Possible Nuclear Accident

[Bergerie1]

Can I respectfully ask some of you who have inside military knowledge of such things (a) how true these reports are, and (b) how near were we to having it explode?

I was a commercial pilot and have little knowledge of military matters and nuclear command and control in particular.

BBC News - US plane in 1961 'nuclear bomb near-miss' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24183879)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/books/review/command-and-control-by-eric-schlosser.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1

[glad rag]

You can buy the book on amazon.

[Pontius Navigator]

a. Probably true.

b. We are told that a nuclear explosion would have been impossible.

We know from Palomares and Greenland that weapons survived crashes without detonation.

[Bergerie1]

Pontius

I know we were told that a nuclear accident leading to a nuclear explosion was impossible. But despite the many precautions that were in place I suspect we came closer to disaster than the powers-that-be have ever been willing to admit. The book suggests this was so. If there any experts out there with inside knowledge, I would very much like to know how accurate the reports in this book really are.

[dctyke]

Maybe 50s tech didn't have the safety systems of later aircraft. I find it difficult to take in that a, for example, a 70s/80s RAFG ac involved in a uncommanded release could overide the safety devices. Or in the event of an accident, send the many signals required to arm down the line to the weapon.

[Peter G-W]

It beggars belief that this weapon was being flown around the States with the crew-controlled safety breaks disabled. But there again we are dealing with a country that delivered one of its B52s to the scrapyard with a nuclear weapon accidentally left on board. I guess when you have a huge stockpile of weapons then you don't need to be too careful...

[Evalu8ter]

Gents,
Be careful judging from the comfort of our current position; history is all about context - the airborne alert was there 24/7 for good reason so accidents were nearly inevitable. It wasn't just the US that were a little 'fast and loose' with such weapons in this period; google the 'Violet Club' interim megaton (ish) massive fission weapon deployed in small numbers by the RAF as an emergency weapon prior to deliveries of 'productionised' fusion weapons (such as YS). The lack of safety breaks in that weapon are hair raising to say the least......but it tells you a bit about the pressures of living in that nuclear shadow.

[ORAC]

The other way to view it is that they had multiple safety systems and they worked.

It should also be noted that even if the last switch had been made there would have been no explosion, as the High Voltage thermal battery in the weapon had not been activated and no electric current was available to discharge the x-ray unit in the warhead.

They reviewed the system after the accident and added additional systems to add further redundancy and eventually stopped airborne alerts.

See here, as usual copy and replace the asterisk with 'o'.

http://nuclearweaponsaccidents.bl*gspot.co.uk

[Tankertrashnav]

The plane was on a routine flight when it began to break up over North Carolina on 23 January 1961.

Leaving aside the question of whether the bomb was or was not about to explode, does the book explain why the aircraft broke up? B52s don't tend to just break up in flight - was this a mid-air, as in Palomares, or severe CAT, or what?

[ORAC]

Leaving aside the question of whether the bomb was or was not about to explode, does the book explain why the aircraft broke up? B52s don't tend to just break up in flight - was this a mid-air, as in Palomares, or severe CAT, or what? See wiki... (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash)

The aircraft, a B-52G based at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, was on a 24-hour "Coverall" airborne alert mission on the Atlantic seaboard. Around midnight on 23–24 January 1961, it rendezvoused with a tanker for mid-air refueling. During the hook-up, the tanker crew advised the B-52 aircraft commander, Major W. S. Tulloch, that his aircraft had a leak in its right wing. The refueling was broken off, and ground control was notified of the problem. The aircraft was directed to assume a holding pattern off the coast until the majority of fuel was consumed. However when the B-52 reached its assigned position, the pilot reported that the leak had worsened and that 37,000 pounds (17,000 kg) of fuel had been lost in three minutes. The aircraft was immediately directed to return and land at the base in Goldsboro.

As it descended through 10,000 feet (3,000 m) on its approach to the airfield, the pilots were no longer able to keep the aircraft in trim and lost control of it. The captain ordered the crew to eject, which they did at 9,000 feet (2,700 m). Five men ejected and landed safely. Another ejected but did not survive the landing, and two died in the crash.[4] The third pilot of the bomber, Lt. Adam Mattocks, is the only man known to have successfully bailed out of the top hatch of a B-52 without an ejection seat.[5][6] The crew last saw the aircraft intact with its payload of two Mark 39 nuclear bombs on board.[2] The wreckage of the aircraft covered a 2-square-mile (5.2 km2) area of tobacco and cotton farmland at Faro, about 12 miles north of Goldsboro.[7]

The two nuclear bombs separated from the gyrating aircraft as it broke up between 10,000 and 2,000 feet.........

[ORAC]

B-52 nuclear onboard safety systems of the period described here, page 18 onwards.

Project Dominic (http://www.ufosnw.com/documents/projectdominic1962/projectdominicreport.pdf)

[Pontius Navigator]

Bergerie, I am fairly well informed and do not wish to add further to what I said previously.

[Bergerie1]

Pontius

Thanks - I respect your reticence. My only interest is how good were the safety systems and how close did we really come to a nuclear explosion.

[NutLoose]

Don't forget the Spanish one too, they are still awaiting the US to clean that up, bet it was done toot sweet States side

BBC News - Palomares bombs: Spain waits for US to finish nuclear clean-up (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18689132)

[Fareastdriver]

This incident was fairly common knowledge in Bomber Command in the sixties.

[BOAC]

My only interest is how good were the safety systems and how close did we really come to a nuclear explosion. - I come here as a 'refugee' from the JB thread on this to ask, like bergerie "how close did we really come" since while I can understand the radiation issues from such a drop, I cannot see how the initiation system would have been in a primed state? Without that, surely, no 'bang'?

