AAIB Report A109E accident at Vauxhall, and Inquest Verdict

[Sir George Cayley]

Vauxhall helicopter crash 'could have been prevented' - London - News - London Evening Standard (http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/vauxhall-helicopter-crash-could-have-been-prevented-9717972.html)

SGC

[Flying Lawyer]

I understand that the AAIB Report will be published tomorrow.

It's been leaked to the press and, as a result, there are news items in today's Telegraph and Daily Mail.

Helicopter safety warnings ignored before London crash - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/11080462/Helicopter-safety-warnings-ignored-before-London-crash.html)

Development hit by helicopter was so big pilots COULDN'T fly through London without getting dangerously close to it | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2747680/Development-hit-helicopter-big-pilots-COULDN-T-fly-London-without-getting-dangerously-close-it.html)


I doubt if the Report will contain any surprises concerning causation but it will be interesting to see what safety recommendations are made - and to read what the professional helicopter pilots here think of them. Too far, just right or not far enough?
There's potential for a good informed discussion. I only hope it won't be spoilt (again) by people who've never held a helicopter licence, either professional or private, but that's probably a triumph of hope over experience.


FL

[Senior Pilot]

Since these newspaper reports tend to change and/or disappear, this is the Telegraph article:

Warnings of a threat to the safety of helicopters flying above central London were ignored ahead of a crash last year in which two people died, according to a new report.

Pilot Pete Barnes, 50 was killed along with Matthew Wood, a pedestrian, when an Agusta 109 helicopter crashed into a crane at St George’s Wharf, Vauxhall, amid heavy fog in January 2013.

But an official report into the disaster, to be published this week, reveals that concerns were raised with the Civil Aviation Authority in 2009 about how the development would affect flight paths.

The operator of London Heliport warned the CAA that pilots travelling along the south bank at low altitude due to cloudy conditions would be forced to breach rules which ban them coming within 500ft of any buildings.

According to a copy of the Air Accident Investigation Branch report, leaked to The Telegraph, the message “does not appear to have led to further discussion or action”.

Following the accident NATS, the air traffic controller, ruled that helicopters should no longer be instructed to fly on the south bank at low altitude to avoid coming too close to buildings.

“Any pilot routing along the south bank of the river and passing within 500ft vertically of the top of the crane, or the building once the crane is removed, would be in breach” of the rules, the AAIB said in its report.

It noted that pilots and not air traffic controllers are responsible for obstacle clearance, but added: “Controllers should not issue clearances which imply permission to breach regulations.

According to a copy of the Air Accident Investigation Branch report, leaked to The Telegraph, the message “does not appear to have led to further discussion or action”.

Following the accident NATS, the air traffic controller, ruled that helicopters should no longer be instructed to fly on the south bank at low altitude to avoid coming too close to buildings.

“Any pilot routing along the south bank of the river and passing within 500ft vertically of the top of the crane, or the building once the crane is removed, would be in breach” of the rules, the AAIB said in its report.

It noted that pilots and not air traffic controllers are responsible for obstacle clearance, but added: “Controllers should not issue clearances which imply permission to breach regulations.

Despite being urged by his client twice not to fly due to poor visibility, Cpt Barnes told him by text message: “I’m coming anyway will land in a field if I have to.”

Unable to land at Elstree, he turned back for Redhill but received another message from Mr Caring telling him London Heliport in Battersea was open, and requested permission to land.

Travelling at low altitude on an established flight path along the River Thames, and unable to remain clear of cloud, Capt Barnes made a right turn towards The Tower at St George’s Wharf, one of Europe’s tallest skyscrapers.

The report claimed it was most likely obscured by the weather, and the pilot could have been distracted by changing radio frequencies as he approached the site.

The helicopter struck the crane’s jib, detaching its rotor blades, after flying within 105ft of the skyscraper. Capt Barnes died as it crashed 700ft to the ground, also killing Mr Wood, 30, and injuring a dozen more people.

The report added that the skyscraper was not listed as an obstacle in the helicopter’s navigation system, and that Capt Barnes had not logged onto an online database containing updated flight information for pilots for the past three years.

It also noted that there is no effective system for ensuring all potential obstacles for pilots are registered, and the crane had only been added to databases "by coincidence" after being spotted by an off-duty member of staff at the Defence Geographic Centre.

The AAIB made a number of recommendations to improve the assessment of obstacles before planning permission is granted, and the reporting of potential hazards to pilots.

Spokesmen for the Civil Aviation Authority and the Department for Transport declined to comment before the publication of the report on Tuesday.

[Boudreaux Bob]

FL,

" Oh Yea of little faith!". Jimmy Durante had the same problem!



What we shall read of course is the Government, CAA, NATS, basically all the "Crats" hold no "Responsibility" no matter their involvement, malfeasance, or misfeasance.

It noted that pilots and not air traffic controllers are responsible for obstacle clearance,

[Flying Lawyer]

AAIB Summary:
At 0820 hrs on 16 January 2013 the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) was notified that a helicopter flying over central London had collided with a crane and crashed into the street near Vauxhall Bridge. A team of AAIB inspectors and support staff arrived on the scene at 1130 hrs.

The helicopter was flying to the east of London Heliport when it struck the jib of a crane, attached to a building development at St George Wharf, at a height of approximately 700 ft amsl in conditions of reduced meteorological visibility. The pilot, who was the sole occupant of the helicopter, and a pedestrian were fatally injured when the helicopter impacted a building and adjacent roadway.

The investigation identified the following causal factors:

1. The pilot turned onto a collision course with the crane attached to the building and was probably unaware of the helicopter’s proximity to the building at the beginning of the turn.
2. The pilot did not see the crane or saw it too late to take effective avoiding action.

The investigation identified the following contributory factor:

1. The pilot continued with his intention to land at the London Heliport despite being unable to remain clear of cloud.

Ten Safety Recommendations have been made.


Report No: 3/2014 (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/3-2014%20G-CRST.pdf)

Index with links to individual sections (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2014_g_crst/3_2014_g_crst_report_sections.cfm)

[AlanM]

No real answers or surprises really - just lots of 'if only' thoughts at various stages of the report.

God bless.

[puntosaurus]

http://www.pprune.org/8277778-post7.html
The AAIB will be investigating not only the ultimate cause of the crash but other factors which may have contributed. It was a commercial flight so I suspect those investigations will include looking at (for example) the nature of the operation, management structure, flight ops structure, safety management systems in place (if any), procedure for authorising flights, and freelance pilots self-authorising if that is what happened in this instance.

They might even look at the risks inherent in a 'no fly-no pay' system, particularly when combined with self-authorisation, if that was the arrangement here.
Has the report filled in any gaps for you AoOOS ?

[Heliport]

No.

The AAIB does not appear to have investigated those aspects.

If it had done so, the list of 'contributory factors' might have been longer than just one item.


H.

[puntosaurus]

What a strange omission. You'd have thought that would be an obvious area to investigate. Then again, I suppose it's possible that they did investigate it and concluded that none of those issues were contributory. Or maybe they did and there was no basis to support a conclusion either way. I guess we'll never know....

[ShyTorque]

Shame it took fatalities to emphasise the dangers of allowing any number high rise buildings directly on a helicopter route in CAS. I always considered it was a matter of when, rather than if, an accident would occur, especially in that location. It was difficult enough when the Post Office Tower was the dominant obstacle, now it's ridiculous.

On the route poor old Barnesy was given, pilots are being given a clearance to fly at 1400 feet QNH. Any lower and you bust R157, which goes up to 1400 feet. Any higher, and you bust your clearance against head-on inbound ILS traffic to London City airport, which come down to 2,000 feet just north of Vauxhall Bridge. While concentrating on maintaining exactly 1400 feet you can think about not busting the 500 foot rule against these high rises while looking for your reporting point and other traffic on H4. Meanwhile pilots need to carry out cockpit checks and slow down whilst descending into Battersea, of course listening to the many "cautions" routinely issued by ATC about cranes, turbulence, river traffic and birds on the FATO alongside the actual landing clearance.

London Heliport itself is surrounded by an increasing number of cranes, some of them overhang the river bank on the approach/climbout area. The river banks are being developed in the immediate vicinity, too (I counted fourteen cranes on a recent visit).

Irrespective of the notification of many of the obstacles (I noted how many "new" ones were suddenly notified in very short order after this accident occurred), there are now so many, it's impossible to be totally aware of all of them, especially when the routing you get isn't necessarily the one you request on the R/T on first contact with ATC.

I think London Heliport has had its day, for this and other reasons and another landing site is desperately overdue.

My solution would be for a new heliport to be built at City Airport (LCY). There is an existing instrument approach there (which would have prevented this accident in the first place) and many of the passengers, who want to go to the city in any case, would be better catered for in that they wouldn't be faced with a 30 minute road journey to get to and from the helicopter.

Obviously, there has always been a helicopter ban at LCY, dating back to the days of "Red Ken". I think a review of this policy is now well overdue.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Shy;


Well said! Combine all that with the fact that there are now so many crane notams that I bet pilots are missing essential items due to the crane stuff being so badly spread out.


Much as I love Battersea I am getting very fed up of EGPWS Obstacle warnings drowning out radios, intercom etc from all the cranes/structures in the Battersea circuit.


Sadly I doubt Boris will be much more help than Red Ken, its not a vote winner.


Dear old Pete, I spoke to him the night before the smash, and a couple of weeks before we talked about a different landing site for London, and about how little chance we had of getting one.


SND

[Bronx]

Safety Recommendations

4.7 Recommendation 2014-031: It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review Federal Aviation Regulations Part 135 Rules 135.615, VFR Flight Planning, and 135.617, Pre-flight Risk Analysis, to assess whether their implementation would provide safety benefits for those helicopter operations within the UK for which it is the regulatory authority.

Assess whether the CAA could learn anything from the FAA? :ooh:

From what my British friends tell me about the CAA that will go over like a lead balloon. :)

[WHBM]

Long before I was into aviation I was a qualified Town Planner (dreary jobs, glad to get away).

One of the things that comes out is the lack of joined-up thinking between different government departments. The CAA allocates helicopter route H4 along the Thames, tightly squashed in under the LCY (who were on easterlies that morning, thus making their turn onto finals overhead Vauxhall) 09 approach at under 2,000 feet. Meanwhile another government department, it seems to be the Deputy PM's office this week, happily gives planning permission (because although ostensibly done by local authorities, all the "biggies" come to government attention) for some of the highest structures in the country right on the same route. This one was right on the Battersea approach from H4 at 700 ft.

You also have to wonder what the developer was thinking in the first place, putting that up into a known and published helicopter route. But avoiding such issues is what Planning is about. Goodness, it nit-picks over the most trivial details. This was not trivial.

The one that has previously concerned me is The Shard at London Bridge. Over 1,000 ft high and again right on H4. Remember that one of the clearances given to this aircraft was to go east in the hold as far as London Bridge. Which is The Shard location. And where a holding aircraft would be doing a 180 degree turn over the river in tricky visibility.

[RVDT]

Interestingly no mention of the "Elephant in the Room" here by contributors.

VFR-IMC anyone?

[Piltdown Man]

A bigger question is why did this guy, who from all accounts was a pretty proficient operator, put himself in the position he did. He was not stupid and background chatter appears to put him in the camp of one of the "good guys". For some reason, he believed it would be worthwhile doing what was he was doing - what was that reason? Was this such regular occurrence he felt comfortable being where he was? Also, was he truly unaware of the buildings along the Thames? ATC were. The CAA were. Until we understand more about the person and the reasons why he was where he was (failing to adhere to Rule 5 is not a cause) we are set for a repeat.

A good report but desperately missing some personal, HF background and analysis.

PM

[cave dweller]

Just started reading the AAIB report, and one thing that I can categorically say did not happen, was that the client did not call the Heliport at 0750 to ask if we were open. I was manning the telephones that morning from 0700. I was, at the time the senior person at the heliport and therefore the Aerodrome Authority. I was called by the DATCO, to ask if we could accept the flight, as we were still completing our opening checks. Given my authority and that we were awaiting final checks on fuel, I was satisfied that H2 fire cover was available, and therefore was happy to accept the flight.. That call from the client at 0750 simply did not happen!

[Bronx]

Piltdown Man A bigger question is why did this guy, who from all accounts was a pretty proficient operator, put himself in the position he did.

IMHO the better questions in the context you mention are --
What can be done to dissuade pilots from getting themselves into that position?
What can be done to help them not get into that position?

..... the nature of the operation, management structure, flight ops structure, safety management systems in place (if any), procedure for authorising flights, and freelance pilots self-authorising if that is what happened in this instance.

They might even look at the risks inherent in a 'no fly-no pay' system, particularly when combined with self-authorisation, if that was the arrangement here.

Corporate pilots are often put under pressure by clients, sometimes direct and sometimes more subtle and we know it has led to accidents.
Freelancers feel even greater pressure, sometimes from clients and sometimes self imposed because no flight = no pay.
1.1.2 Text messages and phone calls

At 0649 hrs, the pilot received a call from another pilot who was a colleague from a different helicopter operation. The pilot reportedly told his colleague that the weather was clear at Redhill Aerodrome and at his final destination but he expressed his concern about the weather at Elstree. The pilot told his colleague that he felt under pressure to go ahead with the flight that morning but he had decided to cancel it.
He obviously changed his mind and decided to give it a go.
Why?
Trying to keep the client happy? As he told the client at 0753 - "least we tried".
No flight, no pay?
The weather was OK at base and OK to the north of England where the client wanted to go. If he could just squeeze in to pick up the client? Worth a try? etc
You always get the holier than thou types when there's an accident but how many pilots can say hand on heart that they have never ever pushed it?

The billionaire businessman client was very quick to tell the press he was happy to call off the trip because of the weather. That looks like the truth so far as it goes, but it's not the whole truth.
The client told the AAIB he phoned Battersea Heliport at 0750 to see if was open.
Whether he did (as he says) or didn't (as cave dweller says) - Why did he tell the pilot Battersea was open?
1.1.2 Text messages and phone calls

0751 Pilot to Witness A: "No hole hdg back to red"
0753 Witness A to Pilot: "Ok."
0753 Pilot to Client: "Over Elstree no holes I’m afraid hdg back to Redhill least we tried chat in 10"
0755 Client to Pilot: "Battersea is open"
0755 Pilot to Operator: "Can’t get in Elstree hdg back assume clear still"
0755: Operator to Pilot: "Yes it’s fine still here." NB. This text was not read.

The pilot was on his way back to base until he got that text. He immediately, at 0756, asked ATC to confirm this was the case. When told the heliport was open, the pilot said that it would be “very useful” if he could proceed there, indicating that he was considering this option. The fact that the helicopter subsequently descended while the pilot was waiting to be cleared to the heliport suggests that his intention was to divert there.

The pilot's decision is final, no question about that, but freelancers want to please clients and hopefully get more work from them. Mostly it works out but, as we all know, sometimes it doesn't and sometimes people die.

A good report but desperately missing some personal, HF background and analysis.
I don't think it's a good report.
They worked out the immediate cause but that wouldn't have been difficult.

A high profile accident like this was a perfect opportunity to investigate the contributory causes, to look at the background culture, to draw attention to the pressures faced by corporate and self-employed pilots etc.
The opportunity was there but the AAIB didn't take it.
Until someone does, accidents of this sort will continue to happen.


.

[Bravo73]

Just started reading the AAIB report, and one thing that I can categorically say did not happen, was that the client did not call the Heliport at 0750 to ask if we were open. I was manning the telephones that morning from 0700. I was, at the time the senior person at the heliport and therefore the Aerodrome Authority. I was called by the DATCO, to ask if we could accept the flight, as we were still completing our opening checks. Given my authority and that we were awaiting final checks on fuel, I was satisfied that H2 fire cover was available, and therefore was happy to accept the flight.. That call from the client at 0750 simply did not happen!

Have you reported that to the AAIB?

(Rather than just tell us on a public rumour forum?)

[Boudreaux Bob]

Bronx
A high profile accident like this was a perfect opportunity to investigate the contributory causes, to look at the background culture, to draw attention to the pressures faced by corporate and self-employed pilots etc.
The opportunity was there but the AAIB didn't take it.
Until someone does, accidents of this sort will continue to happen.


Hole in One!:D:D:ok:

4.7 Recommendation 2014-031: It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review Federal Aviation Regulations Part 135 Rules 135.615, VFR Flight Planning, and 135.617, Pre-flight Risk Analysis, to assess whether their implementation would provide safety benefits for those helicopter operations within the UK for which it is the regulatory authority.

When did the AAIB begin to use Irony and Satire in their Reports?

[cave dweller]

The only person interviewed at the heliport as far as I understand, was the duty datco on the morning in question. This is only my third ever post and all three including this one was on the same subject.I posted this descrepency back in january 2013 when it was first posted that the client had stated that he had called Battersea to see if we were open. My answer then and my answer now is the same, no call was ever received.

[Bravo73]

The only person interviewed at the heliport as far as I understand, was the duty datco on the morning in question. This is only my third ever post and all three including this one was on the same subject.I posted this descrepency back in january 2013 when it was first posted that the client had stated that he had called Battersea to see if we were open. My answer then and my answer now is the same, no call was ever received.

That's all well and good but I seem to recall asking you the same question back when you first posted - have you reported this to the AAIB?

You can't be expecting their investigators to be reading these posts, surely? :confused:

[cave dweller]

Most of the posts at that time suggested not to speculate and to wait untill the official report came out, thats exactly what I have done.

[Bronx]

cave dweller

The only person interviewed at the heliport as far as I understand, was the duty datco on the morning in question.

So why did the duty datco confirm that the client called?
What reason might he have to lie to the AAIB?
Maybe he took the call himself?

Most of the posts at that time suggested not to speculate and to wait untill the official report came out, thats exactly what I have done.

That means not speculating on the internet.
It doesn't mean don't give the AAIB information that might help the investigation!

Whatever, it doesn't change anything because the client, for his own reasons, told the pilot Battersea was open and ATC confirmed it was.

2.3.1 The weather conditions at Redhill Aerodrome had begun to clear (see Figure 10) and the pilot would have been able to return there if the weather at Elstree Aerodrome reflected the forecast. He therefore had a safe contingency plan before departure.

The pilot had already told the client he was "hdg back to Redhill" and changed his mind only after the client said Battersea was open and ATC confirmed it was

If the client had left it as 'no flight' the pilot would have kept to his plan to return to Redhill - and two men would still be alive.

[Bravo73]

Most of the posts at that time suggested not to speculate and to wait untill the official report came out, thats exactly what I have done.

Hang on a minute. By your own admission, you are a witness to the events. And your account differs to the official report of the events. Your account could have a bearing on that report.

And you don't seem to think that you should report this to the AAIB? Are you for real???

[cave dweller]

It may well have been the case that the client had called the DATCO at the time. I am not privvy to what he had said in his report. The DATCO at the time would have not had authority to declare open before 0800. The DATCO did indeed call me to see if we could open to accept the flight , but as I understood it, it was a request from radar in the seconds before impact and that was when he, the DATCO asked me if we could open and accept him. We were not open prior to that communication with the DATCO.

