AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

BBC News - Helicopter carrying 18 ditches near Shetland (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23821083)

I pray that all have survived

[Brom]

BBC reporting CHC as the operator.

[pdatco]

Fingers crossed, but not very optimistic so far.

[SansAnhedral]

S92 or Super Puma....both machines who could use more bad press...

Hopefully everyone made it out okay :sad:

[superq7]

Sans
Is that the same type that was grounded recently?

[SansAnhedral]

Indeed

Super Puma helicopter returns to the skies after two ditching incidents in the North Sea last year - Daily Record (http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/super-puma-helicopter-returns-skies-2136628)

Dateline 7 Aug 2013

Though to be fair its pure speculation right now

[Magicman.303]

It was the EC225 that was grounded. Scotia also fly the AS3B version of the Super Puma and I think they still have a couple of AS32s still flying.

[Ian Corrigible]

"Sky News has been told it was a Eurocopter Super Puma AS332 L2, a model that normal has a good safety record." (http://news.sky.com/story/1132538/helicopter-ditches-into-sea-off-shetland)

I/C

[Maff]

A SAR heli has so far rescued 9 people, 1 on a stretcher according to BBC News

[MoodyMan]

9 of the 18 onboard now back on dry land after being picked up by HM coastguard S92

[Richard Taylor]

BBC report 9 people have arrived at 'Lerwick' in one of the rescue helicopters, 1 stretcher, 8 walk-offs.

[helihub]

STV says three missing...

BBC News - Helicopter carrying 18 ditches near Shetland (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23821083)

[helihub]

SOrry, wrong link, try....

Helicopter 'with 18 people on board' ditches in sea off Shetland | Aberdeen & North | News | STV (http://news.stv.tv/north/237159-helicopter-with-18-people-on-board-ditches-in-sea-off-shetland/)

A helicopter has ditched in the North Sea off the coast of Shetland.

The aircraft is reported to have had 18 people on board when it hit the water two miles west of Sumburgh airport at about 6.20pm on Friday.

A NorthLink ferry travelling between Shetland and Aberdeen via Orkney, which set sail from Lerwick at 5.10pm, is said to turned back to assist in the rescue.

The helicopter is a Super Puma AS332 L2 operated by Canadian company CHC, a company that transports offshore workers to and from North Sea platforms.

Police and ambulance crews are standing by on the shore at Lerwick.

Two coastguard helicopters and lifeboat crews from Lerwick and Aith RNLI stations have been sent to the scene.

The BBC reported nine people had been brought on shore by a rescue helicopter, eight of whom were described as walking wounded while the ninth was taken off on a stretcher.

The RNLI said a search was ongoing for three people missing in the water. Some of those on board have been rescued but it is not clear how many.

Conditions in the area are said to be foggy, with high winds earlier in the evening which have since died down.

A spokesman for the operating company said: "CHC Helicopter can confirm that there has been an incident involving one of our aircraft in the North Sea, approximately two miles off Sumburgh.

"Exact details of the incident, which happened at approximately 6.20pm are not yet known.

"The appropriate authorities have been informed and the company’s Incident Management Team is being mobilised."

Investigators from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) are travelling to the scene.

A spokesman for the Department for Transport said: "The AAIB is aware of the incident and has deployed a team".

Four years ago 16 men died when a Super Puma AS332 L2 plunged into the sea. An accident inquiry found it suffered a catastrophic gearbox failure while carrying offshore workers to Aberdeen.

The aircraft, operated by Bond helicopters aircraft, was returning from the BP Miller platform when it went down off the Aberdeenshire coast on April 1, 2009.

More recently a different Eurocopter model, the EC225, was grounded following two ditching incidents in the space of six months last year. Fourteen people were rescued off the coast of Aberdeen in May, while another 19 were rescued after an EC225 experienced difficulty off the coast of Shetland in October.

The EC225 fleet was only cleared to return to service earlier this month after extra safety checks were introduced.

[UKpaxman]

The local ferry, a cargo vessel, a Norwegian fishing boat and the lifeboat still appear to be combing the area - watching on AIS.

[ptflyer]

ITV reporting 15 rescued 3 still unaccounted for

[iamthetroll]

Coast guard saying wreckage is being washed ashore at Garth Sneff.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23821083

Continuing to pray for the three missing.

[HeliStudent]

They are saying it went down around 6:30pm. Does this mean it would have been on its way back in or are there still lots of flights leaving at that time?

[TTFD]

Weather reports from Sumburgh at the time:

METAR COR EGPB 231820Z 14020KT 3000 BR BKN003 16/14 Q1013
TEMPO 5000=

METAR COR EGPB 231750Z 14019KT 2800 BR SCT002 BKN003 15/14
Q1013 NOSIG=

METAR COR EGPB 231720Z 14017KT 2800 BR SCT002 BKN003 15/14
Q1013 BECMG 4000 BR BKN006=

METAR COR EGPB 231650Z 15012KT 2800 BR FEW002 BKN003 15/14
Q1014 BECMG 4000 BR BKN006=

[XV666]

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/69460000/jpg/_69460978_dsc_9364.jpg

BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23821083)

PR spin at work already: understandable I suppose, but CHC now calling it an "L2 helicopter".

[2Sticks]

Does anyone have any news on which company the victims worked for?
2Sticks

[eastern5709]

Somebody on MFR/Facebook is saying that a family member had phoned them to say that they were on this helicopter yesterday and to quote them "chopper was shaking like a baby's cradle". My only thought here is how he knows it's the same aircraft.

[GipsyMagpie]

For the un-initiated

Super Puma Variants under EASA (http://www.easa.europa.eu/certification/experts/docs/oeb-reports/eurocopter/EASA-OEB-Final-Report-Eurocopter_Super%20Puma%20Fleet%20including%20(C1eL1e)-%2015%2002%2013%20-%20EC+jms.pdf)

[Droopy]

Breathtakingly inaccurate report of the history of the super puma from Colin Blane on Radio 4 just now which is a shame as he's normally very good

[Harry O]

BBC are saying pilots didnt have a chance to make a mayday. Dont know if they have checked with ATC. Incident happened 2 miles off sumburgh.

I think it will be a long time before any type of super puma will carry rig workers again. Seen the same thing with the chinook.

CHC have opened a help line for relatives. 01224 296 866 (bbc news)

[eastern5709]

Is this going to result in the grounding of all Eurocopters/Puma's?

[XV666]

More images coming into the media:

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/08/23/article-2401118-1B6EDB1C000005DC-418_634x430.jpg

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/08/23/article-2401118-1B6EDB18000005DC-698_634x482.jpg

Daily Mail (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2401118/The-helicopter-just-dropped-Three-oil-workers-feared-dead-chopper-carrying-18-gas-platforms-ditches-North-Sea-near-Shetland.html)

[Beaucoup Movement]

The aircraft was inbound to Sumburgh from the North Alwyn. I believe they were doing the localizer approach to Rwy 09 & had just been transferred to tower when the incident happened with no time for a Mayday. Prayers for the remaining 3 missing. :(

[Bravo73]

Any news on the crew themselves? At 13C sea temperature, they could conceivably be in cotton suits.

[Beaucoup Movement]

Bravo73,

True but the immersion suit must be worn if your planning to come back from a flight within 2hours before local night so it would have been touch & go really.

[jimf671]

AIS shows intense activity around Garths Ness which is a rocky headland west of Sumburgh at lat/long 59.884/-1.355 or grid HU364111.

The activity shows a pattern flown west of the Ness then activity along the shore including three returns to Sumburgh including one recently. The aircraft concerned is on MMSI 2161 which is one of the Bristow S-92 in CG colours (R102) and I believe may be G-MCGC. Currently on the ground at Sumburgh.


Another track shows the Lerwick lifeboat which left Lerwick at 1745UTC and left similar tracks to helicopter and is now steaming back past Horse and approaching Sumburgh Head.


The RO-RO vessel has also just left the scene where it had been steaming loop all evening south and west of the ness.

[Harry O]

Survivor tells of loss of power.
Three missing oil workers feared dead after helicopter carrying 18 ditched at sea - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/10263571/Three-missing-oil-workers-feared-dead-after-helicopter-carrying-18-ditched-at-sea.html)

"Fifteen men, including eight described as walking wounded, were rescued following the incident close to Sumburgh Airport.


Dr Michael Bull, a father of one of the men rescued, said his son told him the helicopter lost power suddenly and immediately ditched into the sea. He said they "had seconds" before the craft hit the water, and then turned over."

[El_Presidente]

Here's hoping for a good outcome for all...

GREDL suffered cat gearbox failure, leading to detachment of main rotor. Hell to pay if this is a repeat.

[KiwiNedNZ]

Does anyone know if the crew got out and if there were EC people Onboard. Thoughts are with families and friends of those missing. Hope they find them.

[rwab]

Have just heard 2nd hand the experiences from one of the passengers onboard the helicopter. This not a a quote, but the message was that the crash was sudden and violent, the chopper lurched left, then right before falling into the water and turning upside down. He escaped from a window he punched out.

Must have been a frightening experience.

[Spanish Waltzer]

BBC now reporting two bodies recovered. Wreckage appears to have been towed off rocks by lifeboat & awaiting salvage.

[SilsoeSid]

BBC News - Shetland helicopter crash: 'Two bodies found' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23822420)


Bodies of two of the three people missing after a helicopter crash off Shetland have been recovered, a lifeboat crew member has said.

Coxswain Bruce Leask said they were recovered by lifeboat after being spotted in the water from a rescue helicopter.
:(

[gulliBell]

The link is reporting 3 bodies have been recovered meaning all persons on board are now acountered for.

[b1beefer]

Helicopter Crash: Three Bodies Recovered (http://news.sky.com/story/1132614/helicopter-crash-three-bodies-recovered)

Not good news... Thoughts with the families as ever 😟

[UKpaxman]

Sky news reporting the remaining body is still in the helicopter wreckage which has now been secured by a rescue craft - on AIS I can see a tug is in the area.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Daily Mail up to its usual high reporting standards:

It is understood that helicopters operating west off the islands regularly stop at Sumburgh to take on extra fuel.
This involves flying high towards Fitful Head and then dropping down quickly.
But on this occasion it is believed the aircraft plunged faster than normal and ended up around two miles off the coast.

[ShyTorque]

BBC Radio 2 newsreader just reported this aircraft as a "Sea Puma".

[Heathrow Harry]

passenger interviewed on Radio 4 said sudden loss of power and immediate ditching

[KiwiNedNZ]

Does the L2 have any of the same engine/gearbox components as the 225.

[industry insider]

From EC by email

On behalf of Gilles Bruniaux, please find the following information.

Eurocopter has been informed of an AS 332 L2 accident in the North Sea. It occurred on Friday the 23rd of August at about 6.20pm (local time). 18 persons were on board 16 passengers and two crew. Search officials have confirmed 15 people have been accounted for and that several people have been hospitalized as a result of the accident. At this stage no more information is available. However it has to be noted that this 332 L2 aircraft was equipped with a Main Gear Box with a carburized vertical shaft, this shaft is not the nitrided shaft involved in the two EC225 ditchings.
Eurocopter will provide more information on August 24, 2013 at 2pm French time.

[LordFlashheart]

Four dead now, this report says:

Evening Express - Article - Four dead after Super Puma helicopter ditches in North Sea (http://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/Article.aspx/3366706)

[HeliEng]

Names have now been released on Sky news:-

"The four confirmed dead are: Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland; Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin; Gary McCrossan , 59, from Inverness; and George Allison, 57, from Winchester."

RIP. :-(

[Bravo73]

The names of the four dead have been released:

BBC News - Shetland helicopter crash: Four dead named (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23822420)

A sad, sad day. RIP. :{

[HeliStudent]

Very sad :( condolences to the families affected.

I would like to know if North Sea helicopters have telemetry which automatically and continuously feeds technical information to an operators base?

[pohm1]

Time for the oil industry to walk the talk on HSE and permanently ground all Super Puma variants from the North Sea region.

Will you stand by your statement if it turns out to be pilot error?

P1

[Bravo73]

I would like to know if North Sea helicopters have telemetry which automatically and continuously feeds technical information to an operators base?

No, they don't.

[The Ancient Geek]

Any news yet on the crew ?.
If, as reported, the wreckage has been towed to shore the AAIB will have everythig they need for a full investigation.

[Grenville Fortescue]

3 ditchings and 2 crashes in less than 5 years. 20 deaths.

Time for the oil industry to walk the talk on HSE and permanently ground all Super Puma variants from the North Sea region.

I should first of all like to know the total number of flying hours for the entire Puma series, versus total number of passengers flown, versus total number of incidents and accidents, versus the total number of lives lost.

.. the AAIB will have everythig they need for a full investigation.

Assuming that no parts essential to the execution of a successful investigation have gone missing.

[2Sticks]

BBC reporting that some of the victims were employed by Total.
2S

[HeliStudent]

Do Super Puma helicopters have active HUMS, can the pilots see on the screens the moment there are any changes going on with the heli?

[henra]

Time for the oil industry to walk the talk on HSE and permanently ground all Super Puma variants from the North Sea region.

Could you enlighten us what caused the crash and in how far it was a feature that is common for all Super Puma variants which was responsible for this tragic accident?
No?
Then please let us wait for the accident investigators to find out what caused this and take corrective action once it is clear what needs to be fixed if it was anything mechanical.
Flight safefy is not about 'Feel good', it is about facts.
Let us reserve the 'Just do something' attitude to politicíans....

[Richard Taylor]

Henra, I don't disagree, but as far as the pax in the back are concerned, it is about 'feel good'. If they don't want to get in due to the current run of incidents, then that impacts on oilfield ops, that impacts on the contractors & operators, & that impacts the heli operators.

Yes get the facts, but the bears are going to take a LOT of convincing in the months ahead to get back onto a Super Puma, in any of its variants.

