Hospital Wing AS350B3 accident in Tennessee

[Savoia]

FAYETTE COUNTY, TN (WMC-TV) – There are reports of a medical helicopter crash in Fayette County. The crash happened along Highway 64 near the intersection of Doll Way, close to the Methodist Fayette Hospital in Somerville.

Reports are that the helicopter in on fire. We do know that there was not a patient on board, but we don't know the extent of any injuries.

Medical helicopter crashes on highway - Action News 5 - Memphis, Tennessee (http://www.wmctv.com/story/23754308/medical-helicopter-crashes-on-highway)

[Savoia]

More news coming in from the US .. sadly the news is tragic. :(

While standing outside early Tuesday morning taking a break, Janice Proctor heard a helicopter and saw its lights in the darkened sky.

At the time, Proctor – an employee at the Teague convenience store – thought the helicopter was flying low, but didn't think too much else about it.

Barely 20 minutes later, officials said, that helicopter plummeted into a thickly wooded area about a mile south of the Fayette Academy on Highway 64 in Somerville.

The medical helicopter from Hospital Wing of Memphis virtually disintegrated on impact, said officials who saw the crash site. Three people on board – a pilot and two employees of Le Bonheur Children's Hospital – were killed in the crash.

"I was going out the back down here to take my break. I heard it going over. It was dark. I saw the light from the helicopter," Proctor said. "It was pretty low."

3 killed in medical helicopter crash near Somerville » The Commercial Appeal (http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/oct/22/medical-helicopter-crashes-outside-somerville/)

https://www.hospitalwing.com/aircraft.html

[helihub]

An AS350B3 operated by Hospital Wing went down early this morning about 50 miles from Memphis, sadly killing the pilot, a nurse and a respiratory therapist on board. Our thoughts are obviously wtih the relatives of those three and anyone else caught up by this situation. They were on their way to pick up a pediatric patient with renal failure, and he is OK after making a road trip to a specialist medical center.

Non-aviation witness, as written up by non-aviation media, reported as "hearing a helicopter and saw its lights in the darkened sky...." and ".... thought the helicopter was flying low, but didn't think too much else about it."

3 killed in medical helicopter crash near Somerville » The Commercial Appeal (http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/oct/22/medical-helicopter-crashes-outside-somerville/)

Pilot, nurse, respiratory therapist killed in helicopter crash - Action News 5 - Memphis, Tennessee (http://www.wmctv.com/story/23754308/medical-helicopter-crashes-on-highway)

[helihub]

Statement just received from Le Bonheur Children’s Hospital where the helicopter was flying to at the time of the incident

Today, Oct. 22, around 6:20 a.m. we received reports that we had not received regular contact from a Hospital Wing helicopter flying to pick up a patient in Bolivar, Tenn.

It was later confirmed that the helicopter was down in Fayette County. There was NOT a patient on board. There were two Le Bonheur Children’s Hospital personnel on board along with a Hospital Wing pilot.

The local sheriff’s department, NTSB and the FAA have been notified and a preliminary investigation is underway.

[Savoia]

Lost in yesterday's crash:

https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-s2JOjr_8JTw/Umd-He4hYlI/AAAAAAAAOzs/-NQwJvb-dmk/w450-h328-no/Pedi-Flite+Nurse+Carrie+Barlow+%2526+Pedi-Flite+Respiratory+Therapist+Denise+Adams.jpg
Pedi-Flite Nurse Carrie Barlow & Pedi-Flite Respiratory Therapist Denise Adams

Also gone; pilot Charles Smith.

RIP.

[tottigol]

Anyone has access to WX conditions at time of sccident?