[Heathrow Harry]

well according to the released report it was - only one switch away from redeveloping most of North Carolina in a flash (cough cough)

[NutLoose]

That would have put a heck of a diversion on the Route 66 run.

[Fareastdriver]

Route 66 doesn't go through North Carolina.

[TomJoad]

Route 66 doesn't go through North Carolina.

Not much would have gone through North Carolina had it gone bang:E

[TEEEJ]

Peter G-W wrote

But there again we are dealing with a country that delivered one of its B52s to the scrapyard with a nuclear weapon accidentally left on board.

The B-52H wasn't flying to a scrapyard. It was a movement of AGM-129s from Minot to Barksdale after retirement of this type of missile.

2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_United_States_Air_Force_nuclear_weapons_incident)

[BOAC]

well according to the released report it was - exactly - my point. Why?

[goudie]

Coincidently I'm reading 'A Bucket Of Sunshine' by Mike Brooke.
Excellent read too.

[Tankertrashnav]

Thanks ORAC, interesting account.

[Yellow Sun]

Peter G-W wrote

Quote:
But there again we are dealing with a country that delivered one of its B52s to the scrapyard with a nuclear weapon accidentally left on board.
The B-52H wasn't flying to a scrapyard. It was a movement of AGM-129s from Minot to Barksdale after reitrement of this type of missile.

2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As usual one must never let the facts get in the way of a good story, after all the Grauniad never does.

YS

[BOAC]

Someone must know! We have a fair bit of 'big bang' experience here, I think. How many of you would have the weapon armed 'ready to drop' over the eastern seaboard?

[500N]

Another B52 release over the US occurred which is written up
and which explains the weapon state in the US.

I think the explosive component detonated but not the nuclear
but when I last read it it was explained quite well. I'll try to find
the article.

[NickPilot]

Having spent more time that I care to remember in Eastern NC I can say that a nuclear detonation in that area would have done hundreds of dollars worth of damage.

[Pontius Navigator]

BOAC, I can't speak for SAC SOPs but there were several essential positional checks.

After take-off the system would be checked. Then once passing a Go Line, after the execution order, further switching would take place which essentially checked the electrical systems but the weapon would remain in a safe state should it need to be dropped over a friendly or neutral territory.

The final switching would enable the system to go bang in the event it had to be dropped away from the target area but only once it would land in enemy territory.

I would need to check Peter Hennessey's book to see if he names these positions.

[ORAC]

The final switching would enable the system to go bang in the event it had to be dropped away from the target area but only once it would land in enemy territory. SWESS (http://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/coldwarcomms/conversations/topics/979)

Project Dominic (http://www.ufosnw.com/documents/projectdominic1962/projectdominicreport.pdf). See page 18, para IV(b).

[Courtney Mil]

The big trick with lovely big bombs is making them go bang. A lot of things need to happen in the right sequence and at the right time. Dropping one on the ground without ensuring all those things are properly set up and enabled doesn't make them go bang. You can end up with a lot of nasty radioactive material scattered over the countryside, but you don't tend to get a big bang. Amazing the there were so many "incidents", but not one of them detonated successfully.

[racedo]

So it didn't become a bucket of sunshine because a 1cent switch failed............now who are those people who complain about DOD going out to the lowest bidder.

Course if North Carolina had gone up with a bucket of sunshine would that have increased or decreased the US average IQ ?...............time to run and hide with that one.

[Pontius Navigator]

ORAC, nothing as sophisticated as that for the RAF. All the safety locks removed and the system set for Live. The remaining security and safety was simply the bomb doors and the bomb firing switch.

The bomb doors could be opened manually by either pilot or if set to Auto by the bombing system under the control of the nav rad. The release could be initiated by either pilot, or either nav once the bomb doors were open. Or the bombing system could do it itself. Touch of the Dr Strangegloves there.

I pointed out to a gp capt once that it was possible to set the aircraft on an automatic bomb run about 20 minutes out from the target and for the crew to jump out at that point. He was not amused, but it was certainly feasible. For some targets it would have been possible to bail out over neutral territory.

[West Coast]

Run and hide because with all the potential for humor, you came up short.

[Courtney Mil]

The Minot incident was a dreadful series of procedural failures, but has nothing to do with accidental release or the doomsday rogue nuclear explosion that some here seem to be seeking. Sorry, guys, it was quite simply an appalling screw-up, but nowhere was about to be vapourized as a result.

There's a lot of people ready to jump on the outrage bus over anything to do with the nuclear deterent.

[500N]

You can end up with a lot of nasty radioactive material scattered over the countryside, but you don't tend to get a big bang."

And even then on one incident when the explosives go off, the incident in the U
didn't cover that much ground as the DoD only needed to purchase a small area.
Can't remember which one it was but it is not a large area at all.

[SASless]

Racedo......for sure if that bomb had gone off down Goldsboro way it would have turned the state solidly Republican without any doubt.

So yes....in a way the State's average IQ would have increased.

[onetrack]

Let's get the whole deal in perspective.

1. Journalists write books with frightening exaggerations of scenarios and events, so they can sell lots of books and make lots of money. :rolleyes:

2. There have been, what? - a couple of dozen nukes lost in air accidents. None actually detonated, as far as the nuclear fission event goes. The HE did in a couple of cases.
Compare that number to the number of nukes that have been dismantled in the last, say, 35 yrs. Probably something in the order of 75,000 nukes (the last reasonably accurate disassembly total, was 50,000 in 1996).
The dismantling of pre-1979 nukes is fraught with risk due to the basic instability and easily-detonated nature of the HE - as compared to the more stable IHE of the post-1979-build nukes.

3. There is a far greater threat of a nuclear accident, in the thousands of nukes being transported by ROAD, annually in the U.S. - as compared to the few hundred transported by air annually.

