Cranfield crash, 5 June 2013

[John R81]

BBC reporting a light aircraft down

BBC News - Two hurt in Cranfield Airport light aircraft crash (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-22783492)


Two people have been injured in a light aircraft crash in a Bedfordshire airfield, the ambulance service said.

Emergency services, including two air ambulances, were called to Cranfield Airport just before 13:45 BST.

An East of England Ambulance spokesman said the two casualties received "serious injuries" and were being flown to Addenbrooke's Hospital.
Bedfordshire Police said the Civil Aviation Authority would be investigating.

Cranfield Airport has yet to comment.

The facility is used by flight training organisations, small business aircraft and private jets.

[rbrtchrsty]

Looks like G-BGBN

http://www.abpic.co.uk/images/images/1403987M.jpg

Two airlifted to hospital after light aircraft crash in Cranfield - Local - Milton Keynes Citizen (http://www.miltonkeynes.co.uk/news/local/two-airlifted-to-hospital-after-light-aircraft-crash-in-cranfield-1-5161551)

http://www.miltonkeynes.co.uk/webimage/1.5161818.1370447717!/image/667841091.jpg_gen/derivatives/landscape_595/667841091.jpg

[Tupperware Pilot]

Rumour has it its one of Pilot Flight Training (Cranfield) owned by Chris Alexander.........

[Pilotage]

I was about Cranfield today.

It is PFT, it is a PA38, it wasn't Chris Alexander. Seems to have been an instructor and their student, there were reports that they made a radio call about a rough running engine, and the impact site was somewhere around the 21 threshold. I understand that nobody has died, but both are in hospital and very unwell. AAIB are attending.

That's as much as I know, other than there were a great many emergency vehicles on site.

Thoughts and hopes with the two people in hospital that they make a full and speedy recovery.

P

[porridge]

Sad about BN, had many hours flying on it. Just a note however, the engine always had a problem with plug fouling and one had to be cautious about taxiing rich. It always liked a bit of lean to keep the plugs clean. Worse on hot days too!
So sorry for the people hurt, but there may have been something lacking in the process somewhere. Experience and knowledge of each individual aircraft's foibles is vital.

[captain_flynn]

Sad to hear of this.
I hope that the two on board make a swift recovery.

[Winhern]

Two airlifted to hospital after light aircraft crash in Cranfield - Local - Milton Keynes Citizen (http://www.miltonkeynes.co.uk/news/local/two-airlifted-to-hospital-after-light-aircraft-crash-in-cranfield-1-5161551)

[ZuluFoxtrot]

How sad! I fly out of Cranfield and this has really hit home. Would hate to speculate but here are some facts regarding the school/aircraft:

1. PA38 used to be owed by Bonus (went into administration last September)
2. PA38 in question was getting towards the end of its life. Apparently bought in auction for £7000 ish
3. PFT headed up by Chris Alexander

ZF

[captain_flynn]

Any idea how the two on board are doing now?

[Genghis the Engineer]

Any idea how the two on board are doing now?

Somebody close to the school told me this afternoon - seriously injured, in hospital, but the injuries are no longer judged to be life threatening.

G

[captain_flynn]

Thanks very much for the information. I am glad to hear that they are not in a life threatening state now. I hope they make a swift recovery.

[Tupperware Pilot]

The other side seem to have already picked up on the owner's past!

[S-Works]

Out of curiosity, what is the relevance of the owner or his murky past to do with the crash?

An opportunity for salacious gossip?

I am more interested why an Instructor would attempt a low level turn back. The cardinal sin in my mind. It's called the impossible turn for a reason.

Thankfully they have lived to learn from the mistake. Wishing them a speedy recovery.

[Cows getting bigger]

Oh Bose, did you really have to kick off that discussion? :eek:

IMHO, don't turn back unless you have planned it, in detail. Yes, there are a huge number of variables which can increase or decrease the chances of success but how many pilots are competent/current enough to do it?

Whenever this discussion takes place, I always point people towards this accident report (http://www.ukserials.com/pdflosses/maas_19920930_xx334.pdf) which has some significant personal interest. Not exactly the same circumstances but indicative of how a professional can get it wrong.

[ZuluFoxtrot]

Bosex,


I think that the guys murky past didn't go down to well at Cranfield with plenty of guys opposing down there.

Who said that the instructor tried the impossible turn? I haven't heard any such thing as yet.

ZF

[shakehandsman]

Wind at Cranfield 040/08. Report says: landed short of the 21 threshold.. QED?

[Red Chilli]

Depends which way the aircraft was pointing

[FlyingOfficerKite]

2. PA38 in question was getting towards the end of its life. Apparently bought in auction for £7000 ish

It does beg the question just how long our beloved 'spam cans' will survive?

Maybe there are only so many times you can replace the 'broom and handle' before it's time to throw it away?

KR

FOK :confused:

[shakehandsman]

Red Chillie, 'short of the 21 threshold' is either on the runway (if taking off from 03) or trying to land back on 21 with a significant tail wind, which you wouldn't normally do out of choice.. Implying a turn-back.

Of course I have assumed that they were using 03 - with wind at 040 I can't imagine otherwise.

[Red Chilli]

We don't have enough info at this stage, could have been a normal take off followed by immediate engine failure which would put the aircraft at the 21 end of the runway, no turn back required.

Let's leave it to the AAIB.

I trained at Cranfield a fair number of moons ago (using Bonus) and flew the aircraft in question numerous times.

Hope they recover ok.

[S-Works]

Eyewitness reports are an attempted turn back, stall and spin.

[Tupperware Pilot]

Eyewitness reports are an attempted turn back, stall and spin.
This is what I'm hearing from many different sources. Might be interesting to read the report as to why the engine failed/rough run............

[shakehandsman]

Yes, will read that with interest.

Their last rate on those tomahawks was £75 per hr wet.. Not much profit it that...

Edit: on good authority, not Hinton mogas

[smarthawke]

They use Mogas or UL91?

[tunalic2]

rumour is all ac grounded as of yesterday ( sun)

fact
no phones were being answered

[Tupperware Pilot]

[QUOTE][Mind you, they never uplift at CFD and make you land at Hinton for mogas /QUOTE]
Only fuel at hinton is 100LL
There was a couple of movements at hinton late yesterday afternoon, but thats all..

[Agaricus bisporus]

Link to the latest from the Beds on Sunday, what passes for a "newspaper" around here. It predictably contains the usual imbecilic spoutings of expert local residents and the compulsory boll eaux about annihilating schools.

It seems the flying school has indeed had its licence pulled.

Crashed plane's owner defends safety record | Bedfordshire Local News, Local News Headlines in Bedford | Bedfordshire Newspaper Online (http://www.bedfordshire-news.co.uk/News/Crashed-planes-owner-defends-safety-record-20130609080000.htm)

[znww5]

"Mind you, they never uplift at CFD and make you land at Hinton for mogas"

That's an interesting statement, I was under the impression that mogas could only be used if a) the aircraft has the appropriate STC and b) is not being used for 'aerial work'. I assume flight training constitutes aerial work in this context - have the rules changed?

[shakehandsman]

I'll qualify that a bit...

In the same sentence, we were told that they "use Mogas".

Again, assumption made that they had be refuelled elsewhere as Cranfield only supply 100LL and JetA1.

[znww5]

Thanks for the clarification, but the last time I flew into Hinton the one and only fuel pump was AVGAS.

So where does the MOGAS come from, you'd need up to 25 Imp gallons to refuel a Tomahawk?

[JPlumridge]

First of all my thoughts are with the people involved in the accident and their families wishing them both a speedy recovery, I have rented PA-38's from Hinton since February and flew G-BGBN four weeks ago. Prices I have been paying are £85/hr wet during winter and £100/hr wet during summer with all hours paid for in bulk, not quite sure where the £75/hr comes in or about the mogas statement either as Hinton is 100LL.

[Winhern]

No idea if they used it, but one of PFT's bases is now Sywell, and Sywell have mogas. Mogas is legal for flight training - Brooklands at Sywell put it in their AT3's.

[Tupperware Pilot]

MOGAS come from
tesco's?;)

[FlyingOfficerKite]

As something of an aside - and not wishing to cast asperions - what is the legal situation regarding negligence and liability from the perspective of the instructor in this accident?

The 'impossible turn' - if that is what it was proved to be - is well-known and not something an instructor would be expected to execute in an EFATO situation.

I do not know of any circumstances where liability has been proven and civil action taken against a flying instructor?

It is appreciated that this subject has been discussed in other Threads over the years, but no clear opinion seems to have been decided?

A difficult subject to broach in view of the injury to the occupants, but nevertheless potentially of interest to all pilots and instructors.

KR

FOK

[Jetblu]

The possible "impossible turn" has featured here in the past.

http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=the%20impossible%20turn&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&sqi=2&ved=0CD4QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Ftech-log%2F363093-impossible-turn-possible.html&ei=4cu1UZOtK_PK0AX9oICwDA&usg=AFQjCNGW2Mm2fnX0RXk2t6L2dblTop1v3A

[Saab Dastard]

Jetblu, indeed, and more recently here:

http://www.pprune.org/private-flying/506068-engine-failure-after-takeoff-turn-back.html

SD

[rob_k31]

For info of anyone with bookings, PFT's office at Cranfield is closed. They have a note advising anyone with bookings to contact one of their other bases (closed until 20th June).

