ATO responsible for Warrior accident - what is your verdict?

[sheppey]

Aviation Short Investigations Bulletin - Issue 28 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2014/ab-2014-037.aspx)

On 15 January 2014, the pilot of a Piper PA‑28 aircraft, registered VH‑HVX, was undergoing a Commercial Pilot Licence test flight with a testing officer on board. At about 1500 Eastern Daylight-savings Time, the aircraft landed at Orange Airport, New South Wales. The aircraft had encountered moderate turbulence during the flight from Bankstown and the pilot reported a slight overshoot on landing at Orange due to fluctuating wind conditions.

During the time on the ground, the pilot observed the wind varying from an easterly to a westerly direction and the speed fluctuating from 0 to about 15 kt. The temperature at Orange was about 33 ºC, and the aerodrome elevation was 3,115 ft. The pilot had calculated the density altitude at Orange to be about 5,725 ft.

At about 1530, the pilot observed the wind to be from 110º at about 10-15 kt and configured the aircraft for a short field take-off from runway 11, selecting two stages of flaps. During the take-off run, the pilot and testing officer observed the aircraft performing normally and the pilot rotated the aircraft at about 55-60 kt indicated airspeed (IAS). The pilot then established the aircraft in an attitude to achieve a best angle-of-climb speed of about 72 kt IAS. The pilot reported that the stall warning horn sounded momentarily during the take-off due to turbulence.

When at about 50 ft above ground level (AGL) and about 65-70 kt IAS, the testing officer reduced the engine power to idle and stated “simulated engine failure”. The pilot immediately lowered the nose of the aircraft in an attempt to increase the airspeed and selected the third stage of flaps. At about 10 ft AGL, the pilot reported the aircraft was sinking and flared the aircraft for landing. However, the aircraft continued to sink and landed heavily. The pilots reported that the stall warning did not sound during the descent and that a shift in the wind direction was the most likely cause of the accident.

This incident highlights the critical importance of considering local conditions such as wind, elevation and temperature, as well as the inherent risks of conducting simulated engine failure at low altitude.
............................................................ .........................................................

Sheer folly by the ATO to have the candidate conduct a simulated engine failure at 50 feet after lift off from a short field take off with the only option to land straight ahead on the remaining field length. Blaming the weather conditions was a cop out. A simulated engine failure at that height would require lightning fast reaction by the candidate to not only literally bunt over to maintain safe gliding speed, but risk a heavy touchdown to be followed by heavy braking and risk of skidding and tyre failure. In other words he would have to get it right first time. There is no room for error and little time for the instructor (ATO) to take over from the candidate in the seconds available to touch down. By placing the candidate in a situation which would task even the most experienced pilots, the ATO exposed himself and the candidate to very high risk. To put it mildly he displayed poor airmanship.

In assessing a candidate's competence at conducting a forced landing procedure in a single engine aircraft following a simulated engine failure by throttle closure after lift off, it would be sensible to wait until at least 500 feet. That leaves a margin for slow reaction and also gives a reasonable amount of time for the ATO to make a fair assessment of the actions by the candidate. That includes, among other assessable items, the immediate lowering of the nose in order to maintain a safe gliding speed, correct selection of a landing area ahead and to the side, immediate simulated safety drills including warning any passengers and finally the correct method of going around again from the simulated emergency. Even then, simulating engine failure on take off in any single engine aircraft, is a high risk manoeuvre leaving little room for error by the candidate.

Some years ago, Point Cook was the scene of a fatal accident in a Tiger Moth when an experienced RAAF flying instructor was training another experienced RAAF pilot. The instructor had earlier briefed a wrong speed for climb in the Tiger Moth that was nearly 10 knots slower than the manufacturers recommended climbing speed of 58 knots.

As the pilot lifted off just above the power on stall speed and was climbing, the instructor pulled back the throttle at 100 feet to simulated engine failure with the intention the student should conduct a forced landing straight ahead on the remaining field length. Already 10 knots below best climb speed, the Tiger Moth stalled and entered an incipient spin before the experienced "student" could lower the nose to safe gliding speed attitude. The aircraft hit the ground in a steep nose down attitude and burst into flames. The student in the rear seat escaped with minor injuries while the instructor was killed on impact.

