AF 447 Thread No. 11

[john_tullamarine]

Thread part -

This thread series started out of an earlier thread which starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/376433-af447.html#post4974708) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/376433-af447-229.html).

Another, slower moving, thread on the subject and covering the period from the original thread, above, and the start of thread #4

#1 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/395105-af-447-search-resume.html#post5303737) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/395105-af-447-search-resume-195.html#post6408432).
#2 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/449639-af-447-search-resume-part2.html#post6408428) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/449639-af-447-search-resume-part2-127.html#post6476460).
#3 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/452836-af447-thread-no-3-a.html#post6476336) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/452836-af447-thread-no-3-a-104.html#post6515428).
#4 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/454653-af-447-thread-no-4-a.html#post6515515) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/454653-af-447-thread-no-4-a-54.html).
#5 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a.html#post6561270) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-100.html).
#6 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/460625-af-447-thread-no-6-a.html) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/460625-af-447-thread-no-6-a-85.html#post6793822).
#7 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/468394-af-447-thread-no-7-a.html) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/468394-af-447-thread-no-7-a-68.html).
#8 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/482356-af-447-thread-no-8-a.html#post7129212) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/482356-af-447-thread-no-8-a-78.html#post7278807).
#9 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/489774-af-447-thread-no-9-a.html#post7278812) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/489774-af-447-thread-no-9-a-74.html#post7370230).
#10 starts here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/493472-af-447-thread-no-10-a.html#post7370219) and finishes here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/493472-af-447-thread-no-10-a-54.html#post7759937).

Total posts to date 17634 .. with in excess of 2.7 million views overall.

Links to the various BEA reports are given below. If I have missed any of the useful papers, please PM me with the URL and I can include it.

(a) BEA site - French (http://www.bea.aero/fr/index.php), English (http://www.bea.aero/en/index.php)
- Report link page - French (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/vol.af.447.php), English (http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php)

(b) Interim Report (No, 1) Jul 2, 2009 - English (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf)

(c) Interim Report No. 2 Dec 17, 2009 - English (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e2.en/pdf/f-cp090601e2.en.pdf)
- Update Dec 17, 2009 - French (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.17.12.2009.pdf), English (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/update.on.the.investigation.af447.17.12.2009.en.pdf)

(d) Estimating the wreckage location Jun 30, 2010 (http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/phase3.search.zone.determination.working.group.report.pdf)

(e) Wreckage search analysis Jan 20, 2011 (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/metron.search.analysis.pdf)

(f) Briefing and associated update May 27, 2011
- Briefing (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/info27mai2011.fr.php) - update French (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.fr.pdf)
- Briefing (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/info27mai2011.en.php) - update English (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf)
- Briefing (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/info27mai2011.de.php) - update German (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.de.pdf)
- Briefing (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/info27mai2011.br.php) - update Portugese (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.br.pdf)

(g) Interim Report No. 3 July 2011 - French (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf), English (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf)

(h) Links to final report Jul 5, 2012 and associated documents. (http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/rapport.final.en.php)

Miscellaneous pertinent links -

(a) Airbus Operations Golden Rules (http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_gallery/files/safety_library_items/AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS-SOP-SEQ03.pdf)
(b) ALPA FBW Primer (http://cf.alpa.org/internet/alp/2000/febfbw.htm)
(c) C* and Civil Transports - Cranfield (https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/bitstream/1826/186/2/coareport9303.pdf)
(d) Longitudinal Flight Control Design - RAeS (http://www.raes.org.uk/pdfs/2989.pdf)
(e) Longitudinal Stability: Effect of High Altitude and CG - Boeing (http://boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_02/textonly/fo01txt.html)
(f) pitot static system performance - USN (Pax River) FTM (http://www.aviation.org.uk/docs/flighttest.navair.navy.milunrestricted-FTM108/c2.pdf)
(g) The Problem of Automation: Inappropriate Feedback and Interaction, Not Over-Automation. Donald A. Norman UCSD (http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/Norman-overautomation.pdf)
(h) Upset Recovery - 16MB zip file (http://www.mediafire.com/?jrkvp2ysl7aea25)
(i) Ironies of Automation. Lisanne Bainbridge UCL (http://www.bainbrdg.demon.co.uk/Papers/Ironies.html)
(j) Cognitive Capability of Humans. Christopher Wickens Uni Illinois (http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/chapters/Wickens_Durso%20Aviation.PDF)
(k) Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance John D. Lee, Katrina A. See; Human Factors, Vol. 46, 2004 (http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=LHmZGvvpc1T1RT2pThDgGpvfwpMvh6f TTBPVC4hD8Tpg8J4LdQZy!-290722064?docId=5008765429)
(l) Training for New Technology. John Bent - Cathay Neil Krey's CRM site (http://www.crm-devel.org/resources/paper/bent.htm)


Search hint: You can search PPRuNe threads with a filter in Google by using the following search string example -

ths af447 site:http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/ (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/)

This will search for mentions of THS in the AF447 threads of tech log only.

Just change the THS in the string to whatever you want to look for. This allows one to search for any term or phrase of interest throughout the threads.

Adding the site:URL end part is the magic that restricts Google to only searching in Tech Log.

This filter technique is absolutely wonderful and can be used generically to find things of interest in PPRuNe - appears to work OK in the PPRuNe search function as well.

In respect of Google searching, JenCluse has added some suggestions -

a) indenting the text block with a (one) Tab, *and*

b) emphasizing the fact that it is a search text block with some manner of . . .
<SearchText>, or
"SearchText"

Another search engine approach tailored for AF447 can be found here (http://countjustonce.com/pprune/).

[Brian Abraham]

As experts struggle to identify why the crew of Air France 447 lost control of their A330 over the South Atlantic Ocean nearly four years ago, the industry is also still struggling to develop the precision data needed to accurately reproduce a stall in a Level D simulator. The lack of accurate stall data limits entry and recovery practice because the computers running the simulators have no idea how the aircraft will actually perform.

Safety experts believe better data is needed to properly prepare pilots for a portion of the aircraft’s performance envelope that was once thought easy to avoid.

At a recent conference held at the Royal Aeronautical Society in London, officials from both Airbus and Boeing joined forces to explain the situation to date as well as where the industry still needs to go. Airbus test pilot Terry Lutz believes the day may be coming when pilots will need to hand over more control to onboard computers when the situation becomes too chaotic. This is reminiscent of the blue “level” button in use aboard the four-place Cirrus SR22 piston single that automatically brings the aircraft back to a wings-level attitude even if the autopilot is turned off.

Boeing engineer Paul Bolds-Moorhead reiterated the monumental task of developing accurate lift and stall data in the high-altitude regime, where the stall and unusual-attitude behavior of transport aircraft is typically never tested.

Simulators Still Not Accurate Enough On Stalls | Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainsafety/2013-03-25/simulators-still-not-accurate-enough-stalls)

[Cool Guys]

Airbus test pilot Terry Lutz believes the day may be coming when pilots will need to hand over more control to onboard computers when the situation becomes too chaotic.

Why not address the root cause? Provide better pilot training and make the pilot-machine interface simplier and less confusing so situations dont become so chaotic.

Edit. Sorry guys, I should delete this post. This has been gone over hundreds of times.

[henra]

Why not address the root cause? Provide better pilot training and make the pilot-machine interface simplier and less confusing so situations dont become so chaotic.

Why not do both?
Trying to find a way of having a better grip on aircraft behaviour after things went very wrong still seems a positive thing to me.

Furthermore this move could also help in laying the foundation for developping automatic stall/spin recovery technology similar to what's available in the F-18. Considering today's volume of Flight Control systems in modern airliners this should not be impossible once sufficient aerodynamic data is available.
For Recovery that might be a more realistic approach than training all Airliner crews worldwide in doing 'advanced aerobatics' in IFR conditions...

Curious to see if the manufacturers will go more extreme in test flights in the future?
Maybe even Remote Controlled, similar to the QF-4 Drones?
In a 10 Billion$ Development project these costs should be rather negligeable.

[DozyWannabe]

The other notion that Vaughn pioneered (but which we in this business are familiar with by other names) is the "normalization of deviance". For those new to the notion, one way of expressing the meaning is, the reducing of margins of error in standardized proven systems because the standard can successfully be reduced while maintaining sufficient margins of error. (There are other ways of expressing this of course!).

So rather than nefarious activities behind engineers' backs, most managers could claim to be onside with the safety people but they also knew that they had to be mindful of schedules, budgets, regulatory affairs, government politics and public perceptions. As you would expect these are very bright and aware people but none of that guarantees that phenomenon such as normalizing standards through "reasonable justifications" is the right thing to do. Often it is seen as "amoral", and calculated towards pedantic goals only in hindsight.

Nail on the head.

While us folks on the shop floor like to kvetch about management and accounting, the truth is that there's rarely any generalised malice in their intentions. Whether we're talking about NASA in the case of the Challenger and Columbia disasters, the FAA and McDonnell-Douglas in the case of the DC-10, or De Havilland and the British Government in the case of the Comet, the fact is that most of the time the dangers were not realised because the decisions were mostly in the hands of people who did not fully understand the consequences should something outside their experience go wrong.

As I understand it, in the case of the Columbia breakup, the engineer who first advanced the foam strike theory had to fight tooth-and-nail to get it tested - not just with management, but with other engineers!

I wonder myself, in the briefing was nothing new on the planet, mostly stuff what expierienced old school pilots learned about stalls amd falls from the beginning regardless whether it was civil or military.

Well, even line pilots learn about stalls and recovery when they do their initial PPL training. The issue seems to be that this knowledge was not sufficiently revised once they'd earned their seat on an airliner.

[PJ2]

Dozy;
Re, "Whether we're talking about NASA in the case of the Challenger and Columbia disasters, the FAA and McDonnell-Douglas in the case of the DC-10, . . .", others may accept that the two cases are similar but just for the record, for a host of reasons that have to do with individual, group and corporate behaviours and how knowledge was formed and subsequently reified within the two respective organizations, I would never include the DC10 case in any category that suggests that the two (NASA/Challenger, McD/DC10) are examples of the same phenomenon or are of the same character; in my view they are not. For a good understanding of the difference between the two, The DC-10 Case (http://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Dc_10_Case.html?id=gBHGmwmMj30C&redir_esc=y) has to be read alongside Vaughn's book.

I certainly don't want to re-argue anything here and there are elements of the same behaviours in terms of the normalization of deviance and other phenomena discussed in Vaughn but a key difference is, for example, expressed by Peter French (http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/27799738?uid=3739400&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3737720&uid=4&sid=21102051334847): "There can be little doubt that many engineers and managerial personnel at McDonnell Douglas (and Convair) knew, well before the Paris crash, of the potential for a Class IV hazard* due to defective design of the DC-10 cargo door latching system and the floor structure.", *A Class IV hazard is a hazard involving danger to life. (The DC-10 Case; A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology, and Society, ed. John H. Fielder, Douglas Birsch, SUNY, 1992, New York, p.178).

[bubbers44]

Remember how simple it was when us old guys learned how to fly? Hand fly the first few thousands of hours, learn how to use the AP, but know how to turn it off if it isn't right. Look at the FD and see if it wants to go the same way you do and if it disagrees just go the way your clearance goes. Very simple and everything is safe. Now, we have children of the magenta line flying.

[predictorM9]

I just read the leaked (French) experts report on AF447 (I won't put the link here, just google it) and it explicitly mentions that the plane may not have been recoverable at all because of the alternate 2b law, which limits the deflection of the elevator when the stick is full nose down deflection. They showed that even when one of the pilots put the nose down for two seconds (and then neutral) the elevator did not move much.

As a contribution factor of the accident, the report states:

6.4: alt2b flight law, which is hybrid, does not guarantee longitudinal stability for speeds below the stall speed (VS1g)

6.5: The auto trim of the THS is not deactivated below the minimal flight speed (VLS) in alt2b flight law.

Based on these, I think the flight crew was probably in an unrecoverable situation (no matter what they would have done), unless maybe deactivating the ADRs to go into direct mode (as in the recent EVA air incident).

Being a faculty in systems engineering (on a totally unrelated domain), I am shocked by these conclusions. The A330 cannot stall in normal mode, but why do we need a crash to understand that the ALT2B mode is putting pilots into trouble during a stall? They must have done tests during certification. I'm sure they must have stalled the plane in alternate mode to see how it worked...

I know that pilots are to blame etc, but this sheds a different light. Even if the pilots had been professional test pilots, maybe the plane would still have been irrecoverable.

[henra]

I just read the leaked (French) experts report on AF447 (I won't put the link here, just google it) and it explicitly mentions that the plane may not have been recoverable at all because of the alternate 2b law, which limits the deflection of the elevator when the stick is full nose down deflection.


Did you read the previous Threads on AF447?
If so you would have seen that this topic has been discussed ad nauseum.

Conclusion: We will not know for sure if
it would have been recoverable once the AoA was >>30°.
Nor will BEA, even Airbus will probably not know for sure if it was recoverable past that point.
Some argued it was rather likely it would have been technically recoverable (I tend to belong to this group) some concluded it wasn't.

Drawing a conclusion from looking at 2s of SS input is pointless.
It took more than half a minute of predominantly NU input to initiate this condition. It is safe to assume getting the Trim and Elevator down again would have taken at least the same dedication in the opposite direction. This hasn't taken place in this case so it's all guess work.
Airbus might have a clue at least regarding the logic for the deflection of the control surfaces. But even that won't give a defnitive answer re the recoverability once being at the extreme AoAs.

But:
No Airliner is tested nor required to be recoverable in this attitude. Even the trusty old 737 might not be in certain conditions.
This is so far outside any tested and validated Flight Envelope and no one seems willing to sacrifice an airliner plus crew in order to find out during flight test.
Would you volunteer ?

Conclusion: Don't fly at AoA's of 45° !!!
Simples.

[HazelNuts39]

it explicitly mentions that the plane may not have been recoverable at all because of the alternate 2b lawI've read it (the expert group's report) too. Where does it say that?

[predictorM9]

Drawing a conclusion from looking at 2s of SS input is pointless.
It took more than half a minute of predominantly NU input to initiate this condition. It is safe to assume getting the Trim and Elevator down again would have taken at least the same dedication in the opposite direction.

What the report says is that the full deflection of the elevator down was not achieved with this input, because of the alt2b law. While the same law gives the full deflection of elevator up when the pilot was pulling the stick.

And 2 seconds is not a lot, but in Quantas 72 that's exactly the time that was needed to flung the passengers up at -0.8g. 2 seconds (that's on the cvr). Granted it is not a stall and all, but the 2 seconds nose down input, at full authority would probably have improved things for them.

No Airliner is tested nor required to be recoverable in this attitude. Even the trusty old 737 might not be in certain conditions.
This is so far outside any tested and validated Flight Envelope and no one seems willing to sacrifice an airliner plus crew in order to find out during flight test.
Would you volunteer ?

I'm not a pilot anyway, but a 707 was crashed in the eighties for some fuel test, maybe they could do a similar test over an ocean with a remotely piloted airliner. After all, this might help calibrating models for simulations, and thus give an insight to all planes. It is not an A330 specific issue.
I hope in 2013 we have the capability of simulating the unsteady flow around wings, even in the transonic regime. What is lacking is probably just some experimental data to validate the computations.

Conclusion: Don't fly at AoA's of 45° !!!
Simples.

Yes but all that is easier when you have an AoA indicator. As you mentioned in your post you are probably safe below 30 degrees, which is not that much.

[predictorM9]

I've read it (the expert group's report) too. Where does it say that?

It says:

"Dans cette phase de vol, la poussée maximale appliquée a un effet à cabrer non négligeable ,' le
THS est en butée à cabrer et s'ajoute donc à l'effet à cabrer; la loi de pilotage Nz (à accélération
constante) limite le débattement des gouvernes.
Toutes ces conditions réunies ne permettent plus la récupération du décrochage."

page 55 of the report. The Nz law is I guess the alt2b. They say that the elevator authority was limited.

[mm43]

They say that the elevator authority was limited.Obviously they [the group of experts] didn't read, or understand the post by Owain Glyndwr (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/460625-af-447-thread-no-6-a-23.html#post6663753) in Thread No.6.:ugh:

[HazelNuts39]

Toutes ces conditions réunies ne permettent plus la récupération du décrochageThat is an opinion, referring to the conditions at 02:13:56 when the airplane was descending through 5000' at 10,000 fpm.
The Nz law is I guess the alt2b. They say that the elevator authority was limited.That statement needs to be qualified, I think.

[henra]

What the report says is that the full deflection of the elevator down was not achieved with this input, because of the alt2b law. While the same law gives the full deflection of elevator up when the pilot was pulling the stick.


It is due to Load Factor law (aka Nz law) which applies in all Flight Laws except Direct Law not only in Alt2b. Alt2b is insofar different as all 'protections' are lost.

That said Full Nose Down command in an Nz law should correspond to a G Load Factor significantly below 1g even if the reference Speed is pretty low. This should result in a Nose Down Elevator response finally. Taking into consideration that average G Load in a developped stall will be close to 1g an Nz law should still allow ND Elevator. As there are G Load fluctuations in the dynamic evolution of the stall they might have been unlucky that during these 2s of ND input the temporary G load was on the low end of the range. Unfortunately I don't have the traces in front of me atm. I don't see why Full sustained ND input should not lead to a significant ND Elevator deflection in an Nz Law !?


And 2 seconds is not a lot, but in Quantas 72 that's exactly the time that was needed to flung the passengers up at -0.8g. 2 seconds (that's on the cvr). Granted it is not a stall and all, but the 2 seconds nose down input, at full authority would probably have improved things for them.

That was at a rather high speed and starting in a mostly neutral THS and Elevator.


I'm not a pilot anyway, but a 707 was crashed in the eighties for some fuel test, maybe they could do a similar test over an ocean with a remotely piloted airliner. After all, this might help calibrating models for simulations, and thus give an insight to all planes. It is not an A330 specific issue.


I guess no one is keen on showing crashing airliners these days. They want to convey the image that these things don't fall out of the sky...


I hope in 2013 we have the capability of simulating the unsteady flow around wings, even in the transonic regime. What is lacking is probably just some experimental data to validate the computations.

I'm not so confident. I would think there is quite some iterations between calculation and actual data required to come to a reliable prediction.


Yes but all that is easier when you have an AoA indicator. As you mentioned in your post you are probably safe below 30 degrees, which is not that much.

No disagreement here.

[Owain Glyndwr]

I hope in 2013 we have the capability of simulating the unsteady flow around wings, even in the transonic regime. What is lacking is probably just some experimental data to validate the computations. I'm not so confident. I would think there is quite some iterations between calculation and actual data required to come to a reliable prediction.I ain't quite that easy! It is (relatively) straightforward to establish the 'static' characteristics (lift, pitch, rolling moment due to sideslip etc.) well beyond the stall using wind tunnel tests - to the best of my knowledge the theoretical methods available still struggle with nonlinear separated flows, but I've been out of the business for a while.

The problem is that to adequately simulate the aircraft's motion one needs to have the 'dynamic' characteristics also (eg rolling moment due to rate of roll etc.) and I certainly don't think CFD will be able to handle that for a while. Some of these are extremely nonlinear in the stall regime and cannot be easily simulated.

For a good description of the problems see AIAA 2005 - 5933.

Obviously there will be research aimed at improving this situation, maybe using dynamic models.

[predictorM9]

That said Full Nose Down command in an Nz law should correspond to a G Load Factor significantly below 1g even if the reference Speed is pretty low. This should result in a Nose Down Elevator response finally. Taking into consideration that average G Load in a developped stall will be close to 1g an Nz law should still allow ND Elevator. As there are G Load fluctuations in the dynamic evolution of the stall they might have been unlucky that during these 2s of ND input the temporary G load was on the low end of the range. Unfortunately I don't have the traces in front of me atm. I don't see why Full sustained ND input should not lead to a significant ND Elevator deflection in an Nz Law !?

It should, but from the data on the leaked report, when the copilot puts the stick full nose down for two seconds, the elevator goes from 30 degrees pitch up to 20 degrees pitch up. How fast is the elevator supposed to move? If it is 5 degrees per second then ok they had some authority.

I think this alternate law is a big problem anyway. They should revert to direct law in case of event like this: if you are stall, with the stick at neutral, then the plane will demand 1g and will keep the stall.

On an related note, the report says that
"En cas de perte d'au moins deux ADR, la stabilité basse vitesse est perdue, il est surprenant que le trim automatique ne soit pas désactivé au voisinage de a PROT, alors que c 'est le cas en loi ALT1"

The experts are surprised that the auto trim doesn't stop trimming the plane up once alpha prot is reached, as it is the case in ALT1. I am too.

[HazelNuts39]

The experts are surprised that the auto trim doesn't stop trimming the plane up once alpha prot is reached, as it is the case in ALT1. I am too. Alpha prot is a function of Mach. No valid airspeed - no alpha prot. Latched.

[henra]

It should, but from the data on the leaked report, when the copilot puts the stick full nose down for two seconds, the elevator goes from 30 degrees pitch up to 20 degrees pitch up.

Hmmm, I'm looking at the traces now but I have some difficulties spotting the point where 2s of Full ND input are applied. Could you direct me to it?
I do see one short spike of half ND input and later one very short spike of 3/4 ND. What is my mistake?

