Anti RAF Propaganda : The Times : Letters Page

[CoffmanStarter]

I suspect a few other members will have seen the letter by Lt. Cdr. Lester May RN (Ret'd) in the Times today. Whilst he is entitled to his opinion, I just wonder what motivates a retired RN Officer to be so vitriolic and anti RAF ?

Whilst it may be easy to simply ignore such writings (some of which is quite barking IMHO) and consign them to the sidelines along with "other" axe grinders, the worry is that some of this stuff can gain currency over time.

Lt. Cdr. Lester May's Letter (http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/letters/article3982994.ece)

Full quote ...


Forces organisation

Sir, Neither Julian Brazier, in his
article about Army Reserves (Jan 18),
norformer US Secretary of Defence
Gates, last week expressing concerns
about Britain’s forces, mentioned
land—based aircraft. Both make clear
the Royal Navy is the UK’s strategic
priority; CDS, and General Richards
before him, expressed similar views.
Forces’ websites are telling. Royal
Navy, Royal Marines and Army pages
highlight operational business. The
RAF spotlights the Second World
War, aircraft displays, sport, much
less operations.

This RAF modesty is right. It has
220 combat jets, 650 support aircraft
and 36,000 personnel yet, after
withdrawal from Afghanistan this
year, just four jets, a few other aircraft
and 1,000 airmen will be overseas.
The bulk of the £7 billion-a-year RAF
will be home, facing no air threat, our
islands safeguarded by Nato in
Europe and an expanse of ocean, yet
those 220 Typhoon and Tornado jets
cost £20 billion.

Defence experts here, and across
the Atlantic, argue that independent
air forces are no longer necessary or
affordable. Land-based combat jets
have limited roles, flying mostly
supporting operations on land and
sea. Huge cost and manpower savings
would follow transferring essential
frontline land-based aircraft to Navy
and Army control. The RAF owns 80
per cent of UK military aircraft assets
— reorganisation is overdue.

LESTER MAY
(Lieutenant Commander RN (Ret’d)


Lt. Cdr. L. May RN (Ret'd) Tw1tter Feed (https://twitter.com/NavySpeak)

Where he describes himself as a maritime affairs writer and campaigner. Royal Navy 1967-89: Leading Writer 1971; Lieutenant-Commander (S) 1984. There are some other "choice" quotes about the RAF.

Begrudgingly ... I do agree that the RAF would be better served by having a more operational focus on it's Website Homepage.

[Lyneham Lad]

Yes, I read that this morning with growing dismay - had to check the bottom of the letter to see if it was signed 'Sharky'...

[Whenurhappy]

This letter could have been written any time over the last 95 years, so I don't think that we need to worry just yet, but, as you say, myths have a habit of sticking.

The writer forgets the AT and rotary fleets (AT as in Air Transport, not Adventure Training, and having a look at the RAF home page, an uninformed viewer could get the wrong idea). The writer fails to mention UCAS operated by the RAF...I could go on. The RAF Engagement team do work hard to keep gatekeepers and influencers (eg MPs) informed so I don't think there is too much to worry about the ill-informed rants of a retired Upper Yardsman (Supply).

[CoffmanStarter]

Whenurhappy ...

I'm sure you are right about not needing to worry too much ... but the guy certainly has some venom.

Daly History Blog : "What's the point of the RAF ?" (http://dalyhistory.wordpress.com/2010/08/18/whats-the-point-of-the-raf/)

Scroll down to see more of May's "contributions" :ugh:

[Darvan]

Lester May has history. He writes to The Times, on average, about once every six weeks and has a letter published. The majority of his submissions have an anti-RAF theme. I am not sure if he is a lone antagonist or if he is being sponsored by some Dark (Blue) force.

[Fortissimo]

He is a serial offender and seems to use any avenue to spread his nonsense. You may have seen a letter from him in RAF News recently, along the usual lines (disband the RAF etc). Why the editor thought it useful or even sensible to publish it is anyone's guess. :ugh:

What is certain is that May has no concept of how modern air power is employed, nor of its breadth and complexity. It is pointless trying to dissect all his 'arguments' as most of them are supposition or use false premises, and the man himself is not open to discussion and will not be changing his ill-considered opinions. He is partly right though in one statement - that's the one where he says huge costs and manpower savings would follow transfer of assets to RN/Army control. Manpower reductions would not be that large, as you would still have to regulate and manage, but there would definitely be huge costs!

[Jimlad1]

May is by my reckoning as mad as a box of frogs. He turns up in all sorts of places and comes up wit hthe usual tired old diatribes. He gets in a range of publications, often monthly, and is humoured because there is seemingly no coherent RN or RAF person willing to write sensible letters in his place.

[Fortissimo]

I did reply on one occasion, after which he googled me and then bombarded my work email address with his rubbish! He has the skin of a rhinoceros and you will not change his views by countering them with reasoned argument.

[NutLoose]

I do like reading lucid, concise and accurate letters, shame that wasn't one of them.

£7 Billion a year for the RAF doesn't look bad when you think it's costing an Estimated £6.2 billion for a brace of flat topped boats, which is actually one short of what you need, as you would normally allow for one to be on refit, while one is working up and and one is operational at sea..
Now if as he is saying land based aircraft are dead.. Sticking them at sea you are then limited to approximately 40 total allowing for the other boat being on refit, and additionally with the likes of mines, torpedoes, anti shipping missiles it appears you are sticking all your eggs in £6.2 billion worth of vulnerable assets.
Oddly enough he skirts over the contribution the RAF has made in Afghanistan and seems not to have fathomed out that a Carrier wouldn't have been a lot of use.
Equally I cannot figure out where these huge savings would come from, if you transferred the RAF to the Army and Navy, you would still need the manning to operate them, the bases to operate them from and even admin wise you would need to ramp up to administrate it all..
Oddly he doesn't mention the Marines would be ideal to transfer to the Army, once landed that is all they are, and the Army already have experience in operating a unit that overlaps another service, they're called the paras.

[Odigron]

It is the very ill informed views and the complete lack of understanding of airpower, that Mr May has demonstrated in his letter, that drives the requirement for an independent air force.

His opinion about air forces (and the RAF in particular) are not worthy of consideration - his opinion is on a par with getting an Estate Agent to provide a view on the requirement for Nuclear Submarines - you'll get an opinion, but it's likely to be utter drivel (as it was from Mr May).

No land based fast jets?? Is he really serious?? Does anyone know how many carriers we would need to meet standing and contingent commitments?

For starters:

Defence of UK Airspace (although Mr May doesn't think it is a task required to be conducted by the UK, we can leave it to our European neighbours) = 1 carrier.

Defence of the Falkland Islands (or does Mr May think we can leave this task to the Argentines?) = 1 carrier.

Not sure how many contingent operations that we may need to conduct concurrently, lets call it 2 = 2 carriers.

Probably need at least one spare = 1 carrier.

I won't go into the support and escort vessels required - this of course wouldn't be expensive at all - all eggs in one basket - no redundancy - mad.

I suspect that trying to debate with this poor, deluded and ill-informed individual would get us nowhere. It's a shame that The Times felt the need to print this; Mr May's points are actually at risk of doing nothing more than tarring the reputation of his former Service - I know plenty of outstanding RN personnel, thankfully, they're often much more sensible than Mr May.

Bad form Mr May, a former Lt Cdr maybe, but an expert on airpower - clearly not, and a gentleman?

[Wander00]

Just send a black Omega round to his house................

[teeteringhead]

Don't engage in a battle of wits ..........









........ with an unarmed opponent! ;)

[TheWizard]

Not this bell end again.....
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/304667-disband-royal-air-force.html

[storms1962]

Lt Cdr May seems to be talking sense to me, if only to infuriate the RAF (mainly retired) who seem to think that these forums are a light blue club!!!!
Quote
Military Aircrew A forum for the professionals who fly the non-civilian hardware, and the backroom boys and girls without whom nothing would leave the ground. Army, Navy and Airforces of the World, all equally welcome here.

[NutLoose]

That's him, he and Sharkey must take turns in the barrel... One spouts off while the other takes it easy..

[Roland Pulfrew]

The Wizard

Thanks for the link back to 2007. Some quite interesting predictions/statements on that thread.

[Hangarshuffle]

Its not good becoming angry at him, or personal. May has a point of view.


1.Defence.History is on his side (one could argue), the RAF has got things spectacularly wrong in the past, much to the worse when one looks at the physical damage to our country meted out in the course of 1940,41,42 and even into mid 43 (in my home town). What on earth were the RAF doing in these years?


2.Present day or near about. A question I have asked before and been stiffed for on this site;
Why, in the winter, spring into summer of 2008, in Basra, in the COB were we allowed to be repeatedly rocketed by the bad lads from down town, and the RAF did little to nothing to defend the 4000 odd mixed bag of civvies and 2000 odd mostly British people under that barrage? Phalanx was from the RFA and RN ships, anti barrage was from the Army, air umbrella was from the er USN, USMC and USAF (90% of the time). yet in GB, 100+ FJ and Lord knows how many aircrew sat about and did nothing? I didn't imagine it, I was there.


If the past is a guide to the future, maybe he has a few points right. Its no good getting all prickly, people will report on what they see.

[smujsmith]

Just a thought, but why would anyone take any notice of an ex navy stacker on any matter of importance ? The man obviously has a "burr in his craw" over something RAF, perhaps one of the regulars might remember crossing swords with him. Personally I suspect he was turned down for RAF entry and so went for the inferior option. He needs to learn to live with his life choices, recognise the limitations of his specialist knowledge on the subject (as I do) and take up crown green bowling and pipe smoking. If nothing else it should hasten the popping of his clogs. I do hope he gets over his latest bout of verbal flatulence and look forward to future contributions to British Military thinking,mobviously treasured by the floaty bloaters who follow his Times contributions.

Smudge :ok:

[Roland Pulfrew]

Hangarshuffle you are Lester May and I claim my £10.

1.Defence.History is on his side (one could argue), the RAF has got things spectacularly wrong in the past, much to the worse when one looks at the physical damage to our country meted out in the course of 1940,41,42 and even into mid 43 (in my home town). What on earth were the RAF doing in these years?

Well I suppose they were trying hard to stop the Luftwaffe from bombing your town. They were bombing German targets. They were attacking German submarines that threatened to choke off the UK's lifeline. They were fighting against overwhelming odds to defend Malta. Fighting in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. But hey-ho that's history for you.:ugh: :ugh:

[Odigron]

Hangar,

You know what, you're right - I'm bloody annoyed with myself for getting drawn into this ridiculous non debate.

I'm not sure I see your logic on the history side - if we took that line to it's logical conclusion, we wouldn't have a Navy, Army or Air Force - I'm pretty sure that most could point out mistakes/errors made by all the services - does that mean they should all get the heave ho?

As for the Basra point - can't really comment. That said, we could all once again point out similar errors/failures to succeed amongst all 3 services.

All in all - Mr May has spouted some, in my view utter rubbish, and I am not convinced that your 2 points support the disband argument.

[Deepest Norfolk]

Probably turned down by the RAF before the Navy had him.

[Canadian Break]

Odi - I thought that I had explained the Basra issue?

[NutLoose]

Its not good becoming angry at him, or personal. May has a point of view.


1.Defence.History is on his side (one could argue), the RAF has got things spectacularly wrong in the past, much to the worse when one looks at the physical damage to our country meted out in the course of 1940,41,42 and even into mid 43 (in my home town). What on earth were the RAF doing in these years?


Well early on they were playing a catch up game having been underfunded and undermanned, and that is the world of politics.

[Odigron]

Canadian,

I can't see another post by you on this thread, so not quite sure I get what you're saying. I'm probably being very dull - please enlighten me.

