Vulcans Falkland Raid

[pasir]

The Vulcan raid on the Falklands runway was screened this evening
- in which was shown the skill of the numerous Victors and Vulcan crew . It was always understood that the purpose of the mission was to bomb the runway so as to deny its use to enemy fighters - However the film of the bombed runway showed that of the stradle of bombs dropped only one bomb landed on the runway and at that appeared to be at its far end and well to one side - in that the length of the runway
was barely affected. All aircrew involved were superb but could it honestly be claimed that the runway had been 'put out of action'
and of no further use to enemy jet fighters ?


..

[Herod]

As I understand it, the straddle was planned. If the bombs were dropped along the length of the runway and were off by more than a few metres the whole thing would have been wasted; there would have been a nice line of holes parallel to the runway. As it was, the one was sufficient in that it prevented the use of the jets.

[cokecan]

i've always thought that 'breaking the runway' was a 'nice to have' - the big points of doing the job was to get the Argentines to concentrate more on defending the homeland than worrying about the FI, and to get a load of conscripts and politically reliable officers to reconsider the wisdom of going to war with a nation that can put a strategic nuclear bomber over their heads a mere 8,000 miles from home...

i'm sure the effect on morale of watching a stick of 21 1000lb bombs going off across your newly captured airfield must have been something to behold as well.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi

No it was not out of action, it was a great peace of flying though.

As far as I remember Stanley was not used by Argentinian Fighters as it was unsuitable until fitted with arrestor gear after the surrender.

Deepsixteen

[Archimedes]

Ah, it must have been at least six months since we had the usual long thread on this...

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/479504-falklands-most-daring-raid.html

being the most recent I can think of.

The one hole in the runway (contrary to various myths, blogs and letters to the Daily Telegraph) meant that the Argentines couldn't operate fast jets from the runway even if they extended it with the PSP that was there (there were other complications too) because of the limited resources available to fill it in. This is discussed in no little depth in two different articles in the Journal of the Royal Engineers in 1983/84, one written by the Sapper officer who led the team who had to fill it in to a standard which'd permit the operation of FJ.

There are an array of myths about the raid and a reasonable amount of public domain information which has emerged which disprove many of the myths; the release of the documents about the war (but not all of them - some have redactions, pointing to other documents which are to be retained for another 10 years...) will help as well, since I suspect that some of the confident recollections of senior officers, intelligence types and politicians of the time - notably the details which emerged during the 2002 Staff College seminar for the 20th anniversary - might have been dulled by the passage of time. I've not gone through many yet, but it is worth noting that one of the War Cabinet documents notes with regret that the Sunday Express was going, by 18th Apr 1982, to claim that the Vulcans were being prepped to bomb the mainland, but also notes that this might be quite handy...

The documents also point to the concerns over when to deploy the Vulcans to Ascension because the possible diplomatic ramifications. One of the elements to this discussion noted that shutting the airfield (to combat aircraft?) would be an obvious part of this clearly-stated aim of imposing a TEZ, and thus acceptable. There's a clear sense, even from the few bits of paper I've looked at so far, that there was a far bigger picture than just shutting the runway to FJ going on (there were discussions about using the SAS or naval forces as alternative means of attacking the airfield) - but there's still a lot of paper to go through...

[fantom]

I remember being taught at Chivenor, on my Hunter course, that it was best to attack a straight-line target at a 30 degree angle so as to hit something, at least.

[Alex Whittingham]

What I can't figure out is how they got their fuel flow calculations so badly wrong, and according to tonights film, didn't even monitor fuel flow on the mission, so much so that they were surprised at the final fuel transfer.

[vascodegama]

I recently had a chat with one of the planners. I think there are 2 issues here. The final Vulcan transfer just north of the FI is relatively easy to explain. Bob T had swapped places with the other remaining Victor (which had a broken probe). This had 2 bearings on the situation. The other AC had to keep enough fuel to reach ASI without the planned AAR and the Victor/Victor transfer had taken part further south than planned (delayed by swap around ) which made matters even worse. The part I have difficulty with is understanding why it is that the short slot ac all landed with low fuel states. The supposition that it is anything to do with the Vulcan fuel figures is a red herring since they only transferred fuel to other Victors. It therefore must be that the Victor assumptions were wrong. I can only think that the ISA Deviation was unknown /unfactored.

[BEagle]

I'd agree with the ISA deviation issue, vasco. One other comment I heard was that there was an ASI discrepancy between the Vulcan and the Victors, so that the formation was flying at a higher IAS than planned - but due to RT silence, no-one could give any warning.

[longer ron]

I always thought that the Vulcans had never been flown at that (heavy) load before for any long distances,and that they were 'off the graph' for fuel consumption figures - presumably because the cruise AoA was a little higher than normal (and thus more draggy)

[goudie]

ISTR It was mentioned in 'Vulcan 607' that the planners didn't have accurate figures for Vulcan fuel consumption.

[BEagle]

goudie / longer ron - as vascodegama stated, Vulcan fuel figures were irrelevant to the early Victor/Victor transfers.

Yes, they were inaccurate. Allegedly because 'Caligula' provided normal peacetime training weight figures, rather than ODM figures, I'm told....:uhoh:

[longer ron]

Posted by 50+Ray some time ago

Fuel Burn
It is my understanding that whenever refuelling happened the receiver was topped right up. So for a considerable time the Vulcan was actually above Max AUW, where it was noticeably thirstier. The other factor was that crews were normally operating at between FL410 and FL450. Since AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties the engines burnt more and the groundspeed was less. The relevant pages of the ODM were not looked at in my 7 year stretch on Vulcans, as we just did not operate like that.

I realise that other factors came into play as well !

rgds LR

[Pontius Navigator]

The other factor was that crews were normally operating at between FL410 and FL450. Since AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties the engines burnt more and the groundspeed was less. The relevant pages of the ODM were not looked at in my 7 year stretch on Vulcans, as we just did not operate like that.

According to a friend, operations between 410-450 was an unquestioned Vulcan SOP. The more efficient altitude would have been at the trop. The trop of course was not a fixed level at 360 but would have been much higher at ASI and probably lower at FI.

As 50+Ray stated "AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties " which would have been less efficient but in the other sense.

The whole issue with fuel planning was that it was too easy in UK, in peacetime, on simple sorties, not to use the ODM. War planning was a good illustration of how it was frequently done incorrectly. It was a task delegated to the co-pilot, often a very junior pilot. Frequently the wrong speed tables, 240 vice 325, were used. The correct AUW was often used to the target but after the target the off-loaded bomb weight was often converted to useable post-target fuel. It was my job to check and spot these errors (once I had been taught a quick reference check system by a senior navigator).

I am not suggesting any of the above errors applied but just to confirm that ODM practice was a rarely practised skill.

[pasir]

It is fully understood the impact the raid must have had upon the enemy however reverting to the OP - Googling will bring up a report
from a senior naval aviation officer involved there - Rear Admiral
S Woodward - 801 Air Sqn who is on record for stating in effect that the
actual damage to the runway had been greatly overstated and that
the runway remained operational to the enemy up to the last day of the
conflict. This is not in any way disputing the hazards faced, skills and bravery of all flyers - But simply asking - was the Rear Admiral right ?

[Pontius Navigator]

a senior naval aviation officer involved there - Rear Admiral
S Woodward - 801 Air Sqn

Don't believe everything you read on the web. Who was the Senior Naval Aviation Officer? As CTF, Woodward was not 801 Sqn. Woodward was a submariner not an aviator.

I suspect the bearded one's opinions being quoted here.

[PLovett]

pasir,

The runway continued to be used by C130 and Puma aircraft until the end of the conflict. However, the Vulcan raid prevented the runway from being used by FJ and that was the intention.

I recall reading in one of the books on the conflict that the damage from one of the near misses actually did quite a lot of damage to the runway and it was more significant than the bomb that hit.

The same book also pointed out that there was some severe infighting between the various branches of the armed services over how the war was prosecuted. For example, there were references to the South African navy due to Woodward's decision to operate the Task Force well to the east of the FI. I suspect that any criticism of one branch by another must be taken with a grain of salt.

[spekesoftly]

Continued to be used by Puma or Pucara?

[Pontius Navigator]

there were references to the South African navy due to Woodward's decision to operate the Task Force well to the east of the FI.

Really? Did no one look at a map? Ascension is closer to the FI than Simonstown is. Admittedly South Georgia is closer but for the South African Navy to venture 2,500 miles from it home base would have demanded a significant TF of its own. In 1977 the South African Defence Force changed the Navy's focus to that of a coastal Navy, so we can take that as a No?

[lj101]

Falkland Islands Info Portal - History Articles (http://www.falklands.info/history/hist82article14.html)

The Black Buck Bombing Raid on Stanley Airport

The most spectacular RAF exploit was the Vulcan bomber raid on Stanley airport on May 1st, which had significant impact on the conduct of the war and on morale on both sides, far beyond the damage inflicted on the runway. It demonstrated the undreamed of reach of RAF retaliation, and caused colossal psychological repercussions in Argentina, with the realisation that mainland targets were within bombing reach.

Code-named 'Black Buck', this was an astonishing feat of arms by any standards. It was the longest operational bombing mission ever attempted, a 6,760 miles round-trip from Ascension Island for the ageing delta-winged bomber whose inadequate navigational system and long-abandoned flight-refuelling capability had to be restored. No fewer than 14 aircraft were deployed to get just one Vulcan to its target. With no intelligence on Argentine fighter and missile defence, the operation had to be carried out at night, in radio silence, with no rehearsal. As soon as the bomber/tanker force roared off the runway at Wideawake Airfield, one of the two Vulcans had to abandon the mission when its pressurisation failed, as did one of the 12 Victor refuelling tankers with a defective hose.