Tiger Moths are normally equipped with moveable slats on the top wing which lower the stall speed by about four knots and pop out just before the stall and the clacking noise of them popping out is an effective stall warning. This particular Tiger Moth had its slats permanently locked to minimise maintenance costs. To this day many Tiger Moths have this vital safety feature removed for the same reason.

The ATO in the previous Warrior accident displayed poor judgement in initiating the simulated engine failure after lift off at such a low altitude and in doing so accepted the risks involved. One wonders if CASA has since "reviewed' his Delegation?

[Mimpe]

I won't specifically comment about whose to blame here, but having taken a warrior to Orange mid summer and struggled to get it off the ground and away from the hills at 38 deg C myself, I can very easily understand why the published glide speed and vref left the pilot hanging in the flare well above the ground. It way well have been exacerbated by the longer than expected take off run with less remaining runway than would normally been expected.

[Jabawocky]

Stupid thing to do.

No testing officer WILL EVER do that with me for a very simple reason. I brief them before hand. Simply if you want to see my reflex actions, do it at a height of 300' and we will not be landing off it, as it would be off field unless there is a very big runway or another suitable one involved.

That test's that aspect of an EFATO.

If you want me to demonstrate the ability to handle ground rush and land again from a low cut, we MUST do it after briefing before the take off. No 50' surprises. The ATO can pull the power at will during the climb out, but if under 300' only if we briefed the outcome prior to that takeoff. No negotiations entered into.

This way you can assess both aspects of the real event, but without the risk of the pilot stuffing up and proving they can't do it. Best to see they can and be able to recover if they can't.

This policy has a result which I measure all things with, "Does everything it should and Nothing it should not".

There may be some out there who disagree, that is fine but you will never test me or anyone I know or care about.

Failure to comply with my policy will involve a law suit if something or someone is damaged, physical harm from me if not, or at the very least being ordered to leave the aircraft and hopefully at some remote unserviced aerodrome, while I fly home. Again, not negotiable.

No ATO or CFI has ever argued with me, and they all agreed. But I bet there are a few out there that would.

Does this sound like a Polarair case or am I dreaming?

[Jabawocky]

There was no mention of leaning for the vastly increased DA either, not that it was relevant to the ATo's actions but it would make a big difference to the actual take off performance and maybe better speed and then one less layer in the swiss cheese removed.

And why ohh why was a Best Angle speed used anyway? That was dumb too unless there was some REALLY good reason, and with such a high DA any good reason to NEED the Vx climb would have been enough to say....no, we are not doing it.

At the risk of being accused of advertising again, this demonstrates why my posting these links is relevant. :mad:

Advanced Pilot (http://www.advancedpilot.com/articles.html)
click the middle link...or the others too! :ok:

[dubbleyew eight]

strangely enough I have no problem with what the ato did.
in reality an engine failure if it occurs will never occur at some convenient time.
however to pull an efato in gusty conditions was somewhat stupid.

interesting changes in law have meant that the ato is pilot in command and is liable for the damages caused.
that'll teach him. :E

[LeadSled]

interesting changes in law have meant that the ato is pilot in command

W8,
Would you like to advise us of the law that has changed?
Tootle pip!!

[Clare Prop]

Just to be really pedantic you can't do a CPL test in a Warrior. I looked up the aircraft and it was an Arrow. I wonder what position the undercarriage was in.

Max angle climb, was there an obstacle?

But to pull an EFATO at 50 feet? Not something I would do on a test or in training unless there was sufficient runway remaining plus a lot
more for luck.

I once saw an ATO fail the left engine in a twin commanche with a whopping left crosswind at about the same height. The result was not pretty and the ATO allegedly blamed the student. :ugh:

And I have been PIC on every flight test I have conducted as an ATO, are you referring to the proposed removal of liability which caused a fair bit of angst over Part 61?

