Abbreviated & Expanded Checklists Multi Crew Environment

[Ozgrade3]

I have an aircraft checklist document to introduce which contains an expanded checklist and abbreviated checklist and I;m trying to get my head around the concept.

Now I understand the basic concept between the two, but not sure how they work in practice. The expanded checklist has the checklist item and who performs the task etc. Is the expanded checklist done silently by each crew member then the abbreviated checklist is the one that is read off.

My take on the concept, the before start checklist as an example.

The crew works through silently on the expanded checklist doing the required checks. Then when ready for start the PF calls for the before start checklist and they go to the abbreviated checklist and start the challenge & response process.

Is the expanded checklist more like a do list where the abbreviated is a checklist.....or have got it all wrong.

Can anyone shed some light on this for a simple single pilot fellow like me.

[thorn bird]

Ozgrade, it all comes down to the FOI who decides what the checklist will be, and how it will work. Most FOI's prefer read and do as that is the only experience they have to draw on from their local aero club. There is no way anyone can get a proffessional scan flow do then read checklist approved in Australia, unless its supplied by the manufacturer and then there's no guarantee the FOI of the day wont require you to muck about with it.
I've seen before start checklists that take twenty minutes to complete for a simple light jet, and before landing checklists that can take the entire ILS from locator to minima to complete. If the before landing checklist for an airbus contains two items, for a citation the FOI will require forty. Its unproffessional, distracting and dangerous, but thats CAsA for you, they really should take that "s" out of their name.

[flyhardmo]

The expanded checklist is things that have to be done but can be done in a flow sequence. The abbreviated checklist is a challenge and response to make sure that the important items are done,

Eg: after take off you call for gear up, flap retraction on schedule, and switch off taxi/landing lights. You don't do these items as a challenge and response but the abbreviated checklist will have
Flaps...... UP
gear........UP
To ensure the major items are done.

[Defenestrator]

Ozgrade3,

In a nutshell:

The abbreviated checklist is the one used in the aircraft on every sector. It basically contains the individual checklist items with no detail on what has to be done to complete that particular item. The detail for what is required for each individual item will be found in the expanded checklist. The expanded checklist also lives in the aircraft but is not used that often. Moreover it's there for reference and training purposes. An example would be:-

Abbreviated Checklist- Before Take-off
Mags - CHECK

Expanded Checklist - Before Take-Off
Magnetos - increase power to 1700RPM. Check for smooth RPM drop between 50 & 150 RPM.

Simple example. The Flight Check System approval will heavily depend on the FOI doing the assessment. My advice would be put up a well presented, properly formatted document. It shows effort and you'll likely get some effort in return from the FOI.

This has been my experience with the Flight Check System approval process.

D:ok:

[Mach E Avelli]

A really enlightened abbreviated checklist will even 'chunk' items e.g. it may say "Gear & Flap Up" or "Environmental......" to include the setting of both air conditioning and pressurization controls.
It won't - or should not - include obvious airmanship items like 'Climb Power set' or the two I really, really hate: 'takeoff clearance' and 'landing clearance'. This stuff may have its place at a flying school where they have to cater for student pilots struggling with basic concepts, though even that is debatable, as most simple aircraft can be flown with simple memory checks.
In typical commercial operations, power settings and general airmanship items can be addressed in the SOP, and no doubt your diligent CASA FOI will insist on that.
The expanded checklist should ideally follow the same sequence as the abbreviated checklist, but as its name implies, expand on how stuff is done i.e. the various switch selections in more detail. The expanded checklist is not normally used in daily operations, however could be during training.
Don't confuse the above with 'first flight of day' or 'originating' checklists and 'turnaround' or 'transit' checklists. On turboprops in particular, a lot of stuff is done once a day to check various systems. This can still be incorporated into an abbreviated checklist, perhaps with an asterisk or similar to identify what must be done and when.

It is a nuisance having individual CASA FOIs with their aero club mentality becoming involved with checklists for aircraft on which they may have little, if any, practical experience. I suggest if you have difficulty, refer to the extensive Flight Safety Foundation recommendations on checklists.

[BPA]

Whatever you do make sure you use the manufactures checklist. There are so many companies and CASA that keeping adding/replacing/moving checklist items around they end up looking nothing like the original checklist.

Most multi-crew aircaft checklists will only contain the items that will kill you if missed ie flaps. However the AOM, FCOM etc for each aircaft will have more detailed items/ flows that are completed before calling for the checklist.

Do a search for the B737 NG manuals and checklist and you will see what I mean. Boeing checklist contain less items than what you will find on your typical Cessna or Piper checklist.