Catastrophe was averted when four of the refuelling Victors arrived back at Ascension almost simultaneously, desperately short of fuel. Only the skill of the pilots narrowly avoided a disastrous pile-up on the crowded runway which would have destroyed a quarter of the RAF's total South Atlantic tanker force. Another tanker had a fuel leak and one of the last two tankers broke its probe in a violent tropical storm, leaving only one Victor to press on with the Vulcan, both acutely short of fuel, and in danger of ditching. To maintain surprise, no radio SOS was possible.

As the Vulcan began its bombing run, it was detected by Argentine gun-control radar. But its twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs straddled the runway. The explosions woke the startled Islanders from their sleep, but it tremendously boosted their morale. Tony Chater recalls: "The whole house shook, as though there had been an earthquake. There was terrific jubilation. From then on, we felt confident the British forces would come to our rescue."

The aircraft broke radio silence with the code-word 'Superfuse' indicating the raid had succeeded. Despite more refuelling problems, the Vulcan managed to get back to Ascension and complete its sixteen-hour mission. Its pilot, Martin Withers, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and Victor pilot, Box Tuxford, the Air Force Cross. The effort expended was out of all proportion to the damage to the runway which the Argentines continued to use. But the psychological impact was enormous. The Argentine Air Force removed its only dedicated fighter interceptor squadron, the Mirage fighters of Gruppo 8, from Rio Gallegos and Falklands operations, to re-deploy further north at Comodoro Rivadavia for mainland defence. The Argentines had conceded defeat in the crucial battle for air superiority over the battered Task Force. Harriers could hunt down and destroy attacking aircraft without interference from enemy fighters.

What the British did not know is that, according to the Argentines, President Galtieri had decided on April 30th to withdraw his forces to comply with the United Nations resolution and to seek negotiations on sovereignty. He reportedly changed his mind as a result of the Vulcan and Harrier attacks on Stanley Airport on May 1st.

This has a great photo taken at Ascension;

Falklands 25 « Articles « Fast Air Photography (http://www.fast-air.co.uk/falklands-25/)

[farsouth]

Pontius - think you missed the inference there - I think they were referring to the Royal Navy as the "South African" navy due to it maintaining a position "well to the east of the FI"

[TEEEJ]

Pasir,

Argentine deception techniques made the Black Buck 1 crater appear larger for photo-recce Harrier runs. Simple mud and earth ring on the runway gave the impression that the runway had suffered greater damage.

This crater caused problems with UK forces after the Argentine surrender. RAF News, April 26th 2002, has a piece from retired Air Commodore John Davis. Davis was the first commander of the operations wing at RAF Stanley. In relation to the runway crater from the first Black Buck mission Davis wrote "This rogue crater required a succession of repairs amid what soon became high intensity air operations."

The damage restricted the Argentine air operations and types used. The C-130s continued to use the runway. Other transport types that had been used prior to Black Buck 1, such as the Fokker F.28 Fellowship, were withdrawn from use at Stanley according to the following.

ARIES 82, el transporte de la FAA en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur (http://www.aeroespacio.com.ar/index.php/fuerza-aerea/item/824-aries-82-el-transporte-de-la-faa-en-el-conflicto-del-atl%C3%A1ntico-sur.html)

[Pontius Navigator]

Pontius - think you missed the inference there - I think they were referring to the Royal Navy as the "South African" navy due to it maintaining a position "well to the east of the FI"

Ah, too subtle for me that early in the morning suffering from flu as I am :)

[SASless]

One Vulcan....one time...and one bomb hit on the runway and Gongs all around.

Wow....Golly....Gee Whiz!



Not taking away from the crews who stuck their necks way out to accomplish this but when considered from a realistic point of view....the mission did not accomplish much no matter how one tries to argue it.

Some Harriers used properly could have done much more damage and on a more frequent basis.....perhaps at more risk.

What success the raid had to preventing the Argies from using the runway is more due to the Argies than to the Raid itself. Had they wanted to use the runway....it could have been made right within days if not hours....had they been prepared to do so.

If one studies the timeline of the War....there are probably other factors that caused the Argies to do what they did that were more influential than the Vulcan attack.

[Pontius Navigator]

Neck . . . stick. . . chop

[Barksdale Boy]

Sasless

What you know about both bombing and psychology could be written on the back of a second class stamp and still leave room for the Air Force Act.

[SASless]

I know....you are quite right......bombing was designed to break the will of the people.....as it did in Britain and Germany during WWII....right?

Just as Bombing was supposed to make land warfare obsolete....and win Wars all by itself....right?

Spare me the insults.....this one raid by one aircraft is being made out to be the most significant event during the whole Falkland War. It is not.

I suggest the RN did much to affect the outcome by the sinking of the Cruiser....and much more than just the one raid.

I also suggest the VC's won by the ground troops....and all those Men that get scant mention despite their great individual contributions deserve some credit too.

Perhaps you might put this one raid into perspective by thinking of the Soldiers and Marines who fixed bayonets and went up hills and mountains to defeat the enemy against great odds.

Use some commonsense.....you reckon the Argies could not figure out the capability the RAF had to do bombing attacks on the Main Land....and know they would be weak and ineffective? The RN was far more a threat with its Submarines than the RAF was with its bomber force if it came to full fledged War instead of a campaign to re-take the Falklands.

You make too much of the effect of bombing.....most Air Forces do....unless we are taking about CAS. Then we have to remind ourselves the Air Force is supporting the Ground Forces and not the other way around.

Compare what the RN and RAF Harriers did compared to the single Vulcan attack....and keep telling me how great the Black Buck Raid was in its contribution to the War overall.

If the RAF had the capability of conducting raids on the Main Land....it probably would have....but you did not. That is the one thing the Black Buck raid was very successful at. It proved to the RAF it did not have the Tanker Assets or Base infrastructure to mount a sustained Bomber Campaign against the Argies......and you know it!

Argie unpreparedness is not an RAF victory except by default maybe.


For your consideration and critique.....as I know nothing of the author.

Did one of the follow on Vulcan crew's actually forget to arm their load of bombs as reported in the linked reference thus making 21 rather small but deep holes in the ground?



Sharkey's World: Black Buck - The Truth of the Matter (http://www.sharkeysworld.com/2012/03/black-buck-truth-of-matter.html)

[Pontius Navigator]

T asless, I suggest you read the earlier thread with comments by the SAM Battery Commander who was on the spot. Also by an informed Argentinian author.

The point about terror bombing is fear itself. As you suggest, the actuality becomes quite humdrum. In the case of the Argentine mainland the civil populace had NOT experienced any bombing raid of any kind. Had the mainland been raided then they would have seen how relatively unaffected the majority of the population would have been.

The videos of Shock and Awe show that.

Once raids take place then history shows that the resolve of the civilian populace hardens not weakens.

[Running_In]

SASless. It would be great if you could point out exactly where anyone has suggested that the RAF won the Falkland War with a single Vulcan raid whilst also suggesting that ground war was a just a bit of a side show.

I doubt you will, because no one has suggested that. You're just being a b*llend for the sake of it.

The fact the some marines were brave doesn't mean that Black Buck didn't have any impact. It just sophistry from someone who would rather swallow razor blades than admit that an Air Force might have contributed something not in support of the Army or Navy. It really puzzles me.

And a victory by default is still a victory. Winning with style is great, but winning is winning is winning. I'd love to hear your argument against that...

[SASless]

If the RAF had hit the Main Land....the most effective result would have been "political"....as the whole "Malvinas" thing was a construct by Gallateri to divert attention away from his regime's failures. He sought to capitalize on the "Nationalistic Spirit" of the People by kicking off what he had hoped would be a quick Diplomatic surrender by the Brits.

He miscalculated on several levels....starting with Miss Maggie and more importantly....the British Army, Royal Navy, Marines, and Air Force.

I submit....the Black Buck Raids should have been targeted at the Main Land....as it would have had much greater effect in altering the Argies strategy and deployment of forces.

[Pontius Navigator]

I submit....the Black Buck Raids should have been targeted at the Main Land....as it would have had much greater effect in altering the Argies strategy and deployment of forces.

Oh sh*t is the only thing I would have said if that had happened.

We had no wish to escalate what was a small territorial dispute. I presume you would have targeted the leadership in Bagdad on the same principle?

[soddim]

The discussion of how best to attack the runway needs some qualified input. The angle selected was to deny minimum clear width for operational use by fast jets and that was a straightforward geometric solution determined by stick spacing at the minimum permitted release interval for the weapon and aircraft.

In the case of the Vulcans' first raid it was unfortunate that the along track error was so great that only the first bomb in the stick hit the far side of the runway but it did do considerable damage as has already been mentioned.

One should not detract from the skills and determination involved in this mission even though the runway was not cut as hoped - it was always calculated that the over target requirement to achieve a high probability of success was way more than the resources available. Just be content that an effort was made using equipment and personnel who would otherwise have been unable to do anything useful and they actually achieved something worthwhile in this conflict and in the process showed determination and resourcefulness that we should be proud of. I cannot believe that the Argies were not gobsmacked to find that they were vulnerable to attack from heavy bombers from Ascension Island.

