TSR-2 Files

[Stendec5]

Does anyone know if any files relating to TSR-2 are still classified? If so it surely cannot be for technological reasons as we are talking about 1960s kit. That only leaves political reasons. If so, what are they trying to hide after five decades.
I only ask as I heared on my car radio recently that the Blair regime had prevented release of TSR-2 documents.

[CoffmanStarter]

If not already seen ... suggest you watch this first.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=tEtkrZiDDGc

[Satellite_Driver]

More likely, I would think, to relate to the political shenanigans surrounding its cancellation and the subsequent purchase (itself later cancelled) of F-111K.

[Genstabler]

Makes you want to cry. And strangle a politician!

[Archimedes]

I know that one of the retained files is titled something like 'TSR2: Weapons Carriage', so it's not all political conspiracy...

There are a fair few retained files with interesting titles from that era (not just TSR2 related) which deal with 'weapons' and it is reasonable to assume that these are/were of the sort which go off which a somewhat larger 'bang!'...

[teeteringhead]

I definitely need to go to Specsavers....

.... for a nano-second I thought the Thread Title was TSR-2 Flies!

:ugh:

..... or maybe it's just the daily sex - sorry, I mean dyslexia! ;)

[Squirrel 41]

Back in 2001, I was at a Treasury retirement drinks do, and the lady retiring had been involved in the cancellation debate at the beginning of her career. She remembered it vividly, and was very clear on what actually caused the cancellation: the growth in the cost estimates from early 1964 to spring of 1965 - and specifically in the first quarter of 1965. It was a case of "how high will the bill go?" as each "final bill" was superseded by an ever higher figure. Worse, though XR219 looked beautiful and when the gear retraction / oscillation problem was fixed, it was unlikely to have been in squadron service before 1969/70.

At this point, two things appear to have happened; first, the Treasury progressively lost confidence in the Air Ministry's (MoD from 1964) ability not only to control, but crucially to predict, the costs of TSR-2. Second, there was serious opposition to the aircraft from the MoD and the RAF itself - it was so expensive it was gobbling up all of the available procurement cash.

As a result, when Beamont launched XR219 into the Wiltshire sky in Sep 64, the tectonic plates that govern these things in Whitehall were already firmly against the programme, especially as the Tories had left an unaffordable defence procurement budget. The only thing in her view that would've saved TSR-2 at that point was a high level of confidence in the budgeting in the first quarter of 1965, which was the opposite of what happened.

All terribly sad - but that was the story as she remembered it.

S41

[Roland Pulfrew]

especially as the Tories had left an unaffordable defence procurement budget.

Obviously took until 2010 for Labour to get their own back for that one :E

[Marcantilan]

AIRCRAFT. Discussions on future aircraft production programme: purchase of US aircraft;... | The National Archives (http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=C4392904)

The files are not classified.

If someone want to ask for the docs, I suggest to hire a researcher (I did that several times, PM if you want further info). It is cheapear, easier and faster.

And I am from Argentina, but with a credit card and dropbox (R), distance is not an issue.

Also, a cabinet office file named "The TSR. 2 or the F-111A." is available online at the NA site: Record Type: Memorandum Former Reference: C (65) 57 Title: The TSR. 2 or... | The National Archives (http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=D7660104)

Another one: "Hardship Claim by the British Aircraft Corporation following the Cancellation of the TSR. 2". at Record Type: Memorandum Former Reference: C (66) 9 Title: Hardship Claim... | The National Archives (http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=D7660243)

Regards!

[LowObservable]

A whole lot of stuff here...

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk.nyud.net/documents/research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-17B-TSR2-with-Hindsight.pdf

A few specific things struck me when I read this.

The low-level radar bombing accuracy was still at a point where a bucket of sunshine was needed, but there was no support (on either side of the political spectrum) for more low-yield tac nukes.

The avionics system seems to have been rather similar to the F-111 Mk II suite - the one used on the F-111D variant, which spent its entire career at Cannon AFB in the wilds of New Mexico, like a crazy aunt confined to a remote asylum.

There were some horrible maintainability issues with things like engine changes.

They would have been much better off sticking to EE's original Mach 1.7 goal, and also expended a lot of effort trying to operate off short runways, which is a bit GLWT with a 55-ton aircraft.

The program management was fubared, with subs running late and not reporting the fact, in the hope and belief that either the prime or another sub would be in worse shape and let them off the hook.