4. There is a far greater threat of a nuclear accident in the official DISMANTLING of a nuke - which is carried out thousands of times a year at Pantex.

5. The U.S. has intensive supervision and control of nuke dismantling - at enormous cost (possibly now well North of a cost of $1B annually).
Not so in many other nuclear-weapons-owning countries - where nuke dismantling is being carried out - of which we have very little knowledge of their processes and safety regimes.

6. The journo who wrote the book about the NC incident would be better advised to write a book about the potential catastrophe that awaits from another Chernobyl-style incident occurring from a Russian nuke incident that is probably less than one cheap switch away from happening. :ooh: But then again - he wouldn't have access to any de-classified info to feed on, would he? :rolleyes:

Pantex: Dismantling the Bomb (http://web.archive.org/web/20031230202652/http://www.mmmfiles.com/archive/pantex.htm)

A 200 page, 20 yr-old document that goes into nuke dismantling and constituents recovery, along with planning strategies, in huge detail ..

http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1993/9320/9320.PDF

[GreenKnight121]

5. The U.S. has intensive supervision and control of nuke dismantling - at enormous cost (possibly now well North of a cost of $1B annually).
Not so in many other nuclear-weapons-owning countries - where nuke dismantling is being carried out - of which we have very little knowledge of their processes and safety regimes.

Actually, if you research for facts, not fancy, you will find that part of the START treties (START I signed in 1991) was the US spending a lot of money in, and sending a lot of highly-trained personnel to, the USSR/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)/Russia (&Ukraine/etc) to assist in and ensure the safe and orderly dismantling of the majority of the nuclear weapons held by and in those nations.

Thus, at least in regards to the former Soviet weapons and States, we do have detailed and intimate knowledge of their processes and safety regimes.

[tartare]

The Wikipedia entry on Violet Club (which I assume is accurate) makes for chilling reading. A system of ball bearings to safe a nuclear weapon!
It seems remarkable that there were no accidental detonations.

[Pontius Navigator]

4. There is a far greater threat of a nuclear accident in the official DISMANTLING of a nuke . . . in many other nuclear-weapons-owning countries - where nuke dismantling is being carried out - of which we have very little knowledge of their processes and safety regimes.



A nuke, unlike a conventional dumb bomb, is not an inert lump of metal. It is a very complex physics case containing delicate electronic circuitry and a quantity of fissile material subject to radio active decay amongst other things.

To remain viable it must be serviced regularly and ultimately dismantled and recycled in order to maintain a given arsenal. I don't believe that one track was referring solely to former Soviet states - there are others.

[racedo]

6. The journo who wrote the book about the NC incident would be better advised to write a book about the potential catastrophe that awaits from another Chernobyl-style incident occurring from a Russian nuke incident that is probably less than one cheap switch away from happening. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/icon25.gif But then again - he wouldn't have access to any de-classified info to feed on, would he? :rolleyes:


Lets see Nuke incidents people are publicly aware of

Sellafield UK 1953
Three Mile Island US 1979
Chernobyl Russia 1986
Fukushima Japan 2011

Number of incidents where people got lucky..................who knows but doubt its a low figure.

[Ivan Rogov]

Sounds like quite a safe weapon when compared to our early attempts
http://aviationtrivia.********.co.uk/2011/12/violet-club-quite-possibly-worst.html

ISTR the ball bearings fell out of one in the hangar and that created a problem disarming the weapon, the hole was underneath :ugh:

The UKs early atomic weapon program was as poor as our aircraft industry, lucky for us the US stepped in with interim weapons and then warhead designs.

Plenty of incidents and accidents listed here
Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: Issues: Accidents (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/accidents/index.htm)
:ooh:

[tartare]

Link above doesn't seem to work - here it is cut and pasted.

Violet Club: Quite Possibly the Worst Nuclear Bomb Ever Fielded

The warhead, or physics package, of the Violet Club bomb
When taking a look at the development of British nuclear weapons following the Second World War, it has to be viewed in the context of a piece of legislation in the United States that was passed in 1946- the McMahon Act or the Atomic Energy Act. Sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut who chaired the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, this legislation is better known for its creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the placement of nuclear weapons development and nuclear applications under civilian rather than military control. However, one consequence of the McMahon Act was the stipulation that nuclear weapons development be restricted from US allies- this affect the United Kingdom and Canada who had provided scientists and support to the wartime Manhattan Project. As a result of being shut out of American nuclear weapons development, the British set about to create their own air-dropped weapon which would be fielded in 1953 at RAF Witttering- though somewhat amusingly the first aircraft that could carry the bomb, designated Blue Danube, the Vickers Valiant, didn't become operational until a year later. The purpose of this wasn't just a message to the Soviets, but also to the United States that Britain was more than capable of fielding its own nuclear deterrent despite the McMahon Act.

On 1 November 1952 the United States detonated its first fusion bomb (H-bomb) in the Ivy Mike test at Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific. Given that the British were still shut out of US nuclear development by the McMahon Act, despite the fact that the Blue Danube fission bomb (A-bomb) was still a year out from being operational, strategic imperatives meant that Britain had to develop it's own H-bomb and the program was launched in 1954. In the UK, many military systems were assigned code names under the Ministry of Supply's "rainbow codes"- hence, "Blue Danube". In the development of an H-bomb, the casing had its own code name and the actual warhead, called the physics package, had another code name. The casing of the H-bomb was based on the Blue Danube casing and was designated Violet Club while the physics package was designated Green Grass.

But before the code names had been settled upon, the British H-bomb had a different name- "Interim Megaton Weapon"- implying that it was a high-yield weapon but not a true thermonuclear or H-bomb/fusion weapon. And this is really at the heart of the history of the Violet Club and its historical legacy. First, it indicates that Violet Club was intended to be a temporary weapon and secondly, it wasn't a fusion bomb as was commonly believed by *both* the Soviet Union and the United States.