Edit: I think I see which part of the trace you are referring to.
2:12:32 ?
If you look at the other elevator angle changes you will notice that they don't change very swiftly, even in the NU direction.
It took ~5s to get from 15° to 30° NU elevator angle.
Also not every single movement of the SS is followed by a dramatic change in elevator angle (or any at all). So the speed and onset of elevator angle change seems pretty much consistent with the other angle changes. There is quite some dampening visible in the traces between SS input and elevator movements.
I attribute the magnitude of the slow reaciotn to the ND input you mentioned also to this dampening.
The elevator movement slows down when the ND inputs reduce/cease so it is difficult to predict how far and how fast the elevator would have continued to move from this relatively short sustained SS command.

As I said before: You will not come to a generally accepted conclusion as to what would have happened had they continued to command full ND.
I stand by my tendancy to conclude that the elevator would have moved to a clear ND position. As you would expect even for an Nz law. It just doesn't happen in 2s.

[HazelNuts39]

From BEA's Final Report, para. 2.2.5:
In the specific case of alternate 2B law, some coefficients used in the longitudinal flight control law become speed-independent and are set for the maximum speed for the aeroplane configuration (330 kt in clean configuration). This hardly modifies the behaviour of the aeroplane in comparison to normal law, but can nevertheless induce an unusual response dynamic when the aeroplane has an abnormally low speed for the configuration.

Nevertheless, the pitch attitude reduces from 8.5° NU to 2.5° ND in about 6 seconds. (The Nz law uses a mix of Nz and pitch rate in its feed-back term).

[henra]

From BEA's Final Report, para. 2.2.5:




Thanks!
Using max speed (for the actual config) for setting FCS parameters for the longitudinal Flight Control would explain the visible high level of dampening of the Elevator Control.
That makes a lot of sense when looking at the Traces for Elevator movement vs SS input.

[predictorM9]

Alpha prot is a function of Mach. No valid airspeed - no alpha prot. Latched.

Not entirely though. Because there is a maximal alpha prot for the low machs, and they could take this one into account even with lost airspeeds, i.e. they could have limited the trim up say up to 14 degrees AOA as is the case for low speeds. Granted you are still stalling, but not as badly.

It's like, say, assume that you don't have the slats and flaps position sensor. Yet, would you remove the load factor protection because the limits are a function of the position of slats and flaps? You can still take the worst case values, that shouldn't impact maneuverability.

[HazelNuts39]

Granted you are still stalling, but not as badly.Agreed, the THS would have stopped at about - 5.9 degrees. According to Owain Glyndwr's analysis the AoA would have reached 36 degrees.

[CONF iture]

In ref to http://www.pprune.org/7886998-post1329.html

There is salesmanship mixed with marketing from airplane makers and everyone else, and then there is the reality of an airplane's design which must be trained, learnt, and understood well.
First sim practice was about manual flying to get a taste of the sidestick, even direct law to confirm how the new design was 'conventional'.
Later on emphasis was on the protections and how to apply full back stick to get the most of it or how to abandon to the electronics ...
Last on the priority list was the stall ...

Buying an airliner has to do with expected profits not much with stall protection and Ziegler (https://www.google.ca/search?q=bernard+ziegler&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&hl=en&client=safari) was not exactly a salesman either.

[roulishollandais]

ZIEGLER BERNARD's book :
"Les Cow-boys d' Airbus"
Editions Privat
Toulouse november 2008
ISBN 978-2-7089-9217-7
Forword Jean Pierson

Picture of the cover :
Cowboys_NEW_couv1-1_zps41048f5b.jpg Photo by femmes_pilotes | Photobucket (http://s1166.photobucket.com/albums/q601/femmes_pilotes/?action=view&current=Cowboys_NEW_couv1-1_zps41048f5b.jpg)

Page 65 :
'Donc, j'ai fait bien des mauvais coups par le monde avec quelques "bandits" de la mafia commerciale.'

Page 79 v
'Il devint impossible de faire un tonneau, d'excéder les vitesses limites,de décrocher l'avion et surtout de risquer de briser la voilure en tirant trop fort'

Translation :
'So I did many bad things in the world with some "bandits" in the trade mafia.'

Page 79 'Since it was impossible to make a barrel to exceed speed limits, to stall the plane and especially risk breaking the wing by pulling too hard'

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Excuse me guys... You quote passages where the author/speaker describes the behavior in normal law (i.e. the most common case), and under the pretext that it was not explicitly mentioned in each occurrence it was normal law, you cry foul?
Are you not able to tell the difference between a "commercial" speech and technical instructions?

We understood long ago you don't like what Airbus or Ziegler once said. Now what is the use of repetition? Do you intend to change your mind? Because so far, it is not a convincing speech.

[roulishollandais]

Hi AlphaZuluRomeo,

- Repetition ? I apologize if that book has already been quoted
- Commercial Speach ? I don't think that book can be considered as ad.
- Unsaid "normal law" ? Bernard Ziegler, EPNER Test Pilot, X Engineer knows that has to be mentioned.
- What is said and missed in that book are deliberate provocations, he chosed to associate that to AIRBUS' name, AIRBUS' workers who are allowed to see another message.
- What I found sad, is that this book has been written by Bernard ZIEGLER after the end of the trial of Ste-Odile after many years of justice problems, where he showed he was able to give very acurate precisions.
I was very shocked by the tittle of his book. Really not commercial at all for AIRBUS and for AVIATION.
- Should Bernard ZIEGLER tried to explain a little more that had been misunderstood he could do it freely. He did not chosed that way.
That book is the last image HE wanted to give from himself and his conception of FBW. Once again he decided to say the plane will not stall.
AF447 8 months later showed he was wrong.

Precision : I chosed no sentences out of context

SAD !:ooh:

[Lonewolf_50]

Gentlemen, I suggest paying heed to PJ2.

When the F-18 first came out, it had a variety of wonderful new features and capabilities, and a few buckets of its own PR hype. Some criticized the 'hype' for what it was, because "no aircraft is magical."
All of the hype didn't stop Blue Angel #5 from crashing (low level, pilot ejected) in El Centro back in 1987, due IIRC to engine fuel starvation (inverted, IIRC, but memory is fuzzy). Note: I later heard that there was an issue in early Hornets with fuel pumps that seems to have caught the pilot at a bad time, an issued later fixed ...

Tell me: was that crash due to the overselling of a high performance jet by MD? Methinks not.

PJ's point on knowing your aircraft and how it flies, and training for how it actually works versus PR noise is true for any aircraft. If the AB and or AF training programs, or industry training programs, need improvement, then of course that improvement is worth clamoring for. Kvetching about PR noise seems pointless.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Obviously, toffeez :D

roulishollandais, I have no inclination to nitpick, let me just agree to disagree with most of your opinions expressed above, as a whole :)

If you have a personal problem with Mr Ziegler regarding how he expressed his views as a book author:
This opinion is fine by me, I have no intent to comment it; instead I respectfully suggest to contact Mr. Ziegler directly (or via the publisher).
This would avoid giving the impression that professional pilots may have taken for an absolute truth what is written in a popular book, even if the official technical manuals of the concerned aircraft clearly show them otherwise.

[roulishollandais]

theimpression that professional pilots may have taken for an absolute truthAlphaZuluRomeo you pointed it well. The problem is not with a popular book or my relations with Zieglers but with the fact that effectively the pilots are human like others, receiptive to false, short, pleasant message which suddenly comes in contradiction with S/W in a bad moment.
But feel free to disagree with my opinions. Am I allowed to suggest to read Ziegler's book to make one's own idea? ;)

[Mr Optimistic]

In terms of the algorithms/logic and human interface, are any changes on the cards as a result of this accident.

I am still a bit puzzled as to why the system, which had plenty of data to deduce the thing was falling and likely stalled, couldn't be a little more helpful to the crew.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Am I allowed to suggest to read Ziegler's book to make one's own idea? ;)
Please, be my guest! I for one did this long ago :)
People who will follow your suggestion will soon discover the sentence just before the one you quoted from p.79, which explicitely describes that the FBW technology made it possible to implement "protections" against flight envelope departure before giving some examples (= your quote); this allows any pilot who have read his manual, or even only the ECAM to understand that protections lost means that he now can execute a barrel roll, exceed the speeds limits or stall the aircraft. ;)

[3holelover]

Good grief, am I actually reading here that there are (or were, until recently) pilots out there who actually thought their machines were so magic that they could never stall?

Maybe some basic physics knowledge should be a prerequisite for pilot training? :confused:

[BOAC]

there who actually thought their machines were so magic that they could never stall? - sorry to spoil your day, but there still are - all Airbus pilots who (correctly, as I understand it) believe that if all is working properly in Normal Law it cannot happen, and full back stick can be the way out of trouble. The problem, of course, as we have seen, is breaking that mind set when..............................

[USMCProbe]

In a scarebus, if in doubt of airspeed, call up the FPV. 2.5-4 deg is cruise, 7-8 is green dot, S, or F speed. Above 8 your AOA is too high. Unfortunately use of the FPV as an AOA is not taught by airbus.

It is used everyday by fighter guys with HUDs.

AF447 would never have happened with better trained pilots. Period.

AF447 crew flew into a thunderstorm, which iced up the Pitot static system, then inputed controls that stalled the aircraft. They failed to recognize the stall and crashed 4 minutes later.

There are some bright engineer types on here. The brightest engineer in the world cannot make up for a poorly trained pilot. The poorly trained pilot will eventually figure out how to screw it up. AKA AF447.

[BOAC]

AF447 crew flew into a thunderstorm, - oh Lord! Here we go yet again - round and round. NO THEY DIDN'T - read the report.

Incidentally, a thing called an attitude indicator would have done the job rather than FPV.

[predictorM9]

I have a question regarding all these laws: was it put somewhere on the ECAM that the plane was now in Alternate 2B law? The ECAM just says "Alternate", which is pretty vague. Does it matter to know if you are in alternate 1 or 2 (and the subcategory)?

[Clandestino]

was it put somewhere on the ECAM that the plane was now in Alternate 2B law? No, just alternate, as you have correctly observed.

The ECAM just says "Alternate", which is pretty vague.It is not, because...

Does it matter to know if you are in alternate 1 or 2 (and the subcategory)?...it does not if you are trying to fly the airplane. The situation might be somewhat different (and differing from reality) if one tries to promote conspiracy theories on anonymous web board. The most important information; that protections are no longer available can be perceived just by glancing the PFD, where attitude limits markings, the green "=" are replaced by yellow "x" signs.

AF447 would never have happened with better trained pilots. Period.How do you measure quality of the training? How do you know that the fellow you are training actually understands and believes what you are telling him and is not just trying to make it through the exams and get a piece of paper unequivocally stating he is competent? How do you know that when the chips are down he won't just jettison everything he was taught and revert to some deeply rooted notion of his which might be flawed, even fatally?

Anyone finding plausible answers to these can found a consultancy business and retire a millionaire.

[henra]

How do you know that when the chips are down he won't just jettison everything he was taught and revert to some deeply rooted notion of his which might be flawed, even fatally?


As a Non-Front Office resident (aka SLF) I was always hoping the Sim Checks would help to find this out. Looking at this truly unfortunate accident and the findings as to how it unfolded however, I' afraid you might be right, though...

Although I'm not really convinced that more automatisms will do any good to correct this from a more enigneering perspective I am positive that the aircraft could have known its actual flight attitude at least roughly. A combination of Integral over G loads in all 3 axis versus GPS data would have given a flight path and attitude over Ground. That leaves out wind speed but even that could have been factored in as a trend based on history data of the previous 5 minutes or so when it was still reliable. In case of unreliable air speed an average over the last (couple of) minutes with 'good' data should be a suitable and sufficient working hypothesis.
Based on that information there should be a possibility to give Pilots more indication of the actual attitude and situation even if all Air data is lost or considered unreliable.
We will see if a Manufacturer will go into that direction even though we should hope that the lesson of AF447 has been learned world wide.

[BOAC]

to give Pilots more indication of the actual attitude - what more 'indication' do you consider they could possibly have wanted? Two large and one small instruments not enough?

[busTRE]

BOAC

Airbus pilots who (correctly, as I understand it) believe that if all is working properly in Normal Law it cannot happen

I am confused by this comment. Do you mean that this belief is correct? That it cannot be stalled in Normal Law. Or that they they correctly understand the material they are given but this is incorrect.

Can you clarify whether you are saying they are right or that they are misguided in this belief.

Thanks

[BOAC]

"Do you mean that this belief is correct?" - as I understand it, yes, it is correct, but I am not Airbus qualified. Sorry - I thought it was clear.

[busTRE]

So, they are right to just pull back in Normal Law then! That's a long way from believing your aircraft magically can't stall which is what you seem to be claiming.

[BOAC]

Not in my opinion. What I posted was "and full back stick can be the way out of trouble".

But now I'm confused! Can you clarify? Are you saying you can stall an Airbus in normal law? You would never catch me just pulling back on the stick and trusting in the machine, Airbus or not, despite what any TRE might tell me.

......and by the way, I am not claiming "your aircraft magically can't stall" - I would not be that foolish. Merely stating what I understand from many comments on many fora and excited, breathless words from AB pilots over the years.

[busTRE]

An airbus can stall in normal law, although the only normal law, no failure incident that I am aware of is a severe windshear that momentarily outpaced the EFCS. The crew pulled back in sheer terror and this action along with the EFCS saved the day. The EFCS quickly unstalled the wing then maintained max alpha to rapidly recover the A/C from a 4000 fpm descent below 1000 aal.

As this example shows in a huge number of cases simply trusting the system IS the right thing to do. For example, Airbus FBWs can carry out terrain avoidance maneuvres that are simply impossible on other types. An outfit I am 'familiar with' had just such an incident, full back stick on receipt of the hard 'pull up' just saved them (rad alt at the peak around 40ft). They trusted the system in this instance as they are rightly trained to do and it saved them. Had they pulled to some other less restrictive parameter or not just got on with it (as you suggest) it is highly likely the A/C would have been lost.

In very many circumstances crews are quite right to trust the EFCS to help them out and I believe a number of A/C and pilots) are still flying today because the system helped them. There is a training issue around educating crews when to trust it and when not to and what to do if it isn't doing what it should. But that is entirely different from the claim that 'children of the magenta' as so many ignorant (in the literal sense) posters have it, only know how to fly a computer.

[USMCProbe]

There is training, and then there is experience. In a perfect world the experience does the training and tries to pass it along.

Unfortunately for a long time Airbus didn't train from experience, but TO the lowest common demoninator.

FBW is great. But it doesn't make up for a lack of experience and training in the extreme.

On a Bus, or any other aircraft with a FPV (bird, velocity vector, etc), drop a perpendicular from the pitch bars to the FPV. That is your AOA. If you are less than stalling AOA, you are not stalled. \

Airbus doesn't teach or train this. They should. If they had, AF 447 would have had a lower probability to happen.

This isn't Boeing vs AB. Boeing doesn't teach this either. Fighter guys with HUDS know this as gospel.

[BOAC]

An airbus can stall in normal law - since you seem to be on a different topic and seeing things I have not posted, I think I will bow out of this discussion with you. I actually asked "Are you saying you can stall an Airbus in normal law?" which is a different issue, and I did post "I am not claiming your aircraft magically can't stall". I do not recognise your supposed quote "not just got on with it (as you suggest)" by the way.

Anyway - moving on - for 3holelover (post #34) - there you have it. The answer from someone who says he/she is an AB multi-type TRE. I think we can distill the opinion there that it is taught that (as I understood) it is impossible for a pilot to stall an Airbus in normal law, but obviously as with any flying machine, dynamic un-commanded events can take a serviceable AB into a stalled situation from which it will self-recover given sufficient margins. The question of how you disabuse the 'absorbent' pilot of this instinct when all is not well has not been answered and indeed may well be pivotal. If this belief persists the fault lies fully with the training system, as I have said for many years.

[busTRE]

Just clarify as it seems some are finding this difficult.

AB pilots are quite rightly trained that the EFCS can be trusted in NORMAL LAW, to protect the A/C from stall. In the overwhelming majority of cases, (e.g. EGPWS), using the edge of the protection such as pulling full back without hesitation is precisely the right thing to do. In the TRTO that I work for we are at considerable pains to make sure crews understand that this is not effective in degraded scenarios.

BOAC

Your statement

You would never catch me just pulling back on the stick and trusting in the machine,

strongly suggests that you wouldn't be 'just getting on with it' as a correctly trained crew would in most GPWS scenarios, for example. I didn't use your exact quote to avoid the rather cumbersome multi-quoted post look. If you would never just pull back then your FO would be quite entitled (indeed duty bound) to take-over for you and pull back while you did whatever you were doing instead of 'just pulling back'.

[Gretchenfrage]

Another example why aviation morons will never be on the endangered species list:

For example, Airbus FBWs can carry out terrain avoidance maneuvres that are simply impossible on other types

.... just as Airbus can't stall in normal law and your grandmother can fly any Airbus.

Continue that BS and you are not only not helping Airbus's renommée, but actively encouraging stunningly stupid manoeuvres like this accident displayed. :ugh:

[Mr Optimistic]

4 years after the event and (as an engineer) I am still annoyed by this.

1. AoA meter: yes would have been useful but any pilot capable of discerning its usefulness would be unlikely to be in this situation in the first place. Crucial to recovery and avoidance of secondary stall, but you need to get to the correct mental picture first. In a situation where the world seems to have gone mad, its output would have been condemned with all other indications.

2. Unusual Attitude Mode: well that turns out to be f' all use. How unusual do you have to get. How about an unusual dynamics mode (ie descending at 10000ft/min, nose in the air, engines at full thrust when 2 mins ago was crusing at 35).

3. Inhibition of stall warning. Well Ok, see where the designers where going...

4. Affirm mode by changing some colours on the FD ? In a crisis I am supposed to notice and swing my mind around to that ?

5. Let the THS go way beyond normal limits and not scream about it ?

6. Have a SOP which says blank FD when the software could automatically do it ?

Trouble is that in design you design around nominal conditions and then think about isolated excursions/perturbations. Need to crowbar the logic in some situations.

How about a 'Ghastly Silence' mode (combine it with Unusual Attitude) in which all noises and flashing messages are inhibited except for the crucial ones (OK a button push and you can have all you secondary and tertiary warnings and warblings back), such as what protections have been inhibited, pitch, descent rate, air speed, trim and any other thing you guys think are the first things that should be addressed.................

[busTRE]

Gretchenfrage

Being able to fly a precise max-alpha DOES allow one to fly a terrain escape maneuvre that would be unachievable on a conventional aircraft. So where exactly is the BS. Perhaps you should restrict your insulting comments to areas you have knowledge of. Of which this is not one.

[HazelNuts39]

The question of how you disabuse the 'absorbent' pilot of this instinct when all is not well has not been answered and indeed may well be pivotal. If this belief persists the fault lies fully with the training system, as I have said for many years.Perhaps the answer is that you cannot have it both ways. In that case you have to make a choice between one philosophy and the other.

[Mr Optimistic]

It's easy enough to reset software. Not so easy to reset human beings. To get focus back, first thing is to deny as many opportunities to focus on the wrong thing as possible.

[BOAC]

In that case you have to make a choice between one philosophy and the other. - is that not EXACTLY the problem I think lies here?

The pilots need effectively to understand 2/3 'philosophies' - slightly different 'rules of flying' in each law, and to be able to 'switch' seamlessly from one to the other, probably when the :mad: is hitting the fan. An easy task for a 'HAL' with loads'a lines of code, but for we mere mortals....................

[HazelNuts39]

The pilots need effectively to understand 2/3 'philosophies' - slightly different 'rules of flying' in each law, and to be able to 'switch' seamlessly from one to the other,That's not what I meant. The choice I referred to has to consider the probabilities. How often happen incidents like the two described in post #46, and how often does an Airbus get into alternate law?

Perhaps we need to remind ourselves that in AF447 the airplane did not stall due to 'full back stick'. That took place half-a-minute after the airplane was stalled.

[BOAC]

I understand your point, but would also point out re "how often does an Airbus get into alternate law" - that on some occasions that it has, trouble has resulted.

Incidentally, I did not directly link 'full back stick' with 447 in my posts, but since you have raised it, and perhaps to complete a circle, why was the stick subsequently held back, do you think?

[HazelNuts39]

why was the stick subsequently held back, do you think?That's really anybody's guess, and I've given mine earlier. He had been*keeping the nose up at around 15 degrees, and applied full back stick when the nose dropped below that target.

[Gretchenfrage]

bus TRE

1. An Airbus can crash, stall, CFIT etc. like any other aircraft.
2. An Airbus is not worse than any other design, but it is not better just because of its design either.

I don't want to enter the statistics debate again, but another FBW design has a better safety record. This is not to say that this one is better, but it simply anihilates the eternal myth that certain thing never happen or are much less prone to happen on Airbus.

In the mentioned case it might be true that flying precise max-alpha is the best way out of terrain trouble, but this can be done just as well without Airbus FBW. I have flown the AB, the T7 and the MD11. All of them FBW and they are equally good in flying out of terrain. Even the older stick-shaker mounted aircraft can fly out of trouble close to stick shaker and with average skills the pilot can get asymptotically close to what the Airbus admittedly does very nicely.
Your call that this is only achievable on Airbus is quite preposterous.

It is this myth of some invulnerability of Airbus that cultivates pilots who fly escape manoeuvres with full stick back in any situation.

