WE177 incident at RAF Bruggen

[ricardian]

Documentation, especially the BOI, makes interesting reading (http://tinyurl.com/obhbms3) (there is some redaction but mainly names of individuals)

[Dengue_Dude]

I wondered what happened to them once we'd dropped them off . . . Ouch!

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Very interesting reading!

If one picked out the bare fact - driving nukes around corners without strapping them down - everybody and his dog would conclude (rightly, according to the BOI) that the SSA guys were nuts.
Prima Facie, reading the 'excuses', it would seem that they couldn't make turnaround times with the kit on hand. So why didn't the Flt Lt simply state to HQ that the turnaround time would have to be 'Y' due to lack of kit, instead of 'X' as ordered?
He asked for the kit to meet the task as per regs, pleaded repeatedly for it in fact, but allowed the regs to be broken to meet the task. Then, having let the regs slip to allow tight tasks to be met, breaking the regs became an unwritten SOP, to the extent that the regs were still ignored on a wet day when there was no tight deadline.
I'd also want to know:
Did the guy setting the tight deadlines know that Bruggen could not meet them? If not, why not?


Worth remembering that the ethos of the RAF during the Cold War was 'task is paramount'. As an FJ pilot, I can only recall one occasion when the formation leader refused the task, due to weather being forecast outside limits for parachuting in case of ejection*. The Auth stood his ground and insisted on the task. The tension lasted a few seconds before all the other 3 pilots (me being one) refused the task on the same grounds, in support of the leader. The Auth backed down. Nothing more was ever said. However all 4 pilots left the RAF within 4 years and none were promoted past Flt Lt.


*Do you want to parachute into the Norwegian Sea in winter at night in winds of over 40 kts?

[NutLoose]

I was there when it happened lol, we used to talk about it in hushed tones. I wonder if the other incidents are in public domain yet I notice it was requested, so the person asking must of had knowledge of it?

[newt]

As an FJ pilot, I can only recall one occasion when the formation leader refused the task, due to weather being forecast outside limits for parachuting in case of ejection*.

WTFO!!!!

What were the wind limits for parachuting after ejection? I can't ever remember seeing them in writing! :ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

[BEagle]

newt, I seem to recall them coming in around 1980/81-ish? Perhaps you were flying your Captain Speaking jet by then?

Something to do with the types of parachute then coming into service?

An auth was desperately keen for us to add a few more MLPI hours to the line on the boss's wall one cold winter night, but it was obvious that the aerodrome was becoming icy and there was a strong risk of radiation fog. But he dug his heels in, from the comfort of the nice, warm Ops room and said that he'd wait for a report on conditions from a C-130 due to land in the following few minutes in order to reassure us....:hmm:

When asked, the Herc captain replied "What braking action? It's like a ****ing skating rink out there and we're not going anywhere!".....:\

Collapse of stout party - and we stacked asap!

On another occasion, the local roads were covered in ice and snow when I was due to set off for the aerodrome. So I rang in:-

"Is the RW open?"

"No - they've been trying to clear the camp roads and RW for ages and it's just started snowing again. But try and come in anyway"

"Whatever for? Driving conditions are treacherous, there's no chance of flying, so what would be the point? I'm staying here." Click.

But I suppose if you've walked the few yards from your OMQ to the sqn and you're a FJ Flt Cdr who still thinks he's got a career, other peoples' real life issues are of little importance. On my previous, non-FJ tour, we didn't suffer such nonsense - things were rather more adult generally.

Including anything to do with special weapons, about which no errors of any kind would ever have been tolerated and any non-SOP behaviour would have been firmly stamped upon. So that Bruggen incident frankly astonishes me - however did things get so lax?

[Trim Stab]

As an FJ pilot, I can only recall one occasion when the formation leader refused the task, due to weather being forecast outside limits for parachuting in case of ejection*.


So is it now an SOP that there is no flying by any RAF FJ if it is too windy to eject? What is the limit?

[newt]

Beags. I was still flying FJ in the early eighties and we have all come across that new Flt Cdr who thinks he has a career. However a sense of pride in the job and some carry on spirit should never go amiss!

It may just be the way this story was recounted but surely arguing with the auth at the ops desk is not the best way to deal with the situation? Taxi to the runway and then declare the wind out of limits is just one option which allows some credibility for auth and the guys involved?

I'm off for Sunday lunch now! Dry too as it's January!:ok:

[Just This Once...]

There has been a limit for at least 30 years and we are not the only air force to have a prescribed limit for training flights by day and by night. During ops or QRA the limits are less restrictive and can be waived entirely.

I will not post the limits or who has the authority to waive them or indeed the grounds required to relax or waive them.

[Pontius Navigator]

Certainly in the 80s we had sorties cancelled or play areas changed because of surface winds out of limits - that was at Coningsby.

[Pontius Navigator]

On weapon loading times, with the YS2 it was possible to get the weapon loaded and handed over in 7 minutes.

With the introduction of the WE177 the time jumped to 95 minutes and the station commander went ballistic. The evolution was then clipped to around 35 minutes. I don't know what, if any, corners were cut.

[Lima Juliet]

Newt

Wind limits for non-op flying have been around for years. 40kts of wind in your chute and then hitting the ground would be a leg breaker at the very least. Also there are sea state limits as well as 1 man dinghys don't do well in Sea State 6!

LJ

[glad rag]

Was stripped to the waist playing handball over lunchtime at the airfield side of "the big shed" at laarpads when a herc landed and went off to the site. game carryed on until it got busy over there. We were able to watch as a :suspect: tarp carrying "s" type :suspect: slowly rolled off the side of the ramp and overturned..........well were were all still there and no bangs so we just carried on with the game!:suspect:

Good for the Station Commander to stick it to the usual "blame them all" BOI result as well Salute Sir.

Jnr Tech, the best rank in the Air Force!

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I didn't want to get away from the OPs point about nukes and how dodgy practices arose (and maybe still arise?), but

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/Beaufort_scale_9.jpg

I have subsequently got to know a military parachute tester - the guy who tested wacky equipment/profiles for the SAS, etc. His opinion of 40+kts into the sea at night was "f#cking suicidal".

I've also subsequently been sailing singlehanded at night in Sea State 9. Parachuting into it? No thank you.

[NutLoose]

I didn't want to get away from the OPs point about nukes and how dodgy practices arose (and maybe still arise?), but

Better ask the Navy that one.

[newt]

LJ. Whilst I accept there are weather conditions which may make parachuting a dangerous occupation, I personally have never had a sortie cancelled due to the wind being out of limits should one have to use the Martin Baker letdown. I have changed the route ie not go low flying in Scotland when the wind is gale force! That comes under title "Common Sense" for me!

If you take these rules to the absolute, based on a forecast, then I suspect there would be summer operations only!

[BEagle]

Fellow Cold Warriors will no doubt recall the joys of the annual WST visit when the team would arrive and assess our Special Weapons knowledge / drills. Fail assessment and you would be in the deep and smelly!

One cold day it was finally our turn to 'accept' our weapon at the 230 OCU dispersal where the test assessments were being conducted. You were under the microscope from the moment you left the transport and approached the RAFP with his woolly crocodile. Stricy adherance to the 2 man principle was mandatory; this even included going with the AEO to start the GPU, lest he should carry out an 'unauthorised act or incorrect procedure'. As we walked back to the jet, I noticed that no-one had bothered to clear the snow from the pan, as the jet wasn't going to fly while it had a 'shape' loaded. But the pile of snow in front of the nosewheel meant that we wouldn't have been able to taxy out, so we called over to the RAFP that we were going to kick a clear path through the snow.