[Melchett01]

It's not just over here in the UK that the lunatic fringe is out in force. The US has their own version of Lester May and he is called Robert Farley:

Robert Farley | Ground the U.S. Air Force | Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140574/robert-farley/ground-the-air-force)

The rebuttal was published a couple of months later:

Robert S. Spalding III | Disbanding the Air Force Would Be a Blunder | Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140636/robert-s-spalding-iii/off-target)

Of course, what May and Farley seem to misunderstand is that ownership of airpower does not automatically mean understanding and appropriate use of airpower. After all, on the basis of May's and Farley's logic, then when the RAF operated Motor Boats to rescue downed crews, then it automatically gave them a stake in terms of Naval power and we should have handed the aircraft carriers over to the RAF.

Would anybody in their right mind agree to that? Of course not, so why on earth would we take a service that operates in the air and works at the operational level and hand it over to a service that operates at the tactical level on the land? Why would we hand over such a set of capabilities to a Navy, that whilst a fine fine Service, uses airpower as a relatively minor component of its operations, often with the narrow focus of defending its ships.

Furthermore. both May and Farley in their criticism of specific occasions when air power has not worked, would do well to remember that in this current day and age there are more factors that dictate the conduct of operations other than the wish of the commanders on the ground. RoE, legal and political considerations, media coverage etc all go towards influencing the politicians, who as the decision makers, will set the parameters and authorise specific actions. The RAF could quite easily have turned Basrah into a car park in 2008, probably over night if we had really put our mind to it. I'm not sure what it would have achieved other satisfying May's notions on how to use air power. Neither would it have been approved, so criticism of the RAF for not 'launching the fleet' is aimed in the wrong direction, and if anything, should be directed to the 2-star commander on the ground at the time for not requesting or forcefully enough articulating the requirement for a new car park to the east of the COB.

We have a unique ethos and outlook to operations, under pinning an operational level doctrine and a speed of operations far in excess of anything the Army and RN operate at. Lester May should be reminded to be careful for what he wishes for. Absorption of the RAF into the RN and Army may well not realise all the benefits he assumes it will.

[Nervous SLF]

Please excuse a civilian posting but I wonder if that low rank R.N. chap has been reading up on the situation here in New Zealand?
A previous Government disbanded the small strike force of the N.Z Air Force and so far N.Z. has got away with it. I argued against
that stupid idea at the time and continue to do so, alas with no positive result. I know this will seem very childish ( I don't care ) but
I refuse to speak the name of the person responsible and I would have liked them to have been charged with treason. Of course they
have now managed to somehow got onto the U.N. gravy train.

Sorry to rant on however I have nothing but praise for the R.N. by the way and my late father was quite active in the R.N.during WW2

.

[Union Jack]

Bad form Mr May, a former Lt Cdr maybe, but an expert on airpower - clearly not, and a gentleman?

For the avoidance of doubt, I'm happy to advise that Lt Cdr May was not in fact a "stacker", but joined the Royal Navy as what BEagle would probably call a "scribbly", before subsequently becoming a reasonably senior commissioned "scribbly".

Whether or not he is a gentleman is, however, a somewhat curious conclusion to draw from his letter alone, and one that I therefore suggest that only his nearest and dearest could clarify.
Jack

[gr4techie]

Put him in an orange suit and send him to G'mo Bay for 12 years, for not clapping enthusiastically enough when the RAF marching band play the dam busters theme.

[BEagle]

....but joined the Royal Navy as what BEagle would probably call a "scribbly"....

Perhaps. Although I might be moved to use a rather less polite epithet :\ .

[Odigron]

Jack,
Do you know what, you're quite right, I don't know this man, I have only witnessed his obsessive rantings.

His incessant need to air, in very public fora, his ill-informed and extremely biased views about a former sister service led me to question his character - maybe I shouldn't have done that (my bad as the youngsters would say).

Thank you, sincerely, for pointing out the error in my post.

[TheGreatGunzo]

Speaking from the Dark Blue side, I can say that his interventions are most unhelpful to all. There are many battles to be fought. Picking fights with the RAF is not one of them.

[Fitter2]

I don't suppose he has read Jerry Pook's book (ISBN 184884556-1) about the little affair down South in '82, and the total incomprehension of how to use the air power available by the RN.

From his letter declining an invitation to lecture at Staff College Camberley:

'I cannot see how I can give a talk ... without being extremely rude to the RN. The overwhelming emotion which I have rediscovered is one of sheer cold anger at the incompetent and arrogant way in which the RN did their level best to foil our efforts to carry out effective air operations.'

[teeteringhead]

the RN did their level best to foil our efforts .... and don't get me started on the RN machinations which prevented 72 Sqn from going South in '82.......... :ugh:

[Lingo Dan]

Teeteringhead, Amen to that! I remember it well. Our big moment that never came!

[charliegolf]

.... and don't get me started on the RN machinations which prevented 72 Sqn from going South in '82..........

I seem to remember 33 Sqn getting all aerated about taking over in NI, and rushing about getting ready. I am Welsh, but Sennybridge- come on!

The man is simply bitter. Perhaps he visited a Harrier Sqn and got invited to see the Magnesium Rivet?

CG

[NutLoose]

And the man in his little Hughes 500 that came in to produce all the bags for them, Pumas too if i remember correctly, that and all the planning going on about doing the NI swop :)

[charliegolf]

Nut, I remember the bags being demo'd at 33. The boys who'd have had to fit them thought they were a nightmare on the pan at Odiham, never mind on a ship down south.

CG

[Blacksheep]

Why would anyone take any notice of a mere Lieutenant Commander (especailly an "Ex" one) - and a "Blunty" at that? The Times will be publishing his letters for the comedy effect. ;)

[Lonewolf_50]

Some years ago I met a Nimrod crew member, officer, nav not pilot, who ware a wonderful ball cap.

"UFO's are real, the RAF are an hallucination."

Perhaps LCDR May saw a similar ball cap and took it seriously.

[Fortissimo]

How about we stop wasting time and words on this man and simply invite the mods to close the thread?

[CoffmanStarter]

Thanks TW for the link ... I hadn't appreciated that this character is a repeat offender (in both senses of the word). At least a Google search now returns a PPRuNe reference alongside the tripe he keeps circulating which is something I suppose :ok:

Thanks also to TGG for his comments ... I'm sure you are not alone in what you say :D

PS. Fortissimo ... I think the thread should stand ... but it's now run it's course IMHO.

[Union Jack]

Why would anyone take any notice of a mere Lieutenant Commander (especaily an "Ex" one) - and a "Blunty" at that?

Now, now, Blacksheep! := Think of all the Squabbling Bleeders you have just upset, past or present, "sharp" or "blunt" .....:D

Jack

[goudie]

With regard to former senior officers writing to the editor. ISTR a former Air Commodore, from Sittingbourne I believe, appearing quite regularly on the 'Letters to the Editor' in the Telegraph. Quite entertaining some of them.

[Canadian Break]

Sorry mate - different thread in response to the same innane ramblings of HS. Here it is.
Hangarshuffle - perhaps you didn't see it the first time, or there again, maybe you did and chose to ignore it because it didn't chime with your view of reality! Exactly where were you sitting in the COB?

Hangarshuffle. I too was in the COB when the locals were throwing stuff at us (07/08) and there are many and varied reasons (and some that cannot be mentioned on here) that most of the time it was US aircraft that pitched in. What you perhaps do not know is that all aircraft were allocated to the JFAC at the Deid and tasked from Baghdad according to Coalition priorities. So, as the GR4 was more capable in some areas than the F16/F18 it therefore tasked accordingly - and this task was not burning holes in the sky above Basra at 20K to lob the occasional bomb at the local in his jinglie truck who may, or may not have been actually seen in the process of lighting the blue touch paper. There's a lot more to this than just having a cheap shot at the light blue - who were just as frustrated at what was happening as you apparently were. If the truth were known, you should be casting your ire at our erstewhile "brown" colleagues - who assured me at the time that they were the most "air minded" brigade in the British Army (if they were then God help the rest of them) and assigned the task of organising their air support to a passed-over Rifles major - who to my knowledge never attended the weekly "Air Apportionment VTC". Just saying like.........:=

[muttywhitedog]

Perhaps this retired fishead might like to enlighten us all via the Times as to how many of the RN's Boats have been successfully used in close support of Op HERRICK over the past 11 or so years?

Boats are ok when there's water for them to float on. Personally, I'd stick with the grey things that fly over water are a far faster speed than the floating targets.

[Willard Whyte]

I'd rather the British Military had numerous aircraft that could operate from both land and a suitable (large) floating platform, and weren't hampered by design compromises foisted upon them by insisting on STOVL capability.

There's nothing that says cat 'n trap a/c can't fly off concrete as well as a carrier.

[Odigron]

Canadian,

No worries; thought I was losing the plot.

Apportionment of assets - those in the know, understand this key air power issue. Those Brit mil not in the know just think that there should be RAF assets sat above them 24/7.

We could spend hours explaining this sort of issue to the likes of Mr May, but I suspect that the individual just wouldn't get it - he is, after all, a maritime expert and not an air power expert, but thankfully I suspect that he doesn't represent the views of many of his dark blue brothers and sisters.

[Lockstock]

Why would anyone take any notice of a mere Lieutenant Commander (especailly an "Ex" one) - and a "Blunty" at that

So true.. My dear old man would look at newspaper letters and golf club honours boards etc, with Major Smith and Lt Col Bloggs on them and ask, 'Why would anyone want to advertise the fact that they only ever made middle management..?'

[rockape2k7]

I rarely post on here, but Hangar Shuffle should hear the truth.


I was at the COB too in the time frame you suggest. In fact you can look to me for the answers to why your det was so uncomfortable. But before that I would like to add to your ill informed opinion and add clarity for other, more adjusted, readers and commentators on this thread.


Firstly, your view of the situation as you describe it was not the 'fault' of the RAF. For accuracy...


The RAF Regiment Wing at the COB at that time was a joint, multi national organisation working 'one up' to the UK Brigade and two up to the UK Divisional HQ in a joint manner. It comprised 580 Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force men and women from a variety of nations who defended the multinational COB with great bravery. That joint organisation suffered 4 fatalities and many serious injuries in it's attempt to keep you safe in your scratcher. It paid it's price to defend that little piece of Britain as did many others down town.


Secondly and furthermore:


Phalanx was delivered by Navy, Army and Air Force personnel as part of a joint unit, as part of the Force Protection Wing, and were enabled by great levels of pride, innovation and guile.


The 'counter battery' as you describe it was delivered by the Royal Artillery who for the large part of your det were part of the RAF Regiment Wing. And were proud to fight in that role. Chestnut troop were a fantastically 'joint' unit.


Your focus on the USAF-centric delivery of the 'Air Umbrella' is also inaccurate. The air cover the COB received, at the expense of others in distress, was provided by the coalition air component that apportioned air cover as appropriate. At times, we enjoyed US asset cover. At other times it was UK cover. It only depended on what was required where and in what role. Sometimes the RAF was best suited to the role we demanded. At others it was the US.


With respect, I suggest you desist from posting utter rubbish and dire tribe comment.


R2K7

[Canadian Break]

R2K7 - we must know each other I suspect! CB

[Rick777]

His wife probably had an affair with a pilot.

[just another jocky]

R2K7, thank you for setting things straight there.

In addition, I was a GR4 pilot on one of many dets out there. Our Sqn SOP was, after completing our tasking (we had little choice in that), on our way out of theatre and back to the 'deid, we overflew Basra so we would request some 'playtime' in the overhead to provide a presence. We were allowed to stay up to our max sortie length minus transit time back to the 'deid. So after say, 6 or 7 hours strapped into our seats, we offered ourselves up for another couple of hours overhead. We didn't have to do this, we weren't tasked with it, but we did it anyway, many many times so H-S, please attempt to find out a fuller picture of events before slagging off a lot of people who tried their best to provide what was needed. :=

As for the OP.....I guess the RN fellow is entitled to his opinion, however ill-informed and factually incorrect it is.

[FODPlod]

I have avoided joining the discussion in the hope of seeing some serious rebuttal or the removal of this thread like previous examples villifying Sharkey. Instead, this sort of thing is continuing to appear:

Not this bell end again.....