[Hummingfrog]

I am all for INFORMED discussion on these "crash threads" but do remember that 4 families received devastating news last night.

We have few facts to go one which are:-

1. The a/c seems to have been on IFR Flight into Sumburgh.
2. The weather was poor possibly near to minimums.
3. For some reason the a/c hit the sea 2mls short.
4. The impact can't have been too harsh or nobody would have survived.
5. The a/c didn't completly disintergrate.

From these "facts" one can speculate but in no way be certain. As an experienced Ex NS pilot I have one or two possibilties but they can only be general at the moment. If the AIB have the CVR, IHUMS etc I am sure they will have an initial theory on what happened.

Whatever the reason my thoughts are with the families.

JD

[HeliComparator]

but the bears are going to take a LOT of convincing in the months ahead to get back onto a Super Puma, in any of its variants

...Until the next major event on an S92, AW139, S76 etc. The "bears" do have a rather short and parochial memory, and that is why their opinion should not be used to determine flight safety decisions. That said, I think the vast majority are sensible and understand the concept of risk, and are aware of just how much trouble-free flying these aircraft all do.

[helimutt]

I vote Hummingfrog for Offshore Helicopter Operations Media spokesperson please.

In light of the seriousness of this incident, the tragic loss of life, and the impact it will have on operations not only out of Scotland, but worldwide, possibly on the operator and on EC, then isnt it fair that we wait for the findings of the professionals, before the usual suspects start with their armchair dissection of the accident.

I'm sure we all have our ideas about what happened. But. we werent there.

:sad:

[Grenville Fortescue]

Do Super Puma helicopters have active HUMS, can the pilots see on the screens the moment there are any changes going on with the heli?

If you read the accident report (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/dft_avsafety_pdf_030207.pdf) into G-JSAR, also an L2, is says the following referring to HUMS:

The system comprises a number of accelerometers and transducers around the engines, airframe and drivetrain. Vibration signals from a number of major components are monitored and recorded. The data accumulated during aircraft operation is transferred, usually on a daily basis, to the operator's ground-based computer system.

Whether this system has subsequently been up-dated to allow for real-time analysis and presentation to the flight crew I do not know.

[Stu B]

BBC report is now saying the 2 crew are among the survivors.

[TipCap]

As a long time North Sea pilot (30 years +) but now retired, I always get that "chill" that runs down my spine when I hear of an accident in the North Sea.

It horrifies me how many incorrect facts are spewed out by the media and how many so called "professionals" are quoted. IHMO there has only been one sensible "take" on matters "press" in the past and that is by one of our PPRUNE members.

It is always a relief when you hear about survivors. Having said that it is still a sad day when there are fatalities and my condolences and thoughts go to those families affected.

As has been said previously, let the true professionals (AAIB) state the facts.

However, my thoughts are with all you guys flying the North Sea

TC

[The Ancient Geek]

We all need to get a proper sense of proportion here.

1) Helicopters will never be as safe as fixed wing airliners, they have more single points of failure such as gearboxes, rotors, etc and operate in more hazardous conditions.
2) Despite the above the large helicopters used in offshore operations have a good and improving safety record in terms of incidents per sector flown.
3) The offshore oil industry is totally dependant on these machines and safety is their number one priority.

[Moonwalker]

"and safety is their number one priority."

Yeah right.... 4 choppers down in less than 5 years.... safety is our number one priority :ugh: :D :yuk:

[industry insider]

Grenville and Heli Student

The newly installed cockpit warning on the EC225 is the first in cockpit HUMS warning ever. I am not even sure that is a great idea but that's my personal opinion.

Until now, there have been no HUMS warnings in the cockpit. The likelihood of a false warning causing an unnecessary ditching is too high.
Furthermore, HUMS is meant to pick up issues way before the pilot would need to be worried about them.

HUMS is good but not perfect and the systems still have some way to go to maintain a level of integrity which would allow sufficient confidence to give cockpit warnings.

[nomorehelosforme]

As an off shore industry outsider how many flights are there daily/weekly in the North Sea?

[Harry O]

Very sad news. RIP.
Four oil workers die after 'catastrophic' Shetland helicopter crash - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/10263769/Four-oil-workers-die-after-catastrophic-Shetland-helicopter-crash.html)

The crash victims were named on Saturday as Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland; Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin; 59-year-old Gary McCrossan, from Inverness and George Allison, 57, from Winchester.

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02652/victims_2652439c.jpg

Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland, George Allison, 57, from Winchester


http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02652/crash1_2652440c.jpg
Gary McCrossan, 59, from Inverness and and Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin

[airwave45]

Deleted by poster

[Grenville Fortescue]

industry insider - Thank you for the clarification.

One means of protecting against unnecessary ditching is to categorise HUMS generated warnings as precautionary (given that this information was historically unavailable) until such time as the refinements you speak of are effected.

The lack of HUMS generated warning occurences may of course be due to the fact that the system is, as you say, relatively new.

[HeliComparator]

Grenville, you are presuming that not only was this event caused by a technical issue, but also that it was detectable by HUMS. Two bold assumptions!

As II says, the nature of developing faults in helicopter transmission is that in general they can be detected many hours before becoming catastrophic. So to my mind, this accident was either not of a technical nature, or was of a failure mode not detectable by HUMS.

[Grenville Fortescue]

HeliComparator - No assumptions. Speaking purely about HUMS in relation to a previously raised questions about the same.

[Granite City Express]

A ppruner was interviewed by Sky News this morning. Seemed to give a reasonably factual account without being forced into speculating.

[industry insider]

Grenville, HUMS data from the EC225 is downloaded after each flight now. I believe that Bristow always did download after each flight, CHC and Bond also do now, for the 225s anyway.

Of course, we don't know whether or not mechanical issues played a part or not in this accident.

However, as someone who is on the oil company side of aviation, I have a policy that HUMS data is downloaded after every flight (not sector) for all types of aircraft we contract.

Secondly, I will be working with our helicopter contractor to look at the feasibility of at least periodic in flight HUMS transmissions back to base, much like large jets use their ACARS. Since ACARS only sends short and simple messages I am not sure where packets of HUMS data will be in terms of data size but it must be doable. I want to see some "next step" innovation from Helicopter Operators and OEMs.

[strake]

My son works for a major oilfield organisation. He is a frequent passenger on these helicopters and many others around the world. As most informed contributors on this board know, Offshore helicopter passengers are probably the most safety trained and well practised in emergency drills group of people who fly commercially. A fact that is certain to have saved some lives in this incident.
However, my son who takes a very pragmatic approach to his job and the various risks it entails is obviously quite shaken by the events yesterday. Whatever the reasons for the accident, there is a feeling amongst his colleagues that four incidents in as many years in just one area of operations (the North Sea) featuring what appears to be one type of aircraft, is too much.

Our families thoughts are with those involved. Those who experienced this incident, the rescuers and the families of those who are now bereaved.

[Grenville Fortescue]

I will be working with our helicopter contractor to look at the feasibility of at least periodic in flight HUMS transmissions back to base, much like large jets use their ACARS. Since ACARS only sends short and simple messages I am not sure where packets of HUMS data will be in terms of data size but it must be doable. I want to see some "next step" innovation from Helicopter Operators and OEMs.

This kind of language I find inspiring. As HeliComparator has said, not everything can be picked-up by HUMS (such as freewheel unit condition) but a vast amount of what I believe will (in the future) prove to be invaluable information is and once efficiently collated and presented, can only enhance overall safety - for since when has improved component and systems condition awareness been an impediment to safety?

I am convinced that real-time "processed" HUMS analysis fed not only to the flight deck but also, as suggested, to a supporting ground base would be a boon for helicopter safety in the longterm.

[HeliComparator]

GF I have said in the past that HUMS development stalled a long time ago. The problem is that its a costly venture to research and develop. With no joined-up industry initiative to do so, it would be left to the individual operators who have limited budget, resource and technical ability. Bristow did spend a fortune back in the late 80s to develop their IHUMS system, but in this day and age it seems highly unlikely that such an excercise could be repeated. I am pretty sure they made a big financial loss on the whole thing, and the other operators benefitted from the development just as much as Bristow did. (not forgetting of course that BAH carried out a similair excercise). I takes someone or some organisation with lots of initiative and dosh to raise the game, but at the moment I can't see who that would be.

[Grenville Fortescue]

It will begin (again) with those possessing the attitude of industry insider and will be advanced each time it is proved that more efficient HUMS monitoring, processing and presentation is able to prevent accidents.

[HeliComparator]

GF - Its not just Industry Insider's attitude that is needed, its his money as well! In my previous post I mentioned the difficulty for operators, but of course I should have said that such developments are really the remit of the manufacturers. Unfortunately there doesn't seem much desire to go to the next stage of HUMS by the manufacturers, some of whom seem to regard HUMS as an annoying bolt-on required by untrusting customers. Although the detail has changed, I can't think of any conceptual changes of consequence that have occured since HUMS was introduced in the late 80s, that's about 25 years ago. Are we as an industry even doing AAD? I don't think so (although happy to be corrected).

[ricardian]

Some video footage from the RNLI (http://www.rnlivideolibrary.org.uk/getvideo.aspx?vid=Fqqdh8gH)

[Grenville Fortescue]

I remember when Westland Helicopters were developing their own version of HUMS in the early 80's. A HUMS analysise unit was sent to the Royal Australian Navy and was fitted to one of their Sea Kings. The Sea King crashed and the HUMS data collection unit was sent back to Westlands (oh, this must have been around 1982-ish).

When the analysis was performed they identified an anomaly in the main transmission 150 hours prior to the failure of the component. Since then I have been a dedicated supporter of HUMS.

May I suggest that those such as Industry Insider, his colleagues in the energy industry as well as the likes of yourself and others in aviation coalesce so that potential avenues of advancement in this area be considered.

An industry sector (such as the North Sea) is perhaps one of the few operating arenas which could potentially drive this initiative.

[The Ancient Geek]

Whilst HUMS is an interesting subject we have no suggestion at this time of any technical failure. History would suggest that sudden power loss in turbine engines at low level is likely to be associated with bird strikes. The location of this incident very close to shore in an area where large flocks of sea birds are common would put this high on the list of possible causes for investigation.

[That lights normal!]

3) The offshore oil industry is totally dependant (SIC) on these machines and safety is their number one priority.

If this was remotely true, we wouldn't be flying OS oil workers in decrepit machines without even moving map GPS. (for example):yuk:

[Cows getting bigger]

Every time I see a clip of the RNLI in action it reminds me of how selflessly brave these people are.

[nomorehelosforme]

These are very, very brave men who are only volunteers, having seen that footage I shall make a donation to the charity today. It's sad that such tragic circumstances alert us to the courageous work they do, sincere condolences to all families who have lost loved ones in this terrible accident.

[HeliComparator]

TAG, bird strike is a possibility but don't forget the engines have the "chip baskets" in front of them so unlike fixed wing, the engines are less vulnerable and travelling much slower. Also, taking out 1 engine shouldn't bring it down.

TLN - moving map? Well worth spending lots of dosh on to show a big screen of blue north sea! Anyway lots of airframes now have EGPWS map displays, and Nav displays showing waypoints and navaids. Can you explain what contribution a moving map display would bring to the party?

[nomorehelosforme]

As well as the BBC's "aviation expert" Tim Ripley I see union leader Bob Crow has thrown his pennies worth in, with respect what would he know about helicopters, apart from ones he has travelled on with union funds footing the bill!

[SASless]

HC,

The rocky cliff sides would show up a very stark Red compared to all that Blue now wouldn't they?

Back when we were using DECCA we had a moving Map such as it was....not that I would consider DECCA a modern Navigational system even when we were using it.

Modern day Moving Map displays might not be all that much use over the North Sea....but when departing and landing ashore it would be nice to have.



A question that I keep asking.....why are these event happening on the UK side of the North Sea and not on the other side? Is it just my memory fails me or are we really not seeing any on the other side? I am not suggesting anything....so don't get your feathers ruffled.....honest question here.

If we are not having crashes and ditching on the east side....then what are the factors that might be in play that keeps them from having the same problem?

[maxwelg2]

RIP to the four who didn't make it.

After nearly 22 years flying as a PAX in these machines, it is a sad fact that the only way to improve safety in the different aircraft types to date has been post-analysis of the failure modes and re-engineering to correct this. HUMS IMHO can only be a pro-active tool if it can accurately inform the PIC and co-pilot on a potential imminent failure mode in one of the main transmission components. Will we ever get to that stage of HUMS development?

In the interim, all we can do is rely on what we have available to date wrt. on board monitoring systems, the RFM and the driver's experience and skills.

I reflect back today on the 17 lost in a S92A on March 12th, 2009 over here offshore Newfoundland, and how that tragedy could have been avoided. We learnt a lot of lessons from that loss of life, as we do from all helo accidents. Let's hope we can prevent further loss of life from the AS332L2 variant by quickly identifying the root cause failure mode and engineering a suitable fix.

There will always be risk in offshore flying operations, sadly it's part of the industry. The onus is on the aircraft manufacturer and the operators to provide equipment that is as safe as reasonably practicable. In light of the recent spate of accidents in the North Sea hopefully more focus will be put on improving our current safety controls and fault monitoring systems.

As far as paying for any improvements required to the helos, you may find that funds become quickly available from support from the oil companies when they evaluate the cost impact of continuous/increased offshore personnel vessel transfer operations and the growing dissent of offshore workers to agree to fly in what they will deem "unsafe" equipment.

Safe flying all.

Max

[industry insider]

Max, you are making a massive assumption that there is mechanical failure involved here. Maybe, but maybe not.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, no I think your point is valid. Is it just the nature of random events, or is there an underlying cause behind the accidents we have had over the last 4 years or so, with very few for a long time before that? I don't see any reduction in safe practices from where I am, quite the opposite in fact, but then for whatever reason we in Bristow haven't been a party to these accidents.

