M609
23rd Jan 2013, 12:08
They took their sweet long time (again), but finally ther is a report out on this crash: Old locked topic (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/219672-a109e-crash-norway.html)
Report here: AIBN report (http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/2013-02?pid=SHT-Report-ReportFile&attach=1)
It contains this English summary
LN-OLH was to fly to the ship “Clipper Sky” in the Herviksfjord and pick up a maritime pilot. It was then to transferee the maritime pilot to the ship “Berge Danuta” west of the Skudefjord. After the maritime pilot had been hoisted on board, the helicopter proceeded in a southwesterly direction at 500 ft altitude. Only a short time later the helicopter deviated from the planned course and overflew the island Austre Bokken. Suddenly, the pilot-in-command received a warning indicating that they were about to hit terrain and he climbed steeply. He subsequently lost control of the helicopter. It was dark night and it’s likely that they unnoticed had flown into fog. The first officer, who was preoccupied by communicating with the ship “Berge Danuta”, heard the pilot-in-command calling for assistance. He also noticed vibrations in the helicopter. He perceived that they had an emergency with a possible tail rotor failure, and entered an autorotation. The helicopter autorotated until it hit the ground and rolled over on its side. All four on board were injured. The hoist operator and the maritime pilot did not use seat belts and this led to unnecessary injury.
The investigation has shown that a number of factors contributed to the accident. The flight was conducted as a VFR-flight under conditions which at times should imply that it was flown using instruments. There was little communication between crew members on how the flight should be carried out, instructions for the use of the helicopter's navigation systems were inadequately described in the company's manuals and the crew members were busy with separate tasks when emergency arose.
The company has put significant effort on improving safety in the aftermath of the accident. This has led to several improvements over the more than six years having passed since the accident happened. The Accident Investigation Board has therefore decided not to make any safety recommendations based on the investigation.
Must have been scay as hell for both pilots when they lost references
Report here: AIBN report (http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/2013-02?pid=SHT-Report-ReportFile&attach=1)
It contains this English summary
LN-OLH was to fly to the ship “Clipper Sky” in the Herviksfjord and pick up a maritime pilot. It was then to transferee the maritime pilot to the ship “Berge Danuta” west of the Skudefjord. After the maritime pilot had been hoisted on board, the helicopter proceeded in a southwesterly direction at 500 ft altitude. Only a short time later the helicopter deviated from the planned course and overflew the island Austre Bokken. Suddenly, the pilot-in-command received a warning indicating that they were about to hit terrain and he climbed steeply. He subsequently lost control of the helicopter. It was dark night and it’s likely that they unnoticed had flown into fog. The first officer, who was preoccupied by communicating with the ship “Berge Danuta”, heard the pilot-in-command calling for assistance. He also noticed vibrations in the helicopter. He perceived that they had an emergency with a possible tail rotor failure, and entered an autorotation. The helicopter autorotated until it hit the ground and rolled over on its side. All four on board were injured. The hoist operator and the maritime pilot did not use seat belts and this led to unnecessary injury.
The investigation has shown that a number of factors contributed to the accident. The flight was conducted as a VFR-flight under conditions which at times should imply that it was flown using instruments. There was little communication between crew members on how the flight should be carried out, instructions for the use of the helicopter's navigation systems were inadequately described in the company's manuals and the crew members were busy with separate tasks when emergency arose.
The company has put significant effort on improving safety in the aftermath of the accident. This has led to several improvements over the more than six years having passed since the accident happened. The Accident Investigation Board has therefore decided not to make any safety recommendations based on the investigation.
Must have been scay as hell for both pilots when they lost references