Don't engage in a battle of wits ..........
........ with an unarmed opponent!

Probably turned down by the RAF before the Navy had him.

His wife probably had an affair with a pilot.

It might be easier and more satisfying to produce personal insults, anti-naval invective and contrived arguments than to prove where Lt Cdr May has his facts wrong, or to produce a point-by-point rebuttal of his criticisms. However, it's far less likely to convince people he is wrong and sway opinion. To refresh memories:



Forces organisation

Sir, Neither Julian Brazier, in his article about Army Reserves (Jan 18), nor former US Secretary of Defence Gates, last week expressing concerns about Britain’s forces, mentioned land—based aircraft. Both make clear the Royal Navy is the UK’s strategic priority; CDS, and General Richards before him, expressed similar views. Forces’ websites are telling. Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Army pages highlight operational business. The RAF spotlights the Second World War, aircraft displays, sport, much less operations.

This RAF modesty is right. It has 220 combat jets, 650 support aircraft and 36,000 personnel yet, after withdrawal from Afghanistan this year, just four jets, a few other aircraft and 1,000 airmen will be overseas. The bulk of the £7 billion-a-year RAF will be home, facing no air threat, our islands safeguarded by Nato in Europe and an expanse of ocean, yet those 220 Typhoon and Tornado jets cost £20 billion.

Defence experts here, and across the Atlantic, argue that independent air forces are no longer necessary or affordable. Land-based combat jets have limited roles, flying mostly supporting operations on land and sea. Huge cost and manpower savings would follow transferring essential frontline land-based aircraft to Navy and Army control. The RAF owns 80 per cent of UK military aircraft assets — reorganisation is overdue.

LESTER MAY
(Lieutenant Commander RN (Ret’d)

Here are some sample rebuttals:

The writer forgets the AT and rotary fleets (AT as in Air Transport, not Adventure Training...

I'm not sure that highlighting the RAF's equivalent of the civilian-manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary does much to help its case. RFAs operate in war zones too and not just in logistic roles.

No land based fast jets?? Is he really serious??...

Your argument is contrived. His letter advocates transferring land-based aircraft to Navy and Army control, not abolishing them.

The RAF could quite easily have turned Basrah into a car park in 2008, probably overnight if we had really put our mind to it. I'm not sure what it would have achieved other satisfying May's notions on how to use air power...

Your argument is contrived. There is nothing in his letter about how to use air power or turning Basrah into a car park.

I am ex-dark blue like Lt Cdr May but I believe that land-based and carrier-borne air each have their place. I don't agree with the abolition of the RAF but its advocates will have to do much better to defend its corner than using contrived arguments or simply pouring scorn and personal insults on its critics.

[Odigron]

FOD,

You are right, I should have read his letter more carefully. My quick scan failed to identify the nuance that you kindly point out. I apologise for my contrived comment. I hate it when frustration gets the better of me.

Regarding the point in question - which I believe is May's view that there is no requirement for an independent Air Force in the UK - it is an extremely complex argument, but I will put some thought into a simple 'layman's explanation' of the requirement; this may take me some time, but I hope to come up with something which isn't contrived.

Odi

[Roland Pulfrew]

OK FOD
Let's start with:
Defence experts here, and across the Atlantic, argue that independent air forces are no longer necessary or affordable. Land-based combat jets have limited roles, flying mostly supporting operations on land and sea. Huge cost and manpower savings would follow transferring essential frontline land-based aircraft to Navy and Army control. The RAF owns 80 per cent of UK military aircraft assets — reorganisation is overdue.

Of course that would be "selected Defence experts"; of course it wouldn't be too hard to find Defence experts whose view would be that independent air forces are still a vital part of the triumvirate of air, land an sea power. You need experts in each field and with the best will in the world the green army will always be focused on infantry, and the dark blue on ships and subs.

Land based combat jets have as many roles as sea based combat jets. Land basing allows aircraft to be based closer to the action as regularly as sea based combat jets give you that capability. Let's face it, since 1991 we've had no real problem with basing combat air in land bases close to where the action is: Kuwait, Saudi, UAE and Afghanistan. Carrier based air power has provided a small element of the overall package. Both will probably require tankers and despite one small operation this is a role universally provided by the military. There is no air comparison for the RFA, they do a great job, but trying to compare them with the RAF's, indeed any nation's AAR and AT fleets is an irrelevance and I may add a slur on the support provided by AAR and AT fleets who also "operate in war zones and not just in the logistics role".

It is easy to state that there would be huge manpower and costs savings but there simply would not. There is absolutely NO evidence that you could make savings, apart from maybe CAS's pay! You still need to base all those aircraft at an airfield (and we haven't got many left), you still have to crew them, maintain them, provide the airfield support facilities, the management and tasking of the aircraft, the deployment on exercises, war-fighting, HADR ops, NEOs etc etc. all of this would still have to be done regardless of what coloured uniform was worn. Even the uniforms would still have to bought and paid for so whether you need 31000 light blue uniforms or 30999 additional green/dark blue uniforms there will be no saving.

Mr May makes some unsubstantiated assertions in his letter, he provides no substantial evidence for his assertions and as such they are purely (I'll informed?) opinion. I am afraid opinion is an irrelevance when it comes to capability, doctrine, planning etc. How's that as a starter for 10?

[newt]

If any force had to go then surely that has to be the FAA! Only a handful of fast jet pilots with no fast jets to fly. The move to UAV's will not require ships or carriers! They will be land based!

Clearly any force reduction should be the FAA!

The myth that only Navy pilots can land on ships is nonsense!:ugh::ugh::ugh:

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

newt; if the May fly is aiming at "divide and rule", please don't help him.

As a point of interest, idiocy isn't restricted to stacker two and a halfs . If I recall correctly, Lewis Page was a warfairy, corkhead one.

GBZ

Retired 2 1/2 "stacker" (not forgetting, "box kicker")

[Biggus]

FODPlod,

What did you expect? This is pprune after all. It's more like a crewroom, there's humour, banter, occasional slagging matches, and yes, some pearls of wisdom - but it's not a RUSI debating conference!!

As to countering Lt Cdr May's arguments, what arguments? The fact that he quotes the opinions of a couple of "experts". No doubt I could find somewhere on the internet the opinion of an "expert" that the moon is made of blue cheese - does that make my argument to that effect valid? Does Lt Cdr May quote any national armed forces that have gone done the route he suggests, and examine the subsequent results/benefits? Thought not....

As for the argument for an independent air force, a lot of it revolves around the question of whether or not you consider it a sufficiently sophisticated/complex role to require "specialists" at it, as opposed to people who merely do it as part of their career. While I'm not an expert on either the AAC or FAA, both seem very much sub-branches within their armed force. For example, Prince Harry is an officer in a conventional (Cavalry) regiment, who subsequently trained to fly helicopters, did 3 years on them, but has now returned to more mainstream career. This is, I believe, typical of officers within the AAC. In terms of the FAA, to the best of my knowledge while RN personnel get more flying related tours, these are still interspersed with more conventional sea time, the need to earn watch keeping certificates, etc. Ironically enough (again working on my limited knowledge) the RN seems to regard the submarine service as one which is sufficiently specialized that one can spend the majority of ones service time in submarines without other diversions.

Transferring air assets directly to the Army and RN would result in the creation of purely tactical air forces. The concept of keeping "your" air assets, over "your" ship/army battlegroup, etc, when there is no threat to them, but there are valid targets elsewhere in theatre, is usually the result. Air assets are wasted by tying them up this way - as indeed has been the whole point of pooling air assets as been the case in Iraq/Afghanistan, etc in recent years. The use of air power in a strategic role would almost inevitably cease (is it better to destroy 10 tanks on the battlefield or destroy the factory making them?)

Yes, I know its another quote from the Battle of Brittain, but it happens to be the perfect example. If fighter assets had directly belonged to the Army, they would all have been frittered away in the Battle of France, with nothing left to defend Britain subsequently. And no, we wouldn't have won the Battle of France if more fighter assets had been committed to it!

If your air assets are directly owned by the Army/Navy then decisions made on upgrading/replacing them are going to be almost certainly made by non air minded individuals, with potentially higher priorities than aircraft - for example if a CDS has to make a choice between keeping artillery or CAS aircraft, or a 1st Sea Lord has to decide between frigates and MPA?

Lt Cdr May's letter offers the potential promise of short term savings, but no other nation has elected to follow the path he has chosen, so there is little or no guarantee they will actually be forthcoming. By allocating air assets directly ot the Army and RN, you reduce UK airpower to a tactical level, risk it withering on the vine in the face of competition from assets the host service considers more important, and reduce the skills sets, expertise and experience that the UK currently has in the use and deployment of airpower.

The use of airpower is a highly complex specialization in its own right, which requires an independent air force if its full potential is to be exploited.


And I'm not a staff officer..........

[FODPlod]

Glad to see this elevation in the level of discussion.

...There is no air comparison for the RFA, they do a great job, but trying to compare them with the RAF's, indeed any nation's AAR and AT fleets is an irrelevance and I may add a slur on the support provided by AAR and AT fleets who also "operate in war zones and not just in the logistics role".

While I support the retention of RAF AT (despite my past treatment by the movers), I could easily regard your statement as a slur on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-fleet/royal-fleet-auxiliary) because they are comparable. RFAs carry troops and land them during combat operations; who do you think manned RFA SIR GALAHAD (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFA_Sir_Galahad_%281966%29), RFA SIR TRISTRAM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFA_Sir_Tristram_%28L3505%29), RFA SIR LANCELOT (http://www.historicalrfa.org/rfa-sir-lancelot-ships-details) and RFA SIR BEDIVERE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFA_Sir_Bedivere_%28L3004%29), the LSLs bombed during the Falklands conflict? RFAs also carry stores and equipment and conduct underway replenishment of stores and fuel in war zones. They are even doubling for our dwindling warships in an increasing number of roles.

...Mr May makes some unsubstantiated assertions in his letter, he provides no substantial evidence for his assertions and as such they are purely (I'll informed?) opinion...

Long letters to the DT or Times are either rejected or heavily edited to exclude all but the main points. I'd be curious to see the full version.

...Clearly any force reduction should be the FAA!...

I currently support the RAF's case for survival. Comments like yours won't encourage me to continue! :rolleyes:

[Roland Pulfrew]

FOD

While I support the retention of RAF AT (despite my past treatment by the movers), I could easily regard your statement as a slur on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary because they are comparable. RFAs carry troops and land them during combat operations; who do you think manned RFA SIR GALAHAD, RFA SIR TRISTRAM, RFA SIR LANCELOT and RFA SIR BEDIVERE, the LSLs bombed during the Falklands conflict? RFAs also carry stores and equipment and conduct underway replenishment of stores and fuel in war zones. They are even doubling for our dwindling warships in an increasing number of roles.

I feel for you with the movements thing, I guess most of us have been there.

Thank you for the history lesson on the RFA, I am very much aware of the ethos, service and history of the RFA. I obviously was not clear in my point regarding the AT & AAR force. My point being this is a military role, undertaken by militaries across the world. There is only one non-military AAR outfit and they don't do combat theatres. I am not sure what there is to be gained from comparing the AT/AAR force with the RFA, on either side of the house, but reading back, maybe I misinterpreted your post. Personally I've never really understood why the RFA aren't just part of the RN. As you point out, they do pretty much everything that the RN do.

[lj101]

If any force had to go then surely that has to be the FAA! Only a handful of fast jet pilots with no fast jets to fly. The move to UAV's will not require ships or carriers! They will be land based!Clearly any force reduction should be the FAA!The myth that only Navy pilots can land on ships is nonsense!


The FAA will have a core of approx 30-40 multirole, fourth generation, carrier strike experienced aircrew within the next few years. I would therefore suggest the FAA future is assured. Just the opinion of a serving member of the RAF (big picture wise).