The warhead or physics package of the bomb was based on earlier warhead designs that were named Orange Herald and Green Bamboo. Orange Herald was a lighter version of Green Bamboo and the designs were projected to be the new fusion warheads for the Royal Air Force's V-force, the Blue Steel stand-off missile, and the planned Blue Streak intermediate-range ballistic missile. Testing of Orange Herald showed that it had failed to boost the fission reaction to create a fusion reaction. The failure of the warhead designs left the British scrambling for a high-yield weapon and this became the Green Grass warhead of the Interim Megaton Weapon that was based on design elements of the earlier Green Bamboo and Orange Herald designs. As was the case in the United States, interservice rivalries in Great Britain meant that the Army wanted highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear landmines in Europe and the Royal Navy wanted HEU for the reactors for its planned nuclear-powered submarine fleet. The Royal Air Force was of the feeling that the HEU that had so far been produced in British reactors had to be used or it would be lost to rival services, so that was one of several motivations to rush the Interim Megaton Weapon into service as it would use a significant amount of HEU.


Schematic of the Green Grass warhead showing how the ball bearings were used.
It was the design of the Green Grass warhead that went into the Violet Club that made it for all practical purposes a useless weapon. A hollow sphere of HEU was surrounded by a system of 72 explosive lenses that compressed the HEU to critical mass and detonation. But here was the problem. In the Green Grass warhead, the mass of HEU was in *excess* of the critical mass once compressed by the explosive lenses. That meant if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling, it could partially detonate. American designs avoided this by having an HEU core that was inserted into the physics package usually by the bombardier once the bomber was in flight, thereby "arming" the bomb once the core was inserted. Without the core inserted, the HEU mass in the American designs was below the critical mass. The solution by British designers was to fill the center of the HEU sphere with 20,000 steel ball bearings to prevent the sphere from being crushed and reaching critical mass. To arm the bomb, a plastic plug was removed from the bottom of the warhead (accessible via a hatch on the underside of the Violet Club casing) that allowed the bearings to flow out, thereby arming the bomb.

While it may sound like a creative solution, there were several issues:
The weight of the ball-bearings increased the bomb's weight to 11,250 lbs which was greater than the capacity of not only the bomb release mechanisms of the V-bombers but also the ground-transport equipment of the bomb.
The outflow of bearings took at least half an hour under ideal conditions- in cold weather, the bearings could freeze together, making arming the weapon near-impossible.
Once the bomb was armed by allowing the ball-bearings to flow out of the center of the warhead, there was on way of making the weapon safe again. In fact, engine running was prohibited even with Violet Club "safed" as it was feared vibration would cause the plastic plug to fall out and inadvertantly arm the weapon.
Because the bomb was armed irreversibly, airborne alerts were impossible because take off and landing were too hazardous to attempt with an armed Violet Club.
Dispersal of the V-force to outlying fields was impossible as the bomb couldn't be flown to the dispersal airfield and the bomb transport equipment couldn't handle the Violet Club when it had its ball-bearings in place.

The Blue Danube- the Violet Club looked similar externally.
While the Air Staff of the RAF ordered twelve Violet Club bombs, only five were made and as British author Chris Gibson put it in his book Vulcan's Hammer "From the RAF's point of view, that was five too many." With such an unwieldly weapon, why was it even fielded? First of all, remember that the British were classifying the Violet Club as megaton-class weapon by calling it the Interim Megaton Weapon. It definitely wasn't a megaton weapon, perhaps more 400 kilotons at best, but certainly the Operation Grapple tests at Christmas Island in 1957 did indicate to the Americans the British were succeeding at fielding their own H-bombs- even if those test detonations failed to created the desired thermonuclear reaction. So who was the target of the Violet Club? While serving notice to the Soviet Union that Britain was still a force to be reckoned with, it seems that perhaps the Americans were the target, so to speak- with a weapon in their inventory called Interim Megaton Weapon implying that newer designs forthcoming and the Grapple series of tests in 1957 making a good show of things despite failing to work as planned, in 1958 the United States repealed the McMahon Act and resumed full nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom. The Green Grass warhead used in Violet Club would be the last all-British nuclear weapon as a new Mutual Defense Agreement signed as part of the repeal of the McMahon Act meant British designers now had access to more advanced and compact American designs. In fact, the successor to the much-despised Violet Club, the Yellow Sun Mk.2, used an Anglicized American Mk.28 thermonuclear warhead. But no other fission weapon ever fielded by any other nation approached the explosive yield of the Violet Club.
Source: Vulcan's Hammer: V-Force Projects and Weapons Since 1945 by Chris Gibson. Hikoki Publications, 2011, p47-51. nuclear-weapons.info (http://www.nuclear-weapons.info/vw.htm), by Brian Burnell.

[onetrack]

GreenKnight - Yes, I was aware of the U.S. assistance to Russia in the form of the Co-operative Threat Reduction program.
However, for the U.S., the CTR program been a pretty expensive and lengthy exercise that has resulted in the dismantling of a little over 9100 nukes, ICBM's and SLBM's, over 20 yrs - at a total cost to the U.S. of nearly $8.8B.
That's not exactly nuclear weapons reduction on a large scale, and it's only a small % of the number of U.S. nukes dismantled in the same time frame.