As I hoofed it out of the way, my foot made contact with something substantial. A large, heavy picketing pin (which would have knackered the nosewheels if we'd taxyed over it) had been concealed by the snow. So we told our friendly copper to make a note that we were moving it clear of the jet and did so. The AEO and I assumed that this was a WST trap, so continued with the acceptance. Which went fine until the Nav Rad decided that the manual bomb release flap hadn't been properly wire restrained as he could get his finger between the flap and button without breaking the wire seal... So that ended the assessment.

Afterwards I told the WST chaps that the concealed picketing pin was a bit sneaky of them, only to be told "It wasn't us - and none of the other crews had noticed it!". In the end they didn't fail the others, but they did have a few words with the OCU SEngO about the state of preparedness of the designated pan.... Whereupon the smelly stuff flowed downhill in the time-honoured fashion and some poor young LAC found himself doing a few days jankers. Which was very unfair - screwing up in front of WST should have resulted in ar$e-kicking for those at higher level, in my view, rather than pinning (sorry) the blame on some young lad who clearly hadn't been properly supervised....:uhoh:

[dctyke]

PN: [I]With the introduction of the WE177 the time jumped to 95 minutes and the station commander went ballistic. The evolution was then clipped to around 35 minutes. I don't know what, if any, corners were cut.[I]

Having loaded plenty to Buccs 35 mins would be an bloody good time from the trolley being left in the HAS, I would say the ave was about 50 mins. Trust me, corners were never cut. We were examined every 30 days by the unit team and at least once a year by WST. For example during loading we were never allowed to call each other by names, just a number depending on your role in the four man team. The one advantage in exercises in the nuclear stage was that no-one ever hassled you and the armed policeman outside the HAS never let anyone in! The downside was we were always live armed (with smg's) which was a real pain in the butt come the end of the exercise.... happy days

[Pontius Navigator]

dct, there was more room under a Vulcan and we used to do simultaneous HO/TO at the end of the load sequence.

BEagle,

Not guilty on that one, but at Waddo the bosses crew sauntered out in blues, macs etc, and proceeded to do the WST. All went well until the last minute. The last to exit the aircraft was the co-pilot. As he descended his mac got caught in the cockpit. At the moment critical the captain turned his back and the co re-entered the cockpit. FAIL.

At another unit, again the bosses crew, they sauntered out to the aircraft and were already to do the business but of the WST, no sign. I was with the crew chief in the hut with the 700. Well, not a fail, but a very cheesed off wg cdr.

Then on yet another, in another Mediterranean airfield we had the 'star' crew. The sqn execs were not crewed so they formed a crew for WST purposes. They passed but it was a real peachy test. :)

[The B Word]

Newt

If it's blowing over 40kts at my home base or sea state 6 in the designated ejection area then I have cancelled many sorties. I guess you must have been lucky?

The B Word

[Pontius Navigator]

I have changed the route ie not go low flying in Scotland when the wind is gale force! That comes under title "Common Sense" for me!

That newt was the point, you changed your route.

Now you could only do that on a forecast. I recall low flying over the North Sea being limited to, say, south of 54 north.

[newt]

PN

All I can say is you must have a better memory than me! I cannot even remember sea state being mentioned when briefing for yet another sortie of PIs over the North Sea! Sometimes we did four on the same night too!:confused:

[BEagle]

But did you actually get as far as Grimsby before you were down to Chicken Fuel, newt?

:p

[gr4techie]

I'm glad I wasn't on the EOD team that day.

"Whats the EOD job boss? Some PPK pistol misfired again down the range?"
"No, just a 10kt nuke".
"I hope you have a steady hand or can run far".

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Can you get Sea State 6 in the Grimsby Model Yacht Pond? ;)

http://www.gcmbc.co.uk/imgAbout.jpg

[cuefaye]

But did you actually get as far as Grimsby before you were down to Chicken Fuel, newt?

He'll chop your legs off for that BEagle!:ooh:

[dctyke]

PN: dct, there was more room under a Vulcan and we used to do simultaneous HO/TO at the end of the load sequence.

