Operational Control at Bankstown

[Dick Smith]

If I remember correctly, whenever I went into the briefing office at Bankstown there were Flight Service Officers and also, I think, someone from the MET Department and also the "Operational Controller” who used to check the additions on your flight plan and a few other things and then put a big stamp on it. Can someone advise if the Operational Controller only checked plans that were going into controlled airspace or did the Operational Controller check all plans?

I understand the Government doing Operational Control came in after the Kyeema crash into Mount Dandenong where the pilot had put wrong time intervals on the flight plan and descended too late. Of course, Operational Control by the CAA was abolished, saving the industry (I understand) about $30 million a year. I’m glad I was involved in that.

[dhavillandpilot]

As someone who learnt to fly in 1974 I remember only too well the briefing office and the guys who worked there.

Yes there was operational control for OCA. They use to look over your plans know the weather and very positively suggest flying was not for you, read your experience, that day.

They also use to vet your route against notams and restricted areas. Remember the old flight plan had a column on the right to notate each restricted area.

Now it is up to you, with big brother ready with the do not pass go fine book for transgressions.

Despite the cost these guys in the briefing office probably saved many an aspiring pilot from fatal errors

[catseye]

Geez Dick your showing your age and whats more I can remember it as well. Used to be called Operations Control or similar. Almost going to school and having your work checked for mistakes.

It was cut out when a lot of the face to face briefing departed along with airflash priority calls through the PMG dept........

You are probably right about saving lives but the bottom line is that it is not readily identifiable benefit that air no services could put in front of their bean counters . I

I can recall seeing a couple of people having their plans BK to Bathurst bounced as the Katoomba gap was below vmc and forecast to stay that way all day. :D

[Capt Casper]

In my memento's I have a flight plan for a training flight I undertook as part of my training for my private pilot's licence on 5/9/1964.
The route was Bankstown - Canberra - Bankstown. The document was called a "FLIGHT PLAN B".
At the bottom of the document is an Operational Approval box. It contains the statement (Required for Flights in Controlled Airspace).
Should operational approval be required it has space for "Terms", "Plan approved.........GMT", Plan void.........GMT". "Signature of the Air Trafic Controller", and if IFR, whether 1 or 2 pilots.
On my plan, in the "Terms" box it is rubber stamped "Operational Control Not Required" and hand written are the words "Notams Wx Call CB TWR at North Tip Lake George" it is initialled by the officer in the space for the signature of the Air Traffic Controller.
The Flight Levels on the plan were notated BCTA or B50 which I presume were the correct notations at that time for "Below Controlled Area" and "Below 5000 feet".
The flight was conducted in a C172.

[CaptainMidnight]

As I recall, for IFR flight at any stage in CTA you required FPA - Flight Plan Approval.

In addition to providing WX and NOTAMs initially, the ATC briefer would check the flight plan's endurance i.e. fuel required for departure point to destination plus holding fuel required, fixed and variable reserves, whether the alternate if any was suitable etc. whether the flight planned route was acceptable i.e. in accordance with inbound/outbound routes, two way vs one way routes etc. and tee up special requirements with the TWR or AACC. They used to also look over the rest of the plan for any errors or omissions. If all was OK they'd grant FPA and stamp the plan.

Importantly they and the FS briefers gave a lot of guidance and advice re airspace, procedures and conditions, explained rules and regs. etc. and the met man was there to provide his guidance and expertise also.

Flight Plan DA1641 VH-AES March 1990 (http://www.airwaysmuseum.com/Flight%20Plan%20DA1641%203-90.htm)
MB BO c.70s (http://www.airwaysmuseum.com/MB%20BO%20c.70s.htm)

[Dick Smith]

So have any lives been lost since 1991 when my board removed the operational controllers from CAA?

That's over 20 years ago so surely we would know by now?

Something like $600 m has been saved by the industry since then.

[dhavillandpilot]

Yes you are right Dick, in today's world with better weather radar, GPS etc the system has been made largely redundant and the cost saving great

But in the 1970s things were pretty agricultural and the number of VFR accidents were consistently high

[CaptainMidnight]

Flight Service used to check the same things for IFR & VFR OCTA plans.

How many run-out-of-fuel events have there been since 1991, which perhaps might have been prevented if someone had checked the flight plan's fuel calculations? Difficult to quantify, and it comes down to affordable safety ........

I think the closure of the briefing offices have contributed to the general lack of basic knowledge of GA pilots these days i.e. a knowledge of airspace, procedures, services, operational requirements, met, flight planning etc. etc., things which one could wander in and ask questions about from the briefing guys and gals.