[thorn bird]

Mach E,
I agree with you whole heartedly, there is a wealth of material out there from the FAA, Caa and NASA as well as the FSF. CAsA's own AOCM provides reasonable guidlines as well. Probem is most FOI's dont read past the first page of the AOCM.
Almost all GA aircraft are built and marketed for private ownership so manufacturers checklists are written more to cover litigation than practicality.
There are perfectly adequate expanded procedures contained in most Flight Manuals, they are headed "Normal Operating PROCEDURES" your friendly local FOI, who sometimes dosnt even have a type rating on the aircraft reads this as "CHECKLIST" because as with the "Duck" looks like a checklist, sounds like a checklist, therefore it must be a checklist, which if they took the trouble of asking the manufacturer or the FAA they would find out that no, what the heading says is exactly what it means, they are expanded PROCEDURES, the checklist is for you the operator to work out.
I have seen CAsA required checklists that run to fifteen pages, containing hundreds of items for a light modern glass light jet. I have watched a crew taxiing at a primary airport, both heads in the cockpit, absorbed with a checklist and system checks that run for most of the taxi time. I just think this is heading to a incursion which could be tragic, already witnessed one in Italy dont want to see one here. The micromanagement and interference by unqualified and inexperienced CAsA staff in operational matters must become a major safety issue or do we wait for the smoking hole before something is done. Why do two different operators of the same aircraft operate totally differently?, why is a CAsA approved manual in WA, not approved in NSW? There is absolutely no standardisation in CAsA, just opinions based on a background as an aeroclub Wallah or a RAAF fighter ace. Pity the poor chief pilots who have to accept what they know to be unsafe, complaining will just lead to threats of having their briefs pulled, just do as your told!!! and when the inevitable happens you just know they'll hang you out to dry because you are responsible.

[Mach E Avelli]

Boeing have long had checklists down to a fine art. Don't know anything of Airbus. But Beechcraft did have a terrible checklist for the King Air. Maybe it has improved, but it was a real 'flight 101' job. Though I don't have an actual Beech checklist with me, I recall basic common sense items like: 'shoulder harness....locked', 'rudder pedals....adjust' and even during take off: 'power...apply; check ITT, Torque, RPM' etc.

I guess ever since that retard ran his Citation dry and Cessna got sued because there was no decal under the fuel gauges exhorting the pilot to actually put enough kero in the tanks, manufacturers have to cover every possibility.

Life would be a lot easier if operators could, within reason, be allowed to develop their own procedures. I still have an old United Airlines B737-200 FCOM which has a preamble that basically says that, in the light of their extensive operational experience, they had varied some procedures, and accepted full responsibility for these changes. Boeing happy, FAA happy, pilots happy.

[LeadSled]

they had varied some procedures, and accepted full responsibility for these changes. Boeing happy, FAA happy, pilots happy. Mach E,
There is a procedure for that, the changes from the AFM are accepted by the Type Certificate Holder and the FAA (or not, in some cases), so, in effect it becomes a company specific change to the AFM. Qantas (or at least, they used to) do (did) exactly the same thing --- the pre-takeoff check on the B767 and B744 was doubled --- from 1 item to 2 --- with Boeing "no objection" and FAA concurrence.

CAR 138 seems perfectly clear to me, you will comply with the AFM, as it forms part of the certification of the aircraft, but in the case of operating procedures, CASA FOIs believe their power to issue a direction overrides the certification of the aircraft. You also need to understand the legal basis of Type Acceptance under CASR 21.

To quote the AAAA submission to the ASRR: " only CASA has the prerequisite levels of incompetence to create and sustain such regulatory nonsense."

The AFM is just as much part of the certification of the aircraft as the performance charts, the legal limitations, the weight and balance etc.,

No FOI ( I hope) would purport to give a direction to vary the weight and balance envelope, as part of the Type Certification, so what makes them think they can direct changes to another part of the Type Certification , willy nilly, without the approval of the Type Certificate holder and the NAA that issued the TC/ C.of A (as United has done).

My view is quite clear, CASA FOIs do not have the legal authority to direct amendments to the AFM, without manufacturer (TC holder) and the NAA that issued the Type Certificate /C.of A. approval.

The operator must comply with CAR 138, and so must CASA.

Tootle pip!!

[mattyj]

When I started my IFR rating at the flying school I did most of my training in, I learnt in a Duchess.
The school had a checklist that was about 6 inches long, double sided and laminated. There was an expanded list, about a page and a half. 3 Years later I returned to get renewed as I had let the original expire, and I still had all the original paperwork from 3 years before..The newer checklists had grown to over a foot long, with the expanded checklist, over 2 1/2 pages. I asked my instructor what had happened and she said "all the b-cats like to make their mark on the school before they move on"

The moral; just use the effing flight manual or pilots operating handbook..if you're sooo smart..then you would've designed and certified the plane your flying instead of just being a pilot..

[Capt Fathom]

Ozgrade, are we talking Cessna 172 here?

[Ozgrade3]

Er.....no, something bigger, that burns Jet A.

Was given a manual not long ago...right Bloggs, you are teaching expanded & abbreviated checklists in **** ground school.......right, sure boss......but...WTF is that LOL.

So a bit of swotting up and some late nights studying etc and off I go.

However I do want to teach integrate the principles in all phases, from effects of controls. I have always done the flow check followed up by the checklist to make sure nothing has been done. Bit sick of students who need a checklist for an bloody after landing check in a warrior.

So I though I'd ask here how things are done in 'real aviation'. As always ask 10 pilots and get 11 opinions.

[windowshopper2010]

Ozgrade3,
If you are talking a "Jet" you have to move away from the CASA driven, GA must do things by checklist.
When you fly an aircraft intended for multi-crew operation you must apply the phase of flight Procedure as written in the AFM/FCOM. This is probably what you are referring to as the "expanded checklist". At the completion of the Procedure the PF would then call for the "........... Checklist" and the PNF would then Challenge the PF for a Response and they would answer having double checked the item.