I suspect that if more people had known in 1965 just how much more time and money it was going to take to put operational jets on the ramp, there would have been much less controversy over the cancellation decision.

[mopardave]

you know, reading some of the comments here, I feel no better about TSR-2! I always assumed it was a purely political decision. The more I read though, it would appear that we had an aircraft industry that was, at best naïve........and at worst, downright incompetent! Combine that with successive governments of equal or greater incompetence, and you have the "perfect storm".........my god, we really did throw away our dominance in aviation! I hope we never really do find out exactly where it all went wrong!!!!!!!!!:ugh:

[Saintsman]

It would appear it was haemorrhaging money like an F35....

[Pontius Navigator]

Archimedes, I bet that is left hand right hand stuff. Details of operational clearances, design, numbers etc etc are all in the public domain.

A friend of mine lacks only weapons serial numbers to complete his WE177 research. He has even produced a wiring schematic for the different versions.

What could be in the TSR2 file I have no idea.

[Pontius Navigator]

I suspect that if more people had known in 1965 just how much more time and money it was going to take to put operational jets on the ramp, there would have been much less controversy over the cancellation decision.

I think much angst was over the brutal way the project was terminated with jigs being destroyed. It was the same as the MRA4 fiasco and the AEW3 before that. The only difference is that the TSR2 airframes made it to museums whereas perfectly good Nimrod airframes were deliberately destroyed.

[Treble one]

I read Humphrey Wynns' fine tome 'RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces' a while back, and if I recall correctly, one of the final nails in the TSR-2 coffin was when the relevant Ministry asked BAC for a cost update per aircraft, they were told that they couldn't guarantee it would be less than £5M per airframe.

Now in todays terms where Eurofighter Typhoons are costing in the region of £65M per airframe, that seems relative chicken feed. However in 1965, this was a gargantuan sum, especially as a Vulcan would cost around £750K per airframe.

I stand to be corrected regarding the exact figures....

[Pontius Navigator]

111, the contemporary V-bomber figure was £1m.

I guess it would have been how you spin the numbers. Do you include GE, infrastructure, sneaky beaky support services etc? Things like the Decca 72M and the MRGs were switched to the Vulcan and were thus a benefit that had been largely paid for on another budget.

[Treble one]

I stand corrected....

[Squirrel 41]

PN,

The other thing that was mentioned was the timescales: if TSR-2 wasn't going to be in service until 1969/70, then the RAF couldn't claim (however improbable it may look now) that TSR-2 would have been able to cover a credibility gap in the Moscow Criterion between BLUE STEEL and Polaris.

Without questioning the dedication and the bravery of the V-Bomber / BLUE STEEL crews, its ability to meet the Moscow Criterion by the late 1960s was clearly open to question. On this basis, an argument could've been made (and indeed was, with the 2 x WE177 fit with bulged bomb-bay doors) that TSR-2 for the strategic mission could've filled a gap - if the SSBNs hadn't been ready before, say, 1975.

But given that the Resolution SSBN programme went pretty smoothly, the credibility gap argument was never going to be enough to swing the argument in favour of TSR-2.

(Which is a shame, as it could've been completely brilliant, replaced F-111 etc etc etc. Whether it'd still be in service isn't clear to me, though. And N-a-B is clearly right about the engine installation - IIRC, Damien Burke's (absolutely excellent) TSR-2 book suggests that the production series would either have needed a significant redesign for the engine bays or would have been a complete maintenance nightmare.)

S41

[LowObservable]

In 1965 you could buy a new Rolls-Royce for GBP6,500...

[gr4techie]

Is there any truth in that the Americans wanted TSR-2 cancelled? As it was so advanced for it's time that the Americans feared the Soviets would improve their air defences. Therefore America would have lost its supremacy.
I suppose cancelling the TSR-2 also removed a competitor for their F-111 exports too.

[Pontius Navigator]

Without questioning the dedication and the bravery of the V-Bomber / BLUE STEEL crews, its ability to meet the Moscow Criterion by the late 1960s was clearly open to question.

I have not heard of it put that way before. I know, from a small security breach, that the Mk 1a Vulcans were targeted on Moscow when plan was for high level penetration. The main defence was the somewhat inflexible SA1 concentric rings.