The CTR program has not only been troubled by a total lack of co-ordination amongst the major U.S. weapons and defence agencies - it has been largely stunted, by Russia's refusal to allow U.S. scientists and nuke technicians access to (nuclear) "operational sites".
From link below - "Back in 2006, in a feature for The Atlantic, William Langewiesche detailed how many National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) technicians, sent abroad to help their Russian counterparts enhance the security of Russian nuclear facilities, questioned Moscow’s commitment to nuclear security, and expressed concerns that the CTR-funded upgrades would “slip into disrepair” upon the termination of US funding."
Nukes of Hazard Blog (http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2013/6/21/161526/073)

Russia inherited around 30,000 nukes as its share of the USSR nuke arsenal - and after the collapse of the USSR, it was revealed that the USSR at one time possessed 45,000 nuclear weapons (50% more than previously estimated by Western Intelligence), and 1,200 tonnes of fissile material - more than double the previous Western "guesstimate".

A large proportion of the CTR monies went into "scientist welfare" - as the U.S., by way of the CTR, funded the salaries of over 2200 Russian nuclear scientists and technicians after the collapse of the USSR - to largely prevent desperate, unpaid Russian nuclear scientists, from selling their skills to other, less-stable nations. Another 3000 skilled Russian scientists and technicians departed from Russia to areas unknown, in the period just after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Another large proportion of CTR funding went into Russian nuke transportation assistance - secure containers, armored blankets, specialized railcars, emergency response vehicles, support vehicles, and nuke transportation training.

Another very large proportion of the CTR funding went into costly security arrangements for Russian nukes and fissile material.
One Russian security adviser was reported as stating, that during the catastrophic period of instability right after the collapse of the Soviet Union; "We guard our potatoes better than our nuclear weapons!"

A sizeable sum from the CTR budget went into radiation-detecting devices at critical border crossings and ports in Eastern Europe and nearby States. The U.S. determined that this was the simplest and easiest way to detect any stolen nuclear items.

There was enormous waste in many of the CTR programs - such as the building of a $100M facility to hold discarded rocket propellant from ICBM's and SLBM's - but which fuel, Russia promptly used in its later space program rockets!
Thus, upon completion of the U.S.-funded, secure rocket fuel facility, the Russians promptly informed your guys, there wasn't any ICBM/SLBM fuel left to store in it!

Overall, if the CTR program had had a better-focused strategic aim and structure from day one - and unqualified support from the Russians - it may have been a whole lot more successful - and you guys might have had a lot better return for your money "invested" in threat reduction.
A critical analysis shows that the CTR has had limited effect at best, and in an economists terms, "a very poor ROI."

IMO, the CTR program can really be likened to the Police Chief of a large U.S. city, turning up to a fortified Hells Angels clubhouse with all his men, and politely asking the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Hells Angels, permission to enter their inner sanctum and check on their weapons storage and security - and to help them secure their weapons to prevent any nasty accidents, and to destroy any they don't really want or need. :)

Overall, the total number of current nukes held by Russia and the U.S. on the best figures available, appear to number around 20,000.
That's definitely a whole lot better than the figure of probably well over 100,000 nukes formerly in existence at the height of the Cold War.

Whether the CTR can take a lot of the credit for the "downsizing" of the number of nukes in the world - or whether the downsizing was purely driven by the goodwill of the various countries and States leaders agreeing to multilateral arms reductions, is a moot point.

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31957.pdf

[Pontius Navigator]

Sellafield UK 1953.

1957, I was there.

[Pontius Navigator]

Schematic of the Green Grass warhead showing how the ball bearings were used.
It was the design of the Green Grass warhead that went into the Violet Club that made it for all practical purposes a useless weapon. A hollow sphere of HEU was surrounded by a system of 72 explosive lenses that compressed the HEU to critical mass and detonation. But here was the problem. In the Green Grass warhead, the mass of HEU was in *excess* of the critical mass once compressed by the explosive lenses. That meant if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling, it could partially detonate.

. . .

The solution by British designers was to fill the center of the HEU sphere with 20,000 steel ball bearings to prevent the sphere from being crushed and reaching critical mass. To arm the bomb, a plastic plug was removed from the bottom of the warhead (accessible via a hatch on the underside of the Violet Club casing) that allowed the bearings to flow out, thereby arming the bomb.

While it may sound like a creative solution, there were several issues:

. . .Once the bomb was armed by allowing the ball-bearings to flow out of the center of the warhead, there was on way of making the weapon safe again.

if the warhead were crushed or damaged during handling Essentially if part of the upper sphere collapsed and fell to the bottom of the sphere it could go critical.

Whilst it was not possible to safe the weapons in situ it could, with extreme care be safed by putting the ball bearings back. I am not sure it the arming mentioned took place in the hangar or on a dispersal but it was apparently quite interesting collecting 20,000 ball bearings. Also I don't know whether it was a drill weapon or the real thing.

As mentioned, you could no put the ball bearings back in from the bottom, nor could you invert the weapon and drop them in from the top. It was feared that the ball bearings dropping on to the bottom of the sphere could dislodge some of the HEU plates at the bottom which of course would be the top when the bomb was right way up. They could then drop as soon as the ball bearings were removed.

The ball bearings had to be reinserted with the hole as low as possible to minimise movement and impact and the weapon rotated as more and more were inserted.

Steady hand required?

[Pontius Navigator]

American designs avoided this by having an HEU core that was inserted into the physics package usually by the bombardier once the bomber was in flight, thereby "arming" the bomb once the core was inserted. Without the core inserted, the HEU mass in the American designs was below the critical mass.

I am sure that inflight arming was not possible for many aircraft. On the B36 it would probably be easy to access the weapons bays. On the B47 I doubt that it would have been possible.

Similarly on the Canberra and V-bombers there was no way to insert the gauntlet in flight.

Interestingly, although Red Beard employed the gauntlet system we never had approved documentation for that system. Only with approved documentation could the live weapon be loaded, armed and carried. Therefore while RB was probably* deployed operationally special emergency clearance would probably* have been issued.