If you have the Manual can I suggest you read the preamble of the applicable Chapter because that will probably tell you exactly what to do in any case. ThIs is a good practice anyway as your equipment gets more sophisticated.

If you are trying to fly a single pilot a/c like a multi-crew a/c....well, good luck!

[Capn Bloggs]

An expanded checklist details all the things that must be done/actioned/ checked for each item of the checklist. It is sometimes in the form of a Normal Procedures section of the pilot's operating manual.

The abbreviated checklist only lists the items themselves and is read by one of the crew for the other, or both, as necessary to respond to.

For example:

Expanded checklist:
Lights............Capt, FO...........SET
When cleared to line up:

The captain will extend the landing lights.

The FO will select the strobes and recognition lights to on.

Abbreviated Checklist:
Lights............Capt, FO...........SET

Further, the scans or flows for each crew member are the tasks that each does silently at the appropriate time before the actual checklist is read, in this case, when cleared to line up. When the scans/flows have been done and the captain is ready, he'll call for the bla bla checklist, an item of which will be the lights.

The operator must comply with CAR 138
You just cannot accept that an AFM may well explicitly say operators can modify the procedures as they see fit, will you?

[Ozgrade3]

Thanks Capn bloogs. Pretty much as I thought from reading the document.

It's not a jet, I won't be flying it, or doing actual endorsement training, just a part of a course, an intro to the concept if you will. Others far more skilful and wise (and 200 hrs multi-crew experience) than I, get to do the fun bit.

[601]

Concur with Capn Blogs as to the difference in the two checklists.

If it is a GA turbine the checklist most likely will not "flow" around the cockpit and will not be written for a multi-crew operation.

To write you own, start with the checklists in the AFM. You need to cover all the items in these checklists. Do not forget that there may be checklists in Supplements to the AFM, i.e. Raisbeck Supplement for a King Air. These need to be incorporated into your checklist. An item in a Checklist in a particular Supplement may replace an item in the aircraft manufacturer's AFM Checklist or may be an additional item to what is the AFM Checklist.

Develop a "flow" in the cockpit. If possible sit in the aircraft. Determine where you start with the flow and its direction around the cockpit. Determine who does what. It is no use having the LH pilot moving a switch on a RH panel when it is more convenient for the RH pilot to complete the action. In GA turbine aircraft certified for single-pilot ops all switches are within reach of the LH pilot.

This is also where it could be become tricky as some items have to be checked in a particular sequence but are located on opposite sides of the cockpit.

Some items in the AFM sequence are illogical. From memory checking the fuel panel in a B200 relies on annunicators lights illuminating but the test for the annunicators lights is about 15 items after the fuel panel check.

Once you get the flow correct you should have the basis of the abbreviated checklist. Item....Who.....Response

The Expanded checklist is what the pilot does to get to the Response. This is gleaned from the AFM and/or the Supplements to the AFM.

You may need to add items that are not in the AFM, i.e. at transition - Altimeter 1013 and cross check. Maybe a pressurisation check.

You can add items but you had better have a good reason to delete an item called up in the AFM or a Supplement.

Now some FOIs will insist that the AFM is it. Other FOIs are after a flow around the cockpit.

But that is CAsA.

[AerocatS2A]

Abbreviated checklist = The actual checklist used in the aircraft.
Expanded checklist = The abbreviated checklist expanded with explanatory information. Not used in the aircraft but studied during training so that you know what the abbreviated checklist means.

The expanded checklist is also different from the "scan" or "flow".

The way the system should work is that you have a cue, such as "cleared to line up", that prompts a scan. The scan is the act of making a set of switch selections appropriate to the phase of flight (lights on, autothrottle armed, config checked etc) and should be in the most logical order for actioning the items, i.e., it should be geographical if possible. Once the scan is completed the checklist is called for and covers the important parts of the scan. There may be items in the scan that aren't covered by the checklist simply because they're not that important. The checklist may also not be in the same order as the scan, it should be in an order that makes the most logical sense for checking that items have been actioned.

The expanded checklist sits in your company manuals somewhere and if you ever forget what you are supposed to have checked when replying "checked" to a checklist item you can look it up and refresh your memory.

I have only worked for two companies with a cue/scan/checklist system and one of them had the actual scans laid out in their manuals. The other didn't care what scan you used, that was up to you, all they told you was what needed to be done. It doesn't really matter at the end of the day, but for a newbie it is a lot easier to learn flows/scans etc if you don't have to make it up on the fly.

[LeadSled]

You just cannot accept that an AFM may well explicitly say operators can modify the procedures as they see fit, will you? Bloggs,
In short, no. Show me an AFM that says that !

In the literal legal meaning of the words you use, not some local constructive misinterpretation.

I have dealt with a lot of AFMs over the years, mostly( but not only) FAA or Transport Canada TCs, I have never seen one. I would go further, and suggest that such an AFM would not comply with ICAO Annex 8 and sundry ICAO docs. on the subject of aircraft certification.