[Finningley Boy]

"Letters appearing in one right leaning Broadsheet included a claim that the R.A.F. has had its day and that military flying should return to its roots in the other two services. Another blamed the existence of an independent air force for the loss of airpower elsewhere and suggested that losses in the Falklands were due to the existence of the R.A.F. because this meant no aircraft carriers were available to retake the Islands, clearly some people believe that the term carrier can only be applied to vessels above a certain size and equipped with a compliment of aircraft, also of a certain size and performance. I dare say this particular contributor never held the Harrier in quite as high a regard as the anti-R.A.F. lobby, who in light of recent events, have been driven to incandescent rage at the absence of the navy’s ski-jump carriers and Joint Force Harrier . Another letters page contributor blamed the R.A.F. for hoodwinking the politicians back in the sixties, by presenting their case for how they could operate around the globe using overseas bases, a scheme in which they presented the global map with alterations to suit themselves and convince the politicians of their importance. Also the strategic deterrence chestnut has been raised as the point at which the R.A.F. lost its entire reason for existence, when this role was transferred to the Royal Navy. All these contributors have a common trend, none seem willing to apportion any blame to successive governments who have continually failed to match operational commitments with operational strength. Of all the industrialised nations, only the United Kingdom appears to have ex-military people and other respected individuals publicly advising the government to dismiss the nation’s air force.
If the present roles and responsibilities of the R.A.F. are to be retained and that said functions should be maintained at a minimum level at which they would be of any effective use, then the suggestion of splitting the air force into elements of the other two services would not make any sense. The only justification which is put forward with any logic, in terms of economy, is that we could save money on uniforms. Or would we? Money would be spent on providing new uniforms for those hitherto in air force service, no great expenditure, but an expenditure just the same, the amount of money spent on new unit identities, new aircraft markings (the Navy and Army are bound to want to apply their respective branding irons to the aircraft they each inherit) and the cost alone of moving headquarters and ensuring that the nuances of Navy Law and Army Law are applied in place of Air Force Law, are unlikely to render any kind of advantage to the tax payer. Everything to do with service customs, however, petty and insignificant it may seem to the onlooker, right down to the correct manner in which to salute would need to be addressed. This minutiae of detail would have to be ironed out and would cause a long period of testing the moral of all those who will end up crewing the new extensions to the Fleet Air Arm and the Army Air Corps, or Royal Flying Corps, should the General Staff feel a retro-image may be called for here.

The argument that this is the right and rational thing to do, because of economic circumstances, is further supported on the grounds that air power has always been nothing more than a mere support function, that each role can be assigned according to the overriding and wider demands of maritime and land operations.
How this would be worked out is simple enough in some regards and far from obvious in others. Should the decision to dissolve the R.A.F. be taken, the obvious allocation of assets, infrastructure and roles would see the rotary wing element split in two, the Chinook heavy-lift helicopters would be snapped up by the army, therefore the Army Air Corps, the Merlin utility transport choppers would doubtless go to replace the Fleet Air Arm’s geriatric Sea King Commando Assault Force.

As for the raison detre, the reason for an independent air arm in the first place, the Fighter, Strike and Tactical Reconnaissance element, the Tornados and Typhoons would naturally pass to the FAA. All fixed wing training would most suitably become the 1st Sea Lord’s responsibility as well. The elements which are more puzzling to find a natural bidder for are the big planes. Strategic/Medium Transports, Tankers and Airborne Warning and Control all of these would pose something of an innovation to the other services. And today, these represent an inverse level of commitment for the air force, currently the R.A.F. is looking to take on 22 of the new Airbus A400M Atlas (Future Large Aircraft as it was known in the 1990s) this is the result of another European joint venture, elsewhere there is the Boeing C17 Globemaster III, Boeing E3D Warning and Control aircraft, the remaining C130Js and the yet to arrive R-C135 Rivet Joint. The latter of these are Boeing 707 converts which will replace those Nimrods which had to be prevented from standing down in accordance with SDSR planning to provide their much needed ELINT services for Cameron’s unexpected no fly zone over Libya, their gone now though. However, small and limited the R.A.F. has become, it is still going to present the other two services with a mammoth additional responsibility (and budget), outside their usual remit. We can be sure that the navy with such a grossly expanded air arm would be looking to divert resources yet again from within. So the Tornado or even the Typhoon would almost certainly be looked at as candidates for a capability gap until the F35s arrive, sometime in the distant future. They’d be frustrated by having such jets which couldn’t operate off carriers, not that they have carriers to deploy them on in the first place. The army, probably the least likely to find applications for aircraft would, just the same, find their share of the air force most useful for serving their own requirements. We can also be sure that on top of all their new found commitments, neither service would be keen to take on the very specific role of managing UK Air Defence (they would find it quite a distraction and a low priority on the outside of their core responsibilities), a particularly vital component part of the defence of the realm, might also find few willing takers not being particularly relevant to either the army or the navy, certainly not in its current elaborate form. The army may feel that missile defences, should we return to them, would suit them better, the air defence fighter element again would be best assigned to the navy, the most awkward element to find a home for though would be the early warning, control and reporting system, which is absolutely paramount and can’t be managed as a subordinate priority to policing the sea lanes and training the Afghan army and police."

I've included this page from my book Fading Eagle, published at the end of 2012 (never miss a chance for a shameful plug I always say!:ok:). It deals with the repeated calls for the R.A.F. to be split asunder and fed into the two more senior services and the likely outcome.:E

FB:)

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

I'm always grateful to the Luftwaffe for never being a truly independent Air Force. Had it been so, I might well have been writing my Posts in German.

[Evalu8ter]

FB,
A few counterpoints if I may. Whilst it is much easier for the RAF to be seen as the source of all evil (moving Australia for example...) there are more simple reasons why there was no CV available in 1982. Firstly, the 1966 Defence White Paper killed CVA-01. Why? The overarching need was to reduce costs and rebalance on a Central European NATO role as an inevitable consequence of withdrawal from empire. From Hansard, Healey described it thus:

"We shall keep our existing carrier force as long as possible into the 1970s, but we shall not order a new carrier. In the light of the military tasks we envisage, and of the operational return we can expect from its cost of £1,400 million over the next 10 years, we do not believe that we should be justified in keeping a carrier force indefinitely. A new carrier could not become operational until 1973, when the rest of our carriers would be in the last phase of their active life. But by the mid-1970s we should be able to re-provide the necessary elements of the carriers' capability more cheaply by other means."

"We plan to phase the carriers out by the mid-1970s and to provide the Navy with surface-to-surface weapons which are not now in the programme. After a careful study of the theatres in which our forces may be required to operate under threat, we are satisfied that it will be possible to provide protection for our Fleet and shipping in the 1970s from land bases with aircraft that we shall then have. I shall be glad to develop that in detail in the debate."

"Let me point out that many countries are now running down carriers and have no intention of building others. This is true, for example, of Australia, Holland and Canada. This is a problem which has been solved in many countries and which can be solved here"

It was all about money, context and about NATO commitments in Europe. With Euro AVG (Tornado...) not expected for another decade, the plan was to sell RFAs to the USN in exchange for a 'minimum' force of F111Ks - having already 'taken' the saving of scrapping TSR-2 in 1965.

The running costs of the RAF v FAA were also an issue-the costs (Healey in Hansard) were:

"In 1965–66, about £600 million for the Royal Air Force and about £110 million for the Fleet Air Arm. The R.A.F. has 81 major airfields and the F.A.A.8. The F.A.A. shares the use of 8 of the R.A.F. stations. Initial flying training and certain specialist air training are integrated and we are considering integration in other fields, including logistics and maintenance of common types of aircraft."

What the RN in private tacitly admit is that their Staff work was shoddy by comparison to the RAF. Put simply, the RAF made a much better case for spending Defence's diminishing buck than the RN did.

[The Helpful Stacker]

In 1965–66, about £600 million for the Royal Air Force and about £110 million for the Fleet Air Arm.

Did the FAA figure include a proportion of the cost of operating their ship-based airfields?

[Ken Scott]

I suspect the RAF's figure included a proportion of the cost of running its 'land based airfields'......

[The Helpful Stacker]

I suspect the RAF's figure included a proportion of the cost of running its 'land based airfields'......

I suspect the RAF figure included all the cost of running their airfields. If the cost of operating the carriers hadn't been taken into account in the FAA figures though then their figures (as high as they were) would still have been artificially lower.

[Ken Scott]

I should have put 'proportion' in inverted commas, I was just mirroring the words of the previous poster...

Personally I think that £600 million for the RAF & its 81 airfields compared extremely favourably with the FAA's £110 million for its 8, whether it includes the costs, full or partial, of a couple of carriers (Eagle & Ark Royal?) - & the FAA used 8 of the RAF's bases but I expect they didn't cost that in....

It also serves to highlight the effect of inflation......& how both services have been reduced over the intervening years.

[FODPlod]

Did the FAA figure include a proportion of the cost of operating their ship-based airfields? I suspect the RAF's figure included a proportion of the cost of running its 'land based airfields'...... I suspect the RAF figure included all the cost of running their airfields...

If neither of you knows for sure, I suspect you of mischief-making.

Personally I think that £600 million for the RAF & its 81 airfields compared extremely favourably with the FAA's £110 million for its 8, whether it includes the costs, full or partial, of a couple of carriers (Eagle & Ark Royal?) - & the FAA used 8 of the RAF's bases but I expect they didn't cost that in....

You have just reinforced my suspicion of mischief-making.

During the mid-1960s, the FAA was operating frontline fixed wing aircraft and/or helos around the globe variously from the strike carriers HMS VICTORIOUS, HMS EAGLE, HMS ARK ROYAL, HMS CENTAUR and HMS HERMES, the Commando carriers HMS BULWARK and HMS ALBION and the LPDs HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID. Helos were also embarked on 50 assorted County class GMDs, Rothesay class frigates, Tribal class frigates and Leander class frigates as well as a couple of dozen RFAs.

Regrettably, my support of the RAF's case for survival is rapidly beginning to wane. :bored:

[Evalu8ter]

FODplod,
An impressive list of aging ships; the issue is context. By the mid 60s we could not afford to recapitalise all of those assets AND maintain our more pressing commitment to the NATO central front. In a nutshell, the fiscal situation forced a decision - worldwide or Europe? Healey et al chose the latter. At a stroke, RAFG's squadrons became more important, though less flexible, than their FAA sisters and their expensive to replace and operate decks. The RN benefitted from the Resolution Class build and the increased emphasis on ReForGer protection (the Type 42s were ordered in 1968); Healey himself, if you read the texts, hints at what was to become the ASW biased Invincible Class.

These were strategic issues, at a difficult time. The RAF had lost TSR-2 and was on the verge of losing the deterrent. The transport fleet, likewise, was down sized to meet the new 'Europe First' agenda, and several UK sourced designs shelved. 'Out of Area' was largely off the agenda. Events such as Belize '72 were still in the future. As said before, the strategic argument was against the FAA with the notable exception of ASW rotorcraft (remember 60 ASW Sea Kings were ordered for the RN in 1966....) and the CHF role on NATOs northern flank. RN staff work wasn't up to the (admittedly very difficult) task and they lost the CVA-01 argument on, primarily, cost grounds....

[kintyred]

Depressingly much of this thread has been about "look how important I am". I joined the RAF to support the army. I knew that I couldn't do what an infantryman could do but I thought I might be able to assist him in his job with one Her Majesty's aeroplanes. As SH aircrew I did this for nearly 30 years and was usually able to bring something to the party through a detailed knowledge of my job. I would ask the ground commander what effect he wanted to achieve and then suggest how I could best help him attain his goal.
I can't see what difference it makes whether we have 3 separate services or a single entity provided we all pull in the same direction. I can think of a number of instances however, when this has not happened and I think that it has more to do with not communicating with each other than anything else.
I have always found cooperation between small operational units from different services to be of the highest order; you very quickly iron out the glitches when lives are at stake.
I think that the main problem comes high up in organisations that are too slow to adapt to changing circumstances. I freely admit that the RAF is a top heavy and ineffient organisation, but you won't solve that basic problem by distributing its assets among the other two services....they are just as bad.
I lament the huge expense of operating military aircraft...of all three services. The RAF doesn't have a monopoly on inefficiency though. I wish that more consideration was given to the poor taxpayer by the MoD as a whole. There is too much empire building going on and Lt Cdr Lester seems to be unable to let go of his particular empire.
If your boots are not on the ground, it's your job to support those whose boots are.