Now such questions are left to instructors, some of whom don't have a great depth of knowledge themselves.

[Capt Casper]

Don't know about lives lost, but I bet the unfortunate Pel Air - Norfolk - accident pilot would in retrospect have welcomed "Operational Control"!
Airlines and large commercial companies can no doubt put strategies in place to look after their own interests, but the recent Mildura debarcle even puts them to shame.
The only way you can have effective operational control is to have an experienced, knowledgeable, "effective" person oversee the "operation".
The old adage - "You don't know what you don't know."
Some effective form of "flight following & monitoring" should be required of all commercial flights as part of their risk management.
I don't know precisely how the Americans do it, but I think commercial flights there are overseen by "despatcher's" who in effect, provide a form of operational control and responsibility for the duration of a commercial flight. As well there are FBO's and handling agents who provide a fee based service on demand.

[Old Akro]

Touche!

You could also ask a similar question about the cessation of full reporting. And the withdrawal of fire services at secondary airports.

[Horatio Leafblower]

So have any lives been lost since 1991 when my board removed the operational controllers from CAA?

I started flying post 7/12/91, after the implementation of AMATS and the abolition of position reporting and briefing offices.

I can only ask in reply: How many pilots have departed a GAAP and died after entering IMC?

I give you VH-JDQ for one very recent example :=

[Capt Fathom]

From what I remember, Ops Control aka Flight Plan Approval was only required for IFR flights.

They would sometimes argue with you over petty things. Other times, they were quite helpful. Long before the internet and readily available weather reporting, the first you knew your destination was crap was when alerted by Ops Control!

Now it's self serve!

[Jack Ranga]

Dick,

Fair dinkum, if you think you've saved the industry 600 mil from the abolition of OPS Control you've lost that again to the other empires that have sprung up. 1 to 3 manager ratio etc.

No doubts, OPS Control saved some lives. At what cost? What cost a life? I remember it & briefing. It was an invaluable resource in my pilot education. Many a time you'd submit your plan & the dood behind the counter could tell you whether you were going to get over the mountains or not.

MIA/AD would NOT have happened if OPS Control were around, NCD you may say? If you want to roll the dice, go ahead I suppose.

We used to take the piss out of OPS Control at work, mercilessly. On reflection I'd prefer them to the useless ******** departments we now have. Dick, if you think you saved money by eliminating them you should take a look at what's sprung up now ;)

[Old Akro]

From what I remember, Ops Control aka Flight Plan Approval was only required for IFR flights.

No. I used to get them at Essendon & Moorabbin both during my nav training then after as a new PPL.

As I recall, Ops control checked the flight plan and dealt with NOTAM's etc. They checked arithmetic on time intervals and reporting points.

You went to a separate desk in the same office to see the MET guy to get weather. The decision to go or not go has always been the pilot's. I can recall a couple of instances of debating with the MET guy about whether or not to go. Then like now they would give weather, but not prescriptive advice. Its just not their role.

[Capt Fathom]

Must have been different in the Capital Cities.

In the bush, we just submitted a VFR plan at the briefing office then walked out the door.

If you submitted an IFR plan, you had to wait whilst they rang HQ and got the big stamp of approval before you could move!

I'm talking late 70's early 80's now.

[fujii]

There was never any Operational Control at Bankstown nor any of the other Secondary Airports as they were called. Operations Control was located at the capital city primary airport (SY, ML, AD etc.) where the Senior Operations Controller was located. The Briefing Office at the secondary airports was typically staffed by an FSO and an ATC briefing officer. The ATC would most likely have endorsements for the BO and the tower and work both on a rotating roster.

Both BO staff members could accept plans, however, only the ATC could accept IFR plans and give them Operational Approval. Although the ATC member approved the IFR plan, when the plan arrived in the Operational Control Centre, it was again checked and a paper strip was filled in and displayed for the Senior Operations Controller to monitor for the duration of the flight or leaving the FIR.

I did ATC PF TWR and BO for many years. It was surprising how many plan errors we picked up but it was a great place to meet the pilots.

[Hempy]

$600 mill? Spent in a heartbeat and on the back of a solid front 9....

Even if the loss of 'personal touch' that Flight Service/Briefing/Ops Control bought to aviation in this country has only cost one life, how much was that life worth? What if it was 10 lives? 100? What about your life Dick? How much is it worth?