[ORAC]

The Official History of the Falklands Campaign - Vol II, Page 280-281

"The significance of the Vulcan raids remained controversial. It was an expensive and cumbersome way of delivering bombs but it reduced the demands on the Sea Harriers. The hole in the middle of the runway was probably as much as could have been achieved and it precluded Stanley's use by the more capable Argentine aircraft. Perhaps most importantly it drew Argentine attention to the vulnerability of their mainland bases. This led to the redeployment of their Mirage III* to the defence of the mainland bases and away from support of offensive operations against the Task Force."

[*the only radar equipped Mirage in their inventory.]

May 1st, signal from Woodward to Fieldhouse.

.....Indicating that he was now converted to the possibilities of the Vulcan, he continued:

I would prefer to rely on Vulcan high level work for this task [keeping Stanley airfield down], escorted by Harriers if needs be. Nevertheless the fact has to be faced that the Args have considerable land based air resources and we have only 20 SHAR; to gain control over the air, considerable risks will have to be taken.

The Argentine Response

.....When they appreciated the role played by the Vulcan the Argentine Commanders also had to contemplate that the same aircraft might be used against the mainland. The threat to the mainland became a theme in Argentine planning from this time.

Falklands - The Air War - Page 146, Grupo 8 de Caza:

"The FAA was worried that the next Vulcan target might be rather more ambitious and it was thus decided to withdraw most of the Grupo 8 Mirages to Comodoro Rivadavia to protect the CdoFAS Headquarters. No more long-range missions were flown for some weeks..... At Comodoro Rivadavia the the Mirages stood constant alert and, in the subsequent weeks, regularly patrolled the Argentine-Chile border zone. Incidents such as the Sea King affair at Punta Arenas did nothing to reassure the FAA that an attack would not come from west of the Andes and, accordingly, Mirage activity was increased."

[Pontius Navigator]

Soddim, and of course the attack speed. A lower speed would have resulted in a smaller interval at a potentially greater vulnerability to the delivery aircraft.

[soddim]

Pontius - the effect of attack speed on stick spacing is a given; however, the Vulcan was not capable of reducing vulnerability by increasing speed. In the event it was fortunate that the Argies did not devote more attention to Brain Hanrahan's 10 o'clock news broadcast the night before the raid. He said that the carrier's crew were busy loading bombs on the Harriers - knowing that the Vulcan was already airborne perhaps coloured my view but I would have thought that the only reason for loading bombs was to drop them and where else but Stanley Airfield.

[SASless]

I presume you would have targeted the leadership in Bagdad on the same principle?

Did they not do just that the second time around? And.... missed the guy only to have to hunt him down using ground forces!

[ORAC]

Just to add a couple more snippets about the roles of the Victor, VC-10 and Nimrod R1 from the official history....

The Official History of the Falklands Campaign - Vol 2, pages 236-237. (South Georgia)

Enormous efforts were made using a Victor aircraft supported by multiple air-to-air refuelling to obtain maritime Radar Reconnaissance (MRR) on the location of Argentine ground forces and whether any shipping was concealed in inlets and coastal waters. There were doubts within the Task Group about this approach, with some concern that a Victor flight might simply alert the enemy or that the aircraft might be obliged to divert to Brazil. Taking account of these concerns Beetham and Nott concluded that a sortie was only to be mounted is this was the only way Yound could get decent intelligence on South Georgia. Young, pleased to get whatever information was on offer, was keen and so, on 20 April, the first Victor MRR was flown. The aircraft was airborne for nearly 15 hours, requiring 7 tankers, and became the first to overfly occupied British territory. Again no shipping was detected in the vicinity of South Georgia. Further sorties were planned for 22 and 24 April and in due course successfully completed.

Pages 397-398 (Chile)

It was now agreed that a Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft would be accepted at the airfield on San Felix, a remote island off the coast of Chile. From San Felix the aircraft the aircraft could make several very valuable sorties, refuelling at night in the Chilean air base at Concepcion on the mainland coast, and then flying in Chilean airspace and out into the South Atlantic. The aircraft would be able to collect useful information from outside the cover of Argentine radar, and transmit it to the Task Force. The Nimrod would be supported by a VC-10. The first sortie was flown early on the morning of Sunday 9 May, a second on 15 May and a third 2 days later......

[Pontius Navigator]

SASLess, you miss the point that there was a complete similarity between FI and GW1. In both cases the mission was to recover territory that had been invaded. In GW2 the mission was entirely different.

[Pontius Navigator]

Soddim, I take your point but suggest that a 240 kt attack would have achieved a tighter stick than one at 360 kt - guessing at speeds - but it would have led to a significant increase in time between detection and release.

[KiloB]

How close did Sharkey's Bombs get to the Runway anyway?:rolleyes:
KB

[soddim]

Pontius, given that the along track error caused the failure to straddle the target as planned, I cannot see how a shorter stick length could have helped - in fact, a shorter stick would have missed completely.

As for vulnerability, the attack at 8,000 feet gave more than ample opportunity for detection regardless of speed if the defences had been awake - or if they had listened to the 10 o'clock news!

[Pontius Navigator]

Soddim, I think we are arguing from the same end. I was not suggesting they should have had an even tighter stick just that speed was a factor in bomb interval.

As for attack speed, the alerting time, from 45 miles could have been 10 minutes or less than 7. That would be quite significant and a longer time could have allowed the chickens more time to stop running.

[keesje]

http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/21.-Vulcans-fail-to-close-Port-Stanley-runway..jpg

[t7a]

PN - Does anyone know what the bomb distributor intervalometer setting was? Aircraft speed isn't the optimum way to affect the stick spacing.

[soddim]

Keesie, if I remember correctly, the third raid was intended to release airburst VT-fused bombs to damage parked aircraft. In fact they were released with tail only fusing so they exploded on impact but in any case they all missed the runway. The crater shown on the runway was from the first raid.

[Pontius Navigator]

t7, I am sure they do. IIRC available settings were 0.09, 0.18, 0.24, 0.30, 0.45 etc. Whilst is would have been possible to set any of these there was a practical minimum that would minimise jostle. IIRC that would be 0.3.

At 360k you are talking of around 200 yards per second. 0.03 would therefore give you an interval of 60 yards.

Looking at a crater line on Google Earth I make the interval 53 yards. This suggests, at 0.3 interval, a speed of 315 kts.

My recollection is 40 odd year ago but I think it would be about right.

[t7a]

Thanks PN - sums seem about right.

[SASless]

Would not a single effective raid on the Argie National Command not have achieved positive results and saved a lot of blood shed perhaps? Just as if we had been effective in doing so during Gulf War 1 by whacking Saddam as the kickoff to the whole game?

The question really goes to what the Strategic Objectives were.....and how Assets or the lack of played into the decision making. If one does not have the capability then no matter how one would like to wage the war....necessity dictates the strategy employed.

Long Range Strategic Bombing during the Falklands really wasn't one of the choices now was it?

Thus, if the RAF was going to participate, lacking land bases and other forward operating areas.....the bag of tricks to be drawn from was quite small.

Simple example is the delay in getting the RAF Harriers into the action.....and sadly now BN came to be the only Chinook.

You must admit the British Military especially the RAF was at a great disadvantage in a lot of very serious regards.

There is a thread here discussing a "future" war over the Falklands....and many of the posts are quite similar to some here re capability, assets, and the like.

So what is new in War....particularly in far off places quite remote and distant from the Homeland and Allies.

[Pontius Navigator]

Would not a single effective raid on the Argie National Command not have achieved positive results and saved a lot of blood shed perhaps? Just as if we had been effective in doing so during Gulf War 1 by whacking Saddam as the kickoff to the whole game?.

In 1982 no nation had the capability. You had neither range nor effective weapons.

In 1992 that capability would have been marginal at best.

[TEEEJ]

Keesje,

The labelling on that image is in error. That fall of bombs is not from the 3rd Vulcan raid but from Black Buck 2. The third Vulcan bombing raid carried out was Black Buck 7.

See image at following link.

Black Buck Two's craters can be seen more clearly to the left.

Operation Black Buck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Black_Buck)

[langleybaston]

The RN certainly had the ability to grant the Argie high command a spectacular demo. sunrise over the S Atlantic, "and the next one is for you".

The "failure" to attack the mainland was surely driven by very wise lack of political will to antagonise every nation in S and N America.

[BEagle]

The RN certainly had the ability to grant the Argie high command a spectacular demo. sunrise over the S Atlantic...

And they'd probably have got the ****ing forecast 100% correct for once!

[langleybaston]

Amen to that ............. 'Naval' and 'Met' should only appear in the same sentence with the words "No", "Not", "Nonsense", "Risible" etc.

I was asked on a Purple exercise why my forecast was different from the RN one.

"Mine is correct, sir!"

And it was.

That time .............

[ex-fast-jets]

RN Met Man on HERMES giving us a briefing.

His briefing aids were OHP black & white transparencies only.

There was a deep low over the Falklands.

His opening line.....

"This is what we call a Zebra's arsehole......."

Succinct - understandable - accurate.

[SASless]

PN.....Thank you....my point exactly. Dropping dumb bombs without benefit of timely Intel....sorta ruled that option out.

[MAINJAFAD]

How close did Sharkey's Bombs get to the Runway anyway?:rolleyes:
KB

The only bombs that hit that Runway were dropped by RAF Pilots, The first bomb out of 607 and a number that came off low level laydown attacks from a couple of 1 Sqn GR3s and a SHAR of 800NAS.

[BEagle]

PN.....Thank you....my point exactly. Dropping dumb bombs without benefit of timely Intel....sorta ruled that option out.

What on earth is that supposed to mean?

Would not a single effective raid on the Argie National Command not have achieved positive results and saved a lot of blood shed perhaps? Just as if we had been effective in doing so during Gulf War 1 by whacking Saddam as the kickoff to the whole game?