Sure enough they have heard and were once briefly trained that in such and such law this and this does not work, however if you do such and such the system reverts to this and this, you simply have to switch that and that and consider this and this, then you will know that such and such manoeuvre does not work, however the this and this can still be applied.
You super TREs, Dozys and not to forget the Clandestinos, you astronauts might well know that at any given moment and at least one of you even knows how to do that in real time. But if you are completely honest, you might admit that when the s#!t hits the fan in real life (as opposed to the desk), for some awfully long moments your brain goes into shedding mode.
It is in those moments when the dumbed down assumption that Airbus will take care of everything takes over and the followers just pull and wait. QED.

That is what I call BS, that is what any common sensed pilot and TRE should fight. A start would be to stop with such dumb assertions that Airbus does this and that better than others. It is a fine machine, but that's it.

Another BS is the call for more protections, more automation, more gimmicks to check, recheck, countercheck and overrule anything a pilot does in the cockpit.
Anything can and will fail eventually, Murphys law is a present as Alternate or Direct law. Even such add-on gimmicks can fail. What if all screens go blank? It has happened! In what law are you then????

What we need is a simple independent back-up to all the electronics like i.e. a pneumatically (wind) driven gyroscopic horizon and a unprocessed access to the flight controls.
And then we need pilots who still are capable to fly an aircraft with that!!!!!

That should help in the first moments, not any pretension that the aircraft will do it for you.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi BOAC,
why was the stick subsequently held back, do you think?
I think he was mistakenly performing this following procedure.

"Airborne, initial climb or landing
THR LEVERS AT TOGA SET OR CONFIRM
AP (if engaged) KEEP
SRS ORDERS FOLLOW
If necessary, the flight crew may pull the sidestick fully back.
Note:
Autopilot disengages if the angle of attack value goes above α prot.
If the FD bars are not displayed, move toward an initial pitch attitude of 17.5 °. Then, if necessary, to prevent a loss in altitude, increase the pitch attitude."

I guess he thought that since he was definitely airborne that it was necessary to pull fully back.

We dinosaurs were taught to "respect the stick shaker" during these manoeuvres. Airbus doesn't fit one - just another audio warning on top of constant "C chord" altitude deviation warning.

[HazelNuts39]

Posted one year ago:
http://i.imgur.com/QIX3o.gif

[busTRE]

We probably could achieve a similar outcome with a less colourful description

[CONF iture]

An airbus can stall in normal law
Just need two AoA probes to freeze at a similar angle ... High angle protection no more but normal law still.

An outfit I am 'familiar with' had just such an incident, full back stick on receipt of the hard 'pull up' just saved them (rad alt at the peak around 40ft).
Surely a report must be somewhere ... or is it only AF to have their 'adventures' exposed ?

[busTRE]

CONFiture

Yeah, I said an airbus CAN stall in normal law!

Don't know if the report is in the public domain. But I do know that the investigation team produced profiles for the escape maneuvre which included 'average' airline wide profiles for comparison which didn't clear the terrain.

[Machinbird]

You think a guy nudging the stick shaker is flying a max alpha manuevre as efficiently as one nailing alpha-max with EFCS?
and
Don't know if the report is in the public domain. But I do know that the investigation team produced profiles for the escape maneuvre which included 'average' airline wide profiles for comparison which didn't clear the terrain. I don't understand why you gentlemen think you do not need AOA indicators.

Of course you cannot fly as accurately by just triggering the stick shaker as you could fly with an actual AOA indicator directly in front of you, but if you had an AOA indicator and used it, your performance should not be far different than the EFCS max AOA performance.

In the situation just mentioned by CONF iture, there would be unreasonable AOA values staring you in the face as you decelerated. You would have to be asleep to miss it.

[Clandestino]

Inhibition of stall warning. Well Ok, see where the designers where going...I used to fly Zlin 142 at 180° alpha (very briefly) with stall warning ringer silent, yet a couple of seconds later it went off quite happily as I botched the exit from Immelman.

Now, can we accept that alpha probes need to have some airflow to work reliably or do we keep on harping that they have to work perfectly from zero kt to Mmo, which is quite a wishful thinking?

Affirm mode by changing some colours on the FD ? In a crisis I am supposed to notice and swing my mind around to that ?
Sigh. What was the initial crisis?

Let the THS go way beyond normal limits and not scream about it ? Sigh again. What is the normal THS limit? Did THS follow the pilot's stick order, yea or nay?

Have a SOP which says blank FD when the software could automatically do it ?Fictional software. As developed and certified - can't.

Need to crowbar the logic in some situations.When one's notions are both at odds with official documents and totally disproved by reality and yet still there is urge to promulgate them on internet fora, crowbaring the logic is quite appropriate.

How about a 'Ghastly Silence' mode Worked well around here until a couple of days ago.

The pilots need effectively to understand 2/3 'philosophies' - slightly different 'rules of flying' in each law, and to be able to 'switch' seamlessly from one to the other, probably when the is hitting the fan. An easy task for a 'HAL' with loads'a lines of code, but for we mere mortals.................... Obviously, my umpteen attempts at explaining the protections were just too technical. Let me try it this way: why do you think Airbus pilot needs to understand what you have labeled "2/3 philosophies"? Why would the Airbus pilot need to know anything about protections at all (besides them being covered in FCOM and there being legal requirement to know one's manuals)?

why was the stick subsequently held back, do you think? Panic.

An Airbus is not worse than any other design, but it is not better just because of its design either.So sayst thou.

I don't want to enter the statistics debate again, but another FBW design has a better safety record.Not necessarily just because it's a FBW of different flavour. Part of it is certainly attributable to her price tag combined with date of service entry - she just didn't trickle down yet to lower tiers operators.

I have flown the AB, the T7 and the MD11. All of them FBW Since when LSAS counts as FBW?

It is this myth of some invulnerability of Airbus that cultivates pilots who fly escape manoeuvres with full stick back in any situation. Escape from what? Under what circumstances?

A start would be to stop with such dumb assertions that Airbus does this and that better than others.There is absolutely no realistic doubt that hard alpha protected aeroplane (such as Embraer) performs better in windshear/ground escapes than those with overridable prots. Why would anyone call assertion stemming from flight test results dumb?

What we need is a simple independent back-up to all the electronics like i.e. a pneumatically (wind) driven gyroscopic horizon and a unprocessed access to the flight controls. Where would you power your pneumatic AH from with dual bleed failure? Why ISIS doesn't satisfy you? Did you ever hear about direct law, which is exactly what you propose but is in operation since 1988? Why do you feel the urge right now to denigrate alternate law?

I guess he thought that since he was definitely airborne that it was necessary to pull fully back.Well, since you have so nicely copypasted the procedure 'tis a pity you didn't include the title of it.

It's low level windshear encounter.

What does it have to do with cruise, beats me. Lest you want to suggest that it is indeed difficult to tell the difference between low level maneuvering and cruise flight.

We dinosaurs were taught to "respect the stick shaker" during these manoeuvres. Airbus doesn't fit oneEven the report confirmed it is pretty superfluous as natural buffet is quite pronounced.

just another audio warning on top of constant "C chord" altitude deviation warning. And it says : "STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL". Pretty unambiguous, eh?

Just need two AoA probes to freeze at a similar angle Pray tell, how did it occur?

High angle protection no more but normal law still.Parbleu! Wasn't there any indication in cockpit something wasn't quite right?

[bubbers44]

A student pilot would not have had a problem recoverying from his instructors guidance.

[mm43]

How do I know they had no ATT info?Well, I'm not so sure you do. If the aircraft had remained airborne for another 2 seconds, the words the Capt was in the process of uttering would probably have confirmed the issue - one way or the other.

[gums]

I welcome USMC to the fray. Seems to be from the "next generation" from 'bird and I, but has the same feelings/beliefs about AoA as RetiredF4 and other folks here that have used HUDs and AoA indicators for thousands of landings ( not hours, considering our mission lengths),

It is true that you can use the FPV relatonship to the ship's "boresight" to determine AoA. But why go thru that when you can have a simple display that shows your AoA WRT to stall or best approach AoA ( speed will vary depending upon gross weight and configuration)?. My leading edge flap failure video is old and grainy, but you can easily see it WRT to the pitch lines, and both are related to the real world via an inertial system, with no regard for frozen speed/altitude sensors. AoA doofers are still working. We can laugh at my mistakes near the end, but I corrected enough to save the jet and my skinny butt. The AoA is that braket below the FPV, and had I tried to reach the dersired AoA for normal approach, I would have lost roll authority, so I flew at a lower AoA. As with the A-7, F-14, F-16, F-15, AV-8, F-18, F-22, and now F-35 you pull to get the braket even with the FPV, or push. My upward FPV change near the end was due to extra power, as I had started down quickly when putting out speed brakes from habit ( not good).

http://www.sluf.org/misc_pages/lef-landing.m4v

So much for the basics of using AoA and FPV.

I'll guarantee that the AF447 troops would have noticed their FPV WRT to the pitch lines and realized that the FPV was not going up and that AoA was above the stall AoA. Pitch attitude be damned.

No doubt the unreliable speed was a factor, as was trusting the "protections" when in a back-up flight control law. But inertial vectors and operable AoA displays would possibly have saved the day.

[BOAC]

Obviously, my umpteen attempts at explaining the protections were just too technical. Let me try it this way: why do you think Airbus pilot needs to understand what you have labeled "2/3 philosophies"? Why would the Airbus pilot need to know anything about protections at all (besides them being covered in FCOM and there being legal requirement to know one's manuals)?
- sorry, they still are - I do not understand the question.

Regarding AoA and the Oozlum bird. Forget the AoA. It would take enormous training input and costs no-one will justify, and can easily be 'missed' in a panic too - yet another gauge. All we need is pilots who understand basic flying, and that a PITCH attitude of 17 degrees at 38000' is just silly. I believe they never went below 5 degrees? 3 instruments already there, apparently working, displaying this, and used for 'basic flying'. End of? The challenge is 'why'?

[busTRE]

BOAC

Agree. Introducing AoA would add a layer of complexity that will probably produce more problems than it solves.

Natstrackalpha

How do I know they had no ATT info?

Because the PFD said S&L and the nose was pointing up wards.What utter balloney. You know nothing of the sort and how the hell do you know the real attitude was different from that on the ATT indicator? Please do tell.

It's embarrassing sometimes.

Show us the exact quote from the report

[busTRE]

Are we talking about AF over Atlantic in bad wx that disappeared and was pulled out some time later . . . ? A330? absolute c****n

Now read this carefully. WHERE IN THE REPORT DOES IT SAY THAT THE PFD WAS READING S&L WITH THE NOSE POINTING UP. Show me where it says that because I can't find it.

[busTRE]

Did I invent it?

Yes you did. It does NOT say this in the report and you are full of it.

[BOAC]

- Well, where did I get this from? - are you talking ("PFD diplaying S&L") about the brief interval between zooming up at several thousand feet per minute and zooming down at around 10,000 fpm? Yes, they probably were "S&L" for a moment or two - it is called the 'apogee'.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

The pilots need effectively to understand 2/3 'philosophies' - slightly different 'rules of flying' in each law, and to be able to 'switch' seamlessly from one to the other, probably when the :mad: is hitting the fan. An easy task for a 'HAL' with loads'a lines of code, but for we mere mortals....................

Hi BOAC,

I don't want to interfer to much in your discussion with HN39, abut still I'm puzzled by your comment about the different laws.

I mean, aren't crew supposed to be able to adapt to slightly different 'rules of flying'? Isn't that the very purpose of "keeping" crews and not letting computers alone in the front end?
- Crews are able to understand (and manage) an engine failure, resulting in slightly different 'rules of flying': less thrust available and dissimetry.
- Crews are able to understand (and manage) a fuel leak or a depressurization, resulting in slightly different 'rules of flying': range is shortened, altitude is limited (if depressurization).

Why would crews not be able to understand (and manage) the slightly different 'rules of flying' that some sensor failure may cause, such as the loss of protections caused by law reversion? :confused:

I fail to see the fundamental difference you seem to see between those different failures.

[Natstrackalpha]

Why would crews not be able to understand (and manage) the slightly different 'rules of flying' that some sensor failure may cause, such as the loss of protections caused by law reversion?

AZR

Its not the crew, the airlines or the training. All airlines train and all crews are trained - it is the type of training that needs to be reviewed.

[BOAC]

AZR - I agree with NTA on that and have said it before many times. I don't know the answer to your question, but in the absence of any logical explanation for AB events such as 447 involving 'failure' of the protection systems, I am asking. A kind of Occam's razor, I suppose?

[Richard Thornley]

Quote:
Why would crews not be able to understand (and manage) the slightly different 'rules of flying' that some sensor failure may cause, such as the loss of protections caused by law reversion?
AZR

Its not the crew, the airlines or the training. All airlines train and all crews are trained - it is the type of training that needs to be reviewed


Quote:
Why would crews not be able to understand (and manage) the slightly different 'rules of flying' that some sensor failure may cause, such as the loss of protections caused by law reversion?
AZR

Its not the crew, the airlines or the training. All airlines train and all crews are trained - it is the type of training that needs to be reviewed
Re quote from Natstrackalpha about the type of training given.
Could not agree more!!!
Forget meaningless time in the sim and trying to land on the piano keys. Fully held off landings seem to be a thing of the past except on 2 airlines mainly crewed by "real pilots". WHY. Try landing an old taildragger without this method and watch the resulting bounce(s)! As a result the U/C gets a pounding. You might float down the R/W a bit but no worry.
In our budget restricted times who wants to shell out on tyres and U/C for clueless but highly educated individuals (poorly trained) who cannot fly.

Seems that all you need for a career is education. WRONG WRONG WRONG. A passion for flying is what you need. Go back to teaching basic piloting skills and not just fly by numbers and the world will be a safer place!!!

Hear endeth the rant:D

[HazelNuts39]

The pilots need effectively to understand 2/3 'philosophies' - slightly different 'rules of flying' in each law, and to be able to 'switch' seamlessly from one to the other,I wonder whether it is correct to say that the 'rules of flying' change with the FCS laws. It seems to me they depend on the urgency of the problem.

Situations like low level wind shear and GPWS warning leave no time for thought and just carrying out a drill without hesitation might save the day. In those situations being able to pull without fear of stalling must be an asset.

In AF447 there was no such urgency. The plane would have landed safely in Paris if the pilot had just sat back and 'done nothing'. In that situation there is no need to rely on any protection and the 'rule of flying' in alternate law is no different from that in normal law.

[busTRE]

Natstrackalpha

but, an aircraft encaked in ice with no flying surfaces active having climbed, stalled and then pitched down, increased speed + therefore lift, ocillating from nose hi low airspeed to nose lo hi airspeed, would have had the equal result of `overspeed` and `stall` together on the descending, without any stick held back - as the effect of the stick would have been ineffective anyway.

You haven't the faintest clue what you're on about have you?

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

AZR - I agree with NTA on that and have said it before many times.
As I don't understand what NTA point is (perhaps because I'm under the impression he didn't get the facts right), I'll pass to comment on that.

I don't know the answer to your question
OK, thanks.

but in the absence of any logical explanation for AB events such as 447 involving 'failure' of the protection systems, I am asking. A kind of Occam's razor, I suppose?
I'm not aware of a long list of "AB events such as 447 involving 'failure' of the protection systems"... :confused:
About the logical explanation, there is one in the final report (as to why 447 crew, and more precisely PF, acted as he did) that looks convincing to me. This could led to technical modifications re: FD availability, but I fail to see how a modification to the protection system would be sensible. On that topic, and the existence of the alternate law (that some people judged misleading and/or dangerous), I just read "QF32" by Cpt de Crespigny and found his view on the matter reassuring.

Finally, if I understand correctly, the "go full back stick and trust protections" is teached *only* for low altitude, terrain avoidance events (e.g. CFIT trajectory, windshears...), *not* as a one-fit-all recipe to get out of trouble.
So AFAIK, HazelNuts39 has it right. :ok:

[busTRE]

HN39 you got it just right i reckon.

Since we first started flying it has been about using the right tool for the job and knowing which one to use. e.g.

EGPWS - Pull stick to back stop and you are doing all the laws of physics will allow to avoid the terrain.

Loss of air data - Fly a sensible power an attitude, if in doubt keep what you have until PNF gets something concrete from the QRH

No rule set changes required just a knowledge about the right tool for the job as you would on any other machine.

[BOAC]

AZR - since you appear to be having difficulty reading and understanding posts, let me copy the NTA quote to which I referred i the hope you MIGHT understand this time:

"Its not the crew, the airlines or the training. All airlines train and all crews are trained - it is the type of training that needs to be reviewed. "

Any better?

"I'm not aware of a long list of "AB events such as 447..." Nor am I and nor did I say that. See above.

"but I fail to see how a modification to the protection system would be sensible." - me too - see above.

HN39 - same difficulty? I have passed no comment on the wisdom of "In those situations being able to pull without fear of stalling must be an asset." - I agree - so I presume I can ignore the rest of your post after you 'quoted' me?

[john_tullamarine]

Folks, can we keep the basic credo in the landing lights ? - play the ball, not the player.

This in an extremely interesting thread .. at risk of being devalued by getting into gutter tit for tat.

I would hope that censorship is not the way to go but, should that become evident, it shall occur.

[busTRE]

BOAC

"Its not the crew, the airlines or the training. All airlines train and all crews are trained - it is the type of training that needs to be reviewed. "Quoting it again isn't going to make it mean anything. This point says its not the training. It then goes on to wonder if its the type of training. Well, if its the wrong type of training, then it is the training. As with much of NTA's material it is self contradictory and thus meaningless. I wonder whether that is what AZR is driving at and thus not deserving of a cheap attack at his literacy.

FWIW I believe the training was faulty in the past, in that it did not address power/attitudes appropriate to high level and consequences of inappropriate handling at typical cruise altitudes. It does now in most TRTOs.

[BOAC]

Whilst I appreciate AZR is 'located' in France, in English, 'type of training' is a quite specific expansion of 'training'.

Parse the following?

"I am trained"

"I am properly trained"

[Clandestino]

I don't understand why you gentlemen think you do not need AOA indicators. If there comes a time when applying simple pitch+power to get oneself out of bad air data situation in transport plane is proven to be insufficient, then we might reconsider the need for AoA gauge.

There are times when its appropriate to fly the attitude and times when it's appropriate to fly alpha.

How do I know they had no ATT info?You have no clue. CM2 quickly and decisively brought roll oscilation under control, proving he was looking at the PFD attitude display.

speed will vary depending upon gross weight and configurationNot just that, critical alpha on anything will vary with mach and difference is very pronounced on A330. No reliable mach - no idea how far one is from stalling. As long as one keeps attitude and power reasonable, no big deal anyway.

I do not understand the question.Question is: why do folks season the succinct info about flight controls from FCOM with imagination running wild and consequently accuse Airbus of having dr. Jekyll and mr. Hyde kind of personality?

Forget meaningless time in the sim and trying to land on the piano keys.No such things occurs in the real world so there is nothing to forget.

Fully held off landings seem to be a thing of the past except on 2 airlines mainly crewed by "real pilots". WHY.It never existed in airline world because airliners are geometrically limited, with exception of DC-3 and similar.

[busTRE]

If I am not properly trained then there is an issue with my training.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Hi BOAC.

Once again, I won't critisize the current or past training as I have no indication that it was wrong re: the flight laws and the consequences of their reversion from Normal to Alternate and/or Direct.

I was under the impression that you were advocating that laws and their reversions were somehow "too hard to learn" for (average) pilots and thus that they should be modified in one way or another.

If that was not your point, sorry for misinterpreting your previous posts. I reacted on that because AFAIK the FCOM and other training materials already were explicit on the laws reversions, and associated loss of protections. Without access to more than those materials, I will not comment on training outside of the said materials.

I certainly won't challenge your feelings on the (type of) training needed.

++
AZR

[HazelNuts39]

I presume I can ignore the rest of your post after you 'quoted' me?Please allow me to rephrase the point of my post that you seem to have missed. The single 'rule of flying' that I see is that in general you should not rely on the protections because they may not always be present. However, there a a few very specific conditions where it is appropriate to put aside any doubt about the integrity of those protections.

[BOAC]

I was under the impression that you were advocating that laws and their reversions were somehow "too hard to learn" for (average) pilots and thus that they should be modified in one way or another. - not quite. I was suggesting that just as 'mode confusion' is a well-established derivative of our automotive cockpit, so reversionary modes could be causing confusion when infrequently experienced, and then only when things have 'gone wrong' and commonly (outside the sim) with genuine 'startle factor'.

In terms of a 'modification' I would not really know where to start. I suggested a long time ago (PGF) that from my point of view (non-AB) I would have preferred a drop straight into 'Direct' where you know you simply have a basic aeroplane in your hands which, it is hoped, one can fly. Thus none of the (eg) 'divergence' of roll law from pitch law which I understand happens as the laws degrade - all or nothing for me.

The single 'rule of flying' that I see is that in general you should not rely on the protections because they may not always be present. - so we are back almost full circle. Was the 447 PF 'relying' on some electronic guardian angel to look after him while he (following the FD?), zoom climbed and then tried to keep the nose up? If so, that is the boil that needs lancing.