Once the force went low level the FF Vulcans would have been hard pushed to cover Moscow and as far as I am aware any coverage would have been the Blue Steel Victors and Vulcans - with 5 aircraft on QRA.

The low level launch of the Blue Steel meant a much closer approach to the target but the missile flight path would then be inside the SA1/2 envelope. It was the missile that was more vulnerable, not the aircraft.

Of course the aircraft was the back up if the Blue Steel went U/S - very sporty doing a popup attack.

[Squirrel 41]

Is there any truth in that the Americans wanted TSR-2 cancelled? As it was so advanced for it's time that the Americans feared the Soviets would improve their air defences. Therefore America would have lost its supremacy.
I suppose cancelling the TSR-2 also removed a competitor for their F-111 exports too.

No, it isn't clear that the US wanted to kill TSR-2. Yes, some additional sales of TFX (F-111) would be welcome, but in 1965 the F-111 programme still encompassed the F-111B carrier fighter (which had first flight in May 65, after TSR-2 was cancelled), and was slated for an enormous production run, with commonality driving down production costs and maximising R&D return (see: JSF).

The US offered the RAAF F-111C on terms that the UK couldn't match - because the benefits of scale were so profound - and that knocked 30 out of a total TSR-2 projected build of 180. It's worth recalling that even after TFX went horribly wrong, the USN cancelled the F-111B and F-111D was built in tiny numbers, that they still built 550+ F-111s.

The interesting counterfactual - which in fairness to Dennis Healey couldn't possibly have been foreseen in April 1965 - was that if TSR-2 had continued, and *if* it had had a trouble-free development (which given the complexity of the Nav/Attack system was by no means a certainty), and had successfully entered squadron service by 1970, then by 1968/69 when F-111 was in huge trouble - weight, engines, avionics, horizontal stabilisers falling off - would the USAF would have taken TSR-2 on a licence basis, as they would do with Harrier in the same timescale?

My hunch is "probably", given how effective TSR-2 could've been in SE Asia as well as in Europe, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" in this.

S41

[Squirrel 41]

Once the force went low level the FF Vulcans would have been hard pushed to cover Moscow and as far as I am aware any coverage would have been the Blue Steel Victors and Vulcans - with 5 aircraft on QRA.

The low level launch of the Blue Steel meant a much closer approach to the target but the missile flight path would then be inside the SA1/2 envelope. It was the missile that was more vulnerable, not the aircraft.

PN, many thanks. What I was referring to was meeting the Moscow Criterion in terms of certainty for attacker and defender, and thus deterrent effect from a UK-only operation. It was in this sense that the Criterion's credibility was contested, as the whole Soviet IADS would have been on the lookout for a small number of V-bombers.

Of course the aircraft was the back up if the Blue Steel went U/S - very sporty doing a popup attack.

I'm sure...:uhoh: What was the plan - to toss an unserviceable Blue Steel from low-level? How reliable was Blue Steel when carried?

S41

[BBadanov]

[QUOTE] S41: would the USAF would have taken TSR-2 on a licence basis, as they would do with Harrier in the same timescale?

My hunch is "probably", given how effective TSR-2 could've been in SE Asia as well as in Europe, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" in this. [QUOTE]

S41,
I would say not a snowball's chance in hell would the Yanks have taken TSR2.

Sure problems plagued TFX/F-111 development, wing carry-through box being a major one, but engines and auto systems (like CG fuel transfer). The final snapshot is:
F-111A - used unsuccessfully in SEA ops in 1967, but very successfully by 474TFW in SEA on "Linebacker II" in 1972. Some later modded to EF-111A "Spark Vark".
F-111B - cancelled by USN, who then used some systems in F-14.
F-111C - RAAF F-111A, delivery delayed 5 years until 1973, mainly due to carry-through box testing.
F-111D - first digital attempt, miserable failure, spent a lot of time on the ground.
F-111E - upgraded F-111A, equipped 20TFW at Upper Heyford.
F-111F - best of the breed, good digital avionics, more power in the donks, equipped 48TFW at Lakenheath.
F-111G - FB-111A later transferred from SAC to TAC, some to RAAF.

So yes, probs in the late 1960s, but the USAF was getting on top of them and had solved by 1970-71, which enabled a Wing-strength opnl deployment to SEA in 1972.