*usual caveats - it is not HMGs policy to confirm or deny . . . "

[Bergerie1]

Dear Pontius,

Thank you for your private message – sorry I have not answered earlier but I have been busy with other things!

The problem is that, when anything nuclear is mentioned, journos and the public tend get all hyped up. As I said, when I started this thread, my background is entirely commercial flying, although during the latter part of my time I also dealt with aviation security issues. Thus, while I am ignorant re most military matters, I do have some insight into the way government departments deal with these matters, hence my request when starting this thread to get some reasoned responses from those of you who were in the know.

May I thank you, Pontius, and all also tartare, onetrack and racedo for your inputs – I will follow up with much interest some of your reference.

[The Old Fat One]

Op,

As others have dealt in commendable depth on the various technical issues, I'll change tack and bring in the human perspective. Accidental, unintended or even unfortunate nuclear detonations are perhaps more likely (leastwise thesedays) from human error. There is well documented case of the fairly low-ranking half of a Soviet subs two-man team refusing to follow his commanders orders and release a nuke during the Cuban Missile Crisis. If the account is accurate (who knows) and the dude had lacked the cojones to do what he did we wouldn't be typing this or reading it now, because that really would have changed history.

Scary stuff is it not? Oh, BTW, for those that think this is all just Cold War nostalgia, you might consider all the nuclear hardware parked on the Indian Sub-continent, ten minutes flying time apart.

[Pontius Navigator]

TOFO, it is also interesting that our cousins took nuclear weapons security to commendable lengths. In contrast we had no reliability programme and point guarding of the QRA aircraft was for a long time a single RAF Police acting corporal (unpaid). On a two aircraft main base that would be just 2 men armed with pistols.

There was no marked exclusion zone, backup police could be a couple of miles away and the aircraft, hard by a low wooden perimeter fence were 'secured' with a cheap car door lock - FA501 on the Vulcan (available from Halfords).

That there were so few incidents was due entirely to British sang froid, fair play and LUCK.

[VIProds]

Thanks for the pointer to "Project Dominic", ORAC. I hadn't been aware that the US were using the facilities at Christmas Island to carry out their tests.

Apart from having my "Electronic Block" duties & QRA duties, a group of us were also on standby, whenever a Nuclear Weapon was transported by road or rail. If there was a crash, we would be bused in or flown in to the crash site.

If the HE was triggered on the device, it would NOT trigger a Nuclear Explosion, but would probably crack the physics package casing, allowing Plutonium to spill. Our job was to go in, down wind of the accident site with protective clothing & Geiger counters & cordon off the area that was "Hot".

Although we were put on standby on a very regular basis, thank goodness we were never called out. The USAF would regularly fly in Nuclear Weapons as cargo , so I presume that they had a similar team as ourselves.

[ICM]

PN: Picking up your point about USAF nuclear security, during my time on the C-141 in the early 1970s, "Nuclear Loading" was a required part of annual refresher training, albeit that I was excused on NOFORN grounds. It appeared to be taken very seriously indeed and the training was certainly carried out in an exclusion area.

[Pontius Navigator]

VIProds, yes, it was the first time we came across the term EOD Teams.

There was a question in the House, 1957 IIRC, when a question was asked as to the response by the Royal Air Force as to actions that would be taken in the event of a nuclear incident (it was probably as a result of Sellafield). The appropriate minster rose to his feet and announced to the House that in the event of a nuclear incident to Royal Air Force would attend the incident with Special Safety Teams and thus the SST organisation was born.

At the time he stood up there was no such organisation but there was the following day :).

The initial kit, modelled on suits and procedures used during the nuclear tests was still in use almost 20 years later but by then the white suits we in short supply, the wellie boots were frequently perished and the stirrup pumps were a joke delivering a mere trickle of water through perished rubber hoses.

In the 1980s things improved with more modern kit, NBC suits replacing the white fabric ones.

[engineer(retard)]

Seem to remember it being part of NARO

[Heathrow Harry]

Didn't the navy put a warhead into a ditch transporting it back to Burghfield one frosty day??

[4mastacker]

It wasn't the Navy, it was the usual people and it was the result of an incident involving a civilian vehicle........so I believe.

[Pontius Navigator]

Sush HH, accidents to NW convoys would be a whole new book.

At one time the convoys were so hush hush that they would lay up in a public layby rather than use an adjacent military facility where their true purpose could be guessed at.

On one particular convoy we were free running from the main convoy and coming down one road we were held at a T-junction as our convoy came in from a T-junction on the right. While waiting there came a loud bang and tinkle tinkle as the right front wheel bearing blew up. Fortunately we were outside a large RAF station that had a very large MT setup but now has a well known shopping outlet nearby.

We called them up and they sent a recovery vehicle. We had to provide our 658 to get them to release a replacement. All it said was from Wittering to Secret thence Secret then return to Wittering.

While this was going on we noticed that one of the convoy tractors was on the back of a flat be trailer having come off the road a short while before.

Eventually we all returned to Wittering where it seemed we had had a 50% attrition in serviceable tractors, trailers, and escort bikes.

[Wander00]

BGG - me too when OC Admin at Wyton early 90s. Had this "mobile" phone - filled a large suitcase.

[Courtney Mil]

At one time the convoys were so hush hush that they would lay up in a public layby rather than use an adjacent military facility where their true purpose could be guessed at.

True enough. Hiding something in plain view. Worked well. Mind you, if some local bad boys had come across them in the night and fancied their chances of lifting a few "goodies" they's have got a bit of a shock. Hard to fence on the nearest street market.

"Come, Ladies and Gents. H-Bomds, H-Bombs. Only two left. Sold as a lot or for spares. Three million a pound. Make me an offer for a quick sale."