[cave dweller]

I have only just read the report about an hour ago , so did not know what was in the report

[Bronx]

The DATCO at the time would have not had authority to declare open before 0800.
The pilot was cleared by ATC to contact London Heliport. His response to this transmission ended at 0759:22 hrs - just 38 seconds before 0800.
Maybe the DATCO assumed it would have been 0800 by the time he landed?
Not unreasonable.
Anyway, all that doesn't matter now.


What can be done to dissuade pilots from getting themselves into the position this pilot did?
What can be done to help pilots not get into that position?
It's an industry problem around the world and it ain't gonna go away on its own.
Is there a will in the industry to do anything about it?

Maybe not?
Maybe it's the elephant in the room nobody wants to talk about?

[satsuma]

Despite being urged by his client twice not to fly due to poor visibility, Cpt Barnes told him by text message: “I’m coming anyway..."

Possibly the most revealing words in the report. I'm prepared to bet that the pilots who crashed the Haughey Air helicopter in Norfolk thought or said something along the lines of 'We're going anyway' as well.

Is it me or do helicopter operators appear to be more afflicted by commercial pressures than their fixed wing counterparts? Is it because their clients, whether rich businessmen, toffs or oil companies are rolling in it and keep the operators in a state of perpetual fear of losing their business?

[chopjock]

I'm thinking perhaps the pilot would have been visual with the surface for the turn to Battersea, saw that he was higher than the top of the building so no problem, (didn't see the crane going up the other side), held the angle of bank in and through that soft cloud that was above the building and didn't expect a jib arm hidden in the cloud. :eek:
My opinion it was simply bad luck, should not have gone through the cloud, but bad luck all the same. (How many of us fly a 180 through a cloud and expect nothing in there?)
His experience should have won the day. Dam crane was the problem.

[Boudreaux Bob]

My opinion it was simply bad luck, should not have gone through the cloud, but bad luck all the same.

VFR/SVFR were the Rules he was supposed to be operating under.

When you fly through Cloud under those Rules you eliminate "Luck" and introduce "Fate".

I would suggest you read the visibility requirements for VFR and SVFR.....then reconsider your "Opinion".

The AAIB Report and all the comments that have been made about this sad event really boil down to a single very simple truth.

The aircraft was being operated in a manner that did not allow for avoidance of obstructions while operating under Visual Flight Rules.

That was the Pilot's own doing, everything else is secondary.

Count all the different times he could have said "No!" and could have done so quite reasonably.

That is the one thing that needs to be learned from Tragedies like this. A single word with two Letters is so hard for helicopter pilots to say.....even though it is begged sometimes.

The AAIB should examine that fatal flaw so many of us have. We all have it to some degree. Some of us have survived despite failing to find the ability to say that one single word at the appropriate time.

Usually one really good Scare and we seem to find it much easier if we are around afterwards.

[Harry O]

Barnsey was the best pilot I knew.
I bet most aviators on here have encountered cloud at some stage in their lives, and have usually done a 180 to remain clear. Pete was IFR rated so he had the experience to fly in cloud.
London has numerous cranes going up. I think the problem with the obstructions in London is nobody is controlling them enough.
No cranes should be erected without the CAA being involved from the start, and ATC should be made aware of every one in their area (each day). Part of a hand over brief to each controller for that patch. Not just the Notams.
Do ATC have any crane obstacle markers on their screens for the London area for low level ops?
If the cranes are close to heliports such as Battersea, ATC should look at altering the heights allowed within ATC zones.
The crane type involved is becoming more common and they are almost invisible against the tower blocks in London.

Just noted the BB comment, and all I can say is weather changes...

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Harry O;


Read the London area NOTAMs for any day of the week, then fly over and look out of the window. There are thousands of cranes, and hundreds of NOTAMS. It would be impossible to do anything like you suggest. Just to add confusion the NOTAMs are not in any decent order with some showing LHR airspace, some LCY and some just a London Lat/Long.


The number of crane NOTAMs now is ridiculous and really deserves a section just to itself.


SND

[SilsoeSid]

To accompany the simple 2 letter word that Bob mentioned earlier, there is also a simple TLA that would also apply here ... 'CRM'.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Harry,

We all make mistakes, aviation has always been that way and always shall.

Accepting that fact shows no disrespect of anyone and we should always seek to learn from those sad times we lose one of our own.

I can assure you if it had ever happened to me I would hope there would have been a very honest and candid discussion of what happened.

If that were not done I would see it as opportunity lost that might just prevent someone else from falling into the same trap I did.

In this tragedy, some decisions were made that led to a very bad ending.

I would submit that flying in Cloud over downtown London at very low altitude while supposed to be VFR demands some cold hard consideration.

It may not be what you wish to see but the professional in you should accept the importance and propriety of that being done.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I agree with Bob. We have to be honest regardless of what we thought of Pete. In my view this flight was pushing the limits of feasibility before take-off and reading the reports, the numerous risks involved were simply not in balance with the nature of the flight. It was a simple private charter.

Flying in cloud in such circumstances is not compliant with the IFR.

[CAAAD]

I am a bit surprised that in a high workload environment such as seems to have been the case, single pilot, poor visibility, and so on, the pilot was texting. Although I may be a bit old fashioned and naive.

But it does beg the question - Is this a common practise in the rotorcraft fraternity?

[ShyTorque]

I am a bit surprised that in a high workload environment such as seems to have been the case, single pilot, poor visibility, and so on, the pilot was texting. Although I may be a bit old fashioned and naive.

But it does beg the question - Is this a common practise in the rotorcraft fraternity?

Not with me it's not. I have difficulty texting on the ground, let alone in the air.

[Flying Lawyer]

CAAAD I am a bit surprised that in a high workload environment such as seems to have been the case, single pilot, poor visibility, and so on, the pilot was texting.

The texts sent/received in flight were whilst the pilot was in VMC above the cloud:

0747 Pilot to Witness A: VFR on top at 1500 feet
0748 Witness A to Pilot: But can you land?
0751 Pilot to Witness A: No hole hdg back to red
0753 Witness A to Pilot: Ok
0753 Pilot to Client: Over Elstree no holes I’m afraid hdg back to Redhill least we tried chat in 10

(The pilot obtained clearance to Redhill and, at 0753, ATC asked: “Rocket 2 do you have VMC or would you like an IFR transit?”
The pilot replied: “I have good VMC on top here, that’s fine, Rocket 2”.)

0755 Client to Pilot: Battersea is open
0755 Pilot to Operator: Can’t get in Elstree hdg back assume clear still
0755 Operator to Pilot: Yes it’s fine still here. (This text was not read.)

The last read and sent text messages were approximately four minutes before the collision with the crane:

At 0756, following the message from the client telling him Battersea was open, the pilot asked ATC to confirm.
It was only after ATC confirmed that it was, that he subsequently descended - while waiting to be cleared to Battersea.

He was using the radio to talk to ATC until a few seconds before impact.
The AAIB considered it unlikely that he was distracted at the same time by composing a text message.

I agree, and would go further: I regard it as extremely unlikely.
Firstly because there is not a shred of evidence that he was and, secondly, because the available evidence suggests that he wasn't.


FL

[terminus mos]

Texting while driving is illegal, has been proven to cause distraction and accidents and is a stupid thing to do.

Texting while flying as Captain of an aircraft under VFR or Special VFR or IFR and in marginal weather is crazy, regardless of whether it was a contributory factor at the actual time of the accident or not.

The pilot went against all CRM / ADM learning I have ever seen, he placed undue commercial and operational pressure on himself, there was plenty of opportunity to break this unfortunate chain which he didn't take.

[Bronx]

He wasn't in marginal weather when he sent/read texts.
He was above it in clear blue skies.

he placed undue commercial and operational pressure on himself

I don't think it was self-imposed pressure but, whether it was or wasn't, it still raises questions about why he felt the need to do it.

It's not the first time it's happened and it won't be the last unless the industry is prepared to face up to the direct and indirect pressures on corporate/freelancer helicopter pilots and think of some way of doing something about it.

He was a very experienced pilot, and from what I read on the original thread, well respected by his peers but he still felt he had to try to get the job done. Why did he feel that?

Instead of just dismissing it as yet another 'one off' we need to look more deeply into the pressures that cause this sort of thing to happen time and time again in the corporate world and try to do change the culture that leads to it.
The culture sure ain't gonna change on its own.

[chopjock]

t mos
Texting while driving is illegal, has been proven to cause distraction and accidents and is a stupid thing to do
Why do you think that is? Obstacles on the surface perhaps?
Texting in the air during light work load on top with nothing to hit is hardly crazy now is it?

[terminus mos]

He wasn't in marginal weather when he sent/read texts.
He was above it in clear blue skies.
I am not getting into a pissing contest with you, texting while flying in command of a single pilot aircraft at any time or in any weather is worthy of a Darwin award.

Instead of just dismissing it as yet another 'one off' we need to look more deeply into the pressures that cause this sort of thing to happen time and time again in the corporate world and try to do change the culture that leads to it.
The culture sure ain't gonna change on its own. Easily identifiable cultural problem, its called a day rate

Chopjock

Texting in the air during light work load on top with nothing to hit is hardly crazy now is it?

Yes, I think it is absolutely crazy. He was in command of an aircraft, not the marketing department. Texting in this case simply applied more pressure which built to the point of making a fatal error.

[Pittsextra]

Easily identifiable cultural problem, its called a day rate

Absolutely, and not hard to work out the pressure given:-

Flying experience*: Total all types: 10,234 hours
Total on type: Not known
Last 90 days: 30 hours
Last 28 days: 9 hours
Last 24 hours: 0 hours

[rotorspeed]

terminus nos

Your assertion that texting when single pilot in any aircraft at any time is worthy of a Darwin award is utterly ridiculous - and unfairly damning of Pete Barnes. Pete may have made fatal mistakes here, but texting was not one.

His texts were made when he was VMC on top, no doubt A/P coupled. They were brief and pertinent too - this wasn't just idle banter. The ability to text can actuually be a safety aid - sometimes by informing people on the ground of certain things stress can be reduced and flights made more efficient.

Please explain why sending a brief text is any more distracting than, for example, re-programming a route in the GPS, looking at a chart or approach plate and setting up an ILS with frequency selection with navaid identification etc. All quite accepted distractions from simply looking out of the screen or at the panel monitoring instruments and any warnings - the serious of which tend to be audio anyway in the A109.

[terminus mos]

Please explain why sending a brief text is any more distracting than, for example, re-programming a route in the GPS, looking at a chart or approach plate and setting up an ILS with frequency selection with navaid identification etc. All quite accepted distractions from simply looking out of the screen or at the panel monitoring instruments and any warnings - the serious of which tend to be audio anyway in the A109.

Because all of the things that you mention are directly connected with the conduct of the flight, physically and mentally. In this case, the Commander of the aircraft's mind was on how to deal with his customer when it should have been on selecting Redhill in the GPS, climbing to 2400" and heading about 210 degrees.

[rotorspeed]

tn

Do you ever use a phone when driving - hands free of course?

[satsuma]

EASA put it so much better than the rest of us. For commercial air transport at least (and you'd think the guidance would be sensible across all forms of flying): https://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/InformationNotice2014022.pdf

The operator shall not permit any person to use a portable electronic device (PED) on board an aircraft that could adversely affect the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment, and shall take all reasonable measures to prevent such use.
This means that there is per se no ban on the use of PEDs. However, the operator is required to demonstrate that radio frequency emissions from PEDs do not pose a risk to aircraft systems and equipment and that all hazards are mitigated before allowing the use of PEDs on board.

They are, I should point out, specifically talking about non-transmitting PEDs, where less stringent rules apply. If the operator had carried out a demonstration similar to that highlighted in bold and proven that texts could not have an adverse effect on aircraft systems, at least the only question that remains is the issue of distraction from the primary flying task.

[Thomas coupling]

This is an opportunity to call a spade a spade.
The pilot [RiP] was over confident with his skill set that day. No-ONE else should or could be blamed in any shape way or form.

This pilot thought he was above the laws of nature and the industry when he had decided (in himself) that he was going to press on. This wasn't a "press on itis" it was a cold calculated ecsiion to take on the elements to achieve his target.

As 'nice' as he was, as charismatic as he was - he genuinely felt that he was capable of making the venue - against all odds and advice offered to him.

A MASSIVE breakdown in CRM and a very very bad advert to all other wannabee pilots out there that the highest echelons of the professional commercial world - is flawed.

Learn from this - all you who replace his ilk and never ever think or believe you are above it all.
A sad day for our profession. One that we should be ashamed of. :=

[Piltdown Man]

Judgmental opinions arising from 20-20 hindsight are worthless. We need to know why, not just what. And while we are at it, we should also ditch the focus on the texting stuff and instead bundle it with operating electronic devices. There are more distracting FMS and RNAV systems than mobile phones, yet they appear to be acceptable to use. Also, we must accept that legislation, more stringent SOP's, additional regulations will not necessarily improve safety.

Bronx's last post may lead us in the right direction. For example, I hadn't realised that 10,000 hour pilots in charge of highly sophisticated and very expensive helicopters weren't always paid a salary. I'm also no wiser in understanding how charter contracts work when a job can not be executed, either because of poor weather or technical malfunctions. Who gets paid what etc.

Only if we can see things through Peter Barnes' eyes as he saw them will we be able to prevent the next person from seeing what he did, resulting in a similar outcome.

PM

[Thomas coupling]

PM: You are not listening are you. Try not to look for something that is not there. I'm sure like me, you have been in those circumstances where you are 'up against' it (weather in this case) and have done it time and time again and believe it'll work out OK again....It didn't: Quell Surprise. Live with it......he didn't.

[satsuma]

we should also ditch the focus on the texting stuff

Does it not reveal though a mindset that only some of the rules apply? Like VFR weather limits for example. :hmm: Throw in a bucketload of commercial pressure and what have you got? Something to do with holes in cheese.

[rotorspeed]

Texting, briefly, in the quiet cruise is just not a distraction risk and focus on it should indeed be ditched. The reality is commercial pressure exists in every part of aviation apart from pleasure flying, but of course we just deal with it. For those that don't do corporate flying just consider how useful it is for those that do to be able to - occasionally - communicate with pax, ground ops, wife etc with a message when plans change. So you've set off for a pick up 150nm away and pax cancels - what do you do? Carry on and only find out when you arrive? Ask ATC etc to relay a message? Or receive a quick text saying job cancelled? Sensibly I'm sure, the latter happens much of the time. Saving a load of money on a wasted flying that no-one wants to pay for in the process. How should pilots communicate when plans change?

[alouette3]

I am amazed at the tiptoeing going on around here.With the exception of TC,everybody here seems to want to give the pilot a get -out- of -jail -free card.
Fact of the matter is that Peter Barnes might have been God's gift to aviation but,at the end, he was human just like the rest of us.He was afflicted with the very human pressure of making a buck ---or not. He displayed all the Hazardous Attitudes,in spades, and, at the end of a very illustrious career, made a cold calculated decision which cost him his life.There is no getting around all these facts and we will be better served as an industry if we don't.The time for mourning and paying respects is over.The time to learn lessons is here and if we keep trying to blame ATC,Cranes,Culture and what have you,we will have another one of these in short order.
By the way, it is never okay to text or pull out a laptop to check scheduling when you are entrusted with a multi- million dollar asset.I seem to recall a fellow EMS pilot texting and running out of fuel and the group here was quick to condemn. I also recall an airliner that overshot Minneapolis because the pilots were busy with a laptop going over schedules.The former is dead and the latter are without a job.So ,if you call yourself a professional, do not even debate the VFR okay to text/IFR not okay to text issue.It is unbecoming.Ask yourself, where do we draw the line? If it is VFR On Top and I am on autopilot, is it okay to pull out my smart phone and catch up on the latest episode of House Of Cards?
Alt 3.

[SilsoeSid]

The reality is commercial pressure exists in every part of aviation apart from pleasure flying...

Simply not true!

[cockney steve]

Firstly, I'm not a pilot....but before you reject my post :ooh:

AIUI, the route was "follow the river" had ther been water visible on both sides of the Aircraft, it would not have encountered land-based objects.
Please tell me why i'm wrong.
EDIT.- I accept there are bridges crossing, but clearance should be adequate for any legally-conducted transit.

[Boudreaux Bob]

The discussion can drift around to all sorts of esoteric issues it wants.

But the simple truth is this was a CFIT event.

It occurred in Daylight over a very large Metropolitan area on a route well known by the Pilot.

The Pilot had elected to divert from his planned route and proceed to a landing site for which he did not have the Reported Weather.

The aircraft was being operated under either VFR or SVFR Rules which require adherence to a certain Minimum Visibility.

The Aircraft was observed to be "in Cloud" at the time of the collision with the Crane.

Even when asked by ATC....the Pilot had reported having "Good" Weather (meaning within VFR/SVFR limits).

The Aircraft was at or below the Minimum Altitude/Height Above Ground permissible by Rule.

At no point had the Pilot reported being IMC, requested an IFR Clearance, or was able to conduct an IFR Approach Procedure for his intended landing site.

I don't care if he was texting on two phones....and doing an Irish Jig while listening to BBC. He plainly was not flying the aircraft in any acceptable manner for the conditions extant.

He was required by his VFR and/or SVFR Clearance to maintain forward visibility and height above ground to facilitate avoiding any obstructions on his Flight Path.

As he was in Cloud he failed to do right.

Blame the Crane, ATC, NATS, God, the Devil, Fate, Luck or whatever.....the PILOT was at the Controls and making the Decisions.

He Failed in several ways.

Sadly, he died and destroyed a perfectly good Helicopter and Crane along with some Vehicles on the Ground.

What is unforgivable, is he killed an innocent person on the ground as well as injuring several others.

He was not a "great" pilot......not by a long shot.

He may have been your Friend but if you are honest with yourself, you will accept even Friends can do harm to others.

[rotorspeed]

Silsoe - commercial pressure does exist everywhere, though not where you're perhaps thinking of - with pilots during a job. Pilot salaries, conditions, training, aircraft, equipment etc will all be moaned about by pilots at some point, and are examples of the reality of the constraints of commercial pressure in aviation.

Fair post, BB.

[ShyTorque]

At no point had the Pilot reported being IMC, requested an IFR Clearance, or was able to conduct an IFR Approach Procedure for his intended landing site.

Just to clarify that point. There is no IFR approach at London Heliport. It appears that there was no need for him to have asked for an IFR clearance in transit because the conditions did not require one, bearing in mind that the previous plan was to return to Redhill. The fatal mistake was to descend into fog lifting into low cloud. It may have been that the pilot misidentified another bridge along the Thames for Vauxhall bridge, easily done in marginal visibility.

For an experienced helicopter pilot, VFR is easy. IFR is also relatively easy. It's the bit in between that catches people out, as appears to have been the case here.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Clarify as you wish.