[iRaven]

A few people have mentioned the aircraft owner. Well if you Google/Bing "alexander kirk chris maurice" and you will see the beginnings of a story about 2 of the most intriguing characters in General Aviation!

iRaven

[A and C]

If you are correct PFT are in for a big payday by taking the newspaper to court for libel, much more profitable that aviation.

[znww5]

The Milton Keynes Citizen newspaper has now identified the two victims of the Cranfield crash as instructor Sam Lyons (24) and student Roger Kingsley. Sam Lyons is described as being the manager of PFT Cranfield.

[GBOZR]

I've been around Cranfield all week. No talk of it anymore, however I've heard a lot of stories. PFT's Tomahawks seem to be missing though, and they are also open again (14th June) The only Tommie on the field at the moment is one parked outside Cranfield Flying School in amongst their Cessna 152's.

[andrewc]

I read the accident report you put forward and was struck by
paragraph 2 where the pilot deploys flaps and undercarriage before
ensuring the glide approach to the runway.

Surely you should be certain of making the runway before
you add drag?

-- Andrew

[A and C]

A lot of rumour running about Cranfield about this at the moment, if half of this is true this story will run and run.

[flyingbedfordshire]

For those interested in the pilots condition - both are doing well and have asked to pass on their thanks for their best wishes.

I fly with Cranfield PFT and am sick and tired upto the back teeth of what is obviously the other local schools having a go.

I KNOW that they only used AVGAS and picked it up from Cranfield or Hinton. We were encouraged to go to Hinton for fuel cos it was a lot cheaper.

With regards to the accident, I amongst others heard him to radio declare that he was turning back. He was about 250-300 feet at the time.

The aircraft was doing circuits and the accident happened after a touch and go. I was in the club yesterday and know that both the pilots are doing well. One is expected out of hospital this week but needs some dental work. The other has his leg in plaster and will be in traction for several weeks. If you ask me both are lucky to be alive having done the "impossible turn".
NEVER TURN BACK.

I think it is very telling to tell that G-BOZR or ZULU ROMEO is a AA5a that is registered to Billings next door. They have had two very serious accidents this year already. There is then another poster that works for another flying school locally.

As for the rest- let the AAIB do their job. I will put my money on it being pilot error and nothing else.

[Tupperware Pilot]

I would guess that the new guy is the PFT owner.......

[shakehandsman]

yeah tupperware I think you are right!

fyi zr is a cessna 150 with CFS.

nice to blame the instructor without 'letting the AAIB do their job'. pots and kettles...

[Genghis the Engineer]

Agreed.

Doesn't strike me that throwing acusations at the other nearby schools helps anybody much.

G

[Tupperware Pilot]

flyingbedfordshire has sent me a PM claiming he is a mate of the instructor. I'm checking this out with my contacts at Hinton and Cranfield. But I'm sure its the owner of PFT he got caught a month or so ago trying the same thing on the other forum. and has tried it here are well....... nice try chris!

[znww5]

"Doesn't strike me that throwing acusations at the other nearby schools helps anybody much."

Well said - especially when 30 seconds spent looking on G-INFO establishes that neither the Cessna nor any of the AA5's at Cranfield are registered to Billins. Just the usual poorly-executed distraction tactic from flyingbedfordshireand a host of other single-post 'forumites'.

The question which interests me is why the engine failed in the first place.

As another factual aside, Billins has a good reputation on the airfield and has been trading there for 20 years. PFT (Cranfield) has barely been there 6 months, having originally started at Hinton only 2 years ago.

[Tupperware Pilot]

this is the PM i got, i have just had it confirmed that the real Antonyn did not send it! Again nice try Chris!
flyingbedfordshire


Probationary PPRuNer

Join Date: Jun 2013
Location: beds
Age: 33
Posts: 1
Wrong person
My name is antonyn. Sam is a good mate of mine. He run cranfield. It was speaking to him that I got the info. He admits it was his cock up. I trained with sam at stapleford and we did our atpl writtens together.

You may hate chris as much as anyone but wait for the aaib and u will c im right.

[S-Works]

If you ask me both are lucky to be alive having done the "impossible turn".

Hmm they hardly "did" the impossible turn. They binned the aircraft and severely injured themselves. A clear point that we never turn back for a reason. An Instructor should gave known better....

[Genghis the Engineer]

"Doesn't strike me that throwing acusations at the other nearby schools helps anybody much."

Well said - especially when 30 seconds spent looking on G-INFO establishes that neither the Cessna nor any of the AA5's at Cranfield are registered to Billins. Just the usual poorly-executed distraction tactic from flyingbedfordshire aka JPlumridge and a host of other single-post 'forumites'.

The question which interests me is why the engine failed in the first place.

As another factual aside, Billins has a good reputation on the airfield and has been trading there for 20 years. PFT (Cranfield) has barely been there 6 months, having originally started at Hinton only 2 years ago.

There are two AA5a-s and a C150 owned by syndicates which lease their aeroplanes back to Billins and fly within that club. They have had some minor prangs lately - from my (possibly faulty) local knowledge a prop strike and a tailstrike, and the 150 is offline being repaired at the moment, I think from the propstrike.

Billins has certainly been there a long time and seems to hang onto both a reasonable reputation, and financial solvency. Both rare and valuable commodities in light aviation!

G

[kesikun]

G

Its the "other" AA5 in the "shop" recovering from a student PIO tip strike

That's the only incident this year as far as I know

The C150 that was on Billins line has been moved elsewhere .

S

[Cows getting bigger]

Hmm they hardly "did" the impossible turn. They binned the aircraft and severely injured themselves. A clear point that we never turn back for a reason. An Instructor should gave known better....

Yes, nothing beats a demonstration. "See Bloggs, I told you it was impossible." :eek:

[Genghis the Engineer]

G

Its the "other" AA5 in the "shop" recovering from a student PIO tip strike

That's the only incident this year as far as I know

The C150 that was on Billins line has been moved elsewhere .

S

I stand corrected.

G

[Ajruk]

Hi All, My name Antony and I am friends with the Pilot Sam Lyon.

If you receive any messages from anyone like "Flying Bedfordshire" or others claiming they are someone called Antony then be aware they are highly likely to be Chris Alexander the owner of the club.

I speak to Sam regularly and he wanted me to make you all aware of the situation and his condition.

He is still in hospital but making a good recovery and is expected to make a full recovery.

He also wanted me to explain why he turned back. He was still over the runway when he commenced his turn and he still also had partial power, otherwise he wouldn't have considered it. The power only totally died during the turn.

I am aware people are getting messages allegedly from me claiming that I think it was his fault. I ABSOLUTELY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AT ALL AND I MAY WELL HAVE DONE THE SAME THING BASED ON THE SITUATION.

The AAIB will almost certainly put the crash down to an aging aircraft rather than anything else.

I want to thank the people who have made me aware that someone using my name is PM people claiming to be from me.

[Cows getting bigger]

I guess the instructors didn't think about the colour of their fuel samples?

[kesikun]

or read this ! :eek:

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/20120117SSL04.pdf

[Ajruk]

what colour would it be if it was 10% mogas? Probably very blue I would imagine.

[Mariner9]

The AAIB will almost certainly put the crash down to an ageing aircraft rather than anything else.

A/c age may possibly have been a factor into the EFATO, but I'm afraid i cannot see how it could be blamed for the (reported) subsequent stall/spin, if that's what did happen.

Thankfully, no loss of life, hope the pilots recover quickly.

[Ajruk]

I would disagree with you - If theres an engine failure after take off then the crash was because of that - The pilots subsequent attempts to salvage his life is not the fault of the crash - The EFATO is.
That's like blaming a cancer surgeon for someone dying of cancer? Its the Cancer not the surgeon that has done the damage.
If this had happened at say Southend, then the option to turn back would have been the only one since its built up for miles with nothing at the end of the runway but buildings.
Would you still blame the pilot?

If the Hudson river pilot had crashed badly killing most on board would he have been blamed??
NO WAY

[A and C]

Any one who thinks the age of the aircraft in this accident is a factor is kidding themselfs, maintenance should keep aircraft airworthy and the engine would have had a hard life of 2400 hours +20% and 12 years and so would have been much younger than the airframe.

I could speculate about the reason for this accident but I will say that pure "age" of the aircraft is not a factor.

[Howard Long]

"If this had happened at say Southend, then the option to turn back would have been the only one since its built up for miles with nothing at the end of the runway but buildings."

But it wasn't at Southend, it was Cranfield, and as such is hardly short of fields.

Cheers, Howard

[Ajruk]

Runway 21 is

[Mariner9]

You are entitled to your views Ajruk, but I'm afraid mine differ. EFATO was certainly causative to the accident, but it should not result in an inevitable stall/spin (if that is what happened).

[Ajruk]

I agree but the the stall/spin is the consequence and not the cause. We could debate all day whether the pilot could've done more but the cause is the engine failure.

[Howard Long]

"Runway 21 is"

Both ends are clear of buildings, just fields, unless there has been some recent development.

[Genghis the Engineer]

A/c age may possibly have been a factor into the EFATO, but I'm afraid i cannot see how it could be blamed for the (reported) subsequent stall/spin, if that's what did happen.

Thankfully, no loss of life, hope the pilots recover quickly.

