GoCo NoGo?

[JFZ90]

Final nails in the coffin, or could Bernie still swing it for Bechtel?

Is defence procurement privatisation dead? | Westminster blog (http://blogs.ft.com/westminster/2013/11/is-defence-procurement-privatisation-dead/)

[Just This Once...]

Presumably Bechtel will gain sole access to the magic tree that can provide and sustain suitably qualified and experienced personnel for the long term.

[500N]

I met some people at a show in Las Vegas who were from the UK
and procured Arms and related items for the UK Military.

He was given a tender to supply some gear. He read it, gave it back
to them with a note saying it was not worth it commercially.

They were stunned.

[JFZ90]

JTO

Some familiar names.....

Exclusive: Conflict row as MoD top brass join contractors - Business News - Business - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/exclusive-conflict-row-as-mod-top-brass-join-contractors-8839973.html)

[downsizer]

I wonder what chance DES have with their bid?

[Squirrel 41]

Until someone can seriously explain how we can achieve actual risk transfer to the contractor, then GoCo seems a dead duck. I just can't see how Bechtel (or anyone else) can actually write the blank cheque that would result if they screwed up.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

The message is that "Civil" is bad and commercial is good. It's not until the experiment has failed will anyone take notice. It's only a commercial adventure though; not as as if it could be our national interest and security at risk.

The important thing is that yer man Gray gets the money he was hired for.

Everyone I know who's still in DES hates each day that goes by. They are depressed by seeing things that probably won't work being pushed through and ideals of service they've held dear being dismantled.

Once the great experiment is in place, though, all the knowledge, experience and training will have been lost to put it back together should it fail. Ah, bugger it; it's only money.

[Roland Pulfrew]

It's not until the experiment has failed will anyone take notice. It's only a commercial adventure though; not as as if it could be our national interest and security at risk.

And its not like there isn't a rapidly growing pool of evidence that there are just some things that should be done by the Govt and some things that are better placed in the commercial world. It just so happens that in Defence it should ALL be done by government staff.

Olympics security fiasco; criminal e-tagging fiasco; RAF EFT contract; PAYD etc etc :ugh:

[Red Line Entry]

Statement from the SofS to Parliament yesterday:

On 10 June 2013, I published a White Paper on the strategy for reform of the acquisition and support of our Armed Forces' equipment. The strategy plans to explore the potential for involvement of the private sector under a government-owned and contractor-operated (GOCO) model by means of a commercial competition which is underway, and to compare this option with an internal approach which would deliver an improved solution within the public sector (DE&S+). I want to update the House on progress of the commercial competition.

When the Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) was released on 25 July there were three prospective bidding consortia but this reduced to two shortly thereafter. While we believed that two bidders were sufficient for an effective competition, alongside the internal DE&S+ option, I asked that a review of the process be undertaken jointly between the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). This has recently been completed, and a copy of the report has been laid in the library of the House today.
The review concluded that a viable competition remained, albeit with some risk attached, but that any further reduction in the number of bidders should stimulate a formal reconsideration and decision on whether to proceed further with the GOCO option. Bids were required from the two commercial consortia in three phases and the second of those was due to be received on Friday 15 November. MOD has received a bid from one of the consortia but the second (Portfield, comprising CH2MHill, Serco and Atkins) has decided to withdraw from the competition. This is regrettable and the reduction in competitive tension will make it more challenging for the Department to conclude an acceptable deal with the remaining bidder, notwithstanding the competition from the DE&S+ bid, which will be received shortly.

The Department, with the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury, will now study the detailed proposal received from Materiel Acquisition Partners (led by Bechtel with PA and PwC in support), which is substantial at over 1,200 pages. In parallel, the DE&S+ team will continue to refine and enhance their proposition. This analysis will inform a decision on whether it is in the public interest to proceed with only a single commercial bidder and an internal option, or whether alternative approaches should be considered and a further statement will be made once this process is complete.

So in other words, 'Wait, out'

[dervish]

I'm told there's major confusion on all sides as Mr Gray first announced the model he wanted to use, then confused matters by using the term GOCO, which is a contradiction. The way its been put to me is the DE&S+ and Industry bids will be answering different questions. I'm pretty sure this was explained and predicted on another thread a couple of years ago.

[JFZ90]

there's some irony in the fact that bernie came in to tell everyone how to do procurement better - and his big procurement, feted as a grand competition, seems to have turned into a single source fiasco.

if a PM in abbey wood had got this far in a competition before realising there was no effective competition, you'd be asking questions about serious failures earlier in the procurement cycle, and counting the impact in terms of wasted effort and delay in providing a capability.

[500N]

I sometimes wonder if these orgs don't tie themselves up in so much paperwork
that they don't know Arthur from Martha. The Aussies have certainly done so
in the past.

[tucumseh]

Excellent point JFZ90.

To coin a phrase, this is a real No Turning Back moment for Defence procurement. MoD's expertise is almost gone, deliberately run down in the 90s by Walmsley. ("I don't want engineers running engineering projects"). If GOCO fails, where to then? It is a "Must Not Fail" moment and MoD's historical answer is to chuck money and staff at it, but make sure the cost is booked somewhere else. But neither guarantee success. Hard won practical experience and ignoring senior staffs is as near as you'll get to a guarantee in procurement. History tells us this is irrefutable fact. So, what is MoD's fallback position?

Is it co-incidence MoD is in the same position over Army cuts and the "Army Reserve"? The cuts are going ahead without any guarantee we'll get 30,000 strong reserve. What is the fallback plan? Full scale retreat? The same people are in charge of this asylum. By this, I mean politicians and those at the top in MoD. Savings, savings savings, but never mind the deliberate waste.

I've said before, but worth repeating, that Gray announced the model he was going to use on Radio 4 in December 2011. It was the very same model endorsed in June 2001 for a major Cat A Army project, and still successfully in place today. (Mr C Hinecap alluded to it on another thread the other day). It is based 100% on mandated (at the time) airworthiness regulations.

When questioned by an MP in January 2012, MoD then denied Gray even uttered the words, despite the full interview being available on Radio 4 archives for download. When this was pointed out by the MP, MoD refused to reply, and the initiative went quiet for over a year; in which time MoD announced more experience was being removed.