He was in Cloud.

It was Controlled Airspace was it not?

You are exactly correct there was no Instrument Approach.

He was no longer VMC, VFR, or SVFR.

He had obtained a VFR/SVFR Clearance.

He was not complying with the Requirements of either of those Clearances.

In the UK, can you fly IMC in Controlled Airspace without a IFR Clearance?

[ELondonPax]

I am not a pilot, but an interested observer. To those so keen to defend the use of a mobile phone whilst flying, consider this.
In the UK. A car/lorry driver using equipment that isn’t hands free is subject to prosecution. A commercial bus or train driver who did this on duty would be subject to instant dismissal, as well as prosecution, even if the event happened on a totally deserted road/track at 0600 on a clear summer Sunday morning. Could you explain why such rules about mobiles exist in other safety critical transport modes but should not apply to helicopter pilots?

As for “Texting in the air during light work load” Flying over one of the most densely populated areas of Europe, with complex air traffic restrictions. That’s a “light workload” situation?

[SilsoeSid]

rotorspeed;Silsoe - commercial pressure does exist everywhere, though not where you're perhaps thinking of - with pilots during a job. Pilot salaries, conditions, training, aircraft, equipment etc will all be moaned about by pilots at some point, and are examples of the reality of the constraints of commercial pressure in aviation.

:confused: It was you that said "The reality is commercial pressure exists in every part of aviation apart from pleasure flying,"

I am saying that it exists in every part of aviation, including pleasure/private flying.

[airpolice]

Steve, you should read the report. It will greatly assist your participation in this debate.

The route, going West, is follow the North bank, not the river.

Eastbound is follow the South bank.

That's to limit the opportunity for a head on.


2.5.2 Flights on the helicopter routes
Reciprocal traffic on the helicopter routes is deemed separated when westbound traffic routes along the north bank of the River Thames and eastbound traffic routes along the south bank. Rule 5 applies, so any pilot routing along the south bank of the river and passing within 500 ft vertically of the top of the crane (whose elevation the associated NOTAM stated was 770 ft amsl), or the building (elevation 607 ft amsl) once the crane is removed, would be in breach of the ANO.

The building at St George Wharf has therefore increased the local minimum allowable altitude along the south bank to 1,100 ft (based on the building). It has consequently had the effect of preventing two-way traffic on H4 when London City Airport is using Runway 09 (when traffic on H4 is limited to 1,000 ft amsl) or when the cloud base is below 1,200 ft.

[airpolice]

Rotrospeed wrote :

Texting, briefly, in the quiet cruise is just not a distraction risk and focus on it should indeed be ditched.

I think we need to accept the huge difference between using a panel mounted device like a Garmin GPS/Radio, and holding an iPhone in your hand.

You are not going to drop the Garmin.


As for commercial pressure in all aviation, that's true. Even weekend warriors are not immune to the cost of going around and spending another chunk of money so they are faced with a desire/hint/suggestion that pressing on is much cheaper/better.

As always, its about making the right decisions, in time.

We all know the right thing to do, it's actually doing it that sets some people apart.

When you start getting multiple points wrong, that's when it becomes hairy.

[ShyTorque]

Clarify as you wish.

He was in Cloud.
It was Controlled Airspace was it not?
You are exactly correct there was no Instrument Approach.
He was no longer VMC, VFR, or SVFR.
He had obtained a VFR/SVFR Clearance.
He was not complying with the Requirements of either of those Clearances.

In the UK, can you fly IMC in Controlled Airspace without a IFR Clearance?

BB, I was attempting to clarify your point about the pilot not requesting an IFR clearance and / or an IFR approach. I wasn't disagreeing with your post in its entirety.

The answer to your question is obviously a resounding NO, nor was I attempting to intimate otherwise.

[rotorspeed]

Silsoe - ok, and agree actually! Sorry to misinterpret but your post wasn't clear!

[Bronx]

terminus mos

I am not getting into a pissing contest with you,
What a curious response. :confused:

texting while flying in command of a single pilot aircraft at any time or in any weather is worthy of a Darwin award.Fine. That's your opinion, but it's not what you said.



When the texts were first mentioned in the original thread a lot of people assumed the pilot was texting while he was scud-running and some people even assumed he was texting when he hit the crane. It's clear from the report that he wasn't.

He shouldn't have been scud-running at all but if the guy is gonna be criticized then let him be criticized for what he did not what he didn't.

[alouette3]

Bronx,

He shouldn't have been scud-running at all but if the guy is gonna be criticized then let him be criticized for what he did not what he didn't.

He is being criticized for texting.Period.It was obviously a high workload situation and he shouldn't have been doing that.Before or after or during scud running.

I suppose you belong to the texting,PS/X Box generation that doesn't seem to understand the risks and who believes in the myth of multitasking.
Alt3.

[RVDT]

Hmmmm.................

vJG698U2Mvo

[ShyTorque]

The answer only 15? I counted many more.There were only two figures not wearing white. One of the people passing the basketballs and the gorilla.

Or are we only supposed to count those wearing white shirts?

[Boudreaux Bob]

A3....one should not "assume". You know what happens when one does that without substantial basis or logic on one's side.:=

[Bronx]

Alt3

I don't call VMC on top a high workload situation.
He had been given clearance back to base and was on his way there until he got the Battersea is open message.

I suppose you belong to the texting,PS/X Box generation that doesn't seem to understand the risks and who believes in the myth of multitasking.
You suppose far too much.
BTW, I don't but it gave my grandkids a good laugh.

The myth of multitasking? :confused:
Helicopter pilots have been multitasking since before they invented the word.
Fly yes, operate no.


Piltdown Man I'm also no wiser in understanding how charter contracts work when a job can not be executed, either because of poor weather or technical malfunctions. Who gets paid what etc.

Nobody.
No fly = no pay.

[rantanplane]

The place I learned flying its spelt "arse+you+me"

[Boudreaux Bob]

0755 Client to Pilot: Battersea is open
0755 Pilot to Operator: Can’t get in Elstree hdg back assume clear still
0755 Operator to Pilot: Yes it’s fine still here. (This text was not read.)

The last read and sent text messages were approximately four minutes before the collision with the crane:

At 0756, following the message from the client telling him Battersea was open, the pilot asked ATC to confirm.
It was only after ATC confirmed that it was, that he subsequently descended - while waiting to be cleared to Battersea.

Can we fairly state that had the Pilot not been texting, he would not have been told about Battersea and would not have asked ATC about Battersea, as he clearly indicated he had over flown Elstree and could not find a way down and was returning to Redhill?

If we can, then I would suggest that in that case, Texting caused him to divert from his best decision of all that Day, and thus Texting would have been the Trigger that got pulled on the Gun.

[Heliport]

alouette3I am amazed at the tiptoeing going on around here.With the exception of TC,everybody here seems to want to give the pilot a get -out- of -jail -free card.

Who? :confused:
People have expressed different opinions about texting but no-one has tried to defend what the pilot did.
if we keep trying to blame ATC,Cranes,Culture and what have you,we will have another one of these in short order.
If we keep focusing only upon what the pilot did and don't bother to explore the factors that led, or might have led, him to do it we will have another one of these in short order.
Who's blaming ATC?
The AAIB are concerned about the proliferation of very tall cranes along the river. Are they wrong?
If you think there's no culture problem you are either very much mistaken or it's very different in your part of the world.

We all know what the pilot did, he pushed his luck/tempted fate in poor visibility, but as Piltdown Man and others have said in different ways 'We need to know why, not just what.'

TC PM: You are not listening are you. Try not to look for something that is not there.
He is listening. He just doesn't agree with you.

With genuine respect for your very long experience as both a Navy and ASU pilot, saying 'Don't be over confident', 'Learn from this' etc, whilst obviously sound advice, is too simplistic. People have been saying 'Learn from this' for years and yet these accidents still happen.
Is it not even worth considering whether there are other factors (in addition to over confidence/a belief that it won't happen to them) that lead pilots to do it?
And, if there are, trying to remove or reduce the effect of those factors?


H.

[Thomas coupling]

Heliport: Sometimes one can genuinely not see the wood etc.................
Perhaps you haven't been in situations like this often enough to realise nearly ALL commercial pilots push the limits for absolutely no reason at all other than they have seen it, done it, been there so many times, so one more 'time' shouldn't make a difference. He was not (repeat) under any time, financial pressure to get to his destination. He had been told by the customer to forget it. He wasn't lost, in fact he was fiddling with his damn phone minutes before so he was obviously "comfortable" with his SA.
And that was the problem...he was: COMPLACENT.
Intermittent VMC, cloud hpping/dodging ....call it what you like.
He carried on as if it was a minor blip on his radar.
Sometimes HELIPORT you have to debrief your fellow pilots and tell it as it is.
This is as straight forward a case of unprofessional flying as one could get. Don't look for anything else here, other than CRM....because it was sorely missing.
Please don't wrap this in various layers of aviation gobbledy gook to get others to think "society is to blame". They aren't, the environment wasn't, ATC weren't. HE WAS. K.I.S.S.:*

[alouette3]

Bronx,

I don't call VMC on top a high workload situation.
Single pilot, trying to make it to a heliport,possibly in and out of clouds ,over a large metropolitan city riddled with cranes,changing decisions based on client input,talking to ATC.If that is not a high workload situation I don't know what is.
The myth of multitasking? :confused:
Helicopter pilots have been multitasking since before they invented the word.
Okay so I got your age wrong.However, you do need to read a few more books on human factors and the like before you come out here and make a statement like that. Maybe then you can explain better to your grand kids why it is not safe to text and drive or even talk on the cell phone while doing so.
I know why he did the things he did.But, you go ahead and try and find someone else to blame.
Alt3.

[alouette3]

Heliport,
Who? :confused:
People have expressed different opinions about texting but no-one has tried to defend what the pilot did.
If you haven't figured that out,you need to go back and read this thread from the beginning.

If you think there's no culture problem you are either very much mistaken or it's very different in your part of the world.
Things are no different in my part of the world.Heaven knows we have our own unique set of cultural issues to deal with.But,when we as a a group try to blame culture for a purely poor CRM and Hazardous Attitudes related accident,just because the pilot was well liked , had 10K hours and was British, we are equally to blame. An experienced pilot commits a rookie mistake and so it is culture.Is that what you want the next generation of pilots to get from this?
I certainly hope not.
Alt3.

[SilsoeSid]

This multi tasking malarky that is being thrown around is nothing but a myth. We can do many things at the same time, but we simply cannot multitask to the extent that we believe the term 'multitasking' means, simple.

If we look at this incident in simple chunks, cheese slices if you will, it becomes clearer bit by bit. For starters, as Bob says, it's pretty clear that if the mobile phone texting wasn't going on, Pete would have continued back to Redhill.

Future CRM courses will be pulling this to bits and picking every single one of the multiple times where this incident could have been prevented. Just to make it clear, not everyone of them directly involves Pete.

Yes we can learn from this and learn a lot, however not until people pull their heads out of the sand and realise that CRM involves single piloted aircraft as much as multi piloted aircraft, will we fully appreciate the lessons we are presented with and can learn from. Until then, these mistakes will be repeated.

The days of the term 'Single Pilot CRM' being greeted with contempt, must be relegated to the dim and distant past.

Doesn't this all sound oh so familiar?

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/458333-crash-near-bude-cornwall-24th-july-2011-a-6.html#post7196857

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/446140-cumbria-helicopter-crash-discussion-2.html#post6318274

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/416160-heli-down-devon.html#post5721442

[Piltdown Man]

So if I understand TC correctly, Peter Barnes was the proverbial "rotten apple". He broke the rules and was complacent and as a result, crashed and died. Obviously he'll never make that mistake again and aviation will be safer without him. Or will it?

The answer is it won't be, because nothing will have been done to prevent others from doing the same. Will more rules and greater punishments change anything? I doubt it. The AAIB described what happened where and it appeared Peter decided to aviate, navigate and communicate all at the same time - but we still don't know why. How many times since this incident have helicopters flown along H4 in marginal conditions? I don't have any numbers, but I'll wager it was more than one. How about using pilots with more experience? So that will be pilots with more than 10,000 hrs. Or will another gadget in the aircraft help? Aren't there enough already? Or is it the environment or system in which they operate at fault?

I'll tell you for free, beating people with a safety stick does little to change the future. Or do we print a notice on the windshield stating "WARNING - Do not be complacent"?

The solution I'm suggesting is that we start by understand the reasons why because it is clear that the rule makers have failed us. You don't think so? Well when you next get in your car, see how many illegal acts are committed around you. You can even include yourself if you like. There'll be speeders, under-takers. mobile phone users, non-seatbelt users, in-insured drivers etc. And each and every one of these acts is illegal, yet the drivers still offend.

So yes TC, Heliport is right, I do listen but don't agree with you. The only way we can lift our game is to work with people and not punish them. Creating and enforcing rules, regulations and by-laws gave improvements in the past, but we have moved on. Let's keep progressing and try not to revert back to our savage past

PM

[alouette3]

PM,

The solution I'm suggesting is that we start by understand the reasons why because it is clear that the rule makers have failed us.

What is there to understand? The rules exist and were broken.Plain and simple. No amount of rule making will take away client pressure, economic pressure or self induced pressure.This is especially true in a world of single pilots where there is no one looking over your shoulder and the only one making the decisions is the one least qualified to assess his or her own ability--- the pilot.
No one has failed us. We are our own worst enemy and the only solution is to understand that a 10K pilot was suckered into a situation that killed him. Until we have gadgets that can record a man's final thoughts, we will never know what Peter or any other pilot was thinking in the final moments.We can only surmise ,given the evidence so far, that what he might have been thinking is "I can do this", "It only happens to others" "Done this before can do it again" "Must get the job done" or thoughts along those lines.
Alt3.

[John R81]

AAIB report - comments included in the newsletter of a London firm of lawyers. They concentrate on the recommendations of AAIB.

new email1 (http://www.law-now.com/DirectMail/%7B9D780A3A-DB4C-42DB-96C1-B44D2962B422%7D_agustasept14.htm)

I find the recommendations to the DOT most interesting:

* Implement a mechanism, compliant with Regulation (EU) 73/2010 and UK law, for the formal reporting and management of obstacle data, including a reporting requirement for newly permitted developments;

* Implement measures that enable the CAA to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential implications of new obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures; and,

* Remind the relevant authorities to notify the CAA: (i) where planning permission for developments which include obstacles is granted; (ii) about obstacles not previously notified; and, (iii) about obstacles previously notified that no longer exist.

* (A similar recommendation applies to the Scottish Government reminding the relevant Scottish planning bodies)



The second of these addresses something that I did find rather odd - current law requires CAA to consider only the approach / departure LHR and LCY when considering planning applications for tall buildings in that area, not the Battersea Heliport or H4.

[Thomas coupling]

Alouette 3: Beautifully said. Absolutely spot on.

Piltdown man: You aren't listening. I did NOT say he was a rotten apple, or a bad pilot. He was in fact an unassuming, considerate, very professional guy.
BUT - on that day and at that time, he dropped his guard. Please try to understand this. Using your comparisons: driving: Formula 1 drivers are the best of the bunch - you don't get better, yet they make mistakes and they are catastrophic. It has nothing to do with subliminal psychoanalytical, interdevelopmental breakdown or any other human factor gobbledy gook. The bloke messed up for 0.025 of a second and it cost him his life. Sh*t happens - we are not automatons. Get used to it and move onto something useful elsewhere in the industry where you can improve on.

RiP and all that.................:zzz:.

[airpolice]

John R81
The Aviation Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) released a report on Tuesday, following a fatal helicopter incident near Vauxhall Bridge, London, in January of last year.
A firm of Lawyers who don't seem to know what AAIB stands for.

I've not bothered reading beyond that point.

[rotorspeed]

As usual, there have been a lot of generalisations made about the flight and pilot, most of which do not actually help identify exactly why Pete Barnes hit the crane. And as with all accidents, the exact, ultimate cause is important and often not focussed on enough, I feel.

Ironically I think he hit the crane because (at this point) he was trying to comply with the rules - or at least to the greatest extent he could. The pilot had made a fairly tight right hand turn over Chelsea Bridge, hand flown, at a fairly steady altitude, so was almost certainly visual here. He then descended quickly to 570ft as he was proceeding east, again almost certainly to maintain VMC with a lowering cloud base as he went east. At this point, given clearance to turn west for Battersea Heliport, I'd guess that he knew turning right over the river at 500ft, whilst perfectly safe, would put him blatantly and obviously in breach of Rule 5, so he chose to climb as high as he could whilst being able to see the ground, which he surely could, given the images showing the silhouette of the aircraft from the base of the tower. Tragically in so doing the very reduced forward visibility meant he did not see the crane boom - which frankly was hard to see against the background in good visibility.

So I suspect that (ultimately) pressure to comply with the rules contributed to this accident. Though admittedly he would probably not have been in that situation if he'd fully complied with the rules from the outset.

[Thomas coupling]

Rotorspeed - haven't you been listening?

Look - 'most' pilots scud run especially if they operate within the confines of flying lanes as Peter did and especially if they know that the weather limits are borderline. Most clouds you penetrate during scud running are full of air! One or two are NOT. Guess what -
There was NO pressure to comply with the rules, he had already decided to press on AFTER his principal had told him not to bother. He continued because he was complacent with his performance.

Please try to understand this. He was pushing his luck cloud hopping and ran out of it.

[nowherespecial]

To be fair, if he hadn't been IMC while under SVFR/ VFR, he probably would have seen the crane and hopefully avoided it.

He sounds like a nice guy from what I've read but he broke rules and it killed him. The rules exist as a result of many accidents over the years. They get refined when things happen. For me, there are no extra take aways from someone breaking the rules which were put in place to help him. He broke them, he died. Sad yes but true.

Marking cranes would not have helped this crash as he was supposed to be VFR anyway (key point being 'visual'). What can the CAA realistically do, approve cranes during housing development? Lets be clear here, over London, people should expect cranes, tall buildings and other aircraft, this isn't remote northern Scotland, it's the capital.

[rotorspeed]

TC - actually I have been listening and I agree with much of what you say. However you please listen and understand why I am saying - and that's that people, as you are here - tend to generalise and not look at the exact cause of an accident. I stand by my comments. Why do you think he hit that crane? Do you agree with my analysis? If not, where is it flawed? Or do you really think he was just randomly in and out of cloud and could have hit various buildings at odd times?

Don't think that I am trying to say Pete wasn't to blame. He was. But looking at detail is interesting. If he had not hit that crane he would have almost certainly landed at Battersea with no problem and the flight would have attracted no attention.

[Fortyodd2]

"Why do you think he hit that crane?"

Because the crane, like him, was in cloud and he didn't see it.
The crane was entitled to be there in the cloud - he wasn't.

[Thomas coupling]

Or do you really think he was just randomly in and out of cloud and could have hit various buildings at odd times?


Bang on mon ami. Bang on!!! Welcome aboard.:D

[Boudreaux Bob]

If he had not hit that crane he would have almost certainly landed at Battersea with no problem and the flight would have attracted no attention.

So.....are you saying that except for hitting the crane he had done nothing wrong?

Are you suggesting that except for Fate sticking a Thumb in his Eye it would have been acceptable for him to have done as he did?


TC,

I have a very huge problem with your comment:

"Look - 'most' pilots scud run especially if they operate within the confines of flying lanes as Peter did and especially if they know that the weather limits are borderline. Most clouds you penetrate during scud running are full of air! One or two are NOT. Guess what - "


As a very experienced Rudscunner.....One NEVER punches into Cloud....NEVER! The beauty of the helicopter is that it can fly very slowly....and is very agile especially at slow speeds. One maintains visual contact with the Ground at all times and One maintains forward Visibility and flies at a Speed that allows you to avoid obstacles and terrain AT ALL TIMES. One varies Speed based upon the distance and clarity of Visibility you have. Otherwise, you are going to spear that Mountain Goat with your Pitot Tube one day. One does not EVER Scud Run at Night....if one wishes to live long enough to make other mistakes in life.

All you Youngsters out there reading this. You can "Scud Run" but you have to do it in a "Safe" manner. Finding a way to do it both "Safe" and "Legal" is the hard part. Which should tell you that "Scud Running" is not an approved practice. Not being "Approved" connotes it should not be done to begin with.

[Pittsextra]

If he had not hit that crane he would have almost certainly landed at Battersea with no problem and the flight would have attracted no attention.

...and thats the problem. All making this an utter irrelevance and a box ticking process.

1.17.7 The Operator’s Operations Manual
Part A of the Operator’s Operations Manual detailed the responsibilities
and duties of the Chief Pilot (who was also the Flight Safety Officer), the
duty Operations Manager and the pilots operating flights. There was no
flight‑by‑flight requirement for the various post holders to engage with pilots in the decision whether or not to operate a flight and there was no formal pre-flight risk assessment process. However, it was expected that pilots would liaise with duty personnel or the Chief Pilot as required in fulfilling their responsibility to ensure the safe operation of the helicopter.

On the basis that the chief pilot didn't ensure the safe operation of the helicopter what is the consequence of that??

[rantanplane]

even if there wouldn't be any cranes, or high rise buildings, penetrating clouds in a tight airspace above a populated area, all under VFR rules, is nothing but gross negligence.

if this penetrating thru clouds is a tolerated way of operating, one day there might be an other aircraft in just the same cloud doing just the same mistake

Get f***ing real! :ugh:

What is the overall sum of this insurance case going to be? Is this in any relation to the need of operation as conducted?

We are all paying for it, and some people not only with money but a lot more.

[rotorspeed]

TC - my own view is that you're not right on that, but I accept you could be. You however (I assume) don't think my theory could possibly be true - I generally agree with your posts but that seems a bit arrogant to me.

Don't get out of hand folks, I'm in no way condoning the pilot's actions here, but just trying to consider what actually caused him to hit the crane, as a technical point. Clearly whatever he was doing he shouldn't have been doing it, but I don't think he was being quite as reckless as some here would have.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Rotorspeed,

If you were to omit the part about "trying to comply with the Rules" part of your post....you have offered the most logical explanation of why this happened. I would bet consideration of complying with any Rule was the last thing in Barnes' mind at the time. He was concentrating on getting into the heliport despite some very bad weather conditions.

[John R81]

To me that facts that led to him dropping down through the sucker-hole are interesting in that they led to that decision. Part of the investigation and something to learn from for sure, but separate from what happened down below cloud.

Once through the cloud layer to go into Battersea there are probably three competing pressures; at this point I discount the pressures (self-imposed?) from above the cloud to do the best job he could for the client. Once heading down through the cloud-hole he was concentrating on putting the machine down at Battersea.

The first pressure he faced when he popped-out VFR below is noise abatement. Weather so bad, why not hover over the river and get cleared in? Not ideal from a power point of view, but solo in that machine? No problem! There is a circuit pattern at Battersea designed in part for noise abatement and hovering over the river whilst waiting for clearance would be legal (rules of flight) but generate complaints for Battersea. Safe, but very unpopular. Did it even come into his mind? Perhaps a low-hour pilot would think this way, but then a low-hour would not have been there.

So he flew the circuit

After that, as said already, he has pressures to remain +500ft from anything and to stay VFR. My guess is he was trying to do both which led to a climb and ..... he broke the 500ft rule.

[mickjoebill]

Whilst the crane is getting a lot of attention, the core question is what led him to fly within 105 feet of a prominant building?
Was it solely down to poor vis?

Police and HEMS helicopters aside, how often do helicopters fly within 100ft of buildings over London?

Would any action or report have been taken or made if he had not hit the crane?



Mickjoebill

[SilsoeSid]

Lol
My post was on for 20 seconds, I realised my mistake and deleted it.

Do you have notifications every time a post is made?

[rotorspeed]

BB - what suggestions would have as to why he climbed 200ft before starting his right 180 if it wasn't to try and comply with the rules and be less obvious? If he simply wanted to widen the turn I think he would have done this over lower buildings to the north of the river.

[airpolice]

Sid,

of course I do, that's how you stay on top of the banter.

Bear in mind that the delete key is not the same as a magic buttton.

AP

[Boudreaux Bob]

Rotor,

I have no suggestions on what he did or why he did it as my Crystal Ball is in for routine maintenance.

All I can do is consider what happened.

He hit a Crane in Cloud. Everything after that is pretty much ordinary supposition beyond the information noted by the AAIB Report.

There is an old Greek Saying that fits your question.

"I should smell my hand and know what he was thinking?"

Barnes did not record his thoughts for consideration by the rest of us.

[alouette3]

Would any action or report have been taken or made if he had not hit the crane?
Mickjoebill,

I think you might have steered this conversation in the right direction,finally.
Single pilot operations typically are unsupervised and unchallenged.If Pete had made it that day,it would be unlikely that ,other than he himself, anyone else would have got to know about how close the call was. Seen it here dozens of times.All of us have had our "never doing that again!" moments,but does that a safer operation or a safer pilot make? After all, asking a pilot to voluntarily reveal his close shaves because he pushed the limits is akin to asking a motorist who jumps a red light to stop at the next police station and turn himself in.Never going to happen. We remain human. And, there is the rub.How do operators, gently and in a non punitive way, make pilots reveal their screw ups ? Not by regulation.It has to be by building trust and constant reinforcement of that trust.
Is that possible? I don't know but I am sure it is worth a try.
Alt3

[rotorspeed]

BB - that's a bit disappointing - I thought you might have been able combine the facts provided in the report with your no doubt extensive flying experience to come up with a hypothesis or two to explain the actions that immediately lead to the impact.

Which brings me back to my earlier generalisations comment, and limitations of their value. Saying "fly safer, or "fly by the rules" is valid and reasonable, but of limited value in focussing pilots' minds on risk areas. There can be further benefit in really trying to understand what actually caused the critical error in any given accident. Take the Sumburgh Super Puma crash - what actually caused two pilots to fail to monitor speed anmd height during an approach and hit the sea? Here is not the place to answer that of course.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Rotor,

Let me put it this way for you.

As I was not there and thus have no knowledge of what he was actually seeing weather wise, and not knowing what he was thinking, it is of not much use for me to speculate about that.

That being said, there is no way in Hell I would have done what he did which was to enter Cloud, Fog, or whatever it was that prevented him from seeing where he was going. That is what is baffling about all of this as it just plain does not make any kind of sense at all that he would have done what he did.

One just does not do that kind of thing in the location and weather he was at that day.

Gordy uses a very good saying....."Ass, Tin, Ticket!".

When you get into a real Pickle you save your Ass, try to keep from harming the Helicopter, and ignore the Legal Rules even if it means losing your license for a while.

If I had dropped down to the River looking for a way to slide into the Heliport and then found myself with no where to go....I would have hover mosey'ed along the River until I found a way out and suffered the consequences of my actions. I would never punch into a Cloud or Fog Bank thinking it a wise or safe thing to do.

[Thomas coupling]

BB: I see I am out of your peanut gallery now...heh heh...:D

[CAAAD]

I asked my original question about texting because it seemed to be an unnecessary distraction.

I studied the AAIB report a bit further, and found a meticulous investigation, but a disappointing set of Recommendations, often the case in my experience.

There seems to be a general feeling on the forum that the pilot was not acting in a professional manner, despite his experience and general competency.

The AAIB have chosen to ignore behavioural issues completely in favour of plodding obstacle rule making improvements and so on.

This could have been an excellent opportunity to have made an attempt to get to grips with what appears to be a significant industry wide problem, but the AAIB have rather let us down.

[flt_lt_w_mitty]

Hoping to satisfy the Holy Trinity by stating both rotary and fixed qualifications, and having 'pushed the boundaries' more than a few times - cutting through the crap here:--

Surely the lesson is that if you are going for a bit of skoshie as Mr Hanna used to call it, don't do it
a) Below the level of nearby obstructions
b) Over built-up areas, so far less chance of taking an unfortunate bystander with you?

This does not just apply to rotary!

[Flying Lawyer]

CAAAD
I disagree with you about the AAIB's recommendations concerning obstacles (and think they should have gone further in some respects) but I agree entirely with you that they should have looked more closely into the factors which regularly lead to such accidents. In particular, but not exhaustively, the matters mentioned by puntosaurus very early in the thread.

TCHe was not (repeat) under any time, financial pressure to get to his destination.I disagree, for the reasons already suggested by others.He had been told by the customer to forget it.

He had already decided to press on AFTER his principal had told him not to bother.
That is the same customer/principal who AFTER being told by the pilot at 0753: "Over Elstree no holes I’m afraid hdg back to Redhill least we tried chat in 10" then sent him a text two minutes later saying: "Battersea is open." The AAIB concluded, correctly in my opinion, that it was likely that the customer's message led to the pilot (wrongly) deciding to divert to Battersea instead of continuing in VMC to to Redhill.
Report 2.3.2: The flying time from Redhill Aerodrome to overhead London Heliport is short, so the operational advantage of waiting at the heliport rather than the aerodrome is not obvious. The pilot might have thought that the client intended to drive to the heliport and that to position the helicopter there in advance of the client’s arrival would be advantageous from a commercial perspective. This seemed likely given that the pilot appeared to decide to divert to the heliport immediately after he learned from the client that it was open.For the avoidance of any misunderstanding, I am not defending his decision to do so.

For some reason, you believe that those who disagree with your approach either haven’t been listening to you or don’t understand. I suspect most posters agree with most of what you've said about this accident. However, not everyone agrees that the factors which led to it are as simple and straightforward as you and some others believe. There are other factors which need to be considered and addressed. (I'm not referring to "subliminal psychoanalytical, interdevelopmental breakdown.")

There have been differences of opinion regarding texting while flying in VMC but everyone appears to be agreed that the pilot exercised poor judgment when he left VMC and, as ShyTorque said earlier, made the fatal mistake of descending into fog lifting into low cloud. Those, such as Piltdown Man, who have argued that there should be more careful examination of the factors which may have led this pilot to do what he did (and many other pilots before him to make similar poor judgments) have been wrongly accused failing to understand and by one poster of 'defending' the pilot. They have done neither.

John R81 To me that facts that led to him dropping down through the sucker-hole are interesting in that they led to that decision. Part of the investigation and something to learn from for sure, but separate from what happened down below cloud.
I agree.


FL

[Boudreaux Bob]

FL,

Did the AAIB determine what the Client meant when he reported the Heliport "Open"? Did the Client know for a fact the weather was above Minimums for Operations at the Heliport or was it a blanket reference meaning only the "Opening Time" was at hand?

Likewise, when ATC told the Pilot the Heliport was "Open", did that tell the Pilot the Weather was satisfactory for VFR Operations into the Heliport?

How is Ceiling/Visibility measured at the Heliport and reported to Inbound Traffic?

Must Inbound Traffic remain clear of the Heliport until given permission to enter?

Is it ATC that issues that clearance or someone at the Heliport?

[Flying Lawyer]

Bob

I have already quoted what the AAIB said about Client's final text.
I have no reason to believe that the client knew anything about the Minimums for Operations at the Heliport. That was not the AAIB's point; nor is it mine.
No, it was not "a blanket reference meaning only the "Opening Time" was at hand."


Re your other questions:
The communications regarding diverting to Battersea are fully set out in the report. Again for the avoidance of any misunderstanding, I am not criticising ATC.
I am not trying to defend either the pilot's decision to descend or his actions thereafter.

I am interested in the factors which led to his decision to descend because that is the area which in my opinion has never been sufficiently explored and might have potential for improving flight safety. Perhaps it won't, but IMHO it's worth trying.

[Boudreaux Bob]

FL,

I was not being critical of your posts, just wanting to make sure of what the facts and situation was re those issues. You know I very much consider you to be One to listen to closely.

The Rules, ATC, Weather, Client, Operator, and every other factor can conspire (even unknowingly) to create a Mine Field for us but it is up to us to tread safely and not step squarely on top of those we can see.

In this particular case, there is only one way the Finger can point in that regard.

That being said, I fully agree with your desire to see a much broader review of all those factors and influences that played a role in this and other similar accidents such as the 139 Crash and the Glasgow Police Crash.

All three of these tragedies have some related factors that need examination.

[ShyTorque]

I'll say it again.....in aviation, sometimes the most difficult thing is knowing when to say "NO!", and of course, also having the strength of character to say it.

The saying "Ass, tin, ticket" is a good mantra, but it also needs suffixing with the word "Job".

Human nature means that pilots will continue to learn the hard way.

[Bertie Thruster]

Would it make any difference to this discussion if there were links to a video and still photos showing a pilot flying reasonably but breaking regulations for HEMS flying, on 2 different jobs?

[rantanplane]

Breaking exactly what regulations? Flying single crew VFR in cloud = zero vis! next to tall buildings, means a lot closer than 500ft? Above London? Tokyo? NY city? Thank god I live in a bungalow. On the countryside.

[BOAC]

.........if only he had turned left from the right bank.......................

I recall someone asking on the previous thread about an assessment of forward speed - the AAIB makes no mention I could find. Did anyone do the maths from the radar plots?

[SilsoeSid]

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/3-2014%20G-CRST.pdf
Page 13

1.6.3 GPS devices
The helicopter was fitted with two panel-mounted GPS units, a Bendix King
KMD 150 and Garmin 430, both of which have a colour moving-map display.
The Garmin 430 can provide navigation, communications, and terrain and
obstacle warning functionality. There are two memory card slots provided to
allow the integration of database information. Typically one would be used for
navigation data and the other to provide terrain and obstacle information. Each
card can be accessed from a quick-release slot on the front of the device.

1.6.3.1 Terrain and obstacle warning
If a valid database and three dimensional position fix is available, the Garmin
430 will be able to display terrain and obstacles relative to the helicopter
altitude and position. For obstacle avoidance, the display features a number of
different symbols representing the different levels of alert and types of obstacle

In addition, the device can use flight path data to trigger an alert in respect
of terrain or obstacles which may present a hazard. If an alert is triggered,
the ‘TERRAIN’ page provides a flashing ‘TERRAIN’ annunciation8 in the lower
left-hand corner ‘annunciator field’ (Figure 7). There is an option to inhibit this
annunciation although the symbols in Figure 6 will still be available. When
activated, this will be displayed on the ‘annunciator field’ as ‘TER INHB’.

1.6.3.2 Database update
The GPS units fitted to G-CRST were destroyed in the post-impact fire and it
was not possible to determine their database revision status at the time of the
accident. The terrain and obstacle database to which the GPS manufacturer
refers on its website is available on a subscription basis and updated on a
56‑day cycle.
Operators can download database updates and transfer the data to GPS units
in individual aircraft. As the GPS unit is a customer option rather than standard
equipment, updates are not a scheduled maintenance requirement in the
helicopter manufacturer’s maintenance planning document and, in the case
of G-CRST, were not logged by the maintenance provider as a maintenance
action. The operator stated that it updated GPS databases annually in March
and had not updated the database in G‑CRST because it received the aircraft
in May 2012.

All well and good, but does anyone know when the terrain feature was added to the 430?
From what I can see with the paperwork I have here, any units pre 2007 didn't have the terrain feature.

The accident helicopter was serial number 11017 and was manufactured by
Agusta in 1998. At the last log book entry prior to the accident, the airframe
had accumulated 2,304.5 flight hours since new. The engines were original to
the airframe and had the same number of hours since new. The helicopter had
previously been operated in the UK on the USA register but was transferred to
the UK register in 2007 as G-WRBI.

[SASless]

Saw this on Facebook this Morning......


Helicopter pilot who crashed in central London felt 'pressure' to fly despite bad weather - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/12015190/Helicopter-pilot-who-crashed-in-central-London-felt-pressure-to-fly-despite-bad-weather.html)

[76fan]

Was helicopter crash pilot 'under pressure' to complete flight? - Get Surrey (http://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/surrey-news/helicopter-crash-pilot-under-pressure-10501587)

[maddmatt]

This is the most relevant section of that report for me...

"It is clear from text message records and witness evidence that the pilot
knew before flight that there was fog at Elstree Aerodrome. In a telephone
conversation with a colleague at 0649 hrs, he said he was going to cancel the
flight because of the weather despite feeling under pressure to continue with
it. At 0706 hrs, he reportedly told Witness A that he intended to fly over Elstree
to check the weather for himself and, at 0729 hrs, he sent a text to the client
saying that he would be “coming anyway will land in a field if I have to”. "

It clearly shows he changed his mind, probably due to being pressured, “coming anyway will land in a field if I have to”. and this is the start of a very bad day.

[SASless]

I learned a long time ago that "Weather Checks" are done from the Ground.....either it is good enough or it is not. I know of very few fatalities inside a Tea Room.

[Pittsextra]

Was helicopter crash pilot 'under pressure' to complete flight? - Get Surrey (http://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/surrey-news/helicopter-crash-pilot-under-pressure-10501587)

Re: some of the comments attributed to Tinkler-Rose and Ms Smith. Any view as to why none of this was reflected in the AAIB report?

[[email protected]]

We are, as pilots, our own worst enemies - we have belief in our own abilities borne out of succeeding through our training and spending years 'getting the job done' and we all believe we are excellent assessors of risk and will always know when to say NO (as Shy observes this is a notoriously difficult word to utter when the pressure is on).

The risk vs reward decision we would make from the ground before the engine is started is vastly different to the one we will make when airborne with a task to complete.

Is there an easy answer? No, but at least recognising that we are the weak link may go some way to making extra allowances for 'the wife and kids' when electing to push on when that little nagging voice in your ear (not her indoors) is telling you to turn round and go home.

This is what all that Human Factors training is supposed to make us understand but self imposed pressure and ego seem to keep us from fully absorbing and applying that training.

When you get to the edge of your capacity and multitasking ability it is much more of a 'cliff-edge' than most would expect and that is where we get overwhelmed by events and make big mistakes.