Perhaps its the current obsession with paper safety - both from the operations and the engineering side? Maybe its time to have less reliance on paper, and more reliance on safety derived from individuals carrying out their jobs in a professional manner. In this respect, IMO it is the regulatory authorities that are driving the paper-safety gold rush and showing little interest in the real safety "on the shop floor".

I can't help thinking that in 20 years we will be laughing at how much effort was expended on paperwork for so little result (and how much it distracted resource from the real task of safe operations).

[Hummingfrog]

I think that trying to turn HUMS from a monitoring system into a warning system may be too difficult. It was always designed to try and pick up trends in component's characteristics and then as experience was built up look for trigger points to replace that component.

The only time I came into close contact with HUMS was on the A365N2 which developed rotor vibe. The engineer checked the blades and head before making adjustments advised by HUMS. This lasted a few sorties but the vibe returned. He got onto our HUMS dept who interrogated our base station - we were offsore based, and advised changing the blue blade. This we did - problem solved though nobody could see any defect on the blade it was beginning to delaminate and therefore at speed was causing airflow disruption and hence vibration. I was impressed with HUMS but I doubt a warning system could be designed to trigger at that point as rotors vibrate for too many "safe" reasons.

I am not familiar with the L2 radar fit but the older N2's radar showed your track as a white line and the hard bits as a very bright red! Very difficult not to see! We had a basic moving map on the GPS display - not really used much apart from rig radar approaches.


JD

[keithl]

HC, hallo, how are you doing?

Re: "Chip baskets" as a defence against birdstrikes, I have to point out that although they may prevent ingestion, they won't prevent suffocation.
I'll never forget hitting 24 seagulls at night in a Canberra (well, you wouldn't, would you?). The area covered by compressed wing feathers was quite large enough to throttle a pair of 332 intakes.

I'm not saying that's what happened...etc, etc.

[What-ho Squiffy!]

To the people calling for the immediate grounding of Puma helicopters in offshore, just take a moment to remember that aircraft of all types crash - Sikorsky gearboxes fail, Agusta Westland tail rotors fall off.

Do we hear calls to ground 737-800's every time they crash and break into 3 pieces? (No, but we should, and that is another story).

The Puma series has a long and very good record offshore. Give the type, the operators and those who fly them A BREAK while this is investigated.

[victor papa]

Helicomparator, I illuded to your sentiments a few months ago and was taken out for not considering safety. I however do also feel that in the interest of safety yes we need paperwork but we also need time on the machine ourselves whether flying or servicing without paper pressures just understanding, feeling and listening to the machine. Very sad this accident and especially to the families who lost loved ones, but I love the 332 and worked with her in difficult circumstances and she had her tricks like all of them but definately does not deserve this either.

Hope we can learn something out of this once the facts are known.

[TipCap]

Hummingfrog

In my day, we had to switch the radar to standby on finals, except on an ARA so the chances were that the radar would have been to standby (but then its been a few years since I retired)

TC

[jimf671]

HC and TLN.

A significant part of the rescue opperation last night was by aircraft and vessels equipped with AIS and I tracked them online. MCA SAR aircraft are on AIS, as are the Lerwick lifeboat and the cargo ferry. For a plot every minute or so, that is about every 4000m for a cruising helo.

As I write this, the BA shuttle is about to hit the ground at Dyce as it approaches at 125kts.

Another a/c on a holding to the NW.

[That lights normal!]

TLN - moving map? Well worth spending lots of dosh on to show a big screen of blue north sea! Anyway lots of airframes now have EGPWS map displays, and Nav displays showing waypoints and navaids. Can you explain what contribution a moving map display would bring to the party?

I'd suggest a moving map GPS or linked Multi Function Display would bring 21st Century situational awareness to the party. Say while conducting an instrument approach.
We probably would accept that two fixed card ADFs are all you NEED, but if safety is "Number one priority" anything which dramatically improves SA should surely be on the agenda.

If I was an oil company aviation advisor - I'd advise that no workers are to fly in an AC without a useful MFD - capable of displaying all approach procedures.

"Lots of airframes" so equipped, doesn't change the fact that many also are not.

"Lots of dosh" compared to what? Doing nothing?

I'm not suggesting for a second that loss of SA contributed to this tragedy. Simply commenting on the "Safety is number one priority" statement, and giving one example where cost saving is number one.

[jimf671]

BA1312 now taxied at 11kts and now sitting at the terminal. Cessna just came in behind it.

The northern North Sea is empty of aero signals but packed with maritime AIS, including all the service boats, platforms, bouys, and drilling rigs. If the Oil and Gas industry were to step forward and establish a helicopter band for similar tracking then it may be another small step forward in safety.

Even at one minute updates the search area is down to a strip 4000m long at helo cruise speeds which is not large by maritime search standards! And you usually have 121.5 locally anyway.

What do you think HC?

[Standard Overhaul]

EC225 Knowledge Center: Global Story - YouTube

[HeliStudent]

jimf671, can you share the link to the tracking site you are using?

[Agaricus bisporus]

From the world leading BBC "news" website;

Tim Ripley, an aviation expert with Jane's Defence Weekly, told the BBC there were "many possible scenarios" behind the helicopter crash.

He said: "The most common one at low level for aircraft and helicopters is bird strikes.

"If one of these helicopters ingested a bird it would cause a very, very nasty accident.

Heaven spare us from commentary by "experts" like this imbecile. He knows less about helicopters than my Granny!

[HeliComparator]

Jimf, all our helicopters are equipped with satellite tracking systems that report position at a configurable rate (not sure if its every minute). So such a system is there, its just not open for general public viewing.

[SASless]

Why even the Rednecks in the GOM have tracking systems.....so that rules out the North Sea getting them as who would want to admit the GOM is in advance of the North Sea.:uhoh:

[HeliComparator]

TLN there is a difference between a moving map display and an MFD showing navigational situational awareness. I guess you are not in the industry, otherwise you would understand.

Were it not for the grounding of the 225, all our N Sea fleet would have a MFDs showing the sort of thing you mean. As it is, we do have some legacy 332Ls taken out of retirement in the short term to fill the gap left by the 225s. I can assure you that those who had to go back to the 332L wish they could get back on the 225 for just this sort of reason.

[nomorehelosforme]

Try flightaware

[llamaman]

Another sad day for North Sea aviation. Sincerest condolences to the families and friends and respect to all those who were either on scene or contributed to facilitating a fine rescue effort.

[jimf671]

AERO
Plane Finder ? Live Flight Status Tracker (http://planefinder.net/)

MARINE
Live Ships Map - AIS - Vessel Traffic and Positions (http://www.marinetraffic.com)

[jimf671]

Thanks HC.

Does anyone else have access to the data? ARCC for instance?



===========================

Bond S-92 85P LN_OEC on planefinder and just passed over Peterhead at 122kts 2500ft on return to Dyce. Track shows dep ABZ and visit offshore location (track not accept query position).

[That lights normal!]

HC
TLN there is a difference between a moving map display and an MFD showing navigational situational awareness. I guess you are not in the industry, otherwise you would understand.

Not in the North Sea industry.
But I do fly AS332s (not EC225s) in support of the OS oil industry.
I've found MFDs like the Apollo MX20 very good. (An old bit of kit)
The moving map GPS display available on an iPad is light years ahead of what is available in many AS332s.
I didn't say they were the same thing. Either would be an improvement on neither.
I guess you are not a pilot, otherwise you would understand.

[stringfellow]

Can i assume (im a ppl so please don't get technical) that the ac was intercepting the localiser for 09 as the vis/ weather was bad...... do they use 09 as the approach is over the sea not high land.... i ask as having looked at google earth and having read the metar that an approach to 15 would have brought them direct into wind (140 deg at 20kts)... even in a super puma that's a brisk old wind.

Does 15 not have a localiser/ils and or is the approach unsuitable in bad weather. Assuming they approach to the numbers can i assume that the puma would nose into wind once the runway was in siight??

Im just trying to get a picture of the final moments. RIP.

[Phill]

Does anyone else have access to the data? ARCC for instance?

ARCC/MRCC Don't (didn't) get Co' Sat data, but they have enough bells and whistles to get assets close enough to localise on 121.5

Locating the A/C and survivors didn't seem to be an issue here.

[SASless]

Helicopter crash - live | Shetland News (http://www.shetnews.co.uk/news/7263-helicopter-crash-live-feed)


News report about the crash.

[lynxeffect]

I've met Tim ripley, in his defence he does k ow his stuff but I think a dbl failure from birds is unlikely.

[Pablo332]

“I knew straight away it was an L2 because it only has three wheels, one at the front and two at the back.”
At last an expert witnes. Something sound to work around.

[iamthetroll]

There is only and ILS to 27, and LOC/DME to 09. The high ground to the west and east make 03/15 unsuitable for anything other than a visual approach.
An approach to 09 with 20kts from the right wouldn't be that uncomfortable. All the way down the LOC, you would have compensated for drift anyway, so when you get visual you're already nose into wind drifting left toward the runway.

[Special 25]

Am I write in saying that all of the information in the press so far, including quotes and requotes, have all come from an interview with one of the passengers mothers?? Amazing how other experts and officials are now providing opinions and analysis based on a single interview with someone potentially in Milton Keynes!

[Cows getting bigger]

I'm intrigued by the tracking device discussion. I would be more interested in the rather persistent set of problems which appear to be surrounding various Eurocopter supported transmission systems (OK, I'm taking a slight leap of faith regarding yesterday's accident).

[Pablo332]

Does anyone have any idea why the LH main flotation bag only inflated well after the event?

[SteinarN]

HC,
A question that I keep asking.....why are these event happening on the UK side of the North Sea and not on the other side? Is it just my memory fails me or are we really not seeing any on the other side? I am not suggesting anything....so don't get your feathers ruffled.....honest question here.

If we are not having crashes and ditching on the east side....then what are the factors that might be in play that keeps them from having the same problem?

I think I know something about the differences between the Norwegian and British side of the North Sea.

As I know it, in the British side the helicopter companies follow manufacturer and EU rules regarding maintenance and training. On the Norwegian sides all companies follow stricter rules laid out in three safety reports from Sintef in Trondheim. Sadly I don't have any links to those reports, but among other things they mandates more frequent maintenance and checkups compared to manufacturer and EU schedules.
One other difference is that on the Norwegian side the power out take from the engines is limited to 80 percent under normal operations in order to reduce the load on key transmission components.

The last accident with fatalities on the Norwegian side ocured in -97 when a AS332 L1 went down en route to the "Norne" ship. The reason for this accident was that the splined sleeve on the right input shaft for the MGB had developed several fatigue cracks. This lead to a lock washer coming loose, the bendix shaft got affected, imbalance developed. The shaft then failed, and the RPM regulation of the right turbine also failed or was to slow with the result that the rpm increased uncontrollably until the turbine disc disintegrated at 175 percent rpm. Fragments of the disc severed several control links for the main rotor as well as the tail rotor and also destroyed the left engine.

Lastly I can say that yearly hours flown is about ten or twenty percent greater on the Norwegian side compared to the British side.

[HeliComparator]

Jimf, it a web- based interface to view the data so anyone with the appropriate login details can view the Bristow fleet worldwide.

You saw the S92 on plane finder because it must have extended squitter on its transponder. Glad to see SK are progressing in this area. Our recent EC225s also have extended squitter - after we made a fuss.

[SASless]

Ball in your Court HC....how does SteinarN's observations compare to your knowledge of the UK System and Operator's procedures?

Perhaps JimL might be able to clarify the differences between Norway and the UK approach to TBO's, Maintenance Schedules and the like,re Regulatory Policies and Practices.

[cats_five]

These are very, very brave men who are only volunteers, having seen that footage I shall make a donation to the charity today. It's sad that such tragic circumstances alert us to the courageous work they do, sincere condolences to all families who have lost loved ones in this terrible accident.

Don't forget to gift-aid it - turns £10 into £12.50 and so on.

[SteinarN]

Regarding my previous post, I found some more information.
In the years 1999 to 2009 there was twelve helicopter accidents in the North Sea. Of those twelve, eleven was on the Uk side and one on the Norwegian side. None fatalities in the Norwegian accident, the number of fatalities on the UK side was 34 fatalities in three of the eleven accidents. Total hours flown in the same period was 7,8 million on the Norwegian side and 6,1 million on the UK side.

Correction;
Total man hours flown was 7,8 million on the Norwegian side and 6,1 million on the UK side.

[172driver]

A question that I keep asking.....why are these event happening on the UK side of the North Sea and not on the other side? Is it just my memory fails me or are we really not seeing any on the other side? I am not suggesting anything....so don't get your feathers ruffled.....honest question here.

If we are not having crashes and ditching on the east side....then what are the factors that might be in play that keeps them from having the same problem?

SASless, you may well have your answer right here:

Perhaps its the current obsession with paper safety - both from the operations and the engineering side? Maybe its time to have less reliance on paper, and more reliance on safety derived from individuals carrying out their jobs in a professional manner. In this respect, IMO it is the regulatory authorities that are driving the paper-safety gold rush and showing little interest in the real safety "on the shop floor".

[HeliComparator]

SAS, well obviously I can't compare the Norwegian side practices, because I don't have sufficient knowledge, however it must be borne in mind that Norwegians are much better at doing everything.

[Pablo332]

HC It’s interesting to note that some Norwegian companies won’t even carry out training at EC facility’s due to lack of Health and Safety requirements. That’s not to say EC are slack, the Norwegians are particularly sensitive to these issues.

[Grenville Fortescue]

On the Norwegian sides all companies follow stricter rules laid out in three safety reports from Sintef in Trondheim.