If an operator has an aircraft, that the AFM says something that can be interpreted that way, it is a seriously deficient AFM. Given the amount of work and background information that goes into determining certified procedures, and the potential legal liabilities attached to deficient procedures, the likelihood of any manufacturer giving legal carte blanche to individual operators seems very remote to me.

This is quite distinct from the (say FAA) guidelines for company specific Part 121, 125 or 135 FCOMs, and acceptable and non-acceptable ways of incorporating normal and non-normal AFM operating procedures and checklists.

As the ATSB said, when the famous case of the almost disastrous A320 GA at YMML was finally investigated, Jetstar has made a change to the expanded operating procedures without the TC holder approval, and that had a significant bearing in this very serious incident.Airbus did not approve the change, Jetstar reverted to the TC AFM.

As I said before, CAR 138 and CASR 21 are quite clear.

Tootle pip!!

PS: What Thornbird is referring to, demands by particular FOIs, are creating a very dangerous operating environment. As to Bloggs example dealing with lights, that must be from a very old TC, in "more modern" aircraft, that would often not even be on the "expanded checklist/normal operating procedures", but just be expected of a normally competent and trained crew, who can tell the difference between day and night, or night with fog, where you decide not to use the landing lights for either landing of takeoff.
I am reminded of the "Preflight preparation procedures" on the B747 Classics --- some 400+ items that took the Captain, FO and FE about 20 minutes.
The Checklist call was: Preflight Preparation Procedures
The answer was:Complete -- P, F, E

[Centaurus]

and the PNF would then Challenge the PF for a Response

Not necessarily so. In the 737 checklist philosophy, often the reader of the checklist (challenger) will then reply to his own challenge and thus is now the responder. In other words, the original safe flight concept of one pilot challenges and the other pilot responds (the ideal cross-check situation) is nullified and becomes useless as a cross-check.

In fact in the simulator we see on countless occasions, the check list reader busy mumbling away with his own responses while the PF is heads down tapping away on his FMC CDU oblivious to whether or not his mate in the other seat is actually making switch selections or just talking to himself before putting the checklist in its slot and announcing in a professional deep pilot like voice " XXX CHECK LIST COMPLETE" (mainly for the CVR of course).:ok:

[LeadSled]

Folks,
Just a bit of expansion on my last post:

The checklist philosophy that is now preferred, in a modern flight deck, for normal operations, is to only cover vital actions.

Thus, the "Before Takeoff Checklist" Boeing style, will be "Flaps"
The Before Landing Checklist might be as brief as "Gear" and "Flaps"
The "checklist" is not a "simplified" "Expanded Checklist".

The "Normal Operations" section of the manual will cover all phases of flight, in detail, but you will be expected to carry out all those functions just as a normal day to day operation of the aeroplane.
The "Non Normal" Checklist will be a lot more detailed, generally with only a few memory items, and most of the non-normals will be "read and do".

Sadly, there is little commonality between major manufacturers, and the setup for many smaller turbo-props is "orrible". Even GA type aircraft that nominally follow the GAMA recommended framework for an AFM show "interesting" variations in interpretations of the guidelines.

"Read and do" normal operations, as demanded by quite a few CASA FOIs are a threat to aviation safety. They are not checklists at all, they are procedures lists.

Finally, on the subject of CAR 138, who wants to be the first pilot in command, in the witness box, to be asked by the QC for the survivors: Captain, you did not comply with the AFM, as required by the manufacturer's TC and CAR 138. Instead, you followed a document that was significantly different. As the person ultimately responsible for the aircraft, up to the time of the accident we are examining, why did you use this document?

Tootle pip!!

[AerocatS2A]

The "checklist" is not a "simplified" "Expanded Checklist".
Where I work it is exactly that. The expanded checklist is identical to the abbreviated checklist with the addition of explanatory notes. Maybe I'm missing your point or maybe you are confusing "expanded checklist" with the set of operating procedures that make up the company manuals and the FCOM.

[601]

Captain, you did not comply with the AFM, as required by the manufacturer's TC and CAR 138. Instead, you followed a document that was significantly different. As the person ultimately responsible for the aircraft, up to the time of the accident we are examining, why did you use this document?


I have posed this question to all and sundry with blank responses. I wonder where CAsA would stand if an FOI had required a company to develop the checklist and approved the checklist as part of the FCS that ended up as the centre of attention.

[Mimpe]

I understand the bird strike/ loss of thrust over NY city required a substantially more succinct checklist than the Airbus engineers had foreseen...

[LeadSled]

Where I work it is exactly that. The expanded checklist is identical to the abbreviated checklist with the addition of explanatory notes. Maybe I'm missing your point or maybe you are confusing "expanded checklist" with the set of operating procedures that make up the company manuals and the FCOM

Aerocat S2A,
I am not confusing anything, by the sound of it you are stuck with the nonsense CASA "requires" via the AOCM.

As I remarked previously, some of the older AFMs have very long winded so called "check lists" that are really procedures lists. Most CASA FOIs that I have come across have never developed beyond this point, they want procedures lists called checklists.

Unfortunately, the requirement to adhere to the AFM can be very restrictive, and to be "legally" safe ( limiting your exposure to liability) you must go through the process of TC holder/NAA approval if you want to modify/modernize such checklists.