[Wageslave]

coming anyway will land in a field if I have to

What, beyond this astonishingly reckless statement do we need to know to determine the ultimate cause of the accident?

I have walked away from an operator who expected wholesale disregard of normal safety protocols . Although it saved my arse from official grief it cost me the job and much worse left him still in the market with his unsuspecting posh and glossily brochured clients just as exposed. I'll make no implication regarding a connection or otherwise with this incident but go figure.
The cowboys and the chancers (for this is what they are) who operate towards such pressures should have no place in the industry, even though it voluntarily costs decent honest pilots their jobs.
Sure, it isn't easy for honest pilots to object to such pressure as I found out, but it does, ultimately leave them alive and free of guilt.

[SilsoeSid]

Pittsextra;
Re: some of the comments attributed to Tinkler-Rose and Ms Smith. Any view as to why none of this was reflected in the AAIB report?

If one was to read the report, page 8;


History of the flight
1.1.2 Text messages and phone calls

At 0649 hrs, the pilot received a call from another pilot who was a colleague from a different helicopter operation. The pilot reportedly told his colleague that the weather was clear at Redhill Aerodrome and at his final destination but he expressed his concern about the weather at Elstree. The pilot told his colleague that he felt under pressure to go ahead with the flight that morning but he had decided to cancel it.

Another pilot (Witness A) was aware of the flights planned by the pilot of G-CRST. He stated to the investigation that the pilot phoned him at 0706 hrs to tell him that the weather at Redhill was clear and that he was going to collect a passenger from Elstree. The pilot said there was fog at Elstree but he was going to fly overhead to see for himself.

At 0718 hrs, the client called the pilot to discuss the weather. The client stated to the investigation that the pilot said he thought the weather might clear earlier than forecast. The client said he would drive to Elstree and call the pilot to keep him advised.

The client reported that, at 0731 hrs, having noticed how poor the weather was during his journey, he called the pilot to suggest that he should not take off until he (the client) had reached Elstree and observed the weather. According to the client, the pilot replied that he was already starting the engines and so the client repeated his suggestion that the pilot should not take off.

page 48

Decision making
2.3.1 The decision to depart from Redhill Aerodrome

It is clear from text message records and witness evidence that the pilot knew before flight that there was fog at Elstree Aerodrome. In a telephone conversation with a colleague at 0649 hrs, he said he was going to cancel the flight because of the weather despite feeling under pressure to continue with it. At 0706 hrs, he reportedly told Witness A that he intended to fly over Elstree to check the weather for himself and, at 0729 hrs, he sent a text to the client saying that he would be “coming anyway will land in a field if I have to”.

The pilot was subject to operational and commercial pressures and was required to consider their associated risks when making the decision to operate the flight. The weather conditions at Redhill Aerodrome had begun to clear (see Figure 10) and the pilot would have been able to return there if the weather at Elstree Aerodrome reflected the forecast. He therefore had a safe contingency plan before departure. However, the weather forecast indicated that a large proportion of the flight was likely to be conducted above the cloud or fog, icing was likely during flight within cloud and there was a low probability of being able to land at Elstree Aerodrome because there was no instrument approach procedure.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f5d7ed915d1374000581/3-2014_G-CRST.pdf

[SASless]

As I ponder all of this....the question that is begged....is why the reference to "landing in a field"?

Did Barnes make a practice of off airport landings in the past in order to accommodate his Clients when weather at Airports or other formal landing sites precluded "normal" operations?

Or....did his sense of humor allow for such a comment that at this stage of things come across with far too much significance that is warranted?

With Redhill and other locations in the Clear.....why would he mention the possibility of landing in a field?

[SilsoeSid]

A very good question S'less, one that makes me think that the ability to land in a field makes some of us with a certain mindset, depart in weather conditions below that where if the field landing wasn't an option, they wouldn't have taken off in the first place.

Imho, the rotary ability to land 'in a field' and the thought of using it as a considered option if the met's a little dodgy, is nothing more than an empty chamber in the cylinder of the revolver used in the game known as Met Roulette. Unfortunately either side of that particular chamber are the gotchas!

We can get caught out and the forecasts can be wrong, however on this particular day ….

[Pittsextra]

Hi Sid - I read that but it seems to me that the comments being attributed to T-Rose this week suggest a greater concern, a longer standing unhappiness that a career change would be of interest, that Rose had told him to bin the flight and that in the weeks prior there were other issues with the same client.

[ShyTorque]

I know of very few fatalities inside a Tea Room.

Very true. Unfortunately, that's sometimes where the pilot learns his services are no longer required.

[SilsoeSid]

Hi Pitts, I guess the report can only go on the evidence.

Client problems with other pilots and the client only wanting to fly with certain people is information possibly not factual enough to be included in the AAIB report, besides, that is something Mr Caring denies anyway Owner of The Ivy says he did not pressure crash pilot into flying - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/12017056/Owner-of-The-Ivy-says-he-did-not-pressure-crash-pilot-into-flying.html).

Mr Tinkler-Rose added Mr Barnes had told him he was tired of the pressures of the private helicopter industry and wanted to move into the environment of private jets.

Perhaps the client was part of this 'career change' and to let Mr Caring down on that morning may have been seen as jeopardised this new future.

https://www.rt.com/uk/226223-blair-private-jet-donor/

"The luxurious private jet used by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and dubbed ‘Blair Force One’ is reportedly owned by one of Britain’s richest men.
Blair uses the plane, a £30 million Bombardier Global Express jet, which comes with a stateroom, kitchen, lounge and bed, as he travels around the world as a consultant.
The Telegraph revealed the private jet belongs to Richard Caring, whose fortune is estimated at £800 million ($1.2 billion)."


I see what you mean about recent comments and it's interesting to note that the AAIB report mentions, "The pilot told his colleague that he felt under pressure to go ahead with the flight that morning but he had decided to cancel it.". Yet now at the Coroners Court we hear; "he told a colleague he felt under "extreme pressure" to go ahead with the flight despite bad weather."

Maybe the added adjective has something to do with Mr Caring's comment at the CC;

"Mr Caring also criticised previous evidence from an air ambulance colleague of Captain Barnes, Shaun Tinkler-Rose, who suggested Captain Barnes was placed under "pressure" by his client to fly.
Mr Caring described Mr Tinkler-Rose's evidence as "extreme" and added: "I believe Mr Tinkler-Rose is slightly confused in his understanding of the use of commercial helicopters."
He described Mr Tinkler-Rose as a "frustrated pilot," and disputed the notion commercial helicopter clients are "control freaks or people who can't take no for an answer.""

[rotorspeed]

SASless

In an ideal world weather decisions are indeed made on the ground, but the reality is, particularly in the UK where the nearest met report maybe 50 miles away, going to have a look and seeing if the weather is suitable when at the planned destination is the only - and a sensible - option, providing of course (a) there is a solid alternate if not, with appropriate fuel, and (b) someone is prepared to pay for a possible aborted flight. And fog can be notoriously patchy - from the nearest METARS a site may appear to be surely fogged out, but when there it can be gin clear. This exact scenario was possible for this accident flight. But a good alternate - Redhill - was not used.

[Flying Bull]

@rotorspeed,

with thousands of webcams, even smal airports with automatic weather (and often webcams) one isn´t limitted to the view official met-reports....

[[email protected]]

Would you really trust a webcam or an automated weather report to make a real-world go-no-go decision if you knew it was marginal? I know I wouldn't.

[Flying Bull]

@ [email protected]

yes I do - very often, especially at night, when the number of reporting points is reduced.
I made a linklist of places within my operating area on my homepage, so that I can access the links from PC as well as mobile phone / pad, in case I have to check after an outside landing (i.e. refueling at an closed airport).
With official permission to fly outside normal limitations and often missions which include search for people, who will certainly die, if not found in time, the additional information is very useful.
Also the radarmovies online are very very helpful for timing or routing to get to the mission area or back.

[SASless]

Automated weather reporting sites are becoming quite common here in the USA.....and are used in preflight planning.

How common are those kinds of facilities in the UK?

Thinking of ASOS, AWOS, and similar units.

https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/weather/asos/

[ShyTorque]

Would you really trust a webcam or an automated weather report to make a real-world go-no-go decision if you knew it was marginal? I know I wouldn't.Crab, me old chap... suggest you take a look at the METARS for Heathrow, London City, Stansted etc... the word AUTO is the norm for quite a few UK airfields these days!

My regular operating site's nearest weather station is ten nm away, often with very different met. conditions. With regard to fog being present or not, at the time of your task, the only sure way is to go and have a look for yourself. Five minutes either way can make a lot of difference. Same when operating to early morning off airport destination landing sites. too. It's a regular part of the corporate job. Otherwise, the pax would be flying fixed wing to the nearest airport and driving to the destination and the corporate helicopter business would be no more. Obviously, a suitable alternative/diversion needs to be available and PB did have one.

I don't think PB's decision to go take a look at Elstree was totally flawed except by doing so (in circumstances with a relatively poor chance of success, in view of the initial discussion by phone with the client), he probably put unnecessary personal and commercial pressure on himself.

Once the aircraft had taken off, it began burning fuel and using aircraft hours. Obviously, declaring a "no can do" on the ground, due to weather, is one thing, but to burn fuel and hours and then finish on a "no show" means the difference between making a profit or a loss for the company.

As I said before, the really bad decision was to change from his initial safe plan B, to RTB and instead attempt to get to Battersea in conditions that were only suitable for IFR, when it is a strictly VFR only airport.

Shame that having stated he was unhappy with the pressure of corporate flying, (it sometimes gets all of us that way) he put undue and tragically terminal pressure on himself. Even had he managed to land at Battersea, how he thought he would get away with "altitude busting" right down into R157 is hard to understand unless he thought he was actually flying clear of it, possibly further to the west. I still believe he may have seen a bridge over the Thames through a gap in the low cloud and mistaken it for another. It's an easy mistake to make. Although a regular user of some parts of the Helilanes, I still sometimes have to check the 50,000 chart when given a Thames bridge as part of a short notice or unexpected clearance and at such times the pilot workload can be very high indeed.

[SASless]

The rest of the calculation needs doing too....if you have a result such as in this Tragedy....what is the "Cost" versus "Gain" numbers?

Otherwise, I fully agree with everything you had to say in that post.

We should be like Doctors....and "Do No Harm!".

Once the aircraft had taken off, it began burning fuel and using aircraft hours. Obviously, declaring a "no can do" on the ground, due to weather, is one thing, but to burn fuel and hours and then finish on a "no show" means the difference between making a profit or a loss for the company.

[Gordy]

Weather Cameras are the way of the future, the CAA needs to catch up:

FAA Weather Cameras (http://avcams.faa.gov/)

Pick a camera and click it---then click an image to see all the info it gives. Try Barrow--way up North.

[[email protected]]

Crab, me old chap... suggest you take a look at the METARS for Heathrow, London City, Stansted etc... the word AUTO is the norm for quite a few UK airfields these days! Maybe I'm just lucky having access to MOMIDS and a met man/girl to talk to.

I don't have a problem with auto reporting but not for a really marginal go/no go unless I have a viable plan B ready to go when it turns out worse than expected.

[ShyTorque]

Crab, indeed you are very fortunate; the corporate helicopter pilot is often very much on his own in many respects.

If any helicopter task involves marginal wx conditions, especially with regards to fog (as we all know, it's a met man's guess with regards to timings of clearance), it would be a very foolish pilot who takes off without a plan B and IFR fuel reserves.

[[email protected]]

Agreed - but there are clearly those who will still do exactly that - unfortunately we often read about them post event.

[SASless]

Civilian Flying is a whole different way of life than Military flying.

As Shy correctly states....in the Civilian World the Pilot is generally completely on One's own.

No Met Staff, no Engineering Section, No Ops Staff, and no one looking over your Shoulder to approve your decisions.

[ShyTorque]

SAS, that's correct.

There's no authorisation oversight, no ops staff, so no-one to book your airfield slot clearances or find suitable off airport landing sites (and gain the CAA permssions where needed), arrange aircraft hangarage, your overnight accommodation, transport to and from it .... Then the check A, oil replens etc are all done by you because the engineers don't get to see the aircraft for weeks...it goes on. Of course, as an added bonus, the pilot gets to carry the passenger's luggage.

[ANOrak]

.....unless he thought he was actually flying clear of it, possibly further to the west. I still believe he may have seen a bridge over the Thames through a gap in the low cloud and mistaken it for another. It's an easy mistake to make.

I think Shy has hit the nail on the head and, knowing the area well and having had the privilege of knowing Pete, I believe that this was the real cause of this tragic accident.

[[email protected]]

SAS, unlike a lot of military flying, SAR aircraft launch all hours of the day and night with minimal planning time, sketchy details of the job, next to no idea what weather they will find on scene and often in the sorts of weather that most other sensible people don't go flying in at all.

By comparison - a civilian corporate pilot seems to have it quite easy:ok:

[500e]

Duck Crab Incoming:eek:

[Torquetalk]

Damn Crab, you really are trolling for bites with that one.


I haven't done SAR, but have done HEMS where the criteria you list are met. Have also worked in the single pilot charter environment. There is simply no comparison as far as workload goes, either on or off the job. The lack of team (crew) on the job, and the lack of team (back office support) in the SP corporate world means the workload is simply immense.




TT

[Flying Bull]

Even SAR-pilots should - and actually say no.

Hard decissions, cause you know, somebody is going to die - but better somebody else, I don´t know, than the crew and me.....

We have limits - which protect the younger ones cause they can say no below these limits without any query.

The older ones often fly below these limits - but only, as long as the whole crew is "happy" with that.
Every crewmember is entiteld to cancel the mission, if excecuted below the limits - no discussion after that.

Had some interesting outside landings, twice the helicopter had to stay there for about a week, cause the weather prohibited any returnflight...
Nice service of some locals with tea and accommodation (the rest of the first night) included.....

[ShyTorque]

By comparison - a civilian corporate pilot seems to have it quite easy:ok:

Having done both (which I know Crab hasn't, so he's not yet fully completed his civvie apprenticeship :E), plus military, HEMS and Police, I quickly found the SPIFR corporate world can be the most demanding. Not always, but often, for a number of reasons, the airborne workoad can be extremely high.

SAR pilots have usually got very little to do except drink tea ( ;) ) and always more than one other person in the aircraft to help them once airborne, let alone that well established base organisation to help prep the helicopter and pull it out of the hangar before you even came on shift.

In the corporate world, there is often only one shift. And you're often on it. 24/7.

On SAR, you don't have the person who directly pays your salary sitting in the back, always there to make your day by interrupting you with further demands and suggestion at the most critical of moments, such as the second you initiate an IMC go-around from minima. Try doing your daily job with the equivalent of the chief of the air staff in the cabin, always ready to press the "bing bong" button...

Also, it is always a bonus to be able to use a "Rescue" callsign.
Try getting any priority from ATC units when you're only allowed to use the aircraft reg. as your callsign. Like it or not, you're at the bottom of the pecking order with the puddle jumpers. :ouch:

Speaking of puddle "jumping", the worst job of the day is lying in one after last landing to fit the towing arm because it's nearly midnight and everyone else has gone home.

Having written this, I'm thinking I'd now like to go back to SAR for a rest. :ok:

[[email protected]]

Yes, SAR is just sooooo easy - just remind me how far out to sea with nowhere to land or refuel do corporate pilots fly (day or night), and I must have forgotten the workload involved in night mountains in the snow and wind, hovertaxying in near zero vis with cumulogranitas all around.

Oh and then there is no pressure at all trying to get to a hospital as fast as possible in shi*e weather with guys giving CPR to the casualty(ies)in the back.

And I must be mis-remembering hovering downwind with no references with 250' of cable out and 2 pink bodies dangling on the end - it must be so much more difficult to negotiate a helilanes clearance with a nice air trafficker to get to Battersea during the day.

I presently train pilots up for the SPIFR role and it really isn't rocket science:ok:

Perhaps if the corporate world is so difficult and demanding with so much pressure, the pilots should choose to say no more often:)

[jellycopter]

OK Crab, you've obviously got the biggest Willy on this forum.

[SASless]

Back to Neutral Corners fellas....both jobs have their unique demands.

Both have different setups and ways of doing things.

Crab will in time fully understand what we refer to when we talk of doing things alone....and not just the in-flight SPIFR thing....that is but one part of the job.

EMS pilots know that feeling of looking over their shoulder as their Crew pull every trick they have out of the Bag to save some poor Sod who is having a bad day.

Most places I worked that could be several times a day/night thing for them every shift they work.

We all have flown in crappy weather, a lot of us have done the winching in bad weather thing or done Lifts with folks dangling below us.

Going offshore to the very limits of your fuel endurance is not that uncommon as you try to offer the Customer the max number of seats....which is not much different than SAR as I know very few SAR Pilots who go beyond their fuel limit and cause themselves to have to land in the Oggin.

Crab might just accept that when a Civilian Contractor replaces the Military on some Contracted Task we always do so with fewer aircraft, fewer Staff, and with a higher rate of utilization. That is why we make money doing it.

[ShyTorque]

Damn Crab, you really are trolling for bites with that one.

The fish are not biting - but they're jumping in the boat... ;)

[JerryG]

Give it a break Crab.
I've done both jobs to the max.
SAR takes good airmanship but Corporate involves MUCH harder decisions, believe me.

[[email protected]]

I've done both jobs to the max. Oh dear - now who's got his willy out??:E

[ShyTorque]

Perhaps if the corporate world is so difficult and demanding with so much pressure, the pilots should choose to say no more often:)

Some of us do. The real skill is when you can say no and keep your job.

[Two's in]

Despite the humor of the dick-dance, you are all saying the same thing. Whatever the job entails, the critical component will be the Captaincy decisions that allow you to complete the mission safely. The corporate world has the added fun of trying to keep your job (by keeping your bosses happy) but it all counts for nothing if you kill yourself or your passengers through inadequate or poor decision making (i.e. Basic Captaincy).

This incident illustrated tragically (again) that accidents are no respecter of experience, on the day, the only decision that counts is the last one you made, regardless of how many hours you have under your belt.

[Sir Korsky]

SAR pilots have usually got very little to do except drink tea

Don't forget ' and do some pruuning ' Shy.

I had a situation this week where the weather was SOP borderline and the temps made IFR not an option. I told the pax you may not get to your off airport LZ but we'll do our best. He agreed to continue. We did some dog legging to circumnavigate the bad stuff to stay VFR. It was night time, raining and miserable. We used IAS mode to slow things way down when required - a very important step. Don't charge around when things get murky. On many occasions I asked the SIC if he was happy to continue. We got the customer to his destination and he was happy. We added an extra 10 minutes or so to the trip, but I couldn't care less. We had abort plans set at every step and we weren't afraid to cut our losses and divert. Sticking to your guns is a critical part of decision making and I'm not the gambling type.

[Thomas coupling]

Anorak:


Quote:
.....unless he thought he was actually flying clear of it, possibly further to the west. I still believe he may have seen a bridge over the Thames through a gap in the low cloud and mistaken it for another. It's an easy mistake to make.
I think Shy has hit the nail on the head and, knowing the area well and having had the privilege of knowing Pete, I believe that this was the real cause of this tragic accident.

As much as we all loved him. He had cause to "drop the ball" for a second or two and it was all over. More weight to the statistic that 72% of all UK (global?) accidents are pilot induced.

Crab: I think one of the biggest differences between Corporate pressure and SAR pressure is that the former drags on continuously - way before and beyond the actual trip. The latter arrives in a lorry load - minutes before the trip and ends, seconds after you coast in and are visual with the airfield.
It is the constant drip drip drip of pressure that causes even the best (like this crash) to drop their guard for a few seconds.

For corporate drivers, the pressure starts as soon as the alarm clock goes off.

[JerryG]

He had cause to "drop the ball" for a second or two and it was all over.

Hear hear TC. Let those amongst us who are without sin cast the first stone.

[Thomas coupling]

Jerry - do you honestly think it was anything else?

[SASless]

Twas more than a few Seconds I would suggest....there was a long string of Uh-Oh's!

Way back for instance when the Client called and said the weather too bad...scrub the flight.....for starters.

[JulieAndrews]

Just been fluffing myself up to get big enough to enter the ring - suffice to say - done most types of flying, mil and civ, fixed and rotary - obviously fixed-wing doesn't count as runways don't move!

CRAB - Forget the SPIFR bit, not great magic there, it is the fact you are on your Jack Jones when you need to discuss a situation or re-think decision..
No 'co' to hear sucking his teeth,
No Winch-op with a sarky comment,
No Winchman to tut, no ground crew to raise an eyebrow, no cleaning lady....
Get the picture?

EMS & Police both have crews.
Corporate is the toughest flying environment I have worked in without getting shot at.
O&G is money for old rope, very few 'Captaincy' decisions to make, regardless what they try and say. So regulated and monitored yet they still fly into the sea and kill people!

But please, no more BS. The onshore industry is one of the 'gashest' I have experienced. PB was not the first to fly out of limits, over a congested area, bursting every 500' bubble as he went. Does anyone think it was his first time?.
The big problem is he killed someone else this time.
If you have ever muttered that crass phrase 'There go by the grace of God go I' and raised a glass to someone who died breaking the rules then you are part of the problem.
The industry needs to mature and hold itself accountable - trouble is , the CAA/BHA don't have the nowse and are too busy ignoring what the O&G owners are up too - and no, the latest safety regulations have changed nothing in the way they operate.
So please don't dismiss such flying as just a tragic mishap - PB will be missed but not sure about Rotormotion.
A bit more honesty and integrity won't go amiss in the industry.
If corporate choppers had HFDM/HOMPs then there would be no excuses and some accountability that is sorely missing.
HFDM is insisted on by the customer for O&G machines - not the operator.
It is now the norm but of course far to expensive, bulky, a maintenance burden for a simple corporate machine......until mandated after CAA ran out of ideas.
GPS & Radar data helps but does not yet flag-up to Chief Pilot when flying was outside SOPs or a particular pilot setting trends.
So - a long hard look in the mirror.
Grow some balls and stop making the industry appear so 'gash'.
Those of you that fear for your job because you dared to use all that experience and not fly the owner - whatever happened to 'if there's doubt, there's no doubt'??
Perhaps those pilots who do not allocate time for contingency plans and force themselves into blind alleys through over-confidence and forgetting lessons previously learnt will be culled the natural way - just tragic they kill others in the process.
Getting tired hearing of previous daring-do tales of scud running below minima to get the job done after another tradegy. Especially when all the 'job' is is flying some guy to throw lead at a bird!
How many of you have literally been waiting for this sort of accident to happen - "I told you so".
For those of you that think this is hindsight - maybe you should spend more time thinking about who you fly and why you fly?
To challenge yourself? To challenge the weather limits?
So when an experienced aviator says he would have been sat in the tearoom knowing he had done everything possible but fly then don't retort with the 'fear of losing job' statement - your job is to get punter from A to B iaw simple rules.
If you can't do that then you are doing no one, least of all the industry, any favours.

[MightyGem]

Good post, Julie.

The company that I used to work for as a Police pilot, also did charter work. One afternoon they called the next day's customer and told him it was highly unlikely that they'd be able to get him to his destination for the next day due to cloud/fog. They offered to get him to a (fairly)close airfield and arrange onward transport. The customer said he'd call back.

He called back and said thanks, but he'd found someone who was sure that he could get him to his destination.

He called back again the next day to say that his pilot had scared them both ****less try to get to the destination and had ended up leaving him at the aforementioned airfield, where he'd had to find his own way.

He said he'd never questioned their judgement again.

[Pozidrive]

An interesting story, Mighty Gem.


I'm trying to imagine an ideal world where incidents like this are reported to the regulator. All concerned are then gathered round a table and encouraged to discuss what happened. No threats of prosecution, not the first time anyway, just treat it as a learning experience.


Would that be a grown-up 21st century approach to safety? Any other suggestions?

[[email protected]]

CRAB - Forget the SPIFR bit, not great magic there, it is the fact you are on your Jack Jones when you need to discuss a situation or re-think decision.. Isn't that called Captaincy? If you need to ask someone about your decisions, what are you doing operating single pilot in the first place?

it is illuminating to see some truth about the corporate sector for a change rather than the d^ck-swinging about how hard it is and how stressful it can be.

It is clearly a cut-throat business where the customers have to learn first-hand what the downside is of going cheap and cheerful and believing him when pilot B says 'I can get you there' after pilot A has declined.

Is suspect one problem is that some of the rich and powerful don't think rules, regulations, weather and time constraints apply to them - otherwise they would just drive instead of trying to make a statement by travelling in a helicopter.

But who are the people really causing the problem in this industry? Oh yes, the pilots who keep taking the risks to impress their customers.!

If you really don't like it - don't do the job.

[jellycopter]

Mighty Gem, is your anecdote hinting at PB and Rotormotion, or am I over-thinking it when I read between the lines?

JJ

[ShyTorque]

Mighty Gem, I can say from personal experience that this sort of thing still goes on.

As I said before, the sensible, "good " pilot, who declines a flight for good reason is seen as a "bad" pilot by certain customers.

In their eyes, the only "good" pilot is the one who takes risks/breaks the law on their behalf and gets away with it.

But when that pilot doesn't get away with it and is involved in an accident, those same customers take very large backward steps and say it's nothing to do with them.

It happpens time and time again.

[paco]

Julie - well said!

phil

[ShyTorque]

it is illuminating to see some truth about the corporate sector for a change rather than the d^ck-swinging about how hard it is and how stressful it can be.

It is clearly a cut-throat business where the customers have to learn first-hand what the downside is of going cheap and cheerful and believing him when pilot B says 'I can get you there' after pilot A has declined.

Crab, please don't forget that many experienced corporate pilots in UK are ex military and many will have your present level of experience plus more gained outside the service in wider roles.

Those who have flown, or do fly, the corporate sector understand very well why the first paragraph of your post is a direct result of the second!

Those not exposed to its vagaries and pressures should be somewhat thankful that they are generally protected from it to a greater degree.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Some pilots are skittish about flying in bad weather; some are more comfortable in it. Does this make the "more comfortable" ones bad pilots?

I laugh when I read pilots haughtily talk about what *they* would do in such-and-such situation. "I would just cancel before ever taking off!!" It's funny because it's not all that cut-and-dried. Aviation never is. Those of us who've worked in these hybrid "corporate/personal" jobs are well experienced with the pressures they can bring on top of our own self-induced pressure.

We've all had cases where the weather was crappy but forecast to improve "in a while." So we call the boss.

Me: Can't go, man, weather is too bad.

Boss: When is it scheduled to clear? (Heh, "scheduled to clear," I love that one.)

Me: Well, the *forecast* is calling for some improvement in a couple of hours.

Boss: Call me when we can go.

15 minutes later, when the boss notices some tiny improvement in the fog...

Boss: Have you checked the weather? Can we go now?

Me: Still pretty bad...this *might* be the beginning of the improvement, or it might just be a temporary lifting of the fog and it'll close back in.

Boss: So can we go??

Me: No. I'll call you when we can.

15 minutes later...

You see, not all aircraft owners defer completely to the judgment of their pilots. They can be quite pushy. Some exert direct pressure; some exert it in other, more subtle ways. In the end, you're always keenly aware that your job is on the line. I put up with such a boss for nearly four years before finally throwing in the towel. Fortunately, such incidents were rare, given that the weather in the area I fly is fairly benign most of the year. But there were times. Oh there were times...

It's easy to say, "Just quit then! That guy shouldn't even own an aircraft!" Very easy to say from the comfort of your computer chair and keyboard. Not so easy to say when you've got a mortgage and a car payment and a wife and kids who've grown accustomed to, you know, eating. Where I live, there are no other flying jobs; my guy had the only corporate/personal ship around, and there are no charter companies, not even a flight school to work at. So what's a fella to do?

The 109 pilot screwed up, made a huge error of judgment and performance. He was obviously unsure of his exact location and allowed himself to fly into visibility so bad he evidently couldn't see out ahead at all. Why did he do it? We'll never know. I can put myself in his shoes, because I've been there. As luck would have it, I didn't die.

All we can take away from this accident is that we all make mistakes, even the "best" of us. Please try to not let it happen to you.

[FC80]

it is illuminating to see some truth about the corporate sector for a change rather than the d^ck-swinging about how hard it is and how stressful it can be.


Pot, this is kettle, over.

[JulieAndrews]

"Isn't that called Captaincy? If you need to ask someone about your decisions, what are you doing operating single pilot in the first place?"

Sorry - didn't make myself clear.....
Did not mean that the Jack Jones Captain feels he must ask someone - just meant that, as with every decision, you collate all the factors, utilize what experience is present etc etc blah blah - such a luxury is not available to Jack Jones.
In my younger days I've had an initial 'urge', 'whim' or 'enthusiasm' tempered by others in the crew - remember that the average age of a combat pilot was n,n,n,n,n,n,nineteen at the time - but of course now that I'm older and wiser I let them think they make the decisions and go along with it if it's safe/efficient - I find I also learn more and the CRM cup floweth over ;-)

Crab - I would hope you don't think captaincy is making a decision then taking the crew along for the ride? You mischievous tease.

[[email protected]]

Those who have flown, or do fly, the corporate sector understand very well why the first paragraph of your post is a direct result of the second! Shy, I understand that completely and I am well aware that many corporate pilots don't have your experience or skills to fall back on when things get tough with the weather/customer.

What I find strange is that so many corporate or ex-corporate pilots have taken and will continue to take those risks just to stay in a job they hate.

We have all had crap jobs but you have 2 choices - put up with it or leave, unfortunately some seem to want to put up with it and then moan about how hard and difficult it is on these pages.

FC80 - I may extol the virtues of SAR but that is because it is a brilliant job and I loved doing it for many years because of the challenges - I don't tell everyone how hard it was and then moan about how much I hated it which appears to be the corporate pilots maxim.

Julie - Captaincy is bringing the crew with you and including them in your decision, not something that has ever been a problem I have found. If you are single pilot then clearly the communication loop is somewhat quicker.

Does an airline pilot ask the pax in !st class if it is OK for him to divert due to weather???

[MightyGem]

Mighty Gem, is your anecdote hinting at PB and Rotormotion,
Jelly, not that I know of. I was with PremiAir at the time, and have no idea who the other pilot was.

[EESDL]

Hey Crab, it would appear from reading their crash reports that airline pilots should ask the pax for help - it certainly appears that they struggle to cope with various aspects that a 'poler' would call sop!!
Now let us leave the pax out of this - the only mention of pax is when they come on the i/c at the most crucial moment or start tapping your shoulder - I hope the only time pax are asked where they would like to divert to is when discussing the contingencies with the pa prior to the flight ;-)

Shy, I understand that completely and I am well aware that many corporate pilots don't have your experience or skills to fall back on when things get tough with the weather/customer.

What I find strange is that so many corporate or ex-corporate pilots have taken and will continue to take those risks just to stay in a job they hate.

We have all had crap jobs but you have 2 choices - put up with it or leave, unfortunately some seem to want to put up with it and then moan about how hard and difficult it is on these pages.

FC80 - I may extol the virtues of SAR but that is because it is a brilliant job and I loved doing it for many years because of the challenges - I don't tell everyone how hard it was and then moan about how much I hated it which appears to be the corporate pilots maxim.

Julie - Captaincy is bringing the crew with you and including them in your decision, not something that has ever been a problem I have found. If you are single pilot then clearly the communication loop is somewhat quicker.

Does an airline pilot ask the pax in !st class if it is OK for him to divert due to weather???

[jumpseater]

Crab Does an airline pilot ask the pax in !st class if it is OK for him to divert due to weather???

I am wondering if you are being deliberately daft here. The answer however does relate to these types of corporate ops.

The airline pilot Capt Biggles Ex RAF WingCo VD&Scar, doesn't ask 1st class, he tells them. He is employed by the Acme Airline Co, and operates to those AOC requirements, with loads of peeps providing back up and support for his choice. (Most of the time). There might even be a bloke/blokess sitting next to him saying 'no' too. The posh passenger don't employ him. If they annoy him he can even throw them off the plane if he keeps to the rules set down by his employer, and, Brucie Bonus time, keep, his job. He may even get a mention in despatches for being such a good bloke by the Acme Air Co for throwing the passenger/s off and keeping the other posh passengers happy. The posh pax are expecting him to take them to an airport that they've booked to fly to.

The corporate pilot Capt Bloggs Ex RAF WingCo VD&Scar, gets told by his 1st class passenger that they are going to go. However he is employed by his 1st class passenger, his posh passenger can tell him not to come to work. Ever. Bloggs often doesn't have the back up of an AOC/Ops room or someone in the cheap seats on the left saying 'no'. If his passenger annoys him he can throw them off the plane. His posh passenger can tell him not to come to work. Ever. His Posh passenger is paying him to take him from Posh House to Posh Hotel, in a posh helicopter that he has paid for and wants to use.


You mentioned you're teaching new guys SPIFR, how much course time in the ground school section do you spend on CAP371?

Now I'm not even an engine driver, but I can see the difference.

[[email protected]]

You mentioned you're teaching new guys SPIFR, how much course time in the ground school section do you spend on CAP371?
None - it is wholly irrelevant to who and what I teach.

You rather miss my point - in both cases the people in the back are passengers, not crew - whether they be owners or not; they don't hold the pilot's licence and IR, it is the guy in the front seat and he has a whole raft of legislation, rules and regs (CAP371 included) that dictate how he does his job - not the bloke in the suit sat behind him.

If the bloke in the suit wants to make aviation decisions, he can get a licence himself and then understand why he is being an Ar*e to try and second guess the professional in the front.

How many of these corporate customers would be happy asking their limousine driver to go at 150 mph down the M4 in fog????

Do they know better just because they have money/power/influence??

I get that it is a job which can be very good or appallingly bad but that is still down to the pilot and his professional integrity to decide.

At some point the old maxim of 'No stick - no Vote' has to come into play. Do you want to lose just your job or your life as well?

[SASless]

Crab.....if you have one of the Air Marshals or whatever you call the Top Dogs in the RAF in the back of your Bus and he directs you to do something quite out of order and you tell him to get stuffed....how would that reflect on your Promotion possibilities or retention in service?

Tell me you could win in that Willy Waving Contest!

The RAF is just like Corporate VIP flying.....piss off the Boss Fellah at your very own Peril I would wager.

[Wageslave]

How much does "company culture" come into the acceptance or otherwise of pressure to fly in the corporate world ? Clearly some such operators are purely one man/one machine private bands while others are integrated into a wider commercial company structure where more than one machine and a mix of ops is involved- ie Haughey Air or Rotormotion that may or may not run commercial, ie public transport ops alongside/in parallel with the private/corporate stuff.

Surely here lies a wide dichotomy in both rule and role play?

Purely depending on the identity of the client the same man/machine system can operate to two completely different sets of rules in exactly the same operating environment - they may go to Ascot on one day with client "A" on one set of rules and the following day do exactly the same trip with client "B" on a totally different set. The mindset then tends to morph into pressonitis regardless. History is full of them.

Is this not going to cause a muddying of the rules in even the best regulated of companies?

We have seen the result of sloppy operations control in the accidents to Haughey Air that seem to me to illustrate this concept. How widespread is this situation likely to be? Do gash operators bring about accidents by subverting good pilots to operate as gash ones? I've seen far too many good pilots subverted by gash operators to know otherwise though thankfully Professionalism among the pilots almost always prevents the potential accidents.

It seems to me that the blame for chancing this sort of event is as likely to rest on the company's expectations as on the individual pilot - I don't mean to absolve the pilot of his responsibiities but company pressure can be devastatingly powerful in overwhelming an individual's Professionalism.

I have seen this first hand in several companies (FW and Rotary) and have lost my job for reacting to the pressure more than once so it isn't much of a mystery to me. I have to say that unpleasant as each occasion was it was not a substantial handicap in further employment, and in some cases quite the opposite.

Am I alone in wondering why this isn't a more frequent topic in the "How the **** did that ever happen?" discussions?

I wonder how many of us have not heard of an accident to a particular person/organisation/operator and thought "How the hell did he/they get away with it for that long". Some of course did get away with it insh'allah tho it must have made even his eyes water, but I suppose in those blessed cases no deadly harm was done.

Perhaps this accident was nothing to do with this sort of thing at all, but no doubt others more current than I in the industry will be better placed to judge.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Crab;

To paraphrase: Those who haven't teach." So straight from telling all of us who have done your other job in SAR that we know nothing, now for those of us who have taught SP/IFR and fly SP/IFR for a living you are the expert.Do all of us a favour and wind it in. You obviously know the square root of f*** all about corporate/charter. Teaching SP/IFR is as far removed from flying it as driving a mini is from driving an F1 car.

ShyT and I are old enough, ugly enough (well at least I am) and experienced enough (Willy wave here, 10 500 hours rotary, 5 000 fixed wing, the last 16 years spent in SP/IFR rotary and fixed wing combined) to know what we write about. I have watched inexperienced pilots bullied into flying, have lost jobs because I've refused to fly, been pressurised by more millionaires than there are pilots doing my type of work, had one bright spark keep his hand on the passenger call button knowing that I couldn't hear above the noise of it because we were diverting and he didn't want to, been screamed at, sworn at and threatened. Told a couple of now dead customers to stuff it, and you apparently know it all. Do us all a favour: SP/IFR around northern Europe is the hardest work I have ever done in aviation, frankly I'd love to go back to the "easy life" of SAR. Spare me your colossal expertise, your knowledge of corporate ops ain't worth ****.

SND

[paco]

"Do they know better just because they have money/power/influence?"