If aircraft age was routinely - indeed ever - the reason for aircraft accidents, then aeroplanes would be grounded before they get old enough for it to become a factor.

There are many thousands of aeroplanes flying which are significantly older: in both years and hours, than that PA38.


I suspect that this will be a classic swiss cheese accident - with latent effects (age, maintenance, fuel useage?, design?), passive effects (instructor training and supervision, location, experience levels), and active failures (whatever caused the engine to stop, how it failed). I predict a lengthy AAIB report, although whether it actually contains any recommendations will probably depend upon whether those passive, latent and active failures were within or outside normal acceptable aviation practice as we currently understand it. On that, I hear and read many rumours and anecdotes, but ultimately will believe what I read in AAIB's report.

G

[Cows getting bigger]

Oh come on arjuk , you are having a laugh, aren't you? EFATO options don't get any better than 21 at Cranfield. Indeed, the biggest conundrum is deciding which suitable field to use.

Let me speculate (something I ordinarily try to avoid):

AAIB will find nothing wrong with the engine. There may be a dodgy mag or some oily plugs. One fuel tank will have evidence of residual fuel, the other no evidence but this will be caveated by there having been a post-crash fuel leak. Alternatively, there will be a question over carb ice/vapour lock.

For sure, the engine stopped providing power but I will be rather surprised if anything significant 'let go'. The incident was brought about by loss of power; the (alleged) stall/spin was brought about by pilotage.

[Ajruk]

The fields on runway 21 are sufficient to avoid killing people on the ground but I certainly wouldn't want to find somewhere to land on 21 fields.

[Mariner9]

The Swiss cheese accident model requires more than a single cause Ajruk. It would appear from what has been written that this accident fits the Swiss cheese model quite aptly.

[znww5]

I'm sorry, but the argument 'the engine failed therefore we had a crash' makes no sense at all. If that was true we wouldn't bother teaching EFATO techniques, but simply suggest a pilot picks a religion as they inevitably hurtle towards the ground.

The thing still flies perfectly well with the engine off, so the pilot's job is firstly to maintain best glide speed and then to pick the best landing option 45 degrees either side of heading. Looking at Google Earth, there are plenty of fields under the 03 departure, which was the runway in use at the time.

[Ajruk]

Cows Getting Bigger - Im curious how many EFATO you've had to deal with in your long established aviation career? I find it personally sickening how a bunch of people are pre-judging the actions of a pilot who's too sick to defend himself against you vultures. The fact remains both have survived and will make a full recovery, so let's see be grateful and stop speculating how well you all would have done.
I would imagine you would've landed it back on the Threshold and managed to use the remaining airspeed to taxi it back to the hanger?

ZNWW - Simple as that - No pressure at all - BOSH pick a field, land in it then take out your cigar and celebrate a job well done.

[Piper.Classique]

The fields on runway 21 are sufficient to avoid killing people on the ground but I certainly wouldn't want to find somewhere to land on 21 fields.

Ah. That must be a different Cranfield to the one I visited last month.

Age of aircraft? If that was why the engine failed then why do we bother with all these inspections, cetificates of airworthiness, etc. Might just as well throw the aircraft away after ten years, then.

I agree but the the stall/spin is the consequence and not the cause. We could debate all day whether the pilot could've done more but the cause is the engine failure.


Are you trying to say that a stall is the inevitable consequence of an engine failure?

Training? Why bother training for engine failures? Let's just play it by ear, shall we?

[Ajruk]

When did I say it was the inevitable consequence? I don't think I did?

If the engine hadn't stopped then the aircraft wouldn't have stalled - ASSUMING IT DID which we don't know yet.

I agree it shouldn't have stalled irrespective assuming it did but the cause was an engine failure. That's all Im saying.

[Cows getting bigger]

Arjuk, in thirty years or so I have had two EFATO. One in a thruster where the prop decided to go its own way and the other in a twin whereby I was fortunate enough to have a second engine.

In the same time, I have been to a large number of funerals brought about by pilots doing a very good job of getting it wrong. Maybe you should read the link I posted on page one of this thread and ask yourself why I personally use this as an example of why turning back is a mug's game.

[znww5]

Well of course there's enormous pressure and being human, every single one of us can make a mistake. Personally, I am delighted that your pal and his student survived - we can all learn from such incidents.The discussion is not meant to be taking a pop at the PIC individually.

[Ajruk]

would you turn back with partial power?

[mad_jock]

I would imagine you would've landed it back on the Threshold and managed to use the remaining airspeed to taxi it back to the hanger?

Quite the opposite I suspect he would have gone for +-15degrees out the front.

And more than likely have done a lighting quick fuel tank change as well as ramming the mixture lever up as well if he hadn't trained the student to have there hand across both anyway.

There is a technique which I have seen from students of a certain intergrated school which loosens off the frictions apparently to reduce wear or some such rubbish while on the ground and doing engine checks.

And the turn back is a very American procedure the UK has been banging it out not to do it to instructors for the last 10 years. But initial training nearly always win's when the poo hits the fan which is why those initial ppl lessons are so important.

I have run a tank dry on purpose 3000ft over a runway to calibrate a dip stick. The engine picks up in under a second once the tank selector is turned. The mixture getting caught by accident either by a jacket or a finger is a pretty common one which is another reason to get students to hold their hand under the lever across both the levers during takeoff. Then when they put there hand down to get rid of flap if its being used they won't catch it.

[downwind24]

But initial training nearly always win's when the poo hits the fan which is why those initial ppl lessons are so important.

Never a truer word said MJ !

[Ajruk]

I agree downwind, its nice to see a helpful response. I think the issue here is that he never had an engine failure, he had a partial so he turned back. With a full failure he wouldn't have Im sure.

[JPlumridge]

There is definitely lessons to be learn't from this accident, even with a partial engine failure you should pitch down during take-off and start planning for a forced landing in case that is indeed needed.

During my training my instructor would periodically push my hand off the throttle and move it to idle during take-off and I was expected to react swiftly and in the correct manner, this is all in order to drill it into you to make sure you would instinctively choose this option if faced with any problems on climb out.

There was a video uploaded to youtube recently with a partial engine failure on take-off which demonstrated what needs to be done perfectly.

[Genghis the Engineer]

I've twice had a partial and turned back, both times the aeroplane was unscratched. One was a plug failure, the other a pump failure. The art, in my opinion is flying field to field whilst keeping speed speed about min drag (~best glide at first approximation), then approach once the landing runway / field is safely achievable.


I've flown with a student - a very low hour UK PPL trained at an overseas school somewhere sunny that I was doing a syndicate checkout for. He believed that a turnback was appropriate in the event of an EFATO, and had clearly been told this by somebody who had trained him - despite his never having practiced it. I assume the instructor at his overseas school, as he had many other bad habits as well, although I didn't ask specifically.

G

[mad_jock]

With a partial nothing really changes until you have pitched for the airspeed and choosen a field the carried out engine drills. Then you can look at how much partial performance you have.

Remeber though that as soon as you turn your performance decreases so even a 50ft/min climb will turn quickly into desent the steeper the bank angle.

[rob_k31]

In my option, the 'turn-back / land ahead' question is a split second decision for the pilot. If someone's in that position it's easy to puick the wrong option.

If the engine failure was preventable then that is the root cause and the pilot's decision is a lesser factor.

I don't believe the age of the aircraft is an issue. It's how well maintained it is and the quality of parts used etc. A fully overhauled engine is basically a new engine.

[Mariner9]

would you turn back with partial power?

That's a difficult question. Personally, I brief for EFATO before every T/O, but have never briefed for partial power. Would be a seat-of the-pants decision therefore, presumably as it was for the handling pilot(s). So maybe yes,maybe no for me.

That said, a turn with partial or even no power should not result in a stall/spin if flown correctly. However, Human factors training tell us that humans will make mistakes, particularly in high stress situations like an EFATO. For that reason I think most or all posters on here sympathise with the pilots concerned, despite the fact the majority view appears to be pilot error.

[Ajruk]

Mariner I am an instructor myself and I feel your last comment is very fair. I also would not turn back, though with a partial I would be tempted and may have. There's still no guarantee that a field landing would've been any more successful however.

[downwind24]

As an instructor I have practised , in my head at least , engine failures/partial engine failures , at the field I fly from on thousands of occasions.

I almost know every blade of grass within two miles of where I fly from. The slope/gradient/size of every field that is within glide distance after my runway is used.

I also train my students the same so that should it ever happen to them then they know where to go.

Happiness was seeing an EFATO from an examiner on the end of '20' and a right turn while trimming for best glide....'instinctive' was the word used. And it is the only available place to land should it go bang there !

[A and C]

Ajruk.

Since World War One it has been recognized that turning back is the imposable turn and this accident serves only to demonstrate how true this is.

If you want to continue in flying you need to distance yourself from your feelings for your friend ( no matter how noble and loyal they may be) and recognize that the turn back was a mistake, I have no idea how much power the engine in this case was producing ( as have you ) but the only way to get the aircraft away from the ground with a malfunctioning engine is to nail the best lift/ drag speed with the wings level.

If there is no chance of climbing then the only choice is to use the power you have to get to the best into wind landing site. Do this and you load the dice in your faviour, don't and you shorten the odds on a sucsessful outcome are diminished to almost zero.

