RAF Hastings crash due multiple birdstrikes at Darwin in the Fifties

[Centaurus]

I may have asked this question on Pprune a very long time ago but the memory is a little dimmer than then. So please bear with me.

In the early or middle Fifties, I was based in Darwin on Lincolns when an RAF Hastings took off and had a multiple bird strike. I don't know if the bird strike happened while the Hastings was still on its take off run or after getting airborne. The end result was either the crew aborted the takeoff shortly after becoming airborne and in so doing over-ran the airstrip. Or the aircraft suffered a failure of all or some of its engines and belly landed. It was a write-off I believe.

In later years, I often wondered the exact sequence of events that culminated in the aircraft on its belly beyond the end of the very long runway. The Hastings carried a flight engineer whose main task was to handle the throttles and other ancilliary controls which were on his panel. I believe the pilot had throttles available as well.

It is difficult to understand how birds would stop all engines simultaneously especially as the Hastings had big radial engines. In a jet maybe - but in a propeller aircraft? On the other hand I can understand a multi bird strike just after getting airborne could cause confusion in the cockpit as to how many engines were affected and if one or more was delivering partial power, full power or no power and thus windmilling props. All within a few seconds. Who feathers the props in a Hastings? The F/E or the two pilots?

What really happened that caused such a near fatal accident? I know that a large pipe line paralled a road that was beyond the over-run area of the runway and that it was fortunate the aircraft did not hit the pipe line.

[Jhieminga]

ASN Aircraft accident Handley Page Hastings NZ5804 Darwin RAAF Station, NT (DRW) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19550909-0)

This states that power was lost on three of the four engines. The source for that is this page: Hastings Bangs and Prangs and Splashes and Crashes (http://splashdown2.tripod.com/id11.html)

From that page:
09/09/1955 NZ5804 RNZAF written off on take off from RAAF Darwin Australia, all 25 on board survived.


Lin M Hall has sent this in from Queensland, Australia, my thanks to Lin for allowing me to add this piece on 11th August 2012:


The aircraft was taking off from Darwin on a regular flight to RAF Changi at the time. The pilot blamed a flock of birds for the accident in which at least one engine was said to have lost power. The aircraft broke through the Darwin city's water main, pushed the railway line off the causeway on which it lay and ended up straddling the main (only) road connecting the city to the rest of Australia.


I was a trainee engine mechanic at the time of the accident and did not get any more about the issues until I was on a fitters course in 1958. Air New Zealand was, then, the overhaul contractor for Herc 735 and 737 engines. The RNZAF was going through a long period of troubles with both of the engines. The AirNZ training staff engineer told us that the engines from this crash did not exhibit the expected intake-full of bird debris and they thought it may have been pilot-induced closed throttle. I have no idea what the SOR said about the accident.


Your article also mentions "gulping" and "coring". for those engines. In case you didn't know gulping is where the engine's scavenge-venting system (crankcase breathing system if you like) became pressurised - no reason was ever found - and the breather would spew the oil out into the atmosphere. Until it either fixed itself or ran out of oil. This happened on both Hastings and Bristol Freighter. Coring(1) is where the oil preheating box (a cylindrical device within the oil tank) malfunctioned in that it failed to preheat the rest of the tank's cold oil and the few gallons of oil in the preheater became overheated because it was too little an amount to cool properly. The proper purpose for the device is to allow quick start-up heating of (some) cold oil and a slow introduction of the remainder into the lubricating stream as the whole tankfull warmed up and could join the regular flow through the metering slots in the bottom of the preheater. Coring(2) is where the oil coolers get too cold (during cruise) and the flow through the coolers is disrupted by congealed oil. This can lead to overheating engine oil and engine failure if the aircraft is forced to climb to a higher altitude or on the application of power during descent and approach to landing.


In RNZAF service we used certain transit points to apply or remove shrouds from the front-centre of the oil coolers. For example Darwin was a remove shrouds going northward and install going south. Both Hastings and Freighters suffered from inadequate design of the oil cooling system and inability to operate in both tropics and temperate zones without auxiliary management devices. You can guess that the shrouds, four per aircraft, were carried in the engineer's box of goodies, for each aircraft, and there was no Sec/Ref numbers for them!


Thanks for your web site. It will be useful forever.


Regards


LinHope this helps

[Centaurus]

Thanks a million for that info, Jhieminga. I had no idea so many Hastings were lost. Glad I didn't know about that when I cadged a ride in a RNZAF Hastings from Amberley RAAF base to Darwin and Singapore in the Late Fifties and then in a RAF Hastings from Singapore to Lyneham.