[ancientaviator62]

The UK/US 'nukes' discussion has been very informative to this ex 'truckie' who may well have transported nuclear material in the Herc. (RLF ?)
I wonder if anyone can comment on what the early USSR nuclear devices were like from a safety and effective point of view.

[Pontius Navigator]

CM, spares wise there were some bits :)

The batteries were SAFT and I bought some of these one time. The SEF key as well was probably designed at great expense through an MOD contract but not patented. I first found an advert in Motor Sport where you could change your ignition lock to this new barrel type.

Next they were fitted to gaming machines and now to security locks of all sorts.

In RAF use the keys were in unique pairs for each weapon. We found one unique pair was identical with another unique pair :). I can't remember how we found out.

[Heathrow Harry]

last time I saw a bomb truck was on the A33 north of Basingstoke a couple of years back - it was parked in a lay-by by itself and was accompanied by a very bored looking copper in a panda car - so I guess it was empty and had broken down en-route during the night................

[cornish-stormrider]

Dunno about the " bomb" truck but I am very regularly seeing a mil plated foden IIRC heavy hauler with the Shiniest curtainsider and a " funny" tint to the cab windows.
Not hard to spot an SNM truck either coming or going from Guzz....
I like to play spot the subtle escort vehicle.

I haven't yet managed to catch a glimpse of a flask wagon on the railway but I hear slow heavy trains rolling up the line late at night.

I'm a sad spotter ain't I.

[Courtney Mil]

PN,

Yes indeed. The keys have appeared on threads here. Sorry, the "unique" keys. But doesn't it make you feel good to know all the good things like security keys that came out of our nuclear programme?

Maybe the Pikeys were only after the easily disposable spares and not the physics package. If only they'd realized how warm it would have kept their caravans at night.

cornish-stormrider,

Probably a good thing being a "sad spotter" of these things where you are. It must be very comforting for you that they found such a good use for some of those disused tin mines. Fortunately, the background radiation from the granite-produced radon will mask the small additional emissions from the waste.

[cornish-stormrider]

Rule one of fight club
Don't talk about the mines......
Etc.

[Self Loading Freight]

As a v young schoolkid in early 70s Plymuff, long before I could tell the difference between Mutton Cove, Union Street and the oddly-bumpy Crownhill, I do remember being given iodine tablets 'just in case' we needed them.

One day, I would like to know a bit more about that.

[GreenKnight121]

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
CDC Radiation Emergencies | Facts About Potassium Iodide (KI) (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/ki.asp)
KI (potassium iodide) is a salt of stable (not radioactive) iodine that can help block radioactive iodine (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/isotopes/iodine.asp) from being absorbed by the thyroid gland, thus protecting this gland from radiation injury.

The thyroid gland is the part of the body that is most sensitive to radioactive iodine.

People should take KI (potassium iodide) only on the advice of public health or emergency management officials. There are health risks associated with taking KI.

KI (potassium iodide) does not keep radioactive iodine from entering the body and cannot reverse the health effects caused by radioactive iodine once the thyroid is damaged.


KI (potassium iodide) only protects the thyroid, not other parts of the body, from radioactive iodine.

KI (potassium iodide) cannot protect the body from radioactive elements other than radioactive iodine—if radioactive iodine is not present, taking KI is not protective and could cause harm.

Table salt and foods rich in iodine do not contain enough iodine to block radioactive iodine from getting into your thyroid gland. Do not use table salt or food as a substitute for KI.

Do not use dietary supplements that contain iodine in the place of KI (potassium iodide). They can be harmful and non-efficacious. Only use products that have been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

[kaitakbowler]

The Foden was the TCHD Mk2, I only ever came across the tractor unit which was a heavily modified rigid truck to take a 5th wheel as well as all the security devices, I do know the cab weighed in excess of 3 tonnes. A pity Foden fell foul of, allegedly, miss-management.

[Courtney Mil]

Here we go. Now we can all be spotters.

NukeWatch UK | How to spot a nuclear weapons convoy (http://www.nukewatch.org.uk/spot.php)

[Pontius Navigator]

CM, ty.

In 1974 the convoy was more discrete. A couple of RAFP on Norton (IIRC) bikes, the load carrier and tractor and a spare load carrier and tractor. There then followed a 'bread van'.

While it looked like a bread van it was then resplendent in matt green paint. It contained the immediate crash rescue kit.

That and a JU was your lot.

They were only just considering terrorist threats and discussing the possibility of RM stand-off escorts. Naturally, with turf wars, there was light blue resistance to another service taking part in our super secret work.

[VIProds]

If you Google "Nuclear Convoys", you can see the Foden's used as well as a picture of how they cradled the we177 device. :eek:

[Courtney Mil]

Do you mean this one?

http://ensuresafety.co.uk/media/dContent/uploads/hastor.jpg

WE177 carefully craddled in a white-painted antique bookcase.

And here's the photo taken at the scene of a Foden truck having a puncture on the A1.

http://www.peacelab.org/pictures/nuclear_bomb.jpg

:E:E:E

[Heathrow Harry]

TBH no-one would notice..............

of course the BIG UK near-miss was the collision between HMS Vanguard & Le Triomphant in 2009

FHS - TWO SSBN's............ I know there have been a few bumps between SSN's but that one really takes the biscuit

I thought ramming went out in the 1890's/.................

[Pontius Navigator]

CM, you are joking :).

Given what you did to Sadam's bunkers I don't know how that would have survived

[cornish-stormrider]

Ah the ws3 drop hangers that "no longer exist" at various places...

[Bergerie1]

And there were some other close shaves:- http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831)

[ORAC]

Palomares Summary Report (http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/spain/844.pdf)

[WE Branch Fanatic]

TBH no-one would notice..............

of course the BIG UK near-miss was the collision between HMS Vanguard & Le Triomphant in 2009

FHS - TWO SSBN's............ I know there have been a few bumps between SSN's but that one really takes the biscuit

I thought ramming went out in the 1890's/.................

What makes you think that would compromise either warhead or reactor safety?

In 1974 the convoy was more discrete. A couple of RAFP on Norton (IIRC) bikes, the load carrier and tractor and a spare load carrier and tractor. There then followed a 'bread van'.

While it looked like a bread van it was then resplendent in matt green paint. It contained the immediate crash rescue kit.

That and a JU was your lot.

They were only just considering terrorist threats and discussing the possibility of RM stand-off escorts. Naturally, with turf wars, there was light blue resistance to another service taking part in our super secret work.

Surely a job for the RAF Regiment?

[Heathrow Harry]

WEBF

Do you think that an accidental collision between two vessels each with a reactor and maybe a total of 96 warheads is SAFE???? :ugh:

Probably the warheads wouldn't go off (but that's the subject of this whole thread) but if the reactor area had been hit and breached rather than a rather slow bump amidships then you would certainly have had some radioactive spillage

[Courtney Mil]

Probably the warheads wouldn't go off (but that's the subject of this whole thread) but if the reactor area had been hit and breached rather than a rather slow bump amidships then you would certainly have had some radioactive spillage

No, not really. The reactor compartment may have been breached, but that doesn't even start to mean that the reactor would have been. There have been a lot of incidents, land and sea, where reactor integrity has been compromised, but these have been from a number of reason other than collision. Land based reactors with containments can even stand up to large impacts.

It is not as simple as thinking that the numerous reactors around the world are so vulnerable to damage. And the warheads are very much safer than you may think.

Happy to discuss further - up to a point.

[ludgar]

Re the convoys
Are you kidding? So what were the blue unmarked curtain-side artics that used to travel up and down the M6, stopping overnight at Territorial Army training camps (I won't say which ones......)
Usually discretely followed by an unmarked Range Rover
The local press were insistent there were nuclear weapons on board, and so were the local camp guards

[Courtney Mil]

I wonder why anyone would feel the need to deliver armed nuclear waepons to a TA training camp. Unless, of course...

[ludgar]

It was an overnight stop-off point, roughly midway between sites in Scotland and England. Also very close to the M6 so easy access without needing to enter a town.
Armed guards on the gate and patrolling whenever one of the blue trucks was present. At the time the normal site security was just uniformed civilians. The local council were quite agitated about it.
It all stopped around seven / eight years ago

[langleybaston]

The local council were quite agitated about it.

Ah! the luxury of whingeing during the piping times of peace!

When I lived in Bessacarr Doncaster in the 1970s and our temporary Vulcans scrambled at 0430 or whenever, I fielded a lot of flak from neighbours about "my" V-force.

"Sound of Freedom and sod off!"

I can't remember complaints during the 2nd World War about noisy ackack and fighters, and indeed the huge waves early on D Day.

[Courtney Mil]

Ah, yes. But those folks were always there to protest and complain about nuclear weapons and turned out in droves when the readiness of those that carried the deterent to protect the the protestors had to excercise their readiness - even though they weren't carrying nukes at the time. I have to ask where the hell the protestors were when the weapons were being used for real. No priotests there, I notice.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Moving special weapons from a secret RNAD outside Salisbury to a certain Bovine Point in deep Westoland, with a handfull of bootnecks riding shotgun, was always safe; except on those few occasions when Jack Frost conspired to put the wagons in a ditch. The greatest danger ever was impact damage to the wildlife.

My, how we laughed.

[ludgar]

"a secret RNAD outside Salisbury"
Is that the one with the secret railway siding off the Waterloo-Exeter line? Somewhere near Chilmark?

[ricardian]

You mean the Bath Tunnel?

[ludgar]

ricardian
no - thats the Box tunnel complex
At least six different sites were there - RAF control site, bomb store, records store, regional seat of government, emergency government citadel, navy control site.....
But thats a fair distance from Salisbury
Chilmark was close to Salisbury

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

ludgar. Good guess but the wrong railway line. You would have been hard pressed to see it and there's little external sign now that it had been there.

ricardian. You were on the right lines (as it were) with "tunnel" but miles off in location.

Anyway, I'm risking Thread drift; sorry.

[The Old Fat One]

There you go op...that should get your toes curling.

BBC News - Stanislav Petrov: The man who may have saved the world (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831)

Don't worry though, the computers on the Indian sub-continent will never go wrong will they?

[Heathrow Harry]

(I won't say which ones......)

the stop-off points have been discussed on here several times and people have waxed lyrical about the friendliness of the good people of rural Northumberland for example

Even posted pictures...

A lot of what used to be A State Secret is now freely available on the Web............

[Heathrow Harry]

"Somewhere near Chilmark?"

So secret that they had a Tallboy or a Grand Slam as gate guardian??????

and of course the "maintenance Junction" on the M4 west of Newbury................

[NutLoose]

Don't forget it's not just our foreign counterparts that mess up, remember the Nuke in 84 that rolled off the Trolley at Bruggen damaging it and ensuring several rapid postings of staff... The reason being it wasn't strapped down, due to a lack of equipment. Container seems to have been a pretty shoddy design.

The board of enquiry report into the incident is online and makes interesting reading, will give the Staish his dues, he did try to support his Officers in his summing up comments.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C3FEB537-53A9-4173-8210-95C0886AB273/0/raf_bruggen_boi.pdf

UK nuclear accidents blamed on poor safety - Rob Edwards (http://www.robedwards.com/2007/08/uks-nuclear-acc.html)


..

[Pontius Navigator]

WEBF, RAF Regiment? One would have thought so and no doubt many light blue would have pressed for them.

It may be that it was given to the RM as they could then cover both RAF and RN convoys with one trained cover force rather than duplicate with the two services.