Luxury, a 900lb mc gave us about one/two inch's either end of the bomb bay in a bucc! The rare double load was a real nightmare:O

[Pontius Navigator]

dct, (950!) I endeared myself the them at Bruggen when I said, now shut the door.

Four groundies lay down and footed the door closed :)

[NutLoose]

I remember a room mate at the time when learning I was about to do Q telling me all the fire engines had to respond el pronto to Q if there was a fire and it over rid everything else, asking him why, he didn't know, and I sure as heck wasn't going to enlighten him, my thoughts were heading in the opposite direction preferably up wind.

[Pontius Navigator]

PN

All I can say is you must have a better memory than me! I cannot even remember sea state being mentioned when briefing for yet another sortie of PIs over the North Sea! Sometimes we did four on the same night too!:confused:

BEags probably has the right of it, I was talking about the long range interceptors to your south that could actually get to 54 deg North :O

Seriously, we never had a sea state/low level wind consideration in the early 80s in the Shack. I seem to think it was one of those creeping rules that was sensibly introduced on one sqn or wg then crept to another before being adopted by first one group, then another, until 1, 11 and 18 all played the same game. For Nimrods I don't think ditching weather was ever a consideration, certainly in the 70s.

[Wensleydale]

Did the restriction come in after the SAR winch man lost his life due to the mishap with the survivor and his parachute?


I remember that whenever strong winds were forecast in the UK during met brief for Sentry training sorties, our FA used to ask for the actual surface winds in the fighter play areas so that we had advance warning of any possible cancellations. Winds out of limits resulted in a few phone calls before take-off to ensure that the WC training was forthcoming and we didn't waste lots of expensive fuel waiting for non-existent aircraft.

[Romeo Oscar Golf]

Of course there was a sea state, low level wind limit, and other common sense "rules" which the Auth/Leader would apply to all TRAINING sorties. What we accepted in war was different.
To say otherwise is very disingenuous.

[Pontius Navigator]

WD, it predated the Sentry.

[Background Noise]

Newt, I'm pretty sure the rule was in when you were still in - since we overlapped. I had the impression it had been introduced, or maybe formalised into the rules, after a Jaguar ejection when the pilot had been killed hitting the ground in strong winds - in which case it was sometime after 1979.

[KPax]

I was the 'duty erk' that night in the Cage at HQRAFG when the 'black phone' in the corner rang for the first time in two years. The Duty Ops Officer from Bruggen in a slightly agitated voice said the Op O....m was in force. Never seen so many senior officers rush in to work that late at night. Good to watch from the bottom as CinC RAFG spoke to 4* in the UK about who was going to tell the Germans.

[BEagle]

Interesting that the report states that OLDHAM alert was 'the standard signal for initial report of an accident to a nuclear weapon'.

Standard? Did it happen often then.....:eek:

[Madbob]

Didn't these come in after 29 Sqn lost an F4 in early 1986 up in the Pennines. The nav was very seriously injured landing on some rocky ground doing a Michael Schumacher in the snow. Only the extreme cold and his helmet saved him.

MB

[goudie]

Standard? Did it happen often then.....

According to this report it did

MoD catalogues its nuclear blunders | Environment | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2003/oct/13/energy.nuclearindustry)

[maxburner]

My recollection from the late 70s was, following a fast jet ejection into a very stormy North Sea, the helicopter winchman died attempting the rescue. The F4 at that time had a 35 kt crosswind limit. Someone (can't remember who) was tasked with finding out what limits, if any, other air forces who flew over the North Sea in winter applied. The answer was around 35kts. This coincided with the crosswind limit and so, as I recall, this was adopted by 11 Gp as a reasonable working limit. Incidentally, the limit for wearing immersion suits was 10C. Having since done quite a bit of scuba diving and spent some time in the sea at 10C or so, that limit is mighty low. I believe the RN used 15C and that seems to me to be much more sensible.

[Pontius Navigator]

Didn't these come in after 29 Sqn lost an F4 in early 1986 up in the Pennines. The nav was very seriously injured landing on some rocky ground doing a Michael Schumacher in the snow. Only the extreme cold and his helmet saved him.

MB

Both crew were VSI and I believe one took Holy Orders. No, the problem was not surface wind but low level ejection at high speed. I believe the glissaded down a valley edge, the snow and helmet as you say did the rest.

[Davef68]

Both crew were VSI and I believe one took Holy Orders. No, the problem was not surface wind but low level ejection at high speed. I believe the glissaded down a valley edge, the snow and helmet as you say did the rest.

Aircraft accident in the Pennines area. (http://www.yorkshire-aircraft.co.uk/aircraft/planes/dales/xv434.html)

[air pig]

The man who died in the North Sea was MALM Dave Bullock, trying to rescue an A10 pilot who had 'banged out' if I remember correctly. RiP.

[Background Noise]

Still think it was earlier than that - this was the one I was thinking of:

ASN Aircraft accident 23-NOV-1979 SEPECAT Jaguar GR.1 XX762 (http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=55379)

[Pontius Navigator]

Davef, I was SIntO/SNavO at the time, not bad recall after 28 years. However at the ball later that year Mrs PN almost knocked the Nav over as he was still not steady on his pins.

[Ivan Rogov]

For anyone like me who was unaware of MALM Bullocks heroic actions -

1980 | 3622 | Flight Archive (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1980/1980%20-%203622.html)

http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.202-sqn-assoc.co.uk%2Ffiles%2FSpring-2001.pdf&ei=kSvUUo3dO8e6hAfKrYGYCg&usg=AFQjCNFEmxtqFe9IHw-k9kGp8QsSVUdYoA

He was awarded the George Medal and US Airmans Medal.
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDkQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.london-gazette.co.uk%2Fissues%2F48696%2Fsupplements%2F10103%2Fpage. pdf&ei=qDLUUqj1HoKWhQeP9oGgBw&usg=AFQjCNECMbWAOhLbZW962syu8FzSXWsklg

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/331441-sarh-go-9.html
Post 165 - Highlighting the need for a second winch on long range helos.

[Davef68]

Davef, I was SIntO/SNavO at the time, not bad recall after 28 years. However at the ball later that year Mrs PN almost knocked the Nav over as he was still not steady on his pins.

That pints a picture! I hope my recall is as good in 28 years time!

[Al R]

My most depressing half-tour was at Bruggen in the SSA. As the NATO funded WS3 was being installed, we were busy backloading the gear. When the final item was safely away, word came down that that indeed, really was the final article (I still can't bring myself to say nuclear bomb).

For the first time in 40 years, there was nothing to do. We told the guys in the towers to come down and good old DB requested an authentication for the order which the copper got wrong (first wobbly well and truly downrange by that time I suspect).. so Dez declined to obey.

Japanese stay-behind like, he's probably still up there.

[NutLoose]

I still have difficulty talking about them, gave the one on show at Elvington a halfhearted kick, then had to explain why to a couple of horrified punters next to me...

It was only a few years ago the local press finally figured out and published what we used to do at Bruggen.

[Pontius Navigator]

Here is some additional information:

1. The serial no. of the round in question is quoted as 5168 F4/E and that for another round at Bruggen at the same time is quoted as 5200 F3.No-one has yet been able to explain the significance of these additional letters & numbers after the 4-digit serial number ... … perhaps they refer to the level of modification?

2. Various pressures of the weapon centre-section/capsule are quoted …. it’s not entirely clear whether the figures refer to the ‘capsule’ or to the ‘weapon centre-section’ as the terms seem to be used a little loosely.

3. Reference to pressurizing the ‘capsule’ with dry air as per normal procedure.

4. References to:
- ‘complex interlocking geometric [HE] tile profile’
- ‘live tiles, HE supercharge and RA pit’

5. WE177A ser. no. 5796 is reported to have been removed from service in 1983 as the result of abnormal handling.

[glad rag]

yep some interesting info in that report there PN..;)