[HazelNuts39]

Was the 447 PF 'relying' on some electronic guardian angel to look after him while he (following the FD?), zoom climbed and then tried to keep the nose up?As a non-pilot engineer I'm reluctant to speculate on a pilot's forum about what might have been going on in the 447 PF's mind. I just can't see any reason for him to zoom-climb to seek the limit of envelope protection.

I've no experience with FD's but note that they were mostly unavailable in the first 40 seconds of the zoom-climb, and locked on to 6000 fpm V/S then 1400 fpm only after the pilot commanded those RoC's apparently independently of the FD's.

[BOAC]

Assuming you have 'finished'? - All we need now is a standby altimeter that is working - why? We believe, do we not, that all altimeters were functioning normally?

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

- not quite. I was suggesting that just as 'mode confusion' is a well-established derivative of our automotive cockpit, so reversionary modes could be causing confusion when infrequently experienced, and then only when things have 'gone wrong' and commonly (outside the sim) with genuine 'startle factor'.
OK, thanks for clarifying that for me. I agree that a law reversion is "something more" to take into account for the crew, but I believe that the advantages of normal+alternate+direct laws are more important than the disadvantages (including the quite possible but not proven 'mode confusion').

In terms of a 'modification' I would not really know where to start. I suggested a long time ago (PGF) that from my point of view (non-AB) I would have preferred a drop straight into 'Direct' where you know you simply have a basic aeroplane in your hands which, it is hoped, one can fly. Thus none of the (eg) 'divergence' of roll law from pitch law which I understand happens as the laws degrade - all or nothing for me.
I understand your PoV here, but I disagree. I have no personal qualifications necessary to defend "my" point of view, so I'll just quote two of the reasons that have brought me there:
- The existence of alternate laws comes from Airbus studies, so it is a conscious and maturely weighed decision (until proven otherwise).
- We do have exemple where the alternate law was appreciated: I mentioned the book "QF32" written by the Captain (and PIC) of this flight, but for those who do not have a copy, you can read the interview with Captain David Evans (Senior Check Captain at Qantas), who was onboard too. Both have experience on Boeing and Airbus types. Here is a short excerpt:
ASChan: What’s your opinion of the A380’s survivability compared to other types you have flown?

DE: Well I think the Airbus A380 – it’s a testament to the aircraft that we managed to get the aeroplane successfully on to the ground. The fly-by-wire system, albeit with the damage we were in an alternate law, it still was very flyable. Now comparing that to other types I have flown I am sure that Boeing types would have been equally flyable, but they would have been a lot more difficult, I’m sure.

The complete interview is available on a blog hosted by the Royal Aeronautical Society here:
EXCLUSIVE - Qantas QF32 flight from the cockpit | Aerospace | The Royal Aeronautical Society (http://media.aerosociety.com/aerospace-insight/2010/12/08/exclusive-qantas-qf32-flight-from-the-cockpit/3410/)

[Clandestino]

I was suggesting that just as 'mode confusion' is a well-established derivative of our automotive cockpit, so reversionary modes could be causing confusion when infrequently experienced, and then only when things have 'gone wrong' and commonly (outside the sim) with genuine 'startle factor'. Now I get it! Mode confusion refers to autoflight, not flight controls system. While modern Georges are far cry from altitude holding autopilots of 80 years ago and nowadays we're blessed with such a fine modes as HDG, WINGS LVL, LNAV, VNAV, FLCH, VOR APP, FPA etc. which provide fertile ground for confusion, there is no equivalent of such different behaviour in Airbus FCS. As long as you are flying, have flight controls continuity and are not stalled, left sticks rolls you left and pull on the sticks gets the nose up, no matter which mode you are in. Instead of trying to memorize the formulas from FCOM for subsequent interpretation, it would be easier to to think about different modes in following terms: normal - aeroplane is flightpath stable (which means pitch stable if you don't vary the speed) and will prevent overspeed, stall and excessive attitude on her own. Alternate law - still flightpath stable but no stops. Direct law - like altn but now you have to trim out the residual stick force after setting the attitude and speed. Nothing there to be confused about.

[busTRE]

Natstrackalpha

Taking some of your points in turn:

the crew were unaware of the attYou have zero, absolutely zero evidence of this. It is extremely unlikely that the attitude indication was affected and the report offers no evidence to suggest it was.

MUST be a get you out of trouble card.There is. Its flying power and attitude.

a red button returned everything to direct law immediatelyHow would this have improved anything. I think the difference between alternate and direct is a red herring. If you are flying too high an attitude it makes no difference if you are in alternate or direct law. Plus. Its as easy to fly an improper attitude in direct as it is in alternate.

a standby altimeter that is workingA standby altimeter would be subject to the same limitations or effects as the main ones. They have a standby altimeter. So what would another one gain you.

Likewise a standby attitude indicator, all appeared to be working, they had a standby and what would another one add?

[Natstrackalpha]

- why? We believe, do we not, that all altimeters were functioning normally?

Sorry, sorry, sorry I meant to say - stand by Artificial Horizon/ attitude indicator, thus picked up by busTRE

[Natstrackalpha]

Guyz,

If they had an attitude indicator. why are we here?

If the A/H was operational, then, why did they not look at it? -

See? Their brains curdled into the system . . ?!

If they had looked at it - then they would have recovered the aircraft, instead they were looking at the glistening pinball machine in front of them.

Reminds me of Ka the snake in Jungle book.

[BOAC]

If the A/H was operational, then, why did they not look at it? -
- welcome back to the fray.:)

[OK465]

....and locked on to 6000 fpm V/S then 1400 fpm only after the pilot commanded those RoC's apparently independently of the FD's.

HN39,

You are entirely correct that the pilot would have to be commanding a RoC independently of the FDs for the FDs to default to that RoC when the FDs returned (which the FDs indeed do).

The point you may want to consider is that the FD pitch steering will command an attitude that will provide for the specific RoC in effect at the FD return, in fact the current existing attitude, at least initially.

If the airspeed is continuing to decay, the FD will command a successively higher pitch attitude to meet the Roc requirement that was in effect upon FD recovery.

This commanded continual pitch increase is eventually unsustainable....

[HazelNuts39]

OK, thanks, I understand that.

Figure 69 in the Final Report shows the PF Side Stick Position and the FD Pitch Order.

The graph I reposted in #61 shows the PF Side Stick Position and the Pitch Attitude.

My reply #58 reflects my opinion that the latter shows a closer correlation than the former.

[henra]

If the A/H was operational, then, why did they not look at it? -


Looking at the corrections applied to the roll excursions I think it is safe to assume they were looking at the A/H that is called PFD.
There is also not the slightest indication it didn't work correctly. Please don't let us go back to that tinfoil hat discussion.

It just seems what they saw didn't ring a bell?

[OK465]

HN39,

You may be correct.

The fact that pitch was in the process of being reduced until the moment the FDs made what may have been a decidedly untimely appearance is just one of many observations made in the report.

I think, if nothing else, the fact that until any two ADRs are back within 19 knots (< 20 knots) in a situation like this, the FDs are removed but remain physically selected and then can reappear, may just be one of a number of lessons learned concerning A330 systems functionality that may or may not be specifically relevant to the incident.

[busTRE]

NTA

Ok, lets try this from a different angle. What would/could have caused the attitude display failure?

[Natstrackalpha]

mom pls +++
thanks.

Ice freezes the static and pitot (covers the static and pitot)
Affecting CADC
Affecting the 3 IRS
Affecting (SADC?)
the FACs thus affected (any back up to the FACS similarly affected)

Therefore in my astoundingly limited knowledge the PFD, displays no input from any of the aforementioned. Assuming the acceleromoters in the 3 IRSs
without the input from the CADCs and also the FACs do not function on their own. . . .to produce ATT info - thus rolled and banked - whether we are looking at normal Pitch alternate roll, and/or the whole nine yards - it was not happening because of the Ice/CADC/ and FACs.

Considering the freeze up happened in more or less S+L flight, then that is where (the ATT) remained.

Another theory, for your joy and entertainment is that Stall condition (which came later . . ?) and the protection trying to pitch down is thus offset by a certain somebody holding back press on the stick.

Hmm, considering that 2 stick inputs would sum algebraically would not the same summation occur if airplane wants to pitch down and something is stopping it from doing so? If this latter missive is the case, it would not explain limited or no indication in roll, whereas the CADC and FAC failure might - considering FACs had no input. However, just to shoot that idea down in lfmaes, and stick input woulr override/

Did the THS freeze over? At full forward trim? That would encourage one to pull the stick back coupled with the auto tendency to push the nose down (due to the stalled condition)

but your question was, what, in my mind, caused the ATT to freeze, excuse the pun.

Thanks a bunch bus TRE!

[busTRE]

I see where you're going wrong.

The attitude data is provided by IRs. An IR has no air data input for its core functions and its attitude data is unaffected by loss/corruption of air data from pitot or static sources. The ADR would be affected but the IR would not.

Does that help?

[mm43]

@OK465I think, if nothing else, the fact that until any two ADRs are back within 19 knots (< 20 knots) in a situation like this, the FDs are removed but remain physically selected and then can reappear, may just be one of a number of lessons learned concerning A330 systems functionality that may or may not be specifically relevant to the incident.But that's not really the problem; it along with other matters this crew immersed themselves in was provided for in the FCOM and QRH procedures.

The failure of a crew to follow SOP's, to the extent that what happened here, was never envisaged by the designers, test pilots, or TRE's who helped to compile the appropriate documentation.

It really falls into the, "You can lead a horse to water, but ..." equation.

[toffeez]

FD 1 and 2 ....................... OFF

[Natstrackalpha]

Ok, fine.


Thank you for your time and input - so do you want me to delete my original post now, as people may be queueing up to see it? :O

[busTRE]

Thank you for your time and input - so do you want me to delete my original post now, as people may be queueing up to see it? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/embarass.gif

That's a great idea!:D

[BARKINGMAD]

Just a thought, as I exited the front bog recently at cruise altitude.

My feet and ankles are used to a floor at 2.5-3.0 degrees nose up for the short walk, or the loiter in front galley to liaise with CC.

Even when I'm inspecting the plumbing I'm aware of the step climb the F/O has negotiated in my absence

Can anyone explain why Monsieur Le Capitain did not notice an unusual deck angle during his sprint to the flight deck? Any of us who've walked in the aircraft during initial climb, especially on empty positioning sectors as pax, have been aware of the deck angle and the extra effort to walk uphill.

This must have been a tactile clue to the standing crewmember on his return to the "control center" and yet it failed to trigger a suitable response from him? As a non 'bus driver I felt like getting the thread away from all the exotic Laws various which others have said tend to make diagnosis more difficult.

No AoA probes, no vacuum/wind powered AHs, no reference to expensive ADIRU sourced blue-side up, brown-side down displays, just the plumb bob on a string which we all are when airborne. Yes the craft was probably speeding up, slowing down and bucking around, but the general trend could have been obvious to a standing & walking crewmember, uncontaminated by the confusion forwards of the cockpit door

After that Eurocents worth, back to the darkened room. :confused:

[CONF iture]

That's really anybody's guess, and I've given mine earlier. He had been*keeping the nose up at around 15 degrees, and applied full back stick when the nose dropped below that target.
According to your graph, he was already applying full back stick a short time before the nose dropped below that target.
IMO the correlation with the FD reappearance is obvious.

Panic
No panic here but the attempt to blindly obey the reappearing FD.

[Clandestino]

No panic here but the attempt to blindly obey the reappearing FD.

Have a look at pages 60-62 and 95-96 of the English report.

Flight director is out between 2:10:08 and 2:10:18, yet the right stick is in nose up position, pitch increases from 3° to 9°.

FD returns at 2:10:17 for two seconds and commands between 3/4 and full nose down, yet pitch is maintained around 10°

Then it goes out again for a couple of seconds, pitch hovers around 12°.

Between 2:10:26 and 2:10:36 it's back, demanding 6000 FPM climb and nose up, yet nose is slightly lowered, Roc goes from 6000 to 4000.

Again it passes out, still pitch is decreasing towards 6°.

It is back again at 2:10:47, demanding 1400 fpm climb. Stall warning goes off, nose is abruptly pitched up. Flight director is now firmly below aeroplane symbol, yet the pitch goes up and up and up.

Finally, FD moves to nose up command as stall breaks the climb and aeroplane commences her final descent.

Under no circumstances I would find this to be even distantly similar to "blindly following the FD".

[HazelNuts39]

A few seconds earlier, when full left SS didn't arrest the roll to the right, PF announced: "Je n'ai plus le controle de l'avion la"

No panic?

[awblain]

BARKINGMAD,

I assume that the captain made his way forward up the aisle, flustered and sleepy, while the aircraft was rounding the top of its flight profile - and thus he didn't have to climb upwards. On entering the cockpit, I assume that he sat down right away - and thus did not have to hold on as the attitude steepened into the stall.

If he'd woken earlier or later, or crouched between the flying crew, then maybe he'd have experienced some inertial cue from his body, and would have recognized what was going on. Perhaps also if he'd had to grab to hold on in the terminal-velocity nose-high descent rather than just sit in his seat?

[jcjeant]

Hi,

I assume that the captain made his way forward up the aisle, flustered and sleepy, First is to check where is the rest accommodation for the captain (or the other pilots) in the A330
It's not in the rear toilets .. but just near the pilots office
And that why I don't understand why the captain don't go immediately in the office .. cause all the alarms sounding in the office..
I have always suspected that the captain was not in the rest accommodation

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Barkingmad & awblain,

It is impossible for the human brain to distinguish between linear inertial acceleration (or deceleration) from a pitch change. We need a natural horizon or an ADI/PFD to distinguish between the two.

See http://www.blackholes.org.uk/pp/somatogravic illusions.ppt

[awblain]

Rudder...rat,

Sure, I agree that you can't keep an internal reference to an absolute position, or distinguish whether you're on a vehicle that is slowing down or going downhill. The pitch-up illusion on acceleration on take off in an airliner is by 10-15 degrees or so.

However, when you stand up out of a seat, you can still tell whether the floor is apparently sloping or not. You can tell whether you have to grab the seatback in front and pull to climb into the aisle, or push against it to slow yourself.

During the pitch up (which woke/roused the Captain?), had he been on his feet, he would surely have felt himself to be heavy, and known there was upward acceleration, as in an elevator. When the aircraft was reaching its maximum height he might have been felt a bit light. As he put one foot in front of the other on (the short?) way to and into the cockpit, would he not have noticed whether he had to haul himself up a slope, or was rushed forward downhill? While not being able to perceive absolute motion, he surely would have been able to get a sense of an unusual attitude, unless the acceleration and attitude were unfortunately aligned to make things feel normal when he was on his feet. Or maybe his heart was pounding, and the aircraft was shaking, and he couldn't get any such subtle cues?

[OK465]

FD 1 and 2 ....................... OFF

toffeez,

yes sir, I've done this many times.

My comment was in reference to the fact that they didn't.

Before reading the report, I was unaware of the exact ADR tolerances (both speed, 19 knots, and time, 10 seconds) that were in play when this FD error is made, nor was I made aware in 330 ground school of the fact that the FD buttons remain latched even though the FDs are removed in certain airspeed discrepancy situations.

One of the recurring complaints about the so-called 'children of the magenta line' is that their training is being 'dumbed down'.

I personally hate the phrase, 'You don't need to know that'.

The failure of a crew to follow SOP's, to the extent that what happened here, was never envisaged by the designers, test pilots, or TRE's who helped to compile the appropriate documentation.

mm43,

I understand the importance of SOPs, cockpit discipline and following the recommended procedures, but I also believe in knowing everything I can glean about each aircraft I've ever flown so that maybe I have a better chance of dealing with something which 'hadn't been envisaged'.....

not being told,

'You don't need to know that.'

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi awblain,
or distinguish whether you're on a vehicle that is slowing down or going downhill.
Exactly.
unless the acceleration and attitude were unfortunately aligned to make things feel normal when he was on his feet
Since they didn't change the power initially (thrust lock), then I suggest the deceleration was masked by the increased pitch attitude.

Any short term vertical acceleration could be confused with turbulence.

[OK465]

It is back again at 2:10:47, demanding 1400 fpm climb. Stall warning goes off, nose is abruptly pitched up. Flight director is now firmly below aeroplane symbol, yet the pitch goes up and up and up.

(bolding mine)

Clandestino,

Using the plots from page 60, 61, & 62......

the pitch attitude is 6 degrees at 2:10:48 and transitions to 11-12 degrees (with 2 very short duration plateaus evident, one at 11 degrees, one at 12) at 2:10:57

this is a pitch increase of 6 degrees in 9 seconds....2/3 of a degree per second. I don't consider this as "nose is abruptly pitched up". It is, however, entirely consistent with use of the FD as airspeed bleeds off.

Using the PFD representations from page 96 (Fig. 69), at 2:10:48 and 2:11:05, they show the pitch steering command within 1 to 2 degrees of pitch attitude, presumably for the entire 7 seconds and maybe longer (next PFD representation is at 2:11:39).

I'm unable to see this as "Flight director is now firmly below aeroplane symbol"

From this point as the airspeed decays more rapidly, yes, the nose goes up, up, up...as does, if you notice, the FD pitch steering command (PFD picture at 2:11:39).

Whole sequence is entirely consistent with attempted use of the FD initiated at 2:10:47....(or it probably wouldn't be included as a possibility in the report).

edit: BTW the PFD picture with the FD well below pitch attitude is from 2:10:27, well before that very critical moment at 2:10:47 when pitching direction is reversed.

[Clandestino]

I don't consider this as "nose is abruptly pitched up"Neither would I if we were discussing F-16 or similar instead of widebody passenger aeroplane at cruise altitude, though you are right: attitude itself was more problematic than rate of change.

It is, however, entirely consistent with use of the FD as airspeed bleeds off. "FD order=0" line marks time when vertical mode FD bar is centered. If CM2 chased FD, one would expect FD plot to oscillate around zero, amplitude being inversely proportional to manual flying dexterity.


I'm unable to see this as "Flight director is now firmly below aeroplane symbol"From about 10:53 to about 11:11. If CM2 tried to follow F/D, it would get him in trouble anyway, he just accelerated the demise.

From this point as the airspeed decays more rapidly, yes, the nose goes up, up, up...as does, if you notice, the FD pitch steering command It kept demanding 1400 fpm climb as the aeroplane had been already stalled.

PFD picture at 2:11:39At 2:11:30 pitch is +15, flightpath angle -10, AoA pretty correctly measures about 25° so there is no chance the aeroplane is not already stalled. Nine seconds later it only gets worse.

edit: BTW the PFD picture with the FD well below pitch attitude is from 2:10:27, well before that very critical moment at 2:10:47 when pitching direction is reversed. Errr... yes. It is there to help visualize what does the amplitude of the green line represent. At 2:10:47 F/D returns, engaged in basic modes HDG & V/S, and synchronizes itself to present RoC, 1400 fpm but rate goes down to 1100 fpm and pitch remains constant therefore nose-up command can be seen up until about 10:55. After the stall warning goes off, stick is pulled, rate goes above 1400, so FD commands nose down (green line gets below 0) to no avail. Again: following FD after the stall warning went off the second time would merely postpone stall for a couple of seconds.

[HazelNuts39]

My version (with apologies to the authors of BEA's Final Report, paragraph 2.1.3.3.1):

The flight director displays, the doubt regarding the relevancy of the aural stall warning and the identification of the possibility of an overspeed situation did not allow the PF to make a correct diagnosis. He therefore implemented a combination of antagonistic actions to respond to both an overspeed situation (reduction in thrust, nose-up inputs) and to a stall situation (application of maximum thrust).

Thus, it seems likely that the flight director exerted an influence.

The flight director displays could have prompted him to command a positive pitch angle, of about 15°. This value is the first option in the UAS procedure for the take-off phase below thrust reduction altitude. It is possible that, even though he did not call it out, the PF had recalled this memorised value and then had clung to this reference without remembering that it was intended for a different flight phase. The conjunction of this remembered value and the flight director displays may have constituted one of the few (and maybe even the only) points of consistency in his general incomprehension of the situation.

[Natstrackalpha]

Seems that all you need for a career is education

and money

Back to the plot. somebody advocated - just leave the aircraft as it is and it would fly stright and level more or less.

If, due to trim condition changes, for example have we got auto trim when auto pilot is out?

Is the aircraft/would the aircraft maintain S&L when in its little mind it thinks it is Overspeeding - even with the A/P out?

Take one aeroplane - set it up for straight and level and trim - aeroplane flies straight and level.

If the nose should rise or ondeed lower then ther would follow and ensuing climb or descent.

If left alone the aircraft in the descent would increase speed and eventually pitch up due to the increase in Lift it would then climb until the speed dropped off again when the nose would lower causing a descent and increase in speed ad-nauseam until (dependant on Trim setting and other things**) everything had equalled out and the aircraft had naturally stabilized in a descent or a climb or straight and level - but** with shifting CofG due to fuel being used at about 2180kgs per hour (in the case of a 320 in the crz, more for a 330) then a climb or descent would ensue. Perhaps then this would explain the climb up to service ceiling? and the descent down to . . see that chart above.

[bubbers44]

I guess if the FD and all that really cool stuff doesn't work you could just lower the nose so you aren't stalled any more like in a J3Cub, P51, F86, F4, Concorde, B747 and all other aircraft certified to fly.

[gums]

Guess we folks from another career field have lost the battle about an AoA indication ( a simple one). Same for a HUD.