'World's best' economic practice does not equal 'worlds best' aviation practice. Given your success in the former, and what I've seen of the latter, I can see how you came to a contrary conclusion

[Dick Smith]

All lives are priceless as far as I am concerned. That is equally priceless

For that reason the resources must be allocated to save the most lives

That's why we removed operational control by CAA and the secondary airports RFFS and full position VFR reporting . Allowed money to be spent by the industry where real safety could be improved.

And it has clearly worked. No one is calling for a reversal of those reforms .

[Jack Ranga]

Dick,

You say 'allowed money to be spent by the industry where real safety could be improved' where was that money spent? Because looking at the industry over the last 15-20 years, nothing, NOTHING has improved safety wise. Perception is reality.

I'm genuinely interested in your response as to where that 600 million saved has been spent on safety?

[Creampuff]

Jack is correct, Dick

The money ‘saved’ in one area of aviation was never spent in another area of aviation.

It went the way of so much our hard-earned: to feed bloated leaches on the body politic. :yuk:

[Frank Arouet]

Yes "empire building" became fashionable when Parkinsons Law was introduced.

$600 million could easily have been spent on a feasibility study into the environmental impact on a regulatory review. Oh, and pot plant's. Not Dick's fault, his motives probably assumed he was dealing with "straight shooters" in the departments.

[Hempy]

Dick we all know what you 'saved' the industry in Australia, no one is questioning it. Perhaps just once, though, you might balance your argument with an account as to what you actually cost the industry as well....

[Jack Ranga]

Frank, no doubts as to Dick's motivation, not saying anything is his fault. But if a statement is made as to 600 million being spent elsewhere on safety I'd like to see where it was spent and on what?

Safety has NOT improved. An argument can be made that standards have dropped significantly, I'm paying a bucket load more to maintain my licences but we've saved 600 million. Shouldn't it be costing me less?

[Old Akro]

The money ‘saved’ in one area of aviation was never spent in another area of aviation.

I like CASA bashing as much as anyone. But this lies at the feet of the politicians. I don't believe CASA gets a vote on where the money goes.

The part that CASA should be accountable for is the efficient use of the money its allocated.

They should be accountable for the amount of money that gets absorbed by career public servants in Canberra feeding the bureaucracy vs those with aviation experience at the front line. In the late seventies or eighties the AOPA used to run campaigns about the number of CASA (then DOT) personnel with aviation industry experience. Its time for that again.

They should also be accountable to demonstrate achieved benefits from the new regulations after all the money that its cost.

[BPA]

The lives of the two young men who died in the Trindad crash in the blue mountains in bad weather could have been saved if the briefing office was still there. The aircaft departed BK on a pretty average weather day heading west via KAT, unfortunately they never made it. If the briefing office was there, the PIC of the Trindad would have been able to talk directly to the met man regarding the low cloud over the blue mountains, the FSO would not have accepting their VFR plan as the conditions on the day were not VFR conditions.

Jump forward to 2013 and the lack of Operational Control was a factor in the diversion and landing below minima of the Virgin and Qantas 737's at Mildura. If Operational Control was still in place, the Operations controllers would have recieved all the updated weather forecasts on AD that started to indicate fog at AD shortly after the aircaft departed BN and SY. The Operations controllers would have past this information to the aircaft via the sector controllers. I'm sure if one of these aircaft would have departed the runway while landing below minima of an RNAV approach then the discussion about Australia's former Operational Control would have come out in the media and the reason it was removed was as a cost saving.

[Fantome]

This thought provoking line of debate is one that can do with a good further airing. Putting a brake on those 'accidents going somewhere to happen' will always be a concern of those who train, oversee and regulate. But as an aside, to say 'all lives are priceless' . . .. . well that is a contentious statement, better not gone into here. (Except to say, any one person's life is likely to be priceless to someone close to that person.)

The SOCs the Senior Operational Controllers, did a brilliant job, by and large,that's for sure. One there was at Mascot, the late Doug Hand. What
a quiet, unassuming wealth of aviation and air safety lore resided in that
man's grey matter. The men who came out of the RAAF after the war and who chose to join 'the department' were of a type and calibre whose passing some of us lament. We, the lot of us, are the poorer for not having their kind around today.

Another worthy of honourable mention is the late Don Charlwood, (author of 'No Moon Tonight'). Don did a power of good for the implementation of
sound air traffic controls in Australia and PNG, at the training level.

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Someone mentioned an old flight plan he still has. I have one amongst the souvenirs filled in by the late Chris Braund. One of the boxes at the bottom has 'MEANS OF CANCELLING SAR'.