Brits feel the TSR2 was cutting edge and the panacea for their role and for export. But it was markedly overweight, due to antiquated analogue avionics, heavier than those of its contemporary (the F-111A). I saw the TSR2 on static at Duxford in the early 1970s, and I thought at the time, 'my god this looks old'. IF TSR2 had ever entered RAF service, its initial avionics performance would probably been as unreliable as Jag's NAVWAS. It probably would have gone through a digital MLU (with kit similar to what went into MRCA/Tornado), but as Tornado would not then have been ordered, TSR2 would have required replacement in the 1990s. (Also, in this scenario, the RAF Bucc would not have been ordered either - much to the disappointment of many here.) :hmm:

[Budar]

The RAF requirement to sustain M2.2 for 45 mins and the insistence on 1000 payload range, led to huge cost overuns and delays on the Olympus programme alone. At the very least £1 million for each mile of the last 100 miles
according to Stanley Hooker in his book 'not much of an engineer', great read.

[Pontius Navigator]

I'm sure...:uhoh: What was the plan - to toss an unserviceable Blue Steel from low-level? How reliable was Blue Steel when carried?

S41

As a dud missile, typically either a fuel malfunction or an inertial that went tits up (some training scores were amazing :))

According to a Research Branch study*, when a powered launch was not possible a BS could be released with a popup manoeuvre similar to the YS2. Unlike the YS2 the BS was a low-drag shape and its ballistic properties approach that of an ideal bomb. Time of fall is reduced but forward travel is increased.

To ensure blast over pressure was less than 1.5 psi the BS would need to be released in level flight from 11,000 feet.

In theory the aircraft would enter a rapid climb about 11.5 miles from the target, push over, and fly level for about 2 miles with release around 2 miles rom the target.

In training, to get better scores, this was subjected to creep back with that level flight portion increased to 5 miles or more. The time from exposure to bomb detonation was between 140 seconds down to 120 seconds. It was assessed that a well trained and alerted SA2 crew could achieve a kill within 118 seconds.

Close!

* Oct 1963

[Yellow Sun]

Once the force went low level the FF Vulcans would have been hard pushed to cover Moscow and as far as I am aware any coverage would have been the Blue Steel Victors and Vulcans - with 5 aircraft on QRA.

Moscow was well within the range of the FF aircraft and remained an allocated target until well into the 1970s. Given the "Moscow Criterion" that's not really surprising. Now whether it would have been a primary target for QRA FF aircraft is another question altogether; one to which I doubt we will ever know the answer.

Of course the aircraft was the back up if the Blue Steel went U/S - very sporty doing a popup attack.

Not dissimilar to the YS2 "low level" profile. IIRC both were designed around the SA2 parameters; the missile would hit you about 20 seconds after weapon release! The survivability quotient for was pretty low, but by that time did it really matter?

exmap

[Pontius Navigator]

YS, the primary QRA target for Plan B - at least 5 aircraft - was Leningrad. At that time there were only 7 aircraft of QRA. Draw your own conclusions.

Moscow would have been in range for aircraft with the double-tank fit.

At one point it was planned at that one route for Leningrad would require a single drum tank. This was seen as a severe technical limitation as it required that one QRA aircraft at Waddo and a spare were both so fitted. At the behest of the stn cdr I had to get Bomber Command to change the routing.

That particular mission was routed through the back door so to speak.

The survivability quotient for was pretty low, but by that time did it really matter?

Probably not, but it was the question of the British psychic. I believe our near allies were not as picky. I know when NEAF introduced a new plan that meant we had only sufficient fuel for post-target plus 10 minutes flight. It brought a gasp from the audience when we were briefed and we were not happy bunnies. Logically it would have been no worse than landing in Iran or further east.

[papabravowhiskey]

I recall working for someone who had been around at BAC during the TSR2 years. His take - from a production engineering/materials point of view - was that they were pushing the boundaries on the materials side, including proposed use of exotic flavours of aluminium alloys (including an early Al-Li, IIRC?), driven mainly by the need to save weight, which given the problems we were having with Al-Li alloys at the time of the conversation (mid-80s) was a bit sobering. He felt that there were going to be big, and costly, problems to be overcome in getting production aircraft out of the door and into full service. With regards to the destruction of the jigs etc, his point of view was this: if ANY components, tools or jigs were left on the shop floor, the work force would've carried on working on it, regardless of instructions (there was no other immediate work), and so it was necessary not just to remove said items but also to destroy them.