[Clare Prop]

iPad won't let me edit.I meant removal of indemnity cover

[Mister Warning]

In the airline world, that's what simulators are for. Just ask the RAAF re 707.... :(

[VH-XXX]

If the instructor tried that in my aircraft my reflexes would include smacking his hand from the throttle back into place. As the PIC it's my job to remove any threats to the safety of the flight.

All that aside I've never had an instructor or ATO do a surprise move, there's no need to, they can advise they are going to and then do it. If you disagree for safety reasons you usually have time to stop the action, although a low time pilot would not have the luxury of experience to determine if safe or not.

[LexAir]

Did the ATO still get paid the test fee? On another note, If I were the owner or the insurer I would consider legal action against CASA.

[VH-XXX]

Why CASA? Is that because the ATO is a delegate of CASA?

If CASA don't put that in the syllabus then he was acting on his own....

[Jabawocky]

strangely enough I have no problem with what the ato did.
in reality an engine failure if it occurs will never occur at some convenient time.
however to pull an EFATO in gusty conditions was somewhat stupid.

You have no problem with what he did, but it was somewhat stupid? :confused:

I will cut some slack, I think we know what you really meant.

The point is very simply this. Any test/check is to assess various skills or attributes, and you can't do everything. So with EFATO you need to check for two things as I detailed above.

The argument of "if it was a real one you don't get to choose when or where" does not wash with me. If you actually have one from 50' in those conditions, and you bend nothing that is awesome, but if the failure resulted in the same outcome as in the report, because you did it mostly right but were caught out with gusts, well who cares. The object then is not to kill yourself.

There is no point trying to kill yourself or bend metal in a training/testing environment.

[Black_Knight]

putting myself in the CPL candidates shoes for a moment.

If an ATO does conduct a EFATO simulation at low altitude in conditions similar to the report. wouldn't the best course of action be for the candidate to abort the test apply full power and climb out?

what sort of reaction are you likely to get at the end of the assessment for doing that? obviously you might end up with an annoyed ATO for the rest of the flight, but are they likely to end the assessment there?

[djpil]

I agree Jaba and XXX. The last time some-one did that to me (although at a suitable height when I took my hand off the throttle to move another switch) I simply pushed the throttle forward again - he had omitted to announce the simulated engine failure.

I never teach Vx climbs in my airplane as it is only 7% above the stall speed. Short field take-off speed at 50 ft is the same "The aircraft must be pitched forward to a safe power off speed should a power failure occur during climb-out; failure to respond immediately may result in stall at low altitude."
CASA's draft Part 61 MOS mandates doing that in tailwheel endorsements from September.
It also mandates:
 Short landing.
 Calculates landing performance in accordance with performance chart.
 Lands aeroplane at nominated touchdown point (+200ft/60 metres for PPL,
+100ft/30 metres for CPL) at minimum speed and applies maximum braking.
 Touches down simultaneously on main wheels and tail wheel.
 Controls aeroplane direction on the ground.
 Stops aeroplane within calculated landing distance. So, per my airplane's manual - approach at 10% above the stall speed. PPL tolerance allows touchdown up to 60 metres past nominated touchdown point (per the book) then apply maximum braking. And "stops aeroplane within calculated landing distance." Touching down 60 metres past the nominated touchdown point will not achieve book distances. I can see many bent tailwheel airplanes after September unless the MOS is improved.

[AussieNick]

putting myself in the CPL candidates shoes for a moment.

If an ATO does conduct a EFATO simulation at low altitude in conditions similar to the report. wouldn't the best course of action be for the candidate to abort the test apply full power and climb out?


First and foremost the pilot is responsible for the safety of the aircraft and the occupants of the aircraft, so you would assume that the CPL candidate would have applied power and aborted the EFATO.