[DLT1939]

In a ten year period to 2000 in Australia, there were 75 reported cases of engine failure in single engined aircraft after takeoff, none of which resulted in fatalaties. In the same period there were 242 reported cases of partial power loss after take off resulting in fatalities in nine cases. The ATSB attribute this considerably worse experience in part to comprehensive coverage of EFATO's in PPL training, but little or none of partial power loss scenarios.

Detail here:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2010/avoidable-3-ar-2010-055.aspx (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2010/avoidable-3-ar-2010-055.aspx)

[x933]

Little to add to this, other than i've recently done some 300ft turnbacks in gliders - with a cross downwind landing there's no way i'd want to attempt it in an aircraft with even more marginal performance, let alone a PA38 deficient some horses.

If you've got "some" power - use it. Another couple of hundred feet might have made a turnback more of a feasible option (As a point of note, way back in time on the RAF G115 Tutors solo students were prohibited from turning back and instructors limits were 500ft (possibly 800ft - the memory fades). And even then i'd probably have taken a punt on using the extra height to try and A) sort the problem B) position for a decent field.

Glad to hear the passengers are on the mend.

[mary meagher]

Back when I was still allowed to fly my PA18, a very very crafty instructor gave me my annual check ride. From 1,500 feet about 8 miles away, the engine performance began to falter - "What are you going to do about it?"

Well I still had PARTIAL POWER, and 1,500 feet, so I decided to continue toward the home field. and as we slowly lost altitude, and as the wind was light, I decided to do a straight in downwind approach and landing. Even though the instructor at this point pulled the throttle back completely, it worked very well. He said later he was sure I would have gone for a circuit to land into wind, so I passed the check ride.

How many instructors in the UK cover the danger of incorrect action when faced with a partial power problem? Is it part of the sylabus?

[Genghis the Engineer]

How many instructors in the UK cover the danger of incorrect action when faced with a partial power problem? Is it part of the sylabus?

It isn't on any syllabus, but it's worth knowing. I generally mention it to my students - as it's something I've hit myself, but am on shaky ground insisting that they see it in the air, unless they ask to, because it's not on the syllabus and it's their money I'm spending.

G

[fin100]

I never even thought of attempting a downwind turn to land until I got a check out at KTMH where the only possible efto landing was in the bay. I was given a engine failure and told to turn around - the month before an efto landing in the bay ended with two drowned.

Admittedly, we had got to 500ft and the turn was almost aerobatic steep turn nose down but it was more than possible and even if a hard rapid landing resulted if it was under control it would be survivable.

The point here is that you can practice this a height and in safety. There are places like this and EGHI for example where there is nowhere to go on 20 and the ability to carry it out safely and to know at what height you can do it from is worth knowing.

Its not something a rookie should try but as skill builds it could save your life - but baldly executed will kill you

[Agaricus bisporus]

Turning back is a no-no in most aircraft as the angle of climb is such that there is simply insufficient altitude to make the turn and then reach the field. A turn uses a great deal of height and remember it isn't just 180 degrees to return to the runway. 180 degrees only takes you to a line the radius of your turn displaced, and that isn't likely to be much help. The turn has to be substantially more than 180' and then reversed so its going to be more like 230 minimum.

And by the time you realise you ain't gonna make it back you're completely bggered, too low and heading into the scenery downwind with no choice of where to go, stretching the glide in a downwind turn and.........guess what! That's the simplest formula there is for spin, crash, burn, die. Don't do it!

But I thought everyone knew never to turn back? Surely this is drummed into every student?

[mad_jock]

it is if they have been trained by a Brit instructor that was trained in the UK from the word go.

The ones that did their PPL in the States its a different matter. There be alligators off the end of the runway etc.

Some of them myself included only learned how to do the PFL circuit during the flight instructors course.

And these guys will bring the subject up instead of just telling them that always go straight ahead. This then puts the idea into peoples heads.

There was quite a good youtube video on here I think of an EFATO and you can see the height drop increase as soon as they turned towards a likely crash spot and that was only 5-10 degs of bank.

[mary meagher]

Genghis, if it isn't on the syllabus, surely it should be? if we take into account the Australian study... Who decides these things in the UK?
Could you send me a pm? I have another question .....

Mary

[mad_jock]

Who decides these things in the UK?

Nobody, its all EASA. And with them the paper work is more important than standards of instruction or syllabus.

As long as your SMS system is hunky dory and you have manuals on everything from flying an aircraft to going for a pee your sorted.

The examiners are meant to do the quality side of things. But apparently most of the good uns are fed up with the cost and ballache of maintaining the privilege. And will be retiring when they are next due.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Genghis, if it isn't on the syllabus, surely it should be? if we take into account the Australian study... Who decides these things in the UK?
Could you send me a pm? I have another question .....

Mary

In instructional terms, I am somewhere very near the bottom of the food chain - there may be people here in a position to change the syllabus, but I don't think I'm one of them in this regard. However, I believe that there's a panel of examiners for each of the aircraft classes, all overseen by CAA? I think that with EASA the SEP panel (if that's what they're called) must find it much harder to change things now, but they must have a route to recommend things.

I'm unable to send or receive PMs at present for innocent but irritating historical reasons - but by all means drop me an email via the site. If that doesn't work, boffin (at) engineer (DOT) com will get me.

G

[Tupperware Pilot]

If the engine failure was preventable then that is the root cause and the pilot's decision is a lesser factor.

I have to agree with this........There are two issues here! Engine then (and in that order) the turn!

[Jim59]

Genghis, if it isn't on the syllabus, surely it should be? if we take into account the Australian study... Who decides these things in the UK?
Could you send me a pm? I have another question .....

Mary The EASA syllabus is an Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) published by EASA. Any training organisation can decide it wants to change the syllabus and can submit its proposed difference to the CAA for approval. If the CAA agrees it can approve this difference for only the applicant or for all schools as it thinks fit - but it is still an alternative AMC - the EASA one is still vaid - so schools can elect whether to adopt the new version or not.

The CAA also has to notify EASA who can make the alternative AMC available to all other nations' CAA equivalents. If widely adopted EASA could incorporate it in its AMC for all to use.

One possible change would be to add full spin recover training if a school thought it appropriate. If approved it would allow instruction in spinning without the instructor needing an aerobatic rating. Without a 'custom' AMC the instructor would need an aerobatic rating to teach full spin and recovery. All the school needs to do is write its proposed AMC with a safety justification and submit it to the CAA (no doubt with a cheque).

[Genghis the Engineer]

... and persuade students, in a competitive market, to pay for all this extra training which they wouldn't need at Bloggs Flying School down the road.

G

[Pittsextra]

Ha you hit the nail on the head... paying for extra training, good grief, after all what can possibly go wrong!

[shakehandsman]

I have to agree with this........There are two issues here! Engine then (and in that order) the turn!

Apparently the owner has been telling people it's the airport's fault as he found grass cuttings in his fuel tank! (Heard 2nd hand - not from the horses mouth)

ps. I too received a PM from 'flyingbedfordshire', but claiming to be a club member.

[Tupperware Pilot]

Apparently the owner has been telling people it's the airport's fault as he found grass cuttings in his fuel tank! (Heard 2nd hand - not from the horses mouth)


that wont go down well if he is doing that.....but again i have heard many stories....some are clearly BS some are based on the truth!
17th Jun 2013 13:24shakehandsmanwhat next
Quote:
I have to agree with this........There are two issues here! Engine then (and in that order) the turn!
Apparently the owner has been telling people it's the airport's fault as he found grass cuttings in his fuel tank! (Heard 2nd hand - not from the horses mouth)

ps. I too received a PM from 'flyingbedfordshire', but claiming to be a club member.
Post it!

[mad_jock]

Grass cuttings in the tanks only come from one place, and that's using jerry cans to fill the tanks with nothing to strain the fuel going in.

[rob_k31]

that's using jerry cans to fill the tanks

Jerry Cans... I used to go to school with him, he never could do anything right :8

[Saab Dastard]

Can I remind everyone that Private Messages are just that - Private.

The contents of PMs are NOT to be publicly quoted in the forums.

SD

[Tupperware Pilot]

Can I remind everyone the Private Messages are just that - Private.

The contents of PMs are NOT to be publicly quoted in the forums.

SD

A quick look at the T&Cs ...does not say that? I may have missed that? PM me with details? (i wont post your PM)

[Saab Dastard]

TP,

Time to refresh your memory of the Site Rules that you agreed to at the time you joined:

PPRuNe Forums - FAQ: PPRuNe Rules (http://www.pprune.org/faq.php?faq=pprune_rules#faq_pprune_rules_rules)

Note that these are contained in the FAQ link at the TOP of every page, and are distinct from the legal Ts & Cs - link at the bottom of the page.

SD

ps - by posting the reply here, I'm not singling you out, just thought it would be useful for many people to re-read the "rules of engagment".

[Tupperware Pilot]

thanks SD...

[Maoraigh1]

Grass cuttings in the tanks only come from one place, and that's using jerry cans to fill the tanks with nothing to strain the fuel going in.
Dropped filler cap on recently cut grass, picked it up and replaced it without looking, while checking contents on a pre-flight?
(I use a filter, but Tesco EN228 RON95 has always been grass free).

[Genghis the Engineer]

Dropped filler cap on recently cut grass, picked it up and replaced it without looking, while checking contents on a pre-flight?
(I use a filter, but Tesco EN228 RON95 has always been grass free).

