duty. Especially when you consider that there were 4 radar positions open alongside the visual control room, with unit workload described as high to medium; too many times in recent years this has been a factor in military airprox. There is also something left unsaid here; the Director was setting up the PAR and thus, at a rough guess, was going to conduct the PAR having just directed the aircraft. Who then was going to fulfill the Director's roles and responsibilities iaw MAA RA towards the IFR traffic on PAR whilst they were conducting the GCA?

This distraction then led to them not monitoring the aircraft and not providing TI. The ATCOs prime role is to prevent collisions between aircraft and they can't do this if they're not watching what's going on. The way's in which an ATCO may prevent collisions is by issuing collision avoidance advice and/or by providing traffic information in order for the crew to determine a suitable course of action. In this situation they were unable to do either.

Root cause analysis would look at why that ATCO was placed in that position at that time of day, with that traffic loading, without a dedicated supervisor.

As for the UKAB's finding of cause, it is, as usual, utter guff. It is not a cause of the airprox (ie how the incident occurred) but a statement about what happened. The sooner the UKAB get their act together, as they have been told for a number if years now) the better.

[xray one]

For the movements at Brize they already have too much square footage of airspace, these and similar events will probably be used to try to grab more. Add the fact that Kidlington and Farnborough are trying for Class D - GA traffic in the uk is slowly being strangled by the constant push for more controlled airspace. Cases in point at Robin Hood International with their <10 movements a day and Norwich which is even less.

This airprox appears to be a non event.

[GalleyTeapot]

Class D doesn't stop GA flying in it.
As for the UKAB it's well worth going as an observer, it an eye opener. It's a shame you cannot say anything as an observer there.

[ShotOne]

"non-event..?" OK, nothing got bent or burnt but the same chain of events anywhere moderately busy would take some sorting out. The aircraft ended up outside controlled airspace which certainly wasn't the controllers intention.

[fabs]

I can say something as an observer, and it is a disgrace. They are very explicit in saying it is not their job to apportion blame but this belies what is said. Also a cursory check of some random reports will reveal (in most) thinly veiled attacks on the professionalism (lack of) of pilots and controllers alike.

[xray one]

GT

Class D doesn't stop GA flying in it.

Gliders can be refused permission to enter Class D.

[GalleyTeapot]

Who cares about gliders, I meant proper GA.

[ACW418]

Not a healthy attitude. You would have your day spoiled if you ran into one!

ACW

[squawking 7700]

At least it won't be one from a VGS.......

[chevvron]

So a departure from Fairford is an unusual occurence which distracted at least 3 of the controllers on duty?

[ShyTorque]

I'm surprised to read that some military pilots are reporting every TA. In the big bad world outside CAS, it's not unusual to have to deal with them, usually without the assistance of ATC. The attitude of the SK76 driver in his report reflects that.

[MAD Boom]

The slow compliance by aircrews to instructions by ATCOs to turn and descend has been a contributory factor in a number of miltary airprox in recent years - formation turns and descents in IMC I understand but not single aircraft; however large.

I see no mention of the Voyager pilot being slow to comply. Indeed the minimal information included in the report shows a 20s delay from the instruction to turn to a turn being initiated, however as Shotone has highlighted - was the instruction to turn acknowledged? Without a full transcript we, as observers, will never know. It appears to me that the turn was initiated by the pilot to avoid potential collision, not in response to ATC instruction, hence the Airprox report, however that is just my opinion based upon the information in the report - I may be completely wrong.

And that is my main point - how about we stop the armchair analysis, sat comfortably behind our anonymous profiles, and refrain from criticising the actions of those involved. We weren't there, we don't have the whole picture and so we don't know.

[Just This Once...]

2 Gp crews tending to report every TCAS event (RA and TA) as an airprox, with a little ACP evidence building on the side.


2Gp crews are mandated to report all RAs, regardless of the cause - this is an MAA policy so applies to all MAA regulated aircraft.

As for the our civilian counterparts under the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme:

Part 1: List of Aircraft Operations, Maintenance, Repair and Manufacture - Related Occurrences to be Reported

a) Avoidance manoeuvres:
• risk of collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object or an unsafe situation when avoidance action would have been appropriate;
• an avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object;
• an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid other unsafe situations.

k) Breakdown in communication between flight crew "CRM" (crew resource management) or between flight crew and other parties (cabin crew, ATC [air traffic control] engineering).

aa) ACAS RA (Air Collision Avoidance System, Resolution Advisory). Note: TCAS (Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System) is a form of ACAS. All ACAS RAs should be reported, regardless of the cause.

[ShyTorque]

There was no RA, though, was there? Only a TA, according to the report.

BTW, the TCAS 1, as fitted to the SK76, doesn't have the ability to give RA so there was no requirement for that crew to make a report, although they would no doubt have filed an AIRPROX based on other factors if they had felt the need.

To be perfectly blunt though, having had what I considered at the time very good cause to file a few AIRPROX reports, they don't actually seem to achieve much (apart from giving the board something to discuss over lunch of course).

[xray one]

GA

Who cares about gliders, I meant proper GA.

What a pathetic response.

[GalleyTeapot]

What a pathetic response.

What an equally pathetic response. :D

[whowhenwhy]

Yes crews are required to submit a DASOR following a TCAS RA event, unless they have a reasonable expectation that ATC will submit the report (not many know about that caveat). The issue is that many aircrew submit an airprox report because they have had a TCAS RA - there is not necessarily a requirement to report an airprox because you have had a RA. RA events occur even when lateral and vertical separation is being controlled by ATC because of the way that the system is designed. An RA does not equal an airprox unless you believed that the safety of your aircraft was or may have been compromised.

The ATCO turned the aircraft onto a base leg to ensure that it remained inside the CTR and the crew were slow to respond to that request; hence the aircraft began to approach the very edge of the CTR. That said, given the relative geometry between the 2 aircraft, even if the crew had initiated the turn in a relatively quick time after the instruction was passed, it is likely that a TA would have still been initiated.

And Fabs, you're absolutely correct. The UKAB have for some time deliberately phrased reports to focus on particular aspects of an incident to paint an ATCO or pilot in a dim light. Up until recently, their favourite target was military ATC. I've observed a UKAB meeting where 75% of the discussion centered on the incorrect action of the flight crews involved and 25% on the ATCO and yet, in the subsequent analysis, around 90% of the text focussed on the UKAB.

As far as the size of the BZN CTR is concerned, the fact is that it isn't the correct size for the size of aircraft and their IFR procedural requirements, specifically vertically and requires amendment. The introduction of controlled airspace is not necessarily a bad thing and doesn't need to men restricted access to GA activity, it just needs to be the right type of airspace for the task. Should MATZ continue to be Class G with no meaning to civilian flights, given the type and volume of movements that occurs within them? Look at it on a case-by-case basis - discuss. That said, there should be a mechanism to review existing controlled airspace structures to ensure that they continue to be valid for the type and level of activity at that aerodrome - that doesn't appear to be the case at the moment.