Yes, they do! Robert Maxwell [spit sideways] allegedly used to dicatate that when he was in the machine the 2 minute rundown would not be observed. Makes Alton Towers look like a picnic by comparison.

Sir Niall - we've obviously chewed some of the same dirt! :)

phil

BTW - the worst customers were not the aristocracy.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

And another Pprune thread descends into willy waving holier than though chaos!

Type A extroverts - should we ever be allowed near a flying machine?

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Paco;

The aristocracy are far easier to deal with than some guy who's made millions by pushing the limits, and Cap'n Bob dragged everything to new lows:mad:

What we do looks great from the outside, nice shiny kit, some nice destinations, lots of drinking coffee in those destinations. The outside world never sees the pilot being called at 02:30 with a change, the boss's P.A. not telling you the pax load because if she can withold knowledge then she has power, expecting a 16:00 lift back to base and the boss not turning up until 20:30 on your wedding anniversary, oh and you arrived at work at 06:00, for the third year on the trot. From day one, managing customer expectation is the key to safety. Where I currently work we run a course for P.As so that they can see where the shark infested custard is, it doesn't solve everything, but it helps a lot. It is going to be very interesting when Part NCC comes into force and ops manuals, Accountable Manager etc become a requirement.

BUT, we are also our own worst enemies, when you are told that Captain Fantastic from White Knuckle Helicopters always achieves the task, you know that you are on a hiding to nothing. The problem is that you know Captain Fantastic is a lunatic with 4 stripes and an ATPL who has no concept of minimum LZ size, blatantly ignores weather minima and CAA permissions, and the customer uses Captain Fantastic's tremendous abilities to pressurise you. I once saw a Chief Pilot use that method to bully a young lad into flying to "save disappointing a regular customer" the young lad got away with it, I was sorely tempted to punch the CP concerned, as were some other witnessess.

The customers expect, and the customers are occasionally bloody difficult, and the customers are what makes SP/IFR corporate such a challenging environment, awkwardly those customers also pay the bills, but I wonder if they realise we talk about them when we meet up. If they realise that they have individual reputations amongst the pilots and ops staffs, and that often those reputations stink.

After one well publicised smash my boss and I were talking while waiting for guests and the subject of the smash was the topic, the boss said something about if I refused he would replace me, my response was "There's 350 of you lot on the Rich List, in the UK there's less than 60 pilots doing my job, compared to me you're f###ing common!" I still fly for him, and am regularly introduced as his "bolshey pilot" he is one man I knew I could get away with saying that to, the others all have to be handled differently.

Basically I'm an airborne prostitute: I have various male clients who all wish to be satisfied in different ways, I'm good, and I'm expensive because I remember their whims and preferences and please each one the way he prefers....The lady clients are a lot easier......

SND

[rotorspeed]

Wageslave

I think you need to be careful just blaming lack of operations control too much, rather than the pilots' judgement. You say the the Haughey accident was caused by poor operational control, but at the end of the day it was the pilots who were actually there, looking at the weather and decided to lift. They knew whether it was clear above and they could see stars or not, and what the vis right there was. Obviously helicopter ops are usually out of private sites where there is no reported weather and the go/no go decision (regarding departure) should be dominated by those at that site with most experience - ie the pilots. What is the duty operations person sitting in a remote office going to do? Of course, en route and destination weather is another matter, and here ops can be a big help.

[[email protected]]

Sir Niall - rather unpleasant and unneccessarily aggressive stuff you have chosen to post:ugh:

I haven't claimed to be a corporate guru, I only mentioned that SPIFR is one of the many things I have taught in my career and it most certainly isn't the most difficult.

As I have said before, I understand the pressures to get the job done - those exist in all areas of aviation but the corporate world seems to be the worst for dealing with it.

Your attitude to criticism of the industry is perhaps one of the reasons it is in such sh*te order - your answer is 'it it what it is and it can't be changed' - that bodes poorly for the future of many more corporate pilots and their pax.

Try being introspective rather than just launching at every person who dares to comment on your chosen career.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Crab;

I apologise for being aggresive, but you mis-read me. I am sick and tired of banging the desk, pushing safety cases and doing my damndest to educate customers when so many people let the industry down. The training standards have been lowered by EASA and I am frustrated to buggery by not being able to improve things on a wider basis than my own operation.

I posted on here in the LBAL thread that I have been trying to get a mentoring programme together, currently that is stymied because lawyers and insurers don't want to take any risk in that direction. But with the ever widening skills gap something like that is becoming vital, or we are faced with more inexperienced pilots in 109's, 139's, whatever, teaching themselves corporate ops.

SP/IFR is not difficult, but as I posted before the customers can take it to a whole new level of pressure when the decide to.

If you ever had to deal with the me who exists outside these pages you would know just how frustrated I am at the current situation. I was due to fly at the same time as Pete Barnes, but cancelled the night before due to the forecast and got a 10 minute rant from my customer. PB was one of my closest friends and I am unbelivably angered and frustrated at the futility of both his and Mathew Woods deaths.

Sorry if I upset you, but I'm feeling a touch irritated by the whole sorry situation.

SND

[ShyTorque]

Your attitude to criticism of the industry is perhaps one of the reasons it is in such sh*te order - your answer is 'it it what it is and it can't be changed' - that bodes poorly for the future of many more corporate pilots and their pax.Don't blame the piano player if somebody tells him to play a bad piece of music!

It's the responsibility of the regulator to make the rules, not the operators who have to work within them.

The rules obviously help level the playing field as far as safety goes, but only if the rules are properly enforced. The problem comes that some operators seem to have been getting away with rule breaches for some time. This isn't the fault of the other operators!

Part NCC rules come in next year and although it's a step in the right direction, as I pointed out to one of the CAA senior staff, these rules won't apply to pilots flying smaller helicopters for private owners, which is where much of this side of the problem lies.

Edit: I concur with what SND has written above; this is a very small part of the industry and we know each other and have discussed this and other recent accidents, both before and after the AAIB have published their reports. After PB's accident, I received a number of phone calls from people within the industry concerned about my own safety. I wasn't flying on that day, either....go figure!

[[email protected]]

Sir Niall - roger, completely understand where you are coming from now:ok:

It is disappointing that the regulators seem so toothless when there clearly is a problem that needs to be addressed.

Much of civilian aviation seems to be blighted by a reluctance to face facts regarding the need for training and mentoring in schemes such as yours - the average GA pilot gets precious little post-graduate training once they have their licence and, as you will know, that is what helps Military pilots improve continuously through their careers.

Good luck trying to push through the changes:ok:

[76fan]

Now that Robert Maxwell has been mentioned by name, apart from reducing the risk of more fatal accidents, what would be the effect of exposing the names of other arrogant owners/operators who have had their professional pilots leave their employ due to their pressure/disregard for their professional safety decisions?

Several of us here have been, or still are, in the corporate business and know full well who these owners were/are. I could name another four without thinking and I suspect those still alive continue to apply those same pressures to their pilots to this day. After all, the Cabin Crew section of PPruNe were not afraid of naming their unpleasant "celebrity" passengers .... and this is about saving lives.

Perhaps our Flying Lawyer would give an opinion.

[ShyTorque]

76Fan,

Sounds like a great idea to name and shame - if you never want to work in the corporate sector again.

However, here's one story, which was told to me in person by an experienced ex-Army pilot who found himself working for a private owner, someone the old school gentry might call "nouveau riche". The owner demanded more and more from him until he had said pilot living in a temporary building on his estate. After a day's work, the pilot had gone to bed. Not long before midnight he was awoken by the owner, allegedly a bit worse for wear, who demanded he be flown to Birmingham, on a social escapade.

He was silly enough to do it! I found it hard to believe but gave my opinion there and then; I do know the pilot moved on elsewhere not long afterwards. He was later killed in an inexplicably silly and high profile CFIT accident.

[MightyGem]

Crab.....if you have one of the Air Marshals or whatever you call the Top Dogs in the RAF in the back of your Bus and he directs you to do something quite out of order and you tell him to get stuffed....how would that reflect on your Promotion possibilities or retention in service?
Not one iota, I would imagine. As long as he told him to get stuffed politely. :E

[76fan]

#198 Shy,

Thankfully I "retired" from the corporate onshore helicopter many years ago. My departure was initiated after trying (and failing) to maintain sensible flight safety and compliance with CAA regulations in a company where private owner and AOC flights were mixed just as Wageslave (#178) described. This was combined with a company "push on" and "it'll be alright" attitude. When I was relieved of my position as TRE/IRE/TC by the chief pilot, I surrendered my authority to the CAA with an explanation ....and the CAA reply was "sorry it didn't work out".....

Yep, I am very glad I survived (unlike several with whom I have worked) but I am still bloody mad that it still seems impossible to do anything about the industry standards and safety; no responsible professional pilot wants to break the rules .... but where is the support?

[ShyTorque]

76fan, There is sometimes very little support from above - unless you work for someone like SND.

Well done on sticking to your principles!

[Redland]

I being one of the unlucky people who went CPL IR route at the wrong time and left with no north sea jobs. I can see that corporate you could be talked in to doing jobs outside of the minima if desperate for work.

I am lucky with no financial pressure as I did it a bit later in life and can survive by my self instructing. But some I know have very real financial commitments that do not create an environment that enables the same (no flying today the weather is not good enough) attitude.

The pressure can be a lot more intense, than some here who have military/wage at the end of the month regardles background appreciate. Some people do not have thousands of multi engine hours behind them, or finances to fall back on for waiting for the next job.

Pilots decision making does not always start in the cockpit but in the bank managers office many months or years earlier. I don't think this is right but it is a fact of the cost of entering this industry.

This may not be relevant to PB but to ignore the other pressures on some pilots is short sighted, and naive.

[Wageslave]

There is sometimes very little support from above

Ain't that the truth!

I once found myself in a UK scheduled f/w company that did no reactive maintenance whatever and not one of their fleet of 5 aircraft was ever fit to fly in IMC over the months I worked for them, (Captains were forbidden to write snags in the Tech Log, but then there were no ADD sheets present in the Tech Logs to allow them to do so), individual pilots were publicly ridiculed in the crew room by the CP for failing to bust minima and when I had a fairly serious and very public reportable accident (international, scheduled Public Transport) they simply failed to submit an accident report! That accident is not, to this day officially recorded despite the CAA being fully aware of it's occurrence. I kid you not. Officially it never happened.

When I approached the CAA Flt Ops inspector (not appreciating at the time that he must have been in cahoots with the whole farrago ) he advised me that I could put my head above the parapet if I wished but expect it to be shot off and forget working in the industry ever again or just get out of that particular "nest of rats" (his words) and find employment elsewhere. 20 years later that same nest of rats were, according to every one of their several "ex" FOs I flew with they were still operating in exactly the same manner.

No, you're damn right you get no help from "above". None whatever.

[paco]

I've always thought that my CRM courses should be full of owners - the pilots didn't need them.

Phil

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Paco;

You are right. One of the things I bang on about with my FOI, boss, Ops team et al is that CRM courses cover the cockpit gradient, they never cover the cabin/cockpit gradient. The wealthy risk taker in the back pays the salary/ies of the blokes pulling the sticks and levers in the front. He is used to having his own way and winning in negotiation. He expects to win with his employees, especially those who to him are part of the solution to his time problems.

Helicopter pilots are a specifically and highly trained bunch, with a good idea of their abilities and the legalities of what they can do, as I type this there are 5 around me planning trips, the only common attribute to them is their confidence in what they are doing and their humour, otherwise no two are the same (thankfully) Each has his way with passengers, each has family to go home to, and each one deals with pushy passengers differently. But I know that all of them have at some time been under either direct, aggresive customer behaviour, or the more insidious wheedling pressure that really creeps up on you, and each one is quite prepared to say no in his own way. It takes a while for them to learn that often customers come to respect the man who is prepared to stand up for what he knows is right, and that same customer will cheerfully stamp on the pilot who gives in, the pilots are the experts, and customers should listen to them in the same way they listen to their lawyers, bankers and accountants. Oddly I've never yet met a lawyer, accountant or banker involved in keeping the principal alive in the way the pilot is involved.

SND

[CRAZYBROADSWORD]

Seems to be a lot of corporate bashing going on and admittedly I've only been in that world for the last ten years or so but my experience could not be more different than the ones being described !

I fly for a number of different owners, none of the machines are allowed any defects , my decisions are often decussed but never questioned and I get whatever I asked for . Yes there's often only me involved from pre flight planning, ops and aircraft husbandry but none of that is very difficult .

Compare that to my experience with AOC holders and its chalk and cheese having often been asked to fly aircraft with any number of defects , or pressured to fly in rubbish weather or having my concerns completely ignored ! So from my experience I know where I prefer to work

CBS

[Peter-RB]

Just to add a small comment,

Tower Cranes due to there structure's and ways of being erected and fixed.. ether to buildings ..Or to the ground, have to be left when parked in a Safe way that allows the standing stress's of gravity and wind to make them safe from such things as stress and or collapse, tower cranes always feather(so to speak so the winds cannot overstress or affect the structure, wind limits for certain cranes are between 22 - 25 knt's after that no operation is allowed, but the cranes that fix to buildings and extend with there working height to match the building they are sat on need to park with Jibs at a certain elevated angle( I think the jib has to be at about 72 or more degrees for crane parking safety due to wind stress or wind induced movements.

Looking at any city where hard lumps of structural steel are possibly hidden in clouds or morning mists, allied to the nearness of ANY aviation activity surely should be red lined in vivid red to all interested parties such as ATC s and actual operators , but the local planners of said cities when the very first planning applications are being looked at........is that not so now ?

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Crazy Broadsword;

But you don't do SP/IFR, its a lot easier to say no when the aircraft and pilot aren't allowed to fly IFR. You've got a good customer base you've built over a long time, but their expectations tend to be lower.

SND

[paco]

Sir Niall - I was lucky, because before I started flying in the Army I was on the ATLO staff at Gutersloh, and even then (as a corporal) I was telling generals that they couldn't get on aircraft :) And if they didn't like it, the person at the end of my phone was another general in HQ BAOR - this is because the transport budget for the services is very tightly controlled. Indeed, once two of us had escaped to Wallopp, so to speak, they made movement control a restricted trade.

Naturally, in such circumstances, you learn very quickly how to be diplomatic (or not!), but this kind of training is simply not available to modern pilots.

In answer to the poster above, you're quite right, not every corporate job is awful - I enjoyed my time with JCB when Chalky was in charge, and I think the best job was had by Francis Davy who flew the Laing builders helicopter - he told me that it was 9 to 5 and they respected his decisions always.

However, there are enough people who can make it otherwise, and I am at a loss as to what to do about it, other than to relate my war stories during CRM courses and hope that some of it sinks in.

phil

[cats_five]

"Mr Barnes, a pilot of 24 years, was under great commercial pressure to satisfy an important client that morning when he made the flawed decision to fly, which was "neither safe nor appropriate", the inquest heard. "

Full report:

Vauxhall helicopter crash deaths 'accidental' jury finds - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-35073689)

[John R81]

The key lesson is very clear, if a little harsh:


You are the captain

Your are responsible for the safety of the aircraft, crew, passengers and folk on the ground


It is your decision - alone - whether to light the burners and lift


"Commercial pressure" does not change anything of YOUR responsibility. If you can't stand up to the nasty rich man and take both the decisions and the responsibility for those decisions, then you should not be in the captain's seat. Take the fancy-dress cabbage off your shoulder, stop masquerading as a "captain", and get out of the seat before you kill yourself and others.

[Hughes500]

JohnR81

Well put !

[Flying Lawyer]

John R81

Your proposition is broadly correct, despite the childish language in your final paragraph .
It's also very easy for a PPL to say.

To their great credit, the jury didn't adopt such a simplistic approach.
They identified a very real problem - which sooner or later, preferably sooner, needs to be addressed.

We all know in broad terms what happened. Much more important is why it happens and what can be done to reduce the risk of it happening again. Until those issues are addressed, such accidents will continue.

The pilot's decision is, of course, final.
In practice, as history shows, it is not as simple as that.

(I note also that the jury clearly didn't accept the client's version of events.)


SASlessAs I ponder all of this....the question that is begged....is why the reference to "landing in a field"? I can imagine Pete saying that but, having known him for many years and having flown with him several times, I have no doubt whatsoever that he didn't mean it literally. I believe it was part of his 'client PR' - to ensure the client understood that he was doing his best.

07:53 Pilot to Client: "Hdg back to Redhill least we tried chat in 10"
(He had abandoned his attempt to collect the client and was returning to base. He had already told another witness this two minutes earlier at 07:51)

Then came:
07:55 Client to Pilot: "Battersea is open."


If only that message had not been sent ......

[Flingingwings]

Client pressure is addressed.....Weekly by Ops staff and pilots.

Ironically I've said 'no' twice in the past seven days to people that gave evidence at that inquest 😢. A 'no' fully supported by my CP and Ops.

I was one of several that cancelled flights that morning. Pete was a friend, but the buck 'stops' with us as individuals and an industry.

This industry doesn't need tighter/more rules. It needs the white knuckle companies that SND describes addressed. It needs more CPs like/with the oversight attitude of SND (albeit the Planet isn't really big enough for two of him 😉).

Yes, it would have been better if the final sms hadn't been sent. Equally we wouldn't be discussing this if nobody 'had tried'.

[MightyGem]

Yes, it would have been better if the final sms hadn't been sent.
Yes. Prior to that, Pete had elected to RTB. The customer was trying to be helpful, and from his remarks, that came up earlier in the thread, I'm sure no pressure to go to Battersea was intended, but in Pete's mind, it was probably implied. :(

[Pittsextra]

Your proposition is broadly correct, despite the childish language in your final paragraph .
It's also very easy for a PPL to say.

To their great credit, the jury didn't adopt such a simplistic approach.
They identified a very real problem - which sooner or later, preferably sooner, needs to be addressed.

We all know in broad terms what happened. Much more important is why it happens and what can be done to reduce the risk of it happening again. Until those issues are addressed, such accidents will continue.

The pilot's decision is, of course, final.
In practice, as history shows, it is not as simple as that.

(I note also that the jury clearly didn't accept the client's version of events.)

Could just as easily been a wealthy PPL trying to pick up a mate to go and poop off some shotguns? You live in London, just how out of reach is a 109 and an IR? Private pilots like DR or JP suggest not at all, so CPL, PPL, ATPL don't seem to be the barrier to having an accident.

In the UK we have arguably the most mature aviation structures in terms of regulatory, industry and aeronautics. From the CAA, AAIB, RAeS, BHA, The Honourable Company of Air Pilots etc. Not only do these groups have huge experience as a whole and individually but a great many have members that crossover. The point being that if we wanted to resolve this issue we could do.

The CAA has broadened the scope of its response to SR2014-35 to a "broader and deeper review of IFR flying outside of controlled airspace". It was due for completion Oct 1. One assumes that part of that review could go some way to have given a more formalised structure to contain client pressures?

The inquest heard this:-


The inquest was told that in the weeks prior to the accident, Mr Caring had argued with another pilot from RotorMotion, either over a diverted flight or his perceived general attitude.


It was then decided that only Mr Barnes or owner and chief pilot Philip Amadeus would fly him in future.


This would have put a certain "commercial pressure" on Mr Barnes, Ms Smith conceded.


Whilst the captain he wasn't a director or shareholder of Rotormotion UK nor did he own the helicopter so from a business perspective so there were at least two other parties with bigger commercial interests.

Yet where are Amadeus's ownership of the issues and view on the flight on that day? Given he was also the owner/director of the company. Whilst perhaps no actual rules get broken but it just feels shabby as it seems the company let PB dangle.

One very easy way to get a solution to this is make any communication to aviation businesses, (be that pilot/customer to pilot, pilot/customer to ops) such as this on recorded telephone lines. Beyond that it wouldn't be difficult to make sure any customers with a high % of total company revenue are controlled. There should be no space for the "I'll leave it up to you".

[Never Fretter]

One very easy way to get a solution to this is make any communication to aviation businesses, (be that pilot/customer to pilot, pilot/customer to ops) such as this on recorded telephone lines.

There should be no space for the "I'll leave it up to you".

Sounds a sensible idea!

The CAA has broadened the scope of its response to SR2014-35 to a "broader and deeper review of IFR flying outside of controlled airspace". It was due for completion Oct 1.

So the inquest has completed before that review. Will it suddenly emerge in the last days before Christmas?

[Basher577]

Unfortunately Pete was under a lot of pressure that day but I feel the majority was self induced.
The client hit the nail on the head when he said "Maybe part of the fault is that we became too friendly and he thought he would be letting me down." Anyone who knew Pete would understand this but it does not justify the outcome.

I will wait with interest to see what pressures were involved in the Norfolk accident, lets see if that can of worms is fully opened.

[76fan]

Are the Chief Pilots/Managing Directors of helicopter companies, and private owners without a CPL/ATPL who employ a pilot(s), ever vetted by the CAA to assess their attitudes to rules and flight safety? If not perhaps they should be ......

[John R81]

My language in last post was carefully chosen, and I stick to it. Childish? perhaps, from your viewpoint; but a clear statement of how I personally feel towards anyone who will not stand-up to "pressure" when it is their clear responsibility to do so.


Easy for PPL to say? Well.....


Aviation is not the only profession in which clients might want to do things that are close to the line, on the line, or even over the line. For a self-employed person (I am - a large professional partnership) there is financial pressure not to lose the client, and for employees in some businesses there can be management pressure not to disappoint the client on pain of perhaps loosing their job. So I simply don't see this question being any different in the field of commercial aviation. In my own field, junior employees with poor judgement don't get promoted to be seniors employees. Senior employees who have not actually displayed positive good judgement don't get to be admitted as Partners.


The captain has responsibility for the flight. Take that responsibility or don't be captain. Yes, it's simplistic but it will prevent further deaths.

[The Old Fat One]

^^

I completely agree with this and I was in professional aviation for 27 years, including 3 years in a flight authorization role.

Latterly I have been a director in two other industries, the current one of which is subject to every bit as much "compliance" as aviation. The mistake that is made is to view aviation as something special and John R81 does us a favour when he points out the human failings do not recognize the "specialness" (for want of a better word) of any given profession.

Certain professions confer certain absolute responsibilities - as Truman famously put it "the buck stops here". Aircraft Captain is one such, however simplistic that might appear. I am of course well aware of the myriad complexities of Human Factors (as I said - three years in flight authorisation - ie I authorised the captains). The whole point of any training/authorisation process is to ensure that on the day the captain makes the right call.

Sometimes they don't. And from that we should all learn. Blaming the client, or the director is not learning.

It's denial.

[puntosaurus]

We all know in broad terms what happened. Much more important is why it happens and what can be done to reduce the risk of it happening again. Until those issues are addressed, such accidents will continue. Amen to that, but I'm curious to know what people think the solution is. Two pilots ? erm.. LBAL. Individual flight risk analyses ? erm... this flight went wrong when it went off piste. More and different people being involved in the Go/Nogo decision ? erm... really ?

I think Nick Lappos was beginning to explore the right track with his atttempt to bring landing aids and lightweight instrumentation to the mainstream helicopter world. If you updated his work to include current technology for synthetic landing aids you'd really be getting somewhere. But even then the fixed wing world manages its fair share of cock-ups even with their runway to runway IAP driven approach to IFR.

If you then extended this idea to a drone like world (think "minority report") where the normal operation of a flight was entirely automated, then I think you'd really be getting somewhere. You could then either relax and accept that the only problems now would be unmanaged system failures, or put a pilot in there with strict instructions not to touch the controls unless something went wrong.

On second thoughts, scratch that second idea.

[puntosaurus]

Couldn't resist posting this little extract of ALL the serious incidents from the Docklands Light Railway Wikipedia entry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Docklands_Light_Railway) since its inception in 1987.

Overrun of station buffers
The original Island Gardens DLR station at the end of a viaduct

On 10 March 1987, before the system opened, a test train crashed through buffer stops at the original high-level Island Gardens terminus and was left hanging from the end of the elevated track. The accident was caused by unauthorised tests being run before accident-preventing modifications had been installed. The train was being driven manually at the time.

Collision at West India Quay bridge

On 22 April 1991, two trains collided at a junction on the West India Quay bridge during morning rush hour, requiring a shutdown of the system and evacuation of passengers by ladder.[117][118] One train was travelling automatically, while the other was under manual control.

South Quay bombing

On 9 February 1996, the Provisional Irish Republican Army blew up a lorry under a bridge near South Quay,[120] killing two people and injuring many others.[121] The blast caused £85 million of damage and marked an end to the IRA ceasefire. Significant disruption was caused and a train was stranded at Island Gardens, unable to move until the track was rebuilt.

[Cows getting bigger]

The bit that got Pete (and has got many others before) is that he forgot that his prime role was that of safety mechanism. We've all been there, being too closely linked to business imperatives. In its simplest form it is the chief pilot questioning why a standard route took 0.6 instead of 0.5.

This morning is an example. Wx is crap and the forecast told us that yesterday. So, why are punters still hanging around on a 'maybe'? There are many operators who will stare at an optimistic PROB 30 TEMPO and encourage their pilots to launch into the ether. The problem with that is the business pressure has now been put fair-and-square on the pilot. It takes a strong operator to make the sensible decision before the problem even reaches the pilot; many prefer to hide behind their ops manuals. :hmm:

[Thomas coupling]

R81 - well said overall. I say overall, because the act of turning your client down could mean losing your job and that puts an enormous amount of pressure on LESSER men/women, I would suggest.
I'm not saying it's an easy decision, I'm saying perhaps the solution is to pick your employment carefully perhaps.

My biggest beef - having experienced it countless times (and the ops director for MCAlpine Helicopters/Premier was notorious for saying this when he was in the game years ago - is that the threat by these people on their pilots generates rule breakers and ultimately professionals who go 'rogue'. It is these pilots who will do it if another won't and it is they I wish to pass this message:
You are letting yourself down and your profession down every time you accept a borderline job, simply to keep your job. Plan ahead and the next time you apply for a corporate job - check out the client - it's a two way interview you know.

Even more reason to do this if you have a partner / kids FFS.

[The Old Fat One]

R81 - well said overall. I say overall, because the act of turning your client down could mean losing your job and that puts an enormous amount of pressure on LESSER men/women, I would suggest.

No arguing...being helpful and perhaps directly informative to one or two less worldly wise....

Disclaimer...this advice applies specifically to the UK, although it will apply equally in most other Western jurisdictions.

It is unlikely you would lose your job for doing your job correctly for two reasons:

1. Even in aviation, most people who get to own/run companies are not actually dumb, however much they give the impression that they might be. People who own/run companies are well aware that good staff are - literally - worth their weight in gold and they will look after them as such...even if they don't get along.

2. Assuming your employee has worked for you for two years, if you fire them without good reason, and without following employment protocols, you are bringing a sh1tstorm down on your company. Any employee in the UK that allows themselves to be fired without cause and does not head straight for the nearest employment lawyer is basically ****ing nuts.

For most human beings firing someone is extremely traumatic (trust me...been there, done that). I am an occasional business mentor and one of the commonest failings in business is directors/owners NOT firing people that it is glaringly obvious they should.

So don't be scared of ghosts under the bed...they are usually not there.

[Pittsextra]

Getting all legal because you are not employeed will really depend upon how your services are being engaged in the first place. If you want to specifically relate it to this accident I doubt that PB was an employee of Rotormotion UK in a PAYE sense, meaning there are few (if in fact any) employment laws that would protect.

Given his piloting services were used elsewhere that would be an expensive way to be employeed for a variety of reasons. That said his logbook hours suggest his ability was such that he didn't need to worry about that too much.

What we are all missing when we talk of this pressure is that it isn't recognised to a level that requires any action because there was no safety recommendation in this regard and so if the inquest concludes client pressure was fundamentally the cause of this accident it differs from the AAIB.

[Heliport]

Freelance pilots (as many helicopter pilots are in the UK) are not well placed to take legal action if their work from a particular source dries up.

Their 'employer' in many instances is the company they have set up for the tax advantages.


Pitts

Not recognised to a level that requires any action in the opinion of the AAIB doesn't mean the problem doesn't exist.
I concede it's arguable that the very small number of incidents/fatalities is insufficient to justify any action, and that the solution isn't immediately obvious - at least to me.

[Pittsextra]

Yeah agree with all of that although isn't it surprising that the commercial elements, as they may have related to the decision to fly, were not fully investigated (or at least not reported) especially since the body of work done took circa 20 months.

When you reflect upon the conversation about PB transferring to biz jets, that the client had interest in the same, that there had been recent issues to a degree that only PB and the owner of RMUK were to fly this client. The lack of detail that relates to the process of decision making specifically with this flight, including the pre flight conversation with the CP, especially as it is specifically referred to in the ops manual and is no doubt required by the ultimate owner of the machine and its insurance.

We don't find any of that a concern or a need to improve?

It's barely believable that the investigation can go into so much detail about the physical structure that ultimately ended the flight whilst skimming across the human factors that put the machine in the air in the first place.

The lack of an AAIB safety recommendation may not mean that further issues do not exist but having one at least puts it squarely on the table and communication of response and follow up actions are visible.

[Hughes500]

Well we have turned down work today in marginal weather, could do with the monies but ones life is for more important. Have discovered over the years with regular customers they are much more interested in you being honest especially when it comes to safety. In fact have gained customers due to this attitude rather than loose them. More than happy to tell a customer where to get off, years ago I put down in a field due to weather being considerably worse than forecast. Customer complained so i gave him the keys and said help yourself. Needless to say machine stayed in field. Taxi called customer arrived safely still on time !

[Cows getting bigger]

Same here but it's interesting to see how different brokers react. Some, who one would have thought should know better, still get rather forthright. :=

[John R81]

Read through the AAIB report again last night.


Pitts - personally I don't see an issue with human factors that caused the aircraft to take-off that morning. It was reported 999 at EGKR and expected to remain so. In that machine, VFR on-top under Radar control, was not unsafe. The decision to abort overhead EGTR and RTB was sound, and initially executed without additional risk. The flight back was uneventful to begin with and would have remained so (EGKR approach and landing were not hampered by Wx) if the plan had not changed.


We can't - and shouldn't - exclude humans from the equation and no amount of "rule creation" or "kit solution" will do that. There is always a balance between risk and other matter and only a human will make those complex decisions. As many have noted, simply saying "pilot error" does not help prevent recurrence, and so more analysis is needed. With the benefit of hindsight we can identify decisions that now look to be unwise and so the pertinent human factor question is: why did those decisions at the time look to the pilot to be the most appropriate responses given the information held and the options realistically available?


Carrying on with the flight sequence, this is where it seems to me things began to go wrong:


1. Getting a text to say EGLW was open - relevant as it presented an option not planned & prepared for. It would add pressure to check the information and to plan approach, etc. It would also allow for distraction of thought to what subsequently would happen - quicker response time to pick-up the client once the Wx improved - and hence add to the factors weighed in making the decision whether to continue RTB or to divert. Options at this moment were to respond that cloud was too bad to get through, or to try use resources to plan / execute the divert if it is available.


2. Asking LHR Special for confirmation that EGLW was open and would accept the landing. Given location, speed, etc this put time pressure on the task of getting below cloud but the option was to orbit above cloud whilst the matter was researched and reported back.


3. Deciding to drop through a "sucker hole" to get below cloud rather than orbiting.


4. On getting below cloud, finding the base to be very low in a flight environment filled with obstacles, continuing with a "normal" approach; flying the dog-bone holding pattern. Options at that time include going straight back up and rejecting the diversion, or alternatively going into a (noisy) OGE hover over the river.


5. Possibly being distracted (radio frequency change, for example) whilst executing a more challenging manoeuver in conditions that were certainly less than ideal; option of completing one task before commencing another.




Interested to learn if others agree that the relevant chain of events starts where I put it or somewhere else. I agree that prior interaction with the client, with other clients and with management are relevant to the decision process in accepting / attempting / rejecting the diversion. Also interested to hear if others see more "decision points" in the sequence.




Based on my interpretation (valueless, as I am neither an AAIB investigator nor a lawyer), the verdict of the inquest was not accurate as it cites perceived client pressure and Wx in relation to the decision to lift from EGKR. I suggest above that there was no safety problem with that decision or with the decision to RTB. The perceived client pressure was a factor in the decision to divert to EGLW and I would have liked to see both the AAIB and the inquest to have focussed more on the human factors that led to that decision, and to subsequent decisions once the descent through the sucker hole commenced.

[puntosaurus]

the pertinent human factor question is: why did those decisions at the time look to the pilot to be the most appropriate responses given the information held and the options realistically available?
An excellent question, to which the answer must be that wetware tends to make bad decisions under pressure.

If Pete had been making the decision about going to Battersea on the ground he would have taken a lot more factors into account. He might have thought, the client is in Elstree and the weather is clear back at Redhill and towards our ultimate destination in the North of England. It will take the client 90mins or so to get to Battersea from Elstree by car at this time of the morning. In 90 mins by car from Elstree he could be at Redhill or Luton or Cranfield, the latter two of which have precision instrument procedures. Even if he still wants to go to Battersea, flying to Redhill and waiting is cheaper than parking at Battersea. After discussion on the phone about which of these options suits the client best, he could have finished his tea, had a bacon sandwich, and leisurely initiated his new plan.

So the trick is to give yourself time and options, neither of which are available in the air in highly congested airspace in bad weather.

[cave dweller]

I have said this before on here and I will say it again untill the cows come home, Battersea was not open.
I recieved a call from the DATCO, Requesting if we would open and accept a diversion from SVFR/Thames Radar, To which I gave autherisation.
It was upon this autherisation that the DATCO tried to contact the Pilot, alas with no response!

[Bravo73]

I have said this before on here and I will say it again untill the cows come home, Battersea was not open.
I recieved a call from the DATCO, Requesting if we would open and accept a diversion from SVFR/Thames Radar, To which I gave autherisation.
It was upon this autherisation that the DATCO tried to contact the Pilot, alas with no response!

We know that you've posted the same information on this forum several times.

Can you please explain to us why you didn't share this information with either the AAIB or the subsequent Inquest?

[John R81]

CD and B73: is that the right question? I think that strikes to "why did X send a text to the pilot saying Battersea was open when in fact it was not open?".


From the point of view of the pilot, it seems that he received a text saying Battersea was open. Even if that was factually incorrect, he pilot did not know that and he proceeded to act upon that information by asking Thames Radar about the option of diverting, and dropped down below the cloud-base to hold below in anticipation of being accepted into Battersea.


Puntosaurus: Thanks - I think this is a valuable point for me to take on board. It is a different matter to plan for diversions whilst on the ground compared to an environment of congested airspace / bad weather / client pressure. Though circumstances may make that scenario unavoidable, I need to be conscious of the need to take steps to reduce my workload and risk if I am to divert resource (my attention) to assessing / planning the diversion. I can make that part of my rehearsed response to in-flight "surprise".

[Sir Niall Dementia]

John R81;

We see Battersea is open/closed as pilots. In similar conditions to the day Pete Barnes crashed (but a couple of years before) I had a passenger tell me that he had spoken to Battersea and they were open, and why was I refusing to fly? In my case Battersea was open, the problem was the LHR/LCY weather meant we would not have been able to legally get into the zone. Trying to tell a pushy passenger that yes, Battersea was open, just as reception had told him, but that the weather passed to me by Battersea ATC precluded landing there seemed utterly beyond the grasp of such an intelligent man.

If Pete's passenger had spoken to Battersea, I suspect he would have spoken to reception NOT ATC. Yes Battersea was either open, or about to open following all the checks, and certainly was open for passengers to sit and drink coffeee in the lounge while their pilots waited for the weather to clear enough for them to get in, that did not constitute a confirmation that the weather was suitable. Its a question of semantics, to Cave Dweller (who really does know his stuff) Battersea was closed to air traffic, 60 metres away in reception to the guys and gals who look after the pax and take all the bookings and phone calls from customers etc Battersea was definately open.

The passenger sends a text saying Battersea open from his limited level of knowledge, the meaning to the pilot is different. A box 2 call to Battersea could possibly have sorted the confusion, but we will never know.

SND

[rotorspeed]

John R81 has made a lot of sense on this topic, and Puntosaurus' point on why did PB not divert to say Luton is a good one, given a northern destination. Would be quite interesting to know what the EGGW METAR around the accident time was - anyone know? May well have been fogged in too though I guess. Of course not just cost but the faff of a big airport is often another reason to try to avoid them.

Something that seems missing from (what we know about) the accident flight was what contingency plans were discussed between client and pilot/operator, given the high chance that a landing at the Elstree pick up point would not be possible. Where was the client based? Was Elstree the best place to plan for the pick up? Could Redhill have been considered an option where departure would have been possible in far poorer weather than a landing? Was Luton considered as an alternate? Stansted? Wx info was probably not available at Cranfield early enough. These human factors aspects are important and can greatly add to the risks.

Frankly I doubt PB was really pressured into flying - surely he was too experienced and confident for that. But he would have simply wanted to get the job done and not let his client down, so pushed himself too far.

Pressure, whether from clients, operators or from we pilots ourselves, to get a task done is a risk factor. But it is an inevitable part of flying (and a lot of other things) and to an extent healthy, to encourage us to look at ways of achieving (albeit safely) a flight when conditions are more challenging.

I think something that does come out of this accident is the importance of considering very carefully the alternative options, in advance when on the ground, should the weather compromise or prevent the flight. And these options should be discussed with and ideally agreed by the client, and perhaps even conveyed in writing, by text or email. That might help reduce excess pilot pressure and make clients consider alternatives more carefully and make plans for such eventualities. Obviously I'm sure much of this all happens with good operators anyway, though it appears not have done here and had it occurred, the accident would probably have been avoided.