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NorthSouth
10th Jul 2014, 10:21
AAIB report on this incident is now out here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/july_2014/eurocopter_ec155b1__oy_hjj.cfm). It must fill southern N Sea offshore workers with dread. Two aborted take-offs with a pax offloaded each time, then a mishandled departure leading to both pilots being disoriented and pointing the aircraft at the sea with a 36 degrees nose down pitch attitude and ROD of >3000fpm before arresting the descent at 50ft.

A lot of factors in there but the basic one seems, once again, to be disorientation compounded by pilots struggling to work out what the auto-pilot is trying to do to the aircraft.

All credit to both guys for finally getting themselves out of this very very scary situation but it doesn't exactly instil confidence.

NS

PoloJamie
10th Jul 2014, 14:11
Jesus. Reading through the report screams similarities with the G-BLUN crash.

Kudos to the crew for getting out of it properly though.

Was this reported at the time?

JulieAndrews
10th Jul 2014, 15:03
Reliably informed that the operator reported it to their CAA that evening upon hearing of incident, who then requested UK AAIB assistance.
I'd like to work for a company with such an open culture - rather than get the big broom out to find room under the lumpy carpet.......
Night rig departures into nothing but darkness sat in an aircraft back into service after a lease in East Africa - no thanks matey !

JimL
10th Jul 2014, 15:13
Firstly before comparisons are once again made between the levels of safety in States around the North Sea, it should be acknowledged that this was not an aircraft on the UK register or operated by a UK AOC holder.

As always with the AAIB this was a good factual report and analysis; those who were at the RAeS conference last week (Technology Friend or Foe - the introduction of automation to offshore operations) would have seen the similarities between this incident and the video clip shown of Cougar 851 in 2011 - albeit with a number of additional issues that had to be taken into consideration by the pilots.

Notwithstanding that the crew was dealt a poor hand by the operator, the 'optimistic trait' of pilots comes to the fore; believing that he had an issue with the autopilot - and specifically the collective channel - the pilot still selected the GA button after take-off. Having done this, the trace indicates that he spent a great deal of time breaking through on the cyclic and the collective controls. In fact the upper modes were working as advertised but the pilots did not trust them; their inputs to the controls acted negatively on the situation.

Does this come into the category of 'automation dependency' or not - it is not clear to me. What is extremely clear is that the conclusions reached at the conference last week about the need for a change of culture and more attention given to the issues of automation are applicable to all operators. What a pity Dancopter (and other non-UK North Sea operators) were not present at the conference; their insight into the effects of the introduction of automation would have been welcome,

Apart from taking note of the actions of the operator, I cannot see any recommendations from the AAIB - anyone else spot them?

Jim

Boudreaux Bob
10th Jul 2014, 15:17
Jim,

Is it "dependency" or lack of trust and a resulting lack of dependency?

JimL
10th Jul 2014, 15:38
The fact is that I do not understand the mindset; if he had to reset the autopilot three times, why did he then engage the GA mode (a four axis mode). Having engaged the GA, why did he not trust it until it was established that it was not doing what it was expected to do. All this given that there were issues compounding the situation - including an aircraft (which is not the best performer in any case) that weighed more than the documentation indicated.

My guess would be that this serious incident once again shows that the level of understand of a pilot for what is a very complex piece of equipment (and algorithm) is indicative of general knowledge among the pilot work-force. In my view that is not solely the fault of the pilots but of a system of training and operations which has hardly changed since the introduction of these very complex systems in the mid 2000s.

Jim

Bravo73
10th Jul 2014, 19:27
The OGP minimum for a Commander on 'Helicopters, Multi-engine under 5,700kgs CTOM' is 2000hrs.

Geoffersincornwall
10th Jul 2014, 20:59
What if he had 5000 hours but an analysis revealed that it was 5000 times the same hour - or something close to this.

Mine is not an argument about absolutes but about the wisdom of realising that it is, in the end, competence that delivers satisfaction for operator and customer alike. Their aspirations will not be met unless and until the regulatory system embraces COMPETENCY BASED TRAINING.

This should be supported by a move away from a 'Binary' style of examination in which only two possibilities exist - PASS or FAIL. This system condemns the best pilot in the company to be awarded the same status as the worst and does no favours for the latter who by rights should receive some additional supportive training.

When will we get the message???

G :ok:

NorthSouth
10th Jul 2014, 21:25
Isn't there a more immediate problem? It would be reasonable to conclude from this incident and others before it that there are other helicopter crews flying daily who may be vulnerable to a repeat of this or a similar incident. We can't wait for a revamp of the training system. Surely the CAA needs to take action NOW to review each company's ops management, training, competency etc etc with urgency. Or even place restrictions on night/IFR offshore departures e.g. only using crew with specified levels of experience and currency to fly those trips.

I'd love to know what the eight "long straw holders" on that aircraft now think about their means of transport to work.

Boudreaux Bob
10th Jul 2014, 21:56
Is there a great difference in experience required for big and not quite big helicopters?

What is the key difference between and 225 and a 155 that would drive a huge difference in Total Flight Hours or whatever criteria is being used today?

If it is mere weight of the aircraft then I would find that a bit odd if the two aircraft had very similar flight control systems.

Liikewise if it were just the number of seats then I would find having a different standard even more problematic.

Time in Type would mean more than Total Time in my view.

That added to Total Offshore Experience should be the more important Skill Set being used to determine PIC requirements in my view.

Who would want to be the guy that has to write the Rule and upset the current Apple Cart?

pilot and apprentice
10th Jul 2014, 22:16
The fact is that I do not understand the mindset; if he had to reset the autopilot three times, why did he then engage the GA mode (a four axis mode). Having engaged the GA, why did he not trust it until it was established that it was not doing what it was expected to do. All this given that there were issues compounding the situation - including an aircraft (which is not the best performer in any case) that weighed more than the documentation indicated.

My guess would be that this serious incident once again shows that the level of understand of a pilot for what is a very complex piece of equipment (and algorithm) is indicative of general knowledge among the pilot work-force. In my view that is not solely the fault of the pilots but of a system of training and operations which has hardly changed since the introduction of these very complex systems in the mid 2000s.

Jim

I don't think we can blame it all on training. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to self-challenge, self-critique, and self-improve. When this burden is constantly passed off to someone else, errors like this are the result.

I personally see it as indicative of a mindset, a malaise, that is common all over the industry. Moreso in the multi-whatever and IFR environments which I'll clarify later.

As long as the 'plan' is followed, then 99.9% of the crews out there manage just fine. As long as the [CRM jargon def'n] errors have been predicted and a response promulgated then we happily fix it and carry on. The problem is when fluid, unpredicted adaptability is needed. This is where the system produced "Children of the Magenta" fall apart. They will continue to (blindly in my opinion) revert back to the way they have 'always' done it. It is not a concious decision, it is a conditioned response that they have allowed themselves to develop by getting comfortable with the barrage of limits, regulations, SOP's, etc that endeavour to take away our ability to think.

The more constraining the 'rules' (sum total of reg's, limits, SOP's, etc) are then the less likely it is that we are actually thinking about the job. We are just pushing round pegs into round holes and square pegs into square holes. It is a personality thing, IMHO, that determines how an individual responds to this. Some can't stand it and leave, some accept it. I know pilots who try to prevent this malaise by reviewing EOP's each day, or something similar. Well done!

I have my own way to fight my own complacency that has shown me just how deep the ruts in the road are! There are so many things that we do that are standard (little s) that they almost seem to take on a new life as a Standard (big S). Something as simple briefing that I will decouple at altitude in VMC rather than descend to 500' coupled, or to cruise at 6500' versus the 'standard' 2000', can have the other pilot in a state for ages. It is the worst with pilot who came up in the IFR system as cadets and have never had to figure it out themselves. Many can't believe that no SOP prohibits my indiscriminate activities. It has certainly proven to me how many of my fellows don't actually listen to anything in my brief!

Those crews who have spent real time working in the VFR, single, no support environment have had to develop those self-improvement skills because noone was going to hand hold them along. They also pay more attention. I think we need to put more pressure on ourselves (and each other) in the IFR world.

pilot and apprentice
10th Jul 2014, 22:24
Is there a great difference in experience required for big and not quite big helicopters?

What is the key difference between and 225 and a 155 that would drive a huge difference in Total Flight Hours or whatever criteria is being used today?

If it is mere weight of the aircraft then I would find that a bit odd if the two aircraft had very similar flight control systems.

Liikewise if it were just the number of seats then I would find having a different standard even more problematic.

Time in Type would mean more than Total Time in my view.

That added to Total Offshore Experience should be the more important Skill Set being used to determine PIC requirements in my view.

Who would want to be the guy that has to write the Rule and upset the current Apple Cart?

More legacy rules from the seized wing industry. In days of yore bigger a/c were considerably more complex. It also helps justify and entrench the wage structure.

The offshore world does use a baseline minimum and then there is an ability to use a high time in type, for instance, to offset lesser offshore. Ultimately a tally of hours should be an indication of potential, not a definer of capability.

I'm sure a pilot with 250 hrs total time, but 50 in a 747, would be better qualified than me, with 8000 hrs and 0 in a 747, to do the trans-atlantic hop for LH.

EESDL
11th Jul 2014, 09:35
P & A - well said!
Now if we could trim your post down to a couple of words and stick them up in Ops ............
Just arranged something slightly different at work and was amazed with the number of 'thinks bubbles' floating around heads of 'experienced' pilots.....
It is a helicopter!

HeliComparator
11th Jul 2014, 23:13
P&A I think the term you are looking for, which was mentioned several times at the conference JimL mentioned, is "Resilience". ie crews need to have some depth of ability so that when things go pear shaped, they can fall back on their underlying knowledge and skill and judgment to recover the situation, rather than flailing around helplessly when "the tramlines" are departed from. It is a great and meritorious buzzword, although I am less certain how we train resilience into crews in the real world.


Regarding this incident, I think we need type rated experience to comment (so that rules me out) from the likes of 212man. But with my EC225 experience I find it unfortunate that no mention is made of the trim release buttons. The EC225 is quite happy when you "fly through" go-around mode or the like, but only if you press the trim releases before expecting the AFCS to resume control. Personally I always fly through with the trim releases pressed, in the case of the EC225 it is much more stable and easier to fly, but nevertheless the majority of my erstwhile colleagues would insist on flying against the spring trims. It was one trait I failed to eradicate before I fell off my perch.


Clearly these guys didn't really understand the implications of flying through on one axis but not the other (ie on the cyclic, whilst allowing the collective to be reduced by the autopilot. Inadequate training and lack of OMB information on standard departure procedures probably lies at the heart of that.


Again, relating to the EC225 and therefore risking being wrong about the EC155, I think it is a great shame that what came out of the incident was a ruling that GA mode shall not be used on departure. That is just saying "we don't really understand how this bit works, we are not competent to use is, therefore we won't use it". Presumably the next step, following a future flight path deviation, will be to disallow use of the autopilot altogether and make the pilots fly with no stability at all, just in case it does something they don't understand?!! Barking!


The GA mode, properly used (EC225 again) is a great safety asset during a difficult departure and it is a retrograde step to disallow its use (as always, unless the EC155 has a particular issue that I don't know about)


Oh and that old chestnut about "manual flying skills" crops up again. One thing I learnt from the conference was that "situational awareness" has many levels. The situation regarding where one is around an IF approach, other traffic, terrain etc. is the top level. But at the opposite end of the scale, the situational awareness of what the current airspeed, flight attitude and altitude etc are. And there are numerous layers in between.


So it is with manual flying skills. "Lets make them fly more manual ILSs" for example, means that the pilots are quite good at flying an immaculate manual ILS. To do that typically means that you get yourself in trim and in general the smaller control inputs you make, the better. So you fly a really smooth ILS with hardly any attitude or power changes, and those you do make are very slow and gentle. But does that really help at all with the incident scenario? I would say not in the slightest.


So let's make them fly manually on departure for longer, until the AFCS upper modes are engaged. Again, the flight path should be well controlled and this is generally achieved by small slow and gentle control inputs with correspondingly well controlled attitude and other flight parameters. Does that help with recovering from the incident scenario? I would say not in the slightest.


What is needed in these cases is the confidence to make significant control inputs to stabilise a situation that is getting out of control. These days, with the passengers breathing down our necks and reporting every bump and bank to their safety reps, ATC reporting any slight deviation from the expected flight path, pilots are herded into a very tight flight profile that is always the same, scared of a ticking off (at a subconscious level) if they have to make sudden control movements and lacking in confidence to handle anything out of the ordinary.


Although the report is not yet out, I wonder if this was the reason why the Sumburgh L2 pilot took 8 seconds to increase the collective from lowish power to takeoff power whilst his helicopter was falling into the sea. The engines spool up in about 2 seconds and had he raised the collective at that speed when he first became aware of the need to increase power, I suspect disaster could have been avoided.


How is such ability and confidence gained? When I was a baby co-pilot I went to Miri (Sarawak, Borneo) on the SA330 and we had an empty sector morning and evening positioning to and from the international airport to the passenger airfield which allowed lots of AP out flying, steep turns, torque turns and other wild flying which these days would be absolutely not allowed. But my flying abilities took a massive turn for the better.


So I would say the current obsession with doing everything on rails and not upsetting the passengers is the reason why pilots these days can sometimes lack the skills - or RESILIENCE - to get themselves out of the poo. Writing a comment about the need for "better manual flying skills" will never be the answer. The culture has to change from a short sighted one of "passenger comfort and perceived safety first" to the big picture of "you have to crack an egg to make an omelette" because for sure, the former strategy isn't working.

terminus mos
11th Jul 2014, 23:30
So I would say the current obsession with doing everything on rails and not upsetting the passengers is the reason why pilots these days can sometimes lack the skills - or RESILIENCE - to get themselves out of the poo. Writing a comment about the need for "better manual flying skills" will never be the answer. The culture has to change from a short sighted one of "passenger comfort and safety first" to the big picture of "you have to crack an egg to make an omelette" because for sure, the former strategy isn't working.

I agree HC and I think that the two should and can go together, that's what empty sectors are for and what training sorties should be for, not just testing.

Boudreaux Bob
11th Jul 2014, 23:37
Are you saying "Training" plus "Experience" plus "Mindset" equals "Resilience?

HeliComparator
11th Jul 2014, 23:43
TM I added "perceived" to the text you quoted, because of course the ultimate aim is passenger safety, but that is not achieved by appeasing the passengers' view of what is safe and what is not.


These days, one is not allowed to conduct a "flamboyant" departure or arrival offshore without passengers, on the grounds that the deck crew might see it and somehow feel it was "cowboy flying" thus reducing the standing of the Operator in their eyes. This is the sort of level we have descended to (and did so a good few years ago). We are reaping the rewards of that sort of attitude IMO. A badly-run FDM programme also acts as a funnel that ensures pilots never depart from the tramlines even without passengers, and even during training sorties to some extent.

HeliComparator
11th Jul 2014, 23:52
Are you saying "Training" plus "Experience" plus "Mindset" equals "Resilience?

I'm not totally sure, you would have to ask those who were using the word at the conference, but I guess pretty much so. I would want to try to include "confidence" but of course that is a subset of "mindset".


And experience - not just 10,000 hrs droning over the ocean, but also experience of handling the aircraft in a wide range of flight paths and attitudes including extreme ones. And I don't mean 5 mins spent doing UAs in the Sim - that has very little value IMO. In the real world, the Chimp Brain takes over (see prof Steve Peters writings) and makes us perform badly. The Chimp Brain cannot be tamed in the Sim for it only surfaces when the adrenalin is flowing, and we all know that the Sim is not going to kill us = no adrenalin = no Chimp Brain.

pilot and apprentice
12th Jul 2014, 03:00
P&A I think the term you are looking for, which was mentioned several times at the conference JimL mentioned, is "Resilience". ie crews need to have some depth of ability so that when things go pear shaped, they can fall back on their underlying knowledge and skill and judgment to recover the situation, rather than flailing around helplessly when "the tramlines" are departed from. It is a great and meritorious buzzword, although I am less certain how we train resilience into crews in the real world.

I agree whole heartedly with what you have written HC, and the buzzword is fine.

My contention is that we have to stop telling ourselves and each other that this is a training issue. I believe it is a personal responsibility issue.

Perhaps where the training staff can come into play is in giving joe/jill pilot the tools to self-assess. From there, it is up to the individual to want to improve. And frankly, if they don't want to, then I say send them packing.

I have a rant that is screaming to get out, but it will destroy any last vestige of anonymity I have on here, so not today. Suffice to say, I have tilted long and hard at this windmill and a dozen people nearly lost their lives to prove me right. Sad. Sadder still that so little changes.

pilot and apprentice
12th Jul 2014, 03:06
HC: I'll add....when I was working with copilots who wanted to improve but were finding it very difficult in the multi/IFR role, I advised them to resign (or take a leave) and pursue some good old fashioned bush/utility flying. In a JetBox or 350. They took with them a positive attitude toward self improvement and came back a year or two later with a huge improvement in SA, self confidence, and basic skills.

I still advocate this but there are very few takers, if any.

It is worth noting that there is a provision for copilots with Cougar to take just such a LOA, in the process of upgraded to captain, in their collective agreement.

DOUBLE BOGEY
12th Jul 2014, 06:48
I wanted to ad something about the notion of "Flying Through" the AFCS.

I think it is vital tha the pilot understands exactly what flight path he has ordered from the AFCS whenever he presses an interface button. The GA mode of the EC225/175 is a classic example of this as it delivers something different depending on current IAS and how many engines are working.

If the pilot truly understands the shape and parameters of the impending flight path he should ensure, before deploying it, that the Earth will not get in the way of that flight path.

Flying Through a commanded flight path is a misleading statement a d can lead to serious attitude changes which in themselves can contribute to a cluster-f*ck along the flight path.

Why? Because there are essentially two fly through conditions possible. The first, and in my view the only acceptable one, is to assist the AFCS in achieved an IAS/VS/ALT datum with an appropriate control input. This may be done because the pilot believes the the AFCS is not reacting quick enough because of course it is limited in its immediate authority and rates in which it can modify attitude. However, if the pilot uses this option believing it is vital, he has either already chosen an unsafe flight path from the AFCS or he is simply not patient enough to let the AFCS do its clever work. For this scenario Training and Experience are key to overcoming this.

The second fly through involves the pilot trying to force the aircraft beyond IAS/VS/ALT datums he may have already commanded from the AFCS. Usually this occurs because he did not understand the shape and nature of the flight path he ordered from the AFCS or, as appears in this case, his monitoring skills are so poor he cannot believe that the AFCS is delivering the correct algorithm.
In this situation a modern digital AFCS will take the attitude to its authorised limits to fight the pilot inputs once controls are released.

HC - pressing the Trim Releases is a very dangerous practice especially during a night rig departure and in my view should only be done in an extreme situation. Where the required rate of attitude change to avoid impact demands it. Once the trim is pressed on the cyclic all notion of stability is lost.