One other difference is that on the Norwegian side the power out take from the engines is limited to 80 percent under normal operations in order to reduce the load on key transmission components.


I should be interested to read the Sintef reports if anyone has access to any links.

[RTN11]

Can i assume (im a ppl so please don't get technical) that the ac was intercepting the localiser for 09 as the vis/ weather was bad...... do they use 09 as the approach is over the sea not high land.... i ask as having looked at google earth and having read the metar that an approach to 15 would have brought them direct into wind (140 deg at 20kts)... even in a super puma that's a brisk old wind.

Does 15 not have a localiser/ils and or is the approach unsuitable in bad weather. Assuming they approach to the numbers can i assume that the puma would nose into wind once the runway was in siight??

Runway 15 only has a very basic cloud break procedure, no localiser, so it would be perfectly normal to take 09 with a crosswind in these conditions.

[jemax]

We don't know the aircraft lost power, we do know the aircraft descended rapidly at a late stage with limited/no control.
Reports of power loss only come from survivors, this could easily be confused with entry to auto for some reason.
Also in the northern North Sea, most companies comply with the tighter OGP requirements for crew and aircraft.

[Wizzard]

I've just received the Eurocopter Safety Information Notice.

One quote

"It is confirmed that this 332 L2 aircraft was equipped with a Main Gear Box with a carburized vertical shaft, this shaft is not the nitrided shaft involved in the two EC225 ditching"

[HeliComparator]

Wiz, not too surprising since all the L2s in the N Sea will be operating with the carburised shaft.

[nomorehelosforme]

Sadly in this day and age every industry has this thrown at us, in reality it is merely self preservation for CEO's, Chairman etc who, understandable so, who would wish to be indicted in a cooperate manslaughter charge. I accept and agree with H&S procedures been put in place but do get frustrated when senior management choose, self preservation which overrides practically and common sense!

[SteinarN]

I should be interested to read the Sintef reports if anyone has access to any links.

Here is a link for HSS-3 (Helicopter Safety Study No3) from Sintef. It's however in Norwegian.
http://www.helikoptersikkerhet.no/?dfi=1_SINTEFA14973Helikoptersikkerhetsstudie3HSS-3Hovedrapport.pdf

[SASless]

172drver,

Just a few comments here does not provide sufficient data to decide what the "answer" is.....as the actual answer is far more complex and difficult to ascertain.

I will say the Stats provided thus far very much beg the question....why the UK side of the Sea has such a poor record compared to the Norwegian side.

Much as HC hates the evidence.....it does appear the Norwegians are doing something right and the UK Teams are not.

I don't think Old Man Luck is rooting for the Norwegians in this.

In Nigeria I saw a similar contradiction....Bristow had lost more Wessex helicopters alone....than Schreiner ever had crashes of all kinds. That ignores all the other types that Bristow destroyed all the while bragging about their wonderful safety record and scoffing at the Cloggies down the road.

[MoodyMan]

I think a lot of the individuals directly employed by CHC, Bond and Bristow who post on here seriously underestimate the depth of anti-Super Puma feeling amongst the offshore workforce. Hatred would not be an exaggeration.

[SUMBURGH DIRECTOR]

No mayday call and no time for brace suggests only a few seconds. If the aircraft had descended rapidly and hit the water, I doubt anyone would have walked away.

I've heard that the last recorded stable altitude seen on radar was 400ft-ish.

[SASless]

How long before we see the first 189 in the North Sea.


Never with any luck!

[PhlyingGuy]

AW189, Bell 525, EC175s? I don't see a successful future for the 225 until the next gen replacement.

[HeliStudent]

Does anyone know the registration of the helicopter?

[HeliComparator]

Mitchaa, sorry but it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the nature of a brand new type, to be looking forward to it (assuming you are a passenger).

Moodyman, well you and your mates are entitled to your opinion of course, even if its not a very scientific one.

[jimf671]

How long before we see the first 189 in the North Sea.

There had been talk of late 2013 but press reports of earlier this month now state first quarter 2014.


... it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the nature of a brand new type, to be looking forward to it (assuming you are a passenger).

Agreed.

It's the maths.

[jimf671]

.. it must be borne in mind that Norwegians are much better at doing everything.

It must be borne in mind that Norwegians have a Gross National Income per capita that is 135% greater than the Brits even by the conservative World Bank numbers.

[stringfellow]

Thanks for clarifying the point about despite a partial cross wind from the right the approach to 09 being the best option given the conditions at the time. Thank you and again thoughts with the families who have lost loved ones.

[Magjam]

jimf671:

Quote:
.. it must be borne in mind that Norwegians are much better at doing everything.
It must be borne in mind that Norwegians have a Gross National Income per capita that is 135% greater than the Brits even by the conservative World Bank numbers.

...and your point is?

[HeliComparator]

Mitchaa, that doesn't surprise me at all, social media excels at whipping up hysteria. If these bods are so well informed, maybe they should set up their own offshore transportation business? Or maybe they should leave it to the folk who fly every day, not just a round trip every 5 weeks.

Ps, as you can probably tell, I am past caring!

[Bladestrike]

As I'm sure most are, awaiting for something more solid regarding what actually happened.....please guys.....

[XV666]

Some images from the Shetland News (http://www.shetnews.co.uk/news/7263-helicopter-crash-live-feed) article:

http://www.shetnews.co.uk/cache.img/images/stories/1308/130824_ditched_helicopter3-742x557.jpg

http://www.shetnews.co.uk/cache.img/images/stories/1308/130824_ditched_helicopter4-450x338.jpg

http://www.shetnews.co.uk/cache.img/images/stories/1308/230824_ditched_helicopter2-450x338.jpg

[Harry O]

BBC - Shetland helicopter crash: Call to ground Super Pumas

BBC News - Shetland helicopter crash: Call to ground Super Pumas (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23829107)

Part of the article.

"All Super Puma helicopters should be grounded after a crash off Shetland claimed the lives of four people, a safety group says.
The Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG) said this should include four different models.
Earlier CHC, which operated the helicopter that crashed two miles west of Sumburgh Airport on Friday, said it would suspend Super Puma L2 flights.
An investigation has not yet established the cause of the tragedy.
Three of the four bodies have been recovered. Police Scotland confirmed 14 others were rescued.
Coastguard authorities say they are unlikely to recover the wreckage in the dark or in current weather conditions.
The HSSG is recommending the temporary suspension of all Super Puma commercial passenger flights to and from offshore oil and gas installations within the UK.
It said it would meet again on Wednesday to review its position, and would reconvene before then if any significant information came to light.
The Super Puma series of helicopters includes the variants: AS332 L, L1, L2 and EC225. "

[buzz111]

Greenville,

Here's a link to the mentioned report (Helicopter Safety Study) by Sintef:

http://www.sintef.no/Teknologi-og-samfunn/Sikkerhet/Rapporter--Reports/Helikoptersikkerhetsstudie-3-HSS-3/

Pdf-files on right hand side - summary in English

Rgds

[Aucky]

For example, look at the support this page has got in just over 12hrs. Just read how many of the comments from offshore workers.

http://www.facebook.com/pages/Destro...49173595095243

The feeling is very very strong, the workforce will put pressure on their unions, CHC/Bristows/Bond do whatever their clients want them too.

That is staggering, over 12,500 people in 15hrs, and going up by 50/min.

[HeliComparator]

...and at least 50 of them have ever worked offshore!

[jimf671]

That is staggering, over 12,500 people in 15hrs, and going up by 50/min.

Only a handful of whom were listening when they were at school.

There is a limited role for facts on Facebook.

[HeliComparator]

Well they certainly weren't listening at school when it was explained that an apostrophe is not used to signify a plural!

[The Sultan]

The loss of any aircraft is of concern and we will know soon what caused this one. The mindless speculation is fun to read, but it would be nice if we could up the IQ.

It obviously not the transmission shaft as at least in the short term this only results in the loss of the oil pumps. Therefore, not something catastrophic which happens in seconds.

Dual engine failure also would not happen instantly unless it was an uncontained failure of one taking out the other. As there was no bang this obviously did not happen, and this applies to all other major drive system failures.

This could have simply been a missing cotter pin or loose nut in the collective control which resulted in the loss of connection. Once the simplex collective link is broken you are at the mercy of where the blades feather to. Unfortunately at low speeds this may end up with too little lift to do anything but barely cushion the impact.

The Sultan

[malabo]

Thanks Sultan, at least Puma pilots flying offshore can up their game. Looking at the photos and met reports, I can see the floats were inflated but did not keep the aircraft upright in a somewhat benign sea state. Floats aren't normally armed on an instrument approach to an airport, so something actioned by pilots, but without enough aircraft controllability for a stable water entry?

LOC DME 09 for Sumburgh is a CDFA approach, constant descent from 2100' at 6.4 back to a DA of 300' about 1 mile back.

How does the L2 fly these? Anybody that can give us a rundown on what autopilot modes would have been coupled and what capture settings for AS/VS/ rad or baro alt would be? How far back from the threshold lights does the DA put you?

[SASless]

There shall be some interesting work done by Divers in the next few weeks I bet. Working in close proximity to the rocks is not going to be much fun. Finding missing parts will be of much interest to the investigators. Determining what damage was caused by the aircraft beating up on the rocks in the surf will have to be part of their effort. I suppose some aerial recce of the cliff side will be in order as well to see if there was any contact with the rocks prior to entering the water.

As the Pilots survived.....they will be able to provide investigators with their best "clues" as to the starting point for figuring this out.

[KiwiNedNZ]

Question for those who fly in that area after seeing the Shetland news photos.

Is it significant the gear is down or would they have lowered it on approach to their home base. Just wondering.

Thanks.

[bigglesbutler]

The gear would have been lowered during approach checks (normal point to do so), the accident was on a fairly short finals.

Si

[KiwiNedNZ]

Thanks Biggles. Sounds like he was very close to making it home safely - very sad.

[mickjoebill]

Floats aren't normally armed on an instrument approach to an airport,

Not armed, even if the approach takes them low over water? Aren't take off and landings the most hazardous phases of flight?




Mickjoebill

[industry insider]

Wizzard

See Post# 46.

Further from EC:
As a complement to the information provided on August 24th at 3.41 am (French time), please find the latest information made available to EC :
- The helicopter has sunk and is near the coast, recovery procedure has been launched and the wreckage may be on shore in the next 72 hours
- The 2 pilots are amongst the survivors, they will be interviewed today by the official investigation team
- It is confirmed that this 332 L2 aircraft was equipped with a Main Gear Box with a carburized vertical shaft, this shaft is not the nitrided shaft involved in the two EC225 ditching.

Eurocopter is dispatching immediately 3 experts who will be on site on Sunday August 25th. They will reinforce the local EC team who is already in contact with operators, press and authorities.
At this stage Eurocopter is not recommending AS332 L2 flight suspension without further details coming from the recovery of the aircraft and the official investigation.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Save me the task of wading through nearly 200 posts - has CFIT been ruled out?

G

[SASless]

Nothing has been ruled out yet.

[Rotor Work]

No mention of CFIT,
thinking of the families & friends of the 4 lives lost
RW

[iamthetroll]

Can't speak for all three operators procedure, but regardless of SOP the NS fit L2s have AFDS so they should inflate automagically.

[iamthetroll]

Malabo:

That depends on the brief. Normally it would be a coupled approach given it was not for training, and in the L2 that tends to take the form of a 3-axis, though this may vary between operators. It's flown on the Bar-Alt set to Sumburgh QNH.
APP would be in use to maintain the LOC, with an ALT acquire set about 50ft above MDH (as the L2 has the habit of dipping past the alt acquire and then climbing back up to capture), VS engaged and would be varied to maintain the glide profile.
The stage they were at the DH would be zero on both sides of the cockpit (though this is something that may vary between operators).
If they had opted for a 4-axis coupled the only variation is that IAS would be held and adjusted in tandem with VS, maintaining glide profile.

As I said, it depends on the brief... There is nothing to stop the crew agreeing to it being flown manually, , or with the flight director if they can justify it (for example: if the autopilot was playing up earlier in the flight).

As for where you are when you reach the end of the procedure: I believe it's around 0.5mile grom the threshold, though that is off the top of my head. So I'm open to be corrected in that.

[HeliComparator]

AFDS only inflates the floats if they are armed.

[Geoffersincornwall]

That's why the 139 RFM tells you to arm the floats ALL THE TIME when over water. Not a popular choice but this is a fine example of why such a policy is basically sound.

G.

[tiltrotor]

In response to the "permanent grounding of all Superpumas" -

An interesting stance and approach - one that has been raised elsewhere too.

However - it begs the question - what if a similar accident were to happen on an S92? Perhaps another tail rotor problem on an AW139?

Having set the high profile and attention given to current accidents and developments, one could argue that similar precautions would need to take place on other aircraft as well, in case of technical issues. A fellow member has rightly stated that is is simply too early to say; and, the variants in the Superpuma fleet have indeed some significant differences in some of the systems. We just don't know yet. Statistics can be deceiving - indeed, there were 4 major Superpuma incidents in the UK Northsea recently. But remember to relate this always to the number of flight hours too, not just the type.

So if an S92 technical problem were to develop - would we halt all support to the Oil and Gas industry? Think also deepwater, long-distance, etc. What about business continuity, the impact on Oil and Gas, the price of fuel you pay at the pump?

OEMs simply could not produce enough airframes to make up for the grounding of ALL Superpumas, and there are very little alternatives when it comes to bad-weather, long range and payload. Sure, fill up a 139 with fuel - you will have the range, but only carry 6 passengers!