All aircraft fuel tanks should have finger strainers, and you'd need a heck of a lot of grass to block one of those. This grass issue sounds like a complete red herring to me.

G

[shakehandsman]

This grass issue sounds like a complete red herring to me

I agree.

From what's been said by the individual to others, and on here (in various guises) Everything/one is to blame apart from the maintenance and fuel - they are perfect..... :*

[GBOZR]

''I think it is very telling to tell that G-BOZR or ZULU ROMEO is a AA5a that is registered to Billings next door. They have had two very serious accidents this year already.''

G-BOZR is a Cessna 152 at CFS. Billins don't own any of their aircraft. There are two aircraft that Billins use G-RATI (Cessna 172) and another AA5 which is currently in the hangar having some work done as a student experienced a prop strike. Billins are currently using G-RATE (AA5 Cheetah) in the meantime whilst the other AA5 is being repaired.

[x933]

Grass in the fuel has got to be bollocks. Or the unluckiest pilot in the world, one of the two.

Suprised no one has mentioned carb icing as a possible cause yet - though admittedly I haven't bothered looking at the weather on the day.

[shakehandsman]

Anyone know how the pilot & instructor came out of this? I heard they were in the hospital for quite some time. Hopefully all ok now..

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

The 'student' was the brother of a guy I know. He was badly injured and is still in a bad way.

Is the AAIB report on this out yet?

[rob_k31]

I don't think the AAIB have reported yet.

[greggj]

The report is out, and boy oh boy it makes my hair stand on the back reading this.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Piper%20PA-38-112%20Tomahawk,%20G-BGBN%2003-14.pdf

[znww5]

Almost a two part report in some ways; the analysis of the accident itself and then the consequential findings regarding inappropriate fuel use, unqualified maintenance and record keeping at Hinton Pilot Flight Training.

It's just such a shame that it took the former to uncover the latter. BBC 3CR local radio did a piece on the AAIB report, somebody has posted it, together with a photo montage of their own making at:

BBC News report from BBC Radio - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=GcuUclmYPog)

I hope that those injured have recovered as best they can.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

I hope that those injured have recovered as best they can.

The 'student' is still in a bad way. Probability is his seriously life-changing injuries won't improve.

That's the second PA38 in recent history where the driver (I hesitate to call them 'pilot') didn't fly the aeroplane after the engine failed.

I refer anyone interested to the 'Why has flying training gone assbackwards' thread.

[YODI]

Just read the whole report, shocking really on so many different accounts

[First_Principal]

Hmmm, impartial observations from someone with no knowledge of individuals (or axes to grind):



An engineer cleaned the plugs and re-fitted them correctly, an engine check was performed, and a flight conducted with no issue prior to the crash flight. Although he may not have been officially authorised to maintain this aircraft he was an engineer, and nothing I read suggests his work contributed to any issue with the a/c.
There were insufficient ethanol traces to have caused any issue, and upon being alerted to pilots incorrectly using Mogas the company advised them in staff notes that the a/c were not certified for such use.
Although there were some anomalies in the record keeping it doesn't seem from what I read that these were serious misdemeanors and a check was correctly performed on the day of the crash with nil defects noted.

So we move on from any issues due to the a/c.. leaving that fateful turnback that has so often been discussed here.

If there is any hair-raising going on then that should be the focus; presumably this same instructor taught others NOT to perform this maneuver at low level, and to select a spot dead ahead (and/or within 30deg of the nose), and land as best as able - yet he appears to have ignored such advice, at his and his student's peril. At ~75ft the land ahead should simply be a given, absolutely no question.

At the risk of repeating what has been said many, many, times before by those far more qualified than I: following EFATO get the nose down ASAP, if not before, maintain control speed and land ahead.

I'm not sure that getting the nose down and maintaining speed is given the emphasis that it should at times, hence my bolding this...

Disclaimer: I've never been in this situation, fortunately, and accept that despite all best intentions in the heat of the moment we may not act how we know we should at more rational times. I have however seen the results of a turnback at low level - skillful, but very lucky.

FP.

[piperboy84]

From the report:

Recent fuel usage
G-BGBN operated from Cranfield between 26 May 2013 and 5 June 2013 when the accident
occurred. During this period it had flown 22 flights, uplifted 300 ltr of Avgas 100LL and the
engine had operated for 15.6 hours

If my calcs are right that's 5 USG fuel burn an hour, those 0-235's must be pretty economical, especially when you figure a lot of short flights in the 15.6 hours at full power on T.O.

[Genghis the Engineer]

From the report:



If my calcs are right that's 5 USG fuel burn an hour, those 0-235's must be pretty economical, especially when you figure a lot of short flights in the 15.6 hours at full power on T.O.

Local rumour at the time was that the school owner was having his instructors conduct most flights, particularly trial flights, almost entirely below 60% power to keep tacho hours and fuel burn down.

An engineer cleaned the plugs and re-fitted them correctly, an engine check was performed, and a flight conducted with no issue prior to the crash flight. Although he may not have been officially authorised to maintain this aircraft he was an engineer, and nothing I read suggests his work contributed to any issue with the a/c.
Just correcting to a more correct statement:-
An unqualified person cleaned the plugs and claimed to have re-fitted them correctly, an engine check was performed, and a flight conducted with no issue prior to the crash flight. He was not authorised to maintain this aircraft he was not an engineer, and nothing I read suggests his work contributed to any issue with the a/c apart from any long term damage potentially caused by unauthorised maintenance and fuel use over a long period of time.

He may have been qualified at some point, he may not. I find it often interesting to read what AAIB don't say, in this case they said:-

he CAA later advised the investigation that the individual who carried out the work is not currently a Part 66 licensed engineer.

Although the individual reported that he had previously held an engineer’s licence issued by the CAA, the CAMO stated that he was not authorised to carry out maintenance on this aircraft.

They don't say that CAA confirmed this fellow had ever held a licence, nor what sort it was, nor is there any indication of why that person had ceased to hold a licence.

The bottom line is that the school owner was permitting an unauthorised person to maintain the aircraft, not all flights were being logged, and there was a track record of incorrect fuels being used in the school aircraft. And that is what AAIB found out and saw fit to report.

It remains the case that the cause of the accident was the way the engine failure was handled mind you - SEP engine failures happen and we're all trained for them, whether poor practice make them more likely, or not.

G

[tecman]

What a terrible chain of events. Nothing much to add except good wishes and to note the shock value the first time the EFATO or partial failure happens for real. I am intensely grateful for all the good training and stern warnings about turning back but I must say, when it happened to me, I was surprised that I was so surprised!

One really useful thing to find out is the power your aircraft needs, in the take-off configuration, to maintain level flight. If that's (say) 1700 rpm and you're reasonably able to count on that power, it allows an informed choice about whether a turn of any type is feasible. It's also handy to know a bit about carb heat and mixture, and the juggling thereof, in the happy event that you find yourself with some level of consistent power. The partial failure case is never going to be an easy call but instincts like getting the nose down asap, and knowing the aircraft power requirements all help.

Perversely, the complete EFATO is easier - there's really only one way out, and that's to control the impact in the best way possible. And based on the Australian statistics previously quoted, I can see why some would say that the best chance of survival is just to pull the power off and treat all problems as complete engine failures. I'm glad I didn't but it would probably be the advice I'd give to a low time pilot or student.

Regardless of how the aircraft ended up in the situation it did, I would just urge an understanding thought for the instructor and his decision process. Until you've really been there, you haven't really been there.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

I've been there, and in a less forgiving aeroplane than a PA38. As someone else said, when it happens for the first time for real, the training kicks in, you act like Pavlov's dog, and you GET THE BLEEDIN NOSE DOWN!

This PA38 driver, and the one a couple of years back, didn't. Both got on the radio, though!

[S-Works]

They don't say that CAA confirmed this fellow had ever held a licence, nor what sort it was, nor is there any indication of why that person had ceased to hold a licence.

It depends on what name he was using at the time. With his rather colourful history he has changed his names a few times......

Notwithstanding that, the fact is quite simple, the Instructor attempted a turn back that goes against everything we teach and he and the student paid a very high price for an act of stupidity.

[mad_jock]

Sounds like the instructor was one of these pseudo airline ops types in light aircraft.

Touching down in the touchdown zone for the love of god in a light aircraft.

Cranfield is a 1800m runway if they had touched down on the numbers they would have been up in the air just after the big intersection. Engine starts giving you gip at 200ft power off stick the nose down full flap and your landing on tarmac and if your good you can roll taxi clear at Bravo if not roll it to the end.

I would have been at 600-700ft by the time I couldn't get it in on the runway and by that time no problems getting into the fields at the end.

Its a pity the AIBB aren't picking up on these sort of things as well.

When will these 3 deg glide PAPI pillocks not realise its a stupid thing to do in a light aircraft. Poor profile for engine failure during approach, runway behind you if your doing T&G's etc etc.

Was this instructer Integrated trained?

[Genghis the Engineer]

However he was trained, he was inexperienced, and there should have been a Head of Training setting appropriate standards. ....

G

[mad_jock]

Well we know that was lacking. But if these kids are taught ****e from the beginning that's all they know.

And to be honest I have about 300 hours operating tommys in that temperature and dew point range and never experienced carb icing to the point of ruff running, occasional grumble when the carb anti ice selected during cruise at just in the green arc power settings, but never ruff running. From memory the air gets routed from the intake over hot stuff to heat it up which is why the manual says you only need to use it when you think you have carb ice issues. I used to teach to use it anyway at the normal points because I wanted people in the habit of using it when they went to fly another type that it did matter.