[Devil 49]

METAR KMEM 220654Z 36003KT 9SM BKN008 OVC070 13/12 A3005 RMK AO2 RAE11B33E44 SLP174 P0000 T01330117

SPECI KMEM 220719Z 36003KT 9SM -RA BKN010 OVC075 13/12 A3006 RMK AO2 RAB0658 P0000

SPECI KMEM 220734Z 01007KT 9SM -RA OVC008 13/12 A3005 RMK AO2 RAB0658 CIG 006V012 P0000

SPECI KMEM 220750Z 01006KT 9SM -RA SCT008 BKN018 OVC080 13/11 A3005 RMK AO2 RAB0658 P0000

METAR KMEM 220754Z 36007KT 9SM -RA FEW008 BKN018 OVC080 13/11 A3005 RMK AO2 RAB0658 SLP173 P0000 T01280111

SPECI KMEM 220806Z 35008KT 10SM FEW008 SCT018 OVC080 13/11 A3005 RMK AO2 RAE0756 P0000

METAR KMEM 220854Z 01008KT 10SM FEW011 SCT050 OVC060 12/09 A3004 RMK AO2 RAE0756 SLP171 P0000 60000 T01220094 58003

METAR KMEM 220954Z 01008KT 10SM FEW012 BKN047 OVC065 12/09 A3004 RMK AO2 SLP171 T01220094

METAR KMEM 221054Z 01007KT 10SM FEW012 SCT047 OVC055 12/09 A3005 RMK AO2 SLP174 T01170089

METAR KMEM 221154Z 07005KT 10SM FEW015 BKN040 12/08 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP175 60000 70006 T01170083 10133 20117 53004

Source:
Weather History for Memphis, TN | Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KMEM/2013/10/22/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA&MR=1)

Estimate takeoff an hour twenty minutes before dawn, Easterly track.

[Savoia]

MEMPHIS, Tenn. - When Hospital Wing celebrated its 20th anniversary, the air ambulance chairman said, "We've never had an accident. It makes me nervous just saying it."

Since Dr. Bruce Steinhauer made that statement to The Commercial Appeal in 2006, the Memphis-based air ambulance service has experienced two fatal accidents that killed a total of six people.

The crash Tuesday near Somerville, Tenn., that took the lives of the pilot, a nurse and a respiratory therapist pushes the U.S. toll for air-ambulance fatalities so far this year to 12. It's the first time such deaths have reached double digits since 2010 when 16 people died.

Tennessee Medical Helicopter Crash was 12th Incident for Year to Date - News - @ JEMS.com (http://www.jems.com/article/news/tennessee-medical-helicopter-crash-was-1)

[Gemini Twin]

...and the patient was later safely transported by ground ambulance. Does anyone else find a degree of irony in this? Why not use the wheels first and save the helicopter and crews from unnecessary exposure to harm.

[alouette3]

Gemini Twin,
Being in the industry ,I would be the first to admit that our safety record is appalling and even one accident is one too many.However, I do find your comment a trifle naive.Firstly, there is already a tussle going on between different groups (physicians, hospital ER s , ground ambulance crews etc) as to when and how a helicopter is requested.There are strict guidelines and protocols and these are dynamic.They are being revised and updated constantly. There is an element of location, hospital capabilities, ambulance crew capabilities etc that determine a lot of transports. So, in short, someone has to make that decision and sometimes that decision is right sometimes wrong.It is not a perfect system but it is the best we have, to date.
Secondly, all of us ,pilots, nurses,medics and RTs get into this industry knowing the risks. We try to mitigate the risks by various means but, none of us is under the illusion that this is a risky (not dangerous) business and "exposure to harm" comes with the territory. Those who can't handle it leave.Those who stay know the risks, and ,for the most part, work hard to reduce them.
I wonder why you "expose yourself to harm" every night when you get into bed? After all, haven't you heard, people die in their sleep all the time!
Alt3.

[homonculus]

Gemini Twin / Alouette 3

As often is the case, both arguments have validity and the truth is not that simple.

There is no doubt the string of US EMS accidents should not continue. I dont accept, having worked on these systems, that pilots let alone medical staff sign up for the level of risk involved.