When I say "more modern approach" I am referring to most FAR 25 (or equivalent) certified in about the last 30 years, where the list of "checklist" items is limited to vital actions only, and not a recheck of all the normal day to day procedural actions in normal operations.

I am reminded of the old saw: The things we do every day, we are expected to do by checklist, the things we will do once in a career, we are expected to do from memory"

At least, in recent years, we have got smarter there, as well, with very few non-normal procedures having extensive (if any) recall items.

Mention has been made to the ditching in the Hudson, I have no knowledge of Airbus manuals, but if they are anything like Boeing, there will be a preamble statement something like:

"This aircraft is designed to be flown by two suitably trained and experienced crew, Boeing does not present procedures for every possible combination of failures. Pilots should exercise their judgment under any particular circumstances. Read only items may be completed from memory at the direction of the PIC".

Even if it is not in Airbus manuals, this is what Captain Sullenberger did, in exercising his authority as PIC under FAR 91.3 ( have a look at the CASA Part 91 nonsense in draft, to see the difference)

As a matter of interest, FAA equivalent of CASR 138:
§91.9 Civil aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards, or as otherwise prescribed by the certificating authority of the country of registry.

(b) No person may operate a U.S.-registered civil aircraft—

(1) For which an Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual is required by §21.5 of this chapter unless there is available in the aircraft a current, approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual or the manual provided for in §121.141(b); and

(2) For which an Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual is not required by §21.5 of this chapter, unless there is available in the aircraft a current approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, approved manual material, markings, and placards, or any combination thereof.

(c) No person may operate a U.S.-registered civil aircraft unless that aircraft is identified in accordance with part 45 of this chapter.

(d) Any person taking off or landing a helicopter certificated under part 29 of this chapter at a heliport constructed over water may make such momentary flight as is necessary for takeoff or landing through the prohibited range of the limiting height-speed envelope established for the helicopter if that flight through the prohibited range takes place over water on which a safe ditching can be accomplished and if the helicopter is amphibious or is equipped with floats or other emergency flotation gear adequate to accomplish a safe emergency ditching on open water.
------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, many GA aircraft are STCd versions of very old designs, many predating the FAA and the FARs, somebody mentioned early Kingairs, their AFMs are, in my opinion, very hard to deal with, and far from optimum, as far as risk minimization is concerned.


Tootle pip!!

[Horatio Leafblower]

If you want the CASA good oil, ask GM at Tamworth for the run-down.

I am not sure if he is the SME for CASA on checklists but he is one of them, and not an Aero Club "shopping list" adherent.

His presentation on CASA's take on Checklists is much more "enlightened" than many here would appear to think and aligns with FSF and NASA literature on the matter.

:ok:

[LeadSled]

Horatio,
Maybe you should ask Thornbird what he thinks of said gentleman in Tamworth. I don't doubt that the said gentleman will give you the "CASA good oil" --- that is the problem. We are in severe need of an oil change.
Read CAR 138 again!
Tootle pip!!

[thorn bird]

Leadie thank you, beat me to it. That lunatic will end up killing someone.

[Horatio Leafblower]

Leadsled and Thornbird,

I understand you old girls have your axes and you need to grind them but just a casual observation - you should seek professional help for your hate issues.

:=

I find all interactions with all government agencies irritating and beauracratic and frustrating but to be blunt I find dealing with CASA generally, the local office particularly, and the bloke in question especially, much less irritating than the average govt dept and generally disposed to help wherever possible.

There are many things about CASA that need fixing or could be improved - agreed.

This is not a thread about CASA or one FOI, it is about checklists. If you think the "official" CASA take on checklists is the Aero Club-style "shopping list" you are wrong.

[Capn Bloggs]

I never cease to be amazed (and pleased) when I read stuff like Horatio's. :D

Puts a lot of the obvious ranting and raving from others into perspective.

[A37575]

Always remember when someone claims that CASA says this, or CASA says that, in every case he or she is talking about one CASA person or is generalising. In the case of an FOI it could be a former GA pilot with his own personal viewpoint and who has been given a type rating paid for by CASA which automatically makes him the local CASA "type specialist":=

[LeadSled]

Always remember when someone claims that CASA says this, or CASA says that, in every case he or she is talking about one CASA person or is generalising. In the case of an FOI it could be a former GA pilot with his own personal viewpoint and who has been given a type rating paid for by CASA which automatically makes him the local CASA "type specialist":=

B37575,
You have it in one, sound like you probably know one (of many) actual cases.

Horatio,
It is nothing to do with "hate" or any other emotive words, but all about what is all too common in CASA --- read the AAAA (and many other public) contributions to the ASRR.

In my opinion, what some at CASA are demanding (on top of the demanded violations of the Type Certificate/AFM and CAR 138) is just plain dangerous --- to anybody who has the background to understand why the risk is elevated.

Both in the case of Thornbird and myself, we have many years experience across a quite large number of types,(small, large and in between) under the jurisdiction of a number of NAA besides CASA, (and extensive qualifications beyond , say, an Australian ATPL) we have grown up with the development of what has transmogrified into modern flight deck operations ---- and understand why modern checklist are as they are.

Unfortunately, too many CASA employees have little or no background qualifications, much less years of experience, there is no CASA corporate memory, and unlike, say, the minimum qualifications for an FAA or UK CAA inspector. Too many are as described by B37575.

And that is why (in part) we are getting demands for changes to AFM standard operating procedures, including checklists, that are a serious threat to operational safety.

Sadly (in part) because there is no CASA corporate memory and reservoir of operational technical competence, they don't know what they don't know, but that does not inhibit them in exercising their delegations ---- producing quite unnecessary risks ---- an avoidable threat to safe outcomes.

Tootle pip!!

[601]

Read CAR 138 again

CAR 232 is more relevant to the topic. CAR 138 deals with the AFM.
Checklists, or more correctly, the Flight Check Systems are approved under CAR 232.

[Capn Bloggs]

You just cannot accept that an AFM may well explicitly say operators can modify the procedures as they see fit, will you?

Bloggs,
In short, no. Show me an AFM that says that !

In the literal legal meaning of the words you use, not some local constructive misinterpretation.

Fom my Boeing AFM:
"The operating procedures contained in this manual have been developed and recommended by the manufacturer and approved by the appropriate regulatory agencies for use in the operation of this aircraft. However these procedures are only for guidance in identifying acceptable operating procedures and are not to be considered mandatory or in any way construed as prohibiting an operator from developing their own equivalent procedures".

My FCOM says similarly:
"The 797 Flight Crew Operations Manual reflects the airplane description and operating recommendations approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. This does not mean that individual airlines may not publish manuals reflecting their own operating philosophies."

[VH-MLE]

Well said Bloggsie - and to you too Horatio,

I always have a bit of a laugh when LeadSled - Australia's very own FIGJAM, gets on here pontificating about all things aviation.

This is the guy who makes all sorts of unsubstantiated allegations about the non compliance with regulations of others, yet then proudly admits to doing the same himself - WTF??

He has absolutely no credibility in my opinion and it’s good to see others share a similar view!

Cheers.

VH-MLE

[LeadSled]

all sorts of unsubstantiated allegations about the non compliance with regulations of others, yet then proudly admits to doing the same himself

MLE,
Is that so --- quote just one example, please, or withdraw the scurrilous and defamatory statement..

Folks,
Re. CAR 232 and a few others, what you have not caught up with is the effect of the changes that brought CASR Parts 21-35 in mid 1998, and the repeal of the previous set of Australian certification regulations.

Since then, Australia issues a Type Acceptance Certificate, no longer carries out Australian certification, and a C.of A is issued against that Type Acceptance Certificate.

CASA has no power (despite what so many of you think, it would seem) to amend a foreign Type Certificate, and that includes all components of the Type Certificate, including the AFM. That is the intent of CASR Part 21 and CAR 138.

That this conflicts with (apparently) other CARs ---- So, what else is new??

Bloggs,
So, you are flying a 797, I must confess that is a type I haven't caught up with.

No such statement has appeared in any Boeing AFM I have used. I have never suggested that a company cannot have its own systems, but they must comply with the AFM, or any changes be agreed by the Type Certificate holder and the NAA that issued the TC.

As to your FCOM statement, if, in fact what you present is accurate, what you don't seem to understand is that that is not necessarily inconsistent with all I have said ------ but I don't expect you, -MLE or a few others to understand the nuances ------- it does NOT mean that you can change the AFM procedures, without Boeing or Airbus or whatever specific approval ( don't forget the Jetstar matter earlier referred -- nearly cost an aeroplane.).

That a few of you disagree with what I say, because it is different to what you have been taught,you are used to, what you have always done, or what CASA FOIs think and direct, matters not one jot.

I guess it will take a major damages action to assign liability for unapproved amendments to the AFM, contrary to what is reasonably clear black and white law.

I would have though that the Transair Lockhart River matter and the more recent PelAir Senate Inquiry would have shown, for those who didn't already know, that CASA collectively and individually, is not to crash (pun intended) hot on these issues.

Tootle pip!!

[VH-MLE]

"MLE,
Is that so --- quote just one example, please, or withdraw the scurrilous and defamatory statement.." OK then - here is an extract of a post of yours dated 27th July 2013...

"What you mean is "will happen". I always used to start a clock, the average time to loss of control was around 30s, the best a little over 60s, always the "graduation test" after the initial 3h IF in those days of the Restricted PPL, no student ever failed to spiral out.

I am pleased ( having been accused of all sorts of illegality -- which was true, but now the statute of limitations is my friend) to make the claim that none of my students have even had an accident IFR when unqualified to fly IFR."

As I said, zero credibility and I rest my case...

Cheers.

VH-MLE

[Kharon]

Guys, I just wonder here if "their own equivalent procedures" has a whiff of legal slight of hand?

However these procedures are only for guidance in identifying acceptable operating procedures and are not to be considered mandatory or in any way construed as prohibiting an operator from developing their own equivalent procedures".
You know the one – same as the CAAP – equivalent level of safety and all that. I've always had the notion that at least a stated 'no objection' from the type certificate holder was required to cover your arse – legally, should you wish or need to change the AFM 'procedures' and there is an incident which involves home made changes. I expect a manufacturer would be pretty quick off the 'not our fault' mark if things turned nasty. "No M'lud, whereas we can't stop the operator changing things, the operation was not conducted as per our recommended and we had nothing to do with that change; which failed to be 'equivalent' to our recommended"; etc. etc.