Therein lies the real story. Clearly, Gray was simply fed a line without understanding "his" proposal was extant policy in many domains anyway; so by definition scores of reputable contractors knew it inside out. When this was revealed by an MP, embarrassment ensued. But you'd expect the person who briefed Gray (or submitted the policy as his own new idea) to be asked to explain it. Crisis over, crack on, promote the briefer again. But no, they denied he even mentioned it. Why? The obvious answer is that the briefer didn't understand what he'd cribbed, and couldn't find anyone who did. Or didn't want to admit how low down the MoD hierarchy they'd have to go to find someone to brief a 3 Star. (One answer would be an Army Corporal at Warminster, but that's by the by).

I would like to hear the bidders' views. Did they appreciate, or were they told, that Gray's proposed model has already been implemented? I've never heard of half the companies involved, so I doubt it. Perhaps one has had the mandated Def Stan called up in one of his contracts, many years ago. None are involved in the current Army initiative. A wheel has been reinvented over the last 2-3 years, while DE&S has regressed in terms of ability to do its job. Gray is not on record as changing his mind over the model to be used. He just got someone to think up a new name (GOCO), which took a year. I'd also like to know what the exam question to bidders was, to see if he quietly changed tack, while denying his original tack. Entirely possible.

In short, this recent announcement is no surprise.

[JFZ90]

Meanwhile, the French look on with bemusement.

Google Translate (http://translate.google.co.uk/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.air-cosmos.com%2Fdefense%2Fla-reforme-de-la-dga-britannique-en-difficulte.html)

Reading Hansard, it seems there is still a strong bias towards GoCo from SofS. He described that, despite facing what should be a single source situation of significant concern, the "bid we have on the table is substantial and from a consortium of world-class private sector businesses". Sounds a bit like 'sexing it up', no?

[High_lander]

In light of all things Monty Python- knew economic magazines (http://spendmatters.co.uk/mod-goco-pining-for-the-fiords/)could be funny...:E:E:D

I've been long of the belief that GOCO was dead from the start. I moved with my PT when it was DLO and merged with the All Mighty that was the DPA bit.

There seems to be an air at ABW that so long as it's procured, that's all that matters; the support or the dirty "in service" bit is lost on many at ABW. At least that's what seems to be happening in my PT. GOCO was pushed on us as the saviour from the MOD's commercial cock ups and DE&S+ was the fall back plan.

I think GOCO was never going to happen because it was never, ever, going to be commercially viable for anyone. Where is the profit? Continually reduce the number of staff so you only have the seconded Mil staff left? Who in the GOCO would be the LOAA holders? We don't allow contractor staff to sign off Airworthy decisions, so why now give to someone who has TUPE'd over to a commercial entity.


GOCO was the lovechild of the Turkey Baron, and as soon as Bernard Manning FOXTROT OSCAR, the better.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

There seems to be an air at ABW that so long as it's procured, that's all that matters; the support or the dirty "in service" bit is lost on many at ABW.

I had a genuine hope that when the DLO was formed, the blinkered attitude to in service support that was commonplace in the DPA would fade away. Did it buggery. The Contractor hangs on a "support" bonus in the buy price and the Procurers instantly smile and pat their own backs on a "good deal". How else would certain Survey Vessels be supported from initial buy and, now, pooled stock that cost more outside the original support provisioning contract? How else would a certain renowned engine manufacturer agree to support and store Nuclear Steam Raising Plant to then rent storage space off DES's own Defence Storage and Distribution Agency? Up until then, double accounting was against the rules.

All we had to do is mend what we have; not compound yet more commercial cream skimming. S Pepys must be spinning in his grave like V Boat's INS.

[tucumseh]

I agree with the general sentiments about support being the Cinderella of MoD, despite accounting for around 80% of through-life costs. As one MoD Director (Cox) once said “You are the rump end of MoD”, an ethos that is now all pervading.



But if MoD were to study successful projects, they’d find that invariably the project manager, or a key team member, has worked his way backward through the procurement cycle. That is, he started on support (or even disposal) and therefore had experienced all the problems poor support planning and execution caused, and made provision to avoid them.


To this end, in the late 80s MoD(PE) had, for example, an avionic Integrated Logistic Support Unit. In PE, “ILS” was not what it is today, the bloat-fest built on Def Stan 00-60. If you worked in the ILSU you were responsible for ALL aspects of your projects, from cradle to grave. Suffice to say, there is not a single person left in DE&S who has such experience.


This was compounded by the Services getting shot of their own specialist support departments, demanding that PE do the work (a double whammy, given PE became anti-support, along with AMSO). For example, in 1988 the RN formed their Aircraft Support Executive, infamous for not making executive decisions or supporting aircraft. In more recent times, I’ve experienced both RN and RAF declare they will not support a major aircraft programme AT ALL, withdrawing all labour and destroying key files, forcing years of expensive regression. The only way such a programme can be successful is for the PM to have done it all before, and wear his old hats. At least the RN demanded experienced PMs be appointed. Historically, the RAF parachuted their own officers in to manage aircraft projects, regardless of experience (e.g. Chinook Mk3). I always felt sympathy for them, sitting with head in hands hoping some junior civvy would sit down and take over in his spare time. But CDP (Walmsley) was actively getting rid of them, digging an even deeper hole.

The worst day of my career was being introduced to a new boss in 1997. The 2 Star told us he’d been selected, not through normal competition, but hand-picked by senior staffs specifically because his CV was a golden list of aircraft experience, especially support. An entire section was devoted to his maintenance and trials experience. We made enquiries and his total aircraft experience amounted to a half day jolly to Fleetlands to watch a Lynx take off on a Maintenance check flight. That’s where MoD got to between 1988 and 1997, and nobody can tell me it has improved much! This is important in the GOCO context. From one viewpoint, GOCO needs to succeed because this unacceptable standard has become the norm. I think we are past the point of no return. In fact, the 2001 Army initiative I spoke of, which Gray cited as his preferred GOCO model, was required precisely because we didn’t have the in-house capability. An attempt was made to recruit people to be trained up, but they proved incapable because they didn’t have the necessary background. Their degrees in Defence Administration and the like were fine achievements, but little use when we needed hands on practical experience of support. I’m sorry, but if you permit direct entrants to skip 5 or 6 grades of valuable training and experience, without requiring them to catch up in any way, then you reap what you sow. Today, I imagine some form the DE&S hierarchy. Most don’t know they actually skipped grades. The above posts still exist, but most are vacant because no-one wants them. So industry step in at 10 times the cost.....