Safety Management will always be about a right balance based on risk management. Accident, even incidents where everybody survives will always be tragic. As tragic as they are, we have to accept that we can never be risk free. There are many things we can do to reduce risk, but it is all based on a management process. Shot-gun approaches, like the suggested permanent grounding of all Superpumas, just don't work. They are unrealistic and don't really add value to the Safety of Operations, neither to the business of operators and customers alike. Indeed, nobody will ever die again in a Superpuma crash offshore, but you will shift the statistics simply to other types. Let's see how the AW 189, B525, EC175, etc. will score in the future.

The other thing you do not see on forums is that, despite the lack of fatal accident, you don;t really know how many "close calls" other types have had.

So perhaps it is best to refrain from hurried statements and let the process take it's shape.

[airwave45]

Quote:
That is staggering, over 12,500 people in 15hrs, and going up by 50/min.
Only a handful of whom were listening when they were at school.

There is a limited role for facts on Facebook.


Indeed, however,

The UK helicopter operators have demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that they can't operate any variant of the Puma safely.

I'd be prepared to bet that you won't be allowed to operate this type in the UK Sector for much longer.

The bears (me being one) just won't put up with this any more.
If it comes to a stand off between the bears and the helicopter operators, I know who's going to win that one.

I'd look at getting another type rating under your belt if you currently drive one in the UK.

[victor papa]

Well said tiltrotor! Do a google search on all types and you will find a accident and most a incident as well over the last 5 years and please remember the Super Puma consist of 4 different types. Now it gets interesting if you do the math adding fleet hours in this period. As said now look at it operator hours vs incidents or accidents for the last 5 years and the picture changes completely.

I will have to find another job in a different industry cause there should be no helicopters flying. The smaller helos in big trouble too.

[industry insider]

Grounding makes no sense. Even the initial cause of this accident has not yet been determined.

If it is found to be a mechanical issue which COULD affect other 332s of other variants, then a fleet check will be performed and affected or possibly affected aircraft will be grounded. Just like happened on the EC225

Do we ground all crews when a crew related accident happens? No.

Regardless of the cause, we must use technology and training to make Transport Category helicopters safer and to ensure that the industry can reliably transport workers to work and back home again. OEMs, Oil and Gas companies, Operators, Pilots, Engineers and passengers must work together to achieve this.

A hootin' hollerin' lynch mob mentality will help no one.

[Noiseboy]

So the offshore workforce want the RAF to turn up with... Chinooks and Pumas. Ones that would never be allowed on the civil register after the abuse they will have seen as a necessity of their roles in warfare.

Great idea.

[Swinging Spanner]

First of all I would lie to send my condolences to the passengers that lost their lives and associated loved ones...its a very sad day.

My comments below are not in any way related to today's incident as we need to let qualified personnel get on with their subsequent investigation.

With regards to all the HUMS comments and looking at options to alert crew during flight as well as inform engineering prior to failure etc.We need to understand the philosophy of HUMS and whether it should be included in the cockpit.

HUMS essentially is measuring/monitoring the 'health' of a component. Every rotating shaft, gear and bearing produce a harmonic signature and these harmonic signatures are recorded/collected during each flight. Over the decades Smiths Industries-bought out by GE, gathered large volumes of this data to then produce 'thresholds' so that if the harmonic reading for a particular component exceeded this threshold then a message is generated to inform the engineer after downloading the data. It is important to mention that the automatic acquisition of this data can be taking during straight/level cruise...during a gust of wind...or during a turn, and so a harmonic that exceeded a threshold on one flight may be normal on the next flight. This is why its important for the engineer to assess via trending over a period of time or a 'step change' in data that may be related to a maintenance event for example.

In some cases like with AW, you can subscribe to online support where the data downloaded after each flight is washed through a remote AW HUMS database to then produce a report which is sent online back to the operator.

In essence HUMS moves maintenance away from reactive based maintenance to pro-active maintenance. So in the end the HUMS software is designed to maintain the 'health' of a harmonic signature...not the imminent failure of the component.

Now I put the question out there-do pilots want to be notified during flight of varying levels of 'health' of harmonic signatures of 20...30...40 accelerometers? Would this not be a disruptive impact of the cockpit environment?

I would like to think (as others have suggested) that it may evolve to be more like fixed wing where high priority data will be sent to a ground station in real time where qualified maintenance personnel are monitoring.

Just my 2 cents worth :8

SS

[thelearner]

I work in the industry, no longer travelling offshore, but have flown on all variants from the early 80's, but mainly in Puma's over the last 15 years - in the back of course.

Offshore workers, the majority will not have a high IQ like pilots, and don't know much about flying, and most are not highly technical and can't understand "technical speak". What they see is an increased frequency of accidents and incidents, mainly with super puma variants, 2 in the last 4 years with loss of life, and the others we have been very fortunate in the conditions when the aircraft ditched. I agree that the aircrews are the real experts, and they fly every day in these aircraft, and if you think they have an excellent safety record and are good, then you have to convince the offshore workforce - because it does not look like that to them.

I read the Sintef report posted yesterday, and I'm afraid I don't think it is only luck that the Norwegians have had much less incidents than us, and this must be looked at seriously. The report is very honest and does state that these accidents could have happened in Norway - but they did not. Generally statistics over such a long period don't lie.

From the offshore workforce point of view, it is sensible to ground all pumas until we know what caused this crash - we should already have a good idea from the pilots, although detailed analysis and examination will be required - and the aircraft needs to be recovered first to get to the flight recorders.

Also please don't forget a lot of us knew some of the people that lost their lives. I knew someone on the 2009 crash and the crash on Friday - they were work colleagues, and we spend a large part of our lives living and working together. One of the reasons emotions run high, and unfortunately emotions overule sense immediately after loss of life.

In the back of all variants of Puma, it is cramped and uncomfortable, and yes the size of those of us in the back is also increasing - we maybe need to take some seats out and carry less PAX. I've never flown in an S92 - but those that do say they are similar to the old S61 in terms of space and comfort.

[mad_jock]

Sorry plank driver here.

What do the Norwegians do differently?

[strake]

Offshore workers, the majority will not have a high IQ like pilots, and don't know much about flying, and most are not highly technical and can't understand "technical speak". What they see is an increased frequency of accidents and incidents, mainly with super puma variants, 2 in the last 4 years with loss of life, and the others we have been very fortunate in the conditions when the aircraft ditched. I agree that the aircrews are the real experts, and they fly every day in these aircraft, and if you think they have an excellent safety record and are good, then you have to convince the offshore workforce - because it does not look like that to them.

If you were being ironic, forgive me. If not, then I think you underestimate your colleagues at all levels of operation.
However, I agree with your sentiments. Whatever some of the experts here might say, there have been too many accidents in this one area/region of operation using the SP - even though people will quote variants of type etc- over the past 3/4 years and there is a strong sense of unease against using these aircraft in future. Commercial airline passenger have a choice of routes and airlines. Offshore workers don't.

[henra]

If you were being ironic, forgive me. If not, then I think you underestimate your colleagues at all levels of operation.


Having read some of the comments on the ipetition and the facebook site you can only hope that most haven't been written by that group of people. If these have indeed been written by Offshore Workers this would strongly back thelarner' (h@thelarner')s claim. The level of stupidity you find there truely beggars belief.
It would also be interesting to know if the initiator really is an Offshore Worker or if he is otherwise related to the industry (Operator or Manufacturer).

[roving]

Not sure if this has been posted ...


Shetland helicopter crash: all Super Pumas grounded | UK news | theguardian.com (http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/25/shetland-helicopter-crash-super-pumas-grounded)

[coatimundi]

Having read some of the comments on the ipetition and the facebook site you can only hope that most haven't been written by that group of people. If these have indeed been written by Offshore Workers this would strongly back thelarner's claim. The level of stupidity you find there truely beggars belief.



Can't speak for the i-petition but the reason for stupidity is right there - bl**dy Facebook!

Not all of us offshore use Faceache, many of us have studied the recent accident reports very carefully and more than a few of us are watching what is being said in here. Don't tar us all with the same brush.

[jimf671]

... I've never flown in an S92 - but those that do say they are similar to the old S61 in terms of space and comfort.

It's those big EC225 windows that I am looking forward to looking out.

[thelearner]

I was not being Ironic. There are indeed a lot of very sensible and clever people working offshore, with good IQ levels, and I had not intention of demeaning any of my colleagues. But there are many who are not well educated and will not understand complex technical issues, and can be easily led and influenced by the opinions of those that make the most noise - this is my personal opinion based on my experience which will be very centred on a specific bunch of rigs. I have read some of the Facebook stuff - and emotions are even running high with some people I know are sensible and clever, and their posts surprise me.

But let's be clear - there is huge concern over the UK Sector safety record by everyone now in the workforce, with the super puma in particular, and by the workforce at all levels. So don't "dismiss" it because of some of the stuff and posts on Facebook. The very serious question of why are the statistics so different to the Norwegian sector needs to be answered.

I think the Helicopter Steering group have taken the correct action.

[jonnyloove]

Next there will be calls to bring back the S-61's and bell 212's.
Facebook is not helping already there is a page called Destroy all Super Puma's. scare mongering at its worse.

[P3 Bellows]

The Petition

We the undersigned ask all Employers ,Scottish parliament,Helicopter operators ,Mps,Smp and all concerned with helicopter safety to listen to the workforce and concerned members of the public on the back of yet another ditching 24/8/13 . We dont want to fly and request that s92 or alternative route of transport offshore happen before we have another ditching.The workforce have concerns and ask for support on this matter.


This is the wording of the online E-petition.

[heliski22]

Echoing Mad Jock a few posts ago, can anybody summarise what it is about the way things are done in Norway that is so different or at least so significant?

[thelearner]

Have a look at post number 125 (http://www.pprune.org/8010222-post125.html) on page 7 of this thread. From a Norwegian. I don't know how to verify the post, but no reason at all to doubt what he/she has posted. They have a few interesting posts on the thread, with links to the reports.

[HeliMac]

If a crew related error is detected as a root cause for a fatal accident, do you ground aa crews and request immediate replacement of all crews? Wozld judge this as stupid.

[fenland787]

Is it just my time of life or do I find myself increasingly living in a society who's views are shaped by hysterical headlines and Farcebook?
Re this tragic incident, from the Guardian :

Bob Crow, general secretary of offshore union RMT, said: "RMT and Unite have worked with all sectors of the industry to address the concerns of our members and rebuild that confidence. Last night's events have undone all of that work and we anticipate an outpouring of anger."So Mr Crow, presumably, knows exactly what happened, who was to blame, who deliberately allowed the flight to happen despite the knowledge that it would end in tragedy? I do wish he would share.

This is a sector of the industry I know little about and from posts here there seems to be a history of issues that deserve examination and analysis, but given Mr Crow and his colleagues state they have been trying to 're-build confidence' I can only assume up to last Friday they were happy everything was as safe as it could be?

When the facts are known, there may indeed be a cause for anger, I just feel it's premature and such language, at this time, is unhelpful to all concerned and, in particular, can do nothing to help those directly affected by the tragic event.

[pumaboy]

Having seen there is petition out against the Super puma and the perminant grounding of all Super Pumas then how on earth are you going transport the bears with what capacity is left.

Can the operators cope finacially if this is going to be a long grounding?

I mean the operators have to find rescources from other areas to fill in the gaps of the Super Puma fleet, are we back to ferrying the bears with boats then?

We do not even know what happened Friday evening and everyone is getting to ahead of themselves lets wait and see what comes from the authorities.

It might not even be technical related and then what if this is the case the Super Puma has been seriously dented before we even knew what happend

I blame the media for scare mongering the bears and there families.

I have read people complaining about being crammped in the Super Puma there is more room in Super puma than the 139, 189 or 175.

The amount of BS I have read and heard since Friday then you have to ask yourself no wonder offshore workers are scared.

What about the safety record of the 139 has anybody looked at this before writing of the Super Puma

Ok lets fly them out using the miltary using Chinooks and Pumas.

[Donkey497]

I for one won't be supporting this stupid petition (plus it's badly worded and misspelt).

To transfer to a single type (s92) is both impractical & unrealistic, There isn't enough of them worldwide to meet demand & what do you do until there are, tell the folks offshore to stay put? So, the only practical option available under the terms of the petition is to scrap helicopter travel.

No helicopters simply means everyone offshore has to go offshore by supply boat & transfer to the installation by man-riding basket, an inherently risky process in good weather. How many lives would be lost each winter if we had to go back to only boats & baskets?

My current job means that I don't have to travel offshore as often as I used to, but I am more than happy to get on a EC225 or 332 to do it.

[thelearner]

This post and the one above are entirely accurate. The S92 also has had problems. (http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/new-problem-found-with-sikorsky-s-92-copter/article1314372/?service=mobile)

Boat transfer in the North Sea in winter - the amount of time spent in a boat, and likely being seasick would eat into the leave days and soon the workforce would be asking for the helicopters.

I think most offshore workers know they have to travel in a helicopter, and that it will never have a 100% guarantee of being safe, but it should be a lot safer than it has been over the last 4 years. The trend is very worrying for the offshore workforce. I agree the Puma has had until recently a very good safety record - again the real question is why have they became less reliable - and again the recent incident we have to wait for the cause.

[jimf671]

Here is a key part of the Executive Summary of the Sintef HSS-3 report from Norway.

1. There has been only one helicopter accident, with no fatalities, on the NCS during the period 1999–2009. This represents a significant reduction compared with the previous period 1990–1998 where there were 2.3 fatalities per one million passenger flight hours. For the whole 20 year period of 1990–2009, five accidents with 12 fatalities are recorded. These data result in a risk estimate of 0.9 fatalities per one million person flight hours and an accident rate of 0.4 accidents per million person flight hours.

2. The risk reduction on the NCS in the period 1999–2009 compared with 1990–1998 is estimated to be 16 % according to expert judgements. The most important contributing factors are as follows:

 Gradual introduction of new helicopter types and the implementation of the latest generation helicopter technology
 Improved use of systems for vibration monitoring in helicopters (Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) / Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM))
 Increased pilot skill by added requirements regarding competence, experience and simulator training on NCS operations.
 Improved flight operational procedures
 Improved helideck design and operations through requirements and active use of the Norwegian Oil Industry Association's (OLF) helideck manual and guidelines
 Improved emergency preparedness (such as improved emergency personal locator beacons, impact absorption and rescue suits, more rescue helicopters)
 Introduction of Safety Management System (SMS)
 The establishment of the Committee for Helicopter Safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf has contributed to cooperation and promoted specific offshore safety related rules and recommendations specified in the Helicopter Safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
- Part 1: Organizing of the public authorities’ involvement (NOU 2001: 21) and
- Part 2: Trends, objectives, risk influencing factors and recommended measures (NOU 2002:17).

There are similarities to the approach to SAR that I have become familiar with. No magic wand. The essentials seem to be that they do joined up thinking very well and they look at the numbers. (And they spend the Krone.)

Para 5 is titled as follows.

5. Improve interaction between the operators involved in offshore helicopter transport.

They are also extremely frank about the commercial and international regulatory pressures that could threaten their safety regime.

[strake]

The media isn't scaremongering, the NS rotary fleet are doing a good job all by themselves.
Last trip to NS platform from my son:

Trip out cancelled - a/c unserviceable.

5 hours later landed with replacement

Return cancelled 48 hours (always a really welcome announcement - not), aircraft developed in-flight fault diverted to another rig.
Eventual return flight my son, notices line of clear oil running down from cabin ceiling to floor. Radios pilot. Decision (probably only one available) 'let's keep going, too far to turn back'
I'm sure I don't need to confirm the make of helicopters involved...

Sorry, but if this was say, the London to Aberdeen commercial flight schedule statistics for 4 years, there would be outrage.

[S76Heavy]

My condoleances to all affected by the loss of their loved ones and friends.
We as an industry could well do without another tragedy.

But I do agree that there seems to be an increase of knee-jerk reactions to any incident and accident. Grounding all Super Pumas that among them have less in common than many would imagine, cannot be a decision based on rational thought. At least not technically rational.
It seems to be rational if one takes into account the irrational and highly emotional response to another accident, as a means of limiting the publicity damage to the company.

As a driver I would not get airborne in a helicopter that I did not trust 100%. My life, my reputation and my estate are on the line with every flight. As long as pilots are confident to fly, the passengers should be as well. After all, as long as the "bears" are happy to stay on a rig, I'm happy to land there 'cause it must be safe to do so.

Proper investigation takes time. Until then, every ground crew will check everything even more thoroughly than before, every flight crew will be even more critical than before, and nobody wants to be seen ar feel to be taken any chances. Having said that, there is no 100% risk free life.

I agree with the sentiment that there has been too much paper safety and not enough emphasis on the professionals doing a professional job using their professional judgement. This has led to the current climate in which people with only a limited knowledge of the real world scream for paper measures because they have been conditioned ito believing that they constitute real safety. WRONG.
What ensures your safety are the professionals that do a very good job, day in day out. More than any paper pusher behind an expensive desk can and will ever acchieve by producing more restrictions and procedures.

Occasionally professionals get it wrong, that is true. The AAIB will have to find out where this went wrong and come up with realistic recommendations to prevent it from reoccurring. Until then a grounding of a type will only introduce more risks to other types.
If I had to fly a SP load in my medium type I would need 3 flights instead of 1 on SP, which means 3 times the flight risks but spread over 8 PoB at a time instead of 20.
But how to calculate the knock on effect of splitting the load, flying more hours, having crews arriving and departing in a staggered time scale, how does THAT affect your total safety?

Having said that, having operated at Sumburgh I did wonder why there was only 1 full ILS available on what is clearly an important airport in the region. I would not wait for the investigation results to increase the number of precision approaches there, given the local weather. Although it may have nothing to do with this accident, it would give a greater safety margin overall.

[Hilife]

SASless

A question that I keep asking.....why are these event happening on the UK side of the North Sea and not on the other side? Is it just my memory fails me or are we really not seeing any on the other side? I am not suggesting anything....so don't get your feathers ruffled.....honest question here.

If we are not having crashes and ditching on the east side....then what are the factors that might be in play that keeps them from having the same problem?


I have no knowledge as what the cause of this latest incident was, nor am I trying to speculate, but in response to your question and noting SteinarN’s comments.

If my memory serves me well, the vast majority of S-92 gearbox feet cracking occurrences a few years ago were detected in the North Sea, and I’m sure the OEM briefings identified that torque settings were higher in the North Sea than in other areas of the world, so stress loads were higher.

[P2bleed]

Noticed the floats have been activated. Is it normal practice for this operator to arm them for the approach to the runway?

[Spambhoy]

It transpires the the photos you've have posted contain one of the victims strapped to his seat in row four. It might be an idea to take them down out of respect ?

[newaviator]

S76Heavy ............... one of the best posts I've read on here:ok:

[gulliBell]

At the risk of diverting off-topic...

As an offshore helicopter pilot who has worked in various far-flung places around the world, I'm just curious how it it is, say for example in Australia, where Esso helicopters have been operating in the Bass Strait oil fields for 40+ years and never had a single ditching or accident. Yet we are seeing, certainly in comparison, seemingly high accident rates in the UK offshore industry, and the Gulf of Mexico, and other places. What is it that they do down there differently to other places that the statistics tell us makes that an inherently safer operation?

I know there is not anywhere near the intensity of flight ops down there as in the NS or GoM, not anywhere near as many hours flown, different aircraft type, much fewer platforms, not as far off-shore, and other things. And bearing in mind they flew single engine, single pilot for several years, and twin-engine single pilot for many years. Perhaps the only similarity being ****e weather for 5 months of the year, I don't know. But how is it they can fly (guessing) 250,000+ hours over 40 years and not drop a single ship in the tide, but in the UK and other parts we're seeing a major accident every couple of years or so?

Is the standard of aircraft maintenance different (I wouldn't have thought so)? Are the flight standards of operating crews any different (again, I wouldn't have thought so)? Are their operating procedures any different/safer (can't imagine they would be)? Is the operating environment any different (probably not much, the platforms are built to international standards, and the weather down there can be as ****e as anywhere, although freezing is rarely an issue).

I mean, an accident rate of zero over 40 years, compared with what we see elsewhere, what is it that they do differently? I don't work for them and I'm not trying to blow their trumpet, but by any measure trying to account for long-term statistics versus reality there must be something different going on down there.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Greenville,
Here's a link to the mentioned report (Helicopter Safety Study) by Sintef:
Rgds

buzz111 thank you. I am still reading through the report.


One other difference is that on the Norwegian side the power out take from the engines is limited to 80 percent under normal operations in order to reduce the load on key transmission components.


SteinarN - How is this power out-take measured and what parameters are defined for flight crews so as not to exceed this? Where also is the source for this procedure, is it part of the Sintef recommendations?

[SASless]

The one particular series of aircraft, in one particular part of the North Sea, operated by multiple Operators within that Sector figure in this series of ditchings and fatal accidents.

I posed the question before about the possible significance of this....and suggested pure serendipity is a very unlikely root cause for the phenomenon.

Some folks are calling for grounding the entire fleets of the affected Aircraft and some challenge the rationale for that action.

I suggest it is the right time for a bottom up review of how the UK Sector does business....leaving nothing out of the review....sparing no Sacred Cows.

On the 225, EC and the Authority seem to have agreed upon the cause and cure for the Shaft problem. Whether that issue has actually been resolved satisfactorily or not will take time to decide.

What we know for sure is the UK Sector is putting aircraft into the water at an increasing rate, killing people in the process, and the Industry and Authority seem unable or unwilling to find a way to prevent these things from happening.

It is time to drop the Shields folks.....and find a better way.


The Gulf of Mexico Operators......well some of them anyway....have made significant changes....out of necessity and the accident trend has reversed and is decreasing. Bristow made a move away from Single Engined aircraft and seems to be moving towards a medium to heavy fleet as compared to prior years. Many of the singles they sold off....were snapped up by other GOM Operators.

The results of a Johns Hopkins Study ranked Mechanical Failure and Weather/Judgement failures as the two most common causes of accidents. Of the 139 people killed in the GOM in helicopter accidents.....44 were Pilots (remembering most of the fatal crashes involved single Pilot, single engine helicopters).

Oil- and Gas-Related Helicopter Crashes in Gulf of Mexico Killed 139 Over 26 Years -- Environmental Protection (http://eponline.com/articles/2011/09/16/oil-and-gas-related-helicopter-crashes-in-gulf-of-mexico-killed-139-over-26-years.aspx)

[The Ancient Geek]

Why have some operators or locations never had an accident ?

Do not neglect the apparantly strange behaviour of random chance.
In any set of candidates - for example accidents per hour flown IFR in poor weather - there will be a small but finite random occurrance. The mathematics of chance tells us that it is perfectly normal to get some bunches and some large gaps. This is the nature of randomness - if the incidents were evenly spread they would not, by definition, be random.

What we do know is that accidents are not totally random, there are many factors which affect risk. Some risks such as training, culture, maintenance etc can be managed but others such as weather are beyond our control.

So - what can we do ?.
We must manage the known risks to the highest practical standards but there is little we can do about the weather in the North Sea or the random failure of a component which does not have a history of failures.

If an engine quits at 50 feet over the sea maybe we should not be asking why the engine quit but how we came to be too low and slow to recover.

[edit] My comments are general and are not intended to refer to this or any other specific accident.

[SteinarN]

SteinarN - How is this power out-take measured and what parameters are defined for flight crews so as not to exceed this? Where also is the source for this procedure, is it part of the Sintef recommendations?

I'm not a pilot nor a heli mechanics, so I'm not too familiar with the instrumentation, but a nephew of me is a heli mechanic, and he has mentioned something about an instrument in the cocpit measuring torque, so i assume this is what the pilots are monitoring. As to the source for the 80 percent data, I have it from a news article in "Teknisk Ukeblad". Per Gram is a former Super Puma pilot with 4.500 flight hours on the type. I don't include a link in this post as it seems that I don't have the privilege to include any links without a lenghty delay for approval by the mods. Link will follow in my next post.

Excerpt;
Ulykker i britisk sektor

Per Gram kan ikke si hvorfor det oftere er hendelser og ulykker med helikoptre på britisk side av Nordsjøen enn i Norge. Selskaper i både Storbritannia og Norge følger regelverk utarbeidet av EU.
- I Norge er det imidlertid foretatt ytterligere skjerping av trening og vedlikehold etter anbefalinger i tre rapporter utarbeidet fra forskningsinstitusjonen Sintef i Trondheim. Mulig at dette har hjulpet, påpeker Gram.
-En annen forskjell mellom de to landene er at norske helikoptre bare flyr med 80 prosents motorytelse mens britene utnytter 100 prosent av motorkraften under flyging. Dette mener mange her i landet er et viktig bidrag til den bedre norske sikkerhetsstatistikken.

Translated by Google;
Accidents in the UK sector

Per Gram can not say why it is often incidents and accidents involving helicopters in the UK sector of the North Sea than in Norway. Companies in both the UK and Norway follow the rules laid down by the EU.

- In Norway, however, made ​​further intensification of training and maintenance for recommendations in three reports prepared by the research institute SINTEF in Trondheim. Possible that this has helped, says Gram.

- Another difference between the two countries is that Norwegian helicopter just flies by 80 percent engine performance while Britain uses 100 percent of engine power during flight. This mean a lot in this country is an important contribution to improving safety Norwegian statistics.

[SteinarN]

Link for the news article in "Teknisk Ukeblad"

EUROCOPTER AS 332L2 SUPER PUMA - Andre nødlanding på sjø av samme selskap - tu.no/industri (http://www.tu.no/industri/2013/08/24/andre-nodlanding-pa-sjo-av-samme-selskap)

[Admiral Byng]

Hello, new poster but I've been lurking here for oooh about ten years.

I work in O&G in Aberdeen but I'm a lawyer by training and qualification, grew up in the area and flew gliders at Aboyne when I was younger (some of you on here may well have been my instructors) so I have a reasonable understanding of how things work though I should state that I've never worked offshore and I'm not a pilot so I'm not going to go anywhere near the technical aspects.

I was reading this thread last night and thought that some of the comments regarding offshore workers were rather patronising. Then I saw the posts on Facebook...oh dear.

So far as I can tell, the Super Puma had an excellent reputation until around 2009 and since then it has obviously suffered from a spate of accidents. In my time at Aboyne the most memorable incident was G-TIGK being struck by lightning which was hardly a flaw in the aircraft itself. The posts by some here tend to dismiss the views of the passengers on the basis that they have not taken into account the statistics around hours flown, utilisation rates, differences between AS332/EC225 etc. Obviously these things are important but you have preferred the science of statistics and mathematics over the science of psychology.

Heli pilots are probably better educated and trained than the majority of offshore workers. You are entirely focused on risk-assessment from the moment you check the weather in the morning until you sit down with your drink of choice at home in the evening. For many of you this may just be your personality, for others it might have taken the training to drill it into you. Regardless of the source, you all calculate risk on an almost subconscious level. Most of the people you transport have not been brought up (professionally) with the same approach to risk. It is taught to them on courses and in classrooms but they rarely have the imagination to think that it might happen to them - the same, unfortunately, goes for many senior executives.