Training pilots to use a modern AFCS takes patience, skill and knowledge from the Instructor. But more than this, it takes time! Most Type Rating Courses used by industry do not include any dedicated training on the AFCS. By that I mean real time board briefs and dedicated time just accessing AP functions with the sole remit to fully understanding each mode.

For the GA system of the EC225 this mode requires 2 hours classroom and 4 hours PF/PNF split, of dedicated SIM time. There is no way a pilot has a hope of understanding how it works without this. Thereafter, for the rest of the course, the GA needs to be integrated so the pilot understands how the flight path shape it delivers can be deployed to enhance the safety of his operations especially when close the the surface.

HeliComparator
12th Jul 2014, 07:36
DB I can agree with much of what you say, except for the trim release issue. However let's not distract this thread getting bogged down in an argument where both of us are intransigent.

Boudreaux Bob
12th Jul 2014, 12:10
let's not distract this thread getting bogged down in an argument where both of us are intransigent.

The Gauntlet has been thrown!:E

JimL
12th Jul 2014, 13:32
The concepts that were discussed at the conference embrace a lot of what is being said here by 'pilot and apprentice' and HeliComparator' in the sense that knowledge and experience is built up during scenario-based training sessions. 'Resilience' keeps its dictionary meaning and only the method for achieving it is described. In the extracts below it states how 'resilience' is developed. Rather than paraphrase, here are several quotes from the Evidence Based Training implementation guide:

Scenario-based training phase

This phase forms the largest phase in the EBT program, and is designed to focus on the development of resilience through exposure to situations that develop and sustain a high level of competency. This includes training to mitigate the most critical risks identified for the aircraft generation. The phase will include the management of specific threats and errors in a real time line-orientated environment. The scenarios will include critical systemic and environmental threats, in addition to building effective crew interaction to identify and correct errors. A portion of the phase will also be directed towards the management of critical aircraft system malfunctions. For this program to be fully effective, it is important to recognize that these predetermined scenarios are simply a means to develop competency, and not an end, or “tick box” exercises in themselves.

EBT is about assisting pilots improve from a minimum standard of performance, measured across a very restricted and predictable regime of checking, to a higher standard of performance across a very wide spectrum of activities, under training that facilitates improvement and stretching of competence capability. It is in these “expert” and “beyond expert” areas that we build resilience to deal with unforeseen events, and engender the confidence in and to deal competently with challenges encountered in flight operations.

You will notice the use of the word 'facilitate' in the text and this is further explained as follows:

Good facilitation will invoke a thought process, which may elicit a suggested alternative behavior from the person himself or herself, which of course does not question their values and has a more positive effect. The technique of facilitation allows this process to occur, although it is not just for the poor performer or for the development of attitudes. Facilitation can also be used to reinforce effective behavior because it gives people an understanding of why they are good, which encourages their continued development. Furthermore, it can be used in the development of skills and knowledge, because it is an effective tool for allowing self-analysis and in depth thought, which is an easier way for people to learn, as there is less recourse to memory techniques. The skills of self-analysis are not only of benefit in the training session, but can also be continually used for self-development on the line...

Although instructors have used facilitation techniques within their instruction style naturally for many years, instructors traditionally are focused on just the basics of explaining, demonstrating and, finally, checking that the task is being done in accordance with a standard. However artfully employing the technique of facilitation means that students are given the opportunity to discover what they are doing and the effect it has on others and the task, so that they can make the decision themselves to alter their behavior or even reinforce any positive behavior. This process should be made as easy as possible.

To see how this might change the approach from more traditional methods, here are some elements so that you can see the difference in approach between instructing and facilitating:

What do the words instructing/facilitating imply: telling, showing; [facilitating] enabling the trainee to find the answer by himself.

[I]What is the aim: transfer knowledge and develop skills; [facilitating] gain insight/self analysis to enable an attitude change.

[I]Who knows the subject: instructor; [facilitating] both instructor and trainee.

[I]Who has the experience: instructor; [facilitating] both instructor and trainee.

[I]What is the relationship: authoritarian; [facilitating] equal.

[I]Who sets the agenda: [instructing] instructor; [facilitating] both instructor and trainee.

One of the slides that raised eyebrows and a ripple of amusement at the conference contained this description of the necessary qualities of a facilitating trainer:

Is patient and has a positive attitude;

Shows humility and admits mistakes;

Encourages and is honest;

Is non-judgemental and shows empathy;

Is supportive, respectful and honest;

Has good knowledge.

All qualities that I recognise in HC and many other trainers who are active on this forum.

Jim

HeliComparator
12th Jul 2014, 14:36
...

All qualities that I recognise in HC and many other trainers who are active on this forum.

Jim

Hmmmm, must be my non-evil twin! Anyway, what I didn't get out of the conference was a snappy understanding of the difference between ATQP and EBT. There were presentations on each, but seemingly no link. Are they mutually exclusive, the same thing by a different name, mutually compatible, or what?

Hompy
12th Jul 2014, 18:40
I have recently(the last two years) changed type from an old and reliable heavy machine to a new 'bells and whistles' heavy machine. As is normal, I am responsible for the lives of others when I operate this machine.

I have read the report and the above posts by wise instructors. Apart from disorientation I see very few similarities between this incident and the BLUN accident.

I am not sure whether I am a magenta person or somebody with no grass roots skills or what. I really do not believe that 'bush flying' or manual handling practice would help at all. I do not remember the single engine helicopters I flew having so little power that at max t/o weight you would have to dive to get going. The thousands of 'simple autopilot' hours I have flown have been relatively incident free(long may it continue).

What I can say is I do not properly understand the autopilot yet, even though I have had many hours in a simulator and in the machine and I am very keen to learn every trick. The manufacturer's instructions are poor at best. The English on the said instructions, their format and incompleteness make them some of the worst Flight Manual instructions I have ever read. Not only this but no computer based training exists for the fancy autopilot for me to exercise my old fashioned keenness to learn. It should. I could be more familiar with an A320 autopilot using a cheap off the shelf sim than I am with the autopilot I have to use professionally. Even a procedural trainer would do. The impression I have is that nobody, even the company that produced the machine, fully understand it yet. Maybe I am wrong and somebody out there understands it but certainly nobody has been able to come up with adequate instructions or training packages.

IMHO it is bad training, maybe lack of instructor experience or knowledge and rushed out, poorly supported equipment that is the underlying problem here.....and elsewhere.

pilot and apprentice
12th Jul 2014, 20:56
Hompy, for myself I'll say that I see no indication of a lack of manual skills in this incident. They knew enough to feel the a/c was too heavy, dealt with it appropriately. They were able to clear the faults with the autopilot and make sound judgements on serviceability. Once disoriented they recovered the a/c, got everyone home, and self reported. There is lots to commend.

My comments were directed at the automatic action of using the GA button (standard) on a non standard departure. Why? They already suspected AP faults. A more conservative approach to the AP, or a better understanding of how it would react to a non standard flight regime for engagement of the GA, and there would have been no incident.
Personally I don't like the idea of flying 'through' the autopilot unless one is absolutely 100% certain why it is doing what it is doing and why it needs help. Otherwise, let it fly or fly yourself. Remember the old "you have control" "I have control" from flight training. I personally use the same logic with George!!

This crew may or may not fit the profile I have been talking about. They certainly tried to get back 'on the rails' as soon as they could (AP usage on departure). It is too bad that no one noticed an a/c so far overweight until a full weight night departure, but this crew may have been on their first shift in the airframe. We don't know.

IMHO, just by the tone and content of your post, you are one of the ones who will be just fine. You are asking the questions and you are concerned about the answer.

If you had said "I know what buttons to push to get the job done for now, that's good enough" then I would be worried.

ericferret
12th Jul 2014, 21:15
Sound judgements on serviceability!!!!!!

We know the weight of the aircraft and load, it won't go up.
Offload a passenger and it still won't go up .
Offload another passenger now she fly.

How about shut down, get engineering input and if deemed safe make a non revenue flight back with another aircraft going out to pick up the pax.

This aircraft had an inaccurate fuel system and an inaccurate weight and balance schedule.

HeliComparator
12th Jul 2014, 21:58
P&A on the subject of flying through the AP I'm sure it depends on the model. On the 225, and therefore I'm hoping on the 155 as well, as soon as you "fly through" on an axis, the AP knows it and gives up trying to carry out the upper mode function on that axis until such time as you stop overriding, at which point it smoothly takes up doing what you asked it to do in the first place, PROVIDED the cyclic and collective are in trim when you release control. If the they are not in trim when you let go, the controls jump to the trimmed position, the aircraft will lurch and whilst eventually the AP will resume the correct attitude, in the mean time the attitude will be wrong. That is why it is ESSENTIAL to depress the cyclic trim release especially, when releasing control back to the AP. I say the cyclic control especially, because in general one doesn't fly against the collective spring trim, it is too powerful to do that comfortably.

If you think about it, when flying through the basic AP you are overriding the AP's basic attitude hold, and when you let go that attitude is resumed. It's just the same flying through GA except in that case the underlying mode is "flying up and away" rather than holding some attitude you had previously selected. So when you let go, it just wants to fly up and away, which is usually a good thing when you are near the ground on departure.

If you fly against the trims so as to change eg airspeed significantly, the cyclic is no longer in trim and you must retrim it by pressing the cyclic trim release before letting go. On the 225 with its very light cyclic, the sudden removal of the spring forces tends to cause a slight lurch which is offensive if one takes pride in smooth flight. This therefore is one of the reasons why it is better to press the cyclic trim release the whole time one is "flying through" safe in the knowledge that you can let go at any time, there won't be a lurch, and the AP will smoothly resume doing what is expected of it. The other reason is that, again in the case of the 225, the AP mode when flying against the trims is not quite the same as that when pressing the trim release. Despite protestations from DB the latter case is more stable. Anyway, what is the point in having a trim system if one is intentionally going to fly out of trim?

It's not mentioned in the report, but if the pilot overrode on cyclic whilst the airspeed was changing significantly (thus requiring a new trimmed position at the end of the override) but didn't trim release, instead letting go, it is no wonder the attitude got a bit out of hand. This is absolutely the wrong thing to do, but most likely has never been properly taught to the pilot. If it is anything like the EC225, there is only 1 FDR parameter for each axis, covering both the override detection and the trim release, so it was probably not possible to determine whether the trim release was pressed or the pilot was just flying out of trim. Again, if like the EC225, that FDR parameter is a bit flaky anyway!

In this incident case as mentioned, a good deal of the problem seems to have been taking control only of the cyclic and not of the collective. If it had been me flying, (presuming I had got myself into their situation) I would have depressed both cyclic and collective trim releases which says unequivocally to the AP "I have control", selected a sensible attitude and power, released everything and then watched it fly away.

So, as I said originally, it's a pity the report doesn't cover use of the trim release since it is a fundamental and critical issue.

terminus mos
12th Jul 2014, 22:08
Hompy, for myself I'll say that I see no indication of a lack of manual skills in this incident. They knew enough to feel the a/c was too heavy, dealt with it appropriately.

I am not sure about that. Allowing any aircraft with passengers on board to get to 36 degrees nose down on a rig take off day or night to me shows a big lack of manual skill. A simple pull max power, 5-10 degrees nose down, hold the attitude and count to 10 would ensure a safer take off than the gyrations seen here.

pilot and apprentice
12th Jul 2014, 22:11
Sound judgements on serviceability!!!!!!

We know the weight of the aircraft and load, it won't go up.
Offload a passenger and it still won't go up .
Offload another passenger now she fly.

How about shut down, get engineering input and if deemed safe make a non revenue flight back with another aircraft going out to pick up the pax.

This aircraft had an inaccurate fuel system and an inaccurate weight and balance schedule.

Autopilot serviceability: They cleared the fault, it was serviceable. They discussed it. SOP

The SNS may be great, but in the places I've worked the load presented is often...optimistic shall we say....and they recognized an issue with weight. It did go up, but not as spritely as they liked so they lightened the load. It could have been an issue with wind, turbulence, temperature just as well. They also could have shut down and demanded a re-weigh of all pax and cargo. This seldom wins friends, and dropping a couple pax is a quick easy fix.

THESE things happen all day, every day, all over the world.

pilot and apprentice
12th Jul 2014, 22:30
I am not sure about that. Allowing any aircraft with passengers on board to get to 36 degrees nose down on a rig take off day or night to me shows a big lack of manual skill. A simple pull max power, 5-10 degrees nose down, hold the attitude and count to 10 would ensure a safer take off than the gyrations seen here.

Just basing my opinion on what is actually in the report.

All the manual skills in the world won't save you once you are already disoriented. Choosing a non-standard departure, then hitting the GA early, and finally getting surprised; all that caused the disorientation. The gyrations resulted from the disorientation.

I see no reason, based on this report, to believe that he would have had any trouble if he had just flown the departure himself. But I also think his choice to depart so aggressively at night is odd. Again, without information on this company's performance planning, it is hard to judge how a 155 would normally perform.

This is why IIMC is a killer. If you no longer know which way is up, and you don't trust George, all the hot $hit hands and feet in the world won't help.

HC, I could discuss the trim release, etc in the 76 vs the 225 but neither of us know if it has anything to do with the 155. From your descriptions it appears the 76 and 225 have very important, if subtle, differences.

Boudreaux Bob
12th Jul 2014, 23:05
The Legendary Oil Patch Weight Scales and Clock will get you every time if you let them.

THESE things happen all day, every day, all over the world.

Bubba, who would make two of me, carrying a back pack, briefcase, dragging a Duffel Bag as big has he is, and a two Bears straining to pick up a 40 pound Tool Box....for a combined weight of 290 pounds for example.:ugh:

Or the ol', two minute delay, the Pax is on his way up the helideck steps right now!:rolleyes:

Oh yes, perfection in motion out there isn't it?:mad:

JimL
13th Jul 2014, 09:52
Firstly, the answer HC's question on the link between ATQP (AQP in the US) and EBT - with respect to Europe (I'm sure how this fits in the US or elsewhere). My first admission is that I am not the expert in these subjects but I am relying on discussions with Keith Dyce of British Airways and Mike Varney of Airbus, who are.

ATQP came first and was addressed at tailoring 'operational' training so that it would more align with the issues that were being experienced by the operators. In general, that meant a move away from the tick-box elements that were enshrined in Operational Regulations. However, it addresses only operational training and the requirement to provide licence proficiency checks (LPC) and Type Ratings in accordance with FLC regulations remain.

The EBT programme resulted from an analysis of data collected over a long period - using a number of reporting and survey systems (including LOSA, FDM, ASRs and accident and incident reports - the evidence part of the acronym). EBT also continues the ICAO initiative to establish competence based training; this has led to the construction of the eight ICAO competencies (nine for Airbus who – rightly according to attendees at this conference – include ‘knowledge’). It is considered that the achievement of these competencies, and eventually resilience, depends on facilitation rather than instruction.

The EBT programme uses the results from the data collection to establish a baseline programme (which is defined in the documentation) - which now includes both operational and licence compliance. The enhanced programme, permits further tailoring of the programme to be achieved using the operator's own LOSA, FDM, ASRs and training reports. This dynamic system allows training to be modified as part of the constant improvement cycle.

EBT is now moving into a phase where the Type Rating will also be part of the EBT culture. Something that has to be achieved if the commercial world wishes to have an integrated system of training (Type Rating, Licence Proficiency and Operational Conversion and Training) that is based upon their own procedures and the perceived risks - in their operational environment.

This rather long monologue is intended to show that ATQP is a half-way house to EBT.

Just a couple of other points with respect to this incident:

With respect to Hompy's points; at the conference the complexity of autopilots was discussed and Herve Jammayrac, in his presentation, agreed that they were too complex and the interface had to be simplified. My findings from the conference were: "Autopilot are increasingly omnipotent and few pilots understand them – there is a need for pilots to have access to conceptual models that they can gain, and retain, a mental picture of what is happening within the system". This of course has to be achieved as an addition to the changes in training that are also required.

As was indicated before (and in the report) there were complicated faults with the controls with respect to the autopilot that took some time to resolve. However my earlier point still applies; if it has taken three resets to clear a fault which indicates a problem with the collective channel, a more prudent pilot might have taken that as a given and not engaged the GA function.

The aircraft weighed substantially more that the documentation implied; the system of mass control on the North Sea is reasonable (not more than that I would suggest) and the fact that a decent hover, at the restricted mass, could not be achieved confounded both pilots. The decision to drop passengers was a brave one (and to do it twice showed real initiative); the exaggerated pitch attitude change at the rotation point - with a known heavy aircraft - was not appropriate; it is no surprise that the aircraft took some time to arrive at a point where a climb was possible.

All of this re-emphasises my point that the level of knowledge amongst offshore pilots needs to be examined and the system (in the type rating as well as in operational conversion and training) needs review. One of my observations from the conference was:

"Necessary changes required in piloting skills when converting from flying with basic instruments and stabilisation, to managing the on-board systems, had not been fully recognised and implemented; there was ample evidence that the necessity for managed transition had not been understood (by regulators or operators) or put in place."

Jim

HeliComparator
13th Jul 2014, 12:44
Thanks Jim. Regarding integrated training, this was of course how we did it in the "good old days" - it was only with the advent of JAR that they were split into licence training / testing and Operational training /testing. Are we following a circular path?

Boudreaux Bob
13th Jul 2014, 13:19
Hompy,

I once worked for a builder of helicopters that had English as a second language (no...not an American firm but one on the eastern side of the Saltwater Divide) and saw how the Technical Writers went about their business creating Tech Manuals for an American Aircraft built under license.

Their effort could be described as a simple translation of US Army Manuals into their native language then later doing a second translation into ordinary English.

The comparison of the original Text in the US Army Manual to the related section of the Non-Army English version yielded an impression there were two entirely different aircraft being discussed.

When one considers the fact that most of the Tech Writers are just that and not Design Engineers or Test Pilots tasked with collateral duties of creating the Tech Manuals (including the Pilot's Handbook or whatever passes for such), it is not surprising there is a gap between what is printed and what should be printed.

Compound that by injecting a translation from their "First Language" to multiple other languages and you can see the challenge that process becomes.

Trying to provide a "complete" description of a complex system such as modern AFCS/FMS Autopilot systems are these days is a very challenging task that in my not so humble opinion is not ever bound to be completely successful.

Why a computer based software program cannot be developed is a good question. I would submit simple "Cost" being the biggest obstacle. The integration that would take is a daunting task especially when considering the Manufactuer's cannot produce a paper and text Manual that adequately describes all the variations of the Autopilot system.

Likewise to develop a Systems Trainer that can duplicate all the functions and map-functions of the AFCS system would be a very expensive proposition to develop, field, maintain, and use for instruction.

When the limited fleet size for particular helicopters is considered it just is not economically feasible.

JimL
13th Jul 2014, 14:45
I'm sorry Bob - I don't buy that! I prefer the description of the necessity for good mental models from Don Norman's book - The Design of Everyday Things.