Anyway after posting that, thought he will more than likely not fly again and he will have all his training debts to sort out and no real career to fall back on. So all in all he has been quite severely penalised for his inexperience/poor training/poor supervision.

[NorthSouth]

Well said MJ. Spare a thought for the 21 year old instructor thrown into a highly responsible position, scratching 15 hours flying a month in a company that he probably knew was dodgy but probably also knew that challenging anything would lead to the dole.

NS

[mad_jock]

AAIB will find nothing wrong with the engine. There may be a dodgy mag or some oily plugs. One fuel tank will have evidence of residual fuel, the other no evidence but this will be caveated by there having been a post-crash fuel leak. Alternatively, there will be a question over carb ice/vapour lock.

by Cows getting bigger was pretty spot on.

[Level Attitude]

An unqualified person cleaned the plugs and claimed to have re-fitted them correctlyJust wanted to check:
Is a Pilot not entitled to replace Spark Plugs - hence also remove, clean and refit same ones?

Obviously I do not know whether person mentioned in AAIB Report was a qualified Pilot.

Also, does the fact of removal, cleaning and replacing Spark Plugs really require an entry in the Maintenance Log?

[piperboy84]

Originally Posted by piperboy84 View Post
From the report:



If my calcs are right that's 5 USG fuel burn an hour, those 0-235's must be pretty economical, especially when you figure a lot of short flights in the 15.6 hours at full power on T.O.

GTE: Local rumour at the time was that the school owner was having his instructors conduct most flights, particularly trial flights, almost entirely below 60% power to keep tacho hours and fuel burn down.

OR, if there were traces of ethenol perhaps a 50/50 or 75/25 mix could afford the excellent fuel economy, as the report only listed logged fuel purchases.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Removing and refitting plugs should always require a logbook entry.

Pilot maintenance is not approved on an aeroplane being used for training. Even where it is, the pilot doing it must normally be a owner / part-owner of the aeroplane.

G

[Big Pistons Forever]

Easy rule of thumb for a pilot. If you have to use a tool to do the maintenance task, you can't do it.

[thing]

That's no way to talk about licensed engineers BPF.

[mad_jock]

Does using a coin count?

:D thing.

[cockney steve]

Does using a coin count? Buy a proper Dzus key and stick it on your keyring..

*grumble grumble stereotypical tight fisted jockistani *

[mad_jock]

I will do anyway, but we have a half decent tool kit on our works machines.

A couple of screw drivers, long nose pliers, blunt nose pliers, tweezers and a pair of cir-clip pliers. The electrical spares kit even has a 50 amp fuse in it.

I don't have a clue where it goes, but if a 50amper goes I ain't going anywhere near it. I think we counted 220 24V bulbs in all the various indicator status lights in the cockpit. And before you ask I have a P145 sign off to replace them as well. :p

[Big Pistons Forever]

The two most dangerous things in aviation. A Pilot with a wrench, and an Engineer with a pen ;)

What you do to your airplane before you get into it and fly it, is of course up to you. I would suggest that if you have to disassemble, reassemble something and/ or use more than a simple screwdriver or adjustable wrench you are firmly in engineer land.

[mad_jock]

I would add also avionics engineer with anything mildly sharp.

I have know some that weren't allowed to use a butter knife without an A&P supervising.

[thing]

I would add also avionics engineer with anything mildly sharp.

Oi, I resemble that remark.

We had one new lad who was trying to get an ADI out but the plug on the back didn't have enough slack. We said to him in jest to just go under the panel and snip the plug off. Which he did. He was thereafter known as 'Slasher'.

[mad_jock]

I named one whoops a daisy or just daisy for short.

It was always worth while hanging around if there was any wire locking to do. One day he had to go and sit down because he was feeling dizzy he said it was due to the sun, I reckoned it was more to do with the amount of blood he had lost.

[thing]

:) Locking wire is weird stuff, it's just like catching your thumb on the end of a guitar string, how does something of such a small diameter make you bleed like a stuck pig?

[mad_jock]

Don't worry I finished it all off for him in the thirty mins he was away. The look of relief on his face when he came back and just had to inspect and sign.

[Jan Olieslagers]

Locking wire is weird stuff, it's just like catching your thumb on the end of a guitar string

I was taught to use cheapo wire from the (what do you call the wall-kart in English?) BUT to check it regularly. Guitar strings, even when broken, can still serve a hundred better purposes - the higher positions of the hammer dulcimer to begin with.

[thing]

what do you call the wall-kart in English?

A kart for walls. Special wheels you see, coated with stick.

[mad_jock]

You have to match the lock wire to the material you are locking up.

If you use the wrong one you can set up a sacrificial circuit and either the lock wire will corrode or the part your trying to lock up.

I would never use any lock wire that I had acquired from any other source than an A&P said to use. I don't have a clue if they have different types in aviation or if its all the same stuff. But I wouldn't use anything from a DIY outlet just in case the Aviation stuff is some special alloy which is suited for aircraft materials.

It could well be that its not an issue but hey I drive the things and only help out when tolerated.

It always seemed sensible to me to check materials, I used to put buoys and chain lines down for moorings and was very particular what shackles and lock wire I used. Mine used to last 6-7 years. The other bloke in the area who used to do them only lasted 2 years. When you looked at the shackles all the pins had corroded out the hole. But the lock wire was cracking. Mine used to fail due to friction wear.

[First_Principal]

From GtE's post # 126:

Just correcting to a more correct statement:-
Quote:
An unqualified person cleaned the plugs and claimed to have re-fitted them correctly, an engine check was performed, and a flight conducted with no issue prior to the crash flight. He was not authorised to maintain this aircraft he was not an engineer, and nothing I read suggests his work contributed to any issue with the a/c apart from any long term damage potentially caused by unauthorised maintenance and fuel use over a long period of time.


From the AAIB report:

"...the investigation determined that the spark plugs had been correctly fitted ..."

I'll leave aside arguments as to who/what constitutes an 'engineer', but in making my comment on the root cause of the accident not being due to maintenance I took my facts from the AAIB; they were not an assumption, nor based on heresay.

While later comments I read might suggest there's a history to the individual who performed the plug work there's nothing to suggest anywhere that it contributed to the issue. Therefore on that count at least it's a non-starter.

Back to the turn-back methinks...

FP.

[mad_jock]

Its always going to come back to the turn back. And other issues of airmanship and piloting.

And to be honest this is always going to be a problem because of human nature for several reasons.

1. There is a lot of instructors out there that honestly believe that they can do it. How or why they think this I don't know.

2. A lot of instructors have been taught by number 1 and think they can as well.

3. You have to condition a pilot away from there human nature and to go away from perceived safety.

4. Pilots will always go back to their initial training see points 1 and 2.

We don't know what speed they were using for approach but as those of us that use the book speed seem to be in the minority flying tommys lets presume it was 10knts fast which then gives them a lot bigger distance required to land and take off again. A tommy can land and stop in 350m fully loaded when flown correct at the correct speed. Call it with float due excess speed and student landing call it 550m. And drop it back for a TnG to 300meters.

You already have a displaced threshold which is 206m in and the PAPIS 288 m in.

So you have already got 494meters of useless runway behind you of your 1800m. That's over quarter of the runway gone as you touch the wheels down. Then slow down and clean up and apply power again call it 150 meters then another 150 for takeoff run. So we have now used over 50% of the runway, on the day they used 2/3rds of it rotating at Carlie.

Now look at figure 1 in the report and with something take the distance between Carlie and the impact site about 2 thumb lengths for me.

Then go back to just past the PAPI's which are at 288m in and add that distance. Look how much runway you have left in front of you its a good 600 meters. For a lot of us it would be over 700m. The tommy would have zero problem landing in that from 200ft.

So a huge factor which caused the accident was pish pseudo airline ops of touching down next to the PAPI's. I know it didn't cause the engine to fail but it put the aircraft into zero option position of being low and obstacles in the way. If they had used the full runway available y touching down at the threshold they wouldn't have been in the situation of even having to consider a turn back.

[Cows getting bigger]

Entering a turn with the intent of returning to the airfield at something between 75-200ft agl with a rough running engine when there are numerous options ahead is just suicidal.

MJ - agreed. Poor speed control, PAPIs, big runways, ATPL manuals before knowing how to trim etc etc dumb-down the art of flying. :bored:

[mad_jock]

But why is the AIBB not picking up on this.

Why isn't the CAA's making sure all training establishments including the airline schools have the proper methods defined in their training manuals for flying SEP's?

We have two people now disabled for life now because of pseudo airline pish. What will happen absolutely nothing.

[First_Principal]

I think it's probably in part an indictment on today's society where procedure is put ahead of ability; I don't see it getting any better for some time unfortunately.

In my training there we certainly expected (psuedo) EFATO's, but that is also part of the problem - it's when we don't expect it that things start to unravel; we need to suppress the natural urge to turn-back and/or keep things within the airfield.

It might be that more emphasis on EFATO needs to be included in the training syllabus - as much as instrument training perhaps? Conducting some 'real' EFATO's out in the field, and/or in a simulator might be a benefit.

