Centaurus
14th Oct 2014, 12:04
The following incident was published in Aviation Safety Digest Issue 46 of June 1966. The editor was Mac Job. The middle aged and elderly among us will immediately recognise his easy to read writing style. Note that in the editor comments, he doesn't shy away from making constructive criticism of the pilot's actions. The circumstances surrounding the C180 accident are as valid now as then. With time on my hands in retirement I thought I would occasionally select a relevant article from the pile of old Aviation Safety Digests in my library and place it on this forum. :ok:
Engine Fails during take-off
Immediately after taking off from Wynyard aerodrome, Tasmania, the engine of a Cessna 180 lost power to the extent that flight could not be sustained. The aircraft was force-landed straight ahead in light scrub and was substantially damaged, but the crew of two escaped uninjured.
The aircraft had completed three weeks of aerial photography operations at Strahan on the west coast of Tasmania and was returning to its base at Moorabbin, Victoria, via Wynyard and Flinders Island.
The 70 mile flight from Strahan to Wynyard was uneventful and the aircraft was refuelled. After flight planning for his next leg to Flinders Island, the pilot taxied out, carried out a satisfactory run-up and commenced to take-off. The aircraft accelerated normally at first, but at full throttle the engine surged and the pilot abandoned the take-off. Several other run-up checks at full throttle produced the same response and the pilot taxied back to the apron.
The fuel tanks and fuel filter drain points were checked for signs of water and other contamination but none was evident. The pilot then telephoned an aircraft engineer at another aerodrome for advice before taxi-ing out on to the runway and conducting further engine operating checks. The engine would run normally to 2450 r.p.m, but surging occurred when power was increased beyond this figure. During the last of these tests, the pilot actually lifted the aircraft off the runway briefly, then returned to the apron. After consulting the aircraft engineer by telephone once again, the pilot decided that, as there was a 10-15 knot wind from the south-west, he should be able to fly the aircraft off at reduced power settings using Wynyard’s 4,400 runway 26, and continue to Launceston to have the defect rectified.
After submitting a flight plan, the pilot and his navigator boarded the aircraft again, taxied out, and after a further run-up, began take-off on runway 26 at reduced power using 10 degrees of flap.
The engine ran smoothly at first and the aircraft became airborne, but at about 50 feet the engine began to lose power. Already too far down the runway to land again, the pilot levelled out to increase speed then, realising he had insufficient power to maintain height, closed the throttle and made a forced landing into wind in the scrub-covered area beyond the end of the strip. The undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest among ti-tree bushes 1,700 feet from the end of the runway.
When the damaged aircraft was taken back to the aerodrome for inspection, it was found that the metal gauze filter element in the carburettor filter bowl was completely blanketed by a matted mass of fine cotton fibres, dirt and rubber particles. Further investigation revealed that, during the period the aircraft had been operating from Strahan, it had been refuelled from drums using an old marine bilge pump which had been borrowed locally. The pilot had dismantled and cleaned the pump before using it and had subsequently refuelled the aircraft with it on about seven occasions. He had seen no sign of contamination in the fuel checks he had made after each of these refuelling operations.
The pilot said he had strained the fuel using a chamois leather he had been using to clean the windows. It was clear, however, that the primitive method of filtering he had employed was ineffective.
Comment: This accident provides yet another object lesson on the absolute importance of adhering to established refuelling practices. The aircraft refuelling procedures laid down by the Department and by some oil companies have not been arbitrarily devised. They have been evolved in the hard school of experience. To disregard them, therefore, is to ignore facts made manifest in many accidents arising from faulty refuelling practices. This pilot thought he was taking all reasonable precautions by cleaning the pump, to begin with, and then by carefully carrying out fuel draining checks after each refuelling operation. But it is obvious that there were two weaknesses in his refuelling procedure – the old marine bilge pump itself, the rubber components of which deteriorated under the effect of aircraft fuel, and the inadequate method of filtering the fuel. The accident would not have happened if the pilot had employed an effective filtering system and a pump designed for handling petroleum products.