Being an aviation dinosaur, I was amazed at the first HUD I saw back in 1971. Easy to use, and really helped to see what the plane was actually doing with respect to the Earth, although we still had the "steam gauges" like attitude indicator, turn needle, altimiter, airspeed indicator, etc. Those were the "primary flight instruments", as the really old dinosaurs insisted on flying with them. In practice, 99% of the pilots used the HUD for almost everything, despite its obvious use with weapon delivery. Sure, we used the steam gauges to correlate with the inertial data on the HUD - the flight path marker ( FPV for the 'bus, I guess). But the HUD had the altitude, speed and vertical velocity ( inertial or baro) and heading displayed. The biggie was the pitch line display. No kidding lines that showed actual angle WRT to the Earth, and not a simple attitude. Put the FPM on the horizon line and you were level. Put it at 2 1/2 degrees down and you had a great approach angle. Put it 1000 feet down the runway and that''s where you were gonna hit unless you flared.

Our AoA was not a separate indicator most of the time. The Navy jets had "indexer" lights beside the gunsight or HUD to provide optimum approach AoA for any gross weight.

Yet I see "professional" pilots here that kiss off a HUD and a simple AoA indication. At the same time, they seem to put up with the main displays that seem very cluttered. Then the chirps and bongs and cavalry charge sounds. Sheesh.

I submit a PR link for a "civilian" HUD. I also think you can look at my leading edge flap failure approach video to see the value of the FPM. And be advised I used power to bring the aircraft vector back up after screwing up, and barely made it to the RWY. AoA bracket was low, and I kept it that way because I still had one pound of roll authority unless I let the AoA increase. Hence I used power to achieve rate of descent and flight path ( rate of climb is proportional to power available minus power required, huh?).

I will guarantee that if the AF447 crew had an inertial-based HUD that the PF would not have continued to pull up to an obscene pitch attitude and allow the speed to decay. The thing would have worked as normal without ANY AIR DATA!!!

Look at a cost-effective HUD that I found for this rant:

HGS-3500 Head-up Guidance System (http://www.rockwellcollins.com/Data/Products/Displays/Head-Up%20Displays-HUD/HGS-3500Head-upGuidanceSystem.aspx)

rant ends...

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

My version (with apologies to the authors of BEA's Final Report, paragraph 2.1.3.3.1):

The flight director displays, the doubt regarding the relevancy of the aural stall warning and the identification of the possibility of an overspeed situation did not allow the PF to make a correct diagnosis. He therefore implemented a combination of antagonistic actions to respond to both an overspeed situation (reduction in thrust, nose-up inputs) and to a stall situation (application of maximum thrust).

Thus, it seems likely that the flight director exerted an influence.

The flight director displays could have prompted him to command a positive pitch angle, of about 15°. This value is the first option in the UAS procedure for the take-off phase below thrust reduction altitude. It is possible that, even though he did not call it out, the PF had recalled this memorised value and then had clung to this reference without remembering that it was intended for a different flight phase. The conjunction of this remembered value and the flight director displays may have constituted one of the few (and maybe even the only) points of consistency in his general incomprehension of the situation.

:D:D:D HazelNuts39

[Natstrackalpha]

Guess we folks from another career field have lost the battle about an AoA indication ( a simple one).

hardly - if you can get virtual strippers to perform on your desktop then you can have a plane on an ECAM or other page - Gulfstreams have Profile Alt -
so tying this picky (stripper idea) up with an accelerometer would give you your 3d ATT. In the design it only has to measure Longitudianal, Lateral, and Neutral or Normal Axis and Bob`s yer auntie. Or `change in the aformentioned long, lat, Neut plane(s) Its not difficult - all you need is a computor programmer a mathmetician and a games developer, throw in a pilot or two and job done. Anyone study Ada?

Anyone from Airbus out there PM me and I`ll have a team down there in a week and we can put it together. Notwithstanding the entire thing to be logical and do-able in which case no one will reply.

[CONF iture]

No panic?

On perd le contrôle de l'avion là
Le problème c'est que j'ai plus de vario là
J'ai plus aucune indication
J'ai l'impression qu'on a une vitesse de fou non qu'est-ce que vous en pensez ?

Those are comments from someone who is trying to understand, and he is sharing his concerns.

Someone who is panicking would either :

not say a single word
or would desperately call his mother

[HazelNuts39]

CONF iture,

OK, no panic, just lost.

[busTRE]

NTA

with an accelerometer would give you your 3d ATT.

What information exactly would this show to the crew?

[henra]

CONF iture,

OK, no panic, just lost.


Probably a bit of both.
Completely lost in the first place and then likely creeping up panic preventing them to step back and think about what is really going on, i.e. thinking about the basics. (Pull => cows get smaller, pull more => cows get bigger again)

[Natstrackalpha]

I guess if the FD and all that really cool stuff doesn't work you could just lower the nose so you aren't stalled any more like in a J3Cub, P51, F86, F4, Concorde, B747 and all other aircraft certified to fly.

stoney ground . . . . .

Besides which, sooner or later - someone is going to twig that it had no reliable ATT info and you won`t hear the last of it from me . . .tum ti tum . . . .
What information exactly would this show to the crew?

The attitude of the 3d symbol aeroplane If symbol flying S&L then actual aircraft is flying S&L - with integrated gyros, too, you can also get away from accellerations caused by gravity/centripetal force/inertia and toppling or the need for re-caging - why, you could rig all this up with a . . .laser ring gyro, bring that back into production, its not much.

If you want to play fighter pilots then yea, ok, bring in a HUD - this may even be easier to . . produce than my cartoon type 3D aircraft symbol which acts on all planes/axis. In fact (sorry, am rolling) you could simplify the whole shabuble with a green light on all of the three INS`s:

If L/R/UP/DOWN/Yaw = zero then zero = S&L When S&L (during alignment) a little green light shows on the front of the INS there are five lights 1 up 1 down 1 left and 1 right and 1 in the middle the one in the middle is green. The 1s on the outside (up/dn/left/right) are red - if you get a red light you are not S&L. If you get the green centre one you are.

[busTRE]

NTA

I guess if the FD and all that really cool stuff doesn't work you could just lower the nose so you aren't stalled any more like in a J3Cub, P51, F86, F4, Concorde, B747 and all other aircraft certified to fly.

yeah but what information is your gadget giving them in order to do this?

[bubbers44]

The J3 cub didn't have a battery so no fancy stuff to help but pilots didn't have any problem recovering from a stall. You feel this shaky stall and the stick doesn't do much so you lower it and try to keep is straight. We even had a venturi turn and bank indicator so it was very simple. Now for some people it is very hard with FD's and all the new stuff. Why?

[jcjeant]

Why? To much info .. to much given choices ?
The human are not always the best .. when they must make choice ... :)

[busTRE]

NTA

The aircraft already has something that displays this info, the FPV. Unfortunately, the information from the giros is subject to drift and is also very eratic in its raw state. For that reason it is damped by baro data, otherwise it would be effectively unuseable. If your ADRs are shot then your baro data is unreliable or erroneous and so the data from the giros becomes unuseable which is why the FPV cannot be used with unreliable baro data (as the crew of 447 had at least at first). Thus, your gadget, whilst a good idea on the face of it would suffer from the same issues and thus be of no use in the situation the were in.

[gums]

Oh man. No names, per J.T.'s observation ( but you can quote me by name anytime and my profile on the entries has my real state of residence, etc.)

The HUD's in the military aircraft since 1968 use the inertial system to display the flight path marker/vector and the pitch lines WRT to the Earth. Early ones had some small drift - think one mile in one hour. Short interval data was prolly a thousandth of a degree off from the real world. The A-7 used a doppler system to help keep the inertial very stable, and you could actually takeoff and align the inertial using the doppler in 15 minutes or so. Then we had GPS. With GPS we could align the inertial in a few minutes.

So negative comments about gyros and such for the HUD/main display flight path should look at the record of reliability and accuracy of such systems since the late 60's. The things work without any air data at all!!!! Think AF447, et al, and loss of air data, but a fully operational inertial system that only uses GPS for some positional data now and then, but displays your actual flight path. Would you keep pulling back stick as the troop did in AF447? I don't think so.

There are some here that have used and maybe are currently using a HUD in the commercial flying bidness. The suckers take about 5 seconds to interpret and feel comfortable. For those who have not used one, try it. The bad news is that the company will try to cram all the magenta line crapola on the display when all you really want is some basic nav guidance and your flight path vector to achieve the desired profile.

Sorry if I continue to rant, but I went thru all the advances in avionics and displays since 1971. I never had to see the FMS stuff and the "magenta line" due to my bidness. I never flew a jet that had auto-throttle, or an otto that flew the climb to altitude with all the heading changes and such. I used otto for heading hold and altitude hold and such, especially on long missions while I snacked on a candy bar or ate a box lunch. Think 13 hours in the chair you are in right now reading this.

We have many tech capabilities to help the crews, but we still have to possess basic flying skills and use all the available tools/displays and such of our planes to get where are trying to go. I have a problem with crew coordination, as most of my time was single-seat. So I defer to those here with all the experience.

So that's my input for today.

[Natstrackalpha]

There is still a world of difference between unreliable speed info due to CADC causing technological problems with the kit due to icing and

screaming up to service ceiling and back a few times . . .

I don`t agree on the need to address, in training, further depths of the system - although - that would not be a bad thing in itself, per se`

We must re-emphasise - "get it off the system!!" Get flying - get it S&L and/or leave the b:mad:r alone, but get it off the system - then, somebody drives it - PF, while PM figres out WIHIH! Not as the usual `in the loop ECAM procedures - but as a distinct and absolute 1 pilot flying and 1 pilot (+any extra pilots present in the crew) figuring out all the inobvious and surreal stuff that has just popped up and ruined your evening.

That way - the 233 ton airliner will sail merrily on its way - until the technological anomolies of the moment have been identified and sorted out. The PF is quite capable of doing the flying AND the nav - right from basic training.

THAT must be a procedure - THAT must, MUST be an SOP and a big fat SOP too!

This gives future crews two distinct advantages - 1., PM assured that the aeroplane is safely flying is not affected by the . . emergency . . ? . .situation and therefoe has an undistracted mind to deal with this new load of . . . questions. Same pilots has complete artistic freedom fot eh same reason - he is NOT therefoe concerned with urgent self preservation. instincts kicking in.

[roulishollandais]

......Very sad ....
EDiT jun 27. :
I was sad after seeing jcjeant banned. I did not knew how to say that. It is difficult to continue discussion when suddenly somebody is missing from his empty armchair and you do not know why, is it due to banning or deleting one's own posts. It starts possible misunderstanding (Natstrackalpha was thinking his post did me sad...). Brainstorming is not perfectly sterilized.
But now welcome back jcjeant !

@gums
As usual your post tells us the good FBW state of art.

[Natstrackalpha]

Telephone call!

[Yankee Whisky]

I am very uneasy with the terms used in the discussions around the Airbus
when it went its way to the bottom of the Atlantic. That is as a power pilot I feel that way. I read, for example, the computer decides the rate of change of the elevator when commanded from the cockpit. And that in 2 seconds nose down stick, the elevator actually travels from 30 degr nose up to 20 degr nose up ! Should there not be a "panic button" that, when pressed, makes direct control inputs (or the computerised equivalent) possible.? The aircraft was flying fully nose up elevator (stick input as well) at low speed and, I would have thought that when a pilot pushes fully nose down, the bloody elevator WILL travel fully nose down in QUICK succession.!!!:ugh: In my days of flying I had to use full controls on many occasions, both in normal and in spin or landing round-outs. Why must modern pilots be deprived of this when the sh"t hits the fan, as was the case with AF447 ? Is it possible that we rely too much on statistical probabilities and accept a certain failure rate as normal ? Sure, high speed aircraft and high weights etc play a part, but should the "feel" of flying manually not be exactly that in cases of emergency ? Control loss in the military and civilian aircraft do give a pilot in most cases the option to hit the silk ! Is it possible that (computer) engineers and software experts
have gone too far in taking control of controlling an aircraft ? And test pilots play by the company book so as to keep their well paying jobs ? Just asking.................;)

[HazelNuts39]

And test pilots play by the company book so as to keep their well paying jobs ? Just asking.................The test pilots that I know don't fit your description. They chose their career out of love for flying, and enjoy being members of a team that develops these marvelous machines.

That applies also to the authority test pilots who examine an airplane presented for certification, although they do their work from a different perspective. D.P. Davies explains it nicely in his book HTBJ.

[Owain Glyndwr]

The test pilots that I know don't fit your description. They chose their career out of love for flying, and enjoy being members of a team that develops these marvelous machines.

I'll second that HN39. All those I worked with, besides being fine pilots, were quick to criticise anything they thought was not right and were certainly not "company men"

[bubbers44]

I agree, I will have the pleasure to see Bob Hoover and Chuck Yeager at Reno again in September at the Reno Air Races. They are proof that test pilots are not, yes, company pilots but love what they do.

[CONF iture]

Yeah, I said an airbus CAN stall in normal law!
You mention the case where the EFCS could be momentarily outpaced by an exceptional windshear.
I do mention the case where the system can be duped by exceptional conditions when inputs silently lie to that EFCS.

Parbleu! Wasn't there any indication in cockpit something wasn't quite right?
Not much for a crew who would have to apply a GPWS procedure in such conditions - Crash as a sure ending.

[CONF iture]

Now, can we accept that alpha probes need to have some airflow to work reliably or do we keep on harping that they have to work perfectly from zero kt to Mmo, which is quite a wishful thinking?
If 10000 feet/min is not some airflow, what is it ?

Fictional software. As developed and certified - can't.
Then why the OEB disappeared for some aircrafts ... ?

Not necessarily just because it's a FBW of different flavour. Part of it is certainly attributable to her price tag combined with date of service entry - she just didn't trickle down yet to lower tiers operators.
The safety record for both manufactures is not in question, but the accumulation of events regarding the Airbus FBW and its protections is real.

[Lonewolf_50]

gums & USMCprobe: while the FPV points you both raise were of interest, the FPV equivalent (FD) wasn't working in that A330 when airspeed went unreliable. (That is how I understand the system. If I misunderstand, apologies for adding to the noise)..
Per HN39,
I've no experience with FD's but note that they were mostly unavailable in the first 40 seconds of the zoom-climb, and locked on to 6000 fpm V/S then 1400 fpm only after the pilot commanded those RoC's apparently independently of the FD's.
Comment for HN39:I just can't see any reason for him to zoom-climb to seek the limit of envelope protection.
Even the pilot in the left seat seemed concerned by the right seat pilot' climb. (Per CVR in report)
AZR: OK, thanks for clarifying that for me. I agree that a law reversion is "something more" to take into account for the crew, but I believe that the advantages of normal+alternate+direct laws are more important than the disadvantages (including the quite possible but not proven 'mode confusion').
So long as the pilots both know how the system works, and have practiced it (see BOAC's "properly trained" point) the law degradation slope makes sense (to me) when one looks at the system as a whole. The training point, the training objecive, would hopefully include knowing your systems and sub systems well, and be able to apply the following trouble shooting approach:
"If this is what's wrong, and these lights/alerts are going off, this is what the plane is doing or about to do, or not doing ... "
Being unable to determine "what's it doing" based on "this is what's wrong" opens a crew up for errors in remedy for a malfunction. (True for a lot of different aircraft and situations)
NTA:
If they had an attitude indicator. why are we here?
If the A/H was operational, then, why did they not look at it?
Ever since the release of the FDR info during the interim report era, that question has been foremost. The answer lies in the realm of post hoc mind reading, or best guess speculation.
We aren't ever going to know, but we can infer a breakdown of the instrument scan of both the pilot at the controls, and his co pilot.
One of the better guesses is that PF was following the FD, at least for a while, which he didn't realize was going wrong ... which it will do when airspeed goes all wrong, as at the initiation of the event.
henra:
A/H that is called PFD.
There is also not the slightest indication it didn't work correctly. Please don't let us go back to that tinfoil hat discussion.
It just seems what they saw didn't ring a bell?
Might this lead one to label the event as being the result of "confusion" rather than "mode confusion" ... I'd better duck ... :}
Barking:
Can anyone explain why Monsieur Le Capitain did not notice an unusual deck angle during his sprint to the flight deck? Any of us who've walked in the aircraft during initial climb, especially on empty positioning sectors as pax, have been aware of the deck angle and the extra effort to walk uphill.
The "uphill walk" might have informed his initial verbal offering of "What are you doing" as he arrived on scene in the cockpit.
jejeant:
I have always suspected that the captain was not in the rest accommodation
So, where was he -- in the lavatory?
HN39:
The flight director displays could have prompted him to command a positive pitch angle, of about 15°.
This value is the first option in the UAS procedure for the take-off phase below thrust reduction altitude.
It is possible that, even though he did not call it out, the PF had recalled this memorised value and then had clung to this reference without remembering that it was intended for a different flight phase.
The conjunction of this remembered value and the flight director displays may have constituted one of the few (and maybe even the only) points of
consistency in his general incomprehension of the situation.
Back to an early discussion on training, recency of training, and BOAC's point on "properly trained" pilots. Seems a decent estimation.

[xcitation]

So, where was he -- in the lavatory?
Or... wasn't the FO's wife on the flight - would it be polite to say hello and chat whilst hubby is PIC?

For me the PNF left seat telling PF to stop climbing several times was the probably the most puzzling data point.
If the guy next to me is repeatedly non-responsive and executing a dangerous change in flight level then it ones duty "I have control" and press priority button, and I expect some confirmation in response "roger, you have control" or whatever the French equivalent is.
It was clearly time to put their game face on and switch from sloppy banter chat to professional communications.
Who knows maybe they were impaired by fumes/gas - this is not a judgement just an observation.

[bubbers44]

Yes, a pilot monitoring is supposed to make sure the aircraft is handled properly. He didn't so everybody died. The PF did everything wrong and pulled up into a full stall with PM letting him. Unless airlines get better FO's this will continue to happen. The captain is required to take his rest break so make sure the two pilots up front know what they are doing. These two didn't have a clue because they were autopilot monitors and couldn't hand fly their aircraft, only the captain could who was on his break.

[mm43]

Yes, a pilot monitoring is supposed to make sure the aircraft is handled properly. He didn't so everybody died.In the case of this particular PNF and PF, I suggest (as others may have done) that there was a marked personality disparity between them. From what I have been able to deduce over the past 4 years is that the PF was of a dominating personality, and this factor is possibly more involved than any other (except lack of CRM) in the outcome of the flight.

Over in the R&N Memmingen thread a couple of days ago, Yankey Whiskey made mention of "gliding experience" being possibly a prerequisite in preparing pilots in how to handle the 'too fast and high' events. I responded with reference to this AF447 event by pointing out that this PF did have gliding experience, but take heed of what he did. Neither did the PNF do what you have suggested he should have.

Both posts were deleted.

Their presence in that thread was likely at odds with an otherwise seemingly rational discussion on CRM and how it should be handled in an approach to a possible TOGA situation.

Edit:: The last two paragraphs are not factual! My recollection of when I made the post was somewhat confused by something ...:\

[NeoFit]

mm43
Both posts were deleted.

Not at all!
Still here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/517070-runway-overrun-thessaloniki-4.html#post7906920) (#68 & 70)

[xcitation]

I responded with reference to this AF447 event by pointing out that this PF did have gliding experience, but take heed of what he did.


Good point, it is a tragic irony that had the PF frozen and not touched the controls there would probably have been a better outcome.

[Lonewolf_50]

and not touched the controls

Hmmm, I don't think that's what the "do nothing" proponents are suggesting.

[bubbers44]

If you touch the controls do something positive to fix the situation. Since they forced a full stall they would have been better off both leaving the cockpit and waking the captain to fix things. At least when he arrived at the cockpit he would have something recoverable to deal with instead of what they left him with in the last minutes.

[Machinbird]

If you touch the controls do something positive to fix the situation. Since they forced a full stall they would have been better off both leaving the cockpit and waking the captain to fix things. At least when he arrived at the cockpit he would have something recoverable to deal with instead of what they left him with in the last minutes. Since AP had dropped out together with the autothrottles when the air data went south, what would have prevented the aircraft from rolling over onto its back, particularly since it had a significant tendency to roll to the right in its ALT2B mode?

Personally I think that PM was aware of PF's efforts at keeping the wings level, and did not feel confident enough in his own abilities to take over faced with his lack of understanding as to why the aircraft was so goosey in roll.

The initial significant roll oscillation stands out as an unusual situation not described (to the best of my knowledge) by the other aircraft that had experienced multiple ADR failures due to pitot icing. The limited training these two copilots received did not prepare them for flight in ALT2B Law.

[roulishollandais]

The aircraft was flying fully nose up elevator(stick input as well) at low speed and, I would have thought that when a pilot pushes fullynosedown,thebloody elevator WILL travelfullynose down in QUICK succession.!!! In my days of flying I had to use full controls on many occasions, both in normal and in spin or landing round-outs. PWhy must modern pilots be deprived of this when the sh"t hits the fan, as was the case with AF447 ?
It loooks like Airbus tried to copy in the 80's the F-16 flight management system with a g feedback. Which information had they? Who gave the information? Was is public? (The flight law are still under industrial secret) Were spies at work?
Despite Airbus is using the word "protection" against excessive g (2.5!!!) I suspect the idea was to increase passengers comfort in LIGHT TURBULENCE holding g to 1... In the 80's automation fashion started to have interest to limit sound or vibration with "bruit blanc".
Using the feedback to maintain g to 1 was such a path to realize that goal : limit oscillation of the airliner. (In which point of the plane is a second problem...)