Some Tom Clancy-esque oo-rah political assassination might be something you would consider acceptable, but 'regime change' by such means is not normally on the agenda of civilised nations. The UK sought to expel the invaders from its sovereign soil, not to murder a Head of State. Anyway, who/what/where was this so-called 'Argie National Command' of yours......:rolleyes:

[Load Toad]

And is it proved in Eye-Rak - it wasn't just an issue with one Maddass Insane was it...?

[Load Toad]

And re. dropping bombs on the runway - IIRC that on a previous thread there was mention of the amount of damage dropping at low level compared to high level.


21 x 1000Lb bombs must have right put the sh**ters up a conscript army sitting out in the wet & cold.

[giblets]

Just had a look at an earlier link:
Sharkey's World: Black Buck - The Truth of the Matter (http://www.sharkeysworld.com/2012/03/black-buck-truth-of-matter.html)

Seems a little disingenuous to use today's fuel costs! Making a black buck raid fuel cost £520,000, and cost per weapon a 'tad' high.
So in true geek style, did a little research, fuel at the time was around $0.92 a gallon (don't get me started on UK/UK gallons), or £0.50p (based on the exchange rate of the time.

Makes the cost of the black buck raids a more manageable £65,000 in fuel (basically divide all the costs by 8), or £188k (based on inflation), compare that to $1.45m for a tacit Tomahawk (yes I appreciate the numerous other incurred costs!).

[SASless]

What did the UK pay for fuel delivered to the Black Buck Ops in those days?

The pump price in Blighty has naught to do with the price of fuel at the Forward Operating Base, costs to provide that inflight fuel to the Tankers and the Attack Aircraft.

Cost to Benefit has never been a real consideration in War.

The point he was making as I recall reading it....was to show how much more effective the use of Tactical Assets in the Falklands was to the Black Buck Raid with all of its complexity.

Seems your point about .92 P a unit is a bit useless.

If you are going to attempt to criticize his views.....do find something better than that can't you?

[giblets]

The point he was making as I recall reading it....was to show how much more effective the use of Tactical Assets in the Falklands was to the Black Buck Raid with all of its complexity.


If that was the case, having an entire Annex using numerous tables and calculations based up fuel cost was not necessary, talking about the millions of £ per bomb are a side track to the argument, or was he proving the point that it was an extravagant use of money?

I don't doubt there is a strong element of the later involved

[FODPlod]

...So in true geek style, did a little research, fuel at the time was around $0.92 a gallon (don't get me started on UK/UK gallons), or £0.50p (based on the exchange rate of the time.

Makes the cost of the black buck raids a more manageable £65,000 in fuel (basically divide all the costs by 8), or £188k (based on inflation), compare that to $1.45m for a tacit Tomahawk (yes I appreciate the numerous other incurred costs!).
Cost of 4* equivalent petrol in 1982 was £1.64 per gallon according to the AA. Presumably, one can divide today's cost of a TLAM by much more than 8 to obtain the equivalent price in 1982, what with 'defence inflation' being so much higher than other types. ;)

Didn't all other flying (e.g. C.130 re-supplying the Task Force, Nimrod flights, etc.) have to be suspended for a three-day period for each Black Buck raid owing to the exhaustion of aviation fuel at Ascension?

[Pontius Navigator]

UK pump price is for petrol with taxes paid. Military fuel is not petrol and is tax free (one of the moans of the trains over planes lobby is the duty-free aspect of Avtur).

Did the bearded one consider the cost of over 30 Harrier sorties, all dedicated to dive bombing Stanley, in daylight, from sufficient height to achieve cratering?

I wonder how many 1000lb bombs the magazines on the carriers carried?

Thirty tons is 'not a lot' but is a significant user of space.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Cost of 4* equivalent petrol in 1982 was £1.64 per gallon according to the AA.

Which would be useful if Black Buck was carried out in aircraft that used 4*. Perhaps they could have driven there in an old Ford Transit.

Aviation-grade kerosene fuel with icing inhibitor (F-34 FSII), as used in jet turbine aircraft including the Vulcan, Harriers etc, was priced between 0.95 and 0.96 cents a gallon during the Falklands War, which would have been approximately 50p a gallon at 1982 prices.

[SASless]

Did the bearded one consider the cost of over 30 Harrier sorties,

Does it really take 30 Harrier sorties to get a single bomb on the runway and thus equal the damage done by the Black Buck Raids that had 63 bombs between them?

If you wish to throw in the second bomb that hit adjacent to the runway....lets double the number of necessary hits to equal that success.

[Fitter2]

GW1 showed the attrition rate of ground attacking a well defended airfield, and we didn't have many spare Harriers.

Sharkey does have a rather one-eyed view of the conflict - how many mentions of the RAF ground attack aircraft are there in his book?

For an alternative perspective, Jerry Pook's book (ISBN 184884556-1) makes an interesting read, although I suspect he and Sharkey have similar views on task force senior management.

[ORAC]

Does it really take 30 Harrier sorties to get a single bomb on the runway and thus equal the damage done by the Black Buck Raids that had 63 bombs between them? FFS, read the previous posts. The point was that we only had 20 SHARS and couldn't afford to lose any, hence even the TF commanders accepting that using the Vulcan was the right thing to do.

We were on a knife edge from start to finish - up to the last day and the surrender of Stanley.

Hindsight is wonderful...........

[Just This Once...]

For the required weapon effects the impact angle is critical. Please remember the capabilities of the Harrier at the time as well as the considerable threat from the airfield itself.

[SASless]

Fitter....when you changed from low level airfield attacks and went to Medium Height as done by other Coalition aircraft....were not the results just as good and losses minimal compared to the early low level attacks?

[Engines]

ORAC (and others)

I don't have a huge axe to grind on this one. I served down there (on HMS Invincible), alongside Sharkey and many other FAA colleagues. We were grateful for any help down there, and you are quite right that we were on the knife edge right the way through.

Just to set the record straight, the Vulcan raid was one component of a combined effort against Stanley that day. As well as Black Buck, nine SHARs of 800 NAS attacked the airfield, hitting both runway and parked aircraft. (three more SHARs attacked Goose Green). Shortly afterwards, warships closed the coast and bombarded the airfield with 4.5 inch shells, damaging more aircraft. There were no GR3 attacks that day, because they weren't available for ops until 20th May.

The Vulcan was certainly 'the right thing to do' - it was offered, it was available and it added more effort. but it was one part, and eventually a minor part, of the war. It wasn't 'decisive', and it wasn't 'the most daring raid' of the war. But that doesn't take a single thing away from the brave and professional crews who got the aircraft there and back. It was a damn fine effort.

The only thing I ask is that when we post, please take the time to get it right. really right, and make sure that we honour the efforts of all those who fought down there.

Best Regards as ever to all those who did it then and those who are still doing it now,

Engines

[Pontius Navigator]

Fitter....when you changed from low level airfield attacks and went to Medium Height as done by other Coalition aircraft....were not the results just as good and losses minimal compared to the early low level attacks?

There is a world of hurt difference between medium altitude night attacks with good ECM coverage and SEAD support and daylight attacks against SAM and radar controlled guns.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi

Very well said Engines I was on Glamorgan before I went Deep.:D

Deepsixteen

[SASless]

Remember the Losses too PN.....that was the point of the question.

I know the USAF and RAF differed on how to tackle the problem and early on the RAF went their way...took losses and in time changed to the other method that had been suggested to be the safer way to go.

That is my reading of Horner anyway....and as he was there I shall have to go with his version until someone can prove otherwise.

It is not about courage and ability....it is all about minimizing risk and still getting the job done is it not?

From the RAF website.....


The Tornado GR1s - thanks to their uniquely effective JP233 airfield denial munition - made a particularly distinguished contribution to the counter-air element of the campaign. The offensive counter-air task facing the coalition was daunting. There were only two anti-runway weapons available; the F-111s armed with the French Durandal and the Tornado/JP233 combination. Because of the known limitations of the Durandal, it fell to the Tornados to take on the Iraqi runways.

The Tornados were tasked to attack over a dozen Iraqi main operating bases at low-level supported by F-15 fighters, F-4G 'Wild Weasels' and EF-111A 'Raven' electronic countermeasures aircraft. The F-15s, flying in the fighter sweep and escort roles cleared away Iraqi fighters, the 'Wild Weasels' fired HARM anti-radiation missiles to close down enemy SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) radars, whilst the EF-111s suppressed the Iraqi early warning radars.

Nevertheless, the Tornado crews still had to fly through intense AAA fire to reach their targets, and it was soon realised that simultaneous toss attacks against AAA clusters by other Tornados using 1,000lb bombs would help further to clear the way for the JP233-armed aircraft. After four nights the air opposition had been effectively neutralised, for the loss of four Tornados. Eight Iraqi main operating bases had been closed while the operations of several others had been markedly reduced.

From a UK Newspaper.....

Four British airmen and up to four Tornado aircraft may have been lost unnecessarily at the beginning of the Gulf war because of "disgraceful interference" by a senior officer at the Ministry of Defence, the former commander of the British forces says in a forthcoming documentary.

The senior officer is believed to be Marshal of the RAF Sir David Craig, then Chief of Defence Staff. The claim is made by General Sir Peter de la Billiere, now retired, in a BBC1 documentary series, The Gulf War, which begins on 9 January and marks the fifth anniversary of the 1991 conflict. During the war Sir Peter oversaw the operations of British troops, sailors and airmen.