I know I tried it out - at height - just to see how much height it took to do a turn-back after engine failure. It was significant and again may be something that needs to be demonstrated and tried out several times during a pilot's initial training, and later flight reviews...

Incidentaly MJ, that was a useful assessment I thought.

FP.

[Cows getting bigger]

First principal good post but this goes far deeper than EFATOs. An analogy is driving a car through town without instinctively using the steering wheel to control direction. A professional pilot ( ie instructor) should be able to 'feel' the aircraft and react accordingly. This chap, for whatever reason, handled the aircraft like a computer game and it is purely luck that the stall/spin didn't kill him. I don't point a finger at the pilot, I point it at a training system which does not spend nearly enough time on the basics (ie before cct work). The whole slow speed regime needs to be instinctive.

[S-Works]

We should not be letting the industries most inexperienced be its teachers......

[mad_jock]

And also does the correct technique for individual aircraft types/classes.

I don't do SEP approaches in the works machine I do turboprop ones.

I don't do turboprop ones in SEP's.

I can't remember any issue at all after doing 1100 hours in SEP doing SEP approaches going to 3 deg TP ones at 3 times the speed 7 times the weight and 2300SHP on the wings instead of 120 HP.

So quite why people need trained in this pseudo airline pish from the word go I don't really know.

I don't really hold with that bose you can do it but only if you are teaching the correct thing. The problem which is developing ever since JAR came in is that the two different methods of training are stepping on each others toes.

When I was full time there was one integrated trained instructor in the whole of Scotland and he had a PPL before he started the course. Now over 50% of the CV's coming into flying schools are Integrated trained FI's who think pseudo airline pish is the way to fly SEP's which they have been taught on the premise that they are going straight into a fully automated pref A airliner.

[Genghis the Engineer]

However MJ - none of us would have particular reservations teaching circuits in a PA38 on half that runway length, and there were still plenty of options ahead.

I had a lowish hour PPL come to me for a currency/conversion into a syndicate a year or so ago and, as is my wont, I had him brief me before take-off on his emergency actions in the event of an EFATO. He told me, clearly using words he got from somewhere else, that he'd attempt a turnback if it seemed viable.

I asked him if he'd ever been briefed on how to fly a turnback? No, nor practiced it, nor had one demoed to him.

But he got those words from somewhere.


So, somewhere out there, there are idiots who should know better teaching a turnback as a viable option - but only apparently verbally, without any actual practice of this rather difficult and marginal manoeuvre. And worse still, there are examiners passing PPL/CPL/FI skill tests on people who are preaching this dangerous gospel.

I have flown two successful turnbacks from partial EFATOs - but both times I was actually flying field to field, and not what my student described or this young FI tried to fly. And can think of no good reason I'd ever attempt one at 200ft from EGTC - an airport I know very well, or to be honest from anywhere else at that height. Including a touch and go from halfway down the runway. That hedge at 20 knots would be perfectly survivable!

Somebody taught this man, and somebody examined him. Those people, if the organisation has any backbone, should by now be having meetings: firmly without tea and biscuits, at the Belgrano. If !

G

[mad_jock]

750m would be no problem in the tommy.

But why aren't these airmanship things coming up in the reports?

Its almost as if that the powers that be believe its the way things should be done.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Perhaps an ill advised interpretation of "not to allocate blame" ?

I can't however see why such points can't be raised as training issues?

G

[cockney steve]

Another insight from Mr. (not so mad)....or is that "angry?" Jock. And Mr. Genghis.

I have had no official flying -training whatsoever. Yet I think I have a reasonably good grasp of mechanics, physics and aerodynamics, enough to enable me to understand what's going on, and why.

I have made it my business to explore the subjects in some depth. Unfortunately, many people just shut down at the first hint of anything technical...they learn by rote, spew the correct answer out, parrot fashion,but cannot apply the theory to a real-life scenario.

IMHO, it's bloody stupid to have someone spend~45 hours learning and then try to assess their competence to apply that knowledge ina brief flight.
Sure, some will obviously stand out as "natural",capable pilots, some ,like my late mother who took ~17 driving tests ON THE ISLE OF WIGHT :eek: before some incompetent fool overruled the examiner and let her loose!.....will never ever be competent and safe.

It seems that everybody is excusing a 200 hour jockey.....the man set himself up as a professional.....It was up to him and his professional integrity, to make sure he absorbed as much expert knowledge of his subject as possible.

The two posters mentioned above both demonstrate this trait. That is why they are respected and important to this Forum....PROFESSIONALS!

I've never met either, but would trust my life to them...couldn't say the same about a guy that can't be bothered to learn the fundamentals of his trade.

A few hours flying a Radio -controlled "toy" would give some of these greenhorns a real insight into aircraft handling, aerodynamics and energy-management.
Since when have the inhabitants of the Belgrano, admitted to incompetence or bad admin?......they never make mistakes, just shuffle the cards and slip in a few jokers periodically....it's for your own good, you know!

[mad_jock]

will never ever be competent and safe.

Well to be fair I don't think she will cause any accidents from her grave.

[Genghis the Engineer]

It seems that everybody is excusing a 200 hour jockey.....the man set himself up as a professional.....It was up to him and his professional integrity, to make sure he absorbed as much expert knowledge of his subject as possible.

I didn't know the fellow, although I was around Cranfield that day and saw the aftermath immediately afterwards.

But in this instance I would say that this chap was told by the system that he was a qualified professional pilot competent to do what he was doing. That included his CPL school, CPL examiner, FIC school, FI examiner, and the head of training for the school he was flying within.

Whilst relatively young and inexperienced people can be safe and competent (after all, the Battle of Britain was won by pilots often as young, and with as few hours), they are at-least as much in need of competent assessment and supervision as anybody else. I am making the case that this was almost certainly deficient as this fellow, with his hours, had nothing BUT his training to draw upon. Had he a few thousand hours, then I'd view it differently.

G

[rcalvert]

So what happens with the owner now? Is de-registration the only sanction or are the CAA likely to prosecute for the other things discovered as part of the investigation?

They seem to document a lot of facts that they know, even if they are not the direct cause of the crash (although, as we know, there's usually a chain of small failures rather than one big reason).

[mad_jock]

isn't he currently at her majesty's pleasure?

If there isn't any chance of the CAA getting there costs back I doubt very much if they will prosecute.

[First_Principal]

From Cow's earlier post:

An analogy is driving a car through town without instinctively using the steering wheel to control direction. A professional pilot ( ie instructor) should be able to 'feel' the aircraft and react accordingly

I agree that this would be ideal, and perhaps in a pilot of several thousand hours one might expect this, or at least hope for it! However this chap had just 390hours, most probably in a fairly rigid environment where the sort of experimentation that might lead to a good 'feel' in order to build up a good instinct would be frowned upon.

GtE makes some interesting comments; I'm horrified to hear that a qualified [low hour] pilot would ever express the possibility of a turn-back without having an extremely good reason for so doing - and obviously they didn't.

In the absence of experience then one would want pilots to put training before instinct, no easy thing to do in the heat of the moment. To express this kind of thought suggests that such training was deficient, or perhaps that they didn't listen, or thought they knew better once they got the bit of paper... none of these things are good and presumably would have lead to a serious discussion and retraining before consideration for the syndicate!

But that's one that was 'caught' by one such as GtE, and his later comments are very germane insofar as the training/examination/supervision system appears to be failing some people.

Whilst relatively young and inexperienced people can be safe and competent (after all, the Battle of Britain was won by pilots often as young, and with as few hours)

I'm not so sure that this comment is defendable - 'safe' in 1940 would be very fluid I would have thought, and the environment then is as different to now as chalk is to cheese. However, coming back for a moment to Cow's comment, I think that 1940's Sptifire pilots certainly got the chance to 'feel' an aircraft a lot more, or at least a lot earlier, than today's pilots. In short their flying was perhaps much less by rote or definition than it is today - and it's probable that those selected for the task were of better than average ability.

Today then for an average pilot to get to such a level of competence, and have a useful instinct for their craft, they'd probable need to have several thousand hours of flight time, and have 'experimented' somewhat during that time - a combination of an inquiring mind with a carefully judged taking of risks in order to learn well.

But such a combination is probably rare, and the taking of even qualified risks is not encouraged, so we're left with a cadre of pilots whose response to EFATO may be sub-optimal.

So to bring this back to the present, and to contribute to the future, what can we do?

It's my view that for a minimally trained low hour pilot (after all 50hours isn't a lot, yet one can be in an a/c with passengers and be expected to deal with an EFATO when it happens) the strictures of current training methodology may not have been sufficient to overcome natural tendency, that is to say the instinct to turn back would transcend the voice that says land dead ahead.

Cautiously therefore I'd suggest that some actual turn-back training should be given. I should say very cautiously; but to qualify this, and to present something for discussion here's my thinking:



The possibility of EFATO is just as important, if not more so, as say flight into cloud yet we spend 5 hours specifically on instrument training for a VFR PPL pilot.
I use the word 'important' deliberately because EFATO is an instant unexpected thing whereas flight into cloud carries some deliberation to it - the mechanism is different.
EFATO and all aspects of recovery should be specifically taught to a level similar to instrument training (ie. 5hrs minimum) and should include actual demonstrations of heights and situations at which landing dead ahead, or turning back, are appropriate.
One thing that would hopefully come from this is a clear knowledge of why you don't turn back at 75-200ft - there's nothing like seeing what happens to focus the mind.
Such training could occur at height, but should also include simulator work to give visual aspect cues that wouldn't be available at 3000ft or whatever.
Obviously real-life EFATO's with turnbacks etc would offer the best experience wrt of training, but I suspect we'd very quickly end up with the same issue as to why we don't teach spin recovery to student's these days - the cure could be more fatal than the disease. Yes I know that's arguable but...