Apart from the fuel contamination aspect, the pilot showed very poor judgement in attempting a flight in an aircraft which had developed a major defect. By so doing, in fact, he contravened ANR 34 (1) (d), in that he flew an aircraft while its Certificate of Airworthiness was deemed to be suspended. Also, if the engineer to whom the pilot had spoken on the telephone had given the impression that a flight should be attempted at reduced power, the advice given was, to say the least, very ill-considered.
Engine Fails during take-off
Immediately after taking off from Wynyard aerodrome, Tasmania, the engine of a Cessna 180 lost power to the extent that flight could not be sustained. The aircraft was force-landed straight ahead in light scrub and was substantially damaged, but the crew of two escaped uninjured.
The aircraft had completed three weeks of aerial photography operations at Strahan on the west coast of Tasmania and was returning to its base at Moorabbin, Victoria, via Wynyard and Flinders Island.
The 70 mile flight from Strahan to Wynyard was uneventful and the aircraft was refuelled. After flight planning for his next leg to Flinders Island, the pilot taxied out, carried out a satisfactory run-up and commenced to take-off. The aircraft accelerated normally at first, but at full throttle the engine surged and the pilot abandoned the take-off. Several other run-up checks at full throttle produced the same response and the pilot taxied back to the apron.
The fuel tanks and fuel filter drain points were checked for signs of water and other contamination but none was evident. The pilot then telephoned an aircraft engineer at another aerodrome for advice before taxi-ing out on to the runway and conducting further engine operating checks. The engine would run normally to 2450 r.p.m, but surging occurred when power was increased beyond this figure. During the last of these tests, the pilot actually lifted the aircraft off the runway briefly, then returned to the apron. After consulting the aircraft engineer by telephone once again, the pilot decided that, as there was a 10-15 knot wind from the south-west, he should be able to fly the aircraft off at reduced power settings using Wynyard’s 4,400 runway 26, and continue to Launceston to have the defect rectified.
After submitting a flight plan, the pilot and his navigator boarded the aircraft again, taxied out, and after a further run-up, began take-off on runway 26 at reduced power using 10 degrees of flap.
The engine ran smoothly at first and the aircraft became airborne, but at about 50 feet the engine began to lose power. Already too far down the runway to land again, the pilot levelled out to increase speed then, realising he had insufficient power to maintain height, closed the throttle and made a forced landing into wind in the scrub-covered area beyond the end of the strip. The undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest among ti-tree bushes 1,700 feet from the end of the runway.
When the damaged aircraft was taken back to the aerodrome for inspection, it was found that the metal gauze filter element in the carburettor filter bowl was completely blanketed by a matted mass of fine cotton fibres, dirt and rubber particles. Further investigation revealed that, during the period the aircraft had been operating from Strahan, it had been refuelled from drums using an old marine bilge pump which had been borrowed locally. The pilot had dismantled and cleaned the pump before using it and had subsequently refuelled the aircraft with it on about seven occasions. He had seen no sign of contamination in the fuel checks he had made after each of these refuelling operations.
The pilot said he had strained the fuel using a chamois leather he had been using to clean the windows. It was clear, however, that the primitive method of filtering he had employed was ineffective.
Comment: This accident provides yet another object lesson on the absolute importance of adhering to established refuelling practices. The aircraft refuelling procedures laid down by the Department and by some oil companies have not been arbitrarily devised. They have been evolved in the hard school of experience. To disregard them, therefore, is to ignore facts made manifest in many accidents arising from faulty refuelling practices. This pilot thought he was taking all reasonable precautions by cleaning the pump, to begin with, and then by carefully carrying out fuel draining checks after each refuelling operation. But it is obvious that there were two weaknesses in his refuelling procedure – the old marine bilge pump itself, the rubber components of which deteriorated under the effect of aircraft fuel, and the inadequate method of filtering the fuel. The accident would not have happened if the pilot had employed an effective filtering system and a pump designed for handling petroleum products.
Apart from the fuel contamination aspect, the pilot showed very poor judgement in attempting a flight in an aircraft which had developed a major defect. By so doing, in fact, he contravened ANR 34 (1) (d), in that he flew an aircraft while its Certificate of Airworthiness was deemed to be suspended. Also, if the engineer to whom the pilot had spoken on the telephone had given the impression that a flight should be attempted at reduced power, the advice given was, to say the least, very ill-considered.