In the film, he says that the loss of some of the Tornados could have been averted if the RAF had switched from low to high-level bombing sooner. It is understood Sir Peter and the RAF commander in Saudi Arabia, Air Vice Marshal Bill Wratten, recommended the switch and that the joint commander of the operation, based in Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, agreed with them. But a "senior officer" in the MoD, who could only have been the Chief of Defence Staff, demurred.

"It was a decision of substantial magnitude," Sir Peter says. "It was going to impact on the whole of the RAF's strategy as developed for Europe and put it into question . . . indeed, I saw a letter from a senior Air Force officer in the MoD [believed to be Sir David] saying in effect that if we changed it, [i.e. switching from low- to high-level bombing] then my air commander wasn't doing his job. I've never seen such a disgraceful letter in my life."

Interviewed for the series, the United States air commander in the Gulf, Lt-Gen "Chuck" Horner, said: "I don't think there's any doubt about it. The Tornado losses were in part due to the low-altitude tactics." Lt-Gen Horner suggests that he was relieved when the British changed their tactics, but said he could not force them to.

[MAINJAFAD]

Engines

My comments were about the overall anti runway effort from 1st May - 13 Jun. On the 1st May SHAR attack on Stanley, only one SHAR of the nine was tasked to attack the runway with 1000lbs retarded bombs (flown by Flt Lt Penfold), of the other 8, three lofted VT 1000lbs bombs to airburst over the airfield defences while the rest dropped CBU's to take out soft skinned targets. Only one aircraft was confirmed destroyed, and that was an Islander whose tail was chopped off by a CBU (some other aircraft were damaged but none of them were Military). The Goose Green attack on the other hand did destroy one Pucara and damage a couple of others. The first GR3 low level attack was on the 24 May when 4 aircraft managed to get 9 retarded 1000lbs bombs on to the runway, However the 1 Sqn CO at the time and Sqn Ldr Pook both state that the 40ms delay that was set on the bomb fuzes without their advice minimised the effect of the attack on the runway surface. All other attacks on Stanley Airfield by Harriers (bar one rushed low level 2in rocket attack by 2 GR3's on 30 May to attack suspected swept wing aircraft spotted by a SHAR) were either loft attacks, random 1000lbs dropped by SHAR on their way to CAP stations or the failed attempts to guide LGB's using the GR3 LRMTS as the illuminator (they thought it would work thanks to some duff gen). In all of those cases none of the bombs came as close as those from Black Buck one and two. To be Honest, I agree with a hell of a lot of what Sharkey wrote in 'Sea Harrier in the Falklands', because its not just him that has a go at how the air war was fought, Jerry Pook has equally bad things to say (though not about the FAA) and both are backed up in more diplomatic speak by two other Harrier pilots who have published works (one is on-line only). There is a published bomb plot of what weapons landed where on the airfield in the Book 'Falklands - The Air War' which shows the impact points of 1000lbs bombs and CBU's...plus the Sea Slugs that Glamorgan lobbed at the place.

[Alex Whittingham]

When asking the question about fuel planning on the first page I forgot that my colleague Baz H was involved in the planning and he tells me he was instructed to audit the fuel transfers by comparing what actually happened against the Victor ODM expectation. He says the ISA deviations were correct, and suspects that this snippet migrated from a later ghost trail when the F4 manuals tabled fuel flows against what they said was ISA deviation, but actually turned out to be deviation from JSA.

Baz reckons that, in answer to vascodegama's question, the short Victors were all low on fuel, some disastrously so, because the formation took much longer than expected to form up at night in radio silence, this leading in turn to the early transfers taking place at least ten minutes (he says 10 to 15 minutes) further down track than expected. This meant that all the short Victors were down by at least twenty minutes fuel plus the turn, plus the extra ten to fifteen minutes of fuel transferred. Baz says that the actual fuel burns and transfers matched exactly what the Victor ODM would predict for the modified bracket positions, the only exception being he could not account for 5000lbs missing from one tanker. Out of interest, the Vulcan 607 book records an additional 'off plan' 5000lb transfer to the Vulcan, this may be it.

The inference from this is that there was significantly more fuel in the formation than expected after the early transfers.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Aviation-grade kerosene fuel with icing inhibitor (F-34 FSII), as used in jet turbine aircraft including the Vulcan, Harriers etc, was priced between 0.95 and 0.96 cents a gallon

Engaging pedant mode, the in theatre Harriers/SHARs were burning AVCAT with FSII. As I remember it. AVCAT is/was around 2% more expensive than AVTUR (due to the different scales of economy). As mentioned by others, though, the cost of juice was largely irrelevant.

The supply of 1,000 bombs in the carriers was, indeed, finite but a similarly finite number of re-loads were available a RAS away in certain solid support RFAs. Re-supplying the re-suppliers, though, would not have been a piece of cake.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Engaging pedant mode.......

I believe the fuels stocks at the FARPs operated by TSW ashore were predominately F-34 and both rotary and puffer jets were customers.

[Courtney Mil]

Engaging pedant mode, the in theatre Harriers/SHARs were burning AVCAT with FSII

We all used a lot of AVCAT in the South Atlantic that year. That could also account for some of the fuel-burn discrepancy for the Black Buck missions.

[Squirrel 41]

Courtney:

We all used a lot of AVCAT in the South Atlantic that year. That could also account for some of the fuel-burn discrepancy for the Black Buck missions.

Interesting - why? I don't know anything about AVCAT vs F-34?

Yours in ignorance,

S41

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Simply put, AVCAT (Aviation Carrier Turbine) has a higher flash point than AVTUR. It's safer in a ship and the reason why all Naval aviation at sea (since the DIESO centred TRIBALs) use it. As far as I'm aware, until Stanley was secured, the only aviation fuel in theatre was AVCAT via Fleet Oiler. Ships from trade may have carried AVTUR but it would never have found its way to an RFA or HM Ship

[Squirrel 41]

GBZ,

Many thanks. But why would Courtney postulate that the use of AVCAT over AVTUR could've led to the discrepancy in the BLACK BUCK fuel burn?

Thanks again,

S41

[Pontius Navigator]

Density?

.

[Courtney Mil]

F-34 (or AVTUR) is actually lighter than F-44 (AVCAT), but it has a higher Specific Energy. If you really want to know its 43.15 MJ/kg instead of 43.05 MJ/kg - my calculations so blame me if that's wrong. Probably should have asked an engineer.

Going back to the point about AVCAT on ships, it's not just a case of only having AVCAT available onboard. My understanding is that aircraft that had been refuelled previously with AVTUR have to be completely defuelled when they embark and refuelled with the, higher flash point, AVCAT.

AVTAG is a different story again.

Bottom line is that different fuels (and additives) will affect engine performance.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Density?

Indeed. Avcat being heavier than Avtur in addition to, as has been already stated, the former's higher flashpoint combines to make it less efficient kilo for kilo.

Not sure why this would be a factor in the the fuel calculations for Black Buck though because only limited stocks of Avcat were held in Ascension and certainly nowhere near enough to have supplied the Victor and Vulcan forces (Avcat was stored for vertreps via APFC to RN vessels passing Asi).

The main fuel types at Asi were initially US-supplied F-40 (JP-4) Avtag and later F-34 (JP-8) Avtur. Question is, had the Black Buck missions been fuelled using F-40, then due to the fuel's lower SG and FP (0.75-0.80 and -18oC) compared to F-34 (0.77-0.84 and 38oC) would it have been more efficient than expected, given F-34 was the standard fuel used by the RAF at the time and by which I'm assuming all baseline figures would have been calculated?

My understanding is that aircraft that had been refuelled previously with AVTUR have to be completely defuelled when they embark and refuelled with the, higher flash point, AVCAT.

It is possible to work out a blend ratio in order to produce a composite of the two fuels which falls into an acceptable FP range for use on-board ships (ah, that was a fun lecture at West Moors) but from what I understand this is rarely done, navy types preferring to add any small amounts of F-34 brought on board to their F-76 stocks.

[Alex Whittingham]

My understanding is that aircraft that had been refuelled previously with AVTUR have to be completely defuelled when they embark and refuelled with the, higher flash point, AVCAT.
Certainly not the case with F40 and F34. I still remember the stunned silence from an F4 when offered either F40 (from the underwing tanks) or F 34 from the HDU.

[TEEEJ]

SASless wrote

I know the USAF and RAF differed on how to tackle the problem and early on the RAF went their way...took losses and in time changed to the other method that had been suggested to be the safer way to go.

That is my reading of Horner anyway....and as he was there I shall have to go with his version until someone can prove otherwise.

The initial phase of the campaign was at low level for many of the players and was planned for three days. F-111s, F-15Es and even B-52s were in those initial days flown at low level to strike targets. A number of B-52Gs suffered combat damage at low level. One F-15Es was lost during a low-level mission near Basra. Again during this low level phase other Coalition aircraft suffered damage. One French Jaguar returned with its tail shredded.

After the initial part of the low level phase CENTAF ordered the switch to medium level operations. Details of the low level phase were highlighted in Operation Desert Storm - Evaluation of the Air Campaign - General Accounting Office - House of Representatives.

B-52 low level info.

Colonel Ramsay bio

In January 1991 he was the flight leader for the first night, low-level combat mission ever flown by a B-52G, leading 14 aircraft to strike five Iraqi airfields in the opening minutes of Operation Desert Storm.

Biographies : COLONEL SAMUEL H. RAMSAY III (http://www.151arw.ang.af.mil/resources/biographies/bio.asp?id=10878)

On 17 January 1991, seven B-52Gs, known as the "Doom Flight", took off from Barksdale AFB in Louisiana to help kick off the air campaign. They performed a flight that lasted 35 hours and took them almost halfway around the world to launch 35 CALCMs and then go back home. The routes of the missiles were planned so that they would impact almost simultaneously, and 33 of them hit their assigned targets. That same day, the B-52G followed up this strike with the first low-level attacks conducted by the type after decades of training. Buffs swept into Iraqi airspace at an altitude of 90 meters (300 feet) to pound four airbases and a highway.

With Iraqi air defenses disabled, the B-52Gs then returned to high-altitude bombing, with three-ship formations pounding Iraqi troops concentrations in Iraq with 340 kilogram (750 pound) bombs and cluster bombs. The B-52 performed 1,600 sorties in the Gulf War and dropped 22,725 tonnes (25,000 tons) of munitions.

[2.0] B-52 At War (http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avb52_2.html)

Major James Riggens, USAF also highlights the initial low-level phase in the following.

'Brilliant Attack: The Need For Autonomous Standoff Weapons in Airfield Attack Missions'

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293645&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

See also accounts online of low level operations - B-52 Stratofortress Units in Operation Desert Storm by Jon Lake

First Night over Iraq (http://www.fighterpilots.net/Iraq.htm)

Account by EF-111 pilot on 17th January 1991 providing the jamming for strike packages. He highlights the following '10 F-111Fs and 2 Mud-Eagles (F-15Es) were coming in on the deck against two different targets.'

See online pages of 'F-15E Strike Eagle in Combat 1991-2005 by Steve Davies'

F-15E

On the first night of the war there were 21 F-15Es that went into Iraq. The original plan was for 18, but three more were added near the start time...... Once the refuelling was completed , we headed north and descended to low level.... We were all on the Terrain Following Radar at 200ft in radio silence - the pilots were hand-flying the TFR steering while concentrating on the FLIR picture in the HUD .....

[cheese bobcat]

In 197? the Bomber Command Bombing Competition was joined by a couple of the brand new (!) F111s. These flew from, I believe, McCoy AFB (now known as Orlando Airport), completed the route over the UK and returned to the US. Now I cannot vouch for the distance involved but it must have been a fair competitor for the longest bombing sortie; it certainly was at the time!

By the way, they trounced both the Vulcans and the B52s in the competition, although it was only a demo of their capability, they didn't feature in the prizes.

[ZH875]

Now I cannot vouch for the distance involved but it must have been a fair competitor for the longest bombing sortie; it certainly was at the time!


But only an Exercise sortie, not an Operational sortie.

[SASless]

AW.....lets do nit pick shall we!

[The Helpful Stacker]

The Black Buck missions are still, I believe, the longest bombing sorties launched and supported from a single point.

Not bad for the occupants of a little island near France.;)

[West Coast]

To put one bomb on a runway. The RAF has had innumerable success stories over the years. This may have been a logistical success, but an operational one, not so much. Enter the revisionists who will say the real purpose of black buck raids was to do anything other than close down the runway.

Sorry lads, focus in on the overall outstanding job the British military did in regaining the islands, not a failed raid by a military component that was feeling left out.

[The Helpful Stacker]

"To put one bomb on a runway"

Of course measured against the later B52 raids on Iraq which were part of an operation to remove the threat of WMDs which were never found (and so revisionists changed the purpose of the operation to 'provide freedom to Iraqis') the Black Buck raids could be considered both cheap and effective.

[Archimedes]

Left out? Nimrod MR, Nimrod R, Victor AAR for Shar and Harrier reinforcement, Harriers of 1 sqn - acclaimed by Julian Thompson for swinging the battle at Goose Green (on the record and in print somewhere) - Victors for MRR, VC10 for Medevac, Herc airbridge (including - see National Archives - dropping vital engineering spares to Invincible so it could fix a bit of an engine glitch which otherwise would've required a port stop), Dick Langworthy and the Chinook in due course. And 25% approx of the SHAR force pilots. That's left out?

And. For revisionists, I assume that the contemporary and near contemporary comments of Admiral Woodward, Admiral Lewin, Admiral Leach and Admiral Fieldhouse about the possible wider benefits of hitting Stanley - which CAS had told the war cabinet he'd need at least 25 and preferably 50 sorties to guarantee shutting it completely - count as revisionism, do they?

[West Coast]

Stacker

Not familiar enough to comment on the buff raids you mention, but if they were a failure, then you're simply comparing one failure to another.

Archimedes

The RAF was in a supporting position. Not the fault of the fine folks that comprised it, but rather due to its civilian masters.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi

I would have much preferred more Nimrod coverage and consider the Black Bucks to have been a waste of tankerage/valuable space on Ascension, although as already stated excellence on the part of those involved.

Delivering these guys and other stuff was much more useful.

Parachute drop. (http://www.hmsglamorgan.co.uk/html/parachute_drop_.html) SAS Arriving1 (http://www.hmsglamorgan.co.uk/html/sas_arriving1.html)

Deepsixteen

[Pontius Navigator]

When I was working with the TPG at Dryad I met some of the AWO who had served there. One ex-Broadsword and another ex-Coventry. We didn't discuss the air war and the RAF contribution or not. It was a joint effort and we won.

What they would have liked was SAM that worked and AEW.

[Archimedes]

WC - there's a difference between being in a supporting role (a fact which the then CAS's language about the conflict, to give but one example, shows was recognised) and being 'left out'.

Despite some of the utter rubbish written subsequently by those either with a severe bout of kabourophobia, or a willingness to believe/accept at face value these statements, the RAF was not so stupid as to think that some sort of independent air campaign was going to lead to the retaking of the Falklands - common sense, campaign planning and geography all placed the RAF (and post Op SUTTON, the RN) in a supporting role, and this was known from the start.

[Deepsixteen]

Hi PN

I wouldn’t disagree with that, Wolf instead of Cat and Dart instead of Slug would have been nice, it’s just that as I remember events the BB’s produced gaps in Nimrod coverage and stores support that lasted days? I have always thought that the many other things done by the RAF had more value than the BB’s is all.

Deepsixteen

[SASless]

Of course measured against the later B52 raids on Iraq which were part of an operation to remove the threat of WMDs which were never found (and so revisionists changed the purpose of the operation to 'provide freedom to Iraqis') the Black Buck raids could be considered both cheap and effective.

Oh do spare me!

Managing to put a single Vulcan over a target and get one bomb of twenty one on the target.....and you really want to compare it to the B-52 Operations in either Gulf War and think we will consider your post worthy of even a moments thought?

You simply amaze me with that kind of "thinking".

[500N]

Couldn't the BB raids be considered along the lines
of the US Bombing of Libya from UK airbases.

Sending a message etc ........................

[SASless]

Comparing the F-111 practice bombing raid from Mccoy AFB to Europe and back home to the Black Buck Raids is fair I think.....as both were done from US Air Bases.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

I think the landlords might have precedence. :}

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Managing to put a single Vulcan over a target and get one bomb of twenty one on the target.....and you really want to compare it to the B-52 Operations in either Gulf War and think we will consider your post worthy of even a moments thought?

Sorry; I don't usually argue with you but how long have we Brits had Jointery? We put a long neglected aeroplane, with long neglected crew training over a key target and got, as near as dammit, a result. It put that vital seed of doubt/fear into Johnny Gaucho's mind. It didn't dilute resources need elsewhere. It was a success and none of you armchair warriors/loggies can take that away.

Remember that we weren't on our uppers with our breeches arse hanging out in those days.

[500N]

And from a civilian point of view (at that stage), it had a huge
positive effect on the population of Britain.

As did the sinking of the Belgrano.

Did the sinking of the Belgrano have a huge effect on the outcome of the war ?
Kept the Argie Navy in port and ???????


21 bombs across the runway, whether it put the airfield out of action
or not certainly 1. Put the Argies on notice and 2. Sent a message to the rest
of the world.

[wiggy]

We put a long neglected aeroplane, with long neglected crew training over a key target and got, as near as dammit, a result. It put that vital seed of doubt/fear into Johnny Gaucho's mind. It didn't dilute resources need elsewhere. It was a success and none of you armchair warriors/loggies can take that away.

Spot on, sorry SASless but your comments/analysis were not up to your usual high standards

[West Coast]

Archimedes

Did the raids achieve the missions stated purpose? Surely it had one, and that is how the results should be graded. If the bar was set low enough, BB could be considered a success. This isn't a dig at the the folks involved, indeed they were top notch.

I don't fault the RAF for ending up at a point where a max effort yielded one bomb on a runway and overall in a supporting role. It's an indictment of a government that made a decision to allow the RAF to wither.

[SASless]

Wiggy.....the BB raids did divert resources....fuel and other assets.

My response was to remind a fellow that comparing a three shot raid by single aircraft to a prolonged effort by numerous aircraft was just not a valid comparison.

No dig at the crews doing the job....not at all. As has been said...old bird, old technology, bugger all resources and a very long way to go to drop the bombs.

It is the sad commentary of how Politicians force the Troops to fight at a disadvantage because of some very poor decisions on manning, training, and equipment.

Replying in kind to a waved Willy is just good sport on this forum as there is always a surprise when a couple of Lunkers from way deep down in the hole pop up for the bait.

As to effect....did the Black Buck raids significantly alter the way the Argies employed attack aircraft as much as the Belgrano Sinking affect the way the Argies used their Navy?

I would suggest the Submarine attack was a really effective tactic.

[Pontius Navigator]

A well placed source told me that he had no recollection of a brief that laid out what the overall aim was, but they were certainly focused on breaking the runway so that fast jets could not use it and so the fleet could operate closer to the FI.

So, if interdicting the runway was the mission and that weapons planning required between 25 and 50 aircraft, I think was can take a single hit by a single aircraft, the first aircraft at that, as a resounding success.

Anything else was PR.

[ORAC]

As to effect....did the Black Buck raids significantly alter the way the Argies employed attack aircraft as much as the Belgrano Sinking affect the way the Argies used their Navy? Interestingly phrased question concerning attack aircraft, SASless.

Certainly prevented them from deploying any forward. However, the major impact was on defensive aircraft, as I pointed out on page 1 (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/504450-vulcans-falkland-raid-2.html#post7614168).

Selective memory loss? :=

[SASless]

PN,



if interdicting the runway was the mission and that weapons planning required between 25 and 50 aircraft

Are you saying the Mission to render the airfield unusable was originally determined to need 25-50 bomber aircraft on target to be successful....but as it turned out.... a single Bomber on three nights accomplished what was set forth as being the Task during the initial planning process?

Or....despite the initial planners thinking it would take the 25-50 aircraft over the target....and after the very limited success of the three BB raids using a single aircraft....a decision was made for any number of reasons that no more raids were necessary?

What was the actual reasons for ending the raids after on three nights and the single bomb hit on the runway?

[Pontius Navigator]

Are you saying the Mission to render the airfield unusable was originally determined to need 25-50 bomber aircraft on target to be successful....but as it turned out.... a single Bomber on three nights accomplished what was set forth as being the Task during the initial planning process?

Yes.

Weapons effort planning considers the probability for an aircraft to be serviceable (and that would include the trail), for all the bombs to function, for the bomb characteristics to achieve the aim (aside from the runway the terrain could have absorbed much of the explosive shock, for the aircraft to deliver the weapons within its predicted accuracy, the expected combat degradation for the system, attrition etc etc.

Two aircraft, one on target and one hit was spectacularly lucky.

after the very limited success of the three BB raids using a single aircraft....a decision was made for any number of reasons that no more raids were necessary?

Three sorties, the 3rd aborted due to weather. That third mission was 2 weeks after the first. Weather and tanker priorities may have dictated the pace of attacks. You would need to look at that phase of the operations from all aspects.

What was the actual reasons for ending the raids after on three nights and the single bomb hit on the runway?

The second phase of raids were scheduled to begin on 28 May using ARMs. Their objective was clearly quite different from the bombing and I refer to my previous paragraph.

[ORAC]

Official History of the Falklands Campaign - Vol 2, page 542:

"Further Vulcan raids against the airport had been requested but not provided. The best use of the Victor tankers appeared to be the daily long range Nimrod surface surveillance sortie.

Concerns about radars led to the consideration of use of the American Shrike ainti-radiation missile. BLACK BUCK 4 on 27 May was called off after 5 hours because of problems with refuelling. On 31 May BLACK BUCK 5 took off with 4 Shrike missiles. A Sea Harrier attack was co-ordinated with the raid to keep the radars turned on. Two Shrikes were launched, and one exploded - the first had detonated about 45 foot from the TPS-43 antenna, inflicting significant damage - the second missed......

It was intended to use Shrike by the GR3s. The operational was delayed as RAF engineers assembled the system from parts air-dropped to Hermes by a Hercules, but it was not ready when the Argentines surrendered.....

Another raid (BLACK BUCK 6) using Shrike on 3 June was hampered by the poor intelligence on the location of the radars...... The weather was also poor, so there could be no Harrier decoy sortie to get the radars turned on. Two missiles were successfully fired at a Skyguard site without much effect. Then, when trying to get home, the Vulcan had to divert to Rio de Janeiro because of a broken refuelling probe.......

Page 614:

On 10 June.... a report that four Pucaras had bombed and strafed 3 Para on the northern slopes of Mount Kent before returning to Stanley. No damage had been caused but Moore was worried that the airport was still in use and requested another BLACK BUCK raid on the morning of 12 June. The raid was mounted but was ineffective*. At 2120Z on 13 June, Woodward reported to CINCFLEET that: 'PR of Stanley airfield today shows that BLACK BUCK 7 bombs dropped on identical line to BLACK BUCK 2 without damage to the target'.

*Page 631:

Early on 12 June, at 0850Z, there was the last Vulcan raid on Stanley airfield - BLACK BUCK 7. The intention was to attack the airfield parking and storage area with VT air-burst bombs, but impact fusing was set in error, and the 21 bombs fell wide of the target.

[MAINJAFAD]

ORAC

A bit of poor research / editing on BB6, if that's the official report, as even the Argies admit that a Skyguard did eat a Shrike which did kill four of the soldiers operating it or located near it. On BB5 only 2 Shrikes were carried, not four.

In fact all sorties down south from ASI requiring AAR support were authorised by Admiral Fieldhouse and it was he who decided if the sortie of the day was by a Hercules, a Nimrod, a Vulcan or in the later stages GR3s, though in the beginning only the Vulcan and Victor could do anything useful as at the same time that BB2 was taking place, the total number of AAR capable Hercs and Nimrods released to service was zero!!!

[dragartist]

Suprised it took so many pages to recognise that BB was not just about bombs on runways. I attended a great lecture at london Society of Air Britain some years back where the senior AEO spoke of all the BB sorties. passive EW indicated the presence of Radar controlled Air Defences. what else could have taken these out. Great effort at the time to equip the aircraft with the means. Not just Flight Refuelling but new Nav and weapons systems. I certainly remember working 18 hr days. comming home for tea and back till midnight or 2am.

[MAINJAFAD]

Dragartist

It took about 6 pages for the ARM missions to come up on the first thread (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/479504-falklands-most-daring-raid.html) about this programme as well, that thread is well worth a read if you haven't seen it as there is quite a lot of Argentinean input including that of one of the Army radar operators of the AN-TPS44 that was on the Islands at the time.

[Pontius Navigator]

The ARM sorties only appeared late on the threads as the threads were about the programme of the first BB mission.

Statistically the result achieved by BB1 was almost impossible. Don't forget, making the impossible a reality certainly gave the invading forces a reality check. Again, that was covered in the earlier thread. They had simply never considered that possibility.

Ten tons of bombs in 7 seconds would concentrate the mind in the same way as a battleship delivering NGS.

[ORAC]

A bit of poor research / editing on BB6, if that's the official report, as even the Argies admit that a Skyguard did eat a Shrike What can I say, speak to Sir Lawrence Freedman...

http://i30.photobucket.com/albums/c326/jvoc/BB61_zps9529ca33.jpg

[SASless]

Ten tons of bombs in 7 seconds would concentrate the mind in the same way as a battleship delivering NGS.

Shame you had no B-52's.....36 Tons of bombs....58 500 Pounders internally and 24 750 pounders on external racks.


Likewise if you had a Battleship like any of the Four we had in service for a while....the New Jersey, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Missouri.....think of the combined effect that would have had on the Argies.


http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/bb-63-dnst8709088_jpg-s.jpg


http://dmn.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/B52-Arc-Light1.jpg

[ZH875]

750 Pounders.



Oh look, the Buff carries BABY bombs.

[SASless]

It totes bigger than the 750's......but one does have to admit....51 of those "Babies" exceed anything the Vulcan carried....ever.

Also...please note the B-52 is still in service and unlike the Vulcan which at best is either a Gate Guard or doing the Antique Aircraft Show circuit.

Penis Envy is such a sad state of mind.....

[soddim]

Until smart bombs became the order of the day about all you could say of the big bombers with any degree of accuracy was that all the bombs hit the ground

[ORAC]

51 of those "Babies" exceed anything the Vulcan carried....ever Ahem, you forget the original role of the V-Force, and the B-52.

Fair to say they carried an equal load of death and destruction....

[Pontius Navigator]

Soddim, not always :}.

ORAC, I wish you hadn't said that. A pair of Hound Dogs followed by two or three of megaton weapons in a Money Order or Large Charge following a couple of penetration aids trumps a high kiloton weapon every time.

[SASless]

I do believe the context of the squabble was about Iron Dumb Bombs....which tonnage and numbers can make a real difference.....where when Nukes are considered....the sheer scale of the mayhem done by a single bomb makes comparisons a bit moot.

[ORAC]

I do believe the context of the squabble was about Iron Dumb Bombs....which tonnage and numbers can make a real difference..... Depends how and where. The 300+ ship Linebacker raids might have made a lot more holes in the ground. Not sure they had more of an influence on the war.......

[SASless]

When they went downtown in Hanoi.....they did.

Arclight was the name of the bombing campaign using B-52's down south and in Cambodia and Laos.

Linebacker was the name of the bombing operation up north.

Operation Arc Light (http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/AirOps/arclight.html)



The sad fact is we bombed our Allies and never invaded the enemy!

Having been involved in some activities immediately following some of the bombing down South....they did have an effect if they landed on where the bad guys were. Sadly, they did not do that often enough.

A favorite tactic was sending Scout Helicopters and Gunships into the area right after the raids.....to do BDA and dispatch any NVA/VC seen wandering about the place. Organized resistance was not a real threat following the raids as the physical and psychological effect of 200,000 pounds of bombs falling on your neighborhood has to be seen to be believed. As the Buff's flew too high to be heard and usually unseen.....the warning you got was the sound of the bombs just before they hit. Add darkness and it must have been a terrible experience.

The craters have been put to good use as Cat Fish ponds today.

[500N]

SaSless

And sending in people.

Some excellent write ups in the book MACV-SOG by John Plaster re what they
saw on the ground immediately after a bombing raid.

[ZH875]

The sad fact is we bombed our Allies and never invaded the enemy!


Something you seem to achieve on a regular basis.

[Fareastdriver]

Sasless; stick to that that you know about; you are an ex US Army helicopter pilot that has done time in th UK as a North Sea rotary pilot.

You know bugger-all about bombing......

I am also an ex miltary and North Sea pilot but I have spent some in Bomber Command RAF, so I have picked up a bit of knowledge about how those that actually chuck the HE at the baddies actually work.

As you can, no doubt, pick up your trusty Winchester 73 and drop a fleeing burgler at 50 yards in a hurricane then you know about the wind effect on missiles. A bombsight will, if you believe Norden, drop a 750lb bomb into a pickle barrel at 30,000 ft.

Your trusty B52 during the Gulf and subsequent punch-ups was after their 15th or so upgrade and were not using bombsights as such, either visual or internal radar because the mighty GPS had taken over. They dialled in the target, he autopilot took over and at the designated time it would release the bombs on the wind information that had been programmed into it. Just to make sure they had half-a-dozen 52s flying in formation that did the same thing.

Your poor old Vulcan boring into Stamley manned by people who were already into their retirement programme, using an analoque cold war navigation bombing system and had to fly thousands of miles and drop one stick of bombs on a runway so as to make it unusable.

The lost art of bombing requires four things. The wind speed at release, the wind speed at the target and the the flight characteristics of the bomb. The forth is an interpelation ot the wind during th descent which is normally a comprimise between the upper an lower winds. The Vulcan crew has two of those but no knowledge of the surface or the mid level wind.

They released 29 bombs within one second travelling at 360 ft/sec. Despite that they had Cold War radar with what would be regarded nowadays as appalling definition and no surface weather information they put their stick so that one end of it hit the target. The USAF would have put a fleet of B52s thatwould have obliterated Stanley airfield and and most of the township.

In 1945 General Kesselring, Commander of the Southern German Army was asked of his opinions of the bombing in Italy. "When the Germans bomb the Allies duck. When the British bomb the Germans duck When the Americans bomb everybody ducks."

In 1945 a B29 crew had unlimited hours practising bombing so that they could deliver a certain bomb within a defined area.

They missd their aiming point in Hiroshima by 800 yards.

:ok:If you ever come back to Aberdeen we'll have a few beers together again.

.

[teeteringhead]

.....the warning you got was the sound of the bombs just before they hit. Add darkness and it must have been a terrible experience.

.... er ... not unlike the effect of BB1 on the Argies in Stanley perhaps SASless? ;)

[SASless]

I believe you have had one Pint too many in the past. I know the B-52 is old....but its early development must have been a very well kept secret.


In 1945 a B52 crew had unlimited hours practising bombing so that they could deliver a certain bomb within a defined area.

Now despite being an Army helicopter pilot....I do in fact know a touch about aerial bombing....having actually done some with a helicopter. Some was intentional as well.

We had no bombsight at all unless you consider the Pedal Adjustment pegs on a Chinook a device that could be called a bomb sight. Granted the weapon and techniques were not Army approved unless it was Drums of Tear Gas or Napalm we were dropping but we did attack the enemy with 'bombs". So your accusation I know naught is not exactly accurate.

As to the fine art of true Aerial Bombardment....no I know very little beyond what I have seen in the Dam Busters and 633 Squadron or perhaps Doctor Strangelove.....I never did understand how Slim Pickens ever thought he could steer that Nuke by riding on it like he was on horseback.

So....you defend the Vulcan attack by citing old kit....but suggest a B-29 using a mechanical bombsight....with no wind data beyond what could be constructed using Drift Meters in the Bomb sight and by the Nav....was a failure despite it obliterating the city of Hiroshima. When it comes to Nukes....I would think an 800 meter error could be considered acceptable.

You recall what the Wind problems were for the B-29's were that caused LeMay to go to low level Fire Bombing attacks?


Of course you politely skip over the RAF Bomber Command's accuracy during the same War where whole cities were missed. But that is another topic altogether.

I'll take you up on the Pint....

[Pontius Navigator]

SASLess, last first, my sqn was a pathfinder sqn and was achieving accuracies in the order of 200-400 yards.

Then regarding your Buff with 51 bombs:

A hit from a 750lb bomb will have less effect that a 1000lb one. It also has the marked disadvantage of 50 misses rather than 20.

Curiously, in the run up to GW1 the USAF sought information about our 90-way bombing system and the intervalometer settings both available and practicable.

[langleybaston]

QUOTe.

The lost art of bombing requires four things. The wind speed at release, the wind speed at the target and the the flight characteristics of the bomb. The forth is an interpelation ot the wind during th descent which is normally a comprimise between the upper an lower winds. The Vulcan crew has two of those but no knowledge of the surface or the mid level wind.

I know nothing about bombing but a lot about wind [ask my wife, who suffers the manifestations].

It is true that the mid-level winds are usually somewhere within the extremes of the "bombing level" and the surface [vectors, not just speeds] but your met man straight out of training should know if the change of direction with height is veering or backing or indeed virtually steady ......... this from a consideration of approaching/ departing warm and cold air, so-called advection. "Thermal winds" and such difficult stuff.
However, the total effect of the lowest level winds on a streamlined bomb at near terminal velocity should be small unless a gale is blowing [which again, the met man should be in with a chance of forecasting.

There was enough shipping [friendlies] in the area to construct a halfway decent chart .......................

PROVIDED THE NAVY SHARED THE OBSERVATIONS.

I was stuck at Bawtry so know little of the sharp end, but we did have met men [and very experienced] of the MMU at Ascension, despite the RN desire to get rid of them as they stepped off the aircraft. I would be surprised if they did not give a reasonably accurate forecast ............ as opposed to cloud, rain, snow, fog, the atmospheric pressure and wind are usually forecastable to small margins.

[Fareastdriver]

In 1945 a B52 crew had unlimited hours practising

Didn't do very well there, did I. Not only that I've been bollocked by Pontius Navigator for getting my figures wrong. I won't corect them; it's time for anoher pint.

but we did attack the enemy with 'bombs". So your accusation I know naught is not exactly accurate.

Come on........ I have probably dropped more cars than you have bombs.

[ORAC]

Just checked. Meteorology is not mentioned in the official history.

[SASless]

It also has the marked disadvantage of 50 misses rather than 20.

A Miss is a Miss....but with 50 chances of a hit compared to 20 chances....am I missing something here?

Odd that Bombing folks are comfortable with their Miss rate.....while Army folks are not. Must be the different perspective....looking down or looking up!

[langleybaston]

Meteorology is not mentioned in the official history

Surprise surprise!

Working on the ancient rool:

When I'm right no-one remembers

When I'm wrong no-one forgets

I reckon the forecasts were probably fit for purpose.

Good enough for the Met Office to share in the gongs dished out afterwards.

see: British Units in the Falklands War (http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/Brit-units.htm)

[Pontius Navigator]

It is true that the mid-level winds are usually somewhere within the extremes of the "bombing level" and the surface [vectors, not just speeds] but your met man straight out of training should know if the change of direction with height is veering or backing or indeed virtually steady ......... . . .

However, the total effect of the lowest level winds on a streamlined bomb at near terminal velocity

The treatment of wind was a pretty arcane subject and not a lot we could do about it. The NBS calculated wind based on drift and groundspeed from the DD72M and TAS and temperature from the airspeed servo. Naturally this was wind at height.

As Langley said, the bombs would be falling relatively slowly at release and faster at lower levels such that their time in any given height band would decease as the bomb fell.

I don't believe there was any allowance for the change of wind unless it was factored. A uniform air mass was the ideal medium with dropping from a jet steam or through a strong wind sheer a guarantee of a wide bomb.

Dropping from a lower altitude in the region of 12,000 feet would minimise the wind effect. Now I have no evidence for this but it might be conceivable that knowledge of local winds may well have influenced a decision to bomb or not.

[500N]

Question if anyone knows.

Was information available from the SAS personnel near Stanley
or were the BB raids before they were able to get into their locs ?

And if they were available, would any info re conditions have been
useful if it had been able to be sent ?

[ZH875]

When it comes to Nukes....I would think an 800 meter error could be considered acceptable.

...

Bearing in mind the Vulcan was designed as a high level nuclear bomber, if the first bomb of the 21 hit the runway, then that bomb could have been the instant sunshine device and would therefore been a DH and not an 800m miss, so eminently acceptable.

The calibration of the double offset box was well worth the effort.

[TheVulcan]

I've just finished producing book called Victor Boys telling personal stories written by aircrew and ground crew. I would like to do another one called Vulcan Boys in the same vein so I need lots of help and stories and photos. Two of the chapters of the Victor book were on Black Buck One but for the Vulcan Book I woulkd like to cover all the Black Buck sorties but I need help from you all. Please contact me as soon as you like so that you can start writing! It should be an absolutely super book with your help.

[Dan Dare]

Operation Bluck Buck (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01jhb3d)

Entertaining 45 minute drama on Radio 4 will be available until mid February.

[Pontius Navigator]

DD, is that a repeat of one a few years ago with the engineer officer cast as your ubiquitous Scot, a la Scotty from Star trek?

[Guernsey Girl II]

PN
Yes it was, first broadcast 5 June 2012.

Not exactly Bomber. Now that was a good aviation based radio drama.

[Pontius Navigator]

GG, Thanks. I must tell one of the characters, he missed it first time round.

[Courtney Mil]

Whatever way anyone looks at it, that was one hell of an op. Hats off.