But, that been said, realistically, the student would not have had the experience to recognise this as a dangerous situation. Putting myself in the students shoes I would have accepted that the ATO would not intentionally do something like this unless they thought it was . My thoughts would have been I'm sitting next to a testing officer, this guy/gal must have a heap of experience etc etc and would not have second guessed their call.


You would be hard pressed to find any young student pilot (young in experience, not age) who would be willing to countermand an action or request/order from an ATO for fear of failing the test flight.

[Tankengine]

In days gone past I used to pull the throttle on take off to simulate engine failure. I still pull the release in gliders for the same reason. I do this without warning ( on checks ).:}
The difference in the way I do it compared to this case is that I only do it in conditions where I can safely recover if the student stuffs it up!:ugh:
It seems in this case the ATO did it too low, at too low a speed, in an unfamiliar aircraft?:hmm:
The testing officer is the PIC and wears the prang.

[Tee Emm]

The most tragic outcome I ever heard about was at Camden NSW when the ATO cut the mixture on the right hand engine of a Duchess immediately the student (former B767 captain) had selected gear lever to up. This was at night or dusk. While during the briefing a couple of hours earlier at Bankstown the ATO (30,000 hours plus) told the student his intention was to conduct a simulated engine failure after take off at Camden, the student told the ATO he did not agree due night conditions on arrival. The ATO then agreed not to pull an engine. To cap it off, the ATO placed a map between the throttles and mixture lever as the student got airborne and then pulled the right hand mixture against his earlier agreement.

The student called for the ATO to reinstate the power quickly as he could not control the aircraft at such a low speed with windmilling prop. Soon after the Duchess clipped the top of a tree and stalled wheels up into rising ground and caught fire. The student survived but the ATO died of burns later.

A similar event but not tragic occurred in Victoria where an instructor conducting dual instruction failed the mixture on a student at 50 feet on take off in a Seneca? The student controlled the yaw correctly and continued the climb albeit with low gradient with gear still down . The speed fell below Blue Line in the confusion and the instructor told the student he should have landed straight head on the remaining runway length which is what the instructor had planned he should do. The student therefore did the bidding of the instructor and attempted to abandon the climb in order to put the aircraft back on the runway.

The instructor then grabbed the controls to salvage what was his stuff-up in the first place, and tried to land on the remaining length but landed very heavily and wiped out one wing. Both unhurt. As there was no property damage and no one hurt, ATSB did not investigate. The only report that went in to ATSB was by the instructor, in which he blamed the student for slow reaction and making the wrong decision to continue the single engine climb even though the student did well to control the aircraft until the instructor interfered.

The instructor thus self-exonerated himself for causing the problem in the first place. ATSB accepted the instructor's word for it without further comment leaving the student to wear the blame which was unfair. At no stage was either pilot interviewed by CASA or ATSB. And the student was never required to submit his version of the accident. I know all this because I saw the files...

[Mach E Avelli]

Unless a student is flying solo, or does some deliberate act of sabotage, such as pulling the gear up on the ground or switching off the ignition and throwing the keys on the floor, how can the ATSB find the student at fault?
In a training or testing situation it is the instructor/testing officer who is totally responsible.
Does instructor training no longer include learning what is a recoverable situation and what is not; how far to let a student go, when to patter gently, when to be firmly assertive and when to simply take over control?

[MakeItHappenCaptain]

All that aside I've never had an instructor or ATO do a surprise move, there's no need to, they can advise they are going to and then do it.


Reckon? I flew half an hour of continual FLWOP's once (no dramas) but when I set up the aircraft to create the engine failure on the way back to the aerodrome without prior notice, everything fell apart.

"Siht! What's happening??!?"
"I think we've just had an engine failure..."
"Whadda we do? Whadda we do? Whadda we do??!!":rolleyes:

It's turning into a sad state for aviation when we refuse to conduct emergency procedures because we're scared the student will fcuk it up. How do you expect students to learn if you have to give them two minutes notice the engine will fail?:confused: A little pressure can produce much different outcomes.

I will prep my students by reviewing the EFATO actions immediately before the take-off of TGL that it will occur and then announce the action with "engine failure". Still interesting how many need to be prompted to close both throttles when one fails while still on the runway in a twin.:E

Sure, it can be argued that the ATO's judgement may have been deficient in conducting the exercise under less than ideal conditions, but this was a CPL candidate, not a 50hr PPL. The failure was dealt with correctly by all accounts and the failure was initiated above the TOSS, which in itself has a safety margin over the stall.

I rue the day when the industry accepts the student dictating how the instructor will conduct assessments.

[Bladeangle]

Hey Jaba, why do you say it was dumb for him to use best angle speed?

He was on a CPL flight test, asking a student to demo a short field T/O is normal, the arrow flight manual says how to do it!

These new CPL's are going to be flying up the top end into short strips, hot, heavy conditions, do you really think it is unreasonable to ask a student to demo a short field at orange with over 1600m of runway on a mere 33 degree day?

They're probably both lucky the candidate didn't lift the gear, might have been a different outcome.

As for simulated EFATO. Iv had CASA ATO's and instructors alike do it right throughout my training. When I was instructing it was a sequence in my schools ops manual during "circuit emergencies" lesson.

djpil, why don't you teach Vx?

[andrewr]

And why ohh why was a Best Angle speed used anyway? That was dumb too unless there was some REALLY good reason, and with such a high DA any good reason to NEED the Vx climb would have been enough to say....no, we are not doing it.

Maybe that's what is used for the performance charts? If you don't use the speeds in the chart, don't expect to get the same performance - and you can't calculate the actual performance at your different speed. If it's close, it's important to use the speeds in the chart. You're not suggesting that if there's enough doubt that you need to calculate performance, you should say no to the whole operation?

[43Inches]

He was on a CPL flight test, asking a student to demo a short field T/O is normal, the arrow flight manual says how to do it!

The lines in the Piper POH end at 30c at 3000ft PAlt.

In at least one accident involving a Piper in the US, a Navajo that did not maintain height, single engine, in very hot conditions, the FAA asked Piper their view on the lines on the charts. Pipers answer was simple, the end of the lines marks the end of certified limits, basically the edge of the environmental envelope. You can not extrapolate these lines out, you may interpolate between them.

Secondly can an Arrow at that density altitude acheive take-off climb requirements of 6%? Book says at max weight it can only achieve 200fpm, gear down, 78kias (extropolated of course because lines don't go that far).

Lastly pulling a suprise EFATO at 50ft in an Arrow under those conditions was simply silly and was only going to end one way. There was no risk management in this event, the what ifs surely outweighed the benefits considering the aircraft and conditions. As already stated at least the gear was out to absorb some of the landing shock, could have been worse for those on board if it was up.

Anyone who has flown an Arrow would know that if you went to idle power, 70kts at 50ft on final at approach attitude you would land heavily, this was 72kias, nose high and high elevation.

[djpil]

I never teach Vx climbs in my airplane as it is only 7% above the stall speedI like to have at least 20% above stall speed for climb after take-off - consistent with FAR 23 minimum take-off safety speed.

[Bladeangle]

43inches, are you looking at an arrow IV performance charts?

The one I'm looking at goes up to 40degC. Be it may, they might not have been able to achieve 6% with gear still down, but just eye balling the gear up climb performance chart, it reflects climb of 560'/min which is about 7%...

djpil, agree, sorry I mis-read your post. Out of interest which type machine?

[43Inches]

The aircraft involved was a PA-28R-201 Arrow III serial number looks like a 1978 model maybe.

The chart has 40 degrees at the bottom, this only intersects a line at sea level. If you draw the line vertically you will find to intersect with 3000ft PA you will have to draw from less than 30degrees C. The chart I have is dated 1995, not sure if there are more recent charts.

The 6% climb requirement on take off is with gear extended.

[Jabawocky]

MIHC
How do you expect students to learn if you have to give them two minutes notice the engine will fail? A little pressure can produce much different outcomes.
Yep it sure does. Thats why we have this report along with countless others and some worse.