[Easy Street]

If your boots are not on the ground, it's your job to support those whose boots are

Exactly the view that brought about the need for an independent air force and very surprising to hear from one of its members. You wouldn't find anyone in the Navy off-message to that extent!

Since the vaunted Force Development scheme has evidently missed a trick here, I offer Dowding's letter to Churchill (http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-7.html)as the prime example of an occasion on which it certainly wasn't all about supporting the boots on the ground. More recently (and it annoys me how little impact this seems to have had on the debate) we conducted a successful military intervention in Libya in which our ground presence was practically nil. Air and maritime power 101.

If anything, I think the next SDSR will see further decline in the Army. Although the Commons Syria vote was not directly tied to a ground intervention, I see the political fallout of that result, combined with distaste for the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, pushing future ground interventions so far down the list of likely MoD activities that funding for the required forces is bound to be slashed.

[kintyred]

I think you you see things from too narrow a perspective, Easystreet.
Dowding recognised that our forces in France had been defeated and that there was no point in sacrificing more aircraft in a lost cause when those assets would be neede in the battle for these shores. The Battle of Britain ensured that the boots on the ground on this side of the channel did not have to face the ground forces of an invader. Turning to Libya, our government decided not to send our troops to support the indigenous forces opposing Gaddafi but our air power was most definitely supporting boots on the ground. The only occasion I can think of when air power was used in isolation was the imposition of the "no fly" zones in Iraq....and arguably that was to prevent ground forces being used for humanitarian protection of civilians. Even the use of drone strikes or cruise missile attacks is to prevent ground forces from having to intervene directly or at least reduce own casualties in any eventual action.

[Easy Street]

Kintyred - since we human beings tend to spend most of our lives on terra firma, one could say that all human activity in the air, on the sea or in space (be it military or economic) is supporting human activity on the ground. It's not a particularly productive line of thought when attempting to rationalise our specific national military requirements though - would you characterise the nuclear deterrent as "supporting boots on the ground" because it stopped the Army having to fight the Soviets, for example?

Your logic on the Battle of Britain is equally flawed. The RAF was not 'supporting' our troops by defeating the Luftwaffe; at that stage, it was preventing the troops from being needed at all by directly achieving a strategic goal (deter invasion). That's not 'supporting', it's 'obviating the need for'.

You characterise our air power's contribution in Libya as providing support to the anti-Gadaffi rebels. In doing so you forget that the campaign began to stave off the threat of genocide in Benghazi and elsewhere, and this was achieved predominantly through air power and while the rebels were still totally outclassed in military terms. The fact that the rebels then grew in strength and took advantage of our air and maritime campaign to overthrow Gadaffi doesn't change the fact that, from a NATO point of view, Libya was an air and sea campaign. People live on the ground; air and maritime power are ultimately about shaping events on the ground. Although not necessarily by directly supporting ground-based military operations.

[kintyred]

My main thrust was about the need for cooperation and not to focus on one's own organisation. However you cut it, the important message is that security can only ultimately be guaranteed by human intervention. Historically this has meant....and probably still means....good guys patrolling. Air power is clearly an important adjunct to this end and I don't think that the RAF does it any worse than any other organisation would.

[Lima Juliet]

Kintyred

The only occasion I can think of when air power was used in isolation was the imposition of the "no fly" zones in Iraq....and arguably that was to prevent ground forces being used for humanitarian protection of civilians.

How about, no fly zones over Bosnia well before we put boots on the ground? How about UK QRA that has kept our skies policed since 1945? How about Falklands Islands QRA which has gone up to meet every incursion by Argentine aircraft since 1982? How about the emergency airborne evacuation of British Nationals globally since 1945 - the most recent being last year? How about the very many airborne reconnaisance missions carried out during the Cold War?

All of these are 'Air Power' and without that capability, resting on a rifle butt or having cockers-p would offer nothing to support. The are things that 'air power' can do that the others can't, just like there are things that it can't do (like boarding a narcotics boat or sifting through a building for bad guys, as examples of sea and land strengths).

LJ :ok:

[Heathrow Harry]

what always depresses me about these debates is how all these letter writers ONLY back their own service - there is never any attempt to get a balanced view on defence

Of course the papers publish these diatribes - it's the easiest way to get people angry and ANGRY sells papers

[kintyred]

I'm certainly not trying to promote my own service. I have only a relatively vague idea of what most of it does....and same is true of my knowledge of the other services. The gist of this thread is how best to organise our assets and whether aircraft would better controlled by the Army and Navy. For the last time I will say that I really can't imagine it making any difference to the operational effectiveness.

Leon, thank you for all those examples of air power....you're clearly a more diligent student of post-war military air actions than I ever was! I'm sure there are many infantrymen who are very grateful that those actions took place!!!

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Heathrow Harry. I know that there aren't enough hours in the day to read all of this stuff but you may have missed my support for the Air Force from the dark blue side. I have no illusions of how air power would be applied if it became just another weapon in the ship. Similarly, I've every confidence that the Army would use air assets well at the tactical level and would be glad of extra long range artillery.

[turtle12]

As a former Fishead, whose father served in the RAF during WW2, I think that I can give you at least 3 good reasons for the Navy to suspect the RAF's good intentions.

1. During the period between the wars when the RAF had complete responsibility for the FAA, the requirements for naval aviation were completely ignored, leaving FAA without any modern front line aircraft in 1939 and requiring a panic buy of Martlets from the USA.

2. In the run up to the Healey defence review, the RAF successfully lobbied certain gullible politicians to cancel the construction of new carriers as East of Suez aviation requirements could be covered by the RAF flying FB-111s from island bases in the Indian Ocean. This involved moving one of said islands some 200 miles to meet the endurance capabilities of the FB-111. The Navy did not notice this underhand subterfuge until too late. In the end the Navy lost its carriers and the RAF did not acquire the FB-111s. We both lost out and both should have learned a lesson on that occasion.

3. The 2010 SDSR gave the RAF an opportunity to get rid of FAA fast jet capability which they seized with both hands, with the recommendation to disband the Joint Harrrier Force. This left the FAA with a ten year gap in operational fast jet flying with the exception of the occasional exchange appointment with the USN or FN.

There appears to be a philosophical discussion in US military circles at the moment of requiring all future strike aircraft to be CATOBAR capable. This could be a wise approach for the RN / RAF. Both services would be pushing and working together in the same direction and would both get the same fifth generation strile aircraft, able to operate from fixed and mobile bases.

[Ken Scott]

The gist of this thread is how best to organise our assets and whether aircraft would better controlled by the Army and Navy. For the last time I will say that I really can't imagine it making any difference to the operational effectiveness.


I fundamentally disagree. The reason an independent air force was created in the first place was because the army could not see beyond the tactical battlefield area and the Navy beyond support of its maritime assets. Both services did well with their assets in those areas but the RAF was intended to bridge the missing parts such as air defence of the UK. Dividing the RAF's assets back between the other 2 services again would put us back into that narrow parochial outlook and the parts that did not fit would wither and there would be a loss of 'operational effectiveness' to the UK as a whole.

[turtle12]

WHENURHAPPY

You mention AT as in Air Transport. The feedback that I have had from both RN and Army customers is that the passenger service bit of AT is run by its personnel for the benefit of its personnel, with a service level which makes Ryanair look like a luxury airline.

[Odigron]

Turtle, I've had good, bad and indifferent experiences on AT. I take it that you've not tried the service yourself? Why did you only discuss the problem with RN and army customers of the service? Which particular bit of the service is it that is generating the issue do you feel?

[seadrills]

I was a all ready to jump down the throat of Lt Cdr May but I thought I would test his theory.

I opened 3 web pages in separate Tabs next to each other.

In Tab 1 - Royal Navy - Pages regarding PROTECTING OUR NATIONS INTEREST, Links to operations, where present units are deployed to, Future ships and roles.

In Tab 2 - The Army = Pages regarding SECURING BRITAIN IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD. Links to current units and their operational roles. Links to the Parachute regiment and video of an Apache conducting confined area landings.

In Tab 3 - The Royal Air Force - AGILE ADAPTABLE AND CAPABLE (What for it does not say) - Links to an RAF Display team, A world war 2 operation, a BOB war bunker and a cycle race.

Its not Lt Cdr May we should be remonstrating with but who ever the people compiling our silly web site are.

[Odigron]

Sea,

Could you post the links to the tabs? Cheers

[seadrills]

I'm surprised that I need to direct people to these sites but if anyone is not sure on where to go then here they are ~~~~~~


The Royal Navy is Britain's Maritime Armed Force | Royal Navy (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk)


RAF - RAF Homepage (http://www.raf.mod.uk)


Homepage - British Army Website (http://www.army.mod.uk)

[Odigron]

I too am surprised, they are all very similar. I was expecting a huge difference.

[TheWizard]

seadrills

You conveniently forgot the link to

"Latest News Updates -including Operational News"
plus the scrolling news items at the top of the page.

"A World War 2 operation"- Operation Overlord ring any bells? Fairly significant this year

"cycle race" - that is just a picture which links to the RAF Sports Board website which covers just about every aspect of RAF related sports and AT but of course you would have clicked on that to find out wouldn't you?

The differences between the three are mainly down to the manpower and budget behind them. One is approx 3x bigger than the one of the others on both counts.

[seadrills]

I agree .... But have to say that if we compare Navy news to RAF news and we compare the RN website to the RAF website then it is clear that our contribution falls well short of professional media.... It stinks of amateurish journalism ..... Why?

[Onceapilot]

High spirits, while I agree that much criticism of RAF AT has been misplaced, I disagree about the background issues. Disregarding all the pathetic gripes, the important factor of servicability and its important knock-on effects to the reliability of the service was largely an own goal, scored from neglect by the Air Staff. The airframes themselves were largely blameless. However, despite heroic efforts by the servicing engineers, long term policies of spares holding reductions and engineering trade personel cut-backs, inversely reflected the needs of ageing airframes. The older platforms deserved much greater investment in their servicability than they got from the MOD budget. There are other factors that I will not touch on. However, a basic fact is, that AT was a neglected backwater as far as Air Chief Marshals were concerned until 2001. Politics then took over. One fallout is the £1,500,000 per day contract for the replacement of TriStar, a fleet that with better top level support and some minor (and cheap) expansion in the late 1990's, could have been providing good cost effective service for another decade at least. What is that saying? "penny-wise, pound-foolish"!:sad:

OAP

[Archimedes]

I agree .... But have to say that if we compare Navy news to RAF news and we compare the RN website to the RAF website then it is clear that our contribution falls well short of professional media.... It stinks of amateurish journalism ..... Why?

And you know the best thing? Lester May pops up (usually in the Have Your Say bits below stories) from time to time and claims that RAF News is a glossy weekly, tightly written by a huge staff (who could, of course, be on ops were they not in the RAF's propaganda team) dedicated to pumping out carefully-tailored stories to fool the readership into how brilliant the RAF is, compared to Navy News, which is put together in a few spare moments by a CPO Writer and his cat on an irregular basis, giving a remorselessly honest account of the RN which is ignored in the face of the style over substance stories of RAF News, which means that the RN is always being done down by the RAF and, and....

...and I have always assumed that he's never read, or, indeed, seen a copy of RAF News.