Chris crossed out 'radio' and 'telephone' and wrote in instead 'smoke signal'.

he prefixed his signature at the bottom of the form with 'yours sincerely'

(Chris also appended his initials to the Mustang he bought and flew away from Tocumwal for 300 pounds - VH-FCB)

[Old Akro]

The lives of the two young men who died in the Trindad crash in the blue mountains in bad weather could have been saved if the briefing office was still there.

At the bottom of the ARFOR is a phone number for elaborative briefing. I typically ring it 1-2 times per year when I'm uncertain about weather. My experience is that the guys are outstandingly good. They won't tell you to go or not to go, but in my experience they give very good guidance on the weather you can expect that is augmented with local radar and they can get pilot reports from the controllers. Just because there is not a guy standing at a desk, doesn't mean you can't get the service.

My criticism is that the availability of in-flight weather service is not nearly as good. We had an instance recently where we critically required information on weather at alternates and frankly, got better detail from the iPad than the area controller.

The Mildura incident in my opinion was a failure of available weather observation - not the communication mechanism to get it to the pilot. I believe this is a BoM issue. But I maintain that that argument misses the big picture. We have less airports with ILS than Malaysia and about the same number as Thailand. If we invested properly in first world infrastructure then the Mildura incident would have been a non event.

If you go to the ATSB website you can search using a number of filters. They are a bit clunky, but it kind of works. I searched completed, final reports for accidents with fatalities over the last 5 years and got 71 results. About 17 of those are assistance to overseas agencies - leaving 54 in Australia - or 10 per year. About half of these are choppers. About half are AG / mustering (rotary & fixed wing). If saving lives was really our first priority we'd put more effort here.

I counted only 3 VMC-IMC accidents and 2 NVMC / disorientation accidents. There are 3 where better VHF coverage / radar / ELT might have made a difference by speeding up the search. There were (surprisingly) 3 mid-air collisions - although 2 were at stations where there was probably little anyone else might have done.

[Fantome]

But of course an accurate summation of fatalities in the last five years
cannot be derived from ATSB sources alone, since a number of crashes
are not the subject of ATSB investigation.

Also there will be a number for which ATSB final reports are not yet out.

[Old Akro]

Fantome

Couldn't agree more. And sometimes the neat ATSB conclusion hides other failures. And the search engine is not very good and doesn't deliver the same search results each time. But its an interesting snapshot. It's Lockhart River, Pelair, Canley Vale, Hemplel etc that stick in our mind. But if we really wanted to save lives we'd revisit the job we are doing with choppers.

[sunnySA]

Dick says
If I remember correctly, whenever I went into the briefing office at Bankstown there were Flight Service Officers and also, I think, someone from the MET Department and also the "Operational Controller” who used to check the additions on your flight plan and a few other things and then put a big stamp on it. Can someone advise if the Operational Controller only checked plans that were going into controlled airspace or did the Operational Controller check all plans?

I understand the Government doing Operational Control came in after the Kyeema crash into Mount Dandenong where the pilot had put wrong time intervals on the flight plan and descended too late. Of course, Operational Control by the CAA was abolished, saving the industry (I understand) about $30 million a year. I’m glad I was involved in that.

Makes me query what was presented to the CAA Board if the then Chairman now clearly demonstrates ignorance and makes unsubstantiated claims.

Mr Google says (in relation to crash of the Kyeema)
By public demand a Royal Commission into the cause of the disaster was established, and the Australian Federal Government appointed an Air Accident Investigation Committee under the Chairmanship of Colonel T. Murdoch DSO, VCE with the public equiry commencing on 30 October 1938. Because of the crash, regulations were passed which require flight checking officers to monitor the flights of aeroplanes and advise on such things as position, weather, and alternate landing options.

ABC News says (in relation to crash of the Kyeema)
"The responsibility for civil aviation was taken out of hands of the Department of Defence where it had been a poor relation," he said.

"A new Department of Civil Aviation as a separate portfolio was created. And also the accident gave birth to what became Australia's system of air traffic control."



As Fujii highlights,
There was never any Operational Control at Bankstown nor any of the other Secondary Airports as they were called. Operations Control was located at the capital city primary airport (SY, ML, AD etc.) where the Senior Operations Controller was located. The Briefing Office at the secondary airports was typically staffed by an FSO and an ATC briefing officer. The ATC would most likely have endorsements for the BO and the tower and work both on a rotating roster.

Both BO staff members could accept plans, however, only the ATC could accept IFR plans and give them Operational Approval. Although the ATC member approved the IFR plan, when the plan arrived in the Operational Control Centre, it was again checked and a paper strip was filled in and displayed for the Senior Operations Controller to monitor for the duration of the flight or leaving the FIR.

I'd add that many of the FSO staff who worked in the various Briefing Offices at the Secondary Airports were pilots (PPL or CPL).


Perhaps Dick would like to give some examples how this reported $600m "saving" has led to a safer system, that is, where has the money been spent. Dick, specifically, what did you do with the money that you "saved".

[Fantome]

--------------------------------------------------------


HUGH . .. . WHISTLING DIXIE -

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNtMpPFM7M0

[peuce]

My reply to Dick...each time he resurrects this argument is that:


The removal of OCA/BO/FSOs has resulted in a decrease in the general discipline of the GA community...especially from new pilots entering the system. A generalisation I know, but I believe that would be a widely help belief.
The removal of Full Reporting has resulted in the "disappearance" of a large portion of GA. They are still there, but where, flying to what standard, how efficiently and how many have been lost, caught out by weather or suffered a mechanical issue...and just got away with it...and we've never heard about it? Just because you can't see it, doesn't mean it's not there.


Is that really good value for our $600m?

[CaptainMidnight]

The lives of the two young men who died in the Trindad crash in the blue mountains in bad weather could have been saved if the briefing office was still there. The aircaft departed BK on a pretty average weather day heading west via KAT, unfortunately they never made it. If the briefing office was there, the PIC of the Trindad would have been able to talk directly to the met man regarding the low cloud over the blue mountains, the FSO would not have accepting their VFR plan as the conditions on the day were not VFR conditions.

I was once told a story about a Flight Service Officer briefer at Essendon who finally tore up a young and inexperienced VFR pilot's flight plan, after repeatedly trying to convince him not to "go and have a look" on a real bad (forecast and pilot report actuals) Winter day ......

[Creampuff]

I like CASA bashing as much as anyone. But this lies at the feet of the politicians.I agree.

My reference to bloated leaches on the body politic was not to CASA. It was to the major political parties and their camp-followers.

[mostlytossas]

Yes I remember the old FSU's too and while they could and did refuse to accept a VFR flight plan at times this still did not prevent you from departing if you were sure the weather was good enough or you was silly enough too, depending on your point of view/circumstance at the time. You simply departed no SAR no details. ( simular to todays flight note in so far as you got someone else to look out for you not the system).
And while some pilots were indeed silly to depart, some FS officers were overly cautious and not accepting your flight plan was more to do with protecting their backside ( in case you did go missing) than basing their decision on factual weather rather than a forecast. I remember one day in Bankstown having just that happen to me as he was adamant that the weather was non VMC at Bowral even though the wx system had passed through the area and you could almost see Bowral from the ramp. I flew home to Cootamundra in sunshine no sar no details that day.
While the old system had some advantages at times,at the end of the day the pilot in command has to make the go/ no go call themselves and be trained well enough to make the right one.

[RAC/OPS]

Can someone advise if the Operational Controller only checked plans that were going into controlled airspace or did the Operational Controller check all plans?

So you got rid of them without fully knowing what they did?

[Old Akro]

Just a reality check on a few points.

1. It should be an instructor, ATO, or a mentor with whom you have a relationship that you seek go/nogo advice. Not an FSO. I agree that many were very good. But it simply wasn't their role.
2. The FSO / briefing structure was created in an era without: fax machines, mobile phones, smart phones, internet, personal computers, tablets, iPads. This was an era when face to face was nearly the only option.
3. It was also an era when the weather maps were hand drawn. The available sources of weather were the map in the local newspaper or a met briefing guy. Full stop. A forecast meant 24 hours ahead if you were lucky, not 4 days or 7 days. Now you can get weather radar, predictive MSL charts, satellite images. You can get it from a number of different providers and have it delivered by fax, internet, smartphone app or an old fashioned phone briefing. You can get it overlaid on AvPlan (& Ozrunways?) or Jeppesen flitedeck or some glass instrument panels.
4. While there were some regional met observers, there was not the network of AWIS that there is now. Its pretty easy to call up a number enroute with your mobile connected via bluetooth to your noise cancelling headsets to get a picture of how weather is progressing on the ground. The sadness is that it happens by the public phone network rather than the AsA radio network.
5. It was an era without transponders, or PLB's or spot trackers. VHF radios were unclear and we didn't use headsets. Typically we had only 1 VHF not 2 as is common now.

I did my unrestricted pilot licence navs at Essendon airport soon after it was opened to GA and loved climbing the worn wooden steps of the briefing office following in the footsteps of past generations of DC3 captains. I liked the whole process of dealing with the FSO & the met guy. Of them getting "clay paper" copies of notams and stapling them to the flight plan, then stamping it with the big round red clock stamp. It made a young 1st year engineering student feel important. I liked the satisfaction of flying full reporting and getting the waypoints within 2 minutes. I liked marking up maps and doing calculations with the circular slide rule.

But its gone. And frankly, I think its safer now. Every other industry has restructured and reduced cost through the introduction of technology. So should CASA & AsA. My biggest gripe would be that the cost cutting that CASA & AsA has done has been primarily at the front line, not the bloated back office - and especially not in Canberra.

[triadic]

A thread that brings back some memories !!

1) Operational Control still exists - it is (and always has been) provided by the pilot in command and assisted depending on the operation/operator by a dispatcher. In the days of OPC it was the SOC that had the responsibility for directing Operational info to IFR ops in CTA. He could, if the circumstances warranted extend OPC to aircraft OCTA including VFR if he thought the flight was in some form of danger - such as making the VFR land or take an alternative route. In the early days of NVFR there were occasions where the SOC got involved in VFR ops at night operating below what was considered the LSALT for the area, however the route LSAs were not always the same as those calculated for NVFR ops which lead to some interesting on air 'discussions'!! There were some anomalies in the system and the one that comes to mind is the VFR operation in CTA where the SOC would not be aware of the flight and the responsibility for providing terminal and enroute data was with the FSU for the arrival port. Unless coordinated correctly it was possible for such a flight not to be directed with any Operational info. I recall one such case where the flight left CTA and only to be told on first contact with FS that the TAF had changed requiring an ALTN :uhoh:

2) The previous post on climbing the steps at EN BO brings back some memories also. In the mid '70's there was one ATCO who conducted the briefings etc and he always double checked the pilots arithmetic with some amusing days when some of the regulars would make errors just to find if he would find them!! For some years the FSO there was downstairs and would type the plans up etc. Close to the end of the BO, he was moved upstairs to the rear of the BO, but played no part in pilot briefing unless the ATCO was out of the room. The met man was there for a time, and usually only in the mornings. Later on you could speak to the Met man at Tulla and they would fax any specific info across (first time I saw a fax in fact!)


It was a cost we could certainly do without, but I don't believe the training since has made up for it and as has been said previously the loss of the Briefing Officers was a very big hole in the total pilot/industry education process. There are still many including instructors and check captains that don't know what they don't know and it shows with many of the end products.

As has been said before..."A pilot passing a CPL test today would not have passed a PPL test in the '70's" Sadly this is mostly true. CASA, sadly don't have enough corporate history/experience now to realise this sad fact and do something about it. Changing the licencing requirements is not the fix!

:sad:

[sunnySA]

Perhaps Dick would like to give some examples how this reported $600m "saving" has led to a safer system, that is, where has the money been spent. Dick, specifically, what did you do with the money that you "saved".

Perhaps Dick doesn't have any examples of how this reported $600m "saving" has led to a safer system.

[Wizofoz]

...And in regards to the guys in the Trinidad- as well as a few other accidents where people survived the impact but died waiting for rescue- full reporting would have led to a MUCH quicker S and R effort, and almost certainly saved lives.

[Wallsofchina]

So have any lives been lost since 1991 when my board removed the operational controllers from CAA?

I can think of nine lives lost in three accidents, all weather related but then, even with the operational controllers there was a steady loss also.

What would be good, is for the ATSB database to be searchable by accident type, and then we could quickly get a grip on weather related, fuel exhaustion, planning related etc. and you would see.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
As many probably never knew, DCA Operational Control (control of the commencement, continuation or diversion of the aircraft) only applied to domestic operators, substantially Ansett and TAA, and the smaller airlines.

It never applied to Qantas operations, the only "Ops Control" sat in the left front window seat.

We always found it a little amusing and just a trifle insulting, given Qantas tradition and practice (and the law), that some bloke on the ground would be making operational decisions that were, as far as we were concerned, the exclusive preserve of the bloke called Captain.

US operators have always had Ops. Control, run by each company, it is huge cost and not very efficient. For, say, United, is the flight follower in Chicago going to have a better idea of the Sydney weather than an aircraft several hours from Sydney.

