Forces' productivity

[flynavysomerset]

Letter in the DT


Forces’ productivity

SIR – It is good that Philip Hammond has spoken out on preserving the current level of defence spending (report, March 2).
This does not mean that defence spending could not achieve better value for money. One area that promises improvements without reducing operational capability is that of “harmony” – the amount of time sailors, soldiers and airmen are not available for operations — an inverse productivity measure, if you will.
The Armed Forces Pay Review board has demonstrated that each service has different harmony levels. On the surface this is a reasonable decision, as each service has a different role.
However, the Royal Navy has its own army (the Royal Marines) and its own air force (the Fleet Air Arm) and collectively they operate with less “harmony time” and thus a higher operational availability than the other two services.
By examining a common three-year period the difference in productivity becomes clear. Royal Marines are available for operations for 660 days, the Army 498. Fleet Air Arm personnel are available for 660 days, the RAF only 420.
If the Army and RAF had the same harmony time as the Royal Navy and its constituents, Army personnel levels could be reduced by up to 24 per cent and the RAF up to 36 per cent without reducing operational availability – a significant saving, allowing scarce money to be used elsewhere in defence.

Dr Duncan Redford
University of Portsmouth

[Roadster280]

Dr Redford is taking a simplistic view of a subject that is anything other than simplistic. His 10 years in the RN and academic specialisation in naval history give the lie to his ridiculous assertion that the RN has an army and an air force.

They no more have an Army than the RAF Regt constitutes an army nor the AAC constitutes an air force.

Ergo he has an agenda. He wasn't one of Sharkey's accolytes was he?

[racedo]

Productivity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In the military !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

RN sail to where they need to go and take weeks in doing so...............not suprising as moving to anywhere there is no other way.

Army get a lift on "state of the art" planes :rolleyes:

So does a vovage to the gulf account for availability ?

Boffin should stick to teaching Undergraduates.

[Courtney Mil]

Worry not. If you declare yourself as "FlyNavy..." do not be surprised by a tribal attack on the other forces.

I wonder why the joint concept is so difficult.

Thanks for posting.

[Biggus]

If he seriously thinks I've only worked 420 days in the last 3 years..... i.e. 140 days a year, 28 weeks of Mon - Fri....:ugh::ugh:

If by harmony I assume he is talking about time deployed on operations, does it not occur to him that people back in the UK in the armed services actually work.

We haven't even discussed how many people routinely break harmony "guidelines" with nothing being done about it.

All in all - total boll*~*x! :ugh:

[London Eye]

And if any doubt his sense of neutrality here his is last effort to the Telegraph:

SIR – The possible areas to be cut as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (report, August 7) raise an important issue. The oft-stated position that our Armed Forces will have to work far more closely with allies than previously is the only basis available for assessing where cuts should be made. By this measure the proposed cuts are illogical, dangerous and bad for Britain and Europe.

In order for any increased defence interdependence to work, Britain must bring to its alliances capabilities that are in short supply; in this way we can have a smaller defence sector but still hope to be able to shape European and Nato policies as well as ensuring that the EU and Nato have credible conventional forces.

Many of the proposed cuts go against this. The European members of Nato are rich in army manpower and fast jets, but they are weak in maritime power and strategic airlift.

To propose cuts to the Royal Navy's seven-strong amphibious fleet, which contributes nearly 40 per cent of the European members of Nato's holding in these types, is idiotic, as is any suggestion of cuts to the specialised amphibious power projection force found in the Royal Marines and 3 Commando Brigade.

Furthermore, the Royal Navy's hunter-killer submarines represent 57 per cent of the EU SSN force and 100 per cent of Tomahawk cruise missile armed force available to the EU. To cut the number of such potent platforms with strategic reach, endurance, and armed with a weapon system that is a major political deterrent, defies belief and will weaken our voice in Europe.


If Britain persists in cutting the Royal Navy when all sense suggests that our navy should be enhanced in order to strengthen our hand in Europe and the world, both Britain and the EU will be weaker for it.

Dr Duncan Redford
Centre for Maritime Historical Studies
University of Exeter

There are many holes in his argument in his latest letter, not least that the RN is 'accruing harmony' while undertaking their training at sea and other routine business (cockers p somewhere sunny included) unlike the other services who spend a higher proportion of their lives training at their home bases (one of the reasons why many of us avoided the RN box at the CIO:ok:). This undermines his argument about differences in time available for ops but I am actually more surprised at his naivety: if we increased harmony for the other services, losing many of us along the way to PVR, would that be more money for Defence elsewhere or just a windfall for the Treasury? I hope he was a better RNl officer than he is an amateur military planner!

[Deepsixteen]

Hi


This could be an entertaining thread, looking forward to you making a case for not harmonising harmony in the services.


Racedo said “So does a voyage to the gulf count for availability?” fixed the spolling for you.:D


Only if there are insufficient sun loungers around the pool to go round!:ugh:


It would appear that the Doctor is not the only one with a simplistic outlook


Deepsixteen

[Melchett01]

Dr Redford, as well as displaying a naivety of analysis that I last saw in a 6th form debating society, misses the concept of what Airpower and therefore the RAF is there to do.

As racedo metioned, the RN take an eon to get anywhere, and the Army generally have to go en masse to take and hold, which by implication involves a fair chunk of time away 'holding'. Conversely, the RAF don't actually have to go anywhere to carry out operations. Yes, whilst deployed in AFG, our role is largely to support the Army, but defence of UK airspace is a strategic operational role in its own right. And given that it is a non-discretionary role, carried out 24/7, you could argue that there the entire RAF is on or supporting operations, with no bobbing around on a 14 day transit to get to the AO before you even start doing things.

He really should start by working out what it is the various Services actually do before trying to get into the nuances of their operatioanl manning plots.

[orca]

I think that there are discrete issues here.

I don't think anyone would argue that a ship tends to move at a slower pace than an aircraft which has all the implications well highlighted above.

I don't also think that anyone in the RN can complain about the fact that to move a combatant around incurs a tarif of absence before and after the 'on station' time.

What might be worth investigating is why the metrics are different and what the effects would be if they weren't. After all they are under pinned by quality of life/ moral component of operational capability notions, are they not?

Supposedly the manning for any force depends on the harmony guideline - so there must have been a rationale for them being different. Otherwise one could argue that SDSR wasn't worth the paper it was written on. Ah, hang on a minute.;)

Perhaps we should be arguing for harmony guidelines to align, based on the current RAF model - but I suspect that would be unaffordable, and apparently affordability trumps everything these days. Maybe it's impossible to make savings based on harmony - but I ssupect that isn't quite the case.

I'm not convinced that the RAF is, in its entirety, supporting ops from the UK. An Aussie told me that once about their Air Force and I did think about it before i dismissed the notion. However, I am certainly not convinced that a circa 40,000 strong force looks efficient when you look at what we can actually deploy. The same is true of the other services. I am not convinced that the army readiness cycle is as lean as it could be. I am also not convinced that the RN needs its current officer cadre construct to deploy a small amount of combatants. But then again I don't feel the need to say so in the national press. And I am genuinely all ears if anyone is prepared to enlighten me.

[Melchett01]

However, I am certainly not convinced that a circa 40,000 strong force looks efficient when you look at what we can actually deploy.

Just because an individual may be providing logs or other support functions rather than actually sitting in a cockpit doesn't mean that they aren't necessary or supporting ops in their own way. Don't get sucked in to thinking size equates to efficiency or effectiveness - that is a Sir Humphrey definition of a successful civil service department.

In the Army, a single rifleman is a unit of fighting power. In the RAF, in flying terms, an individual aircraft is a unit of fighting power, but it requires far far more operational and logistical support to get it in the air than a rifleman does to get out on patrol. Whereas the Army equips the man, the RAF - and I suspect the RN - mans the equipment which may give rise to perceptions of inefficiency and excessive manning.

The argument over efficiency and numbers was something we had near constant issues with in JHC where the RAF and AAC had different shift patterns and manning levels / routines. By simplifying things down to a pure numbers game, Radford is completely missing the point that the single services have different ways of doing ops and those individual ways of doing things will come with their own manning requirements.

However, I think you're spot on about not raising this as an issue in the press, however, well intentioned. All it will do is pull the beancounters of the fence and armchair generals out of retirement to argue for their own single services when we should be pulling together and collectively fighting the politicians who would happily see us cut to shreds.

[exgroundcrew]

In 1965 I was on 90 Squadron when all our Valiant’s were grounded and after we scrapped them all there was a need to temporarily deploy us on anything useful?
I was asked to go on a “work study” team to identify the productive hours of all RAF personnel. This required us to learn work study techniques and once trained I was sent to RAF Hullavington at the time a navigation training base. The unit I had to monitor was the ground radar support team and I had lots of code to enter on the forms identifying each quarter hour for each person in the unit. This included items such as Primary role, rest periods, collecting from stores, haircuts, meal breaks and many more.
This was being carried out on at least 50% of bases in the UK.
My radar unit was working 24/7 because of the training commitments and the fitters were working shifts of over 72hrs per week with approx 60% of the time identified as Primary role giving over 40hrs per week productive work.
On submitting my report it was rejected and I was requested (ordered) to massage the figures to produce a result of 29hrs per week!
When I objected I was given this explanation:
The forces pay rise was being discussed in Parliament and one MP raised the question “How many manhours did the average member of HM forces do per week on their primary role” The response was 29, Then came the next question “ When was that study carried out?” Answer 1936. The next obvious question was “Don’t you think we should have more up to date figures?”
In order to ensure the pay rise was voted through and not delayed, we were strongly encouraged to ensure our figures produced a very close match to this mystical 29 hours!

[BlindWingy]

Yet another sad, bitter ex-navy officer with a chip on their shoulder.

Might be indicative of some Naval concern about the next SDSR due to their lack of participation in recent conflicts. Not to mention the carrier/F35B debacle!

[orca]

Melchett,

All valid points. I deliberately didn't try to compare the forces - merely pointed out what I suspected as being inefficient in all three. But I do suppose there was a implicit comparison in what I wrote.

Last time I checked (admittedly pre-SDSR) a Hansard the RAF had circa 1200 Wg Cdrs and the RN 800 Cdrs. Roughly 1 in 30 for the respective force sizes. One has a small number of squadrons and the other has a miniscule number of ships - now the operators, as you rightly point out, are not the whole story - but the numbers are still a little off don't you think? I can't see how either works. Should more than 1 in 30 people in a Navy be a Cdr or above - when a Cdr commands the basic warfighting unit?

I understand that we are different, but that doesn't mean that we are beyond scrutiny and it doesn't mean that we should not attempt to be as efficient as possible.

[CoffmanStarter]

We (the RAF) need to get better at the art of politicking. IMHO this is classic example of the Navy preparing the ground for the up and coming Strategic Review. Have an academic peddle some ideas that twit politicians can hang their hat on ... where the Senior Uniformed Brass can deny any such skulduggery.

Courtney calls it right ... Army, Navy and Air Firce are a COLLECTIVE Team ... and must operate as such.

Coff.

[FATTER GATOR]

Kack article from the 'Professor', however...

Perhaps the RAF should have a much greater proportion of reserves including FTRS.

That way the FTRS can help defend the nation at home without being incumbered by the harmony red-herring.

The RAF Reserve, in much greater numbers, can deploy where required and only when the nation needs them. The RAF could then consist of a much smaller rump of Regular personnel to provide command, policy, continuity and training.

And if it all hits the fan, the FTRS fall-in with the requirements of the day.

FG (staunch Reserve advocate)

[FATTER GATOR]

Standing-by for spears

[Roland Pulfrew]

Fatter Gator

The only problem with more FTRS is that we have singularly failed in a number of areas to recruit our quota of FTRS personnel. There is a naive belief in certain political circles that reserves are the cheap answer, but we often fail to recruit the required numbers. As a simple example the 3 elementary flying training squadrons were supposed to be manned with 50-60% FTRS. The assumption (unsubstantiated) was that recruiting personnel leaving at 38/16 in the normal QFI rich areas around Links/Yorks would be easy, missing the obvious point that those leaving at 38/16 are generally off to airline jobs. Unfortunately we never made the required FTRS recruits meaning that the regular air force had to backfill. The same is/was true of recruiting SRs around the Brize area for Voyager.

For those that haven't caught up (and I include Dr Redford in this), the latest version of Defence Strategic Direction has changed the harmony rates for the RAF and Army to much closer to the RN figures. :bored:

As I mentioned on one of the other topics relating to retired RN officers writing to the "broadsheets", expect more of this divide and conquer tactic in the run up to SDSR.:rolleyes:

[just another jocky]

Does anyone else smell a Sharkey-troll?

Utter........utter........bolleaux. :zzz:

[Bismark]

Of course Redford's piece is simplistic - it is a letter for goodness sake. But there is some truth in his words. For the same requirement for delivering Force Elements you will get more out of an RN FAA Squadron than you will out of an Army or RAF one. due to harmony rules. It was always an issue in Joint Force Harrier and was for JHC when it tried to amalgamate the differing operating stances of each Service...the FAA were always more "available" and more efficiently manned than the RAF due principally to the harmony rules.

We shouldn't be squabbling about this, but we do because of the perceived inefficiency of one Service when compared to the other.

It is a bit like the deployment rates for individuals. When I was serving one always used to see an RAF individual deployed for 4months and 2 days - why? The answer appeared to be that if he/she served for less than this then he/she would not be entitled to the Op Welfare package!

[Justanopinion]

Might be indicative of some Naval concern about the next SDSR due to their lack of participation in recent conflicts. Not to mention the carrier/F35B debacle!

As I mentioned on one of the other topics relating to retired RN officers writing to the "broadsheets", expect more of this divide and conquer tactic in the run up to SDSR

IMHO this is classic example of the Navy preparing the ground for the up and coming Strategic Review.

Enjoying the paranoia. However, the 2 recent letters in the press are no more representative of Royal Navy policy/planning than the pages of Pprune are that of the RAF.

[CoffmanStarter]

Here's a creative idea ...

All PPRuNe members to stump £20 per head so that we can fund a Professorial Chair (out ranks the Navy's Phd bod) ... we then need an educated, erudite and persuasive individual to champion the RAF cause to counter the Navy propaganda.

I have a name in mind who is eminently qualified with a good degree of mischievous guile to be sucessful ... I suggest BEagle ... any seconds on that ?

Coff.

[Archimedes]

Is it worth noting that Dr Redford, in a previous life, was Lt Cdr Redford?

[BEagle]

....the specialised amphibious power projection force found in the Royal Marines....

Ah yes....

Red-faced Royal Marines have been forced to beat a hasty retreat after storming a Spanish beach resort instead of the fortress rock of Gibraltar.

A map-reading glitch sent the 20-strong invasion force onto the beach at La Linea, the town on the frontier with the British colony, to the surprise of Spanish locals.

The marines were greeted by two local policeman who watched in amazement as the heavily armed troops rushed ashore from two launches on Sunday morning.

The mayor of La Linea, Juan Carlos Juarez, said: "They landed on our coast to confront a supposed enemy with typical Commando tactics."

"But we managed to hold them on the beach."

From BBC News 18 Feb 2002

Very specialised amphibious power projection. But at least they didn't have to surrender their iPods on that occasion.

[CoffmanStarter]

See ... I rest my case ... BEagle is the ideal man for the job :ok:

[Bismark]

Very clever Beags but at least I don't think the the RN hasn't shot down one of its own aircraft (twice in Germany?) ....and when was it the RAF last shot down an enemy aircraft????

[BEagle]

....when was it the RAF last shot down an enemy aircraft????

8 June 1982 - ask Sharkey! RAF pilot David Morgan shot down 2 x A-4s. His RN wingman despatched a third and they both recovered to Hermes with very little fuel remaining. All 3 Argentinian pilots were killed.

The most regrettable blue-on-blue was when the idiot RN killed off the excellent Sea Harrier FA2 before its time, leaving only non-radar bombers as the fixed-wing element on its little flat tops....:mad:

[Lima Juliet]

The last Fleet Air Arm 'blue on blue' was sadly only 10 years ago...:sad:

22 March 2003 - Royal Navy Sea King ASaC7 XV650 and XV704 849 Naval Air Squadron collided five miles from HMS Ark Royal operating in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait, seven crew killed.

[Courtney Mil]

I don't think the the RN hasn't shot down one of its own aircraft (twice in Germany?)

I don't think you can really shoot down one aircraft twice. Unless you didn't do it properly first time.

Did you intend the odd double negative?

BEags, what you say there is absolutely correct, except you're forgetting that all of that was part of a RAF conspiracy to kill off the FAA.

[Bismark]

Leon, I think you should withdraw your comment as it is in extremely bad taste.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi

I see the usual suspects have returned to drag the debate away from the subject; if the good doctor is attempting PR for the RN I’m sure we’d be better off without and it pails into obscurity compared to moving Australia does it not Cofman?

Blue on blue is not an appropriate way to describe an unfortunate collision during ops and is disrespectful IMHO.

Of more interest to me is why JHC has not adopted harmonised harmony? Surely it would be a good place to adopt common best practice.

Deepsixteen

[Biggus]

Deep16,

To do that you would first of all have to agree on which set of the various harmony rules are actually "best practice", which may in itself be more difficult than you think.


You are also then faced with one bit of the RN/RAF/Army working to different rules to the rest of the RN/RAF/Army - and if those "different" rules are more restrictive/punitive they are a cause of discontentment, reason for experienced people to drift away from the role, discourage recruitment into the role, etc.....

Anyway, a point I made earlier, but which seems to have been ignored by everyone, is that many individuals (as opposed to formed units) in the RAF have regularly breached the current RAF harmony rules, but the system has either not picked up the fact, or simply ignored it, I'm not sure which!! The RAF rules may apparently be the most generous of all 3, but if they're regularly ignored then the rules themselves are of no consequence!

[Lima Juliet]

No disrepect or poor taste intended. The loss of the 2x Sea Kings was dreadful (hence I described it as sad with a :( ). However, it does show that dreadful mistakes happen and that is exactly what happened with the F4 vs Jag as well...

[Biggus]

Bismark,

HMS Cardiff - shall we stop now?

[Lima Juliet]

Biggus - agreed. CARDIFF vs the gazelle was another dreadful and sad mistake.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi Biggus

To do that you would first of all have to agree on which set of the various harmony rules are actually "best practice", which may in itself be more difficult than you think.


The rules that achieve the highest availability sound like a good start point.
You are also then faced with one bit of the RN/RAF/Army working to different rules to the rest of the RN/RAF/Army - and if those "different" rules are more restrictive/punitive they are a cause of discontentment, reason for experienced people to drift away from the role, discourage recruitment into the role, etc.....

People in the services are still drafted/posted are they not? SM pay managed to encourage me to remain in the service.

Anyway, a point I made earlier, but which seems to have been ignored by everyone, is that many individuals (as opposed to formed units) in the RAF have regularly breached the current RAF harmony rules, but the system has either not picked up the fact, or simply ignored it, I'm not sure which!! The RAF rules may apparently be the most generous of all 3, but if they're regularly ignored then the rules themselves are of no consequence!

Many submariners as individuals and as ships companies have had harmony guidelines breached and RN rules are as you alluded to less generous than those of the RAF.

I think the blue on blue thing needs to be dropped; shooting something down in the fog of war is not comparable to a negligent discharge.

Deepsixteen

[orca]

Chaps,

We are in danger of exposing the unsavoury/ odd side of PPrune whereby any comment, however well founded, against ones parent service must in some way be an insult and a non-debateable lie or untruth.

When this happens the most strange tangential arguments crop up. They go something like - The RAF has different harmony rules, but then again the RN lose i-pods on patrol, but the RAF shot down a Jaguar...and very soon we're in the basement of 'Your mother wears combat boots' type discussion.

We also see occasionally, as has happened on this thread, that some consider Pprune to be a RAF resource of some description.

Whilst accepting that as a Fleet Air Arm type I have a thing for men, search aimlessly for the golden rivet and am responsible for both the HMS Cornwall incident and also the loss of Atlantic Conveyor and indeed the Mary Rose - could I perhaps ask for more balanced input?

Inputs such as 'Professor Fishhead doth spout utter rubbish because....' will show you and your point in a far better light than 'Rubbish, he used to be a fish head, he has an agenda and is probably actually Sharkey Ward'. We do a very good job of lampooning said pantomine villain - let's not become him.

If it's rubbish demonstrate it so to be and all will be well.

Incidentally. On the subject of kills. My personal view is that they are personal. If I had any Air-to-Air kills I'd consider them mine - not the FAA's or RAF's. I'd keep a record on the mantel piece with all the Air-to-Mud ones!;) If any of you actually have kills - what do you think?

[Deepsixteen]

Hi

Agreed.

Deepsixteen

[Easy Street]

On the subject of kills. My personal view is that they are personal. If I had any Air-to-Air kills I'd consider them mine - not the FAA's or RAF's.Dodgy territory IMHO. While it can be acceptable to shoot at and kill people during armed conflict, it is only so because authority is seen to derive from the sovereign power. Therefore, for me, kills belong to your service (and while I don't have any air-to-air victories, I've partaken in plenty of air-to-ground activity). The only time you act in your own right is when acting in self-defence. In my non-military life, I would take satisfaction from stopping somebody from attacking me or my family, but I wouldn't take any additional satisfaction from actually killing them. I read this across to action in 'military' self-defence.

Anyway, back on thread; does anyone know whether the Army and RAF harmony guidelines are supposed to account for time away on exercises? In the last 15 years, operations have formed only about 60% of my nights away from home, with much of the rest being taken up with operational training both within the UK and overseas. It's my understanding that Navy sea training time counts as time away for harmony purposes... it would be interesting if a 'baselined' comparison could be made if you take that into account for Army / RAF.

One other thing that I certainly can't put any numbers to, just a feeling in the water, is the differing working culture between the services during routine home-based operations. My (admittedly tribal) judgement would be that there is still a strong 'POETS day' culture in the Navy, which also has a foothold in bits of the RAF but is by no means widespread. I also get the impression that many flying units are working much longer days than was the case say, 10 years ago, to get the most out of the limited equipment resource available to them. Over a 2- or 3-year period these kind of issues can have an effect equivalent to hundreds of days away from home. Before getting too conclusive that 'the Navy harmony is the right harmony' all the routine home-based business of the three services would have to be taken into account - sounds like a perfect topic for an expensive consultancy study...

[Hovermonkey]

Back to the original post...

I think the professor has the argument totally the wrong way around.

Harmony, in my experience, is generally abysmal in the RN. The 'squad' system proposed by the 'Topmast' scheme was set out with the best of intentions to enable greater harmony for all in the RN, however it rarely works in practice for those in seagoing drafts. Ships are undermanned with various positions gapped as it is. Trying to allow personnel to switch with replacements halfway through deployments is impractical given the numbers the RN have at their disposal.

Let's take the example of a typical 2 year Ship's life cycle and for instance, an ETME (stoker). In 2 years a Ship can generally expect to be deployed to a task for 12-14 months. Our stoker, on a 3 year sea draft will in theory, get his 'harmony' time while the Ship is in UK waters in home port. However, in practice the Ship will be on various work-ups and port visits (2x OST at 4-8 weeks, Joint Warrior at 3 (ish) weeks which will likely include a further week at sea for missile firings in the NWAPPS, the list goes on). In all, I would conservatively estimate that a Ship will be alongside for around 7 weeks a year including block leave periods + a further 5 weekends in home port. Therefore our stoker is getting 59 nights in home port per year as his harmony time. Over 2 years that is 118 days at home, 612 days at sea and only 48 days short of the maximum 660 for a 3 year period.

What about the other year? The Ship may be in refit (if not on a 3 year lifecycle) and if our stoker is lucky he will be retained as skeleton crew. If not, he will be sent on courses (potentially) away from home port or worse, crash drafted to fill another gapped billet on another Ship. The cycle continues ad nauseum until he gets a shore draft after a couple of sea drafts (after 5 years or so).

The reason the system does not work in the RN is that there simply are not enough people to fill the billets in order to harmonise correctly. My point is that it is not the case that the other two forces are not, as the letter implies, pulling their weight but that the RN is pulling an equal weight without sufficient people to make the system work as it should.

This isn't at all a moan. Most people in the RN accept that this is the way of the world and get on with it, enjoy it immensely and it is of course the extreme end of the spectrum. I am just trying to paint the picture to show where the letter writer is coming from.

How the problem is solved is another argument altogether, and one I feel would only be solved with more people and fewer ships that require fewer people. One of those solutions we seem to be lurching towards anyway.

*standing by for incoming*

[A and C]

I simply can't see how any of the forces can be judged by an industrial type productivity measure and it is foolish to do so.

To take the example of an infantry unit, its primary role is to close on and kill the enemy fortunately most of them are 100% unproductive by this measure and those that are engaged are likely to have times when their productivity reaches 200%.

Training directly connected with military matters might well be considered productive but what of adventure training and sport both of these are used to keep mind and body fit but are not a direct military task ?

Finally where will the other tasks of national importance such as clearing up the foot & mouth mess or giving aid to civilian authority's during severe weather come into the productivity picture ?

If you ask me this is just another way of dressing up cuts to the defense budget and trying to make it sound like it has some sort of science behind it.

[FODPlod]

...Training directly connected with military matters might well be considered productive but what of adventure training and sport both of these are used to keep mind and body fit but are not a direct military task?...

Absolutely. I wasted much of my RN career watch-keeping on the bridge or in the ops room 1-in-3 at sea for months on end (1-in-2 when in defence watches) and officer of the day 1-in-3 in harbour (which ate into two out of every three days), both in addition to my day-work. Even my ships' base ports, where we enjoyed our so-called 'harmony time', were often several hundred miles from where I lived.

However, I could always rely for consolation on reading DCIs which revealed that over 90% of the personnel participating in skiing, diving and sailing expeds in exotic locations, or representing the United Services in sports fixtures, were Army or RAF. Their productivity was truly inspirational. ;)

[Easy Street]

Hovermonkey - thanks for an interesting post.

With this evidence that harmony breaches are routinely tolerated in the RN, perhaps Dr Redford would care to develop a proposal to remove the concept of harmony entirely - it can't be that much of a stretch?

I can't stand it when starred officers come out with glib lines such as 'people first' when it is evident that 'turf' comes first, 'capability' is somewhere in mid-table and 'people' languish at the bottom (somewhere alongside 'value for money').

[orca]

Easy Street,

Valid points. I just struggle myself with where the credit for military action lies. You can pick any number of heroes of any cloth who are feted because of their kills - Immelman, Bader, Voss, Carmichael. So surely we are comfortable with personally claiming 'kills' - but you are right to bring up the fact that it isn't so simple. But we don't attribute their victories to a service - otherwise we'd never have heard of them.

I think what irks me the most about the argument is that a small percentage of people join in an oft repeated nonsense that one service is better/ worse than the other due to the air-to-air success rate (kills spelt in a fluffy way) of people flying in its aeroplanes. It makes no sense to me - just as it would make no sense to say 'H Jones didn't charge that position, The Parachute Regiment charged that position'.

Sorry, back to the thread.

[Archimedes]

Inputs such as 'Professor Fishhead doth spout utter rubbish because....' will show you and your point in a far better light than 'Rubbish, he used to be a fish head, he has an agenda and is probably actually Sharkey Ward'.

Orca, you're quite right, but as the person who pointed out Dr Redford's past career, I should note that the intention wasn't to turn him into the next incarnation of Cdr Ward.

Dr Redford, for whatever reason [1] , chooses not to highlight his past affiliations in a fair number of his published outputs - this means that (a) he is sometimes written off as another tree-hugging, sandal-wearing inky-fingered scribbler who'd be hard pressed to comment accurately on whether RN uniform is dark blue when he in fact has a degree of practical knowledge greater than most of those in academia or (b) he can be in danger of being perceived as overly partial (some of his output on the decisions in SDSR was er... clearly that of a former RN officer who remains fiercely proud of his service, shall we say).

It may be that his output which seeks to influence decision-makers comes without reference to his past affiliations since it is known in those circles - but it is useful to be aware of it when debating his comments, I'd argue.

As you note, though, there is a danger that he simply gets written off from the start as a swivel-eyed kabourophobe with a doctorate, which would do him a disservice, so perhaps I should have exchanged a rare attempt at brevity for a slightly more detailed observation.

[1] Edit - and this is entirely legitimate. I can think of a decorated former army NCO now in academia who has only referenced his past life once, yet who writes extensively on military matters, particularly those involving his former employer

[orca]

Archimedes,

For what it's worth I find your posts amongst the most balanced and informative in the forum. I wasn't talking about anything that you posted per se - it was another poster who waded in with the 'Twaddle, rubbish, not true, case dismissed' line/ depth of argument.

Cheers,

Orca.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Bismark

A bit off topic (sorry) but...

It is a bit like the deployment rates for individuals. When I was serving one always used to see an RAF individual deployed for 4months and 2 days - why? The answer appeared to be that if he/she served for less than this then he/she would not be entitled to the Op Welfare package!

Everyone gets the op welfare package (apart from the mine hunter force in the ME), its the R'n'R bit you gain over 4 months. The RAF stopped doing 4 month and 2 day tours some time ago; you deploy for <4 months (and no R'n'R) or 6 months+. And I believe that we are all going to 6 months+ now anyway.

[Bismark]

Roland,
Thanks for that....I am somewhat out of date.

The important thing about the harmony rules is that each Service should be able to justify them. It is hardest to sense that these rules are right when you have Services operating alongside each other, whether in the field or on a ship, with effectively the same kit and outputs yet one Service apparently can be far more efficient with its people. This will become stark again when the question of lengthy embarkations of Jointly manned JSF sqns become a reality.

[downsizer]

This will become stark again when the question of lengthy embarkations of Jointly manned JSF sqns become a reality.

Maybe that should read "if"....:E

[MaroonMan4]

If this is all too simplistic, then being totally transparent and Joint in this current fiscal environment what is the method of measuring Operational Capability, Efficiency, and Value for Money?

I think that HMT/MoD know that Air Power provides a contingent capability with speed (through Expeditionary Air Wings), and Sea Power more slowly (through a future Carrier Task Group?? (which also includes Amphibious shipping I think?), but I get the impression that HMT/MoD cannot afford to resource both properly and either salami slice both (spread betting the risk and reducing each capability), or investing properly on the contingency model that most likely suits future contingency conflicts.

So it would appear that the question is what does an EAW deliver that a CTG can't? With correct investment (i.e.not salami slicing) could an EAW deliver the same effect as a CTG (or vice versa)? With harmony possibly being but one metric of efficiency, when viewed holistically is a CTG more efficient than an EAW? How many EAWs does it take to deliver the same output and capability as a CTG?

For example, I don't see a CTG in 2016 with any embedded ISTAR/UAS or Air to Air refueling and therefore EAWs will still be required in the future. However,I do see future EAWs being able to deliver all of the CTG capability (with maybe the exception of the occasional niche and high resource over the beach amphibious assault/demonstration).

I agree it has less to do with the myopic argument on single Service harmony, and more to do with what can actually deliver the capability, and if there is not the funding to properly resource both Air and Maritime contingent capabilities, which one delivers the most capability more efficiently across the whole spectrum of measuring capability and not just harmony.

Worst case is that we end up with 2 methods of delivering a contingent capability on paper, but in reality due to the lack of future funding both not truly being able to deliver what is expected of them.

[Courtney Mil]

If this is all too simplistic, then being totally transparent and Joint in this current fiscal environment what is the method of measuring Operational Capability, Efficiency, and Value for Money?

Was that a question or were you making one of those politic-speak jokes? :rolleyes:

[MaroonMan4]

Courtney,

A question - but if there is a joke in there, I am happy for you ;)

I genuinely have no idea how one measures productivity of the single Services, but harmony on its own does not appear to be the answer?

[Bismark]

MM4, The problem with an EAW when compared to a CTG is that it cannot "poise". It either moves forward to a FOB or it stays in UK, there is no in between mode. Thus the political decision to deploy will always be set at a far higher bar than for a CTG and in consequence it's ability to influence is weak. That is assuming a friendly FOB can be found near the area to be influenced.

Not sure what this has to do with the original post but hey, we are on page three.

[Wrathmonk]

This will become stark again when the question of lengthy embarkations of Jointly manned JSF sqns become a reality

So how does it work now? We have had Joint units deploying for some time (maybe not flying but Joint none the less). Is there a nominated lead 'Service' to whose rules you abide by??

On JFH (:{:E), where IIRC there was a little bit of 'jointery' in some roles/appointments, which rules did the RN bods apply when on an RAF numbered squadron and which rules applied when RAF bods were on the NSW?

Each Service will argue that theirs is the best way to measure harmony. The easiest way to resolve the situation is to get rid of harmony (fairly certain it was only introduced to give another metric on which to report morale) - after all Service life is a 24/7/365 commitment .....;)

[BEagle]

I was, by that daft fishead's definition, completely unproductive on my first tour, I'm glad to say, because I never carried out my primary duty.


Which was to drop a hydrogen bomb.

[Tourist]

BEagle

I recognise you are being sarcastic, but actually we should think about what you just said.

In peacetime, which generally covered the period you served, the ideal circumstance which we should work towards is everybody in the services being unproductive.

ie, doing nothing but training waiting for something to happen.

Everybody actually doing something important in peacetime is not available when the balloon goes up to go and warfight, because their job is actually important and still needs doing.

I think that this is one of the problems when civvies try to "lean" the military process. They need to do it during total war to make the process valid.

A perfectly poised military force in peacetime would be the opposite of a civilian company, ie 100% unproductive.


Hmmmm. Now that's my kind of military.

[Finnpog]

Isn't the current concept of a CTG (or even UK Response Force Task group) to contain embedded Booties, so it is more akin to a USMC / USN MEU?

In that sense will be more self contained and can poise / posture and then take and hold ground and arguably SLOCs in addition to (if the jets work) some measure of Air to Mud and Air to air. Whether it is Dave B (JSFFan stand fast! I am just supposing) (other effective carrier-borne fast air is available [at a price]).

[FODPlod]

I was, by that daft fishead's definition, completely unproductive on my first tour, I'm glad to say, because I never carried out my primary duty.

Which was to drop a hydrogen bomb. Fascinating. Just to satisfy my curiosity, was that in one of the RAF's heavy bombers in which "...neither air-to-air refuelling nor conventional bombing had been practised for several years..." when suddenly required for the Black Buck raids in 1982? (link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Black_Buck))

I'd be interested in the background to this state of affairs because responsibility for the nuclear deterrent had been transferred to the RN's Polaris SSBNs some 14 years previously, i.e. on 15 June 1968.

[Abbey Road]

FODPlod, hydrogen bombs are not "nuclear", surely?

[BEagle]

I'd be interested in the background to this state of affairs because responsibility for the nuclear deterrent had been transferred to the RN's Polaris SSBNs some 14 years previously, i.e. on 15 June 1968.

The strategic deterrent might have been transferred to Polaris / Trident, but the WE177 was a major part of the RAF's inventory from 1969-1998.

Many of the Great Unwashed seem to think that Vulcans stopped having a nuclear role in 1968. Nothing could have been further from the truth!

[Wrathmonk]

because responsibility for the nuclear deterrent

Are you confusing 'strategic' with 'tactical' (both of which formed the deterrent, and to be honest I suspect (in purely my opinion) that 'tactical' would be the first to be used)? Or otherwise was all that time that UK and RAFG squadrons sat on Nuclear QRA just a figment of my imagination? And I don't recall the nuclear QRA aircraft, or indeed any of the RAF nuclear armed squadrons, being under RN command.....

IIRC the RAF stopped nuclear QRA in about 1998???

[Engines]

Wrathmonk,

Perhaps I can help here. The way JFH was attempting to go about things went roughly as follows:

1. When in Rome, do as the Romans do - so, the 'rules' to be obeyed for day to day flying activity were those applying on the base of operations. On an RAF station - RAF rules, RN ship, RN rules.

2. Own uniform rules - JFH personnel retained their own services' terms of service and engagement rules, as well as pay regs. This included harmony rules. Of course, this was before JPA and the rest.

3. Converge and improve - JFH were charged with developing a blend of the two services' regimes that delivered better effectiveness at lower costs. The basic idea was not to 'average out' but to select the best of each and weld them into a better system to operate the mixed fighter/strike force that had been set up under Strike Command. And that included looking at a better set of 'harmony' rules that allowed embarkations to ships, and deployments to land bases, to be carried out in the best possible way.

All great ideas, but the basic problem was that to do this JFH should have been answering to a Joint Command. Whatever else Strike was at that time, 'joint' wasn't a description that easily applied. So, from day one, there was fierce institutional resistance to any changes away from RAF rules. (The RN hierarchy were really not bothered, having passed the baton to Strike). Of course, once the SHARs were binned, any need for 'convergence' was removed, and the process became once of 'conversion' to form NSW in an all RAF mould.

For what it's worth, those of us who were involved found that, at the working level (by which I mean SO1 and below) there was a huge appetite for trying new ways of doing things and showing the rest of Strike what could be achieved in a 'joint' environment. Friendships were forged across the 'divide' that have lasted for many years, and we were ready to move forward when the rug was pulled. For my part, I think it was a real shame that those who signed up to the idea were so ready to ditch their promises when the single service chips were down. We can only hope that all the lessons from JFH are being reviewed and learned as the UK gets ready to try the 'joint aircraft at sea' idea again.

As ever, very best regards to all those of whatever cloth doing the real business out there today

Engines

[Wrathmonk]

Thanks Engines - as I thought, those at the coalface made it work (using huge doses of common sense) whilst those at the top of the command chain squabbled amongst each other! Hopefully, with potentially 4 years + before F35 becomes a reality on the front line the "rules and regs" will have been squared away. After all the SO1s and SO2s of yesteryear should be the 2* and above of today - some of them may even be in Joint Command!

[FODPlod]

Thank you to all who re-educated me about the tactical WE-177 QRA role of the Vulcan and its successors. In the wee hours of the morning, I'd forgotten that this ordnance remained part of the RAF's arsenal beyond the strategic nuclear deterrent carried by our SSBN force. Please forgive my oversight.

I'm no doubt teaching granny in some cases but in the RN, variants of this device were carried for delivery by Fleet Air Arm Sea Vixens, Buccaneers and SHAR in the nuclear strike role. Unlike the Vulcans, it seems, these versatile aircraft and their crews regularly exercised and often employed their capability to perform conventional bombing, air-to-air refuelling and air defence to one degree or another, too.

Even the FAA's Wasp and Wessex helicopters were in on the act, being tasked with the delivery of the WE-177 '600 lb' nuclear depth bomb in an anti-submarine role if the situation required. However, they also exercised and often employed their capability to drop Mk 11 conventional depth charges or anti-submarine torpedoes and fire AS-12 air-to-surface missiles in addition to their reconnaissance, surveillance and humble utility tasking (someone had to fetch the mail ;) ).

[Nimbus20]

My heart sinks when I see these sorts of threads, because the only winner is he who wishes to marginalise HMF further: be it the press and public opinion, be it the treasury in order to pay for votes for the next GE.

I recall an academic (not the same one as per this thread) who warned repeatedly that though rats have highly developed social patterns, if several were to be confined in a space which because prgressively smaller then there comes a point when the rats turn on one another.

My metaphor of HMF as rats and the Treasury/Govt as the enclosure may not be to everyone's taste, but it suffices to illustrate the pressures that people/Services believe themselves to be under. The winner is not going to be any one of the Services: we now have reduction to one 4* per Service and forcible eviction from MoD HO, as a direct result of VSO delinquent behaviour during the past decade. Who's the winner there?

Look back at history, several hundreds of years, and you will see a common theme: UK governments have ALWAYS resented paying the insurance premiums that HMF represent. Cuts are nothing new.

HMF would be better served by (re)gaining public opinion and utilising that to influence govt. and subsequent force levels and funding prioritisation against the plethera of other (worthy) causes that vie for govt money.

Personally - I would be content to see a reduced HMF international/expeditionary capability if the quid quo pro were to be improved safety/security on British streets (implied task includes education in civic responsibility and policing - 2 other Govt depts) and improved social secuity (implied task includes healthcare & social safetynet - 3 OGDs). May views will not be welcomed by Benny in FI, but I assess the risk to FI to be medium and non-military ie Dipl.


Weapons free against my opinion, as you wish, but do try to stop the "war of the capbadges" from spilling into every thread.

[just another jocky]

.....but do try to stop the "war of the capbadges" from spilling into every thread.

It is sad, especially when a thread is started that clearly either waves 2 fingers at the other services or worse. It also appears it's usually done by ex-forces people. Most of those doing the real job that I meet are pro-joint and are leaving behind the shackles of single-service legacy prejudices. :(

[AR1]

My own take on productivity was/is that it means very little within the context of a watch keeping role and it cant be directly translated to a deskbound role even within the same service. How that can them be measured at a service granularity is beyond me.
Anecdote time.
I worked double days at a day only flying station. earlies started 1 hr before ATC which in turn started 1 hr before flying. Normally then 6am, but we finished at 12am a short day...which compensated us for the following... Afters started at 12 until cease flying which could be 8 in the summer, additionally the afters shift covered out of hours stuff and the following weekends display work.
Days did 8-5.
On change of boss, the decision was made that we (shift workers) weren't working enough basic hours compared to days, so mornings were extended till 3pm and afters finished at 8pm even during no flying periods or later as flying dictated. Given that the out of hours stuff was watch keeping, but the staff using the equipment had gone home, there was actually no work to do..
I don't mind working, but I don't like being shafted simply because somebody further up the food chain cant equate fair and reasonable. Whacked in my environmental and was posted within 3 months.

[Climebear]

There are lies, damn lies, and statistics

Perhaps when measuring productivity, the number of days deployed could be assessed against how hard each Service apparently works when deployed as shown in the latest AFPRB Report (http://www.ome.uk.com/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=BE297674-541B-4357-A608-12EAEC5FC316).

Personnel ‘at sea’ or on ‘overseas operations’ typically work longer hours than their UK based colleagues. The Survey of Continuous Working Patterns showed the Royal Navy averaged 57.9 hours per week when at sea, while the Army and RAF averaged 72.8 hours and 67.4 hours respectively when on overseas operations. These figures are all over an hour less than those for 2010–11.

Then again, perhaps we should just stop sniping, accept that different environments have different practices (not wrong just different), and stand together against the common foe (HM Treasury).

[just another jocky]

Do Navy personnel count as on operations when they set sail out of port? Or os it when they come within territorial waters or something?

As for the hours worked.....I'm not sure we'd like the pilots that ferry our troops or the those that drop ordnance near our guys on the ground being at work as long as those same troops, would we?

This is a really stupid, ignorant thread. :=

[alfred_the_great]

'At sea' means exactly that - at sea. 660 days in a rolling 3 year period.

[just another jocky]

So hanging around outside the harbour counts?

Oh, I am soooo surprised. :rolleyes:

No wonder this thread was started by someone 'navy' and 'somerset'......no agenda there then. :zzz:

[racedo]

If this is all too simplistic, then being totally transparent and Joint in this current fiscal environment what is the method of measuring Operational Capability, Efficiency, and Value for Money?

Static guards and patrols as a Military base are inefficient, lacking real capability as not tested enough in battle conditions and not value for money as they have no productivity to be measured against.

Of course when they detect and deter intruders who intend to destroy half a dozen aircraft, whirly birds, radar on a destroyer or 20 battle tanks by sugar in the tank, radio equipment etc etc they worth every penny.

If you wish to measure value for money then Nuclear deterrent is a waste of money as has not been used and has been replaced a number of times so it has zero productivity and not delivered (pun intended) anything and long may that continue.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi Climbear


Quote:
There are lies, damn lies, and statistics

Perhaps when measuring productivity, the number of days deployed could be assessed against how hard each Service apparently works when deployed as shown in the latest AFPRB Report (http://www.ome.uk.com/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=BE297674-541B-4357-A608-12EAEC5FC316).


Quote:
Personnel ‘at sea’ or on ‘overseas operations’ typically work longer hours than their UK based colleagues. The Survey of Continuous Working Patterns showed the Royal Navy averaged 57.9 hours per week when at sea, while the Army and RAF averaged 72.8 hours and 67.4 hours respectively when on overseas operations. These figures are all over an hour less than those for 2010–11.

Then again, perhaps we should just stop sniping, accept that different environments have different practices (not wrong just different), and stand together against the common foe (HM Treasury).


Clearly the AFPRB must have failed to take into account the Submarine service who mostly work a minimum 84hrs per week at sea before action stations or emergency stations are taken into account and I recall being subjected to a time and motion study during a docking period circa 1995 (harmony time) of 64hrs average over a 42day maintenance cycle.

Whole heartedly agree with your closing statement :D , obviously even within a single service different subsets :O have differing practices.

Deepsixteen