LS -"[CAR] 232 and a few others, what you have not caught up with is the effect of the changes that brought CASR Parts 21-35 in mid 1998, and the repeal of the previous set of Australian certification regulations.
LS – " [I have] never suggested that a company cannot have its own systems, but they must comply with the AFM, or any changes be agreed by the Type Certificate holder and the NAA that issued the TC.

It seems pretty close to the mark – as I read it – this also seems to tally with the AOCM section and as LS mentions; the intent of CASR 21 and CAR 138. But it's certainly typical of the legal techno babble which would keep a pack of lawyers knee deep in empties for a couple of years. Seems to get easier as the aircraft get bigger it's the 'middle weight' older type range which seem to create havoc, my favourite - the Metro 23 SAS checklist, to do the whole thing as per the AFM almost 90 separate elements are involved; this to establish that the system was working at the time the check was complete, offering no guarantee that it will function faultlessly if or when required. Other noted areas of 'conflict' : where certified single pilot aircraft are 'adapted' to multi crew, or where the TC holder expands 'a check' and then presents 'recommended' procedures which are translated into 'shopping lists'.

Not so bad for the 'heavies' with manufacturer assistance, but it's a real buggers muddle for "GA", especially as others (A37575) have mentioned, when the local type expert needs to be reminded to adjust the seat (ensure secure), put the straps on (nice and snug), stow the pen (after checking the ink level) etc. etc. One thing is for absolute certain, if you bend one and you are even suspected of being outside the AFM – there are no checklists published for manning a seat at an inquiry or hearing, even fewer allies. Be careful out there.

[Mach E Avelli]

Bloggsy has it right for Boeing. I know because I have had a checklist CASA approved that was slightly different in format to the standard Boeing one. The reason being we had to do mostly bleeds-off take-offs, whereas their standard checklist at the time assumed operators would be mostly bleeds on. For bleeds off, crews had to reference another book called 'Supplementary Normal Procedures'. In daily use this was a pita.

Also, with some bugsmashers and older Pommy air transport aircraft, the AFM does not set out checklists in any logical order. Rather it sets out procedures, system by system. How to turn the fuel on in the fuel system chapter; how to test the autopilot in the flight control chapter etc. Not practical in daily operations. Hence a SOP written somewhere to incorporate those various checks in a sensible order, culminating with the checklist item: 'cockpit preparation...complete.'

Over the years I have had my share of disagreements and arguments with CASA, but can say that with checklists, never had one rejected.

[LeadSled]

-MLE,
I will pay that one, but I doubt you will find any more.

In self justification, none of my many students has ever had an accident related to VMC into IMC or any similar weather related accident. Although two landed in paddocks, rather than risk deteriorating weather. Maybe, sometime, a breach of the law for the greater good can be justified.

Mach E,

Was the checklist you mention pre. or post the introduction of CASR 21? That makes a difference as far as the process is concerned, but is entirely consistent with all I have said about checklists. Thinking of roughly similar examples, where the Boeing answer to the change was "no objection", I would have thought that would have been the Boeing answer.in your case. As you have said, the operation was already covered in Supplementary Normal Procedures.

The whole point about modern checklists is that they are limited to vital action, they are not aid-memoirs for Normal Operating Procedures.

This is the whole basis of my complaints about what CASA is demanding (and it is not just one or two FOIs) in general aviation operations of small jets and turbo-props --- that virtually the whole of normal operating procedures, step by step, be incorporated in a "check and do" list, not "do and check" vital actions checklist.

If CASA tried that one on, with the major airlines, they would be shown the door.

In the case of one type, following the AFM, there was about ten checklist items to do touch and go circuits --- but the CASA demanded way (don't hold me to the exact number, I would have to go and count them) was about 57 or 58 items ---- completely unmanageable in the course of doing a circuit, completely contrary to the AFM ----- and being head down for most of the circuit is not the way to go.

Tootle pip!!

PS: Kharon mentions a good example with the daily SAS check in the Metro 23, CASA wanted the whole thing done as a two pilot "challenge and reply" procedure from a "check and do" checklist. Completely unmanageable and unnecessary, and not called for (in this form) in the AFM, although Metro AFMs are fairly ugly examples of older AFMs.
Some Kingair manuals are not much better. -8/Q300/400 manuals are a reasonable example of a modern manual for a turbo-prop, with Normal Operating checklist limited to vital actions.

[Capn Bloggs]

The whole point about modern checklists is that they are limited to vital action, they are not aid-memoirs for Normal Operating Procedures.

More to do with more-automated systems in modern airliners not requiring any actions as opposed to "modernising" the checklists to remove superfluous normal operating procedures. After all, that's what a checklist is for; to check that the things that need to be done have indeed been done.

[LeadSled]

After all, that's what a checklist is for; to check that the things that need to be done have indeed been done. Bloggs,
Add "vital" to things that need to be done, and I will agree.

Long before "modern systems", I operated various B707 that were G and N registered, as well as VH-.

The AFM (almost) checklists were used in the N-registered aircraft (ex-PanAm), long by present day standards, but brief and to the point, versus the QF normal checklists of the day, the G- aircraft operating on a UK AOC were somewhere in between. The shortest B707/720 checklists I ever used were for an ex-TWA Boeing 720.

I really don't think many people have come to terms with the full meaning of the Australian 1998 changes, particularly their impact on "the old ways of doing things". When Australia (prior 1998) had Australian certification standards, and created Australian AFMs (or equivalent --- and remember the "Black Book" Operations Manuals for small aircraft) for all Australian registered aircraft, DCA/DoT-ATG/CAA/CASA could "approve" amendments to Australian documentation, and imposed all sorts of Australian unique certification standards, most of them adding cost and complexity and some serious commercial disadvantages, for no demonstrated risk reduction benefit ----- there was no "increase in safety", whatever that means.

All those Australian AFMs (by whatever name) ceased to have any force with the repeal of the Australian legislation that gave rise to them in the first place.

That all changed in 1998, and most of what is on this thread demonstrates that many of you haven't appreciated the real ramifications of the changes. They are not some unintended outcome of the implementation of government policy, they are entirely the intended outcomes, despite the stout and persistent resistance of CASA's "iron ring".

Australian aviation at all levels has benefited by the adoption of the FAA certification standards (Parts 23-35) but the benefits to GA have not been all they could be and should be.

The CASA imposts on the small jet/turbo-jet operators is proof of that!!

Once again, I put the proposition that CASA has no power to amend a foreign Type Certificate, in any way, and CAR 138 means what it says.

Tootle pip!!

[Creampuff]

CASA may not have power to amend a foreign Type Certificate, but CASA does have power to impose conditions on the type acceptance certificate CASA issues off the back of the foreign type certificate or equivalent document issued by the NAA of a recognised country: CASRs 21.029A and 21.029B.

CASRs 21.005, 21.006 and 21.006A are probably relevant too, but I haven’t worked out what they mean.

[Mach E Avelli]

CAR 232, which requires CASA to approve check 'systems', is open to interpretation.

One version is that it means every item on the checklist, the sequence, who does what and when etc must be approved.

Another interpretation is that it means whether a laminated card, book, roller blind or the mechanical 'flip' type can be used; i.e. the 'system'.

And yet another interpretation is that it means all of the above.

I have had some CAR 232 approvals issued that pinned us down to the actual version number and issue date. CASA would then want to charge us big bucks to assess any amendment that may have become necessary as a result of either operational experience or manufacturer's changes. Yeah, right, a small cash-strapped, resources-thin Company will comply religiously with THAT crock. If they did not pick up any subtle changes at audit time (and they never did) that was due to their lack of attention to detail.

In a more favourable light, I have had much more co-operative and practical CASA people simply issue an approval of the 'system', with a tacit understanding that we did not have to go back to them to make any minor changes, just so long as they also got the amendment and reason for that amendment. Which guaranteed co-operation.

[thorn bird]

Mach E,
what you describe is exactly the problem, lack of consistency. What is approved here, aint there. What is approved here may not be approved if there is a change in FOI, how the hell does someone run a business when the goal posts are continually changing, remember here we are talking about "COMPLIANCE".
You are in compliance based on the opinion of the FOI of the day which may not necessarily be in "COMPLIANCE" with the FOI of tomorow. This thread perhaps illustrates the diversity of "Opinion" across the aviation spectrum, which is fine,everyone is entitled to an opinion, except where it comes to "COMPLIANCE" because compliance means you are a "CRIMINAL" or not, and that proposition is based on an everchanging playing field where you have no control of exactly where the goal posts are.
It is no wonder it is getting harder and harder to get anyone to take on a chief pilots role. Why would anyone risk their reputation, and a possible criminal record trying to comply with regulations not even the regulator understands, where the meaning or intent of those regulations can change on a daily basis, where to comply with an unqualified, inexperienced and often completely incompetent FOI you are left with a choice of compromising your own professional integrity, or accept what you know is unsafe. Australia is now a complete regulatory madhouse, that smoking hole is only a matter of time, god help us. The lunatics really are in control of the asylum.

[601]

All those Australian AFMs (by whatever name) ceased to have any force with the repeal of the Australian legislation that gave rise to them in the first place.


Not quite correct. If an aircraft only had "Pilot's Notes" and did not have a manufacturer's NAA approved AFM, that black book was the only AFM you had and still have.

What is approved here may not be approved if there is a change in FOI, how the hell does someone run a business when the goal posts are continually changing, remember here we are talking about "COMPLIANCE".

The approval is still issued under CAR 232. Back in 2003/04, someone in CASA realised that just about all GA aircraft did not have flight check system approved under CAR 232.

This caused a flurry of activity until CASA released that they would not have the time and resources to approve all of these outstanding non-compliances.

On 14 October 2004 up came Exemption Number CASA EX38/2004 giving blanket exemption against the requirement for an approval under CAR 232(2) and compliance with 232(5).

But this did not cover multi-engine helicopters or turbine aeroplanes among other kinds of aircraft.

So CAR 232 is still alive and well today.

If you have an electronic check system within a FMS, this will require a letter from the aircraft manufacturer confirming that the system has been developed and approved by the applicable NAA and replicated in the electronic checklist.