(Or the Templer Committee Report, which blows about 90% of his argument out of the water, but that's another story)

[seadrills]

It seems that it gets worse.... Please tell me that the Labour Party are joking....

http://thedailybale.wordpress.com/2014/01/26/labour-party-announce-plans-to-scrap-the-raf/

[Courtney Mil]

Ah, from the same site that has uncovered this...

In a new piece of legislation drawn up by Ed balls who hopes to replace George osborne in 2015, he has suggested that dog owners should be made to pay £50 a month directly to the labour government.

Really?

[TheWizard]

Please tell me you didn't believe any of that drivel? The article, not the show (although...)
BBC iPlayer - The Andrew Marr Show: 26/01/2014 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b03t7tkk/The_Andrew_Marr_Show_26_01_2014/)

[Archimedes]

And the transcript can be found here - Balls and Hague had about 3 minutes sparring right at the end, and were too busy talking about the proposed 50p tax rate and HS2 to get onto defence.

Transcript of Balls interview (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/2601141.pdf)

Of course, it may be part of a plot to see if Sharkey will mention it on his blog in the same way the spoof 'RAF seeks to take over Parachute Regiment' story made an appearance...

[Willard Whyte]

Ah, from the same site that has uncovered this...


In a new piece of legislation drawn up by Ed balls who hopes to replace George osborne in 2015, he has suggested that dog owners should be made to pay £50 a month directly to the labour government.
Really?

A vote winner. Cats are better than dogs since they don't blindly follow instruction. Or kill children.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

This involved moving one of said islands some 200 miles to meet the endurance capabilities of the FB-111.

Remind me, was that Diego Garcia, Gan, or Aldabra? Aldabra was, I believe from my OASC interviewer, paid for but not yet built.

[Archimedes]

Yes, supposedly Aldabra.

There is some evidence that the 'move' was a genuine error, brought to the attention of the recipients of the paper which contained it by the Air Ministry (via the late Sir Michael Quinlan, who apparently never failed to be irritated by accusations that this was a deliberate ploy[he was in the Air Ministry at the time]) while other evidence suggests that even had the island been moved, the map/chart also showed the actual distances between the island and various locations, and the stated distances were correct.

There are other factors, but the idea that moving an island was a major reason that the CVA01 was cancelled is a complete and utter myth, even if there are plenty who fondly believe it.

[Whenurhappy]

Turtle,

Have you asked the many thousands (yes, thousands) of personnel who have been CASEVACd and Then MEDEVACd back to the UK? I'll think you'll find that their 'passenger experience' was pretty good, given the circumstances.

Oh, and whilst you are about it, ask the grieving relatives of those personnel, from the three services, whose remains are repatriated back to Brize Norton, and previously, RAF Lynham. You clearly have no idea the efforts exerted by the three services (and principally the RAF) to make sure in both situations that the 'customer' comes first.

What is your recent experience of RAF air transport, by the way?

[Evalu8ter]

Moving the Island is a convenient myth for the RN to hide behind hard facts; there was a financial crisis, a fundamental rebalancing of priority towards NATO 'in area' roles (due to decolonisation and the cost of re-equipping BAOR/RAFG)and, as stated before, they were 'Out-Staffed' by the Army and RAF. The acquisition and running costs were outlined by Healey and deemed unaffordable given the analysis of threats & need that had been conducted. This is where the RN lost the argument. It is not 'lobbying gullible politicians' it is getting your Staff work right....

Turtle, without wishing to reawaken WEBF et al, the SDSR 10 decision re FJ fleets has been well discussed. In short, Harrier could not carry Storm Shadow at the time (which proved quite useful over Libya....) and had a too small a fleet to cover concurrent operations - I don't doubt that some elements of the RAF (probably non-Harrier...) saw hitting the FAA as collateral damage - but this was not the fundamental reason. Also, the RN conceded to deleting Ark early (:() to help keep QEC/F35 alive - short term savings had to be found.

Another reason the FAA had few modern types was 'Gunclub Myopia' on the part of the Admiralty which saw aircraft firstly as recce/observation/gunnery platforms (such as the Fulmar) and torpedo bombers (the delightful Swordfish....). Little credence was given to defending the fleet against aircraft as the battlewagons all had lots of guns. Not until Taranto. Pearl Harbour and the loss of PoW/Repulse did RN brass reluctantly admit the shift in emphasis.

RAF AT has been under-invested in for several years as Typhoon/F35 has bled the budget. Can you be sure that the Army would not do the same? Or the RN? 10 new DAS equipped AT aircraft or 3 DD/FFs - what do you think the RN would chose? AT aircraft that can be committed to a threat environment are not cheap.

[Not_a_boffin]

RAF AT has been under-invested in for several years as Typhoon/F35 has bled the budget.

As we've only bought 4(?) wonder cabs to date, but in the last ten years or so acquired 8 C17 and have contracted for 22 A400M, plus the FSTA gift that keeps on giving (at £12Bn), that statement is a bit of a stretch.

[Think Defence]

NaB, we may have only bought 4 wonder cabs to date but we have also written a £2 billion (ish) cheque for Tier 1 partner status

[turtle12]

Odigron

I have had the pleasure of flying RAF, starting with a flight Malta - London in a York in December 1954. The rear passenger door came off in flight and we made an unscheduled stop in I think Hyeres. This was not all bad as we were put up in the French mess and had the benefit of their cuisine for 24 hours and wine with our meals.

My wife and children also flew AT on both duty and space available trips during the 1960s with no problems.

My comments are based on feed back from some of my contemporaries children and even grandchildren who have been recent AT customers.. They do not complain about the aircraft, but about the service level and the attitude of the personnel who give the impression that they are only there to do one a favour.

[Onceapilot]

The only AT strategic casevac/pax aircraft with a true duty of care hostile enviroment capability is about to be scrapped.
I could be wrong. Are the standards of "duty of care for pax" to be reduced?:uhoh:

OAP

[turtle12]

Evalu8tor

The message that I would like to get across is that their 'Lordships' and 'Airships' would do much for the future of their respective services if they got together with a joint plan to support the national defence strategy. The RN and RAF have overlapping requirements where the 'good enough' should be the rule.

Having said that, I believe that to quote Woody Allen, the motto for both services should be "just because I am paranoid, it does not mean that the bastards are not out to get me!"

[Not_a_boffin]

Indeed TD, but that cheque spread over how many years budget?

Hardly bled the AT budget (for the requirement) dry, which was the premise.

[Lonewolf_50]

Just to stir the pot a bit, from a semi-objecive point of view.

Your total military force is small enough that you may be able to save money by reverting to two, Maritime and Land, each of whom have an air capability, with the strategic air function being bickered between the two of them.

Cut out the fat of a third serivce's overhead, and you may accrue a better tooth to tail ratio, in terms of how much in operational capability and training (which is what keeps your force ready to operate) each pound spent in defence gets you.

Before WW II, our nation had a modestly sized defense institution in size and shape, though for sure the Navy had more when it came to the operating forces due to already being all over the globe. We had a secretary of War (Army) and a Secretary of the Navy (war and other than war, which had to be robust due to being a maritime nation).

When we grew into a global power during and after WW II, the successful argument about span and control in re the Air Force becoming established was a reasonably made argument. We are still pretty big.

Up to the North of us, our Canadian brothers in arms went for the whole "Canadian Forces" model in an attempt to achieve a variety of aims, one of which I believe as better requirements process and leaner structure.
(My Canadian friends had mixed opinions on that, how do you all feel that it worked out?)

Maybe the United Kingdom ought to consider that approach in an effort to get more bang for the buck.

LCDR May could easily be wrong about a lot of stuff, but the points on roles and missions never seem to stop getting argued on this side of the pond either. :p

[FODPlod]

NaB, we may have only bought 4 wonder cabs to date but we have also written a £2 billion (ish) cheque for Tier 1 partner status.Indeed TD, but that cheque spread over how many years budget? Hardly bled the AT budget (for the requirement) dry, which was the premise.

And the UK's investment as sole Tier 1 partner means it will reap the benefits of producing around 20% of every F-35 sold worldwide (link (http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/global-partnerships/f-35-uk.html)).

[Think Defence]

Fair point NaB

Anyway, just to stir the pot the other way

We always seem to hear about the arguments for the RN and Army to absorb the RAF but never the other way around

I get all the arguments about complimentary capabilities and approaches but if you were really thinking about cost saving the only way is to ruthlessly eliminate duplication, the same for the armed forces or Tesco, the principles are the same.

So, is there an argument to fold the AAC and FAA into the RAF?

I have an open mind but it does get tiring hearing the 'abolish the RAF/USAF' arguments without any equally extreme counter

[Vortex_Generator]

Does the same discussion/argument go on in other countries with independent air forces, particularly those with smaller defence budgets than ours? Just wondering.

[Not_a_boffin]

Anyway, just to stir the pot the other way

We always seem to hear about the arguments for the RN and Army to absorb the RAF but never the other way around

I get all the arguments about complimentary capabilities and approaches but if you were really thinking about cost saving the only way is to ruthlessly eliminate duplication, the same for the armed forces or Tesco, the principles are the same.

So, is there an argument to fold the AAC and FAA into the RAF?

I have an open mind but it does get tiring hearing the 'abolish the RAF/USAF' arguments without any equally extreme counter

Without wishing to sustain an "abolish the RAF discussion", (which btw I'm not supporting) there are a number of points that bear examination.

Firstly - the purpose of abolishing a service would be to recognise real economies, primarily by reducing "overheads". Folding FAA or AAC into the RAF would certainly reduce some of that overhead, but you would still be left with three different services, each with their own personnel management, engineering management, logistics management and operational organisations, which need to be sustainable in career terms - what is often called "soft manning" issues.

Going the other way (RAF into FAA and AAC) would at least remove some of that duplication, although probably not as extensively as some would contend. However, it is far from clear where the AT and ISTAR assets would sit. AT could sit with the Pongos, but not particularly comfortably, particularly for "strategic" lift, funnily enough, one reason that the Points live with DTMA and not the Navy/RFA. ISTAR could sit with either, but you could easily see fault lines developing as to priorities between ground surveillance and air surveillance (you can guess which service would be most interested in which).

So, on that basis with current and previous UK force structure, it doesn't necessarily look like a sensible idea to bin the RAF. Having said that, the rationale for a separate "air" service is often couched in terms of "air-mindedness" and "strategic effect", at least one (if not both) of which one might argue the RAF is now ill-equipped to deliver. Not that the Navy or Army are any better equipped to do this btw, just that the RAF contention that only they can prioritise air missions is becoming a little hollow given the lack of platforms / systems with truly strategic reach. The argument is often that the Navy or Army would only care about air cover to meet their own local missions and there is some truth in that, although I suspect perhaps less so now and in the future - certainly on the RN side with Carrier Strike.

However, what if the model was not the current RN/FAA, but an organisation more like US Naval Aviation? They cannot be accused of lacking air-mindedness (at least not by the unbiased) although like the RAF they have seen many of their "strategic" capabilities wither under budgetary pressure. In terms of capability, there is now little to differentiate them from the RAF, other than to note that the USN (understandably) can deploy its tactical jets ashore and afloat. That and the significant difference in budget!

Not a suggestion nor indeed a recommendation, merely a note that the "airmindedness" and "strategic effect" arguments may be less persuasive in future.

[M609]

Does the same discussion/argument go on in other countries with independent air forces, particularly those with smaller defence budgets than ours? Just wondering.

Norway, much smaller budget, and all air roles with the RNoAF: No

[Finningley Boy]

Quote:
In a new piece of legislation drawn up by Ed balls who hopes to replace George osborne in 2015, he has suggested that dog owners should be made to pay £50 a month directly to the labour government.



Or... From 50p in the pound to..... £50, or it's off the pound! ...eh!!

Ok, I'll go back to reading my comic.

FB

[The Helpful Stacker]

Have you asked the many thousands (yes, thousands) of personnel who have been CASEVACd and Then MEDEVACd back to the UK? I'll think you'll find that their 'passenger experience' was pretty good, given the circumstances.

I've never heard a complaint from any of the patients I've brought back, even when they discover that the nurse bringing them back after many months away from civilisation is a hairy arsed bloke rather than one of my pretty female colleagues.

[alfred_the_great]

I would like to say I've had cracking service from RAF AT; I have never had to fly into an area that required a DAS system though, which may change things.

[Onceapilot]

Quote ATG "I would like to say I've had cracking service from RAF AT; I have never had to fly into an area that required a DAS system though, which may change things."
Alfred, it might. Especially after the TriStar is scrapped, and someone is firing at YOU!

OAP

[alfred_the_great]

OAP - I tend to take a ship to war, AT is just for commuting to an office.

[CoffmanStarter]

Good to see a couple of 'pro" responses in yesterdays Times to Lester May's original letter :ok:



Sir, As a former Royal Naval officer
it is hardly surprising that Lester
May favours his old service over the
RAF but his wish to see its assets
split between the other two services
would not result in the “huge cost ’
and manpower savings” to which he
refers. The aircraft would still
require the personnel to operate and
maintain them, the airfields with
their supporting staff would still be
needed to house them, no matter
what colour of uniform they wore.
Administration and headquarters
would still be needed to run the
organisation, unless Mr May
believes that there is excess capacity
currently within the Army and the
Navy to carry out these functions?
While he is correct that for a
maritime nation the Royal Navy is
of critical importance and has been
badly treated in recent defence cuts,
he should not forget that the RAF is
much more than just a few combat
jets. He makes no mention of its air
transport, helicopter support, air-to-
air refuelling, intelligence gathering
assets or remotely piloted aircraft.
Each of the three services
performs an essential role in
safeguarding this country and its
interests. Abolishing the RAF would
neither make us safer nor save the
money that Mr Lester says it would.

PHIL MOBBS
West Hanney, Oxon




Sir, Lester May is right that the
balance of effort in the UK needs
correction (letter, Jan 23), but wrong
to advocate disbanding the RAF.
Now is not the time to waste angst
and management effort on such
argument, but our US colleagues,’
and others, are right when they
express concern at the shrinkage of
the Royal Navy. Once withdrawal -
from Afghanistan is complete it will
be upon the Royal Navy that the
support for security, diplomacy and
trade will depend; the UK should not
be found wanting. In Future Force
2020, with only one operational
aircraft carrier and 19 escorts, there
will be insufficient resource to fulfil
such roles. It is here where the
Army and RAF are relatively
impotent and must be scaled
accordingly. The Prime Minister is
disingenuous to suggest that all is
well in defence — it blatantly is not.

CHRIS PALMER .
Commodore RN
Havant, Hants


MOD Future Force 2020 Summary (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf)

And in the interest of balance ...



Sir, As Mr May suggests, there are
questions about the appropriateness
of maintaining independent air
forces on both sides of the Atlantic.
My research on nearly a century’s
experience suggests that independent
air forces create two big problems.
First, they erect bureaucratic walls
between missions, such that soldiers
in need of air support often can’t get
the help they need. To remedy this
the US Army and Marine Corps
created their own air forces.
Second, independent air forces
create lobbying organisations for
parochial approaches to warfighting
and procurement, approaches that
do not necessarily contribute to the
pursuit of national security. The
USAF, for example, has consistently
advocated for air power-centric
escalation of diplomatic disputes,
and has often argued for the
procurement of sophisticated—but-
mission-challenged fighter and
bombers and for the retirement of
much-beloved attack aircraft, such
as the A-10 Warthog. '
‘I believe that it would be
beneficial for the UK and the US
alike to reconsider the organisation
of their military air power.

DR ROBERT M. FARLEY
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce,
University of Kentucky

[Archimedes]

You do worry about Dr Farley's research, though: it seems that he thinks that the USMC only got into aviation because the USAF were letting them down...

[The Helpful Stacker]

Dr Farley seems to be predominately a Naval theorist.

Robert M (http://www.uky.edu/~rmfarl2/Farleycv.htm)

[Evalu8ter]

"You do worry about Dr Farley's research, though: it seems that he thinks that the USMC only got into aviation because the USAF were letting them down..."

The main reason they proclaim to need to retain it was the USN 'abandoning' them at Guadalcanal....

[Ken Scott]

For a university professor Dr Farley's research seems flawed to me. Is he really suggesting that only independent Air Forces 'create lobbying organisations who argue for parochial approaches to war fighting & procurement'?

Does he not consider Mr May, his blog & multiple letters to newspapers a parochial lobbying organisation?

[HTB]

You can probably discount Dr Farley’s views completely, based solely onhis assertion that USMC and US Army aviation were created to overcome shortcomingsin USAF air support. The timeline tells a different story:

The USMC air component was in being as early as 1917;

The US Army Air Corps was formed on 20 June 1941;

The USAF came into being on 18 Sep 1947.

How much of the rest of his letter is guff, based on his narrow opinion?

Mister B

[Haraka]

To clarify:
The U.S. Army Air Corps was born out of the Air Service on 2 July 1926.
The U.S. Army Air Forces were formed on 21 June 1941.

[HTB]

Thanks Haraka

Never trust that font of all misinformation - wicked pedo - but it was a quick and dirty bit of research (which is more that the good doctor seems to have done).

It does seem to support, even more robustly, my (now exposed as erroneous) timeline regarding the sequence of creation of the individual air arms. So still blows his argument out of the water.

Mister B:ok:

[Haraka]

As you said HTB , the note expanding the lineage of the USAF further supports your argument.
Haraka Snr , back in the 70's warned me of political rumblings behind the scenes even then in which a less than 40k strong Service could be used as the tipping point to "end the experiment".
That awful word "jointery" which came in to vogue in the 90's seemed to me be a smokescreen for the continued evolution of the merging process.
A single service based upon an Air Force with Naval and Army support elements is nonsensical.
So where else does an extrapolation of the "jointery" process ultimately look like heading?

[Guest_22]

I'm sorry but I do not subscribe to The Times online so can't provide a direct copy of today's letter and I'm surprised there is no comment already. I paraphrase from what I can remember:

"The RAF is a self-licking lollipop perpetuating the myth of air power and is responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocents."

[Lyneham Lad]

I'm sorry but I do not subscribe to The Times online so can't provide a direct copy of today's letter and I'm surprised there is no comment already.

Reproduced below:-


Unified command, the pivot of successful military action, is an enduring principle of war fighting despite technological progress
Sir, Jeremy Larken’s lucid letter (Feb 3) highlighting the myth perpetuated by the RAF and fellow air power enthusiasts that “air power is indivisible” is long overdue. I go further; the very term “air power” is a flawed concept which has led to the inefficient and ineffective use and misuse of air borne military capability. The sheer complexity of warfare in the technological age necessitates the “indivisibility of command”. Admiral Larken implies this a priority. Unified command, the pivot of successful military action, is an enduring principle of war fighting despite the chimera of technological progress over the centuries. Indeed the expensive, cumbersome and artificial 20th century organisational anomaly, namely the RAF has been the root cause of the unnecessary loss of life, prolongation of military conflict and utter waste of precious resources. It is now bolstered by a massive industrial lobby contributing to the ultimate “self licking lollipop”.
We can no longer afford to be hobbled by this dysfunctional, expensive and ineffective use of scarce resources. The myth of the indivisibility of air power has to be extinguished along with its its alter ego; the RAF itself.
Paul Fisher
Durban-Corbieres, France

[Lonewolf_50]

In support of Mr Fisher:

Giulio Douhet's bombers will always get through ... but he's dead, he was wrong, and it took WW II to illustrate very clearly that the bomber does NOT always get through, be it the Luftwaffe's bomber, the RAF's bomber, or the USAF's bomber.

I've read a number of the interwar years' Air Power advocacy books: Sversky, Mitchell, Dhouhet, others. For their time and place, and the level of tech available at the time, they were certainly worth having in the open battle of ideas.

What was a bit scary in the 90's was to hear people like Col Worden and General McPeak attempt to keep those less than prophetic tomes alive despite lessons learned. (The Five Rings of Air Power model was particularly inane). At around the same time, in an article to the US Naval Institute's Proceedings, McPeak had the gall to state: Sea power is a subset of air power. This from a man who had JPME, and interacted at the professional level with multi service environments for years. He is also the guy who spun "virtual presence" as a military virtue.
McPeak was Chief of Staff of the USAF.
The general sentiment among my USAF bubbas on General McPeak was "Huh? How did he get the nod when so many better men were available?"
Not all men in that position are as clueless, but it is unnerving to consider how someone so lost ends up in such a position of influence. :eek:

My point?
Sometimes, the leadership of the air service does as much harm to the service's aims as good, be it USAF or RAF. It appears that our OP referenced retired RN LtCdr is as much commenting on how the leadership of RAF is presenting the service as anything else.

[gijoe]

But what really matters is...

Was that an RAF tie that Charles was wearing when he visited the flood plains?

See today's letter by retd Spanner in the Torygraph for further.

If it was then it probably came from Burtons or Next.

G:ok:

[Ken Scott]

Mr Fisher would seem to be pushing the 'indivisibility of command' which I would read as a single command unifying all three services so going one step further than Mr May. Only question is then which service would take pre-eminence : Army or Navy?

It's still difficult to see how this would save on scarce resources, as written above if you amalgamate services you just end up issuing new uniforms to existing people, unless you do away with entire forces. So what does he see going as there's not a lot left anyway - all Tornados & Typhoons? (Leaving us with just expected F35 for strike & AD in the UK & FI?) AAR? AT? (Put it all out to charter, but then what about SF & Tac AT?) etc, etc. The 'self licking lollipop' comment implies that he believes all the RAF's functions could be dispensed with.

Mr Fisher uses a great many big & impressive sounding words but in the end this is just obfuscation and he doesn't actually propose anything apart from just getting rid of the RAF with no clear indication as to what should take its place.

[engineer(retard)]

I would say that Mr Fishers letter is a fine example of RN staff work and should be applauded for conveying a clear point with substantiated evidence :}

[HTB]

gijoe

If you really, really want to know...

it's the Royal Dragoon Guards, of which Prince Charles is Colonel in Chief.

Mister B:cool:

[Archimedes]

That was my thought, eng(r): exactly the sort of naval staff work which brought about the decision over our future carriers.

In 1966...


By the by, I've been able to take a quick squint at a bit of Dr Farley's book (about 1½ chapters) upon which his Foreign Affairs article and his letter are clearly based.

In the spirt of brevity, my review of these chapters would go something like this:

Comprehension of key military concepts and theories: :uhoh:
Comprehension of air power matters: :eek:
Comprehension of some of the nuances of the history of the RAF and USAF: :ooh:
Carefully balanced analysis: :rolleyes:

Overall assessment: :\

[Haraka]

A couple of historical points:
The Luftwaffe was never envisaged as an independent separate Strategic Air Arm , being instead designed primarily for the tactical support of a rapidly advancing Army.
It was not based upon Douhet's principles and should not be considered as such ,having being forced into this rõle over the U.K. in 1940.

The concept of an independent Air Force as a strategic arm as touted by Douhet was not actually formally realized by the USA until the post WW2 formation of the USAF (in 1947 q.v. above.). The RAF of course was formed as the world's first Independent Air Force in April 1918.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Lonewolf

the bomber does NOT always get through,

Have you told the USAF? That F117 thingy and the B2 seemed to have done pretty well!

[Tankertrashnav]

The Luftwaffe was never envisaged as an independent separate Strategic Air Arm , being instead designed primarily for the tactical support of a rapidly advancing Army.



In contrast to the Soviet Air Force which was developed as a tactical air force in support of the Red Army, and was very successful in this role. Unlike the Luftwaffe, however, it never moved into strategic bombing or maritime operations in any meaningful way, although luckily for the USSR they had the RAF and the USAAF to do all that stuff for them!