The design model is the designer's conceptual model. The user's model is the mental model developed through interaction with the system. The system image results from the physical structure that has been built (including documentation, instructions, and labels). The designer expects the user's model to be identical to the design model. But the designer doesn't talk directly with the user—all communication takes place through the system image. If the system image does not make the design model clear and consistent, then the user will end up with the wrong mental model. (From Norman, 1086.)

A good conceptual model allows us to predict the effects of our actions. Without a good model we operate by rote, blindly; we do operations as we were told to do them; we can't fully appreciate why, what effects to expect, or what to do if things go wrong. As long as things work properly, we can manage. When things go wrong, however, or when we come upon a novel situation, then we need a deeper understanding, a good model.

I really don't need the designer to tell me how he designed it - or show me the algorithms or circuit boards; what I need is an effective 'mental model' that permits me to work out what I need to do when encountering a situation I have not seen, or been briefed about, before (resilience). My guess is the crew of the EC155 did not see the relevance of their three resets to the collective channel and their selecting of the Go Around mode.

In the event there was no effect but the seeds of doubt over the functioning of the autopilot, sown on the deck of the Clipper, clouded their judgement (as did the destruction of their mental model of the take-off profile caused by the incorrect mass) and resulted in them flying through the autopilot modes.

Clearly there is an issue evidenced by the discussion between Double Bogey and HeliComparator - both of whom have a well-above-average understanding of the workings of the EC225 autopilot.

If you have several hours to spare, sit yourself down with the S92 RFM and try to work out the trim system. Note particularly the change of control over the commanded/reference vertical speed between the 'two cue coupled' and 'three cue coupled' vertical speed mode.

Jim

Boudreaux Bob
13th Jul 2014, 15:00
Jim,

You miss the point I was making. It is not the "Designer" telling the "User" how he designed it...how the electronic boards work...or the inner workings of the algorithms....but how the System is supposed to function AT THE USER's Level.

If the Designer, in this case Air Bus, cannot provide a proper User Manual and Factory Training Course then therein lies a huge problem.

At some point, there has to be a foundation whereby a proper knowledge of how the particular AFCS system operates in both Normal and Abnormal modes. If the builder cannot do that then who can?

Someone has to be the Subject Matter expert. Who would you nominate if not the Builder?

Do you think "language" itself and its usage not influence all of this?

"Resilience" seems to be a new buzz word created by someone to foster some notion things have changed since the advent of Aviation where the Pilot has to understand how the systems function on his aircraft and thus be able to understand what to do when they fail for some reason.

The Cornerstone of all this is the Pilot being able to have a source of education/training to adequately prepare him for those situations.

What has changed is the complexity of systems which makes that all the more difficult and challenging.

The basic problem is the same as ever.

The techniques we must adopt to address this complexity will be different but so have our efforts in the past.

When all these fancy Bells and Whistles quit working, Pilots will have to revert to what they have always done in the past, adapt, improvise, and overcome.

That is where you fancy concept of "Resilience" kicks in.

I call it "fly the helicopter".

You can argue all you want about what it takes to do that but that is the task in its most basic concept.

HeliComparator
13th Jul 2014, 15:18
A bit of Luddite-ism creeping in there Bob! How do you propose to "fly the helicopter" when they become fully FBW? Even now, you are surely not proposing to fully disengage the autopilot and fly without stability at all? No, these days one is inevitably having to interact with the electronics at some level, it is just a matter of choosing the right level, and there no doubt resilience helps. With DB and I not even being able to agree on the use of the trim release, how can we possibly be expected to agree on the vastly more complex issues of the automation? (Although to be fair, we mostly do!).

Boudreaux Bob
13th Jul 2014, 15:46
HC.....can you fly a helicopter by pushing buttons, twisting knobs in addition to or in lieu of moving Sticks?

What part of adapt, improvise, and overcome eludes you?

In the end no matter how you slice it, Pilots have to "fly the machine". If you want to be a nit picker and question every single word and ignore the context and concept then who needs to rethink their position here?

It does not matter if it is FBW, push pull tubes, or cables and pulley's....when it is your Ass sat in the Seat you are going to have to find a way to control the aircraft.

Your knowledge of the systems is the starting point is it not?

In this case "Ignorance" will kill you. You have said that before when suggesting some folks do not understand how their AFCS works and as a result do not know how to properly utilize all of its capabilities.

What is different between what I am saying and your position in the past?


As to this "Luddite" thing, am I not espousing saving the machinery which is quite contrary to what the Luddites were all about?

HeliComparator
13th Jul 2014, 15:56
Bob, I may have misunderstood your previous post but it seemed as though you were advocating manual flight when the pilot's understanding of what the software was doing eluded him because he didn't understand it. My point was that even in manual flight, you are interacting with the AP software and so you need to know how it behaves.

I thought you were proposing a sort of "when the going gets tough, disengage all the fancy hits and fly it manually" strategy, which is not the best philosophy and indeed has caused a recent crash in the N Sea. Re-reading your post you probably didn't mean that!

Boudreaux Bob
13th Jul 2014, 16:42
Language strikes again! I fully agree with "not kicking George aside" and reverting to purely hands on flying. Quite the opposite. That being said, there might be some situations where that is the better method but it should be just one of the things in our Bag of Tricks and not the only one or the first one we grab.

I generally see the continuing pursuit of lofty descriptions of how Pilots function to sometimes cause far more problems than it solves as we find ourselves arguing about the labeling and ignoring the "problem" that prompted the discussion to begin with.

I see this "Resilience" thing as being yet another of those examples of not leaving well enough alone.

The discussions we have had about Training and other education about systems, procedures, standards, and methods to be far more beneficial than getting wrapped around axle over "Resilience" as a concept as the "new" cure.

I have watched folks do the immediate canceling of the autopilot in the Sim when the first Master Caution illuminates and the subsequent disasters that sometimes followed as a direct result. The Demo of watching the Autopilot cope with some failures and fly an absolutely beautiful coupled ILS Approach was lost on some as well.

The Sim is only representative and not a completely accurate duplicate of the actual aircraft in all cases but the Teaching Point was valid.

You and I agree far more than we disagree.

212man
13th Jul 2014, 17:02
Like JimL I'm a little surprised there are no recommendations at the end, which is sad given the severity of the incident. Bear in mind that at 184 ft ASL, the Clipper is a 'giant' in the SNS and a departure from most other decks with the same profile would almost certainly not have had the same outcome.

If I had access to the FDR data, one of the parameters I would like to look at is the FTR discrete to see how the FTR was being used in the initial take off. I carried out the first offshore night (and day) take-offs and landings in the EC-155, and came away from the session with a huge sense of how much safer an exercise it was with the built in AFCS attitude logic. From the hover the forward cyclic input is made using the follow-up trim, not using the FTR. During the subsequent acceleration the aircraft attitude changes automatically to an 80 KIAS climbing attitude. The follow-up trim moves to the long term attitude mode from 30 KIAS, with hysteresis, to 40 KIAS and the only pilot input required is a quick 'left beep' on the cyclic 'beep' trim to correct the roll attitude (4 degrees right wing low, in nil wind). Using the FTR cuts out this natural transition process and I can't think of any reason why it would be used in those circumstances. It also gives the sense of the aircraft being a little unstabilised - particularly in roll - and I wonder if the flight crew's comments reflect this?

I also created a set of offshore performance graphs, using the basic PC2 performance as the datum, but with a 250 kg delta from the MTOM (then 4,800 kg) to ensure adequate AEO performance. In other words, we were never above 4,550 kg on departure offshore - but could be lower when the raw PC2 mass was lower than 4,550 kg. When I look at the PC2DLE masses, I do wonder how much attention was given to the AEO performance.

HeliComparator
13th Jul 2014, 17:04
Bob, I am not one for buzzwords, management-BS-speak etc either, but sometimes it helps to crystallise what we already well know in our hearts, to have it put down in words precisely. Apart from anything else it makes for precise communication amongst people who all understand the buzzword. It is just another form of jargon if you likel but jargon is a good way of communicating concisely provided the terms are understood by all parties.

I will confess to finding a few of the presentations at the excellent conference JimL mentioned, "a little above my head" and was left wondering why it had to seem so complicated when it was clear that we were getting the most fundamental basics wrong, but I liked "Resilience" because it sums up the characteristics of the sort of pilot you and I would like to be flown around by.

DOUBLE BOGEY
13th Jul 2014, 17:37
I find myself agreeing with Bob for probably the first time.

There is no quick fix. Resilience only comes through knowledge, training and practice mixed with a little intelligence.

HC - I do not want to disagree with you but in my view, pressing the Trim release in IMC, especially during a dynamic manoeuvre like a night rig take off, is surely a poor alternative to using at least the ATT mode of the AFCS.

I accept the trim release can help when there are good visual references or instantaneously to remove trim forces when appropriate.

I would hope we are on the same page.

finalchecksplease
13th Jul 2014, 18:28
HeliComparator, JimL;

What conference was this and is there a DVD or other source (web based?) where we can access the knowledge conveyed there and benefit from it?

Thanks,

Finalchecksplease

212man
13th Jul 2014, 19:26
FCP,
http://aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/Events/751/751_Conference_Programme_June24.pdf

I think the proceedings will be available this week.

HeliComparator
13th Jul 2014, 21:02
HC - I do not want to disagree with you but in my view, pressing the Trim release in IMC, especially during a dynamic manoeuvre like a night rig take off, is surely a poor alternative to using at least the ATT mode of the AFCS.


It shouldn't be a matter of WANTING to disagree or not, one has to say what one thinks!

For a night rig takeoff (in an EC225, which I think is what we are both talking about?), pressing GA around rotation time and letting go of the cyclic is, I suspect we both agree, the best way of flying it.

But presuming we want to fly it manually for some reason:

Case 1: no pressing of Trim release. Cyclic is moved forwards to rotate. Hover follow-up trim auto-trims the cyclic so as to maintain in-trim. If you eventually press GA and let go, everything is hunky dory. BUT that presumes not much wind.

If there is 40kts wind (not that uncommon!) no more follow up trim. Now you move the cyclic forward to rotate, airspeed increases so flap back requires the cyclic to be moved further forward. At say 80kts you decide to press GA and let go. The cyclic jumps back to its hover position, the aircraft rears up starts to lose speed. You then start to fight it and a Dancopter EC155 - like scenario ensues. If you operate the beep trim, you beep the IAS datum not the stick position or attitude datum. This is a dreadful way to operate.

Case 2: you rotate whilst pressing trim release. The aircraft is more stable in this mode*, there is no non-linearity of feel associated with the cyclic breakout forces. You can press GA at any time, under any wind conditions, and let go. The AFCS will smoothly take over and carry out its GA function. This technique works every time.

You mention not wishing to lose ATT mode, but the purpose of ATT mode is to hold a previously selected attitude. How can this be a useful feature during a dynamic manoeuvre such as a rig takeoff?

*It's important to bear in mind that the behaviour of an EC225 vs an AS332L when flown against the spring trim, is completely different. With an AS332L operated against the spring trim, there are 2 components acting - a SAS type function, and also a function trying to return the aircraft to the datum attitude. Therefore the deviation in pitch or roll is roughly proportional to the stick deflection away from its trimmed position.

It's quite different on the 225 and hence I suspect on the 155. As soon as override detection occurs any attempt to maintain the datum attitude is disabled. The axis reverts to SAS and a fairly wobbly SAS at that. It is therefore quite difficult to maintain say 30 deg bank flying against the trim in an EC225 - it is wobbly and you typically find the stick back within a few mm of its trimmed position in that non-linear breakout force area.

By contrast if you bank to 30 deg with cyclic trim release depressed, it is a doddle to hold it steady. Plus you can let go to scratch your nose at any time, and nothing happens.

The idea that pressing trim release in IMC is a heinous crime is a hang-up from the 332L and is therefore not relevant. But old habits are so hard to kill!

Boudreaux Bob
14th Jul 2014, 01:27
John Dixson just posted something interesting in the HH-60 thread about the Sikorsky S-67 AFCS system using a variable rate Beep Trim system that was installed on the Blackhawk Prototype but was nixed by the US Army Test Pilots.

No doubt they had probably all grown up on Bell's and perhaps Chinooks with the standard old Force Trim Release system that incorporated a Thumb Release Button.

A lot of different helicopters used the same concept as did the old Huey.

Hopefully, he will be along to explain in better detail how that Variable Rate Coolie Hat thing functioned.

Hompy
14th Jul 2014, 06:46
HC, DB. This is the problem. I am assuming, by your attendance at conferences that you are either very enthusiastic line pilots or training/senior pilots. However, even with your training roles, you are discussing different ways of carrying out a critical flight phase using an autopilot. This should not be a discussion point, it should be clear. There should be no 'choice' here, just the right way or the wrong way. Not only this, if it is an automatic system then it should be automatic. You should not have to 'help' an automatic system otherwise it is pointless automation.

The fact there is ambiguity about ways of handling a critical flight phase is shocking. From my own experience the ambiguity is widespread. Without wanting to sound melodramatic, this is a situation that needs to be resolved or it will lead to further loss of life.

Frankly, I think resilience or manual handling practice or whatever is diverting attention away from the fact that many new helicopters are rolling off the production line without adequate instructions or training packages. This leads to ambiguous and dangerous training. Instead of making the end user resilient shouldn't we be making the training and equipment user resilient?

JimL
14th Jul 2014, 07:11
There is no doubt that the trim system is complex and results in many automation upset incidents. Although the trim mismanagement was not implicated in the EC155 incident, it was in Cougar 851! There is an interesting point in HC's discourse above:

If there is 40kts wind (not that uncommon!) no more follow up trim. Now you move the cyclic forward to rotate, airspeed increases so flap back requires the cyclic to be moved further forward. At say 80kts you decide to press GA and let go. The cyclic jumps back to its hover position, the aircraft rears up starts to lose speed. You then start to fight it and a Dancopter EC155 - like scenario ensues. If you operate the beep trim, you beep the IAS datum not the stick position or attitude datum. This is a dreadful way to operate.

because it appears to describe the sequence of events in the Cougar 851 incident (as we saw from the video replay at the conference): the pilot takes off from the platform using the published S92 Cat A profile but does not press the trim release trigger. As the aircraft passes through 60kts (the lower limit of the autopilot at that time was 50kts) the pilot selects Go Around (GA) and releases the controls. From that point the autopilot is programmed to accelerate to (the Vy of) 80kts, achieve a vertical speed target of 750ft/min and maintain heading. However, the trim system is of necessity (certification rules on hard-over tolerence) limited in authority and cannot overcome the trim forces that remained when the controls were released. The trim actuators never overcome the back force and the aircraft decelerates through 50kts and the autopilot disconnects. It is likely that the deceleration and autopilot disconnect is not anticipated because of lack of knowledge/awareness and a very serious incident (resembling the EC155 incident) ensues.

(I'm sure someone will correct me if the following is not accurate)

We are presently in a situation where, in (at least) one of the latest generation aircraft there are trim releases on the cyclic and collective as well as 'coolie hat' beepers on both. These functions are 'overloaded' in the sense that they result in different actions according to the mode engaged (SAS, ATT, two-cue/three-axis coupled and three-cue/four-axis coupled); both coolie hat trims have longitudinal and lateral functions. As most who fly these aircraft will know, when the aircraft is in two-cue/three axis mode, the aircraft trajectory is controlled by pitch attitude (i.e. holding airspeed or vertical speed by changing pitch attitude) control over the active parameter is provided by the cyclic trim function (release or beeper trim). If the three-cue/four axis mode is engaged - in the simplest form the IAS and VS are both engaged (by the pilot or, under envelope protection, by the system) - control of the VS moves from the cyclic beeper to the collective beeper. Not exactly 'simples' is it!

If this does not describe the autopilot system in your current aircraft perhaps we should ask the question why - is there not a common certification criteria for all Aircraft Guidance Systems (AGS)? This brings us on to another topic covered at the conference and that is the absence of two very important rules for certification of displays, HMIs and AGS - XX.1302 and XX.1329 - and why? However, enough for now; we will no doubt move to these subjects later.

Jim

HeliComparator
14th Jul 2014, 07:28
Hompy yes, and this is kind of my reason for banging on about the trim release issue. Firstly because it seems to me to be an important issue that the AAIB report didn't mention, and secondly because yes, there is no clarity of operational procedures. I think most regulars here know that one of us is the manufacturer's UK person in charge of training, the other is the operator who first introduced the EC225 into oil and gas service's person in charge of that introduction and author of its operating procedures.

The question is, who should be the authority on such matters - the OEM (who builds but doesn't operate the type) or the folk with the most real-world operational experience?

We had numerous cases in the early days, of pilots (who were new to automation and thus suspicious of it) complaining that it reared up on them during a rig takeoff and in every case it was due to them giving control to the autopilot when it was not in trim. You wouldn't give control to you fellow pilot with the stick out of trim surely, so why do it to the autopilot?

Hompy
14th Jul 2014, 07:49
It is both parties' responsibility. As an end user, I don't care who does it as long as somebody grabs the reigns and sorts it out. Give me clear instructions and descriptions and I will follow them and believe. Give me ambiguity and choice coupled with a bad safety record and I will mistrust and make the wrong choice. These things should not be released until adequate training packages have been devised and IMHO for something as complex as the new generation autopilot this means an app or online training so I can practice and learn to my heart's content. Instead of this I have limited sim time with ambiguous instruction and poorly translated and formatted written instruction. Pas bien!

Impress to inflate
14th Jul 2014, 09:34
Hi All

I have a few questions here in reference to the incident??

1) When did the Commanders standards drop from 3000 hours to 2000.:=
2) Why in this day and age of so called "safety" are

A) Oil companies allowing reduced logbook time to fly as P1:\
B) Oil companies allowing foreign (and I'm not being racist before you all kick off) operators to fly for them:mad:
C) Oil companies not paying top dollar AND investing in this industry:uhoh:

Theres always a knee jury reaction to incidents and accidents offshore by the Oil companies that over time are scaled back, reduced or forgotten about until the next incident or accident.

It's about time more money was put into training and equipment that make a real difference

ITI

Bravo73
14th Jul 2014, 10:12
1) When did the Commanders standards drop from 3000 hours to 2000.:=


The minimum hours for an OGP Commander haven't dropped recently. Helicopters <5700kgs (which includes the EC155) is 2000hrs. >5700kgs is 3000hrs (although this can be reduced under specific circumstances).

JulieAndrews
14th Jul 2014, 11:02
Last time I looked - Shell was a Dutch company so who is the "foreigner" here?

Bravo73
14th Jul 2014, 12:03
Last time I looked - Shell was a Dutch company so who is the "foreigner" here?

Shell is generally accepted to be a Anglo-Dutch company. (HQ in NL but listed on London Stock Exchange).

But still European. With a European AOC operator operating from a European state.

212man
14th Jul 2014, 12:06
there is no force trim release on the EC155's collective

Oh really? Or do you just call it "that button we press when we want to move the collective up or down"?

Boudreaux Bob
14th Jul 2014, 12:06
JimL, DB, HC, and 212Man all bear listening to as they all have a lot of experience and background in the topics under discussion.

Even if the debate gets spirited as it does at times.....they all bring a lot to the table even if we do not always agree with everything they say. That difference is usually the result of how they say it rather than the content and is always relatively minor.


HC,

The question is, who should be the authority on such matters - the OEM (who builds but doesn't operate the type) or the folk with the most real-world operational experience?

The answer is "Neither" and "Both".

The OEM should be the Technical Authority and the Operators (perhaps working in unison with each other) should be the Operational Authority and through a collaborative effort arrive at the Industry Best Practice Standard for the particular aircraft.

As I have said before, the folks who design, build, and certify the aircraft "should" be the best source for Technical Information but as you point out they do not have the "Operational" expertise the Operators do.

An Operator might have the preponderance of experience and background re Operating the Aircraft but may not always have a complete exposure to all the different climatic or environmental conditions the aircraft is flown in. If the Operators joined together in a collaborative manner and draw from multiple sources the final product at each Operator would be far better.

An example, a well known Operator had its own EOP re Engine Starter Generators that varied greatly from the OEM's Standard Procedure and did so years long after the cause of the changed procedure had been resolved when the OEM, through Operator Reports of Bearing failures had determined a bad batch of Bearings had been produced. One that Batch had been located, removed from service, the problem went away.

Without a joint effort by the OEM and the Operator, such things can happen that adversely affect the operation of the aircraft. Thus, my view the OEM and Operators must be involved in the process of developing, monitoring, and producing Operational Procedures but each should focus where they are best suited to do so.

As to Jim's idea of a single Certification Standard.....if we look at the Big Airplane World, it is well know that Boeing and Air Bus have two different approaches to how their AFCS systems operate yet both are Certified.

Does that constitute a single standard capable of providing for differences or is it two different standards in your view?

We know the 92 and 225 are similar but different.

Are you suggesting in the future all the OEM's have to design systems that are the same in design and function or just in function? Are you suggesting Pilots should be able to move from Aircraft Type to Aircraft Type built by different OEM's and all the buttons and switches and controls operate exactly the same in every flight condition?

JimL
14th Jul 2014, 12:47
I'm not going to hog this so I will just address the point that was directed to me.

All aeroplanes that are produced by Boeing and Airbus have to comply with 25.1302 Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew:

Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew.

This section applies to installed systems and equipment intended for flightcrew members' use in operating the airplane from their normally seated positions on the flight deck. The applicant must show that these systems and installed equipment, individually and in combination with other such systems and equipment, are designed so that qualified flightcrew members trained in their use can safely perform all of the tasks associated with the systems' and equipment's intended functions.

and 25.1329 - Flight guidance systems.

In themselves, these two rules are objective - i.e. they state the objective and leave the methods of compliance to the applicant/regulator.

With respect to both of them, the advisory material contains a great deal of information which is rightfully in the human factors domain. This guidance includes the requirement to meet human-centric design methods. As such it fully considers the pilot-in-the-loop.

During the recent conference we put a number of flips on the wall which contained the questions we needed to answer in the presentations and in the following discussion. On the flips was contained the mantra:

It is important that synergy is achieved in a ‘design’ / ‘training’ / ‘operations’ system solution but no one area should dominate. Extra training and complex procedures must not be used to mask a poor design. The flight crew should not be expected to compensate for poor design to achieve the desired flight path, or monitor effectively.

This was posted to constantly remind attendees - during the conference - that we should not tolerate deficient designs.

Also around the walls of the conference theatre were pictures of the AH225, AH175, AW139, AW169, AW189, S92 and S76D; these were there to show those who were not aware (our presenters from the fixed wing world) of the complexity of more recent helicopter cockpits. Those presenters remarked on the complexity of the displays, integrated systems and HMIs - more complex than the A380 or the B787.

The fact is that these two rules are necessary to ensure that the standard of certification is appropriate; for, without them, it is not clear to us mere observers, what standards are being applied and why. There is no good reason why the rules are not in Parts 27/29.

In a recent EASA Discussion Document on automation, the Working Group made the same recommendation. However, we were informed that, during consultation, comments were received in opposition to such a recommendation.

This is not a request for something that is not recognised as being logical or necessary.

Jim

DOUBLE BOGEY
14th Jul 2014, 16:30
Hompy - Your comments in your last post stab right at the heart of this problem. There needs to be crystal clear instructions from the OEM as to the correct use of the AFCS. This is happening in the background but it is a slow and sometimes painful process.

DB

micraman
14th Jul 2014, 17:52
May or may not be relavant but for whats its worth.Talking only about N2,the go around button was for go arounds mainly if you were doing an approach at say 100 kts,if you pressed the go around button the aircraft would put 70 kts indicated(I think by memory)and the aircraft would nose up to change the attitude to climb away.If you did this climbing out from a rig and you had less than 70 kts indicated it would push the nose down looking to increase the aircraft speed until you acheived 70 then it would nose up which would mean you are diving at the sea,not a good idea.as I have stated not up on 155 auto pilot so may be a red herring???

finalchecksplease
14th Jul 2014, 22:26
DB,

We would love crystal clear instructions from the OEM but in my experience on the EC225 the output at times isn't that clear at all. Also why is it even as a trainer so hard to get a copy of the latest THM and other training notes? I would have thought it was in the manufacturers interest to give pilots access to all that to improve their knowledge and in doing so make them safer.

Regards,

Finalchecksplease

DOUBLE BOGEY
15th Jul 2014, 07:06
FINALSCHECKSPLEASE - I agree with you and you are not the only pilot to make those comments. In our case I think there has been a lack of understanding between various commercial elements in the Company. Certain departments have viewed publications as a sales opportunity when they could be viewed as essential product support services.

Like all innovative manufacturers there is a natural fear of commercial espionage and sometimes this can lead to a resistance to release information generally.

So much for our excuses! I feel confident however that we are trying to address these issues as best we can and it will take time, especially to get the right information into the right publication. These processes do not absolve the Operators from optimising their training based on the current information available, assisted by the support and guidance of their local Airbus training centre. In my experience the Operators have yet to engage us at the correct level which is a shame as we could even now be in a better place.

I was trained by Industry and have been subsequently trained by the OEM. The emphasis by each is different with Industry holding expertise in the operating environment and the OEM holding expertise in the product. It seems almost inconceivable that we have not, as yet, managed to combine these qualities and capabilities to the point where we are serving correctly the needs of operational flight crew.

In my opinion we are hindered by inappropriate management involvement, culture and in some cases, dogma and fear of change. We need to clear these barriers away and communicate our data and ideas freely to capture the optimum processes.

I live in hope that we will one day achieve this especially before we suffer any more totally avoidable loss of life.

DB

212man
15th Jul 2014, 11:10
I must say that I find it incredible that we are even having a discussion about AFCS trim systems in the context of large, IFR, Multi-Pilot Commercial Air Transport aircraft, but it does appear there is a deep-rooted lack of understanding of the basics of SAS and ATT modes and the role of the trim system amongst many pilots. That's before we even begin to look at upper modes and automation! :ugh:

When the S-92 appeared in service Norway there was a lot of feedback to SAC about problems crews were having on departure from runways, where they would accelerate with forward cyclic held against the force spring and then found the aircraft 'rearing up' on them when they released the cyclic to engage the FD. SAC even had to publish an ASB or AOL to explain the problem. A similar issue appears to have occured in Canada, and I have seen it first hand having taken on a pilot from that operator. The common response was "but the Super Puma doesn't do that".....!

We did not conduct type rating training in my last organisation - as we were not an ATO - but did do operator conversions, and in the first general handling flight in the aircraft we would emphasise basic handing with no automation, to get a feel of how the aircraft actually behaved. This included progressive deselection of the AFCS functions from dual AP dual SAS, to single AP dual SAS, to dual SAS, to single SAS, to no stabilisation at all - and back again, to give a sense of what assistance was being given by the basic system. We would also practice the use of trim - both beeper and FTR. This seems quite elemental to me, and mirrors what I did on the EC-155 (and the other non-automated types I trained on - S61 and B212).

I know when discussing these kinds of issues with the OEM test pilots there is a sense of incredulity and exasperation, and I'm not entirely unsympathetic to that view.

One thought that does come to mind, though,which might partially explain this gulf in understanding, is the types of basic training aircraft that are in service (certainly for civillian training) - they generally have no trim system at all! So, even training using Attitude, Power, Trim and Power, Atittude, Trim, has a slight disconnect to it as it's not actually a trimmed state, but 'trimmed attitude retention by the pilot' that's required. So, what emphasis is placed on this basic but essential function during the initial training on a complex type?

By contrast, any fixed wing pilot starting on even the most basic single piston trainer will know the importance of at least pitch trim, and using it will be second nature. More powerful singles, and twins, have a yaw trim too and it's use is also critical - particulaly for IF, formation flying and navigation. I'm old enough to have been taught by an (Military FW) instructor who rewarded sloppy/inaccurate trimming with growling and a thump on the side of the helmet - we could have a separate thread all about insructional technique, I'm sure - however the overriding emotion when it happened was of sadness at dissapointing him and not meeting his expected standards. Conversely, when he gave praise the pride was immense, and his standards became my standards. We remained friends long after. I'm not sure we see this kind of technique for demanding accuracy and standards in the sausage-factory, paying customer, 20 year old hours-building-instructor world that many of the CPL(H)s come from today, but perhaps we should have a modern equivalent!

I digress....but before we discuss automation I think we have some more basic areas to address....

Hompy
15th Jul 2014, 11:53
BB, DB, HC, 212Man.

I find heartening to know that all the potential safety issues that I have experienced with flying a modern type are being discussed. On the other hand I despair that we are in this position as I thought the industry had progressed from being the 'poor and unsafe' cousin of FW. When did we lose our grip? How long will it take before the above issues are resolved? How long has this technology been flying and therefore have pilots and passengers been exposed?

Mars
15th Jul 2014, 12:51
Ananke you really disappointed me.

We do know what happened in the EC155 incident; the AAIB, using all the data that was recorded, have reported and published the facts, and the trace, for all to read (did you read it before commenting?).

It has been established, not least on this forum (see the discussion above), that pilots do not "...have a generally good knowledge of the aircraft systems" because that implies that when something out of the ordinary happens, they would be able to cope. That this is not so, shows that they have learnt mostly by rote and not by understanding the systems. They are probably not entirely to blame for this as the system appears to be letting them down.

The move away from OPC/LPC - with its reliance upon checking of historical events captured in a tick-box system - to one of facilitating competency, and development of the pilot to have the ability to think through issues that have not been experienced before (resilience), is a fundamental change in direction.

I agree with 'pilotandapprentice' that we all have an individual responsibility for upholding our own standards and taking an interest in our chosen profession. However, this problem is not going to be solved by letting pilots wazz about in multi-million pound transport aircraft. Do they allow that in the A380?

HeliComparator
15th Jul 2014, 16:21
I am reminded of doing ground schools (lots of them!) on the AS332L. Once we had covered how to stoke the boiler with coal, we got onto electrics. As soon as it was mentioned, a groan would go up and the shutters would come down. In order to keep it in its place, it was given a demeaning name ("wiggly amps") whilst something conceptually simple like hydraulics was called "hydraulics", not "squirty fluid" or some other disparaging term. Real men were proud of their ignorance of electrics and wore it as a badge of honour. Only girly swats had any concept of how basic DC and AC electrics worked. So what hope for fancy automation state machines, control laws and algorithms?

HeliComparator
15th Jul 2014, 16:26
Do they allow that in the A380?

Probably not, but that is probably why the crew of the AF A330 held the stick on the back stop as they stalled all the way from 30,000 odd feet into the sea.

Boudreaux Bob
15th Jul 2014, 23:48
With Smith and Lucas as role models.....no wonder Electrics are considered a subject to avoid!

Pittsextra
16th Jul 2014, 09:00
Eurocopter, a hand full of operators and a helicopter safety steering group at the oil and gas industry group Step change in safety and a forum discussion prompted by an AAIB report on an 8 month old event is leading the charge? Really???


Fancy automation, control laws and algos might sound geeky but 1) in their design there is of course more than half an eye to usability and 2) what have people being doing with their 2000hrs before getting fired into the right hand seat?

Mars
16th Jul 2014, 09:12
Pitts,

As usual your post leaves me baffled.

What exactly does this mean:
"...in their design there is of course more than half an eye to usability..."

Pittsextra
16th Jul 2014, 09:31
Mars - merely a reference to:-

Real men were proud of their ignorance of electrics and wore it as a badge of honour. Only girly swats had any concept of how basic DC and AC electrics worked. So what hope for fancy automation state machines, control laws and algorithms?

JimL
17th Jul 2014, 05:46
For anyone wishing to read the report of the RAeS conference "Technology Friend or Foe - the introduction of automation to offshore operations", it is contained here:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/6mhfyscvy9r439b/RAeS%20Conference%20Report.pdf

At the moment, the presentations/papers/audio-feed are not freely available but we are working at having them released to all.

Jim

Boudreaux Bob
17th Jul 2014, 14:44
Best saved for use when Insomnia strikes?:oh:

HeliComparator
17th Jul 2014, 14:58
Best saved for use when Insomnia strikes?:oh:

Or for those who are actually interested in where we are /should be going, as opposed to those who just like the sound of their voice.

Boudreaux Bob
17th Jul 2014, 17:40
HC,

Perhaps your sense of humor failed you. You did see the wee small figure at the end of the sentence did you not?

Read back through this Thread and you will notice I have posted a lot that fully agrees with the thoughts and comments made by JimL in his Report.

Having done that well in advance of his posting that link I should think you could remember that or are you getting Old Timer's Disease called CRS?

I am guessing there are some Mea Culpa's due out of some Senior folks if the content of the Symposium is to be taken to heart by all. You reckon that will happen? Will anyone stand up and admit to being a naughty boy for being a part of the system that has gotten us to the situation we find ourselves confronting?

The Report JimL posted paints a very sad picture of our Industry and its leadership.

At least now we are talking about in in the open which is a change in itself.

finalchecksplease
17th Jul 2014, 18:03
For anyone wishing to read the report of the RAeS conference "Technology Friend or Foe - the introduction of automation to offshore operations", it is contained here:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/6mhfyscvy9...e%20Report.pdf

At the moment, the presentations/papers/audio-feed are not freely available but we are working at having them released to all.

Jim


Having read the report I hope RAeS will allow the presentations / papers / audio-feed to be freely available. I for one wished I could have attended because of what was covered.

212man
17th Jul 2014, 18:35
I hope the presentations can be released too. I also wonder if the cost model can be adjusted. I made the point in my presentation that there was not a single line pilot in the audience - although there was a retired pilot who had an interest I these things, present.

Boudreaux Bob
17th Jul 2014, 18:58
Considering the existing system and environments at the various Operators the absence of Line Pilots seems not unusual at all.

The very last folks that ever get a chance to make useful inputs are those at the bottom of the Totem Pole.

How many Operators fund Line Pilot's attendance at such events or even advertise the events by Inter-Company Notices?

Hilico
17th Jul 2014, 19:18
This is one of the most interesting and informative threads I've ever seen, on any subject.

Overshadowing all the fascinating detail is the need for culture change. I promise you this scenario is not limited to offshore heli operations, but in most cases it does not have the grave effects we have seen here. The culture change has to be taken seriously by the line pilots but most especially by the senior management - as the line pilots will continue not to be invited to events like this until the management do take it seriously, and fully realise what 'culture change' means. I wonder if it would help to cite this thread in making it happen.

Sorry to butt in - please carry on.

diginagain
17th Jul 2014, 19:25
This is one of the most interesting and informative threads I've ever seen, on any subject.
Likewise.

234

HeliComparator
17th Jul 2014, 21:05
...
I am guessing there are some Mea Culpa's due out of some Senior folks if the content of the Symposium is to be taken to heart by all. You reckon that will happen? Will anyone stand up and admit to being a naughty boy for being a part of the system that has gotten us to the situation we find ourselves confronting?



We are all part of the system, but it's not easy to point to individuals who are primarily to blame. Many have done their best to bring about the necessary changed culture and yes, some have been obstructive in that process but they did that out of ignorance, not malice.

HeliComparator
17th Jul 2014, 21:10
?.. The culture change has to be taken seriously by the line pilots but most especially by the senior management - as the line pilots will continue not to be invited to events like this until the management do take it seriously, and fully realise what 'culture change' means.

Trouble is, many senior managers don't really understand the issues - they are not aviation-minded. Needless to say they were in general notable by their absence at the conference.

HeliComparator
17th Jul 2014, 21:13
Likewise.

234

I have to say, it is nice to see at least 2 other folk reading the topic - the lack posts other than by the "usual suspects" was making me think folk really didn't care.

diginagain
17th Jul 2014, 21:50
The subject has ramifications across the industry, as you've pointed-out, hence my interest.

I must say that I'm glad we've moved-on from blaming pax reactions to sudden upsets resulting in skill-fade. Understandable, but not particularly helpful. Hopefully, training departments will find some hours to fill with SCT, and some willing ballast to accompany you.

Boudreaux Bob
17th Jul 2014, 22:38
Now that the Cat is out of the Bag, shall we see marked change by those holding lofty perches upon the greasy pole of management?

Will they "see the light" and join arms and start to sing choruses of Kumbaya while effecting a march towards the Truth?

Where does that begin and who should lead the charge within each segment of the Industry?

Any signs of a ground swell towards improving the environment yet?

cyclic
18th Jul 2014, 09:32
HC

One of the most informative discussions there has been for a long time. The 225 trim release issue is of great interest to me as we have been criticised for using it in this manner, as it turns out, it seems the correct way to operate.

stilllearning
18th Jul 2014, 10:04
.... it overlaps itself .....
the sad bottom line is that beans counters have much more influence in decissions in this industry tan people working in ops ... that should be the first change of mind in managemente ... and so far it is not happening .... at least in my field of view ....

JimL
18th Jul 2014, 10:31
The report (from the principal conference organiser) was intended to summarise - and put into context - the presentations, distil out the main points and set out a list of issues to be discussed/addressed outside of the conference - as we are now doing in PPRune and on other bulletin boards.

The conference was funded by operators (including PHI) and Shell – approval coming from the CEOs who personally endorsed it (this was coordinated by the European Helicopter Operators Committee (EHOC)). The video replays were supplied by a Cougar who agreed not to hold back on detail (the Operations Director and I spent more than a month discussing and shaping the videos to get the best effect from them). We did not shrink from the ‘reveal’ which was hard-hitting and to the point.

No-one refused to present, even though the invitations were addressed at individuals and not organisations. Almost all presenters were open in their approach to the conference; messages came from the experience of individuals or from research undertaken prior to the day. Presenters were encouraged to provide their own views – most were not pre-aligned with the operator.

What I am trying to say is that this was a genuine attempt by all to get to the bottom of the automation problem and not to hide facts or blame someone/something. Reading the summary and the list of issues raised should confirm that.

There is a Joint Operators Committee (JOC); they are working together to address the issues but a number are deep-seated and difficult: the somewhat dysfunctional training regulations, the lack of appropriate rules in certification (which are already in the fixed-wing code) and the out-of-date nature of simulator approval are three that require appropriate movement from EASA.

The JOC have had extensive discussions with the manufacturers on the provision of FCOMs addressing the automation issues and procedures – there is already movement in this area and it is likely to lead to output similar to that provide by Boeing and Airbus for their communities.

That EASA did not attend the conference was something of a disappointment; the same is true for North Sea Fringe State operators (with the exception of Norway). PHI flew a number of attendees over from the US. There were line pilots at the conference – I talked to one-or-two.

It did not take the EC155 report to start this dialogue; the debate had started in three other threads: firstly the EC332 accident in Sumburgh (it should have been Bond ETAP but we had not really thought about it then and confined our discussions to approach profiles); the second with respect to CAP 1145; and the other, the UK Parliamentary Committee.

What is really important is what we now do about the issues raised in the conference; the RAeS have already agreed to provide a position paper - distilling the findings from the conference and turning them into a series of follow-up actions addressed at the relevant parties (it is difficult for them to do more than that).

I have discussed making the presentations/audio feed/papers more widely available but it is unlikely to happen; like most of you, I question this policy because it inhibits the informing of the debate on a matter of public safety. The policy (probably) stems from a period more than a decade ago when ‘proceedings’ were published and sold. It appears less relevant now that we no longer have proceedings.

In committee we constantly debate the amount that is charged to attendees – it is set at a level to ensure that the RAeS (a charity) can wipe its face. Even though the fees are high (and above a level that can be afforded by an interested party) we still have to find outside sponsorship for catering.

Anyway, enough of the background – on with the debate!

JulieAndrews
19th Jul 2014, 07:19
One of those 'Fringe Operators' enquired about attending further meetings as the first they heard about it was at the last Oil & Gas soirée but was politely informed that their input was not required at this stage.
Something to do with level of disclosure/input from the 'Big 3'.
So more a case of "don't Kumbaya" I'm afraid.

JimL
19th Jul 2014, 07:40
JulieAndrews,

There was no bar to attending the RAeS conference - the reason why we organised it was ensure inclusivity.

Did your organisation attend this conference?

Jim

DOUBLE BOGEY
19th Jul 2014, 09:05
CYCLIC - there are 5 ways to fly an EC225 in AT&T mode. That is to say UNCOUPLED. They are:

1 - Hover Follow Up Trim
2 - Cyclic Trim
3 - Cyclic Stick Imput Followed by Trim
4 - Flying Through
5 - Cyclic Trim Release

I have listed them in order of priority based on 1 providing maximum stability and 5 the least. The manual makes a statement that with the trim release pressed there is SAS stabilisation engaged but seeing as the pilot is invariably moving the cyclic it is albeit unnoticeable.

WHY are there 5 methods and which is the most appropriate use at any one time? The answer is based on the "Required Rate of change of Attitude"

Cruising in AT&T mode IMC (and why would we ever need to do this), however, trimming into the turns etc provides maximum stability as the AP is always in the loop providing not only long term attitude retention but also controlling the rate of change of attitude as the trim switch is operated. The argument for pushing against the force trim has long gone with digital ATT and a GA-GA function that rolls wings level when the lateral channel is uncommanded.

At the other end of the scale, VMC landing on a helideck and the turbulence defeats the hover follow up trim, pressing the trim release provides the most rapid change of attitude to stay safely clear of obstacles. Flying through may also help but of course you would want to follow up with a trim release action to prevent the helicopter trying to readopt the previous attitude once stick pressure is released.

These methods should happen instinctively in response to attitude and environmental cues. However, pressing the Trim Release is only correct when used in appropriate circumstances. The methods described need to be taught and practiced during Type Rating Training and the relevance and limitations of each method highlighted.

I am only describing flight in AT&T mode. Pressing Trim Release in Coupled Mode is already an indication that the coupled flight path selected by the pilot is incorrect or misunderstood OR the pilot thinks he can fly it better than a serviceable AP. both behaviours need to be briefed and trained out early in the pilots relationship with the aircraft.

HeliComparator
19th Jul 2014, 09:47
DB, needless to say I strongly disagree with you on 2 points:

Firstly, your assertion that the order you have presented the different modes of flying in ATT is also the order of stability. Do you have any "proof" of that, or it supposition?

Then again, it depends on what you mean by "stability". Your mode 2 is very stable but also too slow for most uses. Mode 3 is quite unstable whilst you are doing the "push" bit, it only become stable after you have done the "beep" bit. I don't like this mode anyway because it brings the cyclic into the non-linear break-out force region as trimmed position is approached, and risks cock-up if an upper mode is engaged (beeping the datum, not the stick).

Mode 4 is the least stable on an EC225 (though quite stable on a 332L)

Mode 5 is the best for manual flying since the heli is moderately stable and as soon as pilot action ceases (ie pilot takes his hand off the cyclic) the current attitude is held. What's not to like about that?

I will also confess to not being a fan of your mode 1 other than when wanting to hold a hover and already being in the hover. I just don't like to feel the breakout region interfering with my control inputs during eg lifting into the hover.

My second strong point of disagreement is your last para regarding flying through an upper mode. It does depend on circumstances but for example a SAR pilot flying through HOV mode to finely adjust the position during winching is surely normal? And when you think about it, the basic autopilot gives you ATT which is effectively an "upper mode" of attitude holding. HOV is an upper mode designed to hold position. The new GTC mode is an upper mode designed to hold longitudinal ground speed (and definitely designed to be flown through).

So it is with GA - an upper mode that is designed to make the heli fly up and away - so if you want to fly it manually on departure but want an underlying mode that will get you out of the poo, why have a mode designed to hold a now-wrong attitude (ATT) when you have a mode that will save your bacon when you get confused (GA)?

The EC225 is quite happy to have you fly through any upper mode, whilst pressing the trim releases, and once you let go, it quietly, progressively and smoothly resumes doing what it was designed to do. Marc Salesse's team spent lots of programming hours making it do that, why not use it!

The problems arise if you fly through some upper modes without pressing the trim release, end up with the controls in a new an un-trimmed position, then let go and allow the stick to jump back to some old and now inappropriate position.

terminus mos
19th Jul 2014, 14:24
The diversity of views between 2 people, 1 of whom was recently a Training Captain on the 225 and another who I don't know but flies the 225 highlights the problem of standardising training and procedures.

It is from Training Captains that many pilots get their training and that OM Part Bs are written. Do these 2 companies train pilots so differently as shown in the views of HC and DB? OEMs don't know much about real operations (it's changing slowly) but when they do, hopefully the training part of the offshore helicopter industry will adopt more of an FCOM type approach.

Part of the problem is also that helicopter pilots come from such non standard backgrounds performing a variety of tasks in very basic aircraft so providing a standard pilot "product" at the end is complex.

HC, I have mostly flown the trim release like you and I generally agree with your comments on DB's various modes.

HeliComparator
19th Jul 2014, 15:10
TM - DB and I are both experienced pilots / trainers with a strong desire to improve the current situation. I have a lot of respect for DB in many areas including his promotion of the use of automation on the 225 which, amazingly, was in general spurned by the other operators (including DB's former employer) or at the very least, not used optimally and side-lined in training and operating procedures. So in many areas we agree. However in the area of trim release and the concept of flying through an upper mode, it seems we disagree.


Of course the trouble is that we both absolutely KNOW that we are right. And when you know you are right, why would you contemplate adopting the other's views? It would be a traitorous act when best practice is your goal.


Faced with this sort of disagreement over a relatively minor (though important) way to fly the aircraft, what hope is there that the 3 main (and a few more minor) operators and the OEM could be dragged screaming into some sort of consensus on the best way to operate this type, even in the N Sea never mind worldwide!


When the EC225 was introduced into Bristow Norway roughly 6 years after its introduction in Aberdeen, they declined to adopt Bristow Aberdeen's way of operating and instead wrote their own checklists etc which were at odds with the philosophy on this side of the N Sea (although to be fair, certainly adopting some aspects of it). So a Bristow pilot from Aberdeen crossing the sea would have had to adapt to the Bristow Norway way of operating - different SOPs and checklists - and that is within the same company!

Boudreaux Bob
19th Jul 2014, 15:25
It would seem that some Hat Size's need to be re-aligned. I do not refer to HC and DB per se but rather at the Industry which tolerates, condones, ignores, or in any way countenances such Turf Protection and Empire Building.

The aircraft in question is the EC-225.

HC and DB both have extensive experience in that particular type of aircraft and we see a marked difference in their views on the "Only" way to fly the machine.

Knowing both of them, they are quite secure in their individual beliefs.

The question I pose to both of them and the audience in general is "How do we arrive at an Industry Best Practice for flying the 225 (in this case) and each aircraft type used by each of the Operators in similar tasking?

We have to consider the various Authorities impose different standards and rules on Operators depending upon what locale the aircraft are being flown.

What does not change is the OEM and its views on the operation of their Aircraft, and the ultimate goal which should be achieving the safest and most appropriate use of the the Aircraft systems.

Plainly, it requires compromise by everyone involved and that means being "honest" and "forthright" when discussing issues.

Is that possible in light of the announced need to do so?

I would suggest DB and HC attempt to do so and see how it turns out.

Lord knows if they can then there is Hope for the Industry writ large.

HeliComparator
19th Jul 2014, 15:36
The question I pose to both of them and the audience in general is "How do we arrive at an Industry Best Practice for flying the 225 (in this case) and each aircraft type used by each of the Operators in similar tasking?




Simple - just do it my way!


(smiley grudgingly added :))



Anyway, as I have said before DB and I agree on far more than we disagree on which gives us a head start compared with say Bristow vs CHC vs Bond (Avincis - how DO you pronounce that?).

However, let us please get away from the idea that the OEM has the answers. They do not, since do not operate multi-pilot (they operate with 1 pilot and 1 flight engineer), nor much IFR and certainly not offshore. Fortunately and to their credit the OEM seems happy to accept that, and is keen to merely be a facilitator in arriving at best practice.

DOUBLE BOGEY
19th Jul 2014, 19:31
HC - firstly we are more aligned than you think. Secondly they are not "My" modes. It's the way the system is set up.

I do not disagree with you BUT a pilot who finds it necessary to "Fly Through" the upper modes by pressing the trim release is simply defeating the object of engaging them in the first place. I absolutley agree that if the flight path becomes unsafe, coupled, one quick method to correct is to trim release, but I personally prefer to correct the origin of such errors by ensuring the pilot understands the behaviour of the upper modes in first place.

It is a nonsense to engage upper modes and then disable the autopilot by pressing the trim release. This is not in any manual not recommended by the OEM.

Stick and Trim I agree completely and in fact never use this myself but I show pilots it is there and add my views as to its relevance. Nevertheless it is a recognised method of attitude modulation.

HC - the bit I struggle to understand is why you believe holding the cyclic trim depressed is a stable condition, especially if IMC. It has a role VMC but in IMC it effectively sacks four digital lanes of ATT feeding off two AHRS in favour of the pilot and his skills. Surely we have by now accepted how limited those skills are if we explore the sticky bits of the flight envelope.

This should not be a debate about what can be done or indeed how we all do it. It should be a debate on the " Optimum" use of the AP. with the Trim pressed only SAS remains and that can never be regarded as optimum. The training mission is to develop CONSISTANT behaviours that will serve us well when we are tired, in the dark and maybe a little distracted. Maximum use of ATT and coupled modes. Planned and executed correctly there should be no requirement to interfere with the AP as it delivers the commanded flight path.

One more point. This OEM does have the expertise in Offshore Operations. There are four of us at least with a combined total of 80 years offshore experience amongst other environments. We certainly do not have all the answers but we are determined to provide the best information and guidance we can on the optimum use of the products.

HeliComparator
19th Jul 2014, 20:35
HC - firstly we are more aligned than you think. Secondly they are not "My" modes. It's the way the system is set up.

I do not disagree with you BUT a pilot who finds it necessary to "Fly Through" the upper modes by pressing the trim release is simply defeating the object of engaging them in the first place. I absolutley agree that if the flight path becomes unsafe, coupled, one quick method to correct is to trim release, but I personally prefer to correct the origin of such errors by ensuring the pilot understands the behaviour of the upper modes in first place.

It is a nonsense to engage upper modes and then disable the autopilot by pressing the trim release. This is not in any manual not recommended by the OEM.

Stick and Trim I agree completely and in fact never use this myself but I show pilots it is there and add my views as to its relevance. Nevertheless it is a recognised method of attitude modulation.

HC - the bit I struggle to understand is why you believe holding the cyclic trim depressed is a stable condition, especially if IMC. It has a role VMC but in IMC it effectively sacks four digital lanes of ATT feeding off two AHRS in favour of the pilot and his skills. Surely we have by now accepted how limited those skills are if we explore the sticky bits of the flight envelope.

This should not be a debate about what can be done or indeed how we all do it. It should be a debate on the " Optimum" use of the AP. with the Trim pressed only SAS remains and that can never be regarded as optimum. The training mission is to develop CONSISTANT behaviours that will serve us well when we are tired, in the dark and maybe a little distracted. Maximum use of ATT and coupled modes. Planned and executed correctly there should be no requirement to interfere with the AP as it delivers the commanded flight path.

One more point. This OEM does have the expertise in Offshore Operations. There are four of us at least with a combined total of 80 years offshore experience amongst other environments. We certainly do not have all the answers but we are determined to provide the best information and guidance we can on the optimum use of the products.

"My modes" - only your modes in the sense of the numbering you assigned to them.

"Flying through" - I still think you don't quite get the point of having an underlying mode during manual flying. You are used to having an underlying mode of attitude retention, you might be used to having an underlying HOV mode if you flew SAR, you would be used to having an underlying GTC mode if you flew the 175 and updated 225. Thus GA is just another such underlying mode appropriate for departure. Whilst flying manually none of the above-mentioned modes do anything, but when you let go they each provide some sort of flight attitude or path control. I can't see any reason for not choosing one that fits the flight phase.

"Holding trim release down" - I can't remember if you flew the 225 when you worked offshore, but if you did you will surely have found that when operating against the trim, the aircraft is very unsteady. For example if you want to hold a steady bank angle against the trim, it is quite difficult. If you want to hold a steady bank angle with the trim release pressed, it is a doddle. Ditto for a nose down attitude eg for a rig takeoff. Surely this is an easy thing to prove, not to me, but to yourself by trying the two ways in the aircraft. I commend you to try it. Quite why the software is less stable when against the springs than with trim released pressed I don't know, you would have to ask AH's autopilot folks.

I suppose possibly there is no difference in the software (though I still think there is) and the difference is due to the ergonomics of having to hold a steady but light force on the cyclic (FTR not pressed) vs being able to relax completely with FTR pressed (or of course release the button at the desired bank angle). Such a difference does, after all, make a fundamental difference to the propensity for biometric oscillations on the collective on ground, as we know to our cost!

Your comment about "only SAS remains" is valid whether or not you press the trim release - although as mentioned, the flavour of SAS when against the springs is less stable than with FTR pressed (for one reason or another). In the former case, when you let go the stick jumps back to some previous position which might or might not reflect a desirable attitude, in the latter the current attitude is held.

All the above is despite the fact that in general (as I think we both agree) the best way to fly it is to select the appropriate upper modes and let it get on with it!

As to the OEM's experience, sorry, I was discounting ECUK (or is it AHUK yet?). I don't know how much "input" you get to the factory but certainly as recently as a year ago, it didn't seem to be much. Yes I am told AH France now has a real live offshore pilot on its payroll, but I have no idea of whether he is of sound judgement, what his background is and how much influence he might have - one voice amongst 9000 (?) employees doesn't seem a lot. I have said it before many times (to EC/AH) but it would be a very good idea if the AH experimental test pilots were seconded to the N Sea for a few months. Flight Test engineers too if they could be allowed to sit in the Jump Seat (after all, it is the FTE's who are the real bosses under the French system!). It would transform thinking at the factory! Just the one non-rev night offshore flight I had with Herve made a difference I think.

You only have to look at the standard offerings of centre console layouts to see that AH don't understand the 2 crew concept - eg they have the "pilot radio" and the "copilot radio". They don't get the simple concept of the PM being the one to work both radios! Each time we had a new batch of helicopters, they wanted to revert to radios at the LH and RH of the console, and I had to get them put back in the middle where both pilots could easily reach both radios. Latterly and amusingly, I had to get this change approved by an EC experimental test pilot - who of course routinely flew single pilot!

Edit: just re-reading your post, I am not advocating pressing the FTR in IMC. There is only one standard way (ie malfunctions excepted) to operate in IMC and that is by use of the upper modes. To fly it manually is to degrade safety and that seems inexcusable when pax are carried. It is not a feasible malfunction to have ATT mode working but other modes such as ALT, HDG, IAS not working so there is absolutely no point in wasting training time for it either.

RVDT
20th Jul 2014, 05:40
they operate with 1 pilot and 1 flight engineer

Sounds like the OEM's were right after all.

It would be a better mix than the current arrangement.

1 x Human Pilot - check

1 x Autopilot - check

1 x Engineer who actually knows what is going on - check

= Happy days

:cool:

DOUBLE BOGEY
20th Jul 2014, 07:16
HC - Thank you for your last post. However we were discussing optimum use of the Autopilot. Whilst I enjoyed your mild rant about the console HMI we cannot fix everything in one day or track all those issues on one thread.

Come and see me and I will show you very graphically why flying manually with GA deployed can lead to very unsafe flight paths!

FYI - 14k offshore in S61, 322, 332L2 and EC225. No OPSAR but I do help SAR pilots to transition to the EC225 SAR. Your description of pressing the FTR in HOV or GSPD modes is flawed. Again I will show you why.

HC - pressing the FTR is not the optimum way to make a turn unless flying NOE military style. Not sure if you have any experience of military applications. However the best way in offshore environment is to do it coupled with HDG when a heading is required. The alternative to this is to trim into the turn. This works very well in mixed mode as it does not interfere with the longitudinal channal and whatever is installed thereon. Pressing the FTR is an acceptable practice during a VMC approach in the latter stages where trimming is no longer happening fast enough. This subject is. Two hour brief and flight in SIM 1 of our syllabus. Specifically to get these concepts hammered home before anything else. The 5 methods f operating in ATT, hoe to do each one and when each is appropriate. Systems approach to flight training.

DB

DB

HeliComparator
20th Jul 2014, 09:09
Resorting to the red inserts!


HC - Thank you for your last post. However we were discussing optimum use of the Autopilot. Whilst I enjoyed your mild rant about the console HMI we cannot fix everything in one day or track all those issues on one thread.


We were also discussing the OEM's input to creating operating procedures and I was illustrating why that was fraught. The AH-F guys at the conference (Gilles and Rupert) fully agree with me.

Come and see me and I will show you very graphically why flying manually with GA deployed can lead to very unsafe flight paths!


Flying manually with GA deployed can cause an unsafe flight path, as the thread subject clearly shows, but only if the FTRs are not depressed on cyclic and collective. If your simulator can show me that your above statement is true with the FTRs depressed, then there is something wrong with your simulator.

FYI - 14k offshore in S61, 322, 332L2 and EC225. No OPSAR but I do help SAR pilots to transition to the EC225 SAR.


Yes I know you have lots of experience, I was just unsure whether you had left CHC before flying the 225 operationally.


Your description of pressing the FTR in HOV or GSPD modes is flawed. Again I will show you why.


OK things are getting a bit complicated here but I never said to fly HOV or GSPD (or GTC) with the FTR pressed. I said they were routinely flown-through - (without pressing FTR, sorry I didn't specify that) - in those modes the FTR can have another function eg setting the datum groundspeed to the current groundspeed. Just re-reading my previous post I have put a sentence into grey since it is not really the full picture, but the full picture is a bit too complicated to explain here.

HC - pressing the FTR is not the optimum way to make a turn unless flying NOE military style. I disagree in the case of visual manoeuvring to takeoff or land, or during an autorotation entry - which are just about the only times you would want to fly it manually. (once settled in Auto, select IAS mode!)


Not sure if you have any experience of military applications. None However the best way in offshore environment is to do it coupled with HDG when a heading is required. I agree, if you want to fly it using the automation, but we are surely talking about the case where you don't? The alternative to this is to trim into the turn. This works very well in mixed mode as it does not interfere with the longitudinal channal and whatever is installed thereon. Too slow and clumsy - much better to use HDG beeped by cyclic trim. If there is a concern about maintaining the longitudinal attitude (night, poor vis etc) one should coupled 4 axis. Pressing the FTR is an acceptable practice during a VMC approach in the latter stages where trimming is no longer happening fast enough. So we are pretty much in agreement, it is just a matter of what you mean by the latter stages!


This subject is. Two hour brief and flight in SIM 1 of our syllabus. Specifically to get these concepts hammered home before anything else. The 5 methods f operating in ATT, hoe to do each one and when each is appropriate. Systems approach to flight training.


Agreed. Of course all our early convertees were diff course ex 332L /L2 so much of the trimming concepts carry over, but when I wrote the type rating course for the new recruits we certainly had to add a big chunk on the basics of the various trimming techniques. You can't progress until you have mastered that bit!

DB

DB

DOUBLE BOGEY
20th Jul 2014, 09:33
HC - I knew we were basically on the same page but I jumped in because you gave CYCLIC the impression that flying with the FTR pressed is the correct way to fly. It is only appropriate VMC, when all the other more stable methods are not happening fast enough! I think we have agreed that! Which is actually what I implied in my list of priorities.

JimL
20th Jul 2014, 09:51
DB,

We do not have another thread for the HMI issues and so we should not shrug it aside so quickly. Without moving off the fence with respect to the very interesting discussion that you have been having with HC (clearly the context should have been set out at the start); his point on the radios were with respect to the fact that they were set up by the OEM for their own mode of operations (single pilot and not offshore - where the PM makes all selections).

That's an important but minor point so here is another probably more important one:

Below are two 'approved' implementations of the 'predicted altitude function' of the autopilot. Examine these examples and imagine 'the eye positions', 'the hand positions' and 'the amount of distraction' in completing the operation.


Go to the Display Control Panel (DCP – on the central panel), select the ALTP position on the rotary switch, pull and turn the central adjustment knob whilst watching the digital indicator on the PFD (above the altimeter); once the correct number has been selected, go to the Mode Selector Panel (MSP – on the instrument panel) and press the soft-key with ALTP under it; check on the MSP screen (a) that it is armed; and (b) that this is reflected in the Mode Selection Annunciator (MSA) on the PFD.


Go to the Flight Control Panel (FCP – on the instrument panel immediately below the FND) find and use the ALT.A knob to select the altitude on the PFD whilst watching the digital indicator and, when correct, push it to select whilst monitoring the indication on the MSA (all the time the eyes are on the FND after locating the correct knob on the FCP).


The second implementation doesn't escape without criticism however because, on the FCP the 'IAS' is on the left of the row of controls but on the FMA, it is on the right. A classic example of poor 'mapping' as described in Don Norman's book - 'The Design of Everyday Things'.

Jim

HeliComparator
20th Jul 2014, 10:11
Whilst on the subject of the HMI and mode selections, can I also just mention that as a multi-pilot helicopter it would be quite wrong to presume that the PF is the one who should be making these selections. In Bristow it was certainly "normal" to get PM to make the selections on the FCP (on the instruction of the PF of course), in part to allow such selections without PF having to take his hands away from the controls at low altitude, leaning forward and risking catching the cyclic with a fingers destined for FCP buttons (yup, happened to me a few times!) and in part because it fosters a feeling of involvement for PM (relevant especially if he is the co-pilot). Obviously the PF could also make such selections especially if the PM was busy with radio, paperwork etc, but it seems good MCC practice to involve both pilots in controlling the flight path where appropriate. And all associated with the correct verbal procedures for use of automation of course.

HeliComparator
20th Jul 2014, 10:15
And another thing!... In defence of the thread subject crews repeated resetting of the AFCS and then expecting it to work but perhaps with some seeds of doubt, what isn't covered is to what extent such resetting was commonplace. Sometimes we end up living with nuisances such as having to routinely reset things that we really shouldn't have to do, in the case of the L2 for example accepting a flashing GOV for departure when we really shouldn't do. These things shouldn't happen but in the real world they do, due to inertia caused by other more pressing things to be fixed, cost, or the daunting task of getting any fixes past EASA.

cyclic
20th Jul 2014, 11:33
HC - I knew we were basically on the same page but I jumped in because you gave CYCLIC the impression that flying with the FTR pressed is the correct way to fly. It is only appropriate VMC, when all the other more stable methods are not happening fast enough! I think we have agreed that! Which is actually what I implied in my list of priorities.

Don't worry DB, I didn't get that impression at all, it was purely the flight regimes that HC was referring to. It would, with an autopilot as good as the 225, be pure stupidity to fly IMC with the trim release pressed.

Boudreaux Bob
20th Jul 2014, 13:08
Something I seem to be hearing is Co-Pilots may have been utilized to do all the Grunt Work, while the Captain did the flying.

That does not mean the Coey's never fly or rarely fly, but does it pose a question as to who should be doing the flying and who should be doing the Monitoring, and under the current Industry Environment we have it wrong way around.

Would that one change, letting the Co-Pilot do the majority of the hands on flying with the Captain pushing the buttons and making the radio calls and thus being free to devote his full attention to ensuring the Flight is being done as best possible not be the better approach to business?

terminus mos
20th Jul 2014, 13:33
Oh dear now I find myself agreeing more with DB's earlier post, I would only use FTR in VMC when wanting to make control movements which would be uncomfortable or feel "unstable" any other way. I don't have much 225 time but the latter stages of a VMC approach would be typical.

In practice, I expect that I subconsciously have used a combination of all techniques at different times during a VMC approach or other VMC manoeuvre without necessarily thinking about exactly which control movement uses which technique. However, coming from types which didn't have as much wonderful automation, I found myself using it to its maximum at every opportunity when I could.

HeliComparator
20th Jul 2014, 13:34
Something I seem to be hearing is Co-Pilots may have been utilized to do all the Grunt Work, while the Captain did the flying.

That does not mean the Coey's never fly or rarely fly, but does it pose a question as to who should be doing the flying and who should be doing the Monitoring, and under the current Industry Environment we have it wrong way around.

Would that one change, letting the Co-Pilot do the majority of the hands on flying with the Captain pushing the buttons and making the radio calls and thus being free to devote his full attention to ensuring the Flight is being done as best possible not be the better approach to business?

I'm pretty sure it is industry practice to take turns at being PM and PF. Certainly was for us. For poor weather instrument approaches (onshore) the Co should be PF allowing the captain to monitor the approach, make the decision, and fly the possibly difficult bit between DH and landing. Offshore it is complicated by the landing being one or other side and not wanting a double-handover of control.

I wouldn't like to see Cos doing most of the flying - Capts have to maintain currency too and as has recently been repeatedly demonstrated, it is often when the Capt has been flying that disaster has struck or nearly so.

JimL
20th Jul 2014, 16:02
Sharing of flying didn't appear to be an issue worthy of discussion at the conference but there was on the best allocation of resources in instrument approaches (incidentally, the presenter was one of the line pilots present):

Captain Colin Milne, using two recent accidents as case studies, explained how the lack of specific procedures and prescribed use of existing automation, had resulted in the aircraft being placed into a situation where recovery had not been possible. He also brought attention to the fact that, in many of the accidents/incidents experienced in the North Sea, the PIC was PF and the SIC, PM; this was contrary to the practice in the airlines where the more experienced pilot assumed the monitoring role - ready to advise corrections or, in extremis, to take control.

As HC has said, with offshore approaches the PF/PM allocation is usually governed by the side of the platform to which the approach is being flown.

Jim

Boudreaux Bob
20th Jul 2014, 18:31
Yes, but.....Milne saw fit to bring it up for some reason.

Offshore may present situations where adopting the Airline method is not possible but then when returning ashore there should be absolutely no hinderance in adopting the Airline Model should it?

HeliComparator
20th Jul 2014, 19:56
Yes, but.....Milne saw fit to bring it up for some reason.

Offshore may present situations where adopting the Airline method is not possible but then when returning ashore there should be absolutely no hinderance in adopting the Airline Model should it?

There isn't, but what's your point? In the one flight, it was probably determined to be the capt's landing offshore due to wind direction and rig orientation, in the other we all agree that it would have been better if Co had been flying the approach, but for P2 to do so is not verboten - after all Cos have to get some experience in the Capt's role before assuming command. It was a command decision to deviate from normal practice, one which he no doubt now strongly regrets.

S76Heavy
20th Jul 2014, 20:04
IMO it would be wrong to adopt any "absolutes" in aviation. And as far as I'm concerned the drive to adopt much of the FW procedures into RW flying is too much as it is. It's just not quite the same type of flying. But you have to know what you're doing. Probably a reason why NASA managed to train monkeys to fly FW but not helicopters yet..

The PIC needs to ensure he/she does not get overloaded. It may mean to take on the PM role and let the SIC get on with it, or take on the PF role if that means an acceptable workload.

As far as training is concerned I advocate understanding and knowledge of aircraft systems as well as environment. Doing anything by rote will become a liability on that one day that you should have stayed in bed.
To ensure that one needs currency in both roles. And never underestimate the learning effect of a good debrief, for both PIC and SIC.

JohnDixson
21st Jul 2014, 03:10
An excellent discussion is going on here, and I am wondering if any of the various operator groups have begun thinking about what they expect out of imminent fly by wire technology?

JimL
21st Jul 2014, 07:31
S76Heavy,

We must not fall victim to a misunderstanding here; when considering how to deal with the introduction of automation, it would be wrong not to consider how others coped with the change from 'control of flight' to 'management of flight' - in Professor Boy's description the 'first revolution'. This was recognised at the conference and characterised as follows:

Necessary changes required in piloting skills when converting from flying with basic instruments and stabilisation, to managing the on-board systems, have not been fully recognised and implemented; there was ample evidence that the necessity for managed transition had not been understood (by regulators or operators) or put in place.

The general mood at the conference was that we are - as an industry - insular and had not taken note of the effect of the introduction of automation to the fixed-wing world. This was summed up as follows:

...we have not aligned ourselves closely enough with our fixed-wing colleagues and we do not, even when offered the opportunity, participate in many of the work-streams. In fact we have actively fed the myth that Rotary is different from Fixed-Wing because it is more flexible but, there is extensive evidence that in SAR, HEMs, Offshore and Onshore Operations, the flight-path and automation management principles look pretty similar to those in aeroplanes.

With respect to the observations of Colin Milne, they were in the context of his presentation ‘Achieving Common (Best Practice) Operational Standards’. In my view it was a cogent observation - particularly in the light of the interim report on the Sumburgh accident - that the majority of automation accidents/incidents occurred when the PIC was acting as PF. What he might have mentioned was that this was also the fact in the Cougar 851 incident - which led to observations about this by the Canadian AIB.

To call the Captain's monitored approach a fixed-wing practice is to miss the point; where 'onshore' instrument approaches are being conducted, there is virtually no difference between fixed-wing and helicopters. If a risk assessment by the airlines had established that Captain's monitored approach was a safer practice, we would be foolish not to assess whether that might be the case for us as well.

Also with regard to Sumburgh, there did not appear to be good (or even any) SOPs with respect to the use of automation and, in particular, mixed mode flying. That appears now to be in the process of rectification as is the issue of stable approaches.

We are also in the process of establishing what monitoring might mean with the advent of automation. That this appears to be more complex than at first imagined was evidenced by an interesting presentation by Steve Jarvis; Steve didn't leave his presentations for us to examine but my observations were as follows:

Doctor Steve Jarvis showed how, by taking different perspectives on any subject, opposite conjectures can be shown to be correct. Even such well used phrases such as ‘situational awareness’ mean different things depending upon context; the crew need to have ‘awareness’ of where they are in the patterns of an instrument approach but also need ‘awareness’ of the current parameters of the flight (and might be ‘aware’ in one but not the other). Understanding that situational awareness is a multi-level concept will have an effect on the roles specified for the crew members and the subsequent division of labour and responsibility.

The roles of pilots in managing and monitoring are more complex than first imagined and simplistic views of what solutions may be required are often misguided. Monitoring for example has always been problematical because it is difficult to know what is being viewed, and when...

John,

I think it is fair to say that industry are filled with trepidation about the transition to fly-by-wire. In fact the wake-up call that now appears to be motivating the industry to examine the current situation, with respect to automation, will hopefully result in effective processes in managing change in the future.

Perhaps this might start with the regulators who should examine their stance with respect to the certification of exotic systems. Although there is now guidance with respect to fly-by-wire, we are still missing the rule/guidance xx.1329 Flight Guidance Systems.

If anything, the introduction of fly-by-wire strengthens the case for close oversight of the design process. However, we are bedevilled by the perennial problem that the knowledge is mostly restricted to the manufacturers.

Jim

JohnDixson
21st Jul 2014, 12:01
Thanks Jim. Was unaware that FBW Regulatory Guidance had finally arrived. What was the source?

Thanks,
John

JimL
21st Jul 2014, 13:05
Hi John,

Unfortunately you are correct; the ARAC committee was tasked on 11 April 2014 - up to that time it is still special conditions (what is not fly-by-wire in the airline and advanced corporate jets these days?).

The guidance that I saw was general and contained in AC 25.1329 (and in various other rules/guidance in Part 25). Strangely enough, EASA have seven references to fly-by-wire in AMC No.1 to CS 25.1329 as opposed to four in AC 25.1329.

Begs the question I asked before: what is being used for certification of FGSs? I have also just noticed the reference in AMC 25.1329 to manufacturers' FCOMs ("The normal procedures for use of the FGS should be documented in the AFM or FCOM, as appropriate. These procedures should be demonstrated during the type certification process.").

Why don't we split this subject off into another thread and see what views turn up? I would be interested in whether Bell are prepared to comment on their system for the Relentless.

Jim

212man
21st Jul 2014, 14:00
Jim,
did you spot BB's thread earlier about the B525 testing?
Link to the article here: 'Flight Testing' the Bell 525 Relentless | Vertical Magazine - The Pulse of the Helicopter Industry (http://www.verticalmag.com/features/features_article/FlightTestingtheBell525Relentless#.U8nDDVaKMoE)

An interesting extract here, with insights into the certification demands not keeping up (my bold):

The biggest change I noted was that the flight controls now have “tactical cues” when limits are reached. When Caudill had me pull the collective to a power limit, it increased the pull force — giving me adequate warning and time to correct. The cyclic will give a similar warning when Vne (never exceed speed) is approached.




The cyclic also has a trim follow-up feature in both fore and aft, as well as lateral modes. The trim follow-up feature is available throughout the entire envelope except when in Translational Rate Command (TRC). Here, the envelope is ˝ knot to 10 knots. At ˝ knot or below, position hold becomes active. Put the helicopter where you want it, and leave it alone. The pilot displaces the cyclic to get the desired speed, or he can beep for the change. Groundspeed from beeping is dependent on altitude: 10 feet and below you get 1 knot; 20 to 11 feet, 2 knots; and so on to 50 feet, which gives you 5 knots. You can’t beep out of TRC.




Since my first visit, Bell changed the trim follow up in longitudinal axis to return to trim. However, TRC is still available in the lateral axis. Therefore, any acceleration or deceleration if not re-trimmed will return to previously trimmed air/groundspeed. For example, if the helicopter is trimmed to 130 knots and decelerated to 50 knots without re-trimming, the helicopter will slowly accelerate back to 130 knots when the cyclic is returned to detent or the displacement is taken out. The same goes for an acceleration. “I wouldn’t say this was the only reason we made the change to longitudinal axis, but it cleans up the control laws and enables us to meet the FAR requirement of ‘Positive Longitudinal Static Stability,” said Caudill.

I'm curious about how many layers of redundency there will be and, therefore, how many levels of control law that may be 'available' - most FW FBW have Normal, Alternate and Direct laws plus mechanical back-up (for temporary control). If we have a cyclic that becomes a translational rate controller rather than an attitude controller, how readily can a pilot revert to primary effects of controls principles if he finds himself in Direct law on a dark night? The 'resilience' concept re-appears......

JohnDixson
21st Jul 2014, 16:04
212, your note reminded of some personal non-success in this area:

You all might recall that Stewart-Hughes got together with the Westland Lynx people, and installed a system for evaluation which, as I recall their brief to SA sounded awfully like the Bell new system. This was when the S-92 was in the design stage. In fact, Stewart-Hughes was proposing what they called carefree handling, and essentially used flight envelope/blade stall algorithms based upon flight test data, tp command appropriate stick forces etc etc. Our project pilot ( Bob Spaulding ) and I lobbied very hard to include that in the S-92 basic flight controls. Unfortunately, it was way ahead of the technical/business criteria for that design, and a good idea went down the tube.

Tactile cueing remains a very valid, and especially with re to FBW, a really intelligent tool to use in keeping the machine where it is intended to be, both by the pilot accomplishing his mission tasks, and the operator/OEM Mfgr, keeping the machine within the design envelope, and within the envelope upon which the component replacement times have been established.

Thanks for the mental push.

John

S76Heavy
21st Jul 2014, 16:19
JimL, I don't think we differ very much in our views. However, when I see the virtually uncriticised adoption of procedures meant for far heavier, faster FW a/c into the offshore environment (like the criteria for a stabilised approach for instance), I have to ask myself why. 500 ft above threshold on a VFR approach is not much on a 747 but it is lots on a medium helicopter. Especially if we're then required to fly a visual approach at 200 ft from 0.75NM away at the end of an ARA in crappy weather. To me it is much more a "cover your behind" action from bureaucrats than a well thought out improvement of safety. I'm not a luddite, but I am a critical customer of "improvements".

As an LTC myself I will take the monitoring role every time when we are getting close to limits or have an unusual situation (stuff breaks, occasionally). It frees my mind to consider other things further down the road and make sure we as a crew are prepared to deal with those.
To me the PiC needs to be a few steps ahead of the a/c every single second of the flight, and when you literally have your hands full, that becomes very difficult.
However, there is still a real requirement to handfly a helicopter, much more than there is in FW. Simply because we are not always able to fly coupled approaches into wind onto large surfaces but sometimes have to manoeuvre low level out of an ARA to minima onto a deck that is surrounded by obstacles. It takes practice to become proficient and confident. All well within OM parameters but challenging nonetheless. So there is a place and time for handflying as well as for full automatics.

To me, the PiC needs to (be able to) manage the flight, using all the equipment available including all the automation to the level appropriate for every stage of flight. But that can only be achieved through learning how to control the flight first, and then learning to allow the automation control the flight while monitoring its correct functioning.

Reading about the tactile feedback from controls I find them very interesting. It would be great to have the feedback without having to scan instruments. It will aid SA enormously. Looking forward to that.

HeliComparator
21st Jul 2014, 20:55
An excellent discussion is going on here, and I am wondering if any of the various operator groups have begun thinking about what they expect out of imminent fly by wire technology?

Hi John - here is my list:

It must have real benefit for the pilot and for safety, not be a "look what we can do!" technology for technology's sake. And I don't count a bit of weight or cost saving as a benefit in that context!

It must have a good HMI and be intuitive. Human-centred design is the relevant buzzword.

It must take on board all lessons learnt in fixed-wing FBW. Helicopter manufacturers can prone to existing in a bubble and starting with a blank sheet of paper, thus repeating all the mistakes that were made 20 years ago in fixed -wing. You only have to look at some of the current generation of helicopters' HMI to see how prevalent the bubble-think is!

It must fully embrace the 2-crew concept (or if you like, make allowances for it!)

There must be full disclosure about its behaviour, including all it's reversionary and fallback modes. In other words, the detailed information that will mean a properly trained pilot never having to say "what's it doing now?" or "what will happen when I ..."?

Manufacturers must not only say how it behaves, but why it behaves that way and how they envisage it being operated.

An adequate supply of approved full flight simulators must be available for pilot training prior to the first sales.

So not much then!

JohnDixson
22nd Jul 2014, 00:39
HC, actually, assuming that the design group is smart enough to NOT simply design a digital copy of the present electro-mechanical/hydraulic system, the new system should address the very issues you raised in the first paragraph. To properly respond to this item is probably a three page term paper!

While using FW FBW experience, there is also now a body of RW experience to take into consideration. Just a small example: the three axis Comanche cyclic. Could it be flown? Sure, and it wasn't that bad ( in fact that machine had excellent flying qualities ), but note that the newer helo FBW configurations have pedals ( an " I told you so " from the old CH-54 back seat community ). There are some remaining conceptual differences in the FW cockpit design approach between Airbus and Boeing, that have implications when thinking about RW standards.


Cannot but agree with your last three paragraphs. The challenge will not be getting the design data made available to the ground schools, but getting the operator/piloting community to buy into that level of education. We went that high road way in training the initial IP cadre for the UH-60A, only to find that 5 years later, the FT Rucker folks had dumbed it all down, with the excuse that it had been decided to do all but the very basics in the units ( and who, pray tell, was going to impart all that knowledge to the unit IP's? ). But you are absolutely correct that the pilot must be well schooled in the how and why, in detail, when it comes to increasingly capable controls.

keithl
22nd Jul 2014, 17:49
As JD says, "an excellent discussion". As long as it remains so, I'd like to join in. Not all pPrune debates are so well conducted.

I know HC and 212man, I see from the input of others that they are well informed and qualified to debate this. My perspective, as a current RW sim instructor and retired FW pilot, is that of someone tasked with training both the automation and the intervention it sometimes requires.

The expertise of many of the contributors is, as I see it, part of the problem. They are company test pilots, CTCs, senior people. The technophiles love the automation and want to use it to the full. They just KNOW that all the protections are built in and can be relied on. The trouble is, the "average line pilots" I see every day find it simpler to fly around on HDG and ALT. That's why I fully agree with HC's wish list. But in it's absence, the "dumbing down" that JD referred to is what is actually necessary to keep pilots confident (and that's important, right?) that they are in control and know what's going on.

This discussion started with talk of trim release buttons and handling. It has drifted into "Automation: Friend or Foe?" I think the latter is the real debate. Should we start another thread?

HeliComparator
22nd Jul 2014, 18:09
The expertise of many of the contributors is, as I see it, part of the problem. They are company test pilots, CTCs, senior people. The technophiles love the automation and want to use it to the full. They just KNOW that all the protections are built in and can be relied on. The trouble is, the "average line pilots" I see every day find it simpler to fly around on HDG and ALT. That's why I fully agree with HC's wish list. But in it's absence, the "dumbing down" that JD referred to is what is actually necessary to keep pilots confident (and that's important, right?) that they are in control and know what's going on.





You are right, the participants on here are knowledgeable about the detail of how it all behaves. That is because they have bothered to find out about it, not because they were born with the knowledge!


I just don't see how "dumbing down" could work. OK it will work for 99% of the time but then, inevitably, circumstances will conspire to cause some automation behaviour to pop up that was hitherto "unknown" due to the dumbing down. Then we have the makings of an accident.


I'm sorry but I really don't see any alternative to pilots being fully aware of all the behaviours that are lurking there and could surface. If they can't hack it they shouldn't be flying these types of helicopters, although in my experience the chances are they could hack it if they just put a bit of time and effort into learning about it and thinking about it during the 6 month gaps between training sessions. I generally found that the folk who really couldn't hack it, couldn't hack manual flying either!


These days pilots get plenty of days off, but there is the rub: With the equal time roster each day on is a pretty long day usually, so no inclination to do any studying after a long double flight. But a day off is a day off and "why should I have to do homework on my days off?". Consequently I do think that the equal time roster, much as I liked it when I was working, is conspiring against pilots attaining and retaining good knowledge of their complex aircraft.

Boudreaux Bob
22nd Jul 2014, 18:47
In light of what Keith suggests about Pilots liking to fly using ALT and HDG, or some very simple utilization of the Automation, perhaps we should first decide just how much automation is needed, desired, and sufficient.

Do we need "Stick Shakers", "Cyclic Wigglers", Collective 'Stiffeners", auto-hover and all that kind of super cooper magic stuff or can we be better served by sticking to simpler systems?

I admit I would love to have enjoyed the SA system of offshore approaches where I punch the numbers into the FMS and watch the AFCS/FMS fly the approach right down to the barest of minimums, but do I really need that for my standard ol' offshore flying?

We should also decide what we want the Pilot(s) to do in the "Flying" of the machine. Or, is it too late to figure out "what" we want to do and then sort out the details of how to build, test, certify, and implement the system(s) to do that?

Or.....is that what we are really doing now with the discussion extant?

HC,

Professionalism is motivated from within, not without. Either One is driven to be "professional" or One is not. I flew with lots of Pilots but very few real "Professionals".

Bob Denny
22nd Jul 2014, 20:57
HeliComparator, thanks for being a voice of reason and experience. I am a 3000+ hour fixed wing pilot with multiple "hairy recoveries" several on instruments in bad weather. All of them required being the "master of my aircraft".

I'm no Sullenberger, just a guy who grew up with old school pilots who taught me how to be the master of my aircraft. How you get there has been extensively discussed here and I have little to add except "cowboy flying" has its place. Let me put it this way: When I taught my kids to drive we went out on dirt roads with plenty of grass on the sides and drove faster and faster till things got squirrely around the curves. Just enough for them to recover or loop the car. We also learned to surprise brake in the shortest distance on pavement and dirt, no ABS allowed. I encouraged them to regularly go out and push the envelope within reasonable safety limits (judgement required).

I just got into rotary (yes at my advanced age!) and am flying only manual in the OH-58 and 407. I get the push button aviation problem. It has been around in fixed wing for a long time, way before glass.

My experience is missing the "keep passengers comfortable or risk losing your job, even it it means dying". If this is really common, and "flying the rails" is driven by that mentality, then it's a giant safety problem created by management holding the threat of termination or demotion over pilots' heads. I know people who, when confronted with serious s**t, will think twice about squawking 7700. Amazing, since that is the declaration of emergency they should make before even opening their mike, and it immediately removes one worry from their plate -- deviation issues or worse on instruments. They are thinking "Oh s**t the Feds are gonna pull my ticket". Ridiculous.

It is much easier to fly around on autopilot, but doing it when not really necessary (CAVU weather, etc.) is stupid unless the aircraft requires it for all ops (e.g. SAS). Fly the aircraft and do your own navigation as a rule. Then when things get really tough, you can fall back on the autopilot and create a safety and workload buffer. But some day that fresh flying skill will save your a**.

HeliComparator
22nd Jul 2014, 20:59
In light of what Keith suggests about Pilots liking to fly using ALT and HDG, or some very simple utilization of the Automation, perhaps we should first decide just how much automation is needed, desired, and sufficient.


Couple of points there, firstly just because the pilot only wants to use ALT and HDG (and I suspect IAS) doesn't mean that the behaviour of the software in those modes doesn't have some "hidden bits" - there certainly are on the 225, and these can surface whether the pilot likes it or not.


But secondly, the "line pilot" is not perhaps best placed to decide how much automation is needed or wanted because, as a general rule, they are a very conservative bunch and like to keep things within the bounds of what they understand, how they flew in the past and what they need to do 99.5% of the time.


When we first got the EC225, the pilots were happy with ALT, HDG, IAS and coupling the FMS en-route, since these were all things that they did on the AS332L (well, maybe not ALT and IAS at the same time).


Two of the main hurdles were:


To trust the GA mode to be used at low speed, near the ground/sea. They wanted to get to the sort of speed where the AFCS worked adequately in the 332L - ie a point they were comfortable with based on their previous experience, Vy or so. Eventually (once a Sim was available), we could take them into the sim and practice engine failures just after rotation on a rig takeoff. In general they flew it badly, dived to get unnecessary speed and flew into the sea, failed to dive enough and fell into the sea etc, and this was with them knowing the failure was going to occur. So then we said "rotate, press GA and then don't touch the controls" at which point the AFCS flew an immaculate OEI departure diving to get speed and then raising the nose so that it was on the horizon just as Vtoss was reached. They soon realised that it was much better than flying the manoeuvre that they were, and of course it wouldn't suffer from "startle" when the unthinkable engine failure actually happened. That battle was eventually won, and now they love it, especially on a nasty dark night.


Then there was the whole "overlay approach" thing. They were quite happy to have the FMS fly them out to the rig and back, but oh dear, all those STARS, transitions and approaches built into the FMS for an onshore instrument approach was all far too difficult. When I wanted to make it SOP to always put the instrument approach into the FMS they said "we always have radar vectored ILSs at Aberdeen, so what's the point?". And the answer was probably "not a huge amount of point on a radar vectored approach at Aberdeen (although situational awareness is helped by seeing the final approach track on the NAVD)" - but surely we do use other airports as alternates, they do have procedural approaches, DME arcs etc and even though we very rarely have to go there, when we do have to go there surely the FMS is a great boon as it totally looks after the horizontal profile of the initial, intermediate, final approach and missed approach of an approach we are not familiar with. We can sit back and monitor against the plate. Easy - if you know how it works!


Anyway, the battle was mostly won when we got our simulator and were able to take them to all sorts of airports that they had used as alternates but never actually been to. They realised that once you knew how it worked, it was fantastic! Of course we got a lot of "uphill" from the CAA too, who thought this was all cheating and we should be flying NDB approaches on some wandering needle that was probably pointing at a CB anyway!


Just as an example, ferry flight from the factory in new 225, had to divert to Carcassone due to appalling weather in the Massif Centrale. Next day was drizzly and definitely IFR departure. Never mind, the SIDs (the French love their SIDS and STARS) were all in the FMS so the one given by ATC was duly loaded in, and jolly complicated it was too. We got airborne and literally passing about Vy going IMC, Mr ATC man say "Change of SID due traffic, its now xyz" (the delights of Class E airspace). To trawl through our pile of plates to find the right SID at that stage would have been pandemonium but instead it was I think 4 button presses on the FMS to load the new SID, going in a substantially different direction, which then promptly unfolded on the NAVD and all the altitudes etc were on the FMS screen. A doddle.


So a potentially very difficult situation was a complete non-event because we knew how to use the kit fluently.

pilot and apprentice
23rd Jul 2014, 02:42
You are right, the participants on here are knowledgeable about the detail of how it all behaves. That is because they have bothered to find out about it, not because they were born with the knowledge!


I just don't see how "dumbing down" could work. OK it will work for 99% of the time but then, inevitably, circumstances will conspire to cause some automation behaviour to pop up that was hitherto "unknown" due to the dumbing down. Then we have the makings of an accident.


I'm sorry but I really don't see any alternative to pilots being fully aware of all the behaviours that are lurking there and could surface. If they can't hack it they shouldn't be flying these types of helicopters, although in my experience the chances are they could hack it if they just put a bit of time and effort into learning about it and thinking about it during the 6 month gaps between training sessions. I generally found that the folk who really couldn't hack it, couldn't hack manual flying either!


These days pilots get plenty of days off, but there is the rub: With the equal time roster each day on is a pretty long day usually, so no inclination to do any studying after a long double flight. But a day off is a day off and "why should I have to do homework on my days off?". Consequently I do think that the equal time roster, much as I liked it when I was working, is conspiring against pilots attaining and retaining good knowledge of their complex aircraft.

I think you are coming around to very much what I was saying a few pages ago. Each of us is responsible for our own professionalism.

As for all the discussion about trim releases: I would say understand what you are doing, why you chose to do/use what you did, and act accordingly.

For instance: in a cruise at higher speeds in a 76, if we encounter turbulence there is a risk of breaking Vne (or whatever magic number the FDM guys have programmed in for a bollocking that isn't really a bollocking because we are a 'just culture' company). I see all kinds of contradictory responses to handling this simple situation. First, this indicates the guy driving wasn't really paying attention. Second, he isn't sure, because he hasn't considered it, what to do. Personally I just fly against the trim in pitch (contrary to what you were suggesting HC) to contain the speed. I am aware enough to know that if I release the cyclic it will jump so I gently allow it move back to trimmed position when appropriate. I'm also aware that pressing the release will reset the datums for the AP, which is why I chose not to.

And there are other ways to deal with it, and it is situation dependant. Of course.

My point is that all these suggestions for the 'right' way to do it are assuming that the pilot is incapable of understanding the system and making a judgement. My contention is that they are capable, but have chosen not to make the effort. Your final thoughts seem to agree with me HC.

So I think I most agree with 76Heavy. Put aside the absolutes, the one SOP fits all, and just demand professionalism.

BTW HC, I agree completely with your directions about using the kit when you don't need to so that you will be capable when you really need to!!

DOUBLE BOGEY
23rd Jul 2014, 05:11
HC fantastic last post hitting at the heart of the matter - competence leading to confidence all facilitated through sound and enthusiastic training.

HC, please please PLEASE come and help us deliver that kind of training in AH and let the next generation of pilots and our Instructors take benefit from your experience. You must be properly bored by now! The SIM door is always open for you!

DB

JimL
23rd Jul 2014, 08:04
'Pilot and apprentice',

Your example of the S76 ALT hold might not have been the best one to introduce into this thread; the control of speed in a three axis ALT mode resides with the use of the collective, not by flying through and overriding the function of the AP - which I'm sure you know!

One of the functions of the HFDM system is to monitor the observance of aircraft limitations; if the practice of using the ALT mode with excessive power is leading to exceedance of the limitations, it is the responsibility of the HFDM manager to raise it with the crew members (how this is done is one of the aspects of the company culture). If it is subsequently decided that this is a trend, it is up to operators to ensure that this trend is addressed by: bringing it to the attention of all; increasing the coverage of autopilots in training; and, auditing the system to ensure that the actions have had the required effect.

Your point in favour of increased professionalism has already had the support of everyone (who would have argued against it?); the question is - how is that achieved? HC and I have constantly bemoaned the lack of crew-room discussion in which the matters we are considering here would have been the subject of heated debate. I think that HC might be correct that the change in work patterns have resulted in the demise of this valuable forum (it certainly was part of my education when I first operated on the North Sea). In some sense it has been reproduced in boards such as PPRune - but with far less restraint because of the remoteness of the medium.

During the preceding pages has been argued the necessity for training based upon competence (not tick-box items and hours allocation) and the facilitation of 'resilience' by exposure to normal scenarios with seeded occurrences. Evidence Based Training (EBT) makes these changes but we must not forget that EBT consists of three phases: the evaluation phase; the manoeuvres phase; and the scenario-based training phase. The assessment phase takes note of the competence of the pilots; in particular the demonstration of knowledge, skills and attitude. I think that 'pilot and apprentice' has already mentioned that in Canada, pilots who are assessed as not 'suited' for this type of operation are offered other opportunities (that certainly happened in Bristow Aberdeen in the early days).

The changing of the culture offshore will take some time to achieve but change it must. Whilst it would be nice for this to be achieved with all pilots remaining in their comfort zone, that will not be the case. Yes, we must ensure that the basic flying skills are not eroded by ensuring that the SOPs permit flight to be undertaken without AP assistance in the appropriate weather conditions (as was shown in the Shell Brunei presentation). Whilst making these changes, it must be made clear that there is a substantial difference between 'flying the aircraft' and 'managing the flight' as quoted earlier:
Necessary changes required in piloting skills when converting from flying with basic instruments and stabilisation, to managing the on-board systems, have not been fully recognised and implemented; there was ample evidence that the necessity for managed transition had not been understood (by regulators or operators) or put in place.

Hopefully, this first revolution will have been achieved before the advent of fly-by-wire.

Jim

PS Whilst we are all motivated to ensure that HC stays involved; it should be at the system level and not at the coal face. We should be mindful of Confucius and fish.

HeliComparator
23rd Jul 2014, 08:28
I think you are coming around to very much what I was saying a few pages ago. Each of us is responsible for our own professionalism.


I don't think I ever disagreed with you, but I would just say that there are 2 sides to it - yes each of us is responsible for our own professionalism, but also the information must be "out there" for us to absorb, something that has not been the case up to now, and with a good company culture to support it all.




As for all the discussion about trim releases: I would say understand what you are doing, why you chose to do/use what you did, and act accordingly.

...


Personally I just fly against the trim in pitch (contrary to what you were suggesting HC) to contain the speed. I am aware enough to know that if I release the cyclic it will jump so I gently allow it move back to trimmed position when appropriate. I'm also aware that pressing the release will reset the datums for the AP, which is why I chose not to.

And there are other ways to deal with it, and it is situation dependant. Of course.


Certainly the correct procedure will be type dependant, and situation dependant. I am not against flying against the trims in the sort of situation you refer to (although I would have thought it better not to arrive at that situation in the first place!). It can be appropriate to fly against the trims in the 225 in some circumstances, but definintely not during some dynamic (IAS-changing) manoeuvre whereby the cyclic will no longer be in the right place when released to trimmed position.

HeliComparator
23rd Jul 2014, 08:31
HC, please please PLEASE come and help us deliver that kind of training in AH and let the next generation of pilots and our Instructors take benefit from your experience. You must be properly bored by now! The SIM door is always open for you!

DB

Hey, I could come and cause mayhem by teaching them to press the trim release and to increase the Vtoss before takeoff (viz our discussion at Trump's pad)! Oh, but then you'd have to sack me :sad:


Anyway, thanks but there is far too much to do in summer. Maybe winter...

Boudreaux Bob
23rd Jul 2014, 11:40
It can be appropriate to fly against the trims in the 225 in some circumstances, but definintely not during some dynamic (IAS-changing) manoeuvre whereby the cyclic will no longer be in the right place when released to trimmed position.


Isn't that exactly what the FTR is designed to facilitate? Assuming One understands the need to reset the Datum to achieve the desired change?

HeliComparator
23rd Jul 2014, 12:17
Isn't that exactly what the FTR is designed to facilitate? Assuming One understands the need to reset the Datum to achieve the desired change?


Yes of course it is. However it is not necessarily quite that simple - on the EC225 and 155 with their cyclic follow-up trim, say a rig departure can be flown "against the trims" because the follow-up trim motors the trims to keep the cyclic in trim (although personally, I don't like flying it like that). So a pilot can happily fly a rig departure "against the trims" and it all works out because by the time they get to 40kts they have stopped bothering to fly it and engaged GA. However on the first day when they have 40kts of wind offshore, same profile flown in the same way, the IAS is already above 40kts and so no follow-up trim and a resultant unexpected rearing up when they let go, unless they remember that "This time, I must press the FTR before letting go". That's why a prefer a "1 technique that always works" which is to always press the FTR . Unfortunately I am not in the majority.

JohnDixson
23rd Jul 2014, 16:34
I imagine that the training sims available to the pilots posting to this thread all include pretty complete training with various modes off.

Question: Is there much ( any? ) failure mode training involving runaways of the various parts/pieces of the system, i.e., series actuator/parallel actuator failures, and the like? Failure modes when you are down to one AFCS/Autopilot, i.e., a for example, 10-15% series actuator runaway ( assuming the actuator runs at 100% of full control per second, but the authority is limited to 10-15 % of full control ). Trim failures wherein the trim runs away at whatever its rate limited value is, and the pilot has to wait the requisite 3 seconds before reacting. That whole repertoire of "fun"?

Just checked with an old friend on the SA side of this question, and his take on the sim training was that a lot of systems off training was done, but little/no " hardover* " training. (* US English for runaways).

212man
23rd Jul 2014, 16:55
John,
we used to incorporate all three hardover possibilities in the S92 simulator - SAS actuator, parrallel actuator and boost actuator. (I say 'used to' meaning they still do, but I'm no longer in that function.) SAS can more or less be discounted as there is only 5% authority and it is normally cancelled out before the crew notice, but the other two failure had markedly different outcomes depending on whether in VMC or IMC, the specific axis and the crew competence. I was always curious how the boost actuators got through certification as they clearly don't comply with the normal 29.1329 requirements (in terms of pilot recognition and reaction times), so I assume they were deemed separate from the main AFCS control system - despite being required for the AFCS to function.

Sometimes the failures were given for their own right, sometimes as a means of generating an unusual attitude and sometimes to create a particular situation - especially removing the ability to use some or all upper modes. They are also good tools for communications skills, as initially only the PF knows what is going on and he has to communicate it to the PM who only knows that there has been a control upset (with a collective boost hard-up, accompanied by overtorque and low Nr if not caught quickly). If having difficulties controlling the aircraft, the PF can find it difficult to say clearly what is happening and what he'd like doing about it!

Trim failures wherein the trim runs away at whatever its rate limited value is, and the pilot has to wait the requisite 3 seconds before reacting. That whole repertoire of "fun"?


Of course, in training the expectation is the pilot will react as quickly as they can - not sit and wait like in certification. I remember Ron telling me about the joys of the triple axis hardover testing - he especially liked the nose down/yaw left/roll right combo, with the 3 second wait.....

JohnDixson
23rd Jul 2014, 18:10
Thanks for the update, 212. The thought behind my question, which your response somewhat reinforced, was whether this sort of training would force the discussion as to what was really in the control system, how it was possible to misbehave, and get pilots feeling comfortable and confident that, no matter the failure, they could take over manually, fly the basic machine, and THEN address the AFCS/Autopilot issue.

In a bit of now ancient history, the introduction of the UH-60 posed a particular dilemma as to how to train up the AFCS/Stabilator system so as to instill confidence, as opposed to fear. Sidebar for a moment: upon assignment to the Aviation Test Board out of flight school, I had the opportunity to get checked out in everything they owned, and one was a CH-34C ( I'd gone thru the H-19 in school ). The IP I had for the 34 was afraid to turn the AFCS on, and imparted a horror story re the " Hardovers can kill you ".

All of the initial IP's were UH-1 guys, thus without any SAS etc experience. To confront that situation, I asked SA Engr to make us a version of the hardover box that was portable and could be passed from machine to machine with a robust but simple cabling setup. That was done and all of that initial group was trained, in flight, at max weight, max speed etc, in all of the failure modes. That was a redundant SAS, single AFCS type system, dual electronics and dual actuator for the stabilator, so there was a good list of things to do on those flights, and it worked out pretty well. As I've mentioned previously, however, that level of training did not endure. It did force a lot of conversation and shall I say, expanded ground school type on the wing instruction.

Boudreaux Bob
23rd Jul 2014, 18:43
OH NO! You don't mean you actually went out in the aircraft and "Did It!"?:oh:

Whatever were you thinking Brother John?:D

HeliComparator
23rd Jul 2014, 18:59
Things move on a bit... We have 4 lanes of AFCS in 2 x 2 mutually monitored APs (ie 4 processors running in 2 boxes). We have triplicated AHRS with the AFCS automatically rejecting a "runaway" AHRS. Ditto for the air data.

We have two series actuators on each channel (except the collective which only has 1 series actuator) of different technologies: 1 analogue open - loop hydraulic servo in the AP hydraulics, one closed loop digital electrical series actuator (I say "closed loop, but ARINC data is sent to position the actuator, the actuator just responds with an "OK" (or not) when it's done it). The series actuators are of similar authority so one can cancel out a hard-over on the other.

The parallel actuators are of course relatively slow, but each one has inputs from both APs and dual RVDTs reporting position to each AP. I am not quite sure what would happen if one channel went hard motor-on, whether the other could cancel it out or not.

So what I am saying is the degree of redundancy and fail-passive makes hardovers pretty hard to envisage and I guess that is why they managed to significantly increase the authority of the series actuators over the previous incarnations of the Super Puma.

We can do parallel actuator hard motor-on failures (maybe a short in the wiring to the motor?) in the sim, but there is no RFM procedure for it, and it all seems very improbable compared to earlier autopilot incarnations (FLW!)

JohnDixson
23rd Jul 2014, 21:25
Yes, HC, your point re the 225 and the like is valid. The FBW aircraft of course, use the same approach except that the failure mode consequences increase the degree of electrical power, computing and sensor redundancy yet further.

For the case that started the discussion, and like equipped machines though, trainable failure modes do exist. That brings to mind something that has yet to be mentioned re this case: the pitch attitudes that are described in the reports are pretty extreme. I saw no mention of any command pitch attitude limits within the 155's AFCS/Autopilot software ( and I'd assume they are there, with numbers far less than the aircraft achieved ) or was the situation that those attitudes were achieved by the aircraft with the systems disabled?

JohnDixson
23rd Jul 2014, 21:41
Boudreaux, that wasn't the only thing the UTTAS program had us doing that was perhaps a bit " outre ".

Charlie Crawford, who ran the Army Avn Sys Cmd Flight Standards Division, and hence was the person running the tech side of the fly-off, came in to visit and left us with instructions to get standard flight loads data at 120 degrees bank angle, which we dutifully did. Steady state data at 120 degrees takes some doing. Having done that, the US Army flight manual* for the fly-off aircraft had a published bank angle chart vs speed. From 34 to 136 Kias, the limit was 90 degrees so there was some margin. I never did learn why Charlie, who never did anything like that without some issue, somewhere, needed that data and the somewhat high limit, for a flyoff done in the main ( two of the three machines were flown by this group ) by a picked-for-diversity group of Army pilots from Ft Campbell units.
* I did retain a copy of this manual.

HeliComparator
23rd Jul 2014, 21:45
... That brings to mind something that has yet to be mentioned re this case: the pitch attitudes that are described in the reports are pretty extreme. I saw no mention of any command pitch attitude limits within the 155's AFCS/Autopilot software ( and I'd assume they are there, with numbers far less than the aircraft achieved ) or was the situation that those attitudes were achieved by the aircraft with the systems disabled?

Yes there are pitch attitude limits for when the automation is driving. But not for when the pilot is driving. In the case in question the extreme attitudes were reached as a result of pilot intervention, both directly, and then, I suspect, consequential to the pilot releasing the controls back to the autopilot whilst out of trim.

JimL
24th Jul 2014, 07:24
Here is a presentation by one of industry's experts on the subject of autopilots - both the slides and associated audio-feed are in this folder (it is best to watch and listen concurrently):

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/6ru1dtrp287skva/AACAe-Tvflr1dHS_MPSrPJlra

The presentation starts with basic principles that most contributing to this thread will know but still, the distinctions between 3-axis, four-axis-analogue and four-axis-digital will be interesting for a number of contributors who have not yet been exposed to the latest incarnations. Where the presentation becomes more interesting is when discussing the reduction of complexity by integration and simplifying HMIs. It concludes with a view of what more should be done - not just in autopilot design and control laws, but holistically within the system (design, procedures, training, provision of information etc.).

One of the most interesting elements of the latest discussion here, is the point where redundancy and 'fail operative architecture' lead to a situation where elements becomes just a box in the 'conceptual model' and 'apparent' complexity reduces almost to zero. When that point is reached, we have moved from technology-led-design to human-centric-design. Perhaps the issue is that we are not yet at that point, are approaching the average pilot's knowledge saturation level and are having to discuss compensatory measures in the form of knowledge, training and procedures.

Jim

DOUBLE BOGEY
24th Jul 2014, 12:25
JIM I think we are at the technoligical point where we must stop teaching pilots utter trivia and concentrate only on what is important for him to safely operate the aircraft.

For some systems this requires a degree of in depth knowledge. Puma LH Hydraulics being a good example. For others, the detail is rather unimportant and only the method of HMI needs serious attention. For me the AP fits into this category. It is not at all necessary to know the way the AP works and which actuator moves the most. It is more important to understand the safest way to fly in helicopter in all the possible modes the AP might have. What the indications mean in terms of what the pilots response should be.

The EC225 is arguably once of the most technologically challenging helicopters on the planet but the HMI has been greatly simplified. I am routinely asked by pilots what are the probable causes of FADEC failure and my answer is why should we care. The light comes on, we follow the checklist, it resolves or it does not. Simple. There is nothing more I can about it.

In some areas we press for too much knowledge at the expense of others.

A modern digital helicopter AP may have up to six modes of operation with up to 5 methods of changing attitude in some of those modes. It is here where the complexity lies. Explaining these modes fully and then experiencing each mode, each method is just a start. Understanding the relevance of each mode and therefore choosing which mode/HMI provides the optimum solution for each task or even phase of a task is the challenge we all face. In this respect there is absolutley no substitute for time spent at the controls working these modes.

DB

Boudreaux Bob
24th Jul 2014, 13:01
Some of us have been saying exactly that for years especially when comparing the FAA and CAA system of Pilot Written Exams as an example.

Do we really care about the inner workings of a Cereal Bowl Compass and how it works or does it suffice we understand how to use a Magnetic Compass and understand factors that influence its accuracy?

I have sat through and taught ground school classes on many different aircraft systems. Some used very detailed drawings, component cutaways, and systems trainers that displayed reactions to Switch movements and triggers to Warning/Caution Lights but in the end it mattered only that the Pilot understood how to recognize abnormal reactions or indications, know how to deal with those, and continue to operate the aircraft in a safe manner.

Determining "Must Know", "Should Know", "Good to Know" and "Nice to Know" and "Who Cares", levels of knowledge is the key. Unburden the amount of teaching needed to meet the Standard and far more attention can be given to the required, necessary, and really useful information.

My view is generally, if a Pilot cannot control the function of a component by means of a Switch, Control, Push Button, or Knob....then only a familiarity with the function of the item is needed.

Do I care which parts of a helicopter are made of Stainless Steel or what tolerance in Microns a filter has or do I care only to know if a filter is blocked and I get an in cockpit indication of that.....then what I should do when that happens? What remedial or corrective action is possible and what effect such an indication has on the conduct of continued flight should be my concern and not the inner workings of the filter itself.

HeliComparator
24th Jul 2014, 13:33
Up to a point I agree. For example, when I first became a training captain on the 332L we had a model of the main undercarriage leg hydraulic valves - all rubber bands and slidly bits of coloured cardboard. I was shown how to demonstrate how the undercarriage hydraulicy bits worked, but when I had to give my first groundschool, I totally floundered. I called in the boss to give the demonstration, which he did. I then asked the class if they understood what had been shown and they all said "No". So I never attempted to use that model again, and when I wrote the groundschool for the L2 and the EC225 it was totally skipped over. No-one has died as a consequence.


I think there was a tendency to fill a 2 week groundschool with "stuff" just to take up the time and provide fodder for an exam - and often (in Bristow anyway) these courses were written by folk with engineering, rather than flying, backgrounds.


Now, there is so much need-to-know knowledge that there is no space for any extraneous crap and it must be cut out! The only reason why we still teach silly limitation numbers of Ts and Ps is because we are required to ask such questions in the exam. As far as I am concerned a pilot doesn't need to know the numbers, just be able to understand the colour coding on the gauge and know when they are approaching or exceeding a limit. Once again, the legislation is way behind the aircraft, and is an impediment to good training, and hence to safety.


All that said... Resilience requires us to have more knowledge that we might need on a normal day-to-day basis, in order to cope with the very rarely occurring abnormal. So a knowledge of how the systems behaves in both normal and abnormal / emergency modes is important, but we don't have to know the engineering detail beyond how it impacts on us in flight.

terminus mos
24th Jul 2014, 14:25
The 332 was a step up in complexity from the 330 and the S-61 but not so much as to be hard to understand. Even the 332 started without collective input on the Autopilot and for some, it was complex enough then.

The L2 was an incremental step up,from the L and L1 but was manageable. It was then a step up again from L2 to 225 but more mature pilots found and still find the leap from L to 225 is a big one.

Part of this is generational, we have young software designers with the OEMs designing clever digital autopilots which are being flown by pilots with 25 years on the 332. Most older pilots will grasp the new technology if it's taught how they learn.

Not all that long ago, line avionics engineers would remove components and repair them with a soldering iron, that no longer happens and new engineers are diagnostically clever box changers. We need a more system functionality based approach, not how components work.

I think that Bob, DB and HC are right, we need to cut the unnecessary and include newer subject matter taught, for now how some of us older guys learn. Learning the Ng limit for an engine when the FLI does it for you is not necessary.

212man
24th Jul 2014, 15:14
What, you mean I no longer need to retain the fact that the AS332L main gear tyre pressure is 7.2 Bar and the OEI 20 second transient Ng limit is 34,900 rpm? Or that the tail rotor goes to 1 degree and 6 seconds of pitch when the control cable snaps? Damn, no wonder I don't have any space in my head to remember other stuff - like people's names......

HC is correct that much of this detail was included a) to satisfy the CAA exams and b) because the groundschool was written by engineers and, to an extent, contained existing material from engineer's groundschool.

When I did the EC155 factory groundschool it was very apparent that their philosophy was rather different, and I remember the engines section comprising of "it has two engines and two yellow switches to turn them on and off" (to all intents and purposes). However, I also agree with HC that some degree of wider knoweldge is also an important thing, and the fact that I had previously learned in labourious detail how the hydro-pneumatic FCU on the PT-6 worked (in the B212) has done no harm. In fact I would say it has given a good understanding of what the basic principles of turbine governing are, which are essential in then understanding how a FADEC works too.

The key is to correctly identify the wood for the trees!

HeliComparator
24th Jul 2014, 15:52
It was then a step up again from L2 to 225 but more mature pilots found and still find the leap from L to 225 is a big one.





I think they do still find it a big leap, but once made it is a welcome one. I recently saw 2 of my ex colleagues, both close to retirement age and both "joe line pilot". Both had flown the 332L for many years, then the 225 for perhaps 6 years before the grounding. They went back to the 332L, but are now finally back on the 225. I asked them whether they found it harder going from the 225 back to the 332L, or from the 332L again back to the 225. The answer was categorically that it was harder going back to the 332L, and they seriously missed all the fantastic kit on the 225 which made the job so much easier and more relaxing.

Boudreaux Bob
24th Jul 2014, 16:10
212man,

Remember the Black Marble Theory?

Our Brain is very much like a Jar of Marbles with a finite volume of knowledge it can store. All those Memory Bits are like Marbles of different colors connoting the importance of each.

Let's assume the Black Marbles are the most important and the Red Marbles are the next most important and the Pink and Mauve's are the least two important.

Should we not do our best to have a Jar full of Black and Red Marbles with as few Pink and Mauve as possible?

It isn't the Data Points about names and faces that is getting to you but all those Thousands of Bottles of Gulder you gulped down those Years ago that is getting to you.

keithl
24th Jul 2014, 21:11
Re yr #134, HC, I remember you telling me about that French SID and I believe I said, "Excellent practical solution, but would you have passed an OPC blindly following a SID out of the FMS without time to find the supporting plate?"

I think your remarks suggesting that if only pilots could be bothered to achieve your level of expertise there would be no problem, are a bit severe. No doubt you put in a lot of work to achieve the eminence and reputation you have, but you need a particular aptitude to start with and we (the trainers) have to provide guidance for those less gifted. From where I sit, automation distracts people from the big picture and commits them to a disproportionate amount of time, and detail, "verifying" that what they THINK they've asked the aircraft to do is what the automatics are about to do.

I am aware of some studies which suggest the next generation of automation will be prioritised towards monitoring what the pilot does, not asking the pilot to monitor what the automation does. I think that would be a better way.

HeliComparator
24th Jul 2014, 22:58
Keith - well I think any TRE who gave a major change of SID at 200' on climb out would be being a bit harsh. Yes of course the FMS should be checked against the plates under normal circumstances, but those were not normal circumstances and I consider my actions were the best under the circumstances. What else should I have done - continued on the old SID towards the conflicting traffic? Personally I think it was a mild example of "resilience".

I'm surprised at your comments about the overall "usefulness" of automation bearing in mind the sort of comments I got from line pilots. Are you really advocating a reversion to "mandraulic" flying with mechanical dials etc? In the fixed wing world the introduction of automation is considered to have had a measurable safety benefit and I don't see why, 20 years down the line, we won't see the same result for RW. Sure, the FW boys still crash, and sometimes automation is at the root of it, but overall they crash less often.

Anyway, to be harsh (again!), Automation is here to stay so best get used to it and make the most of it!