This list is hardly comprehensive but I feel that, if nothing else, a specified allocation of time and a comprehensive syllabus to follow specifically on EFATO could reduce the terrible consequences that seem to happen with unfortunate regularity. I doubt that with current technology and humans as the driver we'd ever eliminate such disasters altogether, but surely increased emphasis would improve peoples chances?

FP.

[Sillert,V.I.]

I think that 1940's Sptifire pilots certainly got the chance to 'feel' an aircraft a lot more, or at least a lot earlier, than today's pilots.

I learned to fly on a PA38.

I had the very good fortune to be sent off on first solo by an instructor who flew a Spitfire in combat in the Battle of Britain.

I was never taught to do stabilised approaches from 500' & didn't need a tarmac runway to land safely.

That first solo was done from 600m of grass & I was expected to be vacating on landing by the halfway point.

During initial training I did once try following the PAPI's at Hurn on a dual XC & quite rightly got severely chastised for it.

[tecman]

Good post, FP. What I would add is the need to consider the PARTIAL engine failure case in the training and briefing. I touched on my own partial EFATO experience in an earlier post and despite the hell of a surprise, I believe that it was prior briefing, the instinctive nose down etc, previous practice in finding out minimum power for level flight, and enough knowledge about the fuel/air induction systems to juggle the carb heat and mixture, that allowed me to make a decent assessment and response.

Unless you have the picture sorted in your head before the event, what hope do you really have? Going through the "what ifs" in the situation of partial (and full) EFATOs at various altitudes is a very useful exercise. Clearly, a partial at 75' is a case for pulling the power and landing ahead. However, endlessly repeating the truisms applicable to a full loss of power are probably not the best way of getting pilots of varying ability and experience, in different aircraft, to the best partial EFATO outcome in all cases. I understand entirely the need to simplify the message for students, and to ensure the reflexes are developed as they need to be. However, I expect that for many people a more thoughtful advance analysis and associated training regime would help.

Like our Australian ATSB reports these days, the UK report on this accident looks of pretty marginal value to me. Interesting to tell the story but the conclusion doesn't go beyond the well-known (and true) observation applicable to a full EFATO at low altitude. If PPruners can rustle up the Australian stats showing the better results in full EFATOs, surely the AAIB can use those to produce a much stronger recommendation about partial failures at low altitudes - namely, pull the power and treat the failure as a complete one.

To not address in the partial power situation is to miss a large part of the story especially, I suspect, in the Cranfield case. When the rpm drops but the engine doesn't entirely stop, you've got a big decision to make in a very short period. A perfectly reasonable response by some pilots in some aircraft will be to shut down the engine and invoke the full EFATO response. In other cases, depending on the altitude, pilot, aircraft and nature of the problem, different responses are reasonable. It ought to be possible to address all the responses, at least at the CPL or instructor training level.

[Genghis the Engineer]

I wonder to what extent the problem is with the CPL syllabus. Getting sidetracked here a bit, but the vast majority of CPL holders will become either airline pilots or flying instructors.

Airline pilots will spend much of their time on A/P.

Flying instructors will spend much of their time in small areas exploring basic aircraft handling issues.

Both will most need to earn their money dealing with emergencies, if they ever do. Neither have much requirement for accurate hand-flown precision navigation. Getting to a diversion airfield, by a slightly erratic route, a few minutes slower than hoped, really aint much of a problem in the real world.


Yet we have a CPL syllabus that is about 70% hand-flown precision nav, 15% handling emergencies, and 15% just handling.

Move the syllabus around to maybe 60% handling emergencies, 20% handling, and 20% precision nav, and you'd have something much more suited to the modern flying environment - and where people like the pilot we're all talking about would be much better fitted to dealing with real emergencies.


Incidentally I disagree with:-

urely the AAIB can use those to produce a much stronger recommendation about partial failures at low altitudes - namely, pull the power and treat the failure as a complete one.

If I had followed that advice, I'd have landed out two aeroplanes, possibly breaking them, in the last few years when I had partial EFATOs. On the other hand, fly field-to-field, positioning for the best landing site, ideally a runway, and you most likely save the aeroplane, and if all else fails, at-least crash where the emergency services can reach you easily. It would also roughly agree with your earlier:-

I believe that it was prior briefing, the instinctive nose down etc, previous practice in finding out minimum power for level flight, and enough knowledge about the fuel/air induction systems to juggle the carb heat and mixture, that allowed me to make a decent assessment and response.

G

[mad_jock]

G you have a large subset though that the CPL is virtually bypassed with an in house check.

They have everything set up to move straight to shiny fully automated jets.

Now instead of going for the CPL which to be honest isn't where the problem is. they need to go for the Instructors courses and examinations more. And get a grip of the syllabuses

In theory you have to do a pre course test but I have never known anyone failing one.

this stuff has to get banged in from the word go. And as long as there are pilot that have been trained with pseudo airline ops pish they will bring it back to GA flying if they are allowed to instruct.

So either ban them form being instructors and propagating this pish or get the syllabuses that they are taught changed to teach them the correct way of flying this class of aircraft.

And change the FIC initial test to be done by an independent FIE which focuses on the basic skills.

[tecman]

Genghis, I was simply making the point that the AAIB conclusion would have been more useful if it had specifically addressed the issue of partial failure at 75'. As you correctly infer, my personal response to a partial with different parameters was a measured one along the lines you describe. It struck me as less than useful to conclude the report with a perfectly correct truism, without linking it back to the initial circumstances of the crash.

[funfly]

I was fortunate enough never to have had a EFTO apart from practice ones.

However I considered it good practice to actually say the EFTO option as part of my final checks prior to every take off - not just repeat a written sentence but have a look at what was beyond the runway and work it out.

Over the top? Maybe, but it's what I did.

[rcalvert]

Originally Posted by mad_jock
isn't he currently at her majesty's pleasure?Hadn't heard that one. What for?

[Genghis the Engineer]

Hadn't heard that one. What for?

I don't believe that he is, but is known locally to have had significant "issues" with the British legal system for reasons unconnected with aviation. All proveable so not slander or libel, but probably not actually helpful to put on here.

G

[cockney steve]

previous practice in finding out minimum power for level flight, and enough knowledge about the fuel/air induction systems to juggle the carb heat and mixture, that allowed me to make a decent assessment and response.

All of which can be found out for one's self.....no leading by the hand and spoon-feeding required:8
I am sure that any putative instructor reading this thread, will have cause to consider where the gaps are in his knowledge.
I don't care if the instructor has 5 hours total time since qualifying, he has not absorbed the basic training and fundamental physics of flight, if he doesn't understand the inherent risks of a slow turn.
Any power is useful to "stretch the glide",especially when confronted with a sea of rooftops! When there's a good choice of inviting fields below, with the furrows in the right direction, there may be a case for a Gimli re-enactment....otherwise, one roof is very much like another, a part-performing donk will give a little bit of extra flight-time to check the obvious (fuel-cock/selector) and carb-heat in some circumstances, followed ,Iwould think, by mixture......A mechanical or Mag failure is usually beyond your control,but a bit of power still gives you some thinking -time. I would be very wary of throwing away one card in a very poor hand,under the circumstances.


I don't buy the "the system's given him a ticket, therefore he thinks he is a professional" scenario.....anyone complacent enough to assume that exam passed = know it all, is not suited to responsibility!
@ mad jock
Thankfully, no, but I'll lay odds on that she caused a fair few accidents! My late partner drove over 40years without a license :( and one trip with her was enough to convince me to ALWAYS drive.....she came back from a trip to the local shop, accompanying Mother, a nervous wreck....highlights included a 12 mile detour because she took the wrong turning, a close inspection and testing of the characteristics of the opposite-side verge (got distracted) sailing through junctions without priority :confused:......
No, I never risked it, personally! :} Forgot to say, Mother only drove Automatics, a clutch and gear-lever were a leap too far!

[thing]

However I considered it good practice to actually say the EFTO option as part of my final checks prior to every take off - not just repeat a written sentence but have a look at what was beyond the runway and work it out.

Over the top? Maybe, but it's what I did.

Thought that was standard training for the PPL syllabus? It's what I was taught to do, just assumed everyone else did as well.

[Piper.Classique]

Thought that was standard training for the PPL syllabus? It's what I was taught to do, just assumed everyone else did as well.

Formal preflight briefing is certainly now a part of the PPL syllabus. It hasn't always been so, I don't know exacty when it was incorporated. Someone may remember?

It has been part of a glider takeoff in UK since at least 1981 when I did my silver C, but I don't think was generally done by power pilots at that time. For gliding there is a memnonic of CBSIFTCBE, for those who like such things, and the E stands for either emergencies or if you have a nervous passenger it seems to become eventualities.

[funfly]

In my gliding time it was

CBSITCB

"up slack"

"all out"

I got my bronze in a K13

(what's the F ? )

FF

[Saab Dastard]

F = Flaps.

And yes, it now ends with E = Eventualities.

SD