There never was any "operational control" of VFR flights, but the way some FSOs carried on, an impressionable young bloke could be forgiven for thinking otherwise.

Undoubtedly, there were many great people amongst the people who worked in the system, but it cost large dollops of money for little demonstrable benefit, ie; it could not be cost/benefit justified. I'm all for nostalgia, as long as I don't have to pay for it!!

Tootle pip!!

[Peter Hugh Pigott]

hi Dick I remember filling in plans back in 1962 and in those days we had full reporting for all VFR flights at huge cost to the taxpayer. We were all told the myth that if we crashed rescue aircraft would take off within minutes to search for us.How gullible was that. Yes they checked every detail,we were all I fear of being wrong. Cheers Pete

[hiwaytohell]

And while some pilots were indeed silly to depart, some FS officers were overly cautious and not accepting your flight plan was more to do with protecting their backside ( in case you did go missing) than basing their decision on factual weather rather than a forecast

This was also my experience. I had my flight plan torn up several times and told "you are not going anywhere today sonny". So we just went "no sar" anyway.

Another experience with operational control was after I had an engine failure on a charter flight one night and called a pan. When I arrived in the circuit area:

ATC: "....Operational Control have instructed you to hold until they can figure it out"

And after a short pause

ATC: "..confirm POB and intentions"

Me: "...POB 3 and land"

ATC: "...clear to land and check wheels on final"

And after landing.

ATC: "...don't worry about calling up, I'll sort out Operations Control. Have a good night."

I remember speaking to the controller later and he'd had a neck full of them as well.

Dick you were right to get rid of it, Operational Control was a total waste of money.

[Frank Arouet]

we had full reporting for all VFR flights

1962 puts you ahead of me who only began flying in 1965, but I can assure that full reporting was not a mandatory requirement in my day. Short flights were regularly done NOSAR no details.

WE did advise "souls on board" on taxi at Bankstown as opposed to POB. But that's another story.

I did my Nav's using full reporting as was the custom, but thenceforth I remember BO50 OCTA with a SARTIME was usual for most flights.

Reporting within 2 minutes either side of ETA was a pain that required constant attention and accurate MET, so most of us flying low performance private flights took the easy way out. I'm still alive so I must be doing something right.

When later flying C210's and Bonanzas that had gadgets like DME (A)! and ADF/ VOR, we flew higher and got there faster but I don't recall full reporting.

I do recall old blokes telling me not to use those electric gadgets because all aeroplanes would converge on the NDB you were homing into and there would be scrap aluminum galore where they all smashed into each other.

Didn't happen of course and I've heard similar things about GPS and people flying one mile each side of track.

Yes, things change, but it is important to recall the old days with accuracy.

I think that's right, but sometimes one has doubts about memories.

[Old Akro]

We were all told the myth that if we crashed rescue aircraft would take off within minutes to search for us.How gullible was that.

If there was a real interest in that, we'd have an ATC that monitored 121.5.

[Hempy]

LOL Old Akro....which receiver would you like 121.5 to have been monitored on?

[Old Akro]

Nearly every other country in the world ATC monitors 121.5. It must be possible. But my argument is not that we don't monitor 121.5. Its that its hard to justify some of the other things (the case in point was full reporting) when AsA has a blind spot about the obvious things like someone monitoring the emergency frequency.

[majorca]

You were correct in abolishing ATC Ops at Capital city aerodromes and placing ops control into the hands of the major airlines, Dick, but it was very short sighted and foolish to abolish briefing office services at the Secondary Zones such as BK and MB. They provided a great service to the GA industry and especially to inexperienced or newly licensed pilots.

[Frank Arouet]

I recall "service stations" giving service. Check oil, water, tyres and wash the windscreen. They don't do that any more. Did "service stations" plan your trip for you or were they liable in any way for you crashing en route.

FS were great and everyone I dealt with were helpful even to the point of making a cuppa or arranging a lift to town, but flight into terrain was as an epidemic then, as now.

Most pilots have access to a computer and watch the weather on TV these days and I guess as technology advances service dwindles. I hope nobody ever thought FS were a fallback if they, as PIC, failed or FS were in any way "flight planners" or carried liability.

I'm guessing if you didn't have Dick to blame, you would be blaming someone else.

I long for the good old days, but I don't live there any more.

[Old Akro]

They provided a great service to the GA industry and especially to inexperienced or newly licensed pilots.