But when the system is piloting z`` with feedback you have to use the stick not to control the elevator but the tendance of the elevator (Airbus S/S action)and you have to integrate the signal in the direct path. The pitch trim does the same work to maintain g=1, not the speed, and is "protecting" (limiting) against quick full nose down.(not a god idea!)

[xcitation]

what would have prevented the aircraft from rolling over onto its back, particularly since it had a significant tendency to roll to the right in its ALT2B mode?


Data appears to favor pilot induced oscillations and as often stated on this thread "making mayonaise".

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/imageshr/figure.64.en.png

Roll attitude: the pink line in chart above shows no roll over - only constant roll approx 10-15 deg. Now compare pink to red and blue and you see oscillations appear to be mostly pilot induced. I suggest that the airbus damps the roll disturbances very well on its own probably because of its mass and drag in the roll axis.

[Turbine D]

Original quote posted by Lonewolf_50
Hmmm, I don't think that's what the "do nothing" proponents are suggesting.
Looking back in the archives, the "do nothing" came from a PJ2 posting:
Original posting by PJ2: I wrote on July 30th, 2009 that the correct response was to "do nothing". I don't claim any special prescience...it's just the logical thing to do when in cruise. When this entire matter was conflated in subsequent discussion, I argued that the memorized items were not only confusing but the entire drill and checklist were poorly written. The "above FL100" memorized item to pitch to 5deg and set CLB thrust was, in my view, intended to cater to high density altitude airfields, not cruise altitudes. But this is not clear in the drill.

There has been plenty of discussion on this item throughout these threads, and I suggest the use of mm43's excellent PPRuNe search tool, to find these discussions.

The BEA press conference comment is, in my view, incorrect. While control would not be lost with an increase of pitch of 2.5deg to an attitude of 5deg, (because the pitch is already 2.5deg in cruise, roughly), the maneouvre does de-stabilize the aircraft when the aircraft is already stabilized in level flight with a good pitch attitude and power setting which were just fine moments before the UAS event. In fact, if one is not trained or accustomed to high altitude handling of a transport aircraft, one may be hunting a great deal with either a CC or an SS to maintain a pitch of 5deg. I just can't see, and never could see this memorized item making any sense whatsoever when in cruise flight.
http://i1166.photobucket.com/albums/q609/DaveK72/i-GnmPntp-L.jpg (http://s1166.photobucket.com/user/DaveK72/media/i-GnmPntp-L.jpg.html)
PJ2 post continued:
At cruise altitudes, I have argued that this was no emergency at all, it was an abnormal which required standard responses as trained, and which required no action other than to get out the QRH checklist for the pitch and power settings. Most here disagreed with this view, citing the "Above FL100 decision-point, but frankly there is no way that setting 5deg pitch is indicated in cruise.

Whether this PF intended to set 5deg or 15deg or something else cannot be factually determined at this time. But the airplane pitched up, and it was held there until the stall while both pilots accepted the trajectory, the pitch attitude and the loss of energy. We can only surmise why, and that, is, I think hindsight territory
Now, perhaps some correction of both roll and nose down tendency needed to be accomplished to return the airplane to the original flight path, but in a different manner than what would be used at low speed and altitude. BTW, the loss of altitude (300 ft. or so) accompanied by roll and nose down was reported in some other UAS incidents.

There were considerable discussions regarding the state of mind of the PF & PNF:
Original posting by PJ2
Quote:
Ah, but was it surprise or "startle" which affected the PF, or was it abject fear?
Either can be argued but in doing so think about what is being said. What business has "abject fear" got in possessing a crew under the quite normal-for-the ITCZ circumstances faced that night and a system failure which, while disconcerting and even initially confusing, was neither an emergency nor as I say a massive failure of engine or aircraft structure? Why abject fear? Startle yes, but then an automatic response? My question is, what must be assumed for such an answer to be rational and in keeping with all those goals we hold dear?

A rapid decompression would certainly startle someone!, and the drill is there to do. Here, there was nothing to indicate a requirement for immediate action.

I want to be careful here not to portray this up as "judge-and-jury" discussion - it is not. It is an attempt by one experienced captain among many here, to keep the original question open rather than "answering" it with, "it was 'startle' factor, and therefore we need to train that out of pilots".

My point is, surprise notwithstanding, (been there a few times...with adrenaline), the intent of thorough training and flying transport aircraft with experienced crews is discipline when things go wrong, reversion to known responses and effective crew communication and why that didn't occur here. The BEA Report goes as far as it might in my view in answering this question but it isn't a complete answer. I think that is for the industry at large to answer, as per the larger discussion concerning automation and "wither airmanship?" I'm not dismissing the startle response - that would be silly. I am asking for some careful thought before assigning it.

In summary, the best response to an event such as UAS by a flight crew is this:
Original posting by PJ2
The "better way" is in how the response was made right from the start of the event. The SOPs do not change significantly from type to type. The trained crew response to an emergency or an abnormality is, with minor variations throughout the industry, very clear and very specific:

- Take control of the aircraft, (usually the PF) and ensure stable flight and navigation;
- Communicate: PF announces the emergency/abnormality so the other crew member, (PM), is aware and shifts thinking and priorites to the emergency/abnormality, (where applicable, PF takes radio communications responsibilities);
- PF calls for the "ECAM Actions" first, then the QRH checklist where applicable;
- PM executes/completes ECAM actions, clearing messages as they are completed;
- When finished, PM calls "ECAM Actions Complete" and calls up the Status Page for aircraft and system condition review;
- When aircraft/system Status is reviewed, PF calls for any applicable QRH checklists. For example, sometimes landing data requires modification;
- Secure the aircraft for continued flight or diversion;
- Communicate with ATC, F/A's (through their leader) and company dispatch;
- Passenger announcement, if required;
- Monitor changes in aircraft performance, fuel situation etc, as required.

Sadly, none of the "better way" happened as related to AF 447.

Hope the above is helpful and appropriate in the current ongoing discussions...

TD

[henra]

Since AP had dropped out together with the autothrottles when the air data went south, what would have prevented the aircraft from rolling over onto its back, particularly since it had a significant tendency to roll to the right in its ALT2B mode?


Would be interesting to know, what would have happened. Personally I heavily doubt the A330 would have turned onto its back.

It is not a Pitts or an Extra.
I don't think it will bank by itself much over 30°. Maybe 45°. With increasing bank angle you get sideslip. In that conditon dihedral and winglets will start creating an opposing force.
I would expect a spiralling decent. Mmo could potentially become an issue in such a Situation but drag also increases drastically when Approach Mmo.

I'm with bubbers44 on this one. Chances are he would have found a controllable yet maybe banking/descending aircraft.

[xcitation]

Would it be easy to have the a/c auto alert an emergency operations center of a stalled a/c at cruise altitude?
Ground support would then call the flight deck using the sat phone to establish a dialogue whilst reviewing the basic flight data via telemetry. There would be a lag of a couple of seconds in the comms however it might restore calm to the flight deck and remind them of SOP.
This would not require any new equipment or expense, probably just a simple software tweak and setting up an emergency ops center. UAVs and remotely piloted a/c require far more sophisticated software.
Then again perhaps the lawyers have blocked this already because of the liability.:ugh:

[john_tullamarine]

.. reminds me of a depressurisation many decades ago in Oz. The senior ATC chap was absolutely adamant that his man convey to the crew the need to don their masks.

Needless to say, the initial considerations of the emergency were long sorted out by the time the ATC messages managed to get through the ATC system and, finally, to the crew.

As I recall .. the crew, having rolled their eyes into the back of their heads, tactfully and diplomatically acknowledged the concern of the senior ATC man and went on about their routine business sorting out the remainder of their problems at the time.

I think that there comes a point where success depends on the crew, the crew's competence and experience, and the operator's training programs ... and there is precious little that third parties can do considering communications realities and time pressures ...

[DozyWannabe]

Since AP had dropped out together with the autothrottles when the air data went south, what would have prevented the aircraft from rolling over onto its back, particularly since it had a significant tendency to roll to the right in its ALT2B mode?

Hmm... Based on earlier discussions I think the idea that the aircraft had developed a right-roll tendency [EDIT: in and of itself] is at best debatable and in my opinion (for all that's worth) actually fairly unlikely. OK, so the data shows the flightpath post-disconnect and stall as being a descent biased to the right - but there are several factors that need to be borne in mind.

Firstly, we know that the AP disconnect occurred roughly simultaneously with a "bump" of turbulence that left the aircraft with a pitch attitude of slightly below zero and a slight bank to the right. From then on the PF took manual control and was making inputs virtually constantly from onset to impact, thus making it impossible to ascertain what the aircraft's response to zero control input would have been. Even in Alternate Law, the aircraft should have remained stable in pitch and bank until an input was made.

Secondly, we also know that the PF was making significant lateral inputs on top of the pitch commands - during the zoom climb this seems consistent with overcorrection, if not PIO. Looking at the DFDR data you can see that the right bank in this phase correlates with the input from the PF's stick - if he were correcting a right roll tendency the roll would occur even with the stick laterally neutral in the traces with an occasional correction to the left.

Finally, once the aircraft was into the stall regime any bank commands attempted via aileron would have been ineffective and inconsistent, as the wing needs to be flying in order for the ailerons to function correctly. The only way to effectively control bank past that point would be to recover from the stall and subsequently level the wings, or in an absolute worst-case scenario use the rudder very gingerly to get some degree of stability during the stall recovery sequence.

Additionally (and perhaps tangentially), there is no mention on the CVR of the aircraft exhibiting a right-roll tendency [EDIT: prior to stall]. Circumstantial I know - but in every case I know of where a specific and consistent control difficulty has come up, it's always mentioned by the crew.

[bubbers44]

I was joking about both going back and leaving the cockpit unattended to get a real pilot but they made things worse by what they did so might have been better off doing so. I have flown with some weak FO's but very rarely. Having two in the cockpit at the same time with no supervision was unheard of during my career. Hopefully this isn't our future in aviation to improve the bottom line by cutting costs.

[bubbers44]

How can their aircraft have a right rolling tendancy? We always trimmed our aircraft in level flight at cruise, wings level and adjusted the rudder trim to make it fly straight and level. Of course you have to normally turn the autopilot off in cruise to do this accurately so may be a problem for some. Once you are wings level and steady on heading the ball magically goes to the center so there are no right rolling tendancies. It has worked for decades and saves fuel too.

[mm43]

.... in every case I know of where a specific and consistent control difficulty has come up, it's always mentioned by the crew. Might be useful to have another look at the discussion on this subject that went on in AF447 Thread No.5 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-70.html#post6616030)

[BARKINGMAD]

Since the current paranoia about hand flying in RVSM, how many F/Os and indeed current captains have had the pleasure and satisfaction, as well as the competence, to fly the 'frame at cruise altitude and even curent max ceiling?

I would not be surprised if neither of the AF447 F/Os had any significant useful current experience in the unusual handling characteristics of their craft at such altitudes, most handling experience now appears to be limited to the lower levels.

This may account for the oscillations observed from FDR, so why is this high-level handling skill being written out of the requirements for Public Transport pilots?

A few minutes in the simulator does NOT suffice to "train" our colleagues in such handling, which is occasionally required when the automatics give up.

Perhaps a climb to and leveloff at cruise altitude should be an item to be assessed in annual line checks, hopefully the presence of 3 fully qualified pilots in the flight deck would prevent the (rightfully) much feared altitude excursion but permit real life high-level handling?

Otherwise how will we get operating crew who are experienced and reasonably current in AIRCRAFT CONTROL at all parts of the legal operating envelope?

My fear, when I'm SLF, is that I'm boarding such a flight where (both of) the Magenta Kids are INCAPABLE of handling the aircraft in S&L at cruise altitude, never mind the trim runaway case where the problem will be compounded by forces and reactions never before experienced by those allegedly in charge.

So part of the UAS training should include a box in the line check form that the candidate is at least capable of handling the REAL aircraft in the cruise and hopefully when things start to go "twang", ALL of us are at least capable of keeping blue-side up, brown-side down whilst the problem is diagnosed and sorted?

I suspect that not only were the AF447 drivers confused by the performance instrument indications, but that the manner in which the 'frame reacted to control inputs was outside their experience, for the reasons I've just offered.

P S. For the beancounters and managers, such online training should not incur a cost penalty, except the automatics are not controlling the flight to cruise level so the odd kg of fuel might be consumed but immeasurable and trivial compared with the valuable experience and knowledge gained by crews?

[DozyWannabe]

Might be useful to have another look at the discussion on this subject that went on in AF447 Thread No.5 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-70.html#post6616030)

Agreed with what you're saying there. The point I was trying to get at was that the aircraft's flightpath was caused by external factors, not a problem within the aircraft itself...

[Linktrained]

Barkingmad

With all the recording of the minute details of each flight now done, surely the amount of hand-flying done by each pilot at cruising level is already available.

In an earlier contribution I suggested that this might be called "447 Time", just to remind pilots of what MAY have been a contributing factor. It could or should, be practiced, at least initially, in areas and at times with the agreement of ATC.

As a very very new Second Officer I was expected and required by my Captains to be able to do just this, admittedly prior to RVSM, for alternate hours of cruising flight.

I was told " NOT TO WANDER ABOUT !"

I suppose that I must have met their standards. As a newish F/O i was the only other pilot on board, flying via Keflavik, Gander and Bermuda to Kingston and hand-flying for 4 hours on each leg (A/P U/S).

One of the 36 passengers weighed "27 stone". We saw that he HAD to be in TWO PLACES AT ONCE, but with an extra seat belt.

Flight time limitations came some years later.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

How can their aircraft have a right rolling tendancy?
I think it's a misinterpretation. When the heading changed (as per FDR) and the crew said "je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement", the aircraft was already stalled (and for a long time).
That doesn't denote a right roll tendancy when it was still flying, as other posters already pointed above :)

[xcitation]

@ Dozy

thus making it impossible to ascertain what the aircraft's response to zero control input would have been.


The BEA has done this for you.
I should have clarified this earlier.
The pink line represents "Simulation without pilot input and with reconstructed wind".
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/imageshr/figure.64.en.png

So can we drop the speculation about what would have happened without pilot inputs? BEA says no barrel roll and no oscillations.

[DozyWannabe]

@xcitation:

Yes, I'm aware of that - allow me to rephrase as "that *particular* aircraft", as some were positing theories that it was damaged in some other way. For what it's worth, I'm of the opinion that the BEA are correct, and that other than the known issues there was nothing materially wrong with the aircraft itself.

[xcitation]

One hypothesis is that the PF pulled stick back because of loss of ASI and fears of a dive and over speed - possibly reinforced by the stall warning later.
Whilst ASI was not available the ground speed could have been used to gain a qualitative idea of going faster or slower e.g. seeing GS decay 400kts to 1000kts as he pulled up and began to hear <<STALL>> then stick forward and see GS increase and warning disappear.
Clearly GS is a terrible quantitive measure of AS on its own e.g. a nose dive would give a low GS and high AS, however combining it with attitude, altitude, vsi etc it could have been of use.
We know he should have followed UAS procedure however the PF appears to have chosen to chase a response from a/c to his flight control inputs. These inputs became more extreme as he dug a deeper hole in seeking response. Glancing at ground speed could have helped him observe the input/response and get some feel in the void.

[Teldorserious]

Still arguing over whether pilots should know how to fly straight and level?

The debate rages on! Hire experience or hire checklist reading robots.

[Natstrackalpha]

The letters CB just spring to mind, I wonder why that is?

[xcitation]

@Teldorserious
Hire experience or hire checklist reading robots

Are you saying experienced guys don't need checklists?
Those checklists are written in the blood of many brave aviators.
The one Apollo astronaut I knew had checklists for nearly everything.
Maybe you're exceptional and never use them but for us mere mortals they work well.
As often said here many accidents are by highly experienced pilots.

[Linktrained]

"Hire experience or..."
That experience had to be gained, somewhere.

And then kept in reasonable practice, too.

It is not " Just something that I did as a beginner and have been able (or forced) to forget ever since."

I had a F/O who allowed the aircraft to drift down towards
the opposing traffic flow, following an A/P failure. He appeared to have forgotten that the ordinary manual controls worked at cruising level, too !
He was able to practice, all the way home.

[bubbers44]

Pilots need to know how to read checklists and also handfly the plane. They just can't do one. We have seen some accidents recently that show how important airmanship is and not just being a checklist reader as previously said. Robots can do that but pilots can also fly an attitude and power to avoid AF447 type accidents. I know this is getting really boring but they should have not needed the captain in the cockpit to fix the problem. He would have fixed it.

[roulishollandais]

Pilots need to know how to read checklists and also handfly the plane. They just can't do one. We have seen some accidents recently that show how important airmanship is and not just being a checklist reader as previously said Regarding cultures , or better said, cultural background : Fact is that the "latin " approach to Team work is totally different than . say the Asian one, jut to take an example. CRM principles were initially designed by and for anglo-saxons , where respect for authority is average but adherence to rules strong. It does not fit all cultures unfortunately, and as we know changing a culture is not easy. Changing a latin culture into anango saxon one has been tried before. Results were mixed to say the least.

I fly regularly in jump seats with a large airline whose policy is: if any crew member say " Go around" the PF must ( and will) go around first , and ask (or debate) why afterwards. This simple rule seem to be difficult to transpose into other airlines whose main culture is totally different
SOP and Check-lists look like written in context-free language, smell like context-free, have colour of context-free, but are NOT CONTEXT-FREE, will never be context-free, and translated in automation algorithms would get hidden bugs too.
Edit Add :
That does not mean don't use check lists and SOP, but don't be blind in using them. They are not perfect, sometimes missing.
I remember in my airline flying MD83 :
1. We had a long never trained emergency procedure in case of physical loss of an engine (rupture) . The check-list was more than one page. The first page finished with "continue page 58" (no more sure it was 58) , but page 58 was a false information, we had to continue on another page that I had time to discover in my armchair at home. I wanted to correct the mention "58" but I have never been allowed by the sector head. Happily engine do not often break and fly away.
2. We had no emergency procedure in case of dutch roll, but once we had dutch roll. Happily the captain had been taught in USA, could decide it was a dutch roll, and tried what had been said in USA "don't touch the control". Not perfect but it worked after great height loss

[Clandestino]

This thread and ten previous are treasure trove of information... for psychologist interested in obstinacy.

Xcitation's link is at least 10th time it is mentioned that analysis of "What would happen if no control input had been made" was performed and has shown very moderate roll and pitch excursions yet folks still harp about turbulence and unstable aeroplane.

Many a time were referenced parts of report that mention that crew was flying through area frequented by thunderstorms but they made a good job of avoiding and yet every now and then someone shouts "They entered CB!"

Interim 2 was very clear that almost every incident (about 30 of them) in cruise resulted in AP disconnect and degradation to alternate law but none resulted in any injury, damage, overstress or departing the envelope. Still we have folks shouting from their soapboxes of how difficult it is to manually fly the modern airliner at altitude and that we need more actual practice in doing so or otherwise we'll face dire consequences.

Of course, there are usual suspects whose last escapade was to hint that what happened to sloppily maintained and then tragically slipshod test flown 320 is in some mysterious way applicable to all FBW Airbi.

While there were a lot of posts that were relevant, informative and stemming from some excellent expert analysis, if we were to employ noise reduction technique on the AF447 threads we'd be hard pressed to fill a single thread with signal, let alone ten.

[roulishollandais]

if we were to employ noise reduction technique on the AF447 threads we'd be hard pressed to fill a single thread with signal, let alone ten
It shows that PPRuNe is not an adept of the "final solution".

[Natstrackalpha]

Agreed with what you're saying there. The point I was trying to get at was that the aircraft's flightpath was caused by external factors, not a problem within the aircraft itself...

Yeh, like a :mad: great big thunderstorm.

[Natstrackalpha]

All this habooble about controlling the aircraft - did they not use the FPV?
At least they would have seen their flightpath that way - as sailing downhill with a nose high attitude is an exceptionally bad situation.

This idea of "full back stick produces climb and TOGA and it will not stall" probably enticed the pilot to do just that in a magentarianly childish sort of way . . .? This "belief" has fooled one or two, at the wrong altitude or in the wrong law.

Also, why not use the three gimballed gyro like they did on the Apollo integrating the D.I. with the A.I. Apart from gymbal lock over the poles -there would be a 3D (kind of) indication of ATT then.

[roulishollandais]

- did they not use the FPV?
They lost the FPV at 02.12.10 (Capt PFD) and 02.12.16 (FO PFD). ACARS sent messages, but these are WARNING messages who have no issue on ECAM :E

Interim report (N°,1) Jul 2,2009 (Page 50/128)
1.16.2.4 Analysis of the messages recieved on 1. Jul from 2h10 via SITA's ACARS network
[...]
02.12.10-.WRN/WN0906010211 341200106 FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV
02.12.16-.WRN/WN0906010211 341200106 FLAG ON FO PFD FPV

[DozyWannabe]

This idea of "full back stick produces climb and TOGA and it will not stall" probably enticed the pilot to do just that in a magentarianly childish sort of way . . .?

There is no evidence for this - none whatsoever. Yet this belief seems to have pervaded a certain set of people...