The report does not go into detail of why did the engines fail and what happened in the cockpit to cause such an accident. I suspect a balls-up somewhere.

[Lancman]

In reply to a couple of your questions Centaurus, the throttle and RPM controls were duplicated at the F/E station and the cockpit. You probably remember that the F/E traveled backwards in his own little world behind the Co-pilot's seat. This was a curious quirk that seemed peculiar to Handley Page aircraft; the Halifax was much the same whereas the Lancaster had the F/E much more involved in the flying.

For take-off in a Hastings the Captain would open the throttles, leading with number four, until he had directional control with the rudder at which point he would call "Your power Engineer" or as one North Country Captain that I often flew with would say "You have the power Engineer but I have the glory" from which point the F/E would further open the throttles to full power aligning the boost as he went. From then on until touch down the F/E handled the power. At least, that's how it was done in the RAF, the RNZAF may have done things differently.

However, in the event of an emergency that required an engine being shut down the pilots would handle the throttle, pitch lever, and the feathering/fire button.

Now for some pure speculation. Like you I'm very doubtful that bird strikes, even big Aussie Northern Territory birds, would cause all four big radial engines to fail. There would probably be a lot of overheating but the engines would have continued to run. My suggestion is that the windscreen would probably have been covered in blood, guts, and feathers and outside reference would have been lost. There might then have been an early example of somatogravic illusion in which aircraft acceleration is sensed as a pitch up, leading to the pilot lowering the nose and causing further acceleration. The length of the debris trail would be very interesting to see.

Pure speculation of course, and were we allowed to have any illusions back then?

[BOAC]

Lancman - I'm pretty sure that 'somatogravic illusions' were just not acceptable until the late 60's :O

[Brian 48nav]

Was that Jolly Jack Huntington?

[Lancman]

'Twas indeed.

[Centaurus]

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y25/HSWL/RNZAFHastingsandLincolnJL-1.jpg

Sorry about the link which was supposed to be displayed directly as picture rather than a link. Am always having strife trying to transfer photobucket photos on to a Pprune page and rarely succeed. I took this photo of a RNZAF Hastings which was over Arnhem Land en-route Amberley RAAF Base to Darwin. We were flying a Lincoln Mk 31 (Long Nose) and had conducted a planned practice SAR intercept of the Hastings. We were Darwin based on SAR duties. We knew its ATD Amberley and its ETA Darwin and departed Darwin to the NE. Some time later the navigator did a fine job of planning the intercept and we spotted the Hastings below us.

I asked him on VHF if we could formate and take a photo. He gave the OK and this was the result. Our main problem was the Hastings cruised about 20 knots faster than our Lincoln, so we used the height advantage and dived to come alongside of him with a good closing speed. The captain of the RNZAF Hastings was Flight Lieutenant Flak. I wonder if he is still around although he would be 85 plus by now.

[Lancman]

The Hastings was a surprisingly nippy old bird, I remember overtaking a DC4 between Travis and Hickam one day on our way to Christmas Island.

[JW411]

It was one of the great pleasures in my career in the Royal Air Force to have become a friend of Nick "Taff" John (who was also known as the Prince of Darkness.)

Taff was an instructor at Dishforth teaching young men to fly the Hastings.

At the end of the course, it was usual for the instructor/examiner to sit in the right seat and examine the student captain, then swop seats while he flew with the co-pilot.

Taff had another idea. He would give the flight engineer a piece of paper with various emergencies listed (such as; "After the third touch and go, switch off the fuel on No.4.").

As already stated, the F/E sat facing backwards. Taff would sit himself upon the jump seat and watch what happened when the trainee crew acted together as a team.

One night, after the third touch and go, the F/E duly switched the fuel off on No.4. The co-pilot had a go at No.1 and the captain had a go at No.2.

As the aircraft sank towards the Vale of York in the dark, Taff apparently took his pipe out of his mouth and said "Gentlemen, would everyone put everything back EXACTLY as they found it!"

The beast burst into life and they got away with it.

[Fantome]

Pure speculation of course, and were we allowed to have any illusions back then?

All of that post highly commendable, sir. You should be writing your memoirs, a la Centaurus.

Thinks .. . . . was there ever a multi-engined aeroplane of British or American design where the pilots did not have the primary engine controls for themselves also, and were hence capable of initiating shut down and feather?

[Centaurus]

Further to previous posts. It is fascinating to read the often expert and not so expert opinions as to causes of accidents. Speculation on Pprune is healthy especially as it may reveal avenues of investigation that may not have been considered by the investigators involved. Some of us flying similar types in similar conditions may secretly think "There but for the Grace of God, go I"

The RNZAF Hastings crash discussed in previous posts here has always intrigued me because in another era, I dabbled in several military aircraft accidents in an official capacity. In the last few weeks, I was able through the kind efforts of people in the New Zealand Department of Defence, to obtain a copy of the Court of Inquiry on the Hastings accident. The cause of the accident could not be firmly established since in those days of 1955 there were no CVR or FDR's. So the Court of Inquiry was forced to speculate on the evidence available (reminds me of Pprune!)

Anyway, I thought Pprune readers may be interested in my brief summation from the pages of the Court of Inquiry. (I haven't read every page yet but enough to see why the Court of Inquiry were unable to pin down the specific cause of the prang.

Here goes:

The RNZAF Hastings took off from Darwin to go to Amberley. It had just got airborne and gear selected up when it had multiple bird strikes. A witness said he saw about 12 hawks on the runway. The crew felt a big bang on the nose of the aircraft. There was no swing. At least one bird hit the nose.

Almost immediately three engines lost partial power and with a rapid drop in IAS the captain made the instantaneous decision to throw it back from 100 ft wheels already up, on the remaining runway length. The aircraft slid off the end of the runway towards an embankment next to the main water pipe supply line to Darwin. To avoid colliding with the water pipe the captain applied full left rudder as the Hastings it slid on its belly and ground looped before hitting the pipe line with the starboard wing tip. Everyone got out unhurt (all passengers were sitting in backward facing seats) which was amazing. The aircraft did not catch fire.

The Court of Inquiry centred on why three engines lost partial power when no birds were found in the engine intakes. In those days British aircraft (including the Lincoln that I used to fly) had inertia switches that when operated by deceleration forces, automatically actuated the engine fire extinguishers. In the Hastings this inertia switch was in the nose and covered with a Perspex cover. Each engine on the Hastings had three fire bottles. It was found that in three engines some of the extinguishers had operated, while in the No 4 engine which never lost power, the fire bottles had not actuated.

The normal take of RPM on the engines was 2800. At the instant of bird strike it was seen that three engines momentarily dropped to 2200RPM - a power reduction which may have accounted for the IAS dropping from 125 knots at bird strike to 113 knots when the captain made the decision to throw it back on the remaining runway.

It was thought that birds hitting the nose of the Hastings might have actuated the inertia switch - although the plastic cover was intact when they found it later. Black smoke was seem coming from the engine exhausts shortly after bird impact. There was a thought that the FE might have loosened the pitch levers friction nut in preparation for reducing to climb power which is done when 125 knots safety speed is reached. Tests proved if that happens (friction nut loose) the pitch levers will slip back with momentary loss in RPM unless the FE keeps his hands on the pitch levers.
Later tests revealed that if the pitch levers drop back several hundred RPM with engines at full power, the exhausts emit black smoke. This does not happen if the throttles are pulled back.

The Inquiry had several theories to go on for the cause of the partial failures of the three engines. In the end these were narrowed to two possibilities. One was the pitch levers slipped back exactly at the same time as the bird strike. Secondly the possibility the nose bird strike actuated the inertia switch causing extinguishers to operate into the engines causing partial power loss.

The Inquiry stated the captain made the right decision when faced with significant loss of power on two out of three engines with a smaller power loss on a third engine and no power loss on the fourth. This was at max weight take off. The captain was also faced with the immediate loss of air speed at such a low altitude coupled with the fear the engines may not pick up immediately after they had failed.

Beyond the over-run area was the water pipe line, a railway embankment and trees. A forced landing further ahead among the trees could have proved fatal. So he made the decision to belly land it straight ahead on the remaining length of runway before it was too late. It was one of those once in a lifetime lightning quick decisions we all hope would never be required of us.

During the Inquiry he was asked if he had ever had an accident before. He replied that in 1946 he was flying a Liberator four engine bomber over mountains in Europe when he lost two engines. The Lib could not maintain height and he managed to force land it next to a road. The captain had over 5000 hours of which 1400 hours were in command on Hastings.
............................................................ ..................................

Further to the above. Have just read Flypast magazine May 2013 issue. There was a fascinating article on Shorts Stirlings used in the civilian role.
A Captain Tam Morrison was flying a Stirling OO-XAC-on 21 December, 1947 departing Calcutta for Kunming.