I aerobatic competition & in some car races, we have guys to make last minute checks of harnesses, helmets, etc. Maybe FS should employ guys like that on the tarmac too ? - as a service to GA? Maybe go over the pre-flight inspections too?

Instructors are supposed to give inexperienced or newly licensed pilots support. If its not happening there, then we need to look at that at the quality of schools, not apply a band-aid. Sooner or later you have to take responsibility for your own actions.

[majorca]

The service offered was more than "checking oil etc", it was also about safety and the BO's provided an operational information centre. The amount of private calls to GA towers seems to indicate there is an information void out there. Not all instructors have the necessary experience to impart such knowledge.

[QSK?]

I must admit to being somewhat bemused by comments appearing on this thread that implies ATS briefing officers arbitrarily "tore up flight plans" or did not accept flight plans in order to protect "their backsides".

I would like to balance this debate by highlighting some facts based on someone who was in the ATS system for many years (up to senior management level) and who also had significant operational experience in the pilot briefing role:

1. No briefing officer (ATC or FS) had the authority to arbitrarily not accept a flight plan from a pilot. They had a responsibility to give the pilot all the critical information for the flight (both forecast and actual) and to provide advice based on their ATS/flying experience where it was considered appropriate. However, provided the flight plan met regulatory requirements, if the pilot still wanted to have the flight plan lodged with the ATS system, then the briefing officer was bound to accept it;

2. The only time a briefing officer was justified in not accepting a flight plan from a pilot was if the flight did not meet regulatory requirements. Typically, these situations included flights intending to operate into remote areas or over water without the proper equipment, flights planning to enter an active restricted area or IFR flights intending to operate contrary to designated one-way air routes or IFR flight plans with altitudes below the published LSALTs. Based on my experience when a flight plan was being rejected by a briefing officer, it was always done in a professional manner, usually followed up with a bit of empathetic education if the pilot was either a student, inexperienced or new to the area;

3. If a briefing officer felt that a pilot (particularly a VFR pilot) was intending to proceed into weather conditions or into an area (remote or over water) that would present a potential safety risk to the aircraft's occupants, the briefing officer had the option of referring the matter to the Senior Operations Controller responsible for the relevant Flight Information Region. I had to exercise this option on a number of occasions in the past. The SOC had the power to either exercise operational control directly over the subject aircraft (even if it was VFR OCTA) or issue a direction to the pilot for the flight not to proceed;

4. Briefing officers were required to retain all flight plans lodged with the relevant briefing office, regardless of whether the flight plans were eventually activated or not; and

5. In all my years of experience, I have never heard of a briefing officer arbitrarily tearing up or rejecting a flight plan.

With respect to other comments as to whether the abolition of operational control has resulted in the loss of life, I would have to say, yes, and point to the PA31 accident at Mt Hotham as a good example. If Operational Control had still been in place at Melbourne, I am sure the SOC would have directed that flight remain on the ground at Essendon. Although no loss of life occurred in the recent VA B737 incident at Mildura or the Pelair accident at Norfolk Island, the lack of effective operational control in my view was a factor in both of these situations.

However, I also agree with comments on this thread that the proper place for operational control should rest with the pilot in command but, in order for safe operational control to be exercised, the pilot in command needs to supported by an effective ground based dissemination system within the pilot's organisation. Unfortunately, I don't consider this to be the case for many of Australia's airlines or larger charter operators, particularly for the smaller regional airlines.

[Frank Arouet]

Not all instructors have the necessary experience to impart such knowledge

This identifies one problem in need of a solution. More chance fixing this than holding Dick Smith responsible for historical changes to all our lives brought about by Government.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

I agree with Mr 'QSK'.

In my experience working at several / various FSC's & FSU's, we were all acutely aware of our responsibilities, particularly what we 'could say/do' and what we could NOT.
And 'tearing up' a FPL was NOT on the agenda.

If submitted, the FPL would be put into the system, as the pilot may decide to go and 'have a look' - later, or seek other advice - instructor etc.

A little green smiley face often was an acknowledgement of a well prepared and legible FPL, and all available assistance was the attitude of the stations I worked at. No flashing blue lights here mate.....

As has been stated, any particularly 'stroppy' situations would be referred to the Senior Ops Controller (SOC) in those days, who DID have the authority to direct the pilot accordingly.
I do not recall ever having to do this as most advice given was in a professional manner, stuck to the facts / requirements of the situation, and was accepted accordingly. What the pilot did later was up to him /her.

No Cheers:hmm: