Nat Geo TV Prog - MoK Accident.

[gamecock]

Tonight on Sky channel 526 at 20.00 & 527 at 21.00.

Seconds From Disaster - a look at the events leading up to the crash of the RAF Chinook helicopter in 1994.

[Chugalug2]

For those that missed it or who can't get Nat Geo, here is a YouTube recording:-
Seconds From Disaster - S06E10 - Chinook Helicopter Crash - YouTube

[SASless]

Well....I did Okay up to the point they Commentator explained the "Fadec" Runaway Up scenario.

Pure Bollocks Folks!

If one engine goest to Topping or higher....the Nr increases dramatically despite one engine dropping back to idle. The rate of climb does not change.

When you load the rotor system by increasing Thrust Lever setting (Collective to the unwashed)....the Rate of Climb increases to a very high rate.....as the good engine will follow the Lever movement made by the Pilot.

I have been there and done that on a Chinook....it is a very interesting experience.....and once had....you do not want a second time.

I can assure you that your attention will be focused upon controlling the Main Rotor RPM which in my case went to between 270-280 RPM....compared to a Normal range of 225-230 (for the model I was in) which is really zinging!

I too went IMC....but with a clearly defined cloud layer and popped through a 1500 foot thick layer....in what seemed just a few seconds. Granted Time had "slowed" while all this was going on.

As to the accident....I hold no opinion.....but as to the Video and what they say about the High Side Fadec failure.....I have not a lot of confidence in what they say.

[Chugalug2]

SASless, an interesting and informed comment. Unfortunately its rather over my fixed winged head, so I'd appreciate a little dotting of the i's...
Are you saying that if a FADEC runaway had indeed occured, the inevitable result would have been a max rate of climb, whatever the pilot's intentions, hence going IMC but almost certainly avoiding a CFIT (even if the "C" bit is a bit iffy)?
What about the 3/4 of hard over left rudder pedal? If that were pilot input (and I believe that is deemed more likely than as a result of impact forces), what does that suggest? The prog says that such an input is unbelievable given normal controlled flight. Is that true? What would therefore cause such an unusual input? The prog suggests it was to rotate the aircraft about its axis to enter a hover to the left. Do you think that is true?
The problem with the HC2 then was that there was so much wrong with it that one is spoilt for choice. A FADEC uncommanded run up, run down, or indeed shut down, or jammed flight controls in one, two, or even all three axis; yer pays yer money and takes yer choice...
No mention was even made of an RTS that limited the a/c to "Switch on only" clearance thus obviating any operational use, let alone pax use, let alone VIP transit use. As with most investigations into this tragedy it left more unsaid and unmentioned than it revealed, other than of course the old familiar claim of Gross Pilot Negligence, this time by an enobled ex AAC pilot. Seems the Star Chamber has chums in high places. It's the same old song....

[SASless]

I am not an accident investigator or clairvoyant so I care not to state any opinion about what the crew did, might have done, would have done, should have done.

I will answer your questions with that caveat in mind.

1. With a FADEC Runaway to the High Side on one engine.....there is nothing in that failure of itself that alters the flight path of the helicopter in any way....NONE.

2. Any Rate of Climb from none....to several thousand FPM would be the result of a control input of some kind into the Thrust Lever system (what most helicopter pilots know as the "Collective") by either a Pilot or if equipped and engaged....an Autopilot system....but that is completely independent of the the Engine system controls....beyond the normal interface of Governor/FADEC to Thrust lever movement responding to the increase demand for power.

3. 3/4 Hard Over of the Yaw Control Pedals.....I can think of no hydraulic, auto-pilot or other input other than a "mechanical" (application of pressure on the pedal by a foot or other similar source) that would cause that.

4. "To Rotate the aircraft about its axis to enter a hover".....pure damn Bollocks! Remember the aircraft hit the ground at a very high forward speed, with a nose high attitude of about 30 degrees and a bank angle of about 5-10 degrees (as I remember the numbers.....). I do not recall a mention of the aircraft heading compared to the azimuth of the path along the ground (was the nose left of the direction the aircraft was traveling to indicate a "turn" being made?).

My basic thoughts based upon a high forward airspeed, a 30 degree nose high attitude, a 5-10 degree angle of bank to the left, and a drastic input of left pedal.....combined with rising terrain in poor visibility...higher ground on the right....sea on the left with sloping ground down to the left....indicates a very rapid input of controls to avoid Terrain. I am not saying that is what happened.....just as I sit here thinking over all I have read and heard about the accident.

Absent Data Recorders and CVR's....Radar Traces....and other information to guide the investigation....any number of explanations are possible depending upon which Ox you wish to see un-gored.

I know of a situation very similar to this one.

The Chinook, carrying a slingload of howitzer ammo for the Australian Army near a Fire Base named "Diggers Rest", pitched up and rolled left and landed inverted killing all the crew.

I have heard two versions of the reasons for the crash.

One though the Bush Telegraph was a forward Swash Plate separation.

The other from a Boeing Tech Rep assigned to the Unit....was a standard issue US Army Mess Hall plastic coffee cup was found wedged in the flight controls in the "SAS Closet" on the left side of the Companionway. The Cup was said to be wedged in a manner that only allowed roll left and nose up control inputs.

I do not know which version to believe....if either.

[walter kennedy]

Sasless
I totally agree with your comments re FADEC/engine runaway - it would indeed have been "the hand of God" in this case, the immediate action to overspeed being to load the engines by pulling up the thrust lever would have lifted them clear.
I long ago discounted any FADEC - there was also the matter of the intermediate power level (from the DECU data) that suggested that they were letting their airspeed wash off, thrust just balancing lift, which would have removed the option of a cyclic/zoom climb (I won't repeat just now my arguments for a deliberate approach to the HLS at waypoint A, a good point to start a swing around the lighthouse).
I was appalled that Burke repeated his garbage about the left rudder position, the initiation of a "quick stop" being the obvious manouvre with their power setting upon realisation of their proximity to the ground - swinging her broadside is fast with a Chinook, slows down rapidly and increases climb without anymore power being needed.
Still the misrepresentation of the weather - it is so common there to be able to see the headland but so difficult to accurately judge closing distance - had they being misled as to their range to go by some other system, all fits - and in this splendid visual treat, no mention is made of such a reference system that I had predicted to have been used and which turned out to have been fitted - a crash they cannot explain yet no mention of a local "navigation" reference system, that the CPLS is used for as in re-supply, extraction, etc..
There is no mention of the other navigation data that shows an intention to cross over to 028 mag, to follow the coast Islay/Jura, after touching base at the Mull.
There is no mention that their track over Antrim hills (in the conditions there) would not have been tight if they had not used STANS (giving weight to the relevance of the HSI course selections).
I could go on but what's the point? No one wants to contemplate the possibility that the team on board was seen by the powers that be as an obstacle to the peace process and as only the powers that be could have set up an exercise intended to crash such a concept is outside anyone's comprehension.

[Chugalug2]

SASless:-
My basic thoughts based upon a high forward airspeed, a 30 degree nose high attitude, a 5-10 degree angle of bank to the left, and a drastic input of left pedal.....combined with rising terrain in poor visibility...higher ground on the right....sea on the left with sloping ground down to the left....indicates a very rapid input of controls to avoid Terrain. I am not saying that is what happened.....just as I sit here thinking over all I have read and heard about the accident.

OK, got that thank you. So they've selected the next way point early, but not turned left, continuing toward the high ground and going IMC in the process, ending up in the config you describe as they impact the hillside. Is that compatible with being unable to make the left turn despite seemingly wanting to make it early (due to the orographic cloud enveloping the Mull slopes)? Amongst all the other baggage that the Chinook had gathered by then was there not a phenomena that, after flying on a fixed heading for a while, control jams occurred that prevented a commanded turn? I do not know of the prevalence of coffee cups in the closet, but it seems to have been the scene of much FOD induced control jams not least by the springs therein becoming detached.
The real question to me seems to be how was this Grossly Unairworthy aircraft in RAF service at all? Boscombe had grounded theirs, and suggested strongly that the RAF do the same with their already in Squadron service a/c, albeit on a restricted RTS. That RTS was even more restricted than the Squadrons knew, but the hierarchy knew and it was they who decided that this accident was solely due to Gross Pilot Negligence. It took the Lord Philip Report to change that to causes unknown. Personally I'd stick with Gross Negligence myself, but not the Pilots'...

[dervish]

Surely the main flaw with the programme was that it concentrated on regurgitating the same old THEORIES, while ignoring the FACTS. In other words the “new” evidence MoD had always called for and ran a mile from as soon as it was tabled. This proved, beyond any doubt whatsoever, the aircraft was not airworthy and did not have an operational clearance. If anyone has any remaining doubts over this I suggest you read the facts.

What they took 45 minutes over should have lasted 5 minutes, just as a reminder. It was a lost opportunity to make a really hard hitting, factual programme.

[SASless]

What other systems would have been in use that would cause confusion....and why would one enter cloud having the primary Nav system indicating a turning point is very close to hand....having acknowledged that by manually selecting the next waypoint and knowing high ground lay just ahead?

[airsound]

Guys, guys, steady on. See what you've done? You've woken Walter again, that's what.

airsound

[walter kennedy]

dervish
<<What they took 45 minutes over should have lasted 5 minutes, just as a reminder. It was a lost opportunity to make a really hard hitting, factual programme. >>
Here, here.

[walter kennedy]

Most of you on this forum would be able to plot tracks on a chart – I do not know why you do not do so as a starting point to understanding this case – applications like “google Earth” make it very easy (just remember to correct for magnetic headings of the time).
One thing that would be obvious to you is that the selection of waypoint B was of no immediate use to them – that track (from where they changed the waypoint) would have taken them over ground higher than where they crashed just a bit further up the Mull; also, projected all the way to Corran, you would see that it would have been a useless guide to following a very irregular coastline as it goes well inland and again over high ground. I suggest that the change was made simply because they no longer were referring to it in the vicinity of the Mull but it would be of use later when they swung back out to sea to take up the 028 track (Islay/Jura coast straight line to Corran) – 028 was on the non-handling pilot’s HSI course selector.
Another thing you should notice is that track that they had taken to waypoint change involved crossing the Antrim Hills and then some sea without a clear visual aiming point in the distance; speed/distance/time analysis (by Boeing and which I agree with) had it that this had to have been very much a bee line on 027 – they must have used the STANS to achieve this.
From the position of waypoint change to the crash site was 035 – a couple of data points were preserved along this track in the GPS system (recovered by manufacturer, data in stages of processing) suggesting a straight line – and the handling pilot’s HSI course selector was on 035. So I believe there was a deliberate turn from 027 to 035 (Boeing’s “Analysis of Available Data” also deduces a deliberate turn to the right at that point). One of the light house keepers and I witnessed a helo approach the plot of land that was where waypoint A was – its approach was over a conspicuous large rock in the sea and so I was able to later deduce that this track was 035 – the helo then swung gracefully around the light house – “they do that all the time” said the light house keeper, adding that they started the turn at the large rock. If you superimpose a set (various bank angles) of turning radii for a Chinook at high speed onto a large map with the start at waypoint A from an initial track of 035 (remember with the magnetic variation back then) you can see that it is an ideal start of a swing around the light house with plenty of clearance from the high ground.
SASless, you asked <<What other systems would have been in use that would cause confusion....and why would one enter cloud >>.
As I have often tried to explain, if you get familiar with promontories like the Mull as seen from the sea and can interpret from the information available that the conditions were to be expected and were an oro cloud sitting on the Mull with the slopes below the start of the oro cloud blurred with the surface hugging mist generated by the phenomenon of “speed up” (I have covered this before in detail on the “Chinook” thread), it is not a question of not seeing the Mull but being able to judge one’s distance off it (I am told navy helo pilots face this problem regularly) – you would not approach at speed without being confident of your aiming point and distance to go – I suggested long ago that such pilots would not have done so without a trusted reference and, at the time (GPS was not to be relied upon back then), the only candidate for them to have been using was CPLS with an operator on the ground operating a PRC112 at a pre-arranged location – it took years to get the proof that this system was fitted – while it was classified at the time, one would have thought that its existence and possible use was worthy of mention in documentaries such as the Nat Geo one, so many years later. The CPLS system is intrinsically reliable and would have been preferred to the GPS/STANS data, especially after a sea crossing, and it would have been difficult to disbelieve what it was saying if it seemed different from one’s eyeball estimate from the fuzzy ground ahead. If you wanted to get rid of the team on board, you’d just have to put forward a requirement that they exercise this system and have the operating PRC112 ½ a mile or so further up the slope than the expected position – if they didn’t crash, it was a free shot anyway.
There was always one aspect that puzzled me and that was why they had crossed the shoreline and overflew land for about 18 seconds (was it from memory just now?) before reacting (probably to seeing something of the ground) – I believe that they may have not observed the moment that they passed over the shoreline because MALM Forbes was not at his window seat – they were probably not in the mist until the last seconds but flying towards fuzzy ground beneath the oro cloud – probably confused with no clear visual cues ahead but still having a distance to go according to their CPLS – this was answered, I believe, by the more recent tragedy on the New Zealand coast when several NZ mil helos were following a coastline in marginal conditions – in aborting the flight, the lead helo turned in towards the coastline (intending a low level “U turn” back up the coast); the third helo saw the second helo start to follow the leader but rose too much in the turn and entered the low cloud – it was found at a distance inland (without having attempted to climb to a safe altitude) that equated to 15-18 secs (from memory just now) – this was apparently consistent with research into pilots reaction times from when unintentionally entering IMC to initiated the correct action (in addition to the witness of the third helo, a crew member of the crash helo survived).
I suppose that I can expect the usual response that followed any pertinent post on the old Chinook thread – if any of you have ever read George Orwell’s “Animal Farm” you may recall the role of the sheep – every time someone tried to talk about the situation, a group of sheep would drown out the debate with repeated chanting of various standard mantras – come on sheep, let’s have several pages of airworthiness pulp in case some readers catch sight of these basic navigation issues! :rolleyes:

[Chugalug2]

airsound:
See what you've done? You've woken Walter again, that's what.

Yup, sure looks that way. Now all we have to do is wake up the other 99.99% who'd really rather not be bothered with this cancerous scandal. Mull won't go away because its aftermath is woven into the very fabric of UK Military Aviation, the pillars of which are fatally flawed by the systematic suborning of Regulations and Process that pre and post dated that tragedy. The High Command was involved in that up to the very top, and have attempted to cover it up ever since. It has now got to the stage where, as Dervish rightly states, all this is revealed yet no-one is prepared to admit it.
Now that might serve the purposes of politicians, government ministers, Very Senior Officers, Civil Servants, and Staff Officers past and present, but how can it serve the purposes of serving aircrew, their passengers, those who service their aircraft, and those who depend upon them to deliver? Above all else how can this cover up serve the purposes of this Nation's Defence?
The MAA, the very bulwark against avoidable accidents happening, is fatally flawed because it is founded upon the compromised Haddon-Cave Report and because it is not independent of the very forces that started this rot in the first place. No institution; legal, professional, technical, investigative, can be relied upon to begin the necessary process of reform because one after the other they have failed in their responsibility. The only hope is to find someone who cares enough to start that ball rolling. Someone? Anyone? Yes? No?...

[dervish]

Walter

let’s have several pages of airworthiness pulp in case some readers catch sight of these basic navigation issues!

If you have read the airworthiness "pulp", which most don't realise was fully accepted by Philips and MoD, you'd notice that it is inextricably linked with "navigation issues" because the airworthiness release stated that the entire navigation system was not to be replied upon in any way whatsoever as it only had a switch on clearance. I don't pretend to understand it all but I can read.

That doesn't mean you are wrong in your theory, but the "pulp" is factual and I think it a bit suspicious that these facts are continually ignored and suppressed. It isn't as if the facts contradict your theory in any way.

[SASless]

I admit to having lost interest in the MoK threads that ran for years.

As an outsider to the UK MOD system and to the "certification" issue.

It would seem the aircraft would be "certified" for use in operational duties ONLY if it had been properly tested and found safe for flight and would have been so certified in some document available to the investigators.

Absent that Document....or if the Document contained a restriction that the NAV system was not to be relied upon....why would the aircraft be in Operational service?

If the Crew was aware of the lack of certification or the Restriction on using the NAV system....why were they using the NAV system.

Can someone sort the Wheat and Chaff on this situatiion?

[Chugalug2]

SASless:-
Can someone sort the Wheat and Chaff on this situation?
That's the dilemma, because those that might, ie the MOD, won't.
if the Document contained a restriction that the NAV system was not to be relied upon....why would the aircraft be in Operational service?

My question exactly!
If the Crew was aware of the lack of certification or the Restriction on using the NAV system....why were they using the NAV system.

Almost certainly they were not, as no such restriction (unsurprisingly) was included in the limitations issued to aircrew. Those indeed included reduced MAUW, no flight in icing conditions, etc etc, but did not say that the entire nav suite was "Switch On Only" as laid down in the Controller Aircraft Release. If it had been included in the RAF limitations, the aircraft would have been unusable as a Squadron aircraft of course. The whole RTS process, whereby CA offered the aircraft to the RAF who could only accept it as defined by CA was thereby suborned, it would appear.

[SASless]

So yet today...after all the investigations...questions in Parliament etc....it cannot be ascertained if the aircraft's Nav system was serviceable for operational flight?

I find that more than a little bit hard to believe.

Someone...somewhere...knowing the answer...having access to documentation...someone....with a conscience or some backbone....should have come forth by now....one would think anyway.

So are all RAF Officers immune from a need to "Do the Right Thing"?

[dervish]

SASless

it cannot be ascertained if the aircraft's Nav system was serviceable for operational flight?

As I said above, read the evidence. There were multiple faults in the navigation system, including time of day and a u/s power supply. I barely understand that, but the evidence got even more technical and revealed a mistake in the basic GPS specification that was only corrected in later years.


Absent that Document....or if the Document contained a restriction that the NAV system was not to be relied upon....why would the aircraft be in Operational service?

According to the evidence given to Philips, that document was obtained and analyzed for the first time during that inquiry. There is an entire section devoted to a lie MoD told a widow, when they claimed in 2010 the document didn't exist. I'd have loved to be a fly on Philips' wall when he was given MoD's letter and copy of the non-existent document.

I think it boils down to this. Philips confirmed the CA release was "mandated", meaning the RAF were not allowed to disregard it. This said "Switch On Only", not to be relied upon in any way. ACAS did disregard it, and in his RAF release to service did not pass on the "switch on only" restriction to crews as this would mean the aircraft could not be flown operationally, if at all. The evidence to Philips offers evidence that this was a serious offence.

What makes this evidence compelling to a complete outsider like me is that it references and extensively quotes MoD documents most of which it would seem had never been offered to previous inquiries. It is 100% factual and doesn't contain a single theory, which I think would have impressed a legal man. On the other hand, theories were ignored, which I think is the correct thing to do. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong.

[Chugalug2]

SASless:
Someone...somewhere...knowing the answer...having access to documentation...someone....with a conscience or some backbone....should have come forth by now....one would think anyway.
Oh, they've come forward all right. Evidence has been submitted to Lord Philip, specifically tasked with looking again at the Mull BoI and the RO's verdict. He found the latter to be wanting and as a result the finding of Gross Negligence by the pilots was set aside.
Nothing further has happened, no further investigation by the MAA, the RAF, the RAF Provost Marshal, the Royal Aeronautical Society, the Police, Parliament, the Government, not even it would appear National Geographic itself. All, it would seem know which side their bread is buttered and don't make waves.
The real issue is not even how a Grossly Unairworthy aircraft received an RTS, but why it was unairworthy in the first place. That is the real scandal, that Airworthiness Provision had already been dealt a fatal blow by the issuing of illegal orders by VSO's to ignore and suborn the Regulations. Once started out on that road there is no going back to your starting point unless and until you completely reform the Regulatory Authority and make it independent of those who might suborn it again, ie the MOD. Haddon Cave baulked at that and thus gave birth to the runt that is the MAA.
That's how it works this side of the pond, anyway. 2*'s and above and you are fireproof. Lesser mortals can and are fed to the wolves in their place. If that were it, so be it. If you can't take a joke etc etc...The problem is that aviation doesn't have a sense of humour and given a chance will always bite you. Given an MAA that is as compromised as the system it inherited, ie an Airworthiness System that cannot provide airworthiness, there is plenty of meat for it to feed on, I'm afraid

[John Farley]

Imagine two impossible things:

1 We had access to God and could be told what happened to cause the crash next month.

2 If you had posted here you had to put £100 on whether there was a technical failure or a crew error.

I wonder who would put their money where (anonymously of course).

[Chugalug2]

John, you make an absolutely fair point. Just as fairly, I do not know why ZD576 collided with that hillside and I do not know of anyone who can fairly say that they do. Hence the outrage at the RO's unfair and unjust finding, leading to a 17 year long struggle to have it put aside. The irony is that had not the RAF found the pilots to have been Grossly Negligent then there would have been no campaign and probably no discovering of the scandal that has since emerged.
Rather than bang on about that, and get another half page reproof from Walter, let me simply point to the following as proof of what has emerged:
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/

[JFZ90]

Imagine two impossible things:

1 We had access to God and could be told what happened to cause the crash next month.

2 If you had posted here you had to put £100 on whether there was a technical failure or a crew error.

I wonder who would put their money where (anonymously of course).


A very well put point; I maybe wrong, but I think I can deduce your view on the matter as a result, if so it is one I personally share.