[JFZ90]

A few minutes on "Bechtel" wikipedia entry is revealing. They seem well qualified. First, some general mismanagement and cost overruns:

The CANOL pipeline contract went to Bechtel-Price-Callahan, a partnership formed for the purpose by the W.A. Bechtel Co., the H.C. Price Co., and the W.E. Callahan Construction Co. In June 1942, the Japanese invaded the Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska, and the construction began in earnest. However, due to poor planning by the Army and mismanagement by the contractors, the CANOL project failed totally. The pipeline consumed more oil than it produced and cost taxpayers an enormous amount of money. Furthermore, as time went on, it became clear that the Japanese did not have the resources to invade Alaska. The CANOL pipeline was abandoned after a mere 11 months in operation.

In 1943, the "Truman Committee" released a scathing judgment on the $143 million CANOL project, calling it more destructive to the war effort than any act of sabotage by an enemy. The judgment singled out Bechtel-Price-Callahan for criticism for its role in the cost overruns and mismanagement that plagued the project.

---

In 1981, Bechtel constructed the Ok Tedi Mine, the largest mine in Papua New Guinea at the time. An engineering feat, the mine was constructed in one of the most remote and inaccessible regions in the world. Controversy would surround the major shareholder of the mining company, Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP), which is now known as BHP Billiton, when it allowed mine waste to be dumped directly in the Ok Tedi River after a tailings dam built by Bechtel was destroyed in a landslide. The Ok Tedi Environmental Disaster resulted from the riverine dumping of pollution.

---

In the late 1990s Bechtel was awarded the contract from Saudi Arabia's Civil Aviation Authority to build Dammam's King Fahd International Airport, the largest airport in the world in terms of land area (780 km²), thus making it larger than the nearby country of Bahrain, that Bechtel completed later than schedule and at a cost that was over budget while bad transport roads led many locals to fly via the nearby Bahrain International Airport.


Note how they treat militarily sensitive information...

According to the Wall Street Journal, Bechtel established a strong relationship with the rebel leader Laurent Kabila during the First Congo War of 1996-7 in central Africa, compiling "the most complete mineralogical and geographical data of the former Zaire ever assembled, information worth a fortune to any prospective mining or oil firm" and commissioning and paying for "U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellite studies of the country and for infrared maps of its mineral potential." According to government officials, some of the satellite data provided to Kabila by Bechtel was "militarily useful information."


Looks like they can do massive cost overruns in the billions - could come in handy:

In early 2003, the Boston Globe launched an investigation into Bechtel's role in massive cost overruns and accounting irregularities in Boston's Big Dig project totaling over $1 billion. Bechtel rebutted the allegations on its website. The Globe, along with the Associated Press, filed papers requesting that Massachusetts Turnpike Authority make public the results of all Bechtel's performance audits related to the Big Dig. Bechtel sought a preliminary injunction to block the release of the documents, but the superior court judge in the case denied Bechtel's request on April 11, 2003, opening the way for public release of the documents.

Mmm, here's a hint of alleged corruption, mixed with some alleged poor management with a hint of gouging profits through IPR:

Like most large American companies, Bechtel and its employees have contributed large amounts of money to United States politicians (over a million dollars in campaign contributions between 1999 and 2002).
Following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush awarded the first Iraq reconstruction contract to Bechtel through USAID, on April 20, 2003. This contract was worth an estimated $680 million. It is alleged that some of the construction projects managed by Bechtel were either poorly implemented, failing within months of their installation, or designed in such a way that Iraqi engineers did not have the knowledge or components to fix Bechtel's proprietary technology.

Should be well placed to take on any airworthiness or duty of care issues:

In 2004 BWXT, a partnership of BWX Technologies and Bechtel National are fined $82,500 for a February 2003 accident at Oak Ridge, Tennessee's Y-12 facility after an accident caused a small explosion, a fire, and contaminated three employees.

----

On July 10, 2006 a three ton section of concrete suspended ceiling crashed in the east bound lanes of the Massachusetts Turnpike I-90, in Boston. This tunnel ceiling collapse was in the Big Dig which Bechtel along with Parsons Brinckerhoff were responsible for building. This collapse claimed the life of Melena Del Valle, a 38 year old native of Costa Rica. Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reily immediately designated the accident scene a crime scene. He has left open the possibility of negligent homicide charges being levied against Big Dig contractors and managers.

And to top it all, this bodes well for a potential single source contract!!!!

In 2005, Bechtel was awarded a no-bid contract by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to install temporary housing for the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief effort. The lack of competitive bidding for the contracts was criticized, as was the high cost of the contracts and the failure to support local, minority-owned businesses.

[JFZ90]

Calls for Bernie to resign....& media has picked up on Bechtel track record.

BBC News - Defence procurement privatisation 'dead in the water', says peer (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25049464)

[Just This Once...]

The whole thing is rancid and I am astonished at what has been going on behind the scenes. I've no idea if the behaviour of some is criminal, but someone needs to have a good hard look before it gets out of hand.

Big money is too attractive to some...

[tucumseh]

"The very fact that this one bidder, the Bechtel consortium, has a bid in of 1,200 pages surely draws attention to the manifest absurdity and complexity of the bid process."


1200 pages is NOTHING. I imagine that's just the initial Requests for Clarification.

[dervish]

Read in the paper today an announcement is due next week and Bernard's baby will be cancelled.

[JFZ90]

Really? Interesting, Bechtel are doing so well too at the moment.....

New Hamad International Airport - Big Project Middle East (http://www.bigprojectme.com/news/qatar-airways-head-slams-bechtel-over-doha-airport-delays/attachment/new-hamad-international-airport-2/)

[cobalt42]

Read in the paper today an announcement is due next week and Bernard's baby will be cancelled.

BBC news have now picked up the story.

BBC News - Plan to privatise defence procurement to be 'scrapped' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25280558)

[JFZ90]

Guardian too.

Government abandons plan to outsource military procurement | UK news | theguardian.com (http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/07/government-abandons-outsource-military-procurement)

No mention of whether Bernie is going to fall on his sword.

Perhaps given that he was told by many this was going to fail, it was a non-starter and it would be the turkey to end all turkey procurements, you do have to wonder if his position is tenable any more.

His mantra seems to have been to find a way to sack those in procurement who are not able to do it effectively and employ those better skilled to do so.

Ironic that he know finds himself at the helm of one of the biggest (in terms of spend) procurement cock-ups of all time. Where does that leave him in terms of having the skills for his own job? :E

So it could be bye bye Bernie, I don't expect he'll get much of a leaving party (well, not one he's invited to at any rate).

[hoodie]

Defence privatisation plan axed (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25321111)

The government has abandoned plans to privatise its defence procurement body after only one bidder was left in contention for the contract.

Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said there was no longer a "competitive process" and the risks of continuing were "too great to be acceptable".

Labour described the decision as an "embarrassing U-turn".

The Bristol-based Defence Equipment and Support Agency has an annual budget of £14bn.

It buys equipment, including ships, aircraft and weapons for the armed forces.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had been considering replacing the agency with a "government-owned, contractor-operated" (GoCo) body.

But two of three consortiums interested in the contract withdrew.

[tucumseh]

Bernard Gray is to appear before a specially convened Defence Select Committee on Thursday. Don't hold your breath waiting for Hodge to ask knowledgeable questions. She'll be too busy grandstanding and, as usual, will miss the blindingly obvious.

The press always say DE&S was to be replaced by the GOCO company, but I don't think Gray ever said that. If he did, he would be wholly contradicting the announcement he made in December 2011. I think this is where the HCDC should be aiming, to establish if he actually understood "his" proposal, and ask why MoD almost immediately denied he'd made the statement. I think the answer would reveal a lot of in-fighting and back-biting in Mandarin Towers and among certain retired VSOs, who quite openly tried to undermine Gray from the outset. I have a feeling his first and greatest mistake was failing to engage the person who developed the model he presented as his own, despite being told to do so by Min(AF).


Oops, got it wrong. Hodge is PAC Chair. Same principle applies though!

[hoodie]

Here's the Sec of State's statement:

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the government’s plans for reform of defence procurement.

The 2010 SDSR set out the government’s vision of an agile armed forces designed to face the challenges of the 21st century. Central to delivering and sustaining that vision, is the ability to procure and support the equipment the armed forces need. There is a widespread acceptance that the present defence acquisition process is not good enough. While there have been notable successes, there have also been many examples of poor performance and sub-optimal outcomes for the armed forces and the taxpayer.

Bernard Gray’s report for the previous government identified three root causes of these problems:

an overheated programme;
a weak interface between Defence Equipment and Support and the rest of the MOD, too often leading to repeated changes to the requirement
and a lack of business skills in DE&S
This government has moved to address all three:

In May 2012, I announced that we had resolved the £38 billion black hole we inherited and balanced the defence budget, with over £4 billion of centrally held contingency to address risks as they crystallised, and a much more disciplined and formalised approach to investment approval, committing funding only when project proposals were properly mature.

As a consequence, DE&S effectiveness is no longer undermined by an overheated programme.

We have also strengthened and improved the interface between DE&S and its MOD customers. We have accepted and implemented the recommendations of Lord Levene’s report on Defence Reform more clearly to define the customers of DE&S as the front line commands, and to give them substantial responsibility for managing their own budgets and prioritising their own requirements. We still have further to go, but we can already see an improvement, and with a substantial reduction in the number of changes to requirements, this is already becoming less of a negative factor in DE&S performance.

We have also started to address the business skills gap within DE&S, through the appointment of Bernard Gray as the Chief of Defence Materiel, and by the recruitment of new senior finance and commercial staff from the private sector.

We are beginning to see the evidence of progress, and while I do not want to pre-empt the Major Projects Review report the NAO will be publishing in the New Year, I am confident that it will show significant improvement in respect of the period since we balanced the budget in May 2012.

But we recognise there is still a long way to go. The reforms we have already instituted are only a start and the challenge of recruiting and retaining the necessary business skills in DE&S is growing, not diminishing – and is likely to get bigger still as the economic recovery gathers pace. A more radical reform of DE&S is necessary if it is to sustain the skills it requires to support our armed forces effectively.

That is why we developed the ‘Materiel strategy programme’.

To address the skills challenge and improve the delivery of complex programmes, DE&S needs to have the freedom to shape its workforce to be world class and to engage effectively with the best of the private sector. The Materiel Strategy is about removing the obstacles to bringing in critical skills and exploiting the capabilities of the private sector, by exploring alternative models for DE&S.

I announced in April that the government had concluded that a ‘Government-owned, Contractor-operated’ model, a GoCo, might well be best placed to deliver the changes required in DE&S; but that we needed to test the market’s appetite for that model, and confirm that it would, indeed, deliver value for money, through a competition. In parallel, I announced that we would work up a public sector comparator, exploring the maximum extent of flexibility that could be achieved within the public sector, a model we have called “DE&S plus”.

The government has maintained an open mind as to which option would prove, overall, to deliver the best balance of risk and potential reward once bids were received.

On 19 November, I informed the house that we had reached the ‘detailed proposals’ stage of the competition, with only one proposal being received from the two consortia remaining in the process. That proposal was from the Bechtel-led Materiel Acquisition Partners. I further informed the house that the government would consider carefully how best to proceed in the light of this development.

I can confirm to the house today that I have decided not to continue the present competition.

The heart of our approach was to test the market’s appetite for delivering aGoCo along the lines we had set out, using the competitive process to drive innovation and value. We have always recognised that there are risks inherent in the GoCo approach. With only one bidder remaining in the competition at this stage, I have had to make a judgment about whether the public-sector comparator alone would generate sufficient competitive tension to ensure an effective outcome for the armed forces and value for money for the taxpayer.

I wish to place on record, Mr Speaker, that ‘Materiel acquisition partners’ have engaged effectively with the very challenging brief we set out. They have presented us with a credible and detailed bid, but we do not have a competitive process. I have therefore concluded that the risks of proceeding with a single bidder are too great to be acceptable.

We have gained many valuable insights from bringing the proposition this far and understanding the issues raised by bidders and potential bidders. My conclusion is that a GoCo remains a potential future solution to the challenge of transforming DE&S, but that further work is necessary to develop DE&S financial control and management information systems to provide a more robust baseline from which to contract with a risk taking GoCo partner.

We are clear that the only realistic prospect of resolving the challenges facing DE&S in an acceptable timescale is through a significant injection of private sector skills. I have, therefore, decided to build on the DE&S plus proposition, transforming DE&S further within the public sector, supported by the injection of additional private sector resource, thus ensuring that the organisation becomes “match-fit” as the public-sector comparator for a future market-testing of the GoCo proposition.

To do this:

We will recognise the unique nature and characteristics of DE&S as a commercially-facing organisation by setting it up as a bespoke central government trading entity from April 2014;

We will give the new entity a hard boundary with the rest of MOD, a separate governance and oversight structure with a strong board under an independent Chairman, and a Chief Executive who will be an Accounting Officer, accountable to Parliament for the performance of the organisation, delivering another of Levene’s recommendations;

And crucially, we will permit the new organisation significant freedoms and flexibilities, agreed with the Treasury and Cabinet Office, around how it recruits, rewards, retains and manages staff along more commercial lines to reflect its role running some of the most complex procurement activity in the world.

We will of course consult with trades unions on the practical arrangements for implementation.

These changes will reinforce the customer-supplier interface between the military command customers and DE&S, facilitating a more business-like approach, allowing us to move earlier to a hard-charging regime and thus further addressing one of the weaknesses identified in the 2009 Gray report.

They will allow DE&S to procure crucial private sector input through a series of support contracts to deliver key changes to systems and processes, and to strengthen programme management while organic capabilities are built. And they will permit the recruitment into DE&S of key commercial and technical staff at market rates and with minimum bureaucracy.

Mr Speaker, Bernard Gray has agreed to become the first Chief Executive of the new trading entity, thus providing a vital thread of continuity between the original Gray report and the continuing DE&S reform agenda.

Alongside the changes to DE&S, we will continue with the reform of MOD’s wider acquisition system, which is focusing on up-skilling our customer capabilities, a key role for our military, alongside the important role they will continue to play within DE&S.

Mr Speaker, these changes will drive significant incremental improvements in DE&S as well as delivering the mechanisms that will give the organisation a robust performance baseline. That will allow MOD, at a future date, to re-test the market’s appetite for continuing the DE&S evolution into a GoCo, and its ability to deliver value for money against a significantly enhanced public sector comparator.

On both counts, this course of action represents the best way forward, both for our armed forces and for the taxpayer, and I commend this statement to the house.

[dervish]

Good grief, lots of new buzz words and phrases in there. MoD will have to employ consultants to translate that speech!

[JFZ90]

What a surprise.

I wonder what this charade has cost since Bernie started it? (£m)

Will MAP be seeking MoD to refund its bid costs? (£m?)

Is Bernie "match-fit", given he has been instrumental in the nugatory costs above?

What do you think of the person that thought using the phrase "match-fit" was a good idea?

FoI request anyone?

[Charlie Time]

The DE&S + option was always going to be the winner when COM(JE), as a thrusting 3*, took on the role as it's champion.

[JFZ90]

The GoCo NoGo | Think Defence (http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/12/goco-nogo/)

Poster on this link says it has cost £7m apparently before the penny dropped that this was never going to be viable, and bid costs could be £10m.

Having now therefore potentially wasted £17m, shouldn't they now get rid of the naive architect of this folly and get a more commercially astute CDM in place? :E

[Manandboy]

Alongside the changes to DE&S, we will continue with the reform of MOD’s wider acquisition system, which is focusing on up-skilling our customer capabilities, a key role for our military, alongside the important role they will continue to play within DE&S.

Mr Speaker, these changes will drive significant incremental improvements in DE&S as well as delivering the mechanisms that will give the organisation a robust performance baseline. That will allow MOD, at a future date, to re-test the market’s appetite for continuing the DE&S evolution into a GoCo, and its ability to deliver value for money against a significantly enhanced public sector comparator.

I'd like to think that the first part of the quote is an acknowledgement that 20+ years of dismantling the "intelligent customer" have finally been recognised - far too late to do anything about it. The whole thing is a re-invention of QinetiQ under a slightly different guise - fantastic in terms of smoke, mirrors and bullsh1t, but basically a profit-making organisation totally dependent on the expertise and support of military personnel. I was hugely uncomfortable with that whole episode, and this proposal just beggars belief!

[EAP86]

Wikipedia: "Gray worked for five years in investment banking and capital markets for Bankers Trust and Chase Manhattan in London and New York."

Perhaps the MOD should go back to "a more commercially astute" General like Sir Kevin O'Donoghue? If the rumours are anything to go by, it wasn't his commercial nous which was lacking, rather it was the political in-fighting which led to the failure.

[Red Line Entry]

Considering the DE&S spend is around £15,000,000,000 EVERY YEAR, I don't know why posters are getting excited over a one off expenditure of 0.1% of that figure that was spent in a genuine attempt to overhaul the entire system.

[the funky munky]

From the Ministers statement it looks like the DE&S will become a trading fund. This was always the unloved bastard child option of the original Materiel Strategy.
I bleive it was just above Do Nothing as an option with Bernard pushing full tilt for the GO-CO, now he will head it! Wow what a u-turn! Are you sure he's not a Minister as well goven this swift change of tempo? Or is it a pre-emptive to block the young thrusting COM JE 3* (ex HELS 2*!)?

[hoodie]

The whole thing is a re-invention of QinetiQ under a slightly different guise - fantastic in terms of smoke, mirrors and bullsh1t, but basically a profit-making organisation totally dependent on the expertise and support of military personnel.

QinetiQ would never have been totally dependent on military personnel; the long term knowledge and skills of its technical civilian workforce, yes - and indeed with embedded support from the military partnership, unique in defence support. But ultimately it was the "boffins" that were QQ's key dependence from the outset in 2001.

Sadly both the continuity and specialisms of the "boffins", and the advantages available from the military partnership, have both been squandered.

Whilst short-sighted and unrealistic commercial management are in the frame for the former, it is sadly the military alone who are in the spotlight for the state of the uniformed element of the partnership.

[JFZ90]

Considering the DE&S spend is around £15,000,000,000 EVERY YEAR, I don't know why posters are getting excited over a one off expenditure of 0.1% of that figure that was spent in a genuine attempt to overhaul the entire system.

Yes, not much ££ in the grand scheme of things, but I'm surprised that there is not more irritation at all the time/money effectively wasted since he arrived 2011 - despite all the good words today, everything Gray stands for and has pushed for appears to be in tatters.

Wikipedia: "Gray worked for five years in investment banking and capital markets for Bankers Trust and Chase Manhattan in London and New York."


If this qualifies him as so commercially astute, why has he just spent 2 years building up to run a competition that has catastrophically collapsed? Results speak louder than words - and in this case they are shouting fail are they not? It suggests critical misjudgement of the market, risk, the business case for industry and even basics like mishandling of pre-qualification & requirement setting etc.

[Red Line Entry]

JFZ90,

Fair point. However, if I'm honest, I'm still a fan of Gray. Ultimately it was he, in his original report, who pointed out that the Emperor had no clothes. I had some involvement in this area and saw the appalling head-in-the-sand attitude to the unaffordable bow-wave of committed expenditure by all at the top.

Gray wasn't a genius to see it - we all knew about it, But at least he brought it to a head with a report that did not whitewash the issue.

[tucumseh]

"DE&S +"


Plus What?

[Lordflasheart]

Tecumseh - ""DE&S +" Plus What ?" ........

Plus - A bit of slap and spin + a bit of time + a partial flotation + a "chosen one" and worr'aveyergot ? Stealth GoCo ?

It's Manandboy's "... reinvention of ..."

SoS has said as much already - statement - penultimate paragraph -

".... That will allow MOD, at a future date, to re-test the market’s appetite for continuing the DE&S evolution into a GoCo, and ...."

Of course it will be proclaimed a win-win. Enough money will appear to have been made in the short term, to pay for trebles all round. There could even be a prize competition for the new name.

Anything more imaginative than "DESQo" anyone ?

[JFZ90]

JFZ90,

Fair point. However, if I'm honest, I'm still a fan of Gray. Ultimately it was he, in his original report, who pointed out that the Emperor had no clothes. I had some involvement in this area and saw the appalling head-in-the-sand attitude to the unaffordable bow-wave of committed expenditure by all at the top.

Gray wasn't a genius to see it - we all knew about it, But at least he brought it to a head with a report that did not whitewash the issue.

The GoCo was not required to address the bow-wave - which has been fixed already in any case.

This was nearly entirely created outside of DE&S in town, running ever more insane options - against a dewindling treasury budget that failed to provide enough money for the committed programme - to try and avoid cancelling the sacred cows until right to the end. Finally, the bow-wave was solved by binning Nimrod, delaying the carriers and lots of other measures - which was always known to be the only alternative answer to providing sufficient funds to what has been ordered, it is so obvious.

I remember back in 2003 discussing whether Nimrod or another Cat A was going to be cancelled to solve the bow-wave. That's how long the wave was running, and at the end of the day it was the politicians who decided that they wanted to ride out the wave, not tackle it.

The banking crisis finally made riding the wave impossible, although it could be argued that a braver more long term thinking government could have found a way to just about squeeze nimrod under the radar into service. They decided not to. It was only about money. At the end of the day any programme has no choice to become overheated if you take enough money away

Grays Go Co idea is a fundamentally unworkable one in my view. I've never seen a credible explanation as to how you'd control it given the complexity and breadth of the portfolio.

Comparisons with AWE are invalid - their requirement set is absolutely trivial and simple in comparison.

[triboy]

Your analysis is spot on sir. Interestingly in that time of the 38Bn? we still underspent annually!!!!

[tucumseh]

Posted on December 10, 2013 by Jon Thompson (PUS)


You will by now have seen either the speculation about the future of the Materiel Strategy and DE&S or the actual announcement by the Secretary of State. I thought I would set out the events of the last few weeks and why we came to the conclusion we did.

In the Gray report 2009 three main reasons were set out for the challenges we faced in delivering the equipment programme. One of those was the ability of DE&S to deliver the programme of work. We looked at various ways in which we could give DE&S the capacity and capability it needed to deliver and, after considerable options analysis in 2010 and 2011, we considered a comparison of DE&S Plus (how we might improve DE&S within the civil service) against a privately run GoCo were the options to run.

In July the formal market process for the GoCo started with the issue of the ITN. One of the three bidding consortia, led by KBR, withdrew in the first week leaving consortia led by CH2M Hill (Portfield) and Bechtel (MAP) to continue in the process. On 14 November, the day before initial bids were due, the Portfield consortium informed us they would not be submitting a bid and, subsequently, we received only one bid, from the Bechtel led consortia, MAP. The reasons for Portfield’s withdrawal are formally confidential but it is worth saying that the reasons for their withdrawal were also registered by Bechtel as issues to be resolved in the second stage of bidding – which would have lasted until the Spring of 2014.

Over the last three weeks we have been considering what we should do, proceed on with MAP, consider DE&S Plus, or a variation on those. Senior DE&S and corporate colleagues have been very heavily involved in this decision, setting aside huge amounts of time and working through the night on legal and financial options. I’d like to thank them for that as it has been an intense period. We were all agreed on two fundamental things, firstly that we needed to give DE&S some freedoms and flexibilities from the working practices of the broader civil service and secondly that to increase the capacity and capability of DE&S we needed the help of the private sector. The reality is that we need to inject new information systems, working practices and skills that we can’t grow or recruit ourselves at the scale we need to in a very competitive market and, therefore, we have to go out and buy in what we need.

There was also universal agreement that we needed to move DE&S at arms length from the MoD. That provides several positives – a hard boundary to charge the commands for services delivered for example. It provides a means of increasing corporate governance in DE&S, an independent Chairman and non-executives, an Additional Accounting Officer and separate Accounts. Finally it provides a means by which we might seek pay freedoms from HM Treasury to try and address some of the skills gaps we face.

In the end I recommended to the Secretary of State that we stop the GoCo competition and create an arms length body as the vehicle to improve DE&S. That will start in April 2014. We looked at every shade of arms length body and identified that various options we all considered should be available weren’t. It wasn’t until we got into the deep centre of HM Treasury that we concluded that a Trading Fund was not possible as it required changes to Treasury primary legislation and would take many months to change.

So, in the end, an arms length body, with appropriate corporate governance, HR freedoms, a hard boundary with the commands and with an injection of business partners was the choice we made. New HM Treasury rules allow us to bespoke the body however we consider would best suit defence. It will have the benefit of being at arms length from the Department, but still within the civil service family. Funds will be made available to the DE&S Board to recruit partners to help implement appropriate IT systems (like Earned Value Management), improve working practices in P3M, boost the finance function and help with the HR function. Further details of that will be made in due course.

I hope that helps to explain!

Jon





Comment: A classic study in avoiding the issues. He's obviously no idea who works in DE&S, unless he's advocating civilianising all Service jobs! (Not a bad thing in certain areas). And EVM is not an IT system. I remember one major company being handed an EVM contract on a Cat A Army programme and grinning from ear to ear as it didn't actually require them to deliver anything. And they promptly proved it. The "industry manager" in the IPT was so intent on using EVM he completely lost sight of what the requirement was, or that it needed delivering to time, cost and performance. The ISD has been and gone years ago.

Next step will be interesting. DE&S has been ground down over the last few years while awaiting this decision, and we see the resultant inexperience on a daily basis.

[tucumseh]

Grays Go Co idea is a fundamentally unworkable one in my view. I've never seen a credible explanation as to how you'd control it given the complexity and breadth of the portfolio.



Something like this needs small steps, or incremental implementation. Gray tried for the big bang, as he clearly didn’t understand his brief. And neither, crucially, did those who briefed him.


I’ve mentioned before that Gray announced the model he would use 2 years ago (Radio 4 on 27.12.11) – “Co-ordinating Authorities” (CA). But within weeks MoD denied he’d said this, despite it still being on the BBC website. Why?


What are “co-ordinating authorities”? The only mention in any mandated MoD standard relates to Post Design Services, in the context of appointing a single contractor to assume responsibility for the integration of individual systems so that, together, they remain functionally safe. (See Tornado/Patriot shootdown of 2003. There wasn’t a CA so no individual was responsible for integration and functional safety). The CA is then, obviously, responsible for the Safety Case. The lead engineer at the CA is THE key appointment. Note; an MoD appointment, not just someone who works for the company. He must be vetted and approved by MoD as he is granted financial delegation to commit MoD funding without recourse to MoD.



Before this system was rundown, without replacement, by RAF Chief Engineer Alcock in June 1993, there were many CAs. Sensible project managers ignored him and continued to invoke the mandated Def Stan (applicable to Air, Land and Sea, not just aircraft). New entrants, now the majority, were never taught this and failure to implement is now the norm. This is why some aircraft and equipment remained safer longer than others.



In 2001 this Def Stan was applied to a major Army programme, encompassing nearly 200 systems – the single biggest implementation ever attempted under one contract. That contract is still viable today, although DE&S can’t explain or get their heads round why it invokes a cancelled Def Stan!



But applying the process to one small programme of 200 systems is definitely not the same as applying it to all of DE&S’s procurement work. For a start, the aforementioned company, despite being a major player in Defence, had to be led by the hand through every step as they, too, had lost expertise once Alcock said he didn’t want aircraft or equipment to be functionally safe. Also, MoD had to employ a lot of external consultants, mostly ex-civilians (I’ve never come across more than a handful of servicemen who understand this; and why would they).


However, as a basic model it is absolutely fine. A CA type contract covers the entire acquisition cycle from Concept to Disposal, which is presumably what Gray wanted the GOCO contractor to do. It is a fundamental truism that any project manager who cut his teeth on PDS/CAS type work has an infinitely greater chance of delivering to time, cost and performance. But here’s the problem. MoD no longer train staff in the pre-requisite disciplines. Today, how many with this training work in DE&S? I’m tempted to say none, but it may be a handful. So, who set the exam question for GOCO bidders in response to Gray’s declared preference for CAs? In the above statement PUS goes on about people working through the night. You can work 24/7/52 for years on end, but if you don’t have the basic training you’ll get nowhere.

[Helol]

tucumesh - is that taken from the PUS' blog?

[Chugalug2]

tuc:-
..they, too, had lost expertise once Alcock said he didn’t want aircraft or equipment to be functionally safe.... MoD no longer train staff in the pre-requisite disciplines. Today, how many with this training work in DE&S? I’m tempted to say none, but it may be a handful. Cause and effect in one! These smooth talking Mandarins could talk the hind leg off a donkey, what they certainly will never do is to name the names of those guilty of reducing UK Defence to this parlous state. Someone has to. Someone has to bite the bullet and reveal the corruption and incompetence that continues to be covered up at the highest levels.
Rearranging the deckchairs, inventing new acronyms, or reusing old ones with no idea about what they really mean is simply wasting more money and risking more lives. It has to stop!

[tucumseh]

Helol

Yes. There is nothing in there that hasn't already been released (except of course the mistakes he makes about DE&S, which are understandable as he isn't employed to know about MoD, and neither are those who brief him). In fact, he withholds the reasons why the consortium pulled out, yet it was published in the press at the time.

[JFZ90]

Can you say what the example CA was in the Army Tuc?

What did the governance look like? Did it still have an IPT? How big? Where did the RMs sit?

EDIT - I think you're referring to FIST etc. Memory is a bit hazy but wasn't the IPT pretty big? I'm guessing Thales took the CA/integrator role with lots of subs/partners.

Speaking in 2011, is this related to bringing the CA back in house....
Asked whether FIST had changed, Bruton concluded, “We have looked at what we are trying to achieve through FIST. Actually we think that it is better to have the integrator in house.

Soldier Modernisation | Volume 8 | UK DE&S (http://www.soldiermod.com/volume-8/des.html)

[tartare]

What I find amusing is the assumption that the private sector manages projects better than Government - market forces etc.
Working in the private sector, I've seen some astonishing fvck ups.
One example, a decision made in just 5 weeks to spend over half a billion dollars on an acquisition that has proved to be utterly parlous.
Big companies can be just as incompetent, wasteful and bone-headed stupid as Governments - in some cases, even more so.

[hoodie]

There are two quite interesting UK Defence-related Blogs out there, both of which have commented on this and both of whom are pro-DE&S, balancing out negativity from other places. Both may be seen to be as controversial as those other places, though!

Thin Pinstriped Line (http://thinpinstripedline.********.co.uk/2013/12/its-no-go-for-go-co-thoughts-on-de.html)

(That link doesn't work, due to this site's strange policy of not allowing links to blogsp*t URLs. Try 'http://thinpinstripedline.b l o g s p o t.co.uk/2013/12/its-no-go-for-go-co-thoughts-on-de.html' without the spaces if you want to read the whole thing)

As with many things in the MOD, the UK perhaps doesn't realise how good a service it gets from them, and while it is very easy to knock the DE&S, it is worth taking a moment to think about what its workforce has done in the last 10 years or so. Compared to almost any other nations procurement system (let alone nations deployed on wartime operations), you then realise that despite huge media complaints, the DE&S is a rather fine organisation indeed. One hopes that the future structures proposed for it help make it even better still, and if the new system enables it to deliver at arms length to avoid planning round challenges, and enables it to recruit and retain high quality people for the long term then that is to be strongly encouraged.

Think Defence (http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/12/mod-reform-groundhog-day-edition/)

There is of course always room for improvement, better processes and better people, we would be idiots if we thought an organisation like DE&S cannot be improved. Having spent just under £20m on the GoCo process, or 2 years running costs for Largs Bay or 20 Foxhound vehicles, lets hope we get some value from it, or as Phil Hammond said, invaluable insight.

However, the real heavy hitters when it comes to procurement cockups are not the people at the end of the M4.

They are mere amateurs compared to those in the Palace of Westminster or churned out by Sandhurst, Cranwell and Dartmouth.

Perhaps MoD reform should start there.

[tucumseh]

JFZ90

Thanks for that link. Reading it, I initially dated it to late 2001. Then he mentioned a 2010 UOR in the past tense and I realised he was presenting very old policies and ideas as recent brainwaves. At the bottom it reveals it was a presentation from 2011. Someone is big on self aggrandisement. It indicates a lack of continuity in DE&S and DEC.

Take the power problem. All that he mentions was recognised long before the main BOWMAN contract was let in 2003 (e.g. raised by Director Infantry in 1999) and mitigation put in hand. It is over 8 years since MoD issued the ITT to solve this, but what he doesn’t say is that one bidder replied to say the MoD specification was so obsolete it would be uneconomical to re-open the production facility! Instead of a 2 year R&D contract to produce a low-spec prototype (again), they offered a full production model to a far better spec, available NOW (2005). Despite this, MoD Commercial let an R&D contract on the favoured contractor (who he mentions, and who was responsible for exploding BOWMAN batteries and injuries to troops) to deliver a prototype in 2 years; but then failed to deliver. To assist their bid, the company was given access to internal MoD reports which provided the answers to bid questions, but were denied other bidders. The resultant waste was astronomical.

He says control of the Soldier System “is being placed in the hands of.......”, omitting to say that the name of the initiative merely changed. It was already in the hands of the same people since 2001, with test cases and dummy runs complete in January 2002! Although not power, as that was deemed to be provided by various other IPTs, two of which were later amalgamated.

When he says bring the integrator “in-house”, he doesn’t actually mean MoD does all the work itself. (At least, I hope not). The physical act of integration, which is what (I hope) he’s talking about, is one small part of the process. MoD hasn’t the capability or the resources to carry out all CA roles, and has never aspired to. Again, he is presenting as a new idea the structure that was endorsed at 3 Star level in 2001. The programme paid for a handful of Army posts (perhaps uniquely; I can’t recall any other programme that had to pay for serving personnel) to manage the Reference models he talks about. Yet again, he mentions this as if it is a new idea, but it (Reference Models, etc) is actually mandated policy. It facilitates the Trial and Proof Installations. The “in-house” aspect was a logical move, in this particular domain, because the necessary facilities already existed and it would be a waste duplicating them at the CA. In fact, the CA were located at the MoD premises, another unique aspect.

This gross disingenuousness, presenting mandated policy and long established initiatives as new ideas, is entirely typical. However, in 2011 it may have been a “relaunch”, perhaps because the few who were trained to manage it were no longer in MoD. At least he had the sense not to copy the presentation to the 2001 conference, which was WAY ahead of his 2011 one! Even so, there must have been a few puzzled foreign countries, given they had copied and implemented our 2001 proposals. For goodness sake, the Commandant of ITDU at Warminster, and a key player, drew on this initiative for his 2004/5 MSc thesis! Had the author read that, or even some basic Def Stans which any aircraft engineer in DE&S should know by heart, his presentation would be very different. There is a distinct lack of Corporate Knowledge here.

What would you call a big team? The entire process was developed by one person in his spare time, although in time the team would, as you suggest, expand. I think the important point in the GOCO context is that such a model (adopted by Gray remember) does not replace DE&S, as inferred by the media and many in MoD. It recognises many key roles are already carried out by industry, and GOCO would “only” need to slightly expand these roles into other parts of the acquisition cycle. On a small scale programme this is possible and manageable, but extremely difficult on a pan-DE&S scale. If only because MoD oversight and management is required and very few are taught these basics. A key question in thiso GOCO bid is not about who bid, but who didn't bid, and why.


Your key question relates to Requirement Managers. This is the main difficulty the consortium that withdrew had with the GOCO bid (according to press statements). The problem MoD have is that their rules (they have never been rescinded) require the RqM to be an engineer, as his main authority is manifested in the exercise of engineering judgement. Over the years this has become rare. There are many non-engineer RqMs, which is fine in many domains, but I don’t think they realise that much of their job is probably done by engineering Civil Servants; or not at all. For example, technical scrutiny and materiel and financial provision; the lack of which explains many procurement disasters, and almost all wasted money. So, in the example you quote, if he was not an engineer he would have great difficulty with technical integration and physical/functional safety. I don’t think they had any role to speak of in this Army initiative; it was entirely a routine CS engineering activity, with expertise recruited from Air Systems (as the Army didn’t “do” systems integration). The CS post was chopped in 2003, job done; which merely emphasises what I say. To be fair to the author, it may explain why his presentation is so short on fact, and reinvents too many very expensive wheels. I hate to say it, but a couple of key consultants would probably have saved MoD an awful lot of money. And reduced casualties (which, after all, was the main aim of the programme).

[tucumseh]

Philip Hammond under fire over appointment of Bernard Gray for top job - UK Politics - UK - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/philip-hammond-under-fire-over-appointment-of-bernard-gray-for-top-job-9005408.html)