[Haraka]

agreed TTNav. There were a few pretty half-hearted ( TB3 etc) raids on targets such as Berlin , but as flying artillery they were impressive in supporting their armies' assault on Germany. (Il2 etc).

[Ken Scott]

Unfortunately as we slide towards the next SDSR these sort of 'scrap the RAF' histrionics will only get worse as Sharkey, May et al work themselves into an anti-light blue frothing rage.

[Lonewolf_50]

Haraka, OK, point taken.

Roland: an F-117 got shot down. So no, the bomber does not ALWAYS get through. (Ballistic missiles, conventionally armed, seem to have a pretty high success rate of getting through, but CEP still seems to be a bit of a problem, rather like RAF and USAAC during WW II).

(Consider also who the B-2 were up against. ;) Yes, B-2 is a lovely piece of kit, but "stealth" is a temporary condition).

[Union Jack]

Richard Overy has thrown his hat in the ring with his article on page 28 of today's Times, entitled "Reports of the RAF's demise are premature", more intriguingly subtitled "The function of our air force is to ponder and prepare for future air warfare. Neither the Army nor the Navy do this".

No argument with the title, but the subtitle seems very presumptuous so as far as the Royal Navy is concerned.:=

Jack

[MaroonMan4]

Jack,

I saw this too. Is this the first time that the concept of no Royal Air Force in the future has been aired in the popular media? I know it is Mr Overy's opinion in the Times' opinion column but I am concerned as to me there is absolutely no rationale or logic (apart from purely financially) to allow the Pongos and Fisheads absorb our people and capabilities.

If all he can offer to maintain the Royal Air Force is that we are the only ones that can and do strategic air power doctrine then the ability for the RN and Army warfare centres to absorb the relevant elements of the AWC and then DCDC absorbing what is left will quickly see this argument turned over. We must also acknowledge that with the majority of the RAF involved in tactical level operations in the last 15 years our so called strategic air campaign doctrinal expertise is not as strong as it was. I think even we all recognise that if we had a functioning carrier during the Libyan campaign that this campaign too may not have been Air Component/CAOC led.

I do recognise that Strat AT is now essentially civilianised, the Joint Force Harrier experience was not a good advert for jointery and that with the demise of the SAR fleet most RAF helicopters sit under Army HQ, but really is our only defence as we head into what will be another bitter and bloody SDSR is that we are the ones that will ensure air power doctrine is fit for the next war requiring a strategic air campaign?

[Haraka]

requiring a strategic air campaign?
And that , my friend ,I think is the issue.

[Easy Street]

Ermmm, Libya?

While the other services like to portray the RAF as self-publicising, it hasn't made anything like enough capital out of its pre-eminent role in ELLAMY and was much too magnanimous in allowing the bit-part roles played by Liverpool, Ocean and the AH to grab equal billing in what was essentially a strategic air campaign. Luckily, I think Cameron understands that, from what I've heard. Perhaps the RAF will lose the war of letters and blogs, but as long as it continues to offer the PM a low-political-commitment intervention option, it'll be OK.

[alfred_the_great]

Ooh, this is going to be fun.

[Hangarshuffle]

Got the PM's ear have you then, Easy Street?! Libya has already been forgotten by the general public. It never did capture their full attention and most people seem to be praying we adopt a far more non interventionist role in the years ahead.
There's no such thing as a low political commitment intervention option anyway and anymore.

[MSOCS]

Hangarshuffle,

The argument here isn't whether air and space power is needed or not - it has been since people started using air and space platforms for military advantage and will be for as long as that continues to be the case. No - the argument here is whether the Army and RN take on the current roles, future equipment, training and expertise that the oldest Air Force in the World has developed over the last 96 years. On that issue I'm of the opinion that the UK's air and space power experts (our airmen and airwomen) would sooner leave the military than be forced to abandon deeply-held traditions, ethos and fighting spirit of their Service. Look how desperate the British Army's arguments have been when entire Regiments have been combined or culled in recent years. Even if you could seamlessly absorb the RAF into the other arms (which you couldn't) there would be large cost spike for sure. I haven't seen any reliable data to show that longer term spending would decrease either.

No, what the Government needs to do is stop this pitiful and spiteful debate by showing leadership and properly resourcing our Forces for the future. Letting them squabble more and more as we approach SDSR15 will do nothing but harm. The vociferous fanboys will always continue to write to The Times but I don't believe that changes the fundamental problem, or the solution.

[TEEEJ]

Lonewolf 50 wrote

Roland: an F-117 got shot down. So no, the bomber does not ALWAYS get through.

Lt. Col. Dale Zelko had already bombed his target. He was on egress when shot down.

[glad rag]

Excellent. :D

[Willard Whyte]

On that issue I'm of the opinion that the UK's air and space power experts (our airmen and airwomen) would sooner leave the military than be forced to abandon deeply-held traditions, ethos and fighting spirit of their Service.

Perhaps that's the problem - and applicable to all 3 services in their respective areas of current expertise. We really can't afford NAMBI'sms any more, both figuratively and literally.

It should not make a ha'penworth of difference which uniform or cap badges are worn as long as one is good at one's job.

[MSOCS]

Willard,

Agree. The argument for streamlining our Armed Forces comes down to all or nothing and I say that as a serving member. Would I ever like to see that happen? Absolutely not; not ever and it would be a huge loss to our National identity if it came to that.

[thunderbird7]

Didn't the Canadians go down the route of one armed service several years ago and then reverse it back to the conventional tri-service set up? If so, why did they change back?

[Bismark]

But I do have a question...why does the RAF operate battlefield tactical helicopters? I can see no purpose to this aspect of aviation ownership when the sole users are the army and Navy.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Lonewolf

an F-117 got shot down. So no, the bomber does not ALWAYS get through.

That is quite true, but I believe that is the one and only one to have been shotdown. I don't think the early air power proponents ever assumed that all bombers would always get through. If they did, they surely would have been quite naive as well as forward thinking?

With regard to the enormous savings to be had from moving all light blue into the green/dark blue I have yet to see a single rational proposal as to where these savings might come from (assuming that all lt blue roles/capabilities are transferred). Unless of course the proponents believe their own services have so much spare capacity that they can do all of someone else's job at the same time as their own? In which case maybe we should be taking those jobs as a savings measure:E

[Evalu8ter]

Bismark,
Historical accident; the SH force are the descendants of the light/tactical transport force (think Twin Pioneer / C47). The 'gentlemen's agreement' between the Army and RAF when the AAC was reformed in 1957 was that the AOP and light recce elements (Auster/Skeeter) would transfer to the Army, and transport helicopter (Sycamore/Whirlwind) would stay with the RAF. More detail here (http://www.army.mod.uk/aviation/28132.aspx).

The RW could, theoretically, have been subsumed into the RN/Army - the so called 'ownership debate'. A couple of important factors favour the status quo; firstly the formation of JHC was supposed to kill-off the debate once and for all - it transferred operating costs under Army budgets but permitted the RAF/RN to retain full command of their assets (good business..unless you're in the Army...). Secondly, more parochially, whereas the FJ-myopic RAF of the 70s/80s would probably have happily waved goodbye to helicopters the simple fact is that the SH force is, in todays RAF, an enormously important component given its size, public profile and decorated/battle-hardened aircrew. Put simply, to lose the SH force now would, for many, bring the whole question of an independent RAF back into debate. Hence why the RAF will now fight tooth and nail; of course the liberal scattering of the CH47 mafia at the top of the RAF make it an easier fight to justify...

[SimonK]

Excellent post Evalu8r, couldn't have said it better myself :D

In my time in the RAF (all IMHO of course!) the SH force was transformed by constant Ops from an unloved and unwanted distraction to the 'core' business of planks, to a high-profile element of a rapidly reducing service. The proof of the pudding for me was attending EFT streaming boards over several years, where a significant and rapidly increasing number of the graduates wanted to fly helicopters as a first, rather than last choice, 'to see some action in Afghanistan'.

Back OT and I'm sure this won't be popular coming from an ex-Crab, but I don't think it would have been totally disastrous (for the SH force at least ;))to have subsumed SH into the AAC and the 'real' RAF to be free to concentrate on planks :E

[Wrathmonk]

to have subsumed SH into the AAC

I wonder how many of the aircrew and groundcrew would swap uniforms if such a thing happened? Knowing how precious the Army (in particular) get about rank equivalence I could see a lot of personnel having to take rank reductions (and marking time in pay). And not forgetting that as far as the Army are concerned flying is not a permanent role for those holding a commission....

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

There are a number of papers in the JSCSC library concerning the transfer/subsuming of RAF battlefield RW assets to the AAC. Those that I found and can vaguely remember mostly concluded that while it was entirely possible, the cost and disruption of doing so outweighed the rather minimal cost savings (including the officer/NCO pilot argument) and improvements to CoC etc.

Interestingly they were nearly all written by Army officers.

[melmothtw]

I wonder how many of the aircrew and groundcrew would swap uniforms if such a
thing happened? Knowing how precious the Army (in particular) get about rank
equivalence I could see a lot of personnel having to take rank reductions (and
marking time in pay). And not forgetting that as far as the Army are concerned
flying is not a permanent role for those holding a commission....


The Germans have recent experience of this, having not long ago transferred their CH-53s from army to air force control. Speaking to army pilots, I was told that, while they weren't especially chuffed at having to swap services, it wasn't really such a deal breaker. I guess that in the final analysis, when your job is on the line you'll go where you're told to.

I imagine that issues such as rank and pay etc were all thrashed out well ahead of time, and given that the crews and ground staff did all transfer it would seem they were settled to the satisfaction of all concerned.

[Haraka]

And not forgetting that as far as the Army are concerned flying is not a permanent role for those holding a commission....

Something that the RAF held in common with it in my case.......:O

[Engines]

Evalu8ter and others,

Just a little more than a 'gentlemen's agreement' governed the division of airborne assets between RAF and Army - the key document was the 'Templer agreement' which, I think, dated from the late 50s, as inferred in the link provided. I understand that it was this document that gave aircraft above 4,000 lbs to the RAF, below 4,000 to the Army.

Amazingly, given its age and increasing irrelevance, it has been trotted out on a regular basis by RAF officers anxious to take over flying machinery. I was reminded of its existence by a fairly overwrought Wg Cdr in around 1980 when Lynx was obviously going comfortably over 4,000 lbs, and again in the late 90s by a similarly excitable Group Captain over the Apache. I understand that its most recent outing was in a paper to help justify RAF ownership of the Shadow.

Just to stress that in all my time working with the RAF heavy SH fleet, I have never once encountered any of this sort of petty shenanigans at the working level, and I am constantly amazed by their professionalism and dedication to doing the job. I suspect that the same goes for all military aircraft operators of any cloth, creed or persuasion, who are actually working at the sharp end. Sadly, as one looks further ip the command chains, some fairly unlovable behaviours have taken place in the last few years.

Evalu8ter is bang on target in identifying the RAF's sudden and Damascene conversion to the value of having 'RAF' pointed on the side of SH aircraft that are very much in the public eye.

I sincerely hope that a leavening of RW types in the upper echelons will calm this sort of thing down. I really do.

Best Regards as ever to all those delivering support to our guys on the ground,

Engines

[Evalu8ter]

Engines,
Quite right old friend, however the AAC have played the game re 'arming' too. Certain Army VSOs are proud at continually blocking any attempt by the RAF to buy Blackhawk as a Puma/Wessex replacement as they feared an armed variant would undermine the AAC's AH/LUH requirement and force size. The DAP Blackhawk can outlift, outrange and outshoot the Lynx...you can see their point!

I'm not sure, but was the AAC position the rationale behind CHF losing the armed capability they had with Wessex when they transitioned to SK4? Or was the 3BAS/847 Gaz/Lx mix seen as the alternate?

Shadow was an interesting pi**ing contest which didn't reflect well on either side....

[alfred_the_great]

A prime example being the good Rev'd Dannatt over Blackhawk - IIRC, he crows about it in his autobiography.