Having worked on FAIs I can definitely say that, until something bad happens, most people do not think 'it' will happen to them. Many professions (pilots, lawyers, doctors etc) work on the basis that 'it' most definitely will happen to them and so they work to avoid it. If you come from this perspective then the Facebook-type baying mob is confusing and frustrating. If you come from their perspective then you don't really give a hoot whether part of the transmission system is made from gold-plated titanium or chewing-gum provided it works. Faced with a sudden increase in serious incidents over a relatively short period they will get out the pitchforks regardless of the number of datasheets you attempt to fend them off with,

My point is to suggest that it would probably serve pilots well to understand that the people behind you are a) not well versed in the actual level of risk and what you do to mitigate it and b) not in control of their own destiny to any degree when they are flying with you - just think about the last time you were a passenger in a car you thought was going too fast and went for the brake in the passenger footwell; it's not a nice feeling.

I have noticed, in conversations with my brother (who works offshore and is not keen on choppers generally) that he and many of his colleagues seem to consider the pilots as being some kind of opposition. It appears to be part of the culture and I have no idea how it has developed but it needs to be worked on by both sides if things are to improve. For the avoidance of doubt I do always point out to him that the pilots don't consider it a barrel of laughs to declare an aircraft 'tech' when they have just flown halfway across the North Sea and that they are just as keen to get home for a beer and a curry as all the passengers.

[Grenville Fortescue]

SteinarN thank you for this additional information.

From what Steinar is telling us, Norwegian North Sea operators are setting a maximum torque limit of 80%. This would certainly impose less strain on the aircraft and its dynamic systems.

With what frequency I wonder do UK North Sea operators use between 80%-100% torque? Rig-based take offs with 10/12 pax+ depending on fuel?

[HeliComparator]

GF I think it may depend on type. The max torque in the cruise is around 80% for the 225 and L2, although we cruise the 225 at max cruise (~80%), everyone seems to operate the L2 at max cruise 65%. The S92 can I think be cruised at 100%, although nobody does that. So I don't think anybody cruises at >80% in UK sector. So we are left with the very brief excursions above 80% that occur during takeoff and maybe landing. I am not aware that our colleagues in Norway have any restriction on doing this - it is after all part of the spectrum of usage from which fatigue and life calculations derive. In any case, mandating a power limit for takeoff and landing could be counter-productive since it would be far worse to reduce the clearance from the structure, so that one day, the structure might be hit, as opposed to using the allowed full power.

Therefore, I don't see that the point made by SteinarN can be correct, and he does indicate that he is neither pilot nor engineer, so I suspect something perhaps "lost in translation".

I did read the execuitive summary of the Sintef #3 report. Whilst it contains a good deal of sense, most of the specifics are in fact platitudes that don't really indicate the detail of a way forward or indeed why the Norwegian side seems to have a better safety record than this side.

Having had a bit to do with our colleagues in Norway, I don't think there is a fundamental difference in the way we operate, and whilst I know less about how we maintain, again I dont think there is a significant difference, other than perhaps a cultural difference between Norwegian attitudes and UK attitudes. There does however seem to be more funding available in Norway, and greater reluctance from the oil companies to force the operators to keep their costs down - ie less "race to the bottom" than we have seen here. I know its an old line, but I do see the oil companies obession with minimising how much they spend on helicopter transportation, when it represents a tiny part of their overall budget, as a possible factor in at least some of the recent spate of accidents.

The difference between having an accident and nearly having an accident can be very small, and perhaps it is therefore a fairly small difference in resourcs that is responsible for the differing statistics.

[fa2fi]

I've tried googling but can't quite find what I'm looking for. Does anyone have and solid statistics (not anecdotal or hearsay) that the super puma has a better or worse safety record compared to similar types?

[Grenville Fortescue]

HeliComparator thanks.

Seems that most people are using 80% for cruise. Hopefully we will find out if the Norwegians are doing something different which could be beneficial.

[HeliComparator]

I'm going to get more flaming I'm sure, but here is my take on the recent spate of accidents to the Super Puma family.

REDL - could have been avoided if the correct maintenance procedures had been followed after the epicyclic CHIP warning (epicyclic should have been opened up)

ETAP 225 - pilot error, in part as a result of weak procedures in the Ops Manual and a pilot who, whilst very experienced, was relatively new to night operations in the N Sea

Bond 225 shaft failure - could have been detected before failure if rigorous HUMS monitoring was in place

CHC 225 shaft failure - could have been detected before failure if rigorous HUMS monitoring was in place

Latest L2 - who knows, but it doesn't seem to have been the repeat of any previous technical failures, certainly not a catastrophic failure otherwise the injury pattern and fuselage damage would have been much worse.

So, out of the 5, 3 are maintenance issues, 1 pilot error and 1 that we don't know about. Apart from the unknown latest one, none of them were unavoidable issues with the Super Puma family.

[HeliComparator]

Whilst I'm in rant mode, the other area where we Brits are failing is in the devaluing of human skill and experience. All a company has to do is to write a manual of instructions and procedures for employees to follow, and Bob's your uncle. It doesn't matter if the person who gets the job is an idiot or not. If he is an idiot, you can't get rid of him easily due to HR and employment issues. If he is good at his job, its not appreciated and the companys' attitude is that if he doesn't like something, he can be replaced by another bum on a seat. That tends to breed a culture of not bothering too much because why get stressed when you can just coast through your job and get your pay cheque at the end of the month?

When companies finally realise that their employees are their most valuable resource, things might improve! (along with the flying pigs etc)

That's probably enough ranting for one day!

[Choppers Rule]

CHC in Norway uses 75% TQ when AGW is below 25000lbs and 70% above 25000lbs on the S92. Max TQ on a S92 above 100kts is 86%.

[Moonwalker]

If he is an idiot, you can't get rid of him easily due to HR and employment issues. If he is good at his job, its not appreciated and the companys' attitude is that if he doesn't like something, he can be replaced by another bum on a seat.

Totally agree! Sums up the British employment culture pretty well.

[satsuma]

That tends to breed a culture of not bothering too much because why get stressed when you can just coast through your job and get your pay cheque at the end of the month?

I very much doubt that's what your passengers want to hear at a time like this. Being a professional flyer/maintainer and 'not bothering too much' are surely mutually exclusive.

[victor papa]

Helicomparator, I agree fully. This is part of a bigger problem and the 332 yes is paying the price. I agree with your analysis as well that human error was involved and not just with the 332-I will ask again that we look at global type statistics for the last 5 years and incl causes differentiating between catastrauphic and preventable. I also believe we are loosing the plot in some areas. Engineers with good laptop skills and university degrees are preferred where I work above hands on experience and lets call it the good old hands on mechanic who looks and feels-a lot of our engineers do a after flight with gloves so yes good for OHASA but how do they feel the machine? Pilots spend time on tv screens and responding to promps as they should from warning lights or displays and yes its technology, but what happened to flying by the seat of your pants understanding warning vs what the machine is doing? Airbus accident comes to mind. I am not critisizing but we need to find a balance? Meanwhile let me continue my paperwork.........

[Grenville Fortescue]

It doesn't matter if the person who gets the job is an idiot or not. If he is an idiot, you can't get rid of him easily due to HR and employment issues. If he is good at his job, its not appreciated and the companys' attitude is that if he doesn't like something, he can be replaced by another bum on a seat. That tends to breed a culture of not bothering too much because why get stressed when you can just coast through your job and get your pay cheque at the end of the month?


Sadly this care less culture is rampant in many large companies today and even those individuals at the top with the will to change things face extraordinary challenges.

Most public companies require large numbers of people to be on board before any meaningful changes can take place and whenever one or two individuals come up with proposals, even if they are sound, there are invariably others who are eagre to challenge them, to emphasise the bottom line (which shareholders love) and find justifications for maintaining the status quo.

Therefore, it requires not only someone who understands the issues and has the guts to do something about it but, more significantly, the authority to make it happen.

[HeliComparator]

Well that is tough, this is a professional pilot forum, not a public relations forum. Although I will say that I was thinking more of the support and managerial staff than the technicians and pilots. The pilots tend to have strong self-preservation, the engineers are tied up by so much paperwork whose raison d'etre is to work out who to imprison when things go wrong, that they tend to pay attention as well. But it would be foolish to think that a helicopter operator solely comprises these two groups - in fact they seem to be in the minority these days!

[biscuit74]

Helicomparator - that was an excellent and perceptive set of posts, not rants at all. Thank you.
What you describe is indeed a modern British problem, thanks largely to some well intentioned but very silly and badly written employment legislation, notionally about 'equality' but actually working against capability, competence and common sense. As you said. And sadly, ultimately that risks and costs lives. Hard fact.

This is an issue in lots of areas of engineering and business, not just in our aviation world.

I'm afraid the 'politically correct' lobby in HR and the legal side have a lot to answer for. Sometimes truth and PC behaviour don't go together.

Darned if I can see an answer, since the 'powers that be' are unlikely to have the bottle to grasp the real root causes and sort 'em out. Much easier to make soothing management speak noises.

[thelearner]

I can't quote yet (not enough posts) but I fully agree with the posts by Helicomparitor. And the post above. Spot on.

[[email protected]]

HC - excellent work, 'paper safety' is exactly the right term; management devise box-ticking exercises, spreadsheets and colour-coded charts, using them as metrics to show how well they are managing the risks without actually spending the money required to remove or reduce them.

Sadly the military has gone down this same road with the MAA and a safety management scheme which is delivered with religious zeal - it is mostly arse-covering so no-one ends up in court, generates a massive amount of staff work and doesn't actually make anything safer at all.

Perhaps the parallels are there with the NHS - layers of management proving govt targets are being satisfied by ticking boxes but not enough doctors and nurses to actually treat the sick people.

[EESDL]

Diginagain - raised the issue of size of pax v actual escape hatch size at last industry meeting - only to be told that this was an "old problem and being looked into" - was gobsmacked - first such meeting and was not use to the blather I heard that day...........
Inertia and empire building are phrases that spring to mind. As mentioned many times on this forum - the employer is responsible for ensuring employee fit for duty. Also appears that Seat crashworthiness is also given a cursory nod but ignored. I'm no lightweight but I have my own escape exit and usually wide awake and in the loop for each 'landing' so confident of surviving a controlled ditching - as for the latest incident - could not imagine what would have gone through the mind - sounded absolutely dreadful ! Condolences to those who have lost loved ones.

[heliski22]

Helicomparator - that was an excellent and perceptive set of posts, not rants at all. Thank you.

I'll second that, including the thank you!

[Tractor_Driver]

HC.

Excellent posts.

The problem is exacerbated by managers who believe that they are working for an oil service company, not an airline. I heard of one senior HR manager who was horrified to discover that Training Captains had access to other pilots training records. What about Data protection? :ugh:

[fenland787]

All a company has to do is to write a manual of instructions and procedures for employees to follow, and Bob's your uncle. HC, I wholeheartedly agree with your posts - they are not rants - I have watched it happen over the years, and indeed, fought a successful rearguard action to try to prevent it for a while! I ultimately lost when I was bought out by a much larger operation who liked the golden eggs but promptly killed the goose they bought by insisting on 'proper' management
When companies finally realise that their employees are their most valuable resource, yes, and could I add 'their employees knowledge and experience' to that?
Stage two of the 'write the procedure' school of management is, when it finally dawns on them that all the people who knew anything have gone, is the "We'll get all our detailed design, manufacture, testing, etc, etc done outside, it's much more cost-effective" so they do, and they pay vast sums of money, and they will eventually get a product. But guess what?
a) they can't support it in-house and
b) they have now paid other people to acquire all that skill and knowledge who can sell it again and again, possibly to their competitors and, when they want a new product they pay out again!

But hey - it's an ill wind and all that, guess what I do for a living these days...:ok:

[Irish Steve]

Living dangerously here, but when I see people die as the result of an "incident/accident", my blood pressure rises.

My worry us that the standard response to a problem these days seems to be to surround it in paperwork, rubber stamps and signatures in triplicate.

That way, the problem becomes so mired in audit trails, and all the other buzz words that are so beloved of bean counters and backside protectors, its unlikely that anyone other than a masochist will ever get to the bottom of what the original problem is, as it is now surrounded by so much irrelevant bureaucracy that making sense of the issue becomes many times more complicated than it ever used to be.

I've read a number of threads in different areas here today, and the underlying and scarily common theme seems to be the dilution of real skills and replacement of those skills by SOP's, or CAM's or just plain straightforward mountains of paper than obfuscate the problem so that it loses it's significance and urgency, until of course a significant number of people die. Then, all manner of mountains of paper are dragged out and examined to try and determine which aspect of the supervisory system failed and allowed the problem to continue.

Far better to fix the problem in the first place. A friend recently commented that the aircraft wasn't fit to fly if the weight of the paperwork was not greater than the weight of the airframe. Having seen some of the mountain that is now needed to do something like a lease return, I can believe it.

Does it make the industry safer? Does it save lives? Do we really learn from having 20 rubber stamp impressions on a piece of paper rather than one stamp at the end? Too much of what is being justified as supervision is now regrettably only backside protection to make sure that someone else can be blamed or worse when the unthinkable happens. That's not a safety culture, that's a defence against ambulance chasing legal eagles that would be better employed doing something productive.

Not a good scenario, not al all. I just hope that this the ultimate cause of this tragic event wasn't a known issue that was mired in obscurity in order to allow "the system" to carry on operating.

[helialan]

Everyone throwing statitics around here about the SP
Wonder how many helicopters (of all makes and models) have had catastrophic structual or mechanical failure on 2NM final in IMC over the last 20 years?
Wonder how many helicopters have made CFIT in last 3NM of approach to minimums over the last 20 years?

[UKpaxman]

Are there any helicopters that have a system to slow descent in the event of a gearbox or rotor failure? Given the air industry builds redundancy into their critical systems, its always struck me that the helicopter gearbox/drive shaft is a system where redundancy seems to have been deliberately ignored - I presume there's no practical solution, is there?

My thoughts go to the friends and families of all those involved.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Are there any helicopters that have a system to slow descent in the event of a gearbox or rotor failure?