This "belief" has fooled one or two, at the wrong altitude or in the wrong law.

When and where? I've never heard of any incident or accident caused by flight law confusion.

[Natstrackalpha]

Indeed?

The one at the airshow many years ago - full back stick below 100`
Aircraft landed in the trees.

[Natstrackalpha]

Thank you Roulis, will review.

[HazelNuts39]

From the Final Report, page 98 (my bolding):
It should however be noted that an error was made in the analysis of the “FLAG FPV ON PFD CAPT (F/O)” message. This had been explained by the combination of two conditions: that the TRK-FPA mode had been selected by the crew, and that the FPV was unavailable. In fact, the first of these conditions is not taken into consideration when sending the message to the CMC. The fact that the status of the FDR parameter, which indicates the transition from HDG-VS mode to TRK-FPA mode, did not change during the flight confirms that the crew did not at any time select TRK-FPA mode.

[CONF iture]

The fact that the status of the FDR parameter, which indicates the transition from HDG-VS mode to TRK-FPA mode, did not change during the flight confirms that the crew did not at any time select TRK-FPA mode.
Except that coincidently some 20 sec earlier the CPT had just said :
"Prend ça"
Probably what I could say after selecting the bird on ...

That's also coincidently the period of time when full back stick was maintained ... at which time the bird would have been firmly at the bottom of the PFD ...

BEA is not telling everything.
Where are ALL the data ?

[roulishollandais]

@Hazelnuts39
1. In any case the FPV was no more available, due to ADIRU algorithm which is not purely inertial. (not equipping HUD is inertial, as gums confirmed it often).
2.We no more find the whole list of the ACARS in the final report. To find it we have to go to the N°1 BEA interim report (in english only : WHY ?)
3. and we find that strange note :

1.16.2.5 Partial conclusion
[...]
Note: the CFR was designed to facilitate maintenance operations; it is therefore not intended to be used for investigation purposes


I understand that OPS didn't "knew" MAINTENANCE ...

That interim report has been written jul 2. 2009, and ACARS were recieved by AIR FRANCE (CDG, were they received by AF RIO too ?) nearly in real time.... a couple of minutes before the crash.

The messages received on 1st June after 2 h 10 all transited via the same
satellite (Atlantic Ocean West, operated by the Inmarsat Company) and SITA’s ACARS network. The twenty-four raw maintenance messages are listed in the table below:

02:10:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF

02:10:16 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 226201006AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT

02:10:23 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 279100506F/CTL ALTN LAW

02:10:29 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228300206FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT

02:10:41 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228301206FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT

02:10:47 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 223002506AUTO FLT A/THR OFF

02:10:54 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 344300506NAV TCAS FAULT

02:11:00 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228300106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD

02:11:15 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228301106FLAG ON F/O PFD FD

02:11:21 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 272302006F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT

02:11:27 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 279045506MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 2

02:11:42 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 279045006MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 1

02:11:49 - .1/FLR/FR0906010210 34111506EFCS2 1,EFCS1,AFS,,,,,PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 1X3 (9DA),HARD

02:11:55 - .1/FLR/FR0906010210 27933406EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HA

02:12:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010211 341200106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV

02:12:16 - .1/WRN/WN0906010211 341201106FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV

02:12:51 - .1/WRN/WN0906010212 341040006NAV ADR DISAGREE

02:13:08- .1/FLR/FR0906010211 34220006ISIS 1,,,,,,,ISIS(22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION,HARD

02:13:14 - .1/FLR/FR0906010211 34123406IR2 1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3,,,,ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD

02:13:45 - .1/WRN/WN0906010213 279002506F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT

02:13:51 - .1/WRN/WN0906010213 279004006F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT

02:14:14 - .1/WRN/WN0906010214 341036006MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR 2

02:14:20 - .1/FLR/FR0906010213 22833406AFS 1,,,,,,,FMGEC1(1CA1),INTERMITTENT

02:14:26

- .1/WRN/WN0906010214 213100206ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED

[DozyWannabe]

The one at the airshow many years ago - full back stick below 100`
Aircraft landed in the trees.

That wasn't flight law confusion, that was stuffing up the approach and letting the engines spool down, having previously disabled the safety feature that would prevent them automatically doing so. Because the aircraft in that case was in Normal Law, it never stalled - it simply crashed because the crew put it in an irrecoverable position. Anyway - completely different incident, not really relevant here...

[jcjeant]

BEA is not telling everything.
Where are ALL the data ?
The BEA (and some other) have all data
IMHO to see it will take to wait for the trial as it is a request of some families' lawyers

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

@ CONF iture:

FDR parameter, which indicates the transition from HDG-VS mode to TRK-FPA mode, did not change during the flight
Hard fact.
(+ BEA admits it can make mistakes... and correct them in due time)

Except that coincidently some 20 sec earlier the CPT had just said :
"Prend ça"
Probably what I could say after selecting the bird on ...
Guess.
(based on a very vague word: "ça"/"that", BTW)

Which one do you believe?

BEA is not telling everything.
Where are ALL the data ?
You may repeat it at lenght (which you do, lately), but without adding hard facts and/or logical patterns, I doubt many will change their mind to embrace your view.

Cheers :)

[HazelNuts39]

The captain's "Prend ça" is echoed three times by the PNF. The BEA nor the judicial group of experts understand what "ça" refers to. The next item on the CVR record is the PF saying that he has 'no vario' "there". Both the BEA and the judicial experts attribute that to the VSI needle being on the stop, but it has been there (6000 fpm) for some time.

Therefore I think the PF is replying to the captain and the PNF, who have been pointing to the standby instrument, which doesn't indicate V/S.

EDIT:
Why is it a problem for the PF that he doesn't have V/S? I can understand a pilot needs V/S to maintain altitude or a certain value of V/S. Both pilots have expressed more than once that they've lost control, the altimeter is spooling down rapidly, and the PF announces: "Ï have a problem, it's that I don't have vertical speed indication"?

[Lonewolf_50]

HazelNuts39:
I seem to recall a line of thought that went this way:

that if he was looking at the V/S, and the V/S was "pegged, (at a max value) he may not have recognized how fast he was falling, and then thought his V/S display was wrong.

I may have mis-remembered a number of previous discussions on this, but the guess along that line of thinking is consistent with a general breakdown in instrument scan. His significant change in altitude (an error) when flight condition and route called for straight and level flying, is also a symptom of a breakdown in instrument scan.

[gums]

I am feeling that some of the dinosaurs here are resisting the concept of an inertially-based flight path symbol, coupled with a HUD are too much to ask. I also iterate some of my beefs and whines rom the last four years. Sorry, but I need to rant.

I try to live the situation of 447 and am deeply saddened. I understand to some of extent the complications of crew resource management and such in a plane with more than one "pilot". I never had that problem or challenge. If I screwed up, it was me. I didn't take 200 PLF's with me.

I understand the mentality of "you can't stall this plane", but I also learned the best I could all the reversion laws and such of the first operational FBW system in the world. After all, you never, not ever, commanded actual control surface position or rates with zero stick/yolk feedback. In our family model we could not see or feel was the nugget in the other seat was attmpting. In an extreme situation, as with sensed AoA above 30 degrees or so, HAL would allow you to use the "manual stick override" feature, and you could actually control horizontal stab like the 'bus "direct mode".

As 'doze pointed out, in the "airshow/demo" accident and with 447, it is possible to fly the jet to a condition that precludes recovery. So I question basic airmanship and knowledge of the plane's capabilities and aero characteristics.

Back to my main whine - why not a flight path vector clearly displayed to show you what the plane is actually doing with zero air data, and a very simple device that resembles what you see looking forward as you fly those last thousand feet before touchdown begin the flare.

I flew with such things from 1971 until 1984. I checked out many commercial reserve and guard pilots. They simply loved the displays and capabilities.

see: HGS-3500 Head-up Guidance System (http://www.rockwellcollins.com/Data/Products/Displays/Head-Up%20Displays-HUD/HGS-3500Head-upGuidanceSystem.aspx)

Maybe I am not informed of what the current commercial jets use for basic attitude reference, or if they have an inertial system for nav and velocity vectors. Seems to me that many vendors have provided these since the 70's, although we military pukes used them from the early 60's.

Sorry for the rant, and I'll watch the reaction.

[femanvate]

Few crashes have captured our fears and emotions like AF447, literally disappearing over the middle of an ocean. After all the finger pointing and politics, there are still strong arguments attributing the cause to various parties.
1. If you blame the pilots to vindicate Air France, you are correct.
2. If you blame Air France to vindicate Airbus, you are correct.
3. If you blame Airbus to vindicate the pilots, you are correct.
Did we learn enough to anticipate these scenarios happening again? or will the growth of fly-by-wire lead to a new category of "digital crashes™ "

[Clandestino]

This is Profesional Pilots Rumour Network.

Aerospace professionals do not indulge in assigning blame, so if you are looking for someone who is both blaming something or someone and is also correct, you are at wrong place.

Few crashes have captured our fears and emotions like AF447Imagination too, as you only too well prove.

[Landflap]

"Aerospace professionals do no indulge in assigning blame ".............Good grief, tell us which joyous planet you live on ! My 40 year career and well over 20,000 hrs as a professional pilot have convinced me that the blame culture is rife. Everyone seems to want a scapegoat in order to shift the blame. Sometimes, just to place a situation in a box and close the file. Indeed, I started my career in 1965 laughing at the phrase "Not me Guv, I'm electrics !" ! The AF prang is not classroom holes in cheese lining up. It is inadequate pilot training, inadequate airmanship & the armchair computerised technology favoured by modern aircraft designers. Damn, just argued myselef into lining up holes ! Look, get back to proper, selected, pilot training & teach the guys & gals at the sharp end to FLY out of problems. Avoid thinking inside the box. It will kill you.

[Centaurus]

& teach the guys & gals at the sharp end to FLY out of problems

And that's the rub.. Simulators are just the vehicle to learn how to FLY out of problems. But when the majority of check pilot/simulator instructors have no idea how to first demonstrate rather than simply criticise from the jump seat, then it is easier for them to talk the pilot under training through button pressing rather than actually placing hands on the flight controls and throttles and fixing the problem quickly.

[roulishollandais]

After more than 40 years so positive experience in Military planes , it is time to teach HUD flying in civilian airline world.

To get it :

1. We have to add it to ICAO Instrument Rating mandatory items to know to get instrument rating qualification.

2. Gyrolasers have proved their liability in Space navigation too... It is great time to fly with inertial informations as basic information and PFD as spare, and

3. Using head-up displays .

With A320 we discovered with surprise that very strange - non-pilot -position neck bolded on computers during ... minutes!! PM and sometimes PF have in supposed to be "modern" FBW planes.

Civilian pilots are still using the very old concepts to fly without visibility or transitioning instrument/visual leading to crashes by bad piloting AND management.

Aerobatics is still to learn to understand mechanik of flight and forget the wrong Airbus ad. phantasm anything flying would never stall..

Pilots have to get pilots again. Head up with good informations in the brain and in the eyes :)

(skydiving taught me "Body goes where eyes are going) ;)

[J.O.]

Re Femanvate's question - did AF447 change enough to prevent it reoccuring?

When an accident is caused by a large number of negative factors coming together with tragic consequences, I don't believe there is any such thing as the 100% solution. Yes, some of those factors should be a straight forward fix - in particular the pitot tubes which were already a known issue - but those that are related to human behaviour are much more difficult. How do you gaurantee that no pilot will ever haul the nose up to an excessive attitude in response to a fairly simple fault? How do you impress it upon aircraft commanders that leaving the flight deck for a snooze as you are entering one of the most dangerous weather zones on the planet may not be the best idea? How do you ensure that every possible fault scenario has been thoroughly anticipated so that proper procedures and training can be put in place to allow pilots to deal with them effectively and safely? What can you put in place to give relatively inexperienced pilots enough reserve in the tank so that when a challenging situation is presented, their actions aren't detrimental to the result?

These are all very complex questions that don't offer simple solutions. So in other words, while we'd all like to think it can't happen again, how do we know that even if we've dealt with many of the contributing factors, that there aren't others hiding in the weeds, just waiting for the opportunity to strike? For all that we have advanced in aviation equipment, procedures and training, predicitive engineering is still an infant in this game.

[PEI_3721]

J.O. ‘It’, AF447 should not happen again; as you say there are fixes, and the industry rarely suffers the exact same accident.
Did it change enough for AF447, yes; for future safety, I doubt it.
The critical lesson is how difficult it is to identify the significant contributing factors and the conditions by which these line up – what is significant.

Attributing cause or identifying the ‘holes’ which previously had lined up, suffers hindsight bias.
Humans are biased; it’s easier to blame someone or something than understand the underlying issues. Blame – blame culture, does not help learning.

What the industry might learn is a reminder that accidents can happen from very rare events, and with hindsight there are indicators – precursors, which if understood earlier and managed, might prevent an accident. We cannot succeed in all cases, but we might learn how to prevent the initial events escalating.

Safety is like a boat, they all leak. The art of safety is to identify the large holes, plug them, and ensure that you can bail faster than the residual leaks. But this assumes you understand what is meant by a hole or a significant leak.

We might not be able to identify all aspects, but we could identify and change the process of how ‘holes’ line up; i.e. how we think about safety, anticipate, monitor, respond, and learn (http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/61/39/86/PDF/RAGdiscussion_APR05.pdf); both individually and as an organization.

[FlexibleResponse]

I tend to agree with Landflap.

And to answer femanvate's question, no, we have not yet learnt these basic lessons to prevent a recurrence of AF447...sadly enough...

[Uplinker]

I think the real question here is : Why do airlines think it is OK to use less and less experienced pilots?

For example; the sort of pilot who has no experience of "real" aircraft, say turbo prop twins, that they think it is reasonable to hold full back stick/yoke in a stall situation - and they think that by doing so they will recover and fly out of the situation? Or that it's OK to viciously 'pump' the rudder pedals through turbulence, which snaps the fin off.

What is the airline's end-game here?

[Lonewolf_50]

What is the airline's end-game here?
Possible answer: Getting rid of pilots, since HAL will never go on strike. :E

[DozyWannabe]

Possible answer: Getting rid of pilots, since HAL will never go on strike. :E

If only it were that simple (as I'm sure you're aware!)...

PJ2 has written some excellent posts on the encroachment of the MBA generation into airline management and how it has negatively affected training and safety culture.

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/285754-thoughts-airline-training.html#post3441359
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/392314-we-facing-safety-issue-3.html#post5256776
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/489774-af-447-thread-no-9-a-32.html#post7306229

If people are looking for a thorough and well-reasoned argument, I'd suggest looking them up and starting from there.

And for those thinking of it as an exercise in blaming/exonerating the crew, AF or Airbus - the report makes it clear that mistakes were made by all three of those entities, plus others. In short, none of them come up smelling of roses, and nor does the industry as a whole.

For my part, the old engineering truism:
You can have it done fast, done well or done cheap. Pick two.

rings very true in this case.

[Bealzebub]

I think the real question here is : Why do airlines think it is OK to use less and less experienced pilots?

For example; the sort of pilot who has no experience of "real" aircraft, say turbo prop twins, that they think it is reasonable to hold full back stick/yoke in a stall situation - and they think that by doing so they will recover and fly out of the situation? Or that it's OK to viciously 'pump' the rudder pedals through turbulence, which snaps the fin off.

What is the airline's end-game here?

In this case the Captain had over 11,000 hours, and the F/O's over 9,000 hours between them. In the case of AA 587 (which I assume you are alluding to) The F/O (PF) had around 4,500 hours including a range of twin turboprop aircraft in his previous employments, (DH6, BE99 and SH360's). The Captain had over 8,000 hours and came from a military background. He had nearly half of his experience as Captain, and had around 6,000 hours with the airline of which over 1,700 were on type.

As is evident from the last 80 years and more, experience hasn't stopped accidents. Technology hasn't stopped accidents. Training hasn't stopped accidents. It is the interaction, development, and understanding of the human factors aspects of how all these things combine together that is leading to huge improvements in safety. It is always going to be a work in progress, and (certainly in my lifetime) never likely to eliminate error or failure.

Training is now moving towards more relevant competency based and specific to the role. It still has a great deal of scope for improvement. Experience is a good thing, but it can also be the façade of bad practice, complacency," normalization of deviance," and weak training and learning.

Airlines are commercial enterprises. They want to offer a regular, safe and profitable commodity. One accident (in many cases) has the potential to kill their business as well as their customers. They don't attract customers, they have no business. They don't offer a regular and safe service, they have no business. They don't make a profit, they have no business. It is really that simple.

[Teldorserious]

Beal - You couldn't be more wrong. First and fore most you can't name ONE accident that experience wouldn't have prevented and does on a daily basis.

Over and over, we see a plane go down and say 'he should have done that' and it's the same old thing, over and over. If they had hired a pilot and not a checklist reader, buddy or a pal, everyone would be alive.

[Bealzebub]

Teldorserious,

If there is any logic in your response, it is so tortured that it is crying out for help. Perhaps you would care to make a sensible statement or question, so that a sensible reply can be offered.

[Armchairflyer]

Santa Bárbara Airlines Flight 518 is IMHO an example where a less experienced captain (or even a "magenta line addict") would probably have refrained from taking off with some of the navigation equipment not (yet) working properly. And the Los Rodeos crash is arguably another case where experience and reputation were at least a double-edged sword.

[DozyWannabe]

Santa Bárbara Airlines Flight 518 is IMHO an example where a less experienced captain (or even a "magenta line addict") would probably have refrained from taking off with some of the navigation equipment not (yet) working properly.

If I recall correctly, the crew were not aware of the extent to which the nav equipment (even down to the mag compass) was broken.

And the Los Rodeos crash is arguably another case where experience and reputation were at least a double-edged sword.

That was an almost unique situation in that the Captain had spent more time in the simulator as a TRE than he had on the line over the previous months. In the sim, obtaining clearance was usually a formality.

Don't get me wrong - overconfidence is dangerous, and experience *can* sometimes breed overconfidence. However, fundamentally they are two different things. AF447 exposed an industry-wide problem whereby training in several areas - in particular stall recognition/recovery and high-altitude manual handling - had been allowed to slip too far.

[jcjeant]

And for those thinking of it as an exercise in blaming/exonerating the crew, AF or Airbus - the report makes it clear that mistakes were made by all three of those entities, plus others. In short, none of them come up smelling of roses, and nor does the industry as a whole.

Yes none of them .. included the BEA but they forget to put their mistakes in the report :)
The phenomenon of ice crystals was officially ignored (was not taken into
account in the regulatory definitions)
Before the accident, the BEA estimated that the number of precursor events had not interest in flight safety.
After the accident, the BEA has undertaken an analysis of the events which led to the issue in emergency (December 2009) a safety recommendation to the certification standards
Pitot probes are changed.
With this recommendation, the BEA has admitted, without saying, that he had erred in its assessment of the facts.
The blockage of the Pitot probes has multiple system failures that seriously affect the control of the aircraft.
This is a serious incident under the European Directive 94/56/EC.
BEA had an obligation to investigate and possibly make recommendations.

[DozyWannabe]

@jcj:

By its very own nature the BEA is simply an incident and accident investigation bureau. It is not a regulator and cannot make recommendations unless invited to do so. The previous UAS incidents happened across a wide group of airlines from many countries and none of the investigation bureaus of those countries saw fit to make recommendations either. The revised procedures and workarounds, along with the pitot tube replacement schedule were considered sufficient by all parties at the time, so to point a finger at the BEA in this instance is a fallacy.

[jcjeant]

It is not a regulator and cannot make recommendations unless invited to do soThe BEA have not to be invited to do investigation on reports of incidents or accidents he know(if those are mandatory for flight safety) and he can made any recommendations he want
Remind your mantra ... the BEA is independent
The regulators are not mandatory to follow those recommendations ... but usually they follow them

none of the investigation bureaus of those countries saw fit to make recommendations either
Pitot icing problems were identified by the BFU (German BEA) since 1999.
Besides Airbus was so aware that it caters to the U.S. FAA
September 2009 in an attempt to make him change the negative formulation for
manufacturer of the AD (see ABI letter to the FAA below):

To:
U.S. Department of Transportation
Docket Operations, M–30
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.

West Building Ground Floor
Room W12-140
WASHINGTON, DC 20590, USA
FROM
Marc LE-LOUER
DATE
04 September 2009
PHONE
+33 (0)5 61 93 24 57
FAX
+33 (0)5 61 93 45 80
E-MAIL

OUR REFERENCE
EALA_LR03D09021899
YOUR REFERENCE
Docket Number FAA–2009–0781; Directorate
Identifier 2009–NM–111–AD; Amendment 39–
16004
Copy:
FAA – Vladimir Ulyanov
EASA – L. Gruz
Airbus EA – Y. Régis
Airbus EAL – F. Duclos
Airbus GSE - F. Combes
Subject: Airbus comments on Docket Number FAA–2009–0781; Directorate Identifier
2009–NM–111–AD; Amendment 39–16004; AD 2009–18–08 : Final rule; request for
comments.
Dear Sir,
Airbus is pleased to provide comments on the FAA’s Final rule Docket Number FAA–2009–
0781;
Directorate Identifier 2009–NM–111–AD; Amendment 39–16004; AD 2009–18–08.
In order to be consistent with the EASA text in the AD 2009-0195, we ask you to replace the
sentence " airspeed discrepancies, which could lead to disconnection of the autopilot and/or
autothrust functions, and reversion to flight control alternate law and consequent increased
pilot workload. Depending on the prevailing airplane altitude and weather, this condition, if
not corrected, could result in reduced control of the airplane" in the "Unsafe Condition"
paragraph with the following sentence :
"Airspeed discrepancies may lead in particular to disconnection of the autopilot and/or auto-
thrust functions, and reversion to Flight Control Alternate law. Depending on the prevailing
aéroplane altitude and weather environment, this condition could result in increased difficulty
for the crew to control the aeroplane.
Indeed, from the Handling Quality perspective the unreliable air speed event and the as per
design consequences don't change the a/c contrability. It only increases the pilot workload to
control the a/c.
Secondly could you add the following sentence, which has been inserted in the EASA AD
2009-
0195 (sentence not included initially in the PAD 09-099). It presents the results of additional
Pitot probe tests :
"Preliminary results of additional wind tunnel testing conducted with the C16195BA probe
during
August 2009 are consistent with the qualification data of the probe and have not identified
any safety issue regarding the probe behaviour within the icing envelope as defined in the
appendix

[DozyWannabe]

The BEA have not to be invited to do investigation on reports of incidents or accidents he know(if those are mandatory for flight safety) and he can made any recommendations he want

You're wrong there - while the BEA is independent it can only issue reports either if invited to do so, or if the conclusions it comes to vary from those of the designated investigation authority (in the form of a rebuttal).


Pitot icing problems were identified by the BFU (German BEA) since 1999.

Completely different manufacturer and model of tube and a completely different airframe. Pitot tube icing has been a known issue in aviation circles for as long as they've been used!

Besides Airbus was so aware that it caters to the U.S. FAA September 2009 in an attempt to make him change the negative formulation for manufacturer of the AD

Firstly, Airbus has no direct connection to the BEA, DGAC or any other agency of the French government, so I don't see what this has to do with what we were previously discussing.

Secondly, the change in phrasing does not (as far as I can see) downplay the problem in any way - it simply increases the level of technical detail and accuracy (and apparently also ensures that the FAA document is as in-depth as the EASA document).

[jcjeant]

while the BEA is independent it can only issue reports either if invited to do soSo .. finally that's a proof that the BEA is not independent ...
You can't be independent if your actions are monitored or must be allowed by somebody else

[DozyWannabe]

@jcj:

No - "independent" in this case means that the investigating organisation is independent from the regulator and other government agencies, nothing more. The most infamous example of where this became a necessity was following the DC-10 case in the 1970s, where the FAA kept the NTSB at arms' length in favour of the "Gentlemens' Agreement".

Even a nominally independent accident investigation agency does not have the remit to begin an investigation of it's own volition.

[CONF iture]

while the BEA is independent it can only issue reports either if invited to do so
by who exactly ?

[DozyWannabe]

I doubt you need me to tell you that. They are involved by default when an accident or incident occurs to a French-registered aircraft, over French territory or if the aircraft was built in France. In the first and third cases, they are usually guests of the host investigating agency if the accident happened overseas. Sometimes they are called in by other countries' agencies as an independent assessor.

In the case of the previous UAS incidents involving Airbus widebodies, their remit only extended as far as the host nations would allow - and none of them demanded action over and above that which was being done prior to AF447.

[CONF iture]

The captain's "Prend ça" is echoed three times by the PNF. The BEA nor the judicial group of experts understand what "ça" refers to.
That's poor effort regarding an important remark on the cvr especially at a time when full back stick was maintained ...

The next item on the CVR record is the PF saying that he has 'no vario' "there".
Translation is incorrect.
The words are :

Je… j'ai, le problème c'est que j'ai plus de vario là
The problem is that I don't have any vsi anymore
d'accord j'ai plus aucune indication
Ok I don't have any indication at all

There's more in it that I don't have a VSI on the standby.

Both the BEA and the judicial experts attribute that to the VSI needle being on the stop, but it has been there (6000 fpm) for some time.
The quotes ?

Therefore I think the PF is replying to the captain and the PNF, who have been pointing to the standby instrument, which doesn't indicate V/S.
Now why would the CPT and PNF point to the standby instruments to use them if all big attitude indicators on the PFDs function and agree ?
What is supposed to be so interesting on the standby that the PFDs have to be ignored ?

Why is it a problem for the PF that he doesn't have V/S? I can understand a pilot needs V/S to maintain altitude or a certain value of V/S. Both pilots have expressed more than once that they've lost control, the altimeter is spooling down rapidly, and the PF announces: "Ï have a problem, it's that I don't have vertical speed indication"?
When indicating, are both V/S in agreement ?
Are 3 altimeters behaving the same way ?
Remember the attitude AoA bank and position of the statics ...

[jcjeant]

In the case of the previous UAS incidents involving Airbus widebodies, their remit only extended as far as the host nations would allow - and none of them demanded action over and above that which was being done prior to AF447.
From May 2008 to March 2009, nine incidents (UAS) of icing of the Pitot probes are recorded on the A340/A330 fleet of Air France.
These nine cases involve Thales AA probes.
Company Air France
Nation : France
Aircraft registered in France
BEA : French investigation agency

[HazelNuts39]

CONF iture:

Thanks for your correction and other observations. You've convinced me that "Prend ça" is probably not referring to the ISIS.

V/S exceeded 6000 fpm at approximately 02:11:31 and the PF's remark about the vario was at 02:11:58.

[NeoFit]

From May 2008 to March 2009, nine incidents (UAS) of icing of the Pitot probes are recorded on the A340/A330 fleet of Air France.

Coincidence?
AF 330/340 PHC logic had been modified since summer 2008 (http://www.jumboroger.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/AF-447-Observations-des-parties-civiles.pdf)(p12-13, 16, 34)

Remember the A340 TANA flight event - august 2008 (ASR - FGNIH AF908 CDG - TNR - ALARME STALL ET PERTE DES INDICATIONS DE VITESSE SUR LES PFD).

[DozyWannabe]

From May 2008 to March 2009, nine incidents (UAS) of icing of the Pitot probes are recorded on the A340/A330 fleet of Air France.
These nine cases involve Thales AA probes.
Company Air France
Nation : France
Aircraft registered in France
BEA : French investigation agency

Yes, that just leaves over 20 that weren't. None of which demanded from the host agencies any action more urgent or widespread than that which was already being done. Prior to AF447, UAS was considered a relatively minor problem by the industry as a whole.

@Neofit: No, it's probably not a coincidence, but it's a stretch to claim that there was anything nefarious to the change. Note that the document doesn't specify what the change was - perhaps a temperature boost, perhaps an extension to the amount of time the heat is cycled on.

That document (via electronic translation) reads to me like it has the fingerprints of the SNPL all over it, with the same old arguments against the Airbus FBW layout that they've been using since the '80s. It also implies early on that the BEA report lays responsibility for the accident with the crew, when in fact it does no such thing.

[jcjeant]

UAS was considered a relatively minor problem by the industry as a whole. Right .. but why it was also considered as relatively minor problem by a agency like the BEA for not investigate it .. and reverse (by recommendations) the idea that had the industry as a whole ?
Industry = profit
BEA -EASA = safety
The industry was playing her game ... what about the BEA and EASA
I'm certain that some questions about the BEA and EASA will popup at the trial .. and maybe it will be answers ..

[DozyWannabe]

As far as I'm concerned accident investigation agencies are still part of the industry. What concerns me is why you're singling out the BEA when they are far from the only agency that encountered the problem.

Also, investigative agencies tend to have a more peripheral role in non-fatal incidents. It's the recommendations of agencies with a broader remit, such as EASA, that tend to carry the weight - and they in turn hash out solutions with the manufacturers and the airlines.

It's important not to lose sight of the fact that the UAS situation triggered by the pitot tubes was simply the initiating factor. Far more central to the case is the question of why crews were insufficiently trained to handle such a situation, and a proper investigation into human factors - namely how a qualified pilot could become so overwhelmed by the situation that they do precisely the wrong thing consistently from onset to impact.

Re: the legal proceedings - call me cynical, but if I want the truth then the last person I'd expect to get it from is a lawyer. In fact most of the misinformation and scuttlebutt regarding Airbus has originated from within the legal profession via the news media.

[jcjeant]

It's important not to lose sight of the fact that the UAS situation triggered by the pitot tubes was simply the initiating factor. Far more central to the case is the question of why crews were insufficiently trained to handle such a situation, and a proper investigation into human factors - namely how a qualified pilot could become so overwhelmed by the situation that they do precisely the wrong thing consistently from onset to impact.Well you have the answers in your own message :)
UAS was considered a relatively minor problem by the industry as a whole. So .. why a extra training for what was considered by the whole industry as a minor problem ?
A extra training was put in force "after" the accident .. as contrary of the general idea .. the UAS is no more considered as a "minor problem"
Note that some had warn long before the AF447 case that a UAS was not a "minor problem"

[Clandestino]

Good grief, tell us which joyous planet you live on !

If blame culture is still alive & kicking, you can freely call my joyous world "Hypocrisia". For last decade and half everyone is publicly & officially denouncing it.

Look, get back to proper, selected, pilot training & teach the guys & gals at the sharp end to FLY out of problems. It might prove to be uneconomical.

After more than 40 years so positive experience in Military planes , it is time to teach HUD flying in civilian airline world.
So we can make loft deliveries in B787? There are civvie HUDs and folks using them are trained how to use them. There are procedures for dealing with unreliable airspeed that don't include HUD and AF447 crew did not follow them. Until such a time when no-HUD crew follows the prescribed procedure and it turns out to be insufficient, there is no real-life validated argument for "Everybody go fly the birdie!"

Gyrolasers have proved their liability in Space navigation too... It is great time to fly with inertial informations as basic informationThat's what I've been doing last 4 years.

PFD as spareNo can do. When my HUD packs up, only thing we lose is CAT3A, CAT2 is still available so it gets MELed and I'm ordered to go out and fly without it. Do you think I can say "Sorry boss, but I fly strictly HUD, I can't fly PFD only anymore" and still keep my job after that?

Civilian pilots are still using the very old concepts to fly without visibility or transitioning instrument/visual leading to crashes by bad piloting AND management.Civilian pilots proficient in using very old and very proven concepts of instrument flying are still alive. Those unable to apply them are those who are sadly no longer with us. Attitude+power = performance. Watch out for illusions. Know your aeroplane. Still works no matter how much electronics get packed into airframe.

How do you impress it upon aircraft commanders that leaving the flight deck for a snooze as you are entering one of the most dangerous weather zones on the planet may not be the best idea?Excuse me... how many aeroplanes did we lose crossing the ICTZ? How many flights cross it daily? Dangerous it might be but crossing it should be manageable for any airline pilot, which 99.999% of the time it is.

How do you ensure that every possible fault scenario has been thoroughly anticipated so that proper procedures and training can be put in place to allow pilots to deal with them effectively and safely? You don't. You teach pilots to understand the aeroplane and the atmosphere so they can come up with solutions for problems not covered by books and procedures.

What can you put in place to give relatively inexperienced pilots enough reserve in the tank so that when a challenging situation is presented, their actions aren't detrimental to the result? a) genetically alter future pilots so they are born experienced

b) train pilots so they are competent even when low houred.

What do you think real world does?

These are all very complex questions that don't offer simple solutions.These are simple questions with simple solutions (not necessarily easy or cheap ones, though) touted as complex by snake oil purveyors.

So in other words, while we'd all like to think it can't happen againIt can and it certainly will if we treat it as FBW crash. AF447 is performance related - aeroplane, crew and system performance.

For all that we have advanced in aviation equipment, procedures and training, predicitive engineering is still an infant in this game. Patently untrue, certainly ever since we got FDM.

Why do airlines think it is OK to use less and less experienced pilots?Because those claiming it's not OK have no leg to stand upon.

For example; the sort of pilot who has no experience of "real" aircraft, say turbo prop twins, that they think it is reasonable to hold full back stick/yoke in a stall situationLast time I checked, the beast that pancaked into Buffalo suburb was turbo prop twin.

It is always going to be a work in progress, and (certainly in my lifetime) never likely to eliminate error or failure.Not even if you live forever. That's why we got TEM.

First and fore most you can't name ONE accident that experience wouldn't have prevented and does on a daily basis. First and foremost, would you be so kind to check total hours of the commanders of: Crossair 3597, Birgenair 301, KLM 4805 and Airblue 202.

So much for the experience being panacea for all flying ills.

Over and over, we see a plane go down and say 'he should have done that' and it's the same old thing, over and over. If they had hired a pilot and not a checklist reader, buddy or a pal, everyone would be alive. Pretty clueless about how flying works, that anyone can have a bad day or be ignorant and marginally competent but lucky and have long flying career, yet pretending to be knowledgeable and judging who is pilot and who is checklist reader. Oh, well, there is always bottom of the page.

[henra]

2. Gyrolasers have proved their liability in Space navigation too... It is great time to fly with inertial informations as basic information and PFD as spare,


The ISIS installed in AF447 was a Ring Laser Gyro.

[roulishollandais]

The ISIS installed in AF447 was a Ring l@ser Gyro.
But mixed (polluted) in the algorithm with air data :\

[femanvate]

My question was not looking for someone to blame for AF447, but trying to analyze the root causes of that crash as they would apply towards the future of aviation, that will have hundreds of passengers flying one-pilot, then no-pilot craft.
AF447 involved a plane that did not correctly represent it's state of having failed airspeed sensors followed by the deep stall to the pilots. The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario, and the pilots never correctly deciphered the contradictory information at their disposal.
While blame can be attributed to the Airplane manufacturer, the airline, and the crew, blame should not be viewed as something to react against (unless you are a lawyer) as much as it should be freely discussed and used as a stepping stone to prepare for the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.

[Volume]

While blame can be attributed to the Airplane manufacturer, the airline, and the crew, blame should not be viewed as something to react against (unless you are a lawyer) as much as it should be freely discussed and used as a stepping stone to prepare for the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.Except for the last 7 words I could not agree more.

[DozyWannabe]

AF447 involved a plane that did not correctly represent it's state of having failed airspeed sensors followed by the deep stall to the pilots.

Err - yes it did. The ECAM, PFDs and warning systems all showed loss of pitot tube data, followed by UAS, and sounded the Stall Warning for over a minute once stall was in effect.

The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario

Check the previous threads - a UAS procedure was part of the documentation supplied to airlines.

...the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.

As a tech guy, I fervently believe it won't happen in my lifetime.

[Volume]

The airline never trained it's pilots to recognize and address such a scenario
Check the previous threads - a UAS procedure was part of the documentation supplied to airlines.So was the procedure supplied, or were the pilots trained or both? You might very well both be right. Just having a new procedure in the books does not mean that the pilots know (and understand!) it.
So was the UAS procedure part of the crew training at AF?
Did that particular crew went through UAS procedure training?

[Owain Glyndwr]

So was the procedure supplied, or were the pilots trained or both? You might very well both be right. Just having a new procedure in the books does not mean that the pilots know (and understand!) it.
So was the UAS procedure part of the crew training at AF?
Did that particular crew went through UAS procedure training?

The BEA report covered that in depth

[CONF iture]

Hard fact.
The closest from the Hard Fact is from the FDR data on the day of extraction, not from a published trace you can chose the color or the shape without sharing the raw material.
Full data to the families.

Guess.
(based on a very vague word: "ça"/"that", BTW)

And you are not more interested that the BEA in knowing what's behind that 'vague word' that seems central for the 3 crew members to understand why they act as they did ...
The same way, you and the BEA are not interested in the Wiring ACARS MSG.

You may repeat it at lenght (which you do, lately), but without adding hard facts and/or logical patterns, I doubt many will change their mind to embrace your view.
Should I care ?
If AZR had been a close friend of mine and on that flight deck, I know where my priority would go before blindly accepting his condemnation, get the full data, go to the hard facts.

[DozyWannabe]

Full data to the families.

The problem is, the more I look at the document purported to be on behalf of the families, the more it looks like your standard SNPL hatchet job, and I have to wonder if the SNPL have loaned the group their legal team for their own purposes.

They're not interested in the truth, they are interested in maximising the potential for civil action against those with the biggest pockets (namely Airbus and AF). The SNPL take great pleasure in smearing Airbus at any opportunity, so there's a degree of mutual interest there...

[CONF iture]

Then keep on looking dozy and tell me where the SNPL is putting all his weight to get the full data ... ?
SNPL is pure diversion nothing else.

[DozyWannabe]

If it's a diversion, then why does the document diverge into talk of conventional controls (with regard to stick-shaker), and erroneously claim that the BEA report puts the responsibility for the accident with the crew (which it does not)?

[CONF iture]

Noise around
Nothing concrete

Answer my last question

[DozyWannabe]

I can't answer your question because I don't know. What I do know is that asking for the raw data (which no agency has ever done with a DFDR that records that much information) isn't going to help, because the interpretation of that data is going to be an open goal for accusations of bias from both sides' legal representation, and the scope for misinterpretation of that data is going to be huge.

It smacks to me of playing to the gallery, with the intent of insinuating the notion that the report is incomplete and motives suspicious among those who haven't followed things closely up until now.

What makes little sense to me about this push is that the report as it stands states that while the aircraft was mishandled by the crew, this can be attributed -at least in part - to insufficient training on the part of the airline. The airline seemingly did not disseminate Airbus's UAS bulletins effectively, nor did it follow up on whether the message was received by its crews - it also elected to spread the maintenance schedule where the pitot tubes were to be replaced over time. Airbus allowed that, and the report highlights aspects of the aircraft's design which could be considered unhelpful in a situation of this nature.

Now I'm no legal expert, but it seems to me that these aspects of the report give grounds for the families to pursue legal damages and recompense against Air France, Airbus and the authorities already - so why would they need more than that?

[Uplinker]

..the future, which will undoubtedly see unmanned airliners giving us better reliability and cheaper flights.

You think????!!!!! One thing that has kept airline safety so high is that the pilots in the front don't want to die either.

Passengers wanting increasingly unrealistically cheap flights is one cause of the lowering of pilot standards and training, which is arguably one cause of this crash.

Flying in a plane is often cheaper than the equivalent train journey. How can that be economically possible? Think about it for one second. Think about where savings need to be made to make flying a jetliner, operating in three dimensions cheaper than a train, operating in one dimension???



(Before the trolls get out of their pits - I do realise that no trains go from South America to Europe !)

[DozyWannabe]

Passengers wanting increasingly unrealistically cheap flights is one cause of the lowering of pilot standards and training...

While I agree with you in general, I think this statement is at best debatable. The rise of the "lo-co"s, and the attempt to compete with them on price, didn't really take effect until well after the trend was noticeable. As PJ2 refers to, a far more plausible correlation can be drawn with the transition within airline management away from those who were "airline" people through and through towards a more generalised "MBA" style of management, which did not take into account the unique aspects of the sector.

Flying in a plane is often cheaper than the equivalent train journey. How can that be economically possible?

Well, quite. Arguably one of the reasons France's Air Inter ran into difficulties was having to compete with the TGV.

[jcjeant]

What I do know is that asking for the raw data (which no agency has ever done with a DFDR that records that much information)http://i.imgur.com/3v6qZJw.jpg

When they want .. they can :ok:

[DozyWannabe]

@jcj:

I said "with that amount of information". That FDR stored nothing like the amount of data that the DFDR on AF447 did.

As I said, the report as it stands questions the standards of Air France, Airbus and the regulator - isn't that enough for the families and their legal representatives to make a case?

[john_tullamarine]

Just having a new procedure in the books does not mean that the pilots know (and understand!) it.

General comment, ie not directed at this mishap specifically.

For us to accept such a statement is to accept that the standard of professionalism amongst working pilots has plummeted to an utterly abysmal level.

A bog standard pilot would be expected to know his relevant Type books. If there exists confusion, that would be referred to the operator's specialists and, if necessary to get some action, the relevant pilot union or regulatory agency. Sometimes one has to stand up and be counted, especially in respect of aircraft commanders.

Then again, the environment may have changed since I was in the sharp end ..

[CONF iture]

I can't answer your question because I don't know. What I do know is that asking for the raw data (which no agency has ever done with a DFDR that records that much information) isn't going to help, because the interpretation of that data is going to be an open goal for accusations of bias from both sides' legal representation, and the scope for misinterpretation of that data is going to be huge.
On the contrary, full data is the best way to cut the bs - Find something else.

Now I'm no legal expert, but it seems to me that these aspects of the report give grounds for the families to pursue legal damages and recompense against Air France, Airbus and the authorities already - so why would they need more than that?
The one who lost a loved one is looking for the full story, the real one, not a 'recompense' ... Once again, you're way out dozy.

[jcjeant]

That FDR stored nothing like the amount of data that the DFDR on AF447 did.

Don't be afraid of amount of data .. they are still enough paper and ink on earth to print it .....

[A33Zab]

Don't be afraid of amount of data .. they are still enough paper and ink on
earth to print it .....


And we need a monks lifetime to decode the 300+ mandatory parameters into a readable format for the ones who cannot read the - RAW - 12 bit Harvard BiPhase Code.

[HazelNuts39]

A33Zab,

Good point. Just to add - from Interim Report #2, para. 1.11:
This Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) has a recording capacity of at least twenty-five hours. The decoding document, supplied with this airplane, has around 1,300 parameters.