From the article: "After pre-flight planning, Tam's crew and passengers boarded OO-XAC the following morning for the penultimate leg to Canton. Immediately after take off, at about 150-200ft, three engines failed leaving Tam no option but to put the fully laden aircraft straight ahead. Part of the path the aircraft took was through a cemetery of stone burial mounds. Each was about 4ft high, and these tore through the Stirling.

When it finally came to rest, the fuselage was largely intact save for the nose and cockpit. Tragically, the co-pilot died and the flight engineer suffered a broken hip, but thanks to Tam's skill the rest of the crew and passengers suffered only minor injuries. Such a catastrophic multi-engine failure suggests fuel contamination."

The report makes no mention of the possibility of a bird strike. But if there had been a bird strike and if the Stirling was fitted with inertia switches that actuated engine fire extinguishers, the circumstances would have been eerily similar to the crash of the RNZAF Hastings at Darwin eight years later.

[Lancman]

Thanks for that Centaurus, all interesting stuff. It rather indicates that my speculation about somatogravic illusion was just so much hogwash! And aircraft of that time didn't tend to accelerate at any great rate anyway; not even going downhill!
Did you notice that the findings came from a "Court" of Enquiry? it wasn't until much later that they became "Boards".
The findings of most enquiries of that time were perforce speculative relying as they did largely on witness evidence and this one was no different.
Three sets of engine fire extinguishers were discharged and three engines lost some power, any significance there?
By the way, the inertia switches didn't have to be damaged in order to energise the circuits; they consisted of a steel ball restrained by springs in a fore and aft mounted shallow U shaped tube and given a sufficient decelleration the ball moved up the tube and closed the electrical circuit. I remember looking at such a box in the nose of a Lancaster in flight one day and noticing a large T shaped handle sticking out of it with a very grubby red canvas flag attached on which I could just make out the words TO BE REMOVED BEFORE FLIGHT. I didn't dare remove the pin in flight, just in case, but I did bring it to the attention of the relevant authority after landing.
The Britannia had a similar system plus wipe-off switches in the engine nacelles. If operated they would shut off fuel and oil supplies to the engines, shut down the generators, and fire the extinguishers. This happened undemanded once and led to a large handle being fitted in the flight deck above the windscreens which would reverse the whole process and allow you to relight the engines. It was known colloquially as the OH MY CHRIST handle.
The engine control levers in the Hastings didn't have the knurled nuts to set their friction as in the Lancaster and Lincoln but had instead had a pair of rather nice, and sensitive, levers set in the quadrant next to the throttle and RPM levers. The procedure, in the RAF, when the Captain called for climb power was:
One hand on the throttles, one hand to reduce the friction, reduce the boost, friction back on.
One hand on the RPM levers, one hand to reduce the friction, reduce the RPM, friction back on.
All the levers moved fore and aft, again unlike the Lancaster/ Lincoln.
The Captain in this accident did a superb job of making a split second decision and following it through to a successful conclusion; everyone walked away.

[Centaurus]

Reading through the Court of Inquiry file, I noticed that it was SOP for the flight engineer to reduce the power to what was termed "Rated" power of 2500RPM and +8 boost as soon as the aircraft reached safety speed of 125 knots.

In fact on this occasion, the captain had just called 125 knots (the signal for the F/E to reduce power after take off) when shortly afterwards three of the engines displayed power loss. The co-pilot said in his witness statement "The captain raised the undercarriage and the aircraft proceeded to climb away. The captain called "Safety Speed" and at just about that time we struck a bird or birds with a loud report. We would be at this time approximately 100 ft"

How things have changed since those days. It would be most unusual nowadays for a pilot to reduce take off power at 100 ft to rated or climb power. Even in my day on all types of aircraft including Rolls Royce Merlins and Pratt & Whitneys, the usual height to reduce to climb power was never below 500 ft AGL. I wonder why the haste to reduce power so soon after lift-off in the case of the Hastings? Was it an engine manufacturer recommended procedure or was it just a squadron SOP? Either way, it certainly would be a very critical time (125 knots or 100 ft AGL) for a flight engineer to start fiddling with pitch and throttle levers when there may have been no operational necessity to do so.

I vaguely recall reading an article written by a highly respected engine handling guru (maybe it was John Deakin in his excellent series of articles called "The Penguin's Perch") where he maintained that his research had found that if an engine failure after take off was going to happen in piston-engine aircraft, it was most likely at the first point of power reduction from take off power.

While the reason for the mysterious engines power loss on the Hastings was never determined with certainty, the wisdom of changing power at safety speed of 125 knots which would occur around 100 - 200 ft AGL, would seem questionable in light of todays engine handling procedures on piston engine types. Hind-sight is a wonderful thing.:ok: