windshear/TOGA

[JammedStab]

I should now the asnwer to this already but I want to make sure. You are in a modern Boeing doing a derated thrust takeoff. After selecting TOGA, you see THR REF displayed on your FMA. Soon after liftoff you encounter a windshear and desire maximum available thrust to escape the windshear. To achieve this, you can press TOGA again and now you will have full rated takeoff thrust.

Also, with all systems working and configured nomally what happens during this windshear encounter if you instead push the thrust levers fully forward. Full rated TO thrust which will be the same as if you had pressed TOGA.

[Kirks gusset]

After take off you will not get take off thrust as the thrust mode will change to climb ( see take-off page transit to climb page on ams), assuming the ground/air system is working. The windshear escape manoeuvre and related pitch and power it gives can be found in the systems manual, the explanation of how much thrust is given is in the systems manual, although boeing state " max trust is available at the forward stop". the availability of the windshear system alerts and reactions of the system depends on altitude. You have many different questions rolled into one and the answer does not exist in one area alone. In a nutshell, if you advance the thrust levers to the forward stop full power for the phase of flight is available but if the windshear escape manoeuvre is triggered then initially FDs will command approx 600fpm until speed is recovered then the pitch will adjust.

[felixthecat]

After lift off and with speed greater than 80kts pressing TOGA disarms LNAV and VNAV and gets rid of any takeoff or assumed temperature reduction. If auto throttle is in HOLD it will activate in THR REF

[de facto]

[QUOTfE]After selecting TOGA, you see THR REF displayed on your FMA[/QUOTE]
Never seen THR REF on a modern 737 FMA.
You will see N1 then at 84 kts ThR HLD then at 800 ft ARM.

To achieve this, you can press TOGA again and now you will have full rated takeoff thrust.
Once the AT is in ARM mode(above 800 ft),you will get n1 limit for 26K.(ie you derate 24 k from a 26k ).

Also, with all systems working and configured nomally what happens during this windshear encounter if you instead push the thrust levers fully forward

AT must be disconnected.

If not and the AT is in ARM mode,you will get,by setting the thrust levers to the full forward position the full rate of your engine rating.(ie 27300 lbs for a 26k).
In that case you will overthrust the engine.(if you go more than the N 1 limit).

Full rated TO thrust which will be the same as if you had pressed TOGA.
No.
If you press toga again at 800 ft you will get MaX thrust for the ouside temp and pressure altitude,if you fire wall the engines,you will get full rated thrust and will overthrust the engines.

Firewall the engines is only when MAX thrust is not sufficient and you are descending,then its better to overthrust the engines than hitting terra ferma.:ok:

[felixthecat]

There are several different 'modern' Boeings with different setups :) I see THR REF every time I fly :)

[sleeve of wizard]

MANUAL FLIGHT • Disengage autopilot • Push either TO/GA switch • Aggressively apply maximum* thrust • Disconnect autothrottle(s) • Simultaneously roll wings level and rotate toward an initial pitch attitude of 15° • Retract speedbrakes • Follow flight director TO/GA guidance (if available)

Don't try and out think the system.

[Intruder]

In the 744 and 748, THRUST REF will change to HOLD at about 65 KIAS on the takeoff roll. Pushing the TOGA switch AND pushing the thrust levers full forward will ensure TOGA is engaged for Autopilot and FD reference, as well as ensure full takeoff thrust.

[JammedStab]

After lift off and with speed greater than 80kts pressing TOGA disarms LNAV and VNAV and gets rid of any takeoff or assumed temperature reduction. If auto throttle is in HOLD it will activate in THR REF

I think this is the answer I am looking for. It is on the 747. At 65 knots we do get HOLD but it seems to go back to THR REF at 400 feet.

Therefore, if correct, pressing TOGA will give full rated thrust for the windshear escape maneuver, not derated or assumed temperature thrust. This will be the case whether the autothrottle is in HOLD or THR REF. Meanwhile if you were still on the ground and encounter windshear, pressing the TOGA button a second time does not increase thrust from its derate/ATM setting. Is this all correct.

[Kirks gusset]

Be aware, there is a Boeing Bulletin about arming VNAV on the ground with certain levels of software, in this event VNAV will remain engaged and a second push of TOGA switch is required to get correct FD guidance for the WS recovery.

[5LY]

I'm a 777 guy, so this may or may not help you.

On the ground, if A/T status is HOLD, you have to push up the thrust levers yourself. Pushing TOGA will not increase your thrust, it will only cancel LNAV & VNAV. On the ground, any time you see HOLD annunciated, the thrust levers belong to you.

Once airborne, pushing TOGA will cancel derates and below 400', give you TOGA roll and above 400', give you TOGA roll and pitch.

There's more to this that you'll find in your manuals. It's pretty important to know what happens if you push TOGA. For example, if you push TOGA after an engine failure don't expect it to follow LNAV (you most likely don't want it to of course) and more importantly, don't expect it to accelerate at your flap retraction altitude without further intervention from you if you've cancelled VNAV.

[JammedStab]

For example, if you push TOGA after an engine failure don't expect it to follow LNAV (you most likely don't want it to of course)

I can think of one place you do want LNAV after an engine failure....Hong Kong. Continue on the published departure procedure.

Thanks for the other information,

[Lemon Drop Kid]

I am interested in what the F/D will command after a windshear warning when the TOGA switches are pushed (767).

I have found this quote elsewhere..

"If vertical speed is less than 600 ft/min (like in a performance degrading windshear) it commands constant 15 degrees pitch.
If VS is between 600 and 1200 ft/min it blends a constant pitch with speed through elevators logic, weighted by exact VS.
VS > 1200 ft/min (normal takeoff and climb) it command speed through elevators".

Can anyone shed any light on this as it is not in any manuals I have seen, and which a/c it applies to.

[Skyjob]

Different aircraft types, different modes.

JammedStab - Please refer to the type and model you're asking about!

[cosmo kramer]

For 737, you never get any sort of take-off thrust (either with or without derate) after pressing TOGA when airborne. It won't cancel anything out, it will completely change mode:

After airborne you get GO AROUND THRUST limit. Nothing more nothing less.

...and be very aware that if the throttles are still in hold (THR HLD, i.e. below 800 feet), you do NOT get any increase in thrust what so ever! Only the N1 limit bugs will move, but since the throttle is in hold, it will stay at the takeoff thrust selected (with derates/assumes etc.). Hence, you would then have to move the throttles yourself - either to the N1 limit bug, or firewall as needed - this is really something any 737 pilot must know.

Above 800 feet, the auto throttle changes to ARM. That mean the auto throttle is now able to move the thrust levers if so commanded. Pressing TOGA above 800 thereby changes thrust limit to GA (as indicated by the N1 limit bugs moving to that limit), and the thrust will automatically advance.

Here is what Boeing has to say about it:
Note: During a reduced thrust takeoff, a second press of the TO/GA switch below 800 feet above field elevation will change the thrust limit mode to GA and N1 reference bugs to increase to full GA thrust, thrust levers will not be in motion. A second press of the TO/GA switch above 800 feet above field elevation, thrust levers advance toward full GA thrust.
(With second press they are referring to the initiation of the takeoff roll as the FIRST press).

Above 2000 and flaps retracted (which ever is later), NOTHING will happen if you press the TOGA switch.

[flyboyike]

That JammedStab is truly the Renaissance Man of aviation. Every week he's on a different airplane, in a different country, in a different type of operation.

I confess myself jealous.

[JammedStab]

Different aircraft types, different modes.

JammedStab - Please refer to the type and model you're asking about!

747-400.

I know the procedure is of course to manually advance thrust which will be limited by the EEC's but I was just curious what second TO/GA push would do(on ground and when airborne). This question based on the difference in go-around thrust for one TO/GA push and two TO/GA pushes.

[latetonite]

To 5LY,

Sure you did not get mixed up in your second paragraph?

[cosmo kramer]

This question based on the difference in go-around thrust for one TO/GA push and two TO/GA pushes.
There is no one/two push for takeoff. It's only for go around. Of course there is a first push too, and that is when you initiate takeoff with the toga push. There after there is only ONE push, which will give you go around thrust as described in my previous post. This is valid for 737, but I would wonder if it was much different on 744, due to commonality.

I am beginning to wonder how people can ask these sorts of questions, and allegedly at the same time operate the aircrafts in question!

[latetonite]

Completely agree, Cosmo. But that is aviation today. Get used.

[JammedStab]

The manual says "If more thrust is needed (up to maximum thrust) when the airplane is on the ground and HOLD mode is displayed, the thrust levers must be manually advanced. After the airplane is in the air, pushing a TO/GA switch advances the thrust levers to maximum available thrust and THR REF is annunciated.".

For the airborne part, it doesn't say if there is a difference between being in HOLD mode(up to 400') or when you are back to THR REF. One might answer that you are already in THR REF mode above 400' but that could be CLB2 or CLB1 if they were selected. It does say "maximum available thrust" but just wanted confirmation that it was full climb thrust.

Sorry if you don't like me asking questions like this for clarification. Intelligent responses appreciated.

[John Farley]

I would have disengaged the autopilot, opened the throttles and pulled to the shaker.

How times change.

[flarepilot]

I've flown planes without autothrottles

and with modern boeing autothrottles.

it was just so, so hard to move two big levers (or four for that matter) forward and back to control the engines.

go= forward

go for all you are worth, forward till you bend throttles over mechanical stops.

or

go...engage autothrottles to pre programmed thrust setting, watch and feel thrust levers move by themselves

but be sure clutching mechanism works properly and moves them together and make sure the thrust setting is correct


soon, there will be automatically tying shoe laces!

[JammedStab]

I would have disengaged the autopilot, opened the throttles and pulled to the shaker.

How times change.

Thanks John. What you have said is pretty much similar to a procedure for the aircraft in type in the event of a windshear encounter(although there is an automatic windshear recovery system for the aircraft allowing the FD to command appropriate pitch and can be followed by the autopilot) but lets not get distracted by a microburst windshear here. Just a way to get more thrust which could be desired for other reasons as well.

Maybe I am getting caught up in words here, I'm just not sure what Maximum Available Thrust is with THR REF indicated. Max takeoff, max continuous, full climb thrust, CLB 1, CLB 2. Maybe I'll just try a second TO/GA push in the sim.

[JammedStab]

In 'classic' (non-FADEC etc) aircraft, levers all the way forward = maximum fuel flow and something heading towards maximum thrust that the physical installation can deliver; probably lots more that it's rated at in many cases. Catastrophic failure may not be far away, and lasting damage is very possible.




I think that is what happened to the Kalitta 747-200 in Colombia a few years back.

[latetonite]

The possibility of doing damage to the engines is there. The alternative may be more dear.

[VNAV PATH]

I should now the asnwer to this already but I want to make sure. You are in a modern Boeing doing a derated thrust takeoff. After selecting TOGA, you see THR REF displayed on your FMA. Soon after liftoff you encounter a windshear and desire maximum available thrust to escape the windshear. To achieve this, you can press TOGA again and now you will have full rated takeoff thrust.



quoting initial "jazmmedstab" post and I'll be giving B 777 description.


If aircraft is detecting windshear with associated warnings ,you MUST press TOGA switches so as to activate windshear followup by flight director.

Thrust status will change from THR REF to THR .

As someone said THR REF is just the reference thrust commanded by FMS ( D-TO, CLB etc)

Per exemple in approach , as flaps are non 0 ang glide slope captured thrust reference changes to G/A ( indicated top left of EICAS) and you autothrottle in SPEED mode on your FMA .

If you then press TOGA switches to make a go around, you will have a FMA change to THR REF wich means your airplane in is go around mode , THR REF meaning in this case: engine thrust is just thrust to acheive 2000 ft/mn rate of climb (if just one click on TOGA switch) . If you press a second time on toga switches , you then have your reference thrust changed to full goaround engine thrust .


Regarding thrust situation awareness , my eyes scan goes from FMA of course ,to EICAS green thrust indication . This particuraly on engine failure until CON is selected

pause !


Refering to some post speaking of TOGA control law :

Whatever take off or goaround mode, indeed, when altitude rate is greater than 1200 ft/mn, elevator controls pitch to keep selected speed.

When altitude rate becommes negative, aircraft is controlledby pitch.

When rate is between 0 and 1200 ft/mn, there is a combination of speed control and pitch control. Kind of small difference if autopilot used 600 ft/mn replacing 1200 value to be simple !


Happy new year.

[AirRabbit]

I'm just not sure what Maximum Available Thrust is with THR REF indicated … Max takeoff, max continuous, full climb thrust, CLB 1, CLB 2.
All “thrust references” are calculated values … where the result is dependent only on the parameters chosen … and they are always (at least more so than less so) based on efficiency and effectiveness of the “relationships” of those parameters at the anticipated normal ranges for the flight conditions expected.

…there is an automatic windshear recovery system for the aircraft allowing the FD to command appropriate pitch and can be followed by the autopilot
…so, are we to believe that you would be perfectly confident in the airplane systems to the degree that you would allow the airplane to safely fly itself out of a windshear encounter? I think that doing so is very likely a result of either “over confidence” in the airplane systems or “under confidence” in the pilot flying … who do you know better … YOU … or the guy(s) who designed, developed, constructed, and installed that system … and how come he isn’t there with you when you have to make that decision?

Maybe I'll just try a second TO/GA push in the sim. Before you make any potentially life-altering decision on how to operate your AIRPLANE based on what you see, hear, and/or feel in a SIMULATOR, I would strongly suggest that you find out what kind of information was used to program that particular simulator for the specific conditions you desire to examine. The fact is that the simulator will do what it is programmed to do … and ONLY what it is programmed to do. Good input = good output … Bad input = bad output … and No input = potentially deadly output.

In that case you will overthrust the engine.(if you go more than the N 1 limit) I think you meant to say “over speed” the engine. Unless they’ve made some remarkable advancements in jet engine technology that has escaped general notice, there is no such thing as a “thrust-limit” on a jet engine. As an example, I used to fly one that had a planned and used TO EPR of 2.83 – with water injection. There are limitations on "engine boost" that are applicable to internal combustion engines ... where additional pressure can be pumped into a cylinder to increase the power generated when ignition occurs ... and, in those cases, one can, indeed, "over-boost" an engine (pump too much air under pressure) into that pressure chamber - because of the structural integrity of that chamber. Additionally, as you probably know, 100% is not necessarily the real maximum rotation speed for any jet engine (you see maximum values all the time of 104%, 106%, and sometimes even higher); over-temp is a much more serious problem than over-speed; and if it is equipped with the necessary sensors and indicators, an increase in engine vibration above whatever is considered “normal” is also something that should be avoided. I’m relatively sure that if engine manufacturers could generate more “pressure” at the exhaust end of the engine in relationship to the “pressure” at the intake of that engine – without having to resort to dumping raw fuel into the burner sections (i.e., “after-burner”) - they would probably jump for joy. I’m not saying that one doesn’t need to know or respect engine limitations, but when it comes to IF or how hard I may have to hit the ground … I’m not at all worried about maintaining the integrity of that hunk of spinning metal.

And ... I, too, hope that each of you and each of your families' enjoy a peaceful, prosperous, and SAFE New Year!!

[JammedStab]

…there is an automatic windshear recovery system for the aircraft allowing the FD to command appropriate pitch and can be followed by the autopilot

…so, are we to believe that you would be perfectly confident in the airplane systems to the degree that you would allow the airplane to safely fly itself out of a windshear encounter? I think that doing so is very likely a result of either “over confidence” in the airplane systems or “under confidence” in the pilot flying … who do you know better … YOU … or the guy(s) who designed, developed, constructed, and installed that system … and how come he isn’t there with you when you have to make that decision?

No, you are to believe that Boeing says that this is a procedure which I repeated. Nothing more and nothing less. I don't think it is reasonable to expect the designer to accompany every flight that has windshear potential so no point bringing the subject up as it is not the basis for whether or not to be aware of manufacturers procedures and recommendations.


Maybe I'll just try a second TO/GA push in the sim.

Before you make any potentially life-altering decision on how to operate your AIRPLANE based on what you see, hear, and/or feel in a SIMULATOR, I would strongly suggest that you find out what kind of information was used to program that particular simulator for the specific conditions you desire to examine. The fact is that the simulator will do what it is programmed to do … and ONLY what it is programmed to do. Good input = good output … Bad input = bad output … and No input = potentially deadly output.

It is quite possible that the sim could be different than the aircraft but I still think that useful information could be gained. Which of course is why we use the simulator. If a certain procedure does apply to the simulator, I should think that there is a high probability that it will apply in the aircraft as well. But as you suggest, no guarantees.

As earlier stated, the procedure is to manually advance thrust levers so this is more of a learning a bit more exercise.

[cosmo kramer]

…so, are we to believe that you would be perfectly confident in the airplane systems to the degree that you would allow the airplane to safely fly itself out of a windshear encounter? I think that doing so is very likely a result of either “over confidence” in the airplane systems or “under confidence” in the pilot flying … who do you know better … YOU … or the guy(s) who designed, developed, constructed, and installed that system … and how come he isn’t there with you when you have to make that decision?

There are different degrees of wind sheer. The AFDS perfectly capable of flying out of a moderate wind sheer. Why on earth would anyone in that case:

I would have disengaged the autopilot, opened the throttles and pulled to the shaker.

...infact why would you EVER do that for a wind sheer. What you are describing is terrain avoidance maneuver. Totally unnecessary for a wind sheer where ground contact is not a factor.

Thank god times have changed.

[flyboyike]

Relax, cosmo, these guys are just theorizing. Because they are theorists.

[latetonite]

Cosmo, I am afraid this time you are not correct.
If 15 degrees NU still results in a negative VS, all you can do to avoid ground contact, is to pull up more. Up to the stick-shaker, if necessary.

This is common on all aircraft, I believe, after the DC10 accident in DFW.

[cosmo kramer]

If 15 degrees NU still results in a negative VS, all you can do to avoid ground contact, is to pull up more. Up to the stick-shaker, if necessary.

I think you read what I wrote too fast... But I will elaborate:

Wind sheer escape maneuver does NOT call for raising pitch to stick shaker, but as you wrote 15 deg ANU. Even if this results in negative V/S, you hold 15 deg (or what ever value applicable to you aircraft), as long as ground contact is NOT a factor.

If ground contact becomes a factor, you are no longer flying a "wind sheer escape maneuver", and the wind sheer is no longer the priority. Because it's obviously far worse to risk a crash. Hence, the wind sheer escape transitions over to "terrain avoidance maneuver", which calls for raising the nose to intermittent stick shaker.

However, in e.g. 1500 feet during approach or takeoff, and getting into wind sheer, it makes no sense what so ever to raise the nose to stick shaker and risk going into a stall. In addition to not making sense, it is not correct procedure either.

[cosmo kramer]

737 Windshear Escape Maneuver
Manual flight:
• Disconnect autopilot.
• Press either TO/GA switch.
• Aggressively apply maximum*
thrust.
• Disconnect autothrottle.
• Simultaneously roll wings level and
rotate toward an initial pitch attitude of 15 °.
• Retract speedbrakes.
• Follow flight director TO/GA
guidance (if available).

Automatic flight:
• Press either TO/GA switch**.
• Verify TO/GA mode annunciation.
• Verify thrust advances to GA
power.
• Retract speedbrakes.
• Monitor system performance***.


GPWS Warning
• Disconnect autopilot.
• Disconnect autothrottle.
• Aggressively apply maximum* thrust.
• Simultaneously roll wings level and rotate to an initial pitch attitude of 20°.
• Retract speedbrakes.
• If terrain remains a threat, continue rotation up to the pitch limit indicator (if available) or stick shaker or initial buffet.

[latetonite]

Cosmo, I see your point clearly. And it would indeed result in the same.
However, In my QRH, Maneuvers 11.1, pulling up to the stick shaker, is part of the "wind-shear escape maneuver".

[cosmo kramer]

I would be interested to see that quoted in full. The above is quoted from Boeing standard QRH, and is written as such in all the QRH I have from the previous companies where I worked.

Intermittent stick shaker is mentioned in the notes, as the upper pitch limit, i.e. it may necessary to lower the nose, below 15 degs ANU. Which of course makes sense if 15 degs would result in a stall.


...still the point is that there is no reason to "blindly" raise the nose to intermittent stick shaker for every wind sheer warning, as John Farley suggest.

[latetonite]

Cosmo:

Trying to cut and paste, to no avail.

So, extract from QRH B737 rev.17, 17_07 dec12:

Man. 1.11

action, dot nr 5, "simultaneous roll the wings level and rotate towards an INITIAL pitch attitude of 15 degrees.

And then in the first note, the devil is always in the tail:

"Flight at intermediate stick shaker may be required to obtain a positive terrain clearance.. "

I do not think I have to refer to a different manoeuvre, while, in my opinion, this covers the exercise.

Of course, there is no reason to go to SS at the initial notation of windshear.

[AirRabbit]

No, you are to believe that Boeing says that this is a procedure which I repeated. Nothing more and nothing less.
Just so I understand … you are saying (are you not) that Boeing has developed a procedure which pilots are perfectly welcome to use, and using this procedure will automatically recover the airplane from a windshear encounter, and, of course, you are aware that any procedure developed by Boeing, recommended by Boeing, and found in the Boeing operations manual, if used exactly as Boeing has recommended, will put Boeing directly in the sights of litigation should anything catastrophic occur … and Boeing is accepting this situation for windshear encounters. I just want to understand your comment.

I don't think it is reasonable to expect the designer to accompany every flight that has windshear potential so no point bringing the subject up as it is not the basis for whether or not to be aware of manufacturers procedures and recommendations.
Well, I shouldn’t be terribly surprised to see that irony is lost on some.

It is quite possible that the sim could be different than the aircraft but I still think that useful information could be gained.
Once again … just to understand … you acknowledge that some things seen, felt, and/or heard in a simulator “could be different than the aircraft” but you are convinced that this “different from the aircraft” information is useful to you. Is that right? The point I was trying to make is that, indeed, sometimes there IS information contained in a simulator that is NOT like the airplane (which may result from its being improperly understood, improperly programmed, or completely absent in the simulator – meaning that the simulator WILL NOT act or respond like the airplane) – and I am telling you that I KNOW aircraft simulation, quite well, and I'm recommending that such differences be recognized and avoided at all costs – and if absolutely unavoidable, proper and complete instruction MUST be simultaneously accomplished to ensure that any incorrect information is NOT carried over into the operation of the airplane. In fact, I would suggest discussing such matters with someone exceptionally knowledgeable about and well versed in the operation of the airplane's systems and the impact of those systems on the airplane's performance, handling, and response ... and failing that, please discuss the legal implications involved when someone ignorantly does something in aviation … and I say this in the hope of ensuring the highest degree of safety possible.

If a certain procedure does apply to the simulator, I should think that there is a high probability that it will apply in the aircraft as well. But as you suggest, no guarantees.
I’m not sure how you can say that … no guarantees, but go ahead anyway? Please, re-read my response, above … and if that doesn’t do anything for you … I’d recommend reviewing the ABX DC-8 accident in Narrows, Va in December, 1996 … and if that doesn’t impress you, I’d recommend a vocation change.

[flyboyike]

I’m not sure how you can say that … no guarantees, but go ahead anyway? Please, re-read my response, above … and if that doesn’t do anything for you … I’d recommend reviewing the ABX DC-8 accident in Narrows, Va in December, 1996 … and if that doesn’t impress you, I’d recommend a vocation change.


I wouldn't sweat his vocation situation much, especially since he's obviously nowhere near aviation.

On a related note, I'm not altogether clear on what windshear escape procedures (in a simulator or otherwise) have to do with the crash you mentioned, but then I don't have three decades of writing FARs under my belt.

[flyboyike]

Refreshing to see an honest man 'round these parts, huh, OK465?

[latetonite]

Flyboyike, Airrabbit was referring to simulators in general, I dear to believe.

[flyboyike]

Entirely possible, by the time I get done reading his dissertations I'm not entirely sure what my own name is, much less what he's referring to.

[AirRabbit]

....but then I don't have three decades of writing FARs under my belt.

A 38 year old would have had to have started at age 8....so this is believable.:}

Hi OK465 – I’m presuming that, given the juxtaposition of the above posts, your comment here is likely in response to one of the 2 folks that I’ve ever put on “Ignore” in my tenure here. I am usually able to simply skip over the ramblings of those who bluster and boast (and almost without fail, do so in a most unpleasant way), but after an entire career of essentially having to treat those types with a level of respect they clearly don’t deserve, I’ve decided that, when I run across such childishness, rather than swallow such swill in the name of politeness, it’s far easier to take advantage of the facilities provided by the owners/operators of this forum and simply recognize such emptiness with the proper level of recognition … none at all … and that is most easily achieved through the Ignore feature. As I’ve said, many times on this forum, the material I post is the result of my background, education, training, and experience – and if I’m not sure of a comment, I have always acknowledged that fact within the post. Initially, I decided not to divulge my identity or my full background, primarily to keep my then-employer from having to defend something I said and, perhaps a bit more poignantly, to prevent them from becoming my former employer. At the present time, I have not seen any particular advantage in changing that position … as it forces me to rely solely on the weight of the argument itself rather than the “positional authority” some may try to ascribe to my thoughts. Suffice it to say that I often wish that I was as smart and as experienced today as some of those 38-year-olds believe they are today – when it only takes a modicum of awareness to know that the Dunning-Kruger effect (Dunning?Kruger effect - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect)) remains “alive and well” in each of those cases. And ... should anyone have any specific question about simulation or the necessary requirements to have a simulator qualified, I'd be happy to attempt to provide an answer ... assuming, of course, that one of these "knowledgeable chaps" haven't already provided that answer ...:p ... and, in case it's necessary, THAT was the reason behind the reference to the ABX accident - in that the crew repeatedly used techniques and procedures they learned/practiced in their erroneously programmed simulator - and died in their airplane as a result.

Happy New Year!

[JammedStab]

Just so I understand … you are saying (are you not) that Boeing has developed a procedure which pilots are perfectly welcome to use, and using this procedure will automatically recover the airplane from a windshear encounter, and, of course, you are aware that any procedure developed by Boeing, recommended by Boeing, and found in the Boeing operations manual, if used exactly as Boeing has recommended, will put Boeing directly in the sights of litigation should anything catastrophic occur … and Boeing is accepting this situation for windshear encounters. I just want to understand your comment.

I'm sure if you re-read it you will understand it. It is a procedure which is what it is. if you don't like the procedure, and you may very well have good reasons for not liking it, feel free to let us know. That is what the forum is for and any professional input from you is quite welcome.





Once again … just to understand … you acknowledge that some things seen, felt, and/or heard in a simulator “could be different than the aircraft” but you are convinced that this “different from the aircraft” information is useful to you. Is that right? The point I was trying to make is that, indeed, sometimes there IS information contained in a simulator that is NOT like the airplane (which may result from its being improperly understood, improperly programmed, or completely absent in the simulator – meaning that the simulator WILL NOT act or respond like the airplane) – and I am telling you that I KNOW aircraft simulation, quite well, and I'm recommending that such differences be recognized and avoided at all costs – and if absolutely unavoidable, proper and complete instruction MUST be simultaneously accomplished to ensure that any incorrect information is NOT carried over into the operation of the airplane. In fact, I would suggest discussing such matters with someone exceptionally knowledgeable about and well versed in the operation of the airplane's systems and the impact of those systems on the airplane's performance, handling, and response ... and failing that, please discuss the legal implications involved when someone ignorantly does something in aviation … and I say this in the hope of ensuring the highest degree of safety possible.


Always a good idea as you suggest to try and find someone with someone exceptionally knowledgeable. Still going to try it in the sim. Hopefully the sim instructor that day will be exceptionally knowledgeable.

[AirRabbit]

Always a good idea as you suggest to try and find someone with someone exceptionally knowledgeable. Still going to try it in the sim. Hopefully the sim instructor that day will be exceptionally knowledgeable.


…and what if that instructor thinks he/she knows all there is to know about the specific issue in which you are interested, but does not admit it … or worse, does not know it? If you observe carefully you may be able to pick up on the first … but what if it is the second? Will you KNOW that what you see, hear, feel in that simulator is what you would see, feel, and hear in the airplane if the conditions were identical … OR would you PRESUME those stimuli will be the same? Why do I ask? What will you do if you are the pilot flying and the airplane initially gives you what you believe to be the same stimuli that you saw in the simulator?

I cited the ABX accident – despite what some lesser-knowledgeable readers may believe - the crew members in the ABX DC-8 were flying a post maintenance check flight – a portion of which was to conduct a recovery from a stall. The pilot flying in the left seat was the Chief Pilot for the DC-8 fleet, the pilot monitoring from the right seat was the former Chief Pilot for the DC-8 feet, and the flight engineer was a senior DC-8 flight engineer. The simulator this crew (and others) had used in their previous training was not programmed correctly and provided sufficient “thrust” to recover the simulator from a fully stalled condition, while maintaining sufficient elevator back pressure to maintain essentially level flight and all that was needed was to advance the power … the simulator recovered each time … every time. But, in the airplane, in those same conditions, with the same initial indications … all that resulted was that the outboard engines (it is presumed it was the outboard engines) began to compressor stall … the airframe buffeting never stopped … the power was reduced to regain smooth airflow through all engines … again, and again, and again (I don't remember the number of times) the power was advanced with the controls deflected to a nose up position to minimize altitude loss … unfortunately … after all the attempts, the altitude lost was all of the 17,000 feet they had under them … and all on board died – at least largely BECAUSE they did what they thought was the proper procedure to effect a satisfactory recovery – and they thought this because that is what they saw, heard, and felt in their simulator.

[JammedStab]

…and what if that instructor thinks he/she knows all there is to know about the specific issue in which you are interested, but does not admit it … or worse, does not know it? If you observe carefully you may be able to pick up on the first … but what if it is the second? Will you KNOW that what you see, hear, feel in that simulator is what you would see, feel, and hear in the airplane if the conditions were identical … OR would you PRESUME those stimuli will be the same? Why do I ask? What will you do if you are the pilot flying and the airplane initially gives you what you believe to be the same stimuli that you saw in the simulator?



It's a chance I'll just have to take. Thanks for the advice.

To be honest, I have flown 5 types with sims(and one other sim for a job interview) and not one flies like the real aircraft. Most had at least one characteristic that was appeared to be really off. Things such as extreme sensitivity in more than one type to strange visuals on V1 cuts to a really large pull force required to rotate.

But we have to make do with what we have I suppose. Based on this reality combined with your post, there is not much that we should be doing in the sim.

Oh well, I did my first flight on the line with no touch and goes for the last type despite the reality the fact that what I was seeing, hearing and feeling in the aircraft were not exactly the same as the sim. So, I think I'll try pushing the TOGA switch next time under the proper circumstances in the sim and take my chances of the potential future consequences.

I'm no sim expert but I believe the more unusual things like actual stalls and other things that the simulator were not certified for may not be very realistic at all. Especially in an old DC-8.

While a little off topic but I do remember reading that DC-8 crash report many years ago that you have mentioned. Improper stall recovery is what I remember. I believe they were in a nose down attitude but still stalled. Pulling on the control column were they not? Not very conducive to a recovery. Good point on the misleading sim stuff they experienced but a stall recovery is fairly straight forward. I'm sure Douglas has written down procedures, just like Boeing does as earlier mentioned by me. Somebody didn't follow them it appears.

I would suspect that with all these software updates we hear about on some types like Airbus that there could easily be some differences from sim to plane and plane to plane. Most types I flew had quite a few differences from plane to plane with various different models for pax, cargo and combi and previous owners differences from each other. Have survived so far. I think I will again despite trying to learn a bit more.

[AirRabbit]

I'm no sim expert but I believe the more unusual things like actual stalls and other things that the simulator were not certified for may not be very realistic at all. Especially in an old DC-8.

But we have to make do with what we have I suppose. Based on this reality combined with your post, there is not much that we should be doing in the sim.

While I continue to offer recommendations regarding simulator use, let me be perfectly clear … in today’s environment there is NO, absolutely NO, training that is better conducted than that accomplished through the proper use of simulation equipment under the supervision of a properly, completely, and competently trained instructor. The cautions I offer are to help ensure that the instructor/evaluator conducting the training (or administering the evaluation) knows if, what, and where the simulator being used may provide less than optimum cueing for use by the pilot being trained or checked. As some of the “older” heads would recognize, simulation has come a very long way over the last 30+ years … to the extent that we now have several “levels” of simulation … where each level is designed to provide appropriately differing levels of simulation accuracy … and only the top levels authorize complete training and checking capabilities – e.g., Level D has essentially no training/checking restrictions (even though it is not perfect) – Level C provides the same capability, but only IF the applicant meets certain prerequisite requirements – and Level B provides for complete recurrent training/checking, including the takeoffs and landings required for recurrent training or checking. In the US there are essentially 4 levels of full flight simulators (FFS at levels A, B, C and D) and 4 levels of flight training device (FTD at levels 6, 5, 4, and 3) … with a 5th level of FTD likely available with the next update of the regulation dealing with simulation equipment (Part 60) which will likely be a new Level 7 FTD. All of these devices are under the purview of the Air Transportation Division, while the General Aviation Division is currently responsible for the devices used in general aviation activities, called BATD (Basic Aviation Training Device) and AATD (Advanced Aviation Training Device) … although there are factions at work that would recommend the FAA “get its act together” and put all devices into a continuum of device levels such as advocated by ICAO, and eliminate the confusion that inevitably creeps into the mix without such standardized oversight. The various levels of FTD can be, and ARE, regularly used to provide excellent training – provided such training remains within the verified performance envelope of the specific device being used – AND is conducted under the direct supervision of a competently trained and validated instructor and/or evaluator – regardless of the level of simulation used - again, recognizing the existing authorizations and/or limitations for each specific device.

As I’ve mentioned in earlier posts, there is an international activity currently underway, sponsored by the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) and the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) called the International Training and Qualification Initiative (ITQI) where the focus is aimed at establishing the minimum standards that should be applicable for the training and evaluation of Pilots, Instructors, and Evaluators – I think this is a very important activity and that it should be participated in by all who have an interest in seeing that such standards are developed and incorporated into the training and testing of airline crews anywhere and everywhere.

Other than the obvious reasons for having such internationally accepted standards, this would better ensure that any use of “older” simulation equipment (like that older DC-8 simulator) could be effectively used for teaching the kinds of things that had been taken for granted – Yes, I said effectively used. For example, while the particular simulator used by ABX for stall recovery training could still be used for that training, there would be a CONDITION applied (and this is a huge deal!!) that the instructor would be trained on the content and limitations of the simulator and on the best way to ensure that whatever is being taught or tested is thoroughly understood by the instructor or evaluator, including any and all simulation deficiencies and the best way to ensure that proper and effective training (or testing) can be accomplished in THAT simulator … requiring that the instructor be on his/her toes to ensure that the crew members being trained are carefully observed with respect to what the pilot flying is actually doing and correct any inappropriate action – on the spot – with an explanation of the reason for the correction. For example, if the pilot is attempting to maintain altitude through the use of nose-up elevator pressure while adding power to “fly out of the top of the stall (and I’ve always hated that particular reference) the instructor would correct those inappropriate actions and explain why it would be necessary to allow the nose to approach or go below the horizon WHILE full power is added – explaining that the higher the altitude this task is begun, the higher the gross weight of the simulated aircraft, and the slower the airspeed at the time of the initiation, the greater the probability will be for getting the nose closer to, or further below, that horizon, WHILE full power is added (and I mean full power, which, depending on the existing altitude, could mean “bend-the-throttles-over-the-forward-limits” – and then IF the pilot not flying (the pilot monitoring) notices the EGT climbing into the red, he might consider advising the pilot flying to “pull ‘em back a bit” … but just to keep the temperatures within bounds) to ensure the minimum amount of time to regain flying speed – AND the instructor must be able to explain, and effectively teach, that operation within the mid-range of the stick-shaker is not necessarily something that must be completely avoided – and CAN be used to better ensure the capability of the airplane to remain airborne and lessen the possibility of ground contact IF the potential for ground contact is more than remote… AND, in the event that ground contact cannot be avoided, at least that contact will be at the minimum rate of descent possible. The instructor should explain that in at least in some simulators (and was true in that old ABX-used DC-8 simulator) the “thrust” value could well be provided on the basis of simple throttle position instead of the computed value of fuel flow, fuel density, fuel temperature, airflow direction into the engine intake (usually skewed with nose pitched up, interrupting direct airflow down the axis of the engine), and similar issues. There are very few currently operating simulators that are equipped with programming that will provide a close approximation to what is likely to happen in a real airplane in a fully developed aerodynamic stall – although there IS currently underway, a focused international effort to determine how to best acquire, use, gather, formulate, extrapolate, program, test, etc., etc., methodologies that can provide the most realistic simulation of such an aerodynamic stall possible – AND, just for your information … that effort has been realizing quite a bit of success over the past year, or so – and I fully expect that to be an extremely valuable addition to simulator qualification requirements – once any “bugs” are ironed out.

To be honest, I have flown 5 types with sims(and one other sim for a job interview) and not one flies like the real aircraft. Most had at least one characteristic that was appeared to be really off. Things such as extreme sensitivity in more than one type to strange visuals on V1 cuts to a really large pull force required to rotate.
In most cases, the majority of any “sensitivity” such as what you describe (and I’m assuming you are referring to the “sensitivity” of the simulated airplane’s response to your control inputs) is attributable to inaccuracies of the motion system. Of course, no FTD is required to have a motion system – and the first two levels of FFS require only a 3-axis motion system … it’s only the highest 2 levels of FFS that require a fully functional 6-axis motion system. But, it is absolutely necessary for that motion cueing (all of it) to be kept (as much as can be provided with the technology – the newer the better) within the appropriate values mandated for that specific simulator. Humans operate in a 3-dimensional world and are subject to external forces – most noticed when free to move both along AND around an axis in each of those three directions … that is 2 motions in each of 3 axes (along AND around the longitudinal, the lateral, and the vertical axes), meaning 6 degrees of freedom – which is where the “6DOF” reference is derived. If you have a simulator with only 3 degrees of freedom – the motion cannot be recognized as “realistic,” and of course, with NO motion – the result is more than obvious – and tends to skew the pilot’s recognition of the effect of his/her control inputs. But input cueing is not limited to motion – there are also visual cues, sound cues, and control feedback cues – where visual cues include BOTH outside the cockpit (runways, airports, etc.) and inside the cockpit (instrument response times and magnitudes, just to name 2 of the very many) – sound cues from the engines (steady and changing), audible warnings and reminders, slip-stream noise, etc. – and control feed-back, sometimes referred to as control “feel” – the amount of effort you have to exert on the control wheel to make a turn or how much column force is necessary to rotate for takeoff, etc. The most misunderstood factor about these input cues – is that there are very few persons who are even aware of what they use for cueing stimuli on which they make their control application decisions – conscious AND subconscious decisions.

Oh well, I did my first flight on the line with no touch and goes for the last type despite the reality the fact that what I was seeing, hearing and feeling in the aircraft were not exactly the same as the sim. So, I think I'll try pushing the TOGA switch next time under the proper circumstances in the sim and take my chances of the potential future consequences.
Ouch – if you operate under the US regulations, I certainly hope that your simulator training was done in either a Level D, or at least a Level C, simulator with your having had the appropriate prerequisite experience requirements. I know of a relatively new airline that had gone into business not terribly long ago with a desire to type rate ALL of their crew members – left seat and right seat. Fine with me … but when it came time to begin “line operating experience,” the airline was erroneously told they could begin doing so without any seat dependent training for the right seat guys in the right seat. That generated a set of serious issues that resulted in the airline’s certificate being moved to another district and there were some persons within and outside of the airline and the FAA who lost their jobs!

While a little off topic but I do remember reading that DC-8 crash report many years ago that you have mentioned. Improper stall recovery is what I remember. I believe they were in a nose down attitude but still stalled. Pulling on the control column were they not? Not very conducive to a recovery. Good point on the misleading sim stuff they experienced but a stall recovery is fairly straight forward. I'm sure Douglas has written down procedures, just like Boeing does as earlier mentioned by me. Somebody didn't follow them it appears.
As is true in almost any/every accident … there were a lot of errors made … and I’m not trying to point out anything OTHER THAN it is apparent that these very experienced pilots attempted to do what they were trained to do … and whether they realized it or not, I would argue that they were doing what they had seen done, had practiced doing and at each practice they had achieved the result they desired – but those times were in the simulator.

NTSB Accident Report ABX DC-8
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were:
•the inappropriate control inputs applied by the flying pilot during a stall recovery attempt;
•the failure of the nonflying pilot-in-command to recognize, address, and correct these inappropriate control inputs; and
•the failure of ABX to establish a formal functional evaluation flight program that included adequate program guidelines, requirements and pilot training for performance of these flights.

Contributing to the causes of the accident was the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator’s inadequate fidelity in reproducing the airplane’s stall characteristics.

If you were to review the Flight Data recordings of this accident (which are available, by the way) I believe you would see that the pitch attitude did, in fact, achieve a nose-down position on more than one occasion … but at each time as I recall there was an apparently deliberate attempt to either reduce the amount of nose-down or return to a nose-up. In fact, if memory serves, there was never a time when the control column pressure was toward a nose-down position (i.e., a nose down control column pressure) … in fact, again, if memory serves, there were times, well after the initiation of the stall buffet, where the control column back pressure was at or above 30 pounds of pull. I don’t remember the charted range of this parameter – but I remember the “nose-up” pressure being almost to the end of the charted range. And, as a correction … I think I had said they were at 17,000 feet and on further thought, I don’t think that is correct … it seems to me after considerable attempts to recall some of the specifics (but … you should know that there are times when I can’t tell you what I had for breakfast that morning!) I think the altitude was more in the range of 12 to 14 thousand feet – but I don’t recall if that was MSL or AGL – probably MSL … and I think that the report (at least the report available to the pubic) contains FDR information for only the last couple of minutes of the flight.

[AirRabbit]

No, you are to believe that Boeing says that this is a procedure which I repeated. Nothing more and nothing less.
Quote:
Originally Posted by AirRabbit
Just so I understand … you are saying (are you not) that Boeing has developed a procedure which pilots are perfectly welcome to use, and using this procedure will automatically recover the airplane from a windshear encounter, and, of course, you are aware that any procedure developed by Boeing, recommended by Boeing, and found in the Boeing operations manual, if used exactly as Boeing has recommended, will put Boeing directly in the sights of litigation should anything catastrophic occur … and Boeing is accepting this situation for windshear encounters. I just want to understand your comment.

I'm sure if you re-read it you will understand it. It is a procedure which is what it is. if you don't like the procedure, and you may very well have good reasons for not liking it, feel free to let us know. That is what the forum is for and any professional input from you is quite welcome.

Hi J/S … I took your recommendation to heart and found what I think is the reference you were citing … but, what I found was an operating description of the Automatic Flight Director System (AFDS) and not a “procedure.” Here is what I found by searching Boeing Flight Manuals for Automatic Windshear Recovery:
The AFDS provides windshear recovery guidance by means of the normal go–around pitch and roll modes. With go–around armed, pushing a TO/GA switch commands a pitch–up of 15 degrees or slightly below the pitch limit, whichever is lower. As rate of climb increases from 600 to 1200 feet per minute (0 to 600 feet per minute with engine out), AFDS gradually transitions from pitch to airspeed control. The target airspeed is IAS/MACH window airspeed or current airspeed, whichever is greater when TO/GA is activated. If current airspeed remains above the selected speed for 5 seconds, the selected airspeed is reset to current airspeed, (to a maximum of the IAS/MACH window speed plus 25 knots). When the autopilot is not engaged when go–around is initiated, the pilot must fly the windshear recovery following the flight director commands. If the autothrottle is not armed, the thrust levers must be advanced manually.
As I read this, it is not evident to me that this should be understood to be a “procedure” that is to be followed, but rather, to me this is a description of how the various systems installed on the airplane actually provide information visually to the flight crew, and describes to the flight crew what the visual displays represent – together with a description of the various parameters that are involved. Additionally, I am perfectly comfortable with the fact that Boeing is providing all the information they are capable of providing … and I’m sure they offer this description because under the greater percentages of time when a situation occurs similar to one that would suggest a pilot might use these systems as described here, this description is very likely exactly what the pilots will see. Additionally, I’m quite sure that Boeing is not advocating that any pilot would blindly follow any so-called “procedure” if the information being presented is suspected of providing questionable information.

Having said that, this description does not indicate, at least in this section of the manual, what the flight crew should do if the conditional parameters described here are not met. For example … the paragraph describes that “if go-around is armed, pushing a TO/GA switch commands a pitch-up of 15 degrees or slightly below the pitch limit, whichever is lower” … and that “…as the rate of climb increases from 600 to 1200 fpm, the AFDS gradually transition from pitch to airspeed control…” I’m confident that this is exactly what the systems involved will do. However, it does not indicate what happens or what should be done if the rate of climb does not increase … or if it begins to decrease. It also describes what the pilot must do if the autothrottle is not armed/engaged ... “the throttles must be advanced manually” … and if the autopilot is not engaged when the go-around is initiated … “the pilot must fly the windshear recovery following the flight director commands.” But, as I’ve said above, what happens if the flight director commands are insufficient or you need something to be done a lot more “robustly” than what the automatic systems are providing … what then? Of course, the answer is FLY the AIRPLANE.

What I’m saying is that this paragraph describes how the systems are designed to function – given a very specific set of circumstances – with the anticipation that all of the parameters will be realized as is presumed in the paragraph’s content.

OK. Out of concern for the well-being of those of you who absolutely abhor long posts … stop reading … and those of you who have concerns about or question my professional history … stop reading ... and anyone else who is not interested in what I have to say on the subject of training ... stop reading. Continue at your own risk.

Quite some time ago, I was involved in a rather major effort to determine a satisfactory pilot reaction to an inadvertent windshear encounter. This was the new, “hot button” issue at that time, not long after the windshear accidents at New Orleans and JFK. A fairly sizeable group assembled at the Boeing facilities in Seattle where Boeing had programmed into one of their B737 systems trainers (not a full flight simulator – but it had pretty good aero-programming) representative windshear parameters, closely representing a combination of those two accident profiles – but with the ability to alter some of the severity of the actual shear. Each of us was given several opportunities to conduct a takeoff and experience the “fun.” They could (and did) adjust the gross weights, and used varying flap settings for takeoff – and inserted various combinations of down-drafts, nose-to-tail wind shifts, etc. … some of which were designed to be survivable with application of the proper procedures and some were designed to result in a crash, regardless of the techniques and control applications used. I took my turn … and I had the opportunity to demonstrate my “stick-n-rudder” skills, in a relatively heavy weight B737 TO with a takeoff flap setting of “5,” the programming used called for a relatively significant nose-to-tail shear just after lift-off. I fought valiantly, but to no avail … and crashed … just as it was designed to do. But there were 3 of us who had previously discussed alternative sets of responses … and I asked to repeat the same circumstance. We did just that … set everything up exactly as the first attempt. However, after encountering the shear, after advancing the throttles to the firewall, after getting well into the stick-shaker, I called for “Flaps 15” – and when the Boeing instructor in the other seat hesitated … I grabbed the flap lever and moved it to the “15” detent. We did not crash. And the Boeing personnel were highly “insulted” that I had the temerity to do something other than what they had designed as “the” procedure … saying that adding flaps also increased drag – and THAT was something that simply should not be done – as it would result in catastrophic results! When the group, as a whole, asked if the trainer was accurate with respect to its aerodynamic responses, they indicated that it certainly was. Our group acknowledged that adding additional flaps would very likely increase drag, but as long as the airspeed was sufficiently high, lift would also be increased – and to a much larger percent than additional drag would be generated. Of course, we all recognized the pros and cons of both sides of this particular circumstance … but the “procedure” to make “no configuration” changes, while perfectly logical in some circumstances, was found to be not so logical in others. Of course, we were not suggesting that a flight crew can or should indiscriminately raise or lower flaps or landing gear. But, after some very lengthy discussions, even Boeing acknowledged that in some circumstances, adding additional lift capability, even at the cost of some additional aerodynamic drag, could mean the difference between an accident and a drinking-story.

And … before any of my regular detractors who have ignored my suggestion earlier to “stop reading” begin to throw barbs in my direction, alleging that I am, yet again, touting my experience, or blowing my own horn … let me say that anyone of the 3 of us that had agreed to attempt this particular example could have been at the controls at the time – and, in fact, it was both of the other guys who did most of the arguing that took place at the trainer that day.

My point is that knowing what the airplane is capable of doing, and being confident in what, when, where, why, and how you desire to manipulate the various parameters available to you as the pilot flying any particular airplane – can be, and sometimes IS, all the difference between the same two potential outcomes – accident or war-story. This is only one of the reasons that I have continually advocated that pilots should learn (and practice to the greatest extent possible) all they can about their airplane – the training that is conducted should provide a wide-range of familiarity with the airplane responses and resulting capabilities. In fact, I would not argue if the regulator was to mandate such extensive training, at least initially, and to whatever extent is thought appropriate on a recurring basis. Things like recoveries from an aerodynamic stall … slow flight demonstrations while maintaining level flight, turns, climbs and descents – using the stick shaker or other stall warning as the reference cue – all conducted at very light, intermediate, and very heavy gross weights and at various airplane configurations of both flap and gear extension … recoveries from a bounced landing … go-arounds from rejected landings … accelerate – stop / accelerate – go distances … balanced field … climb performance (segmented climb, engine malfunctions) … the automation policy of the company including written operating procedures for selecting and deselecting appropriate levels of automation, and CAT II and CAT III approaches when authorized … ice protection (anti-ice and de-ice) pitot-static system(s), windshield, wing and tail surfaces … and, as you might expect … the list could go on and on. I fully recognize that working for a company requires each of us to do what we're contracted to do ... but I also believe that we're not merely programmable beings ... and we have a duty to do all we can to protect and provide appropriate service for our passengers - the best way I know how to do that is to ensure I know and practice all I can about my airplane and how to best react to whatever circumstance occurs - whether it results from my actions or actions of others, including "mother nature." How we get to that point is the issue ... it has to be by willingness on our parts (including our bosses) or by direction of the regulator - and likely the best way would be a combination of the two.

Sorry ‘bout the “rambling” – but, I did warn you.

[PEI_3721]

IMHO it would be unwise to use a successful (simulated) example as the basis for generic procedure because it was situation specific (shear and crew - event experience).
Some windshear guidance systems use adaptable laws vs altitude which are based on max lift (and thrust) – leave the flap and gear configuration as it is. The optimisation is for speed to be sacrificed at ‘lower altitudes’ minimizing altitude loss, whereas at ‘higher altitudes’ speed is retained to pass through the hazard more quickly at the expense of some altitude loss.
I do not know how this optimisation applies for takeoff, but most safety teaching is that where there is a risk of windshear don’t take off.
Whatever procedure is published, it does not guarantee a safe outcome; there are combinations of windshears, situation (altitude/energy), and crew performance from which recovery is impossible.
See http://www.scribd.com/doc/35984283/Windshear-Incident; if this had been encountered 50 ft lower or the crew's response was less than the excellence demonstrated, then … …

[AirRabbit]

Very well said, PEI_3721. And you used considerably less verbiage than I!

[JammedStab]

Here is what I found by searching Boeing Flight Manuals for Automatic Windshear Recovery:

As I read this, it is not evident to me that this should be understood to be a “procedure” that is to be followed....


Boeing describes the Automatic Windshear Recovery as a Maneuver in the FCOM. It is quite clear on the procedures or actions to be taken. I am quite confident that if they didn't think it was a procedure to be followed, it would not be provided.


However, it does not indicate what happens or what should be done if the rate of climb does not increase … or if it begins to decrease.

Boeing is also quite clear in the FCOM about your concerns by stating,

"WARNING: *** Severe windshear may exceed the performance
capability of the AFDS. The pilot flying must be
prepared to disengage the autopilot and disconnect the
autothrottle and fly manually"

In other words, it is quite possible to have a windshear warning at a relatively higher altitude and stay on automatics. More severe stuff requires manual flying. All bases covered.


As a final add on here for anyone reading this thread.....

Second TO/GA push on the ground does nothing to increase thrust, therefore manual thrust lever movement is required. As soon a s airborne, the pilot can "terminate the HOLD mode and cancel any derate thrust limits by a second press of the TO/GA switch after liftoff."

[AirRabbit]

Hi J/S:

First, let me thank you for taking the time to read my opinions … and I must acknowledge the professional and respectful manner in which you have made your points and outlined your positions. Personally, I believe there will never be a time when we have too many gentlemen (and ladies, for that matter) in the cockpit, and I do hope that the cockpits of the future will be staffed with persons who embody your attitude and demeanor.

While you and I may disagree on some (and I emphasize – some) of the “finer” points, I think that discussing these issues has demonstrated the importance of recognizing what the “book” says, and perhaps even more so, acknowledges the importance of understanding how that information may be used. Perhaps even more important is developing an understanding, and, from that, recognizing the various ways in which the airplane (and its systems) will, or may, tell the flight crew what is going on, enabling the crew to properly interpret that information and decide whether or not it should be acted upon if it becomes necessary to do so – and thereby better understand what the proper response actions should be.

In my view … a good discussion … and, again, I thank you for taking part.