However, many transfers are from small community hospitals with very basic levels of medical capability by European standards. In addition the US courts system judges negligence not by the standard a normal group of doctors would provide but by the highest standard that can be provided. Third there are financial pressures to transfer early rather than later.

The protocols are varied and we do not know the protocols nor the individual clinical details in this case or in the case of many accidents. What I find so numbing is that we were having these discussions in the 1980s

It would be interesting to do a retrospective study on the clinical need in the case of the last 100 accidents and a matched pair review of patient outcome. A number of US states have the ability to do this but I have never seen one. We cant turn back the clock for these poor individuals but it would be nice to see a downturn in EMS accidents

[Gemini Twin]

Alouette 3 sorry that you found my thought naive but sometimes it easier to cut through the "revised and updated guidelines and protocols" and ask my basic simple question.
There have been many cases were after an accident a patient has been transport by an ambulance. One case I remember well, was after a patient was removed from a wreck A109 at St Peters he travelled to the destination hospital by ground transport. Studying similar cases (and there are quite a few) it would seem that these "guide lines and protocols" may need further revision and updates. Again sorry this may also sound naive, but it's just another thought
As homonculas states, we have been discussing this issue since the 1980's and not an awful lot has changed.
Also I do fully realize that "exposure to harm" comes with the territory, as you put, it is ever present, but please notice I said UNNECESSARY exposure to harm. One extra word makes quite a difference.
To quote our friend VF, Happy landings all ways.

[Jack Carson]

Having worked in remote areas of the southwest and southeast United States we experienced many situations where the decision to utilize the helicopter was not determined based on specific established protocols or patients medical needs but rather on the requirement for continuous availability of local ground EMS support in the area. As an example, utilizing ground transport from White River, AZ to either Phoenix or Tucson removes the local EMS unit (first responders) from the area for as much a 16 hours. That was coverage they could not afford to lose on a Saturday evening.

[Gemini Twin]

You're right Jack, any system ought to be adaptive to the situation. My memory of the incident at St Pete's was not quite correct. The patient had been transported to Olympia from Grays Harbor by ambulance and than transferred to the helicopter to continue the trip to Seattle. The accident occurred on TO from the hospital helipad and the patient was wheeled into the emergency room and admitted St Peters for further treatment. Fortunately none of the helicopter crew of three was badly injured.

[grumpytroll]

Dear Gemini Twin,

I am trying to understand the logic of your argument. Let me put in my thoughts and see what you think.

If someone in my family was injured etc and needed transport to a higher level of care and the medical experts first best choice was a helicopter, then that is what I would choose. If for any reason the helicopter could not complete the transport, I hope to goodness the medical people would put my loved one in an ambulance if they felt that the time spent in the ambulance was acceptable to the medical condition of their patient.

Yes, the people involved in the particular situations you cite were eventually transported by ground. Why wouldn't they be? That was the next best option.

I get a sense that your argument is that if there is ground transport then that should be the first option taken in any situation. In many regions of the country where I have flown EMS, the time it would take to ground transport would be 3-5 hours or more depending on traffic while the helo can make the trip in one. For example take a look at the drive from Parker or Lake Havasu City, Arizona to either Phoenix or Vegas. Yes there is risk, but hundreds and probably thousands of flights over these particular routes have been flown over many years, both day and night with great success. There are many areas of the U.S. where helo transport makes absolutely the best choice for the welfare of the patient when time is critical.

Is there room for improvement? Of course. Ground transport should be considered as the best alternative when time is not critical. In medicine, time is nearly always a crucial factor when considering transferring a patient to a higher level of care.

Cheers

[alouette3]

I think this is a worthwhile discussion,despite the differing views.
Gemini, as you see, there are many, many reasons for a helicopter transport beyond the condition of a patient.As to that latter issue, who decides what benefits or does not? The patient, the family, the doctors, the flight crew? In our litigious society, in whose hands would you leave the decision? And when I say you, I mean you, personally.Give me a workable solution not a philosophical idea that does not resolve the issue. As the Russians say, the best is the enemy of good.The best solution is to have optimum numbers of helicopters, twin,IFR ,two pilot and flying almost a scheduled operation by day only.What we have is neither the best nor optimum.But ,it works.
It is a known fact that for every flight that ends tragically, there are hundreds and thousands completed safely and routinely.If 95 % of those patients flown did not need a helicopter, that is the way it is, today. But, if 5% are helped or whose outcomes are positive, then this is a worthwhile endeavor.After all, nomne of us is sure whether we ourselves or our family members may end up in that 5% someday.
It is up to all of us,crews, pilots, operators, regulators and customers, to make sure the system is used and not abused and risks are either eliminated or mitigated to manageable proportions.
Fly safe and happy landings!
Alt3.

[Grenville Fortescue]

How can operational tasking/scheduling/prioritisation be responsible for actual flight safety? Isn't one the responsibility of an operations director/manager/controller and the other the responsibility of the pilot in command of the aircraft?

[[email protected]]

Those who can't handle it leave.Those who stay know the risks, and ,for the most part, work hard to reduce them. sadly it would appear that quite a lot of those who can't handle the risks end up leaving in a very terminal way.

[homonculus]

Grumpytroll

You make a good point. If the doctor says take your loved one by helicopter you sure will not argue. However the reason the doctor says use a helicopter is often due to defensive medicine. If there is a helicopter and he doesn't use it and the patient 'goes off' he might be sued. If the helicopter has an accident that isn't his problem.

In practice it is a little more complicated. Receiving hospitals may want to get e patient as early as possible for financial reasons. Using a helicopter may also increase the patient severity on which reimbursement is based. Some major centres are desperate for volume.

Whether or not the US use helicopters when they are not needed is not the issue - it is after all their money and they have to pay 18% of GDP on it. The issue is whether this indulgence results in a lower amount of ground transport and creates a vicious circle making helicopters more necessary, and second whether this dependence means that helicopters are used in marginal weather at night over poorly lit territory single pilot.

The US are now over funding community hospitals whereas systems such as Medicare often underfund urban hospitals - for example Medicare may only pay them cost less 30%. Together with telemedicine and mandatory continuing medical education, the desire to ship out everyone ASAP may abate. I for one will be happy.

[Savoia]

Preliminary Report: NTSB (http://ftpcontent4.worldnow.com/wmctv/NTSB-prelim.pdf)

[ShyTorque]

So, in short, someone has to make that decision and sometimes that decision is right sometimes wrong.It is not a perfect system but it is the best we have, to date.

In all spheres of aviation I've been involved with, only the captain makes the go/no go decision. All others may only make the initial request for the flight.

(The above includes military support including special ops, search and rescue, Casevac, Corporate, VIP, Police, over a period of 36 years).

I take it this was yet another accident involving a "VFR only" machine? Being flown in conditions that would have been more safely flown in an IFR equipped one, namely capable of being climbed to MSA when Night VFR was no longer possible.

I've flown VFR machines at night, some of them "floppy stick-ers". I trained on them, and was trained by the military to fly them on instruments. The last one I flew was originally SAS equipped but was stripped out so that police equipment could be carried instead.

These days I wouldn't accept a job requiring me to. No problem in UK, because legislation has outlawed it here, after previous high profile accidents

The answer to this slaughter? Use IFR equipped machines for an IFR job, or any job which has the possibility of becoming IFR. Train the crews to use them and keep them current. Take away the existing pressure to launch due to the no fly= no cash basis.

I keep banging on about this and make no excuses for doing so. I have personally experienced the aftermath of a number of accidents; just one accident is one too many. To keep losing people for the same basic reason is almost insane. The root cause of many of these EMS accidents is the requirement to make a profit.

[Rwy in Sight]

In my country where there are a lot and I mean a lot of islands, we had three EMS crashes in a two years period. Immediately after each accident, the ambulance flights using helicopters dropped dramatically only to raise few months later. I am not sure it is relevant but maybe fewer flights means by definition fewer accidents?

Rwy in Sight

[ShyTorque]

Provided you choose to "no go" on the correct occasions, how could it fail to have a significant effect?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Shy torque, having spent three years flying an unstabilsed AS355 for Night HEMs in UK (prior to JAR-OPS), I think you are hitting the nail on the head. For me the decision to launch, continue or land in a filed and wait was based solely on the ongoing safety of the flight. We, and the unit, were fully funded for the fiscal year to provide a healthy number of flight and training hours.

My decision always final and always supported by my crew and the Ambulance Service Control.

I cannot imagine how this must translate when the flight is already begun, dollars being burned already and the safety margins start to compress.

It is in our nature to try our very best to get the mission done especially when it involves people at the other end who may desperately need our services. The only real protection possible is to legislate AND remove the financial pressure.

The free market economics do not blend well in this area of our industry.

I wish the families of those affected well and hope they can find some comfort in the fact that there loved ones lost their lives in pursuit of a greater cause.

DB

[alouette3]

Shy Torque,
You misunderstand.The decision was not about going or not going.For the most part that is still the purview of the PIC.This was about the decision to use or not to use a helicopter to transfer a patient. That decision still remains with the physicians or the ambulance crew on the ground at the scene of an accident.Sometimes, people with hangnails have been flown and sometimes people who desperately needed a swift transportation were left to die or endure the ride to the hospital.Hence my comment about right and wrong decisions.
As for the rest of your comments, I could not agree more.
Alt 3.

[SASless]

How can operational tasking/scheduling/prioritisation be responsible for actual flight safety? Isn't one the responsibility of an operations director/manager/controller and the other the responsibility of the pilot in command of the aircraft?


FAR Part 135 which all HEMES Operations in the USA must comply with, require Operational Control by the Operator in addition to any responsibility and duties required of the Pilot.

Enforcement of that Requirement by the FAA, after way too long, went a long way in reducing the frequency of EMS Helicopter Fatal Accidents.

To answer your question.....in the USA....we see flight safety as being a shared responsibility to include Dispatch Authority.

Rotor & Wing Magazine :: New Helicopter EMS Rules: What it Means for Public Operators (http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/public-service/FAA/New-Helicopter-EMS-Rules-What-it-Means-for-Public-Operators_74441.html#.UnOUsxYtWTs)

[Devil 49]

Yes, as a rule, the PIC is the final authority as to accepting a dispatch request in USA HEMS operations. There are institutional and personal forces that could affect a PIC in taking the decision:

Revenue generated by transports completed is a clear and obvious issue in a 'for profit' operation, as is the 'rescue hero' syndrome. Many programs act to minimize these as much as possible, with varying effectiveness. But my experience is that pilots are there to fly and preventing a mistake from that mindset is a serious challenge.

Some programs require documentation of weather and other issues that prevent a transport being taken/completed. Adverse pressures, intentional and otherwise, are obvious. Generating data for management needs to be completely separated from the go/no-go.

I'm sticking my head up to draw fire, but the 'three to go' rule involves untrained and unqualified personnel, and occasionally, other agendas. This can put the absolute authority and responsibility for the decision in many hands. The idea is that any objection to a decision of dispatch will be towards the most conservative and safest action, but it's not always so. "Can't you/couldn't you do this, that or the other thing" discussions do occur and one should reasonably expect that to color the process.

I understand the operational control issue. I also see it as a potential dilution of responsibility- "If Op Con approves, it's probably alright".

To be clear, there's no reason to suspect any of these issues affected this event.

[SASless]

I used the Single "No!" method when deciding to go or not. If any member of the Crew said "No!" it was enough to call it and head for the Coffee Pot.

Even if the Crew said "Go!" and I decided for any reason not to go....the answer was "No Go!". Once I made that call....there was no altering it no matter who argued or whatever reason was given.

If the weather improved or some other measurable factor changed to allow the flight....then I would change my decision but it was my call...my responsibility....and most importantly....my LIABILITY!

I did not give a stuff about numbers of flights made, the profitability of the operation, the condition of the patient or the desires of the Operator, Hospital, or Med Crew.....my decisions were made on the FAR's, SOP's, Base Policies, my personal limits, and the existing weather and other factors that pertained to being able to make the flight safely and efficiently.

Our Mission Statement said something along the lines of "....to provide a Safe, Efficient, and Professional Medical Transportation Service...." and that is all we were obliged to do.

Heroics was not part of the pay check (cheque).

[ShyTorque]

SASless, we have always sung off the same hymn sheet in this matter. Sadly, it would appear that not all do, despite these ongoing and similar HEMS accidents.

With regard to the use of unstabilised VFR machines - any mission may launched having ticked all the right boxes (i.e. VFR achievable & maintainable, based on the met. information available at the time) but the forecast may of course be wrong.

That is when the real danger comes - does the pilot press on in marginal conditions, hoping to fly through a shower/poor visibility - or does he turn back. In this situation it's the easiest thing in the world to totally lose situational awareness and aircraft orientation, it occurs in a few seconds.

With a correctly flown IFR machine (i.e. instrumentation and stabilisation, preferably an autopilot fitted) a couple of button pushes and the aircraft systems will unload the pilot from most of his dangerous workload (overload) and climb itself to a safe altitude, on a safe heading. Having done so, the pilot can make a decision based on what he now knows and sees in front of him. It may even be possible to continue IFR for a while and subsequently let down back into VFR. If not, at least the aircraft and occupants are safe.

I know the stock answer to this - the industry can't do it because it can't afford it. As the old saying goes, "If you think flight safety is expensive, try having an accident".

[BigMike]

Last 2 posts... Gold.

It really is that simple.

"....to provide a Safe, Efficient, and Professional Medical Transportation Service...." This sums it up...
That's all we are doing. Not saving the world, just moving a person from A to B who requires medical attention.
VFR single will do this fine with limits, IFR twin will give more options, however the FINAL decision rests with the PIC... not the Flt Nurse, not the Doctor, Base Manager, Etc... the PILOT.

As the pilot, are you comfortable launching based on available information, and conditions? fine. Current conditions outside your/aircraft ability... then simply No.
Doesn't matter if you NVG, IFR, Twin, blah blah... it is either safe to go, based on current information, or it is not...
In any event, if it's turning pear-shaped, then just land... overly simplistic, not really. We apply this to other types of helicopter flying don't we...?

[Jack Carson]

SASLess, Shy torque and Big Mike make very valid points. I have a slightly different slant in addition to their comments. As a new guy to EMS eleven years ago I made a concerted effort to standardize my approach to the flights. All flights day or night were flown to a standard profile established by myself. This entailed a takeoff and climb to a standard altitude. Most flights were flown at two to three thousand feet AGL. If I didn’t have the weather to insure terrain and cloud clearances, I DID NOT go. This was really easy in areas without local weather reporting because I was the weatherman and could not be disputed. One unnamed regional manager attempted a comment on one of my no-go decisions but his comments became just background noise to the TV in the base quarters. My number of rejected flights was not any greater than any of my contemporaries in the region

In addition, having flown SPIFR I became very attached to the autopilot. Once again standardization kicked in. Day/night VFR or IFR the autopilot was always engaged shortly after takeoff and was not disengaged until descending for landing. This experience makes me believe that all EMS ships, single or twin should have an autopilot. Autopilots don’t care if the ship is in VMC or IMC it just continues to fly the machine. IIMC procedures are reduced to turning a heading knot and calling for help.

[victor papa]

I wish we could run this thread in parallel with the 332 ditching thread. These 2 threads if read together to me defines the ultimate human factor in all the debates. On this thread we want automation to stop the accidents cause we dont have it, in the 332 thread theres a lot of critisism to automation and how its used when and how and type because we had automation! So, 2 accidents. Both lets simplify it to CFIT? 1 no automation so the solution is get it! 1 Full 4 axis fitted so the solution is some wants less automation, more training, better automation............... So it never ends?

Looking at the North Sea the last 5 years, I dont think its going to be as simple as IFR machines and the accidents will go away? The reasoning will just change and as per the 332 thread we come close to contradicting ourselves in the solution given simply of IFR machine?

[SASless]

I did as Jack describes.....every flight was set up as though it were an IFR flight....frequencies set, heading bug set, course set, and when available Autopilot used. All charts, maps, approach plates arranged and ready.

Scene Flights to off airport destinations got treated as though they were to the nearest IFR Airport. Fueling flights whenever possible were Instrument Approaches to the Airport using a published approach to minimums....some hand on...some hand off depending upon the machine.

Even in a VFR Only Machine with no SAS......just in case the worst case scenario occurred.

One hint of un-foreceast weather or a deterioration of existing weather and it was find a Safe Haven time.

IIMC is a KILLER even if you are well prepared......un-prepared and the odds become almost certain you become a topic of discussion here and other places.



VP,

You miss the point of both discussions if you think each thread contradicts the other.

Automation is not the issue in either thread.

Proper use of Automation is.

Used properly in an EMS Helicopter....it can save your life.

Used improperly (or not used at all) and you can find yourself explaining yourself to a much higher authority.

[ShyTorque]

I wish we could run this thread in parallel with the 332 ditching thread. These 2 threads if read together to me defines the ultimate human factor in all the debates. On this thread we want automation to stop the accidents cause we dont have it, in the 332 thread theres a lot of critisism to automation and how its used when and how and type because we had automation! So, 2 accidents. Both lets simplify it to CFIT? 1 no automation so the solution is get it! 1 Full 4 axis fitted so the solution is some wants less automation, more training, better automation............... So it never ends?

Looking at the North Sea the last 5 years, I dont think its going to be as simple as IFR machines and the accidents will go away? The reasoning will just change and as per the 332 thread we come close to contradicting ourselves in the solution given simply of IFR machine?

Helicopter VFR is safe.

Helicopter IFR is safe.

Blurring the two, or attempting one when the other is appropriate is what is UNSAFE.

[Grenville Fortescue]

On this thread we want automation to stop the accidents cause we dont have it, in the 332 thread theres a lot of critisism to automation and how its used when and how and type because we had automation! So, 2 accidents. Both lets simplify it to CFIT? 1 no automation so the solution is get it! 1 Full 4 axis fitted so the solution is some wants less automation, more training, better automation............... So it never ends?

Looking at the North Sea the last 5 years, I dont think its going to be as simple as IFR machines and the accidents will go away? The reasoning will just change and as per the 332 thread we come close to contradicting ourselves in the solution given simply of IFR machine?

Actually is does end, and it ends with skilled/disciplined crews.

On the 332 thread some are going on about better training/awareness of automated systems and understanding how they work which, you would think, would be standard. But, what if (for argument's sake) the automation fails, then what? Monitoring attitude, altitude, airspeed and heading should, you would think, be a fairly basic and frequent practice (especially on approach). But this comes down to personal discipline, initially through training and thereafter through ongoing personal subscription to the lessons learnt from that training, but in this case not in relation to the intricacies of automation but rather the basics of flying.

In the same way with this accident (assuming we are talking about CFIT) a skilled/disciplined pilot flying a single pilot scenario will ensure he/she understands the boundaries of their own and their aircraft's limitations, identify a healthy buffer between the periphery of those limitations and where they practice their operational flying, and then enforce this separation with discipline based on an appreciation that this buffer is a prerequisite to basic safety.

[victor papa]

All 3 of you are making my point better than I did.