PBW

[EAP86]

BB
What a/c of that era had anything other than analog?

[LowObservable]

Correct - as noted the TSR2 had analog-digital hybrid systems. The F-111A was mostly analog, the F-111D/Mk II was a "didge too far" and the E/F - the only models used in combat after VN - had a hybrid fit.

[Stendec5]

It just seems crazy to invest that much time, effort, talent, and of course money taking the project up to (early) flight-testing status. To have such luminaries as Beamont/Dell/Knight giving positive feedback from the cockpit. To have what could obviously evolve into an extremely effective piece of kit...and
then pull the plug on it.
It doesn't seem to have any logical explanation. But then I suppose that sentence could be written on the gravestone of the once highly capable and innovative British aircraft industry in general.
Thanks for the replies by the way, all interesting material. I'm sure we've not seen the last of this subject.

[Pontius Navigator]

BB
What a/c of that era had anything other than analog?

Nimrod, just a handful of years later had a state of the art digital system. It had a massive 8k of 16bit core storage. While this was in Nimrod about 5 years later it had been in service with the Chieftain tank before that.

IMHO a big problem would have been navigation and bombing accuracy. It would have relied on a side scan radar system which, by definition, would provide a fix at less than real time. Even if the navigation degradation was very small, say 0.2 deg per hour at 15 minute fix frequency the error fix to fix at 1080 kts (600 yards per second) would be over half a mile.

[dragartist]

PN,
There is a good description of the TSR2 Nav Bombing system in the John Forbat book. ISBN 978 0 7524-3919-9
too heavy on wiggly amps for me to fully take in. many of the references relate to papers in the Brooklands museum. The epilogue describes how some of the systems went on to be used in MRCA (Tonka) and the Nimrod 1.
My copy is signed by the author in Nov 08.
Drag

[Hangarshuffle]

It was too expensive. We didn't need it. Labour took over a set of books that were totally unbalanced.
Please remember the TSR had, like all defence equipment, to be paid from the taxpayers purse.
In the early into mid into late 1960s.!!.....
Most people had outside toilets, no central heating, no bank account, were still paying off WW2... and on and on. We were too poor.
And in the final analacist, er... we didn't need it. History proved that.
Healey and Callaghan and Wilson were right.

[Hangarshuffle]

But you will never get the books. Far too hot. As everyone knows, when it comes to spending on war toys Conservatives good, Labour bad, yes?!

That's the way its always spun despite being utter balls!

[Pontius Navigator]

HS, yes, except that it seems to be labour that bought the kit and not the Tories.

[barnstormer1968]

There is another political theory for its cancellation.
There is a tale of a certain Brit PM being 'got at' while on a visit to Russia.
After this visit many subtle but long lasting changes occurred in the UK, and the unions gained in power. The Americans clearly didn't want competition, but then nor did the Warsaw Pact.

This story does come from credible sources IMHO, but could not be proven either way as no one would gain from admitting any of it.
If the cancellation was not purely on rising cost, or the 'fixed price Concorde data research contract offer' after cancellation, wasn't down to U.S. Influence over the Brit loan from the IMF, and couldn't be put down to there being no need for manned bombers, then it has to be something else.

I'm no conspiracy theorist, and am happy to believe it was due to a group of people with massively inflated egos and a over developed sense of self importance (politicians) who just didn't like it or wanted to do something to boast about later.

[Pontius Navigator]

Mind boggling.

[B Fraser]

massively inflated egos

or Mountbatten (the anglicised version of Battenberg) as he was known.

[teeteringhead]

And does not Mountbottom figure in another aspect?

Did he not badmouth TSR-2 to the Aussies which - amongst other factors - led to them preferring F-111 to TSR??

[Dr Jekyll]

In the early into mid into late 1960s.!!.....
Most people had outside toilets, no central heating, no bank account

Hardly 'most people'.

[Stendec5]

I don't know if its directly related but I too had researched the rumours naming Lord Mountbatten as titular head of a post coup-de-etat administration in the late 60s to early 70s, such was the exasperation in some (presumably powerful) quarters with the Wilson government. If true however I suspect it would have had a lot more to do with just TSR-2.
Fascinating to speculate "what might have happened" had such a move gone ahead. You just can't imagine such a thing happening here though.
Lord Mountbatten of course was a navy man and no apparent friend of TSR-2, so even a post coup Britain would presumably have been sans TSR. She just couldn't win could she?

[MAINJAFAD]

TSR2 was a messed up project from the start as far as the RAF was concerned it was the only game in town as far as new combat aircraft. It wasn't going to replace the V-bombers either, as that role was going to Blue Streak (until it was canned in 1960), then Skybolt and finally to Polaris. Because it was the only fixed wing combat aircraft that the RAF was going to get, they asked for all the bells and whistles in the operational requirement. The project was badly mismanaged, the aircraft would have been a complete pig to fix had it ever made it into service and very unlikely to be able to do the mission it was designed to do. Mountbatten knew this and was pushing for an aircraft that could do 80% of the job for 20% of the cost (i.e. Buccaneer). Air Staff also got very cold feet about the project and wanted something to replace the Canberras and Hunters in Germany as soon as possible. Thus the Labour government did what they were advised by the Defence staff.

Can P1154 (which would have most likely been another pig) and go for an updated P1127/Kestrel and the Phantom.
Can the AW V/STOL transport and get off the shelf Hercs
Can TSR 2 and get F-111 (money issues and the problems that the F-111 were having killed that one), Get Buccs and start work on AFVG (which when the Frogs pulled out led to Tornado).
Start work with the Frogs in getting a new Trainer / Light Attack aircraft (Jaguar).
Get a load of new Helicopters in partnership with the French and the Sceptics. (the planned 30 Chinnok buy had to be canned as the money ran out, but Labour made up for it in the late 1970s).

[Pontius Navigator]

There were rumours. General Sir Walter Walker had proposed a Civil Assistance programme. Look him up.

This was well after the TSR2 issue.

Mountbatten, from the same source, was also the subject of rumours.

This was well after the TSR2 issue.

Mountbatten was CDS until 15 Jul 1965 and would have had the ear of the PM at that time. As TSR2 was already controversial when Wilson came to power, all it would have needed was damning with faint praise.

[barnstormer1968]

MAINJAFAD

What gives you the idea that the committed navy, navy loving and RAF hating chap that Mountbatten was had an in depth knowledge of whether the TSR2 could fulfil its mission?

I have heard many stories, read many books and watched many documentaries on the subject. Most folks are convinced Mountbatten disliked the TSR2 for reasons other than whether it could do its mission, and also wanted to up the sales for Buccaneer. In some ways Mountbatten was the 'Sharky' of his day IMHO. Both are very pro RN, and both consider themselves royalty :)

[Stendec5]

Would that be "Sharky" Ward?

[Basil]

Most people had outside toilets, no central heating, no bank account, were still paying off WW2
Don't know where you get all that from. We lived in a pretty crap house in a bombed industrial town and had an inside lav. I had a bank account in 1962 and we were still paying off WW2 debt to the USA until a couple of years ago when the UK, honouring its debt, made the final payment.

[Pontius Navigator]

We was posh. We had too loos. One outside used by the rats and garden tools and one inside. We had central heating in our semi - the central dividing wall allowed for a fire place in every room, though we could only afford coal for the living room to heat the water.

Got a fridge in the mid-50s and a washing machine in the mid-60s (twin tub, remember them) when the stove top water bath rusted through.

[CoffmanStarter]

twin tub, remember them...

The Rolls Twin Tub IIRC :ok:

PS. I was very young then :}

[Wander00]

My parents bungalow, new built in W London in 1939, had a built in copper boiler in the kitchen for the washing with a folding mangle above it - funny - nearly 70 years on I can still smell it, and there is lot of dust in the air.

The copper was replaced by a twin tub I guess in the 60s.

[Wander00]

We had an Ascot gas water heater in the kitchen, replaced when we got central heating in the 70s. did not see a gas water heater again until we moved to the Vendee 6 years ago. There was a similar appliance in each of the two gites. Got an engineer to come and service them and he condemned both. Guests now have electric water heating.

[Pontius Navigator]

We had an Ascot gas water heater in the kitchen,

Grandparents had one over the bath. Scared me sh1tless as a small boy with this fire breathing dragon bubbling away.

Their bungalow was on short stilts, only the front porch was solid to the ground - very modern in case the Thames flooded. All gone, blocks of flats now.

[Wander00]

Bungalow, short stilts, reminds me of the holiday chalets at Jaywick near Southend. Most got washed away in the East Coast floods and were rebuilt even closer together.