There were plans for exploding bolts on main rotors followed by crew ejector seats and an airframe parachute but if you've worked on helis then you'll probably understand why these ideas were shelved, but they were tested - looong ago.

Its about the only thing I know that could slow descent in the event of catastrophic gearbox or rotor failure!

[jimf671]

I am particularly interested in the point raised about the window sizes.

The L2 has the small middle windows which are roughly Sikorsky size and larger ones at the front and back corners.

The EC225 has big beauties all the way along the fuselage and I am really looking foward to sitting beside those shortly.

The AW189, again, has big beauties all along the fuselage.

Having a decent-sized jettisonable door right in the middle of each side of the aircraft also seems like a good plan from the swimming passengers' point of view. You got in at the middle so just head back the way you came and whichever way you turn there'll be a big door. Sorted.

-----------------------------

Now here's a problem with modern design that has been annoying me for the whole 16 years since I first had to deal with it. There are a number of international standards for the size of vehicles and various other products. I had to design roll-over protection for an eight-wheel-drive vehicle back in the 20th century. I followed the ISO standard for the vehicle class, and a large person with arctic clothing, and ended up with a roll-over bar with its highest point 20mm lower than the top of my head. Oops.

Why?

The stats were for a 95% confidence level based on the entire world population. North European males often fall outside that range.

The windows in the L2 door or the S-92: are they Chinese-large?

[HeliComparator]

UKpaxman, no not really. I am presuming you mean some sort of ballistic recovery system as fitted to some light aircraft. The trouble with many of these ideas (apart from cost and weight) is the risk of inadvertent deployment. Parachutes and rotor blades don't mix well together!

Despite these accidents, and lets remember that only 1 was a catastrophic failure (because I don't think the injury pattern of this latest event points to catastrophic failure) in all the Super Puma operations since 1982 (on UK side). A ballistic recovery system would have to be incredibly reliable to suffer less than 1 inadvertent deployment in that time. Also you would of course have to stop or jettison the rotors before deployment. Scary!

[Fareastdriver]

jimf671. The doors on all Pumas are the result of the original French Army requirement that the Puma would be low enough to go into a Transall and narrow enough to be transported on a French railway truck. The Pumas have been saddled with that restriction over decades.

When you climb into a 747/737/A320 and sit in a seat with lots of legroom that has the escape exits by it the hostie will ask you to familiarise yourself with the operation of the said door in case you have to operate it in an emergency. The escape and dunking drills I have done, both military and civil in different continents have also emphasised this detail. I find it very strange that with this accident that one main door was not jettisoned thereby trapping people inside.

[HeliComparator]

Jimf, the L2 has large windows front and back, and the central jettisonable doors. That just leaves 1 pair of windows towards the front, and 1 pair at the back, that are the smaller variety.

However, in an event such as we have just seen, its probably too difficult to jettison the main cabin doors, and pax will use the smaller door windows instead. I think there is scope for making door jettison easier in extremis, or even automatic, but of course one always has to guard against inadvertent deployment.

[UKpaxman]

Thanks for the replies.

I guess the point I'm making is that I can't think of another form of civilian transport that places 100% reliance on something as complex as a gearbox with no redundancy in the event of a catastrophic failure.

I completely agree with what's been said above about the practicality or reliability of such systems, but I'm sure the boffins could design something to at least help slow the descent.

Tragic though the latest accident was, the failure happened at probably the most opportune point in the whole flight given the reasonably sheltered location, altitude and speed, proximity to sumburgh and prevailing wind. A few seconds later and the outcome would have been so much worse.

[[email protected]]

The obvious answer is rearcrew/cabin attendant/door slider but that is wasted payload and lost revenue as far as bean counters are concerned.

[HeliComparator]

Ukpaxman, I would disagree with your point about lack of redundancy for civilian transport systems. You only have to look at the greatest transport killer - road transport. One driver with minimal initial and no recurrent training, opposite direction separation distances of a few feet with fatal consequences if separation becomes zero. One steering wheel held on by 1 nut, etc etc.

The P&J routinely feature fatal road accidents, we seem to have had a spate of them this month. They make the news, then are forgotten the next day. But one heli accident killing fewer than those killed on the roads of Grampian for a month, is a major catastrophe that dominates the news for days or weeks and brings calls for grounding etc. It just doesn't bear logical analysis.

[UKpaxman]

Fair point HC, although it was more the design element I was referring to. The whole helicopter gearbox/drive shaft design issue is something that's niggled at me ever since the chinook disaster.

[jimf671]

... would be a very unlucky place to have a “catastrophic loss of power”.

Or a very unlucky place to be compelled to enter auto.

[Colibri49]

This is intended for those "bears" and non-pilots, of whom some are jumping to conclusions based on very little or nothing.

I have many years and many thousands of hours flying the various helicopter types which transport you to and from your offshore workplaces.

On a few occasions over the decades I have been required to fly as a passenger in the cabin and I've never greatly enjoyed the experience. I'll go further and admit that when wind and weather conditions are rough, I feel at least a little apprehensive. It's quite different from sitting up front and feeling that I have some control over my fate. So I sympathise.

But whereas you might do some 10 return flights in a year, I do about 200 and because I recognise that no flying can ever be risk-free, my quota of apprehension about remotely-possible emergencies probably adds up to much the same as yours i.e. we can both ascribe a similar number of grey hairs each year to the stress of flying.

But I do enjoy the job and probably most of us accept that this industry affords us a good income in return for a modicum of risk. Having said all this, it fills me with sadness whenever someone dies and especially if it could have been avoided.

Now to my final point; an anology. You're driving your Mondeo along a road and come upon a serious accident involving another Mondeo. Or maybe it wasn't even you, but a family member of yours who told you about the accident. Either way, does it make sense to immediately get rid your Mondeo and join a clamour for all Mondeos to be recalled, before anyone knows the cause?

It might have been a deer that caused the car to swerve. All we pilots and other helicopter support staff ask is for some common sense. Mondeos, like all makes of cars get involved in accidents which arise from numerous causes. Please consider helicopters in the same light.

Apart from last year's two EC225 ditchings, there is no common theme in these random accidents affecting the Super Puma family. In March 2009, an S92 had an awful accident off Newfoundland and another came perilously close to disaster from the same cause in Australia.

Excluding the above examples where common causes were identified, random means exactly what it says and the only way to almost eliminate risk is to stay in bed.

[cyclic]

HC, another good point. No death is acceptable but your point about the casualty rates on the Aberdeenshire roads is very valid. Aberdeenshire has one of the worst accident rates in the whole of the UK but you don't hear calls for the ban of fast cars bought by wealthy oil workers after every fatal accident. Sorry, off topic I know but where is Bob Crowe and his muckers when this happens so frequently?

[Offshore Addict]

Why not just designate the pax sitting closest to the door jettison handle as being responsible for its operation in an emergency ??, a simple tap on the shoulder by the despatcher or HLO should do it. Why not make it part of the outbrief too ??

As someone who flies offshore for a living I am quite happy to fly on any aircraft the pilot says is safe, I am as saddened as any at recent events but knee jerk reactions help no one. I trust you guys and its pretty clear from this thread that you take your responsibilities very seriously. The vast majority of guys I work with feel the same and are happy to fly if you are. I know from my time in light blue that all aircraft have their problems, fundamentally I think the Puma variants are safe, been flying in the back of them for over ten years and never had a problem.

[mary meagher]

Helicomparator, in one of his excellent posts, says that oil companies have an obsesion with minimizing helicopter transport costs. So helicopter operators in the UK are competing with each other to win a contract. Low bid wins? If too many of UK aircraft are off line because of a possible defect, where will the oil companies find transport offshore? The UK operators may no longer be able to meet requirements.

Is there any reason they could not approach a Norwegian operator to provide this service?

[HeliComparator]

Mary, I don't think there is any particular reason except that Norwegian services cost a lot more! Bear in mind of course that the Norwegians are the same companies (CHC and Bristow) flying the same types (Super Puma and S92) and will be struggling with the grounding of the Super Puma fleet just as we will.

Anyway, hopefully it will be determined that the accident was not as a result of an intrinsic failure in the Super Puma that has not surfaced until now (30 years after inception).

[cyclic]

Unfortunately, in order not too scare the living daylights out of the work force, the dunker is a very gentle affair in a warm swimming pool. I can assure you the military version is much more realistic but half the workforce wouldn't pass the course. Where do you draw the line of realism against risk?

[HeliComparator]

I think that was my point SD. You are quite right in your points, however this difference in cultural acceptability doesn't stand rational scrutiny.

[AW_ia_TOR]

Well said Colibri49

[SASless]

Whatever came of the call for mounting float bags well up on the sides of the helicopter to ensure the aircraft does not go inverted during a ditching? Are there commonsense safety precautions that have not been pursued by the Authority, Operators, or the Manufacturer?

[roundwego]

HC, Ref. your "Whilst I'm in rant mode" post, I totally agree. And any one who puts their head above the parapet and argues against the "modern" management lemmings get sidelined very quickly. A good organisation should encourage critical comment and argument from below in order that procedures and processes are thoroughly and intellectually tested. Too many companies have "top down" management where the senior management think that safety comes from the top when in fact it comes from the bottom.

Sasless, This was a crash not a ditching.

[maxwelg2]

After having just recenty completed my HUET in the new S92 simulator, with stroking seats, windows that have to be opened when upside down, and a much faster capsize time albeit still in a warm pool, we are waiting for approval to use a cold pool and wave buoy to replicate more realistic conditions. The down side, many of us offshore workers would most likely fail this more intense level of offshore survival training.

We use HUEBA over here but do our refresher training separate from the HUET exercises due to risk of damage to the lungs if you forget to breath out when > 1 meter underwater and upside down.

The reason we got the HUEBA system "fast tracked" was partially due to Cougar 491, in that tragic accident the impact was so severe that all but one survivor drowned, the HUEBA may have saved one more PAX but we will never know.

My last MIS-BOSET was in Malaysia a few years ago, we had to use the air pocket plus in the HUET after the pool training exercises, not an easy thing to do. I don't know what the current OPITO HUET is like but I found the use of the rebreather in the HUET much more realistic.

My point here is that we cannot take out all the risk in offshore helo operations, there is a fine line between realistic survival training and too high a risk to be taken on board by the operators. However as a PAX I strongly believe that we should have the option to sign a waiver and perform more realistic exercises if we wish to do so. For those who do not wish to attempt these exercises then the current required participation needs to at least be maintained. At the end of the day you are responsible for your own safety, but in a crowded helo environment your actions will affect other people's chances of survival.

As a PAX I accept the risk every time I fly, I trust in the pilot who trusts the AMEs who trust the manufacturer and their company's safety and maintenance programmes.

I would love to see the addition of flotation devices that would prevent an offshore use helo capsizing in SS6 conditions, perhaps the recent loss of life regardless of the root cause will put more focus on this option. Everything is possible if there is enough momentum behind it.

Let's try and take something positive out of this tragedy in the same way that we addressed some of the S92 issues back in 2009. To not do so would be to accept the latest loss of life as yet another unfortunate fact of this chosen working environment.

Safe flying

Max

[SASless]

Round,

Call it what you want...."Crash" or "Ditching".....the aircraft went into the water, wound up inverted, and as we both know.....survival rates are greatly diminished when the aircraft fails to remain upright and fills with water.

You also know Helicopters are particularly prone to roll over particularly if one of the standard float bags is damaged or fails to inflate.

The Hi-Side mounted Float Bags concept was proven to very effective preventing the Helicopter from doing just as this aircraft did.

At this point Round.....do we "know" it was a Crash? You suppose it was....but until we hear from the Pilots....are you quite certain it was not a Forced Ditching that turned out badly?

I should think you are being premature in casting a vote.

We all can have an opinion on this...but until we hear more....it is totally conjecture what happened.

Probably we can accept two causes are most likely......severe mechanical failure of some kind.....or CFIT....but only the Investigators will be able to tell us with definity what happened.

[Variable Load]

Max,
My last MIS-BOSET was in Malaysia a few years ago
I suspect our paths would have crossed. I know from your posts that we share a similar passion for safety, albeit from a different perspective (customer vs crew). I do hope our paths will cross again at some point so we can exchange viewpoints.

I would like to add to the current debate on the specifics of this incident, however......:mad:

I will offer one opinion. The thread running stating that Norwegian standards were superior to UK standards I believe to be false. As HC has stated, the two current operators on both sides of the median line operate to similar, if not identical Standard Operating Procedures. The biggest identifiable difference is that there are two operators in Norway, whereas due to commercial reasons (i.e. BP reintroducing a third operator) the UK sector now has greater competition and far cheaper rates. It would be interesting to hear the HSSG viewpoint on how safety is affected by the commercial "efficiency" the offshore helicopters operators have to introduce!

I am not saying that any operator deliberately introduces policies and procedures that introduce additional obvious risk, or take shortcuts. However there are commercial pressures to "trim" towards the basic regulations rather than build the "gold plated" standard.

None of this may be related to the current incident!

Finally, a word of caution regarding statistics. Shell have probably been the most proactive oil company over the last 30 years with regard to improving offshore helicopter safety. However if you were to look at which North Sea oil company has suffered the most fatalities in the N Sea, Shell is top of the list by a long way. There is no statistically valid reason for this and it would be easy to jump to the conclusion that Shell was a bad contract manager, etc. I use this as an example to demonstrate that low frequency events will sometimes produce odd statistics that should be categorised more to 'bad luck' rather than anything else. I would include in this category:
Norway vs UK
Super Puma variants vs S92 VS AW139
Bristow vs CHC vs Bond

OK, that's probably enough for now.

My thoughts are both with the individuals and families that have suffered a loss, as well as those that are making their own individual journey through the post-traumatic stress that this event has imposed on them both directly and indirectly.

This is not a good time for the industry and we need to pull together as one.