I rue the day when the industry accepts the student dictating how the instructor will conduct assessments. Simply they won't if ab initio's, they do not know differently, but I am not a student and I do not mind fair play. But some actions are stupid and do not achieve the outcome necessary. If a genuine failure or a simulated one end up in a sticky situation, the walk away bent airplane is acceptable in only one circumstance. You the instructor or ATO take full responsibility for the other. It is up to the Instructor/ATO to be sure of a safe outcome. If you only think you can....you can't.

Need I remind you of an "almost family" member of mine who did exactly this kind of thing. He killed himself and a soon to be JQ FO in a Brasilia in DN not long ago. Just 4 years ago http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/409686-air-north-brasilia-crash-darwin-merged.html

I rue the day that anyone thinks this is a good idea, don't you? :=



Bladeangle
Hey Jaba, why do you say it was dumb for him to use best angle speed? Yes I do. The data speaks for itself. :ok:

Can I suggest you read again what I wrote while thinking more about what I said in determining what the pilot reactions were and when to teast each facet. Rather than reading it looking to pick fault in my arguments. You see and understand different things when you take an open mind to reading things. Yes I too am guilty of that too.....all the time, so I understand. :O



andrewr
You're not suggesting that if there's enough doubt that you need to calculate performance, you should say no to the whole operation? That would depend on the circumstances. That is a judgement call. It might be OK to depart but not risk EFATO's because they rarely happen and may be worth the risk. If one does happen, well you do the best you can and may well end up with a bent aeroplane and no injuries. They did!

I have to say that I am with 43" and djpil on this.

Anything that ends in a bent aeroplane in any training is generally a dumb idea. As proven. A mechanical failure might be an exception.

[MakeItHappenCaptain]

So let's all keep pretending everything will be la-di-da and allright on the night, eh? Yes training accidents will occur, but there will be much more severe outcomes from other real failures if we ignore the possibility. Did you achieve your standard of flying by never being shown anything without the slightest bit of risk?

The Darwin Bras crew should've configured the aircraft correctly and preferably should've been in a sim. Are you seriuosly suggesting all EFATO training should be mandated as sim only?!?? Seriously?

Want another example?

I'll point out a mate of mine who successfully landed a jump plane full of people at Gladstone several years ago after an engine failure. I can guarantee all of his pax were thankful his training included unannounced failures, not just "during this flight, I will be failing the engine."

I'm sure we can both come up with supporting examples until the cows come home.

Simply they won't if ab initio's, they do not know differently, but I am not a student and I do not mind fair play. But some actions are stupid and do not achieve the outcome necessary.

And I would be surprised if someone of your experience would be unable to handle a simple closing of the throttle at say 200' with 500m of runway remaining, but you may well be asked to demonstrate it. I'm not going to ask you to demo it with 100m left, but if you refuse to even partake in the exercise, them you might as well find someone who is willing to sign you off for your flight review after three circuits.

If you think the rest of the industry is up to your standard of handling, then you are both seriously mistaken and remiss in encouraging others to boycott this type of training.

If a pilot is unable to perform this kind of exercise, then should they even be flying? Would you put your kids in the back with them? Many will be that rusty that they are desperately in need of the practise. I have flown with on RPPL recently who just kept the nose up and started heading off the runway. Are you telling me this kind of training was unnecessary? He can now handle a failure of this kind and I am happy to sign off his review.

There is a time and place for everything. Better judgement is certainy warranted in many of the accident scenarios, but with all due respect, you can't stick your head in the sand and think it won't happen.

Also agree with djpil. That's what TOSS is all about. FAR 23.51 to be exact.

[VH-MLE]

"Does this sound like a Polarair case or am I dreaming?"

Personally, I would respectfully say you're dreaming, but just the same it's a good question to get an accurate answer to, rather than relying on the unsubstantiated rumours made by a few on this forum.

I've asked our very own FIGJAM (that's LeadSled for anyone interested) to provide evidence regarding his comments on the same issue a number of times previously, but he seems unable or incapable of answering.

[Jabawocky]

OK...maybe I am dreaming. I seriously do not recall the specifics but I do recall it had something to do with a battle about safe ATO practises.

Maybe there were parallels.......maybe not.

If you can, settle the score, otherwise I am still none the wiser.

MIHC
The Darwin Bras crew should've configured the aircraft correctly and preferably should've been in a sim. Are you seriuosly suggesting all EFATO training should be mandated as sim only?!?? Seriously?

C'mon which was it? configured correctly (provide data please) or in the SIM (agreed) YES SERIOUSLY.

I'll point out a mate of mine who successfully landed a jump plane full of people at Gladstone several years ago after an engine failure. I can guarantee all of his pax were thankful his training included unannounced failures, not just "during this flight, I will be failing the engine."

You clearly can't read nor comprehend or you have beer goggles on. I never said never do failures for real unannounced. Just not at a height where if I (the chekee) screw up, you can't 100-110% for sure recover. Otherwise do it in segments. Prove I can land on the runway from 50'. Then unannouncd at 300' make me almost land on a acreage block which will result in a survivable write off. Do you know Martin Wood? Remember the A36 off YCDR recently? That is the outcome you want.

And I would be surprised if someone of your experience would be unable to handle a simple closing of the throttle at say 200' with 500m of runway remaining, but you may well be asked to demonstrate it. I'm not going to ask you to demo it with 100m left, but if you refuse to even partake in the exercise, them you might as well find someone who is willing to sign you off for your flight review after three circuits.

Hang on a minute, now you are comparing me with an ab initio and closing my comfortable parameters, that is having your cake and eating it too. I dare say yes I could cope with that. In fact from 300' in my plane I will put you back on the reciprocal runway. But that will make you **** your pants. I think you have missed the point here. Remember...if you only think you can...you can't and that applies to you too as the CFI/ATO or whatever. This is a grey area where only the foolish tread, and unless you are sure the candidate is good for it, and you are even better, thou shall not go! The fuzzy numbers are very flexible on man and machine capability, and the wx on the day. How close can you go before you get in an ATSB report.

Rule No.1 Do nothing that will make you look silly in the ATSB report.

Would you put your kids in the back with them?
Not the ATO in this case, and only a maybe on the CPL candidate. My daughter no, not a chance. My son yes.... :E But only in the front seats :E Far more skill than me.

Yes the cows are coming home. We are probably far closer to agreement in real life than our words are depicting. But you need to test and demonstrate in a manner where a cock up does not kill, that way you live to LEARN another day. If you scrub out on day one...no more learning and I think this is the point you miss.

Best Regards :ok:


PS: I think you give me more credit than is due for flying skill. I am average at best.

[VH-MLE]

Unfortunately it had nothing to do with "safe ATO practices" - despite the misinformation presented here from time to time to muddy the waters.

There was ample evidence supporting this in the AAT hearing many moons ago...

Having said that, I am pleased to see that Polar seem to be doing very well these days...

[MakeItHappenCaptain]

What do you mean which? From the ATSB report, I read it as being both.
The increased drag from the 'windmilling' propeller increased the control forces required to maintain the aircraft's flightpath. The pilot under check allowed the speed to decrease and the aircraft to bank toward the inoperative engine. Additionally, he increased power on the right engine, and engaged the yaw damper in an attempt to stabilise the aircraft's flight. Those actions increased his workload and made control of the aircraft more difficult. The PIC did not restore power to the left engine to discontinue the manoeuvre. The few seconds available before the aircraft became uncontrollable were insufficient to allow 'trouble shooting' and deliberation before resolving the situation.
That would be configuration and;
Shortly after the accident, an EMB-120 simulator and its staff were approved to undertake the operator's training requirements. In response, the operator transitioned the majority of its EMB-120 proficiency checking, including asymmetric flight sequences, to ground‑based training at that facility.

That would be the sim part.

As for training practices, I'm just gonna agree to disagree here.

Moooo....:ok: