1968...what would you do differently?

[Pittsextra]

So TSR2 has been binned and now its 1968 and the F-111 order has been cancelled. What would you do if anything differently from this point on??

[blaireau]

Buy F4's. I liked, indeed insisted on a good aircraft for my weekends away.

[SASless]

Done and excursion to Hanoi along with my mates....all 500,000 of them.

[LowObservable]

Modern avionics in the Bucc. Multimode radar, inertial, EW. And to continue the what-if, we'd probably be fitting them today with AESA, F414s and the next generation of RCS-reduction kit, and confusing the F-22s at Red Flag like they baffled the F-15s in the 1970s.

[jamesdevice]

Put Wedgewood Benn on trial for Treason?
And maybe Wilson as well for good measure?

[Pittsextra]

and confusing the F-22s at Red Flag like they baffled the F-15s in the 1970s.

Lets have some 1970's Bucc stories....:ok:

[newt]

Lets not!!!

[Pittsextra]

you prefer Jag stories :E

[newt]

Much better:D:D:D:D

[cuefaye]

They'd be very short ones though :eek:

[CoffmanStarter]

I'd still have bought the F4 ... but more of them and not bu99ered about with the engines.

[Pittsextra]

What were the French Mirage's like?

[CoffmanStarter]

French ... Simples !

[Squirrel 41]

Pitts:

Meaning elegant, cheap to buy, likely to break, expensive when they did, and long waits for the bits to arrive.

S41

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

I never did understand why they insisted on Speys in the F4s. Didn't the increased drag of the fuselage to accomodate the engines negate any power gain, while bestowing a greater fuel burn for the unrealised (because of the said drag) extra engine power?

[CoffmanStarter]

SSD ... Political meddling ... Simples !

[SOSL]

Shaggy, you're quite right - the F4J we bought backs you up. But the Spey was a beautiful jet engine.

Rgds SOS

[Aileron Drag]

1968...what would you do differently?
So TSR2 has been binned and now its 1968 and the F-111 order has been cancelled. What would you do if anything differently from this point on??

Absolutely nothing. It was at that point I resigned, handed in my blue suit, and joined BEA. At least there, I thought, I'd get to fly an up-to-date jet! Bl**dy Socialists. :ugh:

[airborne_artist]

The real question is whether the TSR2 would have been any good for any of the many roles for which it was intended?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

The real question is whether the TSR2 would have been any good for any of the many roles for which it was intended?

That's a very interesting question. Those involved in its few flights insist it was an amazingly capable aeroplane, but it looks to me to have a tiny wing; great for straight line speed but not so good for manouvering and STOL despite blown surfaces.

[aw ditor]

Put the Tanks' down Whitehall.

AD'

[molitor5901]

...the TSR2 might have been a good aeroplane, when the computer technology caught up! (sometime after 1980?)

[BEagle]

Those involved in its few flights insist it was an amazingly capable aeroplane, but it looks to me to have a tiny wing; great for straight line speed but not so good for manouvering and STOL despite blown surfaces.

Unfortunately, an eminent TP of the era insists on talking opinionated nonsense about the lack of wing area on the bomber. It was intended to be a high speed, low level nuclear strike bomber first and foremost, with no real need for energetic manoevring. Whether or not STOL would ever have been used operationally, I doubt - neither was the STOL / rough field performance of the Jaguar (yes, that's what BWoS claimed!) ever used.

A pig to fly at low speed, I gather - but so was the Bucc below 300KIAS!

As for 1968; well, I think I should have chosen an easier degree at a nicer university. Aeronautical Engineering on the Mile End Road wasn't much fun - although the South Woodford halls were OK. The UAS was great fun though.

We were stuck with the 50:50 Phantom due to the incompetence of 'pound in your pocket' Wislon and his fellow travellers; however coming into service was the Jaguar, Hawker's little airshow jet, and the F-4. Plus the AFVG had been canned a year earlier, as had F-111K and it was to be another 6 years before UKVG became the Tornado bomber, so the RAF had no option but to acquire the Buccaneer - a decision which was to prove very sound in later years. So at least prospective fast jet pilots had a lot of interesting aircraft from which to choose!

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Wasn't there allegedly an element of a certain other TP talking-up TSR2 because he'd hung his coat on it rather than on Concorde, which he thought would be cancelled?

[4Greens]

The Speys were to improve the performance for carrier ops.

[John Farley]

My opinionated nonsense was based on the considerable AoA used for takeoff and landing at (light) flight test weights which to my way of thinking would have required a lot of runway to be available at operational weights.

So, opinionated - sure. Nonsense - not sure.

As to the original low level high speed penetrator operational requirement, with the full benefit of hindsight the viability/usefulness of such a role would probably be fairly low today.

[Yellow Sun]

The real question is whether the TSR2 would have been any good for any of the many roles for which it was intended?

Could I point the Hon Member to:

John Forbat's " TSR2 - Precision Attack to Tornado" ISBN 978 0 7524 3919 8

The book contains quite detailed descriptions of the TSR2 avionics and AFCS. The question one has to pose; and answer; is whether the system could have been made to work at all and if so could it have functioned properly in anything other than its narrow primary role?

If nothing else you should read Ch9 - The Central Processing System.

I fear that the introduction to service would have been long and painful and by the time that it was complete we may have found ourselves in something of a cul-de-sac.

YS

[cuefaye]

Once again, succinctly put John. I would just add that I think its usefulness would probably have been fairly low some twenty odd years ago - with hindsight as you rightly say.

[Cows getting bigger]

Binned the Harrier before the advent of the Internet, pprune and That Harrier thread.

[The B Word]

And the Comet based Nimrod to save the bandwidth wasted on that in the past 2 years on Pprune!

[Pittsextra]

At the time was anyone pushing for a more tactical air force that may not have been all that good in the delivery of nuclear weapons but more focused on the defence of economic interests against conventional forces?

In my mind is of course a reflection on the conflicts that have taken place since 1968 but also thinking about the development of the EH101 helicopter. The concept of which was from 1970's becoming operational 30 years later.. One wonders how far requirements changed or indeed if at that time anyone thought that they even might?

[Milo Minderbinder]

Could we have afforded TSR2 though?
Machining parts from solid billits of titanium is a damned expensive way to build any mechanical structure, especially when you (in some components) can get close to a 90% wastage rate before you account for quality control rejects.
It was one of the things that did for Westland a few years later: uncontrolled titanium wastage from the machining was completely unbudgeted for, simply because no-one had ever needed to account for raw material losses before. Aluminium and alloy was so cheap in comparison, that the wastage costs were relatively trivial and no-one thought to look at the costs
Westland lost out also because the scrap was nicked and passed on the the local caravan dwellers, but even if it had been recycled legitimately there still would have been a huge loss. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany weren't keen on taking it back, and paid a pittance for it.

I've often wondered whether the same error was initially made with TSR2, with no-one anticipating just how high the scrap rate would be from the maching processes

[BEagle]

...the considerable AoA used for takeoff and landing at (light) flight test weights which to my way of thinking would have required a lot of runway to be available at operational weights.

What percentage of development thrust was used on those early flights - and was BLC used for landing? RB didn't seem to think it would have been much of a problem. Although the daft STOL requirement was Air Staff nonsense, in my opinion.

Would Hawker's still-borne GOR339 contender, the P1129 have fared any better? Who knows; the Kingston design didn't fly whereas the TSR2 did.

As to the original low level high speed penetrator operational requirement, with the full benefit of hindsight the viability/usefulness of such a role would probably be fairly low today.

As would, perhaps, be the usefulness of a little short range V/STOL jet capable of flying not very far carrying not very much?

By the way, you may also wish to review the Fairey Rotodyne programme which was making significant progress with noise reduction before it was cancelled in 1962, over 3 years before P1154, TSR2 and HS681.... The Rotodyne was not part of the same cancellation programme; indeed, it was doing so well that there wasn't a single complaint about 'noise' or 'smell' when it flew to Battersea Heliport 50 years ago - the only enquiries from the public were out of curiosity.....

[Milo Minderbinder]

The Rotodyne lost out on politics following the Westland / Bristol / Fairey shotgun wedding.
Only one of the Rotodyne / Westminster / Belvedere was going to get government development funding, and the Belvedere seemed the lowest risk. Or someone greased someones palm to keep the work at Weston, not Yeovil.

[octavian]

Order more Canberras and Hunters.

[N.HEALD]

Buccaneer with Tornado or TSR2 avionics, TFR etc and I think we would have had a cracking aircraft and saved a bundle of £sd to boot,

[Aileron Drag]

BEagle,

"So at least prospective fast jet pilots had a lot of interesting aircraft from which to choose!"

I don't know when you were training, but in 1968-9 there was sod-all choice. People were leaving the RAF in droves from the JP training bases.

Of around 40 guys on the JP course I was on, only two or three would go to Valley, due to very serious cutbacks. Everyone else was 'doomed' to Oakington.

I didn't know at the time what he was doing, but after leaving the RAF one of the first people I met in Queen's Building (LHR) was my old boss at Leeming.

It was a grim time to have chosen the Royal Air Force as a career.

[rlsbutler]

As a Vulcan captain in the early 1970s I would very much rather have been flying the TSR-2, after which I had hankered futilely ten years earlier.

The primary role was to wander our great big aircraft at low level into Western Russia. Whatever serious defence we had against Russian SAM was bundled up in our AEO and his magic boxes. If we were to attack by night we would use terrain following radar, which offered a generous invitation to whatever radar-homing missiles they might have positioned ahead of us.

Day or night, missiles or no, the Russians had literally thousands of the AA armoured vehicles known as ZSU-23-4. I was not alone, I am sure, in feeling that our Vulcans would be swiftly shredded by the first of these weapon systems we met.

Now the TSR-2 might have taken ages to bed in its computing system - but it would have moved through Western Russia like s*** off a shovel. I suspect we and our Vulcans were wasting our time even attempting this exercise; in TSR-2s, on the other hand, we would have got to our targets with just two good engines and a Pilot Nav Card.

[Scruffy Fanny]

Beags - I think your been a bit unkind to JF! - what ever your views on TPs sometimes they do have a valid point ! - TSR-2 in my opinion would have been great about 1980 - just when GR1 entered service. I met and had Lunch with RPB at his house in 1988 and he was still most enthusiastic about TSR-2 I also knew Jimmy Dell pretty well. What I have learnt with hindsight is just how close they came to disaster on a good few of the flights. I think they only flew 19-20 sorties RPB about 6-7 Jimmy Dell about 11 and Don Knight 2 - all from memory . The engines were powerful but very limited. When you look at a lot of the kit that went into TSR2 and then look at what ended up in Jaguar and F4 it really would be wrong to say TSR-2 was brilliant! The FGR2 INAS was never great and the early Jaguar Navwass probably cost a few pilots their lives. I've never found out if the GMR in TSR was any good - GR1 ended up with the Texas Instruments GMR and TFR I'm guessing because it was cheaper than Ferranti and perhaps an offset in costs from the F111 programme. Having almost finished (plug) my book on Tornado what we ended up with is probably better than we could have hoped for . Tornado a fruit of the 1970s with its trendy swing wing is arguably the best CAS combat aircraft in service today- due to a reliable airframe and smart weapons . The F3 ( and before some FAA persons starts ranting- be quiet) also became a capable aircraft - not an SU27 beater or F22 slayer but excellent as a long range interceptor. So in brief TSR2 would have been good but my guess it would have seen service in Gulf War one just as it retired and we would all be saying how brilliant it was !!!

[Barksdale Boy]

Beags, to judge from your #22, it looks as though you share an alma mater with Caligula!

[DBTW]

I don't think it's about aeroplanes...:)

...the wrong decision you guys made in the late 60s was the one about leaving the British Commonwealth to join the European Economic Zone, or was it the Common Market ( ;) what did you call it before this more modern pseudo-federation?) That single mistake pretty much changed the course of history from one where Britain was at the middle of everything with friends all over the world, to one where it has become a small group of islands off the west coast of a mainland populated by reformed enemies.:hmm:

[rjtjrt]

I am always surprised at the lack of appreciation of what great opportunity was lost then. No, not TSR2, but RAF not getting F-111. That to me was the real opportunity lost.

[CoffmanStarter]

Back to the 1968 shopping/wish list ... I'd have put down an order for 500 or so Northrop T-38 Talon's and set in motion the remuster of the VR ... probably of not much strategic use ... but great fun :ok:

[t43562]

http://prototypes.free.fr/tsr2/images/avro730_03.jpg (http://prototypes.free.fr/tsr2/images/avro730_03.jpg)

[Fg Off Bloggs]

With 2500 hours on the Bucc, what's to change?

Bloggs

[SOSL]

4Greens - # 25...

The Spey was ordered to provide jobs in the UK. The spams had been flying off carriers for years, using GE engines.

The carrier version of the Spey only differed from the RAF version in that it had a catalytic (e.g. faster light up) igniter in the re-heat system and some differences in the rigging.

Rgds SOS

[John Farley]

BEagle (others may find the detail that follows a little tiresome)

As would, perhaps, be the usefulness of a little short range V/STOL jet capable of flying not very far carrying not very much?

Interesting comment - which may say more about the holiday you are having than the actual aeroplane.

The very first GR1s that entered service in April 1969 had a spec requirement for an unrefuelled ferry range of 2000nm. This was demonstrated. When it came to delivering prod aircraft to Gutersloh from Dunsfold in the early 70s with the original engine I used to go from a VTO for no better reason than one could. BTW at that time HSA were paid £750k per copy. Remarkable really when you think it was also the first RAF aircraft with an INAS, moving map and HUD.

The wing gave us trouble in that the spec called for 6g at 10,000ft 16,800lb and 400kt. We could only manage 5 unless we put the nozzles down when it was easy to reach the 6. However the Dunsfold pilots ever thinking of their mates said that was cheating, So they insisted the wing was dressed and modded to achieve the extra g. Which was done.

Since over the years more than 800 airframes were delivered to 6 countries and 7 air arms I guess some people checked the facts. When it came to the final big donk which was flat rated to an OAT of 50degC (!) I simply could not believe the changes from the 1964 low thrust 1hr life (nozzles down) 25hr life (nozzles aft) engine that I had started on.

As it happens some recent Flight International correspondence refers to Harrier myths that would not go away despite being quite incorrect.

[longer ron]

The Spey was ordered to provide jobs in the UK.


The carrier connection was that the Speys were supposed to help cope with our (relatively) small carriers...the US ones were a wee bit larger !

[alwayslookingup]

Pittsextra, Post #31

"One wonders how far requirements changed or indeed if at that time anyone thought that they even might?"

When we get tired of this thread re 1968 how about re-mustering it for 1986, the first time I saw mention in the press about a new Eurofighter thingy?

In light of world events since the late 80s, what would we have done differently then? (Probably most of the above comments would suffice).

[BEagle]

I simply could not believe the changes from the 1964 low thrust 1hr life (nozzles down) 25hr life (nozzles aft) engine that I had started on.

Indeed, it's amazing how things developed over almost 50 years! Perhaps TSR2 and Rotodyne would have seen equally significant development given the benefit of time?

Sorry for having been being rather intemperate in some earlier posts, but myths about many cancelled UK aircraft programmes cannot be left unchallenged.

And for the record, I consider the UK's premature scrapping of the Harrier GR9A and particularly the Sea Harrier F/A2 (with AIM-120 and Link16) to have been scandalous.

[Pittsextra]

"One wonders how far requirements changed or indeed if at that time anyone thought that they even might?"

When we get tired of this thread re 1968 how about re-mustering it for 1986, the first time I saw mention in the press about a new Eurofighter thingy?

In light of world events since the late 80s, what would we have done differently then? (Probably most of the above comments would suffice).

Well maybe except that the Eurofighter is at least home grown and i'm not sure we scrapped an alternative Brit type in order to get it.... So aside from all that... Actually that question of mind came from a royal aeronautical society lecture by David Gibbings who - amoungst other things - was reflecting upon the EH101 helicopter project.

Cutting a long story short it was a concept that was borne out of an anti-submarine requirement in the 1970's, a threat which had arguably passed by its inception. That and the rapid rate of development in electronics and you have things that are a little long in the tooth before they are ever brought into service.

Upon reflection one wonders if that may have been the case with TSR2, given the all things to all men type role - although it is 1968 and I imagine unable to be rekindled by this time?

edited to add quote

[SOSL]

Good point Lron,

Ark Royal (No. 4) was about 300 ft shorter than Nimitz, say, but Ark Royal was constructed with an angled flight deck before the spams caught on.

Nonetheless the Spey in the F4 was still ordered to provide jobs in the UK.

That's not to detract from the performance of the Spey in other aircraft types and in its marine version. It was a ground breaking engine and still a workhorse around the globe.

Rgds SOS

[SOSL]

Eurofighter - homegrown?

Rgds SOS

[longer ron]

Hi SOSL
Yes I agree it was jobs for the boys to a certain extent,and I have often wondered if an american phantom would have been able to launch/bolter from our carriers...any comment from the boys in dark blue ??
You only have to look at the land on footage/bolters from the 'sailor' series to see how tiny our flight deck was :)

[Onceapilot]

Although the MRCA was later than the TSR2, and somewhat shorter legged, the overall result (IMO) was an excellent all weather tactical Strike/Attack platform, that has (several) war credentials to show for it. The decade or so delay from TSR2 allowed the Tornado to be a multinational project that benefited greatly from the dawn of the digital age and became an almost unimaginable step forward in IMC Strike/Attack capability. The answer to the question is, most things worked out well till 1990. The Tornado will go down in history as a great workhorse that we almost got by default.

OAP

[dat581]

Give HMS Eagle the same "Phantomisation" refit as HMS Ark Royal and restart the CVA01 project so both ships can be replaced with conventional carriers in the early eighties. No through deck cruisers.

[alibongo]

LR - John Eacott has posted pics before, they cross decked from the USS Kennedy:

Photos from Ark Royal (F4, Sea Vixen etc) - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums (http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=14097)

[AGS Man]

I would have ensured that Flt Lt Alan Pollocks Hunter was armed so instead of 3 protest circles of Parliament he could have just got shot of the Wilson politbureau with a couple of 500 pounders!

[John Botwood]

DBTW
rjtrt

One of the main reasons for the scrapping of TSR2 was the fact that Oz cancelled their order for the aircraft.

[esa-aardvark]

So, if you could could get hold of a 1968's time frame carrier,
say Ark Royal and some Phantoms & Bucaneers would they be (have been) any use in the recent Libya, Gulf1&2 or Falklands
conflicts (peacekeeping?). Of course not to forget the good old (new when I knew them) Gannet. Regards for the new year,John.

[SASless]

The USN had two EB-47E's for ECM duties and one B-47E for flight test of the engine that was to power the E-3 Viking.

The B-47 had a very interesting history and did some very dangerous work as a Recon aircraft.

Some wound up as Drones.

[Pittsextra]

Has the fact MI5 kept a file on Harold Wilson ever been investigated given it was Wilsons government that canned TSR2.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

One of the main reasons for the scrapping of TSR2 was the fact that Oz cancelled their order for the aircraft.

Because Mountbatten told them it was rubbish, and they could get three Bucks for the cost of each TSR2. With friends like that.....

[DBTW]

Thanks John B One of the main reasons for the scrapping of TSR2 was the fact that Oz cancelled their order for the aircraft.
Quite certain that cancellation did not force the UK out of the Commonwealth and into the Common Market though...

[RedhillPhil]

Hi SOSL
Yes I agree it was jobs for the boys to a certain extent,and I have often wondered if an american phantom would have been able to launch/bolter from our carriers...any comment from the boys in dark blue ??
You only have to look at the land on footage/bolters from the 'sailor' series to see how tiny our flight deck was :)

Voila! One U.S. Marine F-4B aboard H.M.S. Ark Royal. They'd been cross-decking with the Forrestal in the med. This one went U/s and was put in the hanger. It emerged with 892 squadron tail markings.




http://www.stormclimb.com/wp-content/plugins/hungred-image-fit/scripts/timthumb.php?src=http://www.stormclimb.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/US-f-4-phantom-british-markings-2.jpg&h=0&w=600&zc=1&q=100 (http://www.stormclimb.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/US-f-4-phantom-british-markings-2.jpg)

[longer ron]

Nice photo Phil :)
So I suppose my next logical question would be - could the US Phantoms operate from our carrier with any sort of useful load other than a belly tank ??

[Molemot]

If I may return to the reasons for cancellation of the TSR2...some years ago, Radio 4 broadcast a late night series called "The Benn Tapes", presented by Tony Benn who had kept a diary, and then taped records, every day during his time in office. He described the circumstances resulting in the cancellation of the TSR2; since one of my relatives had been involved in the mechanical design of the sideways looking camera for that aeroplane, I sat up and took notice of what TB was saying.

The gist of it was that the Treasury had told the Cabinet that the country was broke and needed to borrow money...(nothing's new, is it?) So an approach was made to what was then called the World Bank...who said they'd have to ask the Americans. The Americans, in their turn, said we could have the money...providing we cancelled Concorde (thus leaving the SST field open for the Boeing aircraft). However, the contracts between the UK and France were copper bottomed water tight and there was no chance of effective cancellation...this was because HM Government had wanted to guard against the French getting cold feet! Once the impossibility of cancelling Concorde had been admitted, then the fall back position was for TSR2 to be cancelled, leaving the F-111 unopposed, and this is what happened.

After explaining this, TB went on to say that the true tragedy was that UK plc was actually trading itself out of the mire unassisted, and the loan that the Treasury had said was essential was never needed.....so the cancellation was for nothing, in the end.

[RedhillPhil]

Nice photo Phil :)
So I suppose my next logical question would be - could the US Phantoms operate from our carrier with any sort of useful load other than a belly tank ??

U.S. F-4s could be launched with a typical F-4 load but.....only on the longer(200') waist cat.
Now, in an interesting piece of selling coals to Newcastle there was talk of McDonnell modifying the Phantom to be able to operate from the "Essex" class ships. These were comparable in size to Ark Royal. The modification(s)?
Fit the F-4K's extendable nose leg and Speys. Talk was that this was to be designated F-4L. I think it was dropped because the F-14 and 15 were on the horizon.

[longer ron]

Thanks Phil...I think that would clarify to a certain extent the need to fit speys to our F4's,but dont worry I am aware of the politics of procurement :)

rgds LR

[Heathrow Harry]

Molemot

I wouldn't believe much that Benn says now - he is as slithery as any politician and on a number of occasions his "evidence" is totally at variance with the facts

[Molemot]

Heathrow Harry...if you have any inside knowledge I would be interested to hear it! TB's explanation was succint and logical, with the original contemporary recordings he made. Of course, it could all be nonsense...but I can see no possible advantage to him if it were. The programme to which I refer is nothing he "says now"...it was a long time ago,but has stuck in the mind.

[ORAC]

Reference TSR 2, see here* (http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-17B-TSR2-with-Hindsight.pdf) pages 33-44, but especially 40-44.

As stated the TSR 2 was a Canberra light bomber replacement, not a strategic bomber replacement and, with the cost going through the roof and the pull back from east of Suez on the cards, cancellation was inevitable - as was the subsequent cancellation of the F-111.

* RAF Museum - "TSR2 with Hindsight". Edited by Air Vice-Marshal A F C Hunter CBE AFC DL

[LowObservable]

ORAC - Great link. I had only seen that document previously in print form for silly prices, and it is now on its electronic way to my iPad.

And some stuff about "digital Bucc" in this, from the same source...

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-27A-Seminar-Birth-of-Tornado.pdf

[TURIN]

Quite certain that cancellation did not force the UK out of the Commonwealth and into the Common Market though...

What???

I have a couple of drinks over Christmas and wake up out of the commonwealth. When did that happen?

[John Farley]

BEagle.

No problem. No sorry needed.

I have sent you a PM with some detailed info so as not to bore folk here.

JF

[CoffmanStarter]

So despite my "tongue in creek" post at #43 ... is there no vote for re-mustering the VR and equipping it properly :(

[BEagle]

JF, thanks - a gent as ever! Your PM made interesting reading and the point about specification writing was indeed very sound.

In my small area of providing a military aircraft system to a couple of customers, I insisted that we involved the end-users at an early stage, to ensure they received the system they needed. However, I also came across engineers who wouldn't listen to the voice of experience - a typical example being 3 functions being controlled by one 2-position push button. They wouldn't accept that this was silly, insisting that software would take care of 2 functions and only 1 alternative was needed. But we've since seen that the software doesn't always work as expected.......

They were the sort of engineers who, I'm sure, would be happy to fit a software controlled fire extinguisher....:\

Re. a couple of projects about which we disagree:

- ORAC's link to the TSR2 debate reveals Jimmy Dell's comment that initial climb angle (and hence body angle) was quite steep in order to remain below the undercarriage limiting speed. He raised no concerns about AoA and mentions that the aircraft handled well in the circuit and on the approach, concluding that, "as a flying machine, we did indeed have a world beater in our stable".

- Reading more about the Rotodyne, cancellation was due to lack of funding following problems with RR delivering the Tyne in time for contractual deadlines to be met. The RAF was diffident, considering that the Andover would be sufficient and BEA wouldn't commit without a military order. The prototype's noise problems had been overcome by the time of the Battersea demo flight and the production version promised even further reductions. There were no 'gearbox' issues; the aircraft did not have a main rotor gearbox by virtue of its tip-jet design and the cyclic/collective swashplate worked as advertised. I remain convinced that Rotodyne would have given the RAF vertical lift capabilities in excess of the Chinook some 20 years earlier - and civil flights between a wide range of small regional airports would have been possible.

I do agree about the AW681 though! As for P1154, it could not have been used from deployed sites in the same manner as the Harrier and PCB would have destroyed any 'natural' runway surface. In the end it wouldn't really have offered any significant advantage over a conventional second generation fighter-bomber, given that its V/STOL capabilities were becoming rather irrelevant. So the decision to go for Harrier at one end and F-4 at the other was undoubtedly correct at the time. Perhaps if P1121 'Hurricane 2' hadn't been killed by Duncan Sandys in 1958, the RAF wouldn't have needed to select the American design 10 years later?

[Haraka]

The prototype's noise problems had been overcome by the time of the Battersea demo flight


Apparently down to the level of a DC-8. Only you don't operate DC 8s out of city heliports.
Having said that Beags, given an Osprey length of gestation with better powerplants and lower structural weights..........

[BEagle]

Ah yes, the old DC-8 analogy. I'm not sure which aspect of DC-8 operation was used for comparison, but as you and I will recall from our university days, Haraka, the noise made by Heathrow-bound DC-8s, B-707s, VC10s and particularly Tridents even as far out as over Brompton Road was greater than the background traffic noise - but not so today!

The proof that noise was being dealt with satisfactorily came from the Battersea Heliport flights; zero complaints and only 2 calls from curious members of the public who wondered what was going on.

Derek Wood's Project Cancelled contains a number of significant errors about the Rotodyne; James Hamilton-Patterson's Empire of the Clouds also perpetuates the myth that Rotodyne was cancelled at the same time as TSR2, P1154 and AW681 rather than 3 years earlier......

Still, when the genpub are content to be deafened by the racket inside a London Underground train :( , yet whinge about the slightest noise made by an aircraft overflying the city, scientific noise measurement and silencer technology will always be defeated by rumours and false speculation....

It reminds me of the Concorde boom trials over the Irish Sea and off the coast of Cornwall. Some grumblers had decided that their local church would be damaged by the distant sonic booms. So the church was duly instrumented and observations made. As Concorde's distant boom was heard, the needles indeed twitched. "See, told you so!", claimed one of the agitators. Then someone slammed the church door....and the needles went to full scale deflexion....:hmm:

[ancientaviator62]

Was not the TSR2 liable to be unduly affected by side gust loads on LL flight as was the case with the USN Vigilante ? Perhaps someone with better information could elucidate.

[keesje]

Re: TRS2

I don't see much space to put fuel other then behind the cockpit. Probably there would have been many tankers all around and very efficient engines.

http://cdn-www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/middle/9/1/9/0979919.jpg


1968...what would you do differently?
Wait a few yrs for F15s / F14s ? With Spey's :E

[Milo Minderbinder]

You mean F14/F15 with Olympus 320s

[BEagle]

I don't see much space to put fuel other then behind the cockpit.

Internal fuel capacity was 25425 litres, of which roughly 80% was in the fuselage, with the other 20% in the wing. Additional fuel could be carried in under wing tanks or in a fuselage ferry tank.

[LowObservable]

After devouring ORAC's link yesterday and learning a lot about TSR2 that I did not know before, a few observations...

Cost was wildly underestimated, as with TFX and JSF. Paddy Hine, in his what-if musings about what might have been if the project continued, doubts that more than 100 would have been affordable, and that high-end estimates would have precluded the F-4K program.

The overruns were being under-reported (see Wilson's comments, p16 on) and the communications between MoA/S, MoD, prime, subs and direct-to-government suppliers were rife with suppression and misinformation. ACAS(OR) was ready to scrap the project before the Oct 64 election because costs were out of control.

The airframe and engine would probably have come good, eventually - but two requirements in particular (M=2.25 vs M=1.7, and STOL/grass field) were very expensive and had been imposed without a proper cost study. As one participant remarks, there was nobody in industry to say "you can't have that". (cough TFX JSF cough)

Avionics? This would make a fascinating comparison with F-111 experience, and to consider whether TSR2 was more equivalent to the original F-111A kit, the never-worked F-111D system or the compromise Mk IIB that the C/E/F all had. It sounds a bit like -111D in which case it would be a freaking nightmare. Also, as Simmons (p107 on) notes, the best accuracy in a low-level blind delivery was several hundred yards - so the concept depended on a sizable arsenal of kiloton bombs, which nobody was signing up for in 1964-65.

With a Pave Tack equivalent and a 1980s avionics modernization, it would have been different, but until then...

Technologically, a great deal was learned. From a requirements viewpoint, one result was a more balanced set of reqs for MRCA-75/Tornado, and even Typhoon. It's interesting that while the UK/Europe have had their difficulties, it is the US where death by compounded requirements has been the rule - B-1A, B-2, F-22 and JSF.

[Engines]

LO,

Your point about over-specification and compounded requirements is well made, but I'd respectfully suggest, having been very familiar with them, that JSF requirements were not as 'off beam' as those for F-22 and B-2.

The JORD/JIRD process used for JSF was exhaustive and ran for around three to four years, where any number of trade studies were conducted to ensure that the 'unguided requirement' scenario was less likely to arise.

The JSF programme's main problem, in my view (and others will differ) was a lack of systems engineering discipline in the early days after contract award, which led to requirements not being correctly 'decomposed' or flowed down into the design teams. The main reason for this (again my view) was an extremely optimistic schedule that put the designers under huge time pressure right from the start.

On top of that there was a lack of focus on weight (very regrettable on a powered lift aircraft, and another systems engineering failure) and an over-emphasis on manufacturing (which led in many cases to weight growth).

The other thing to remember about JSF/F-35 is that it is (quite rightly) being fully reported in an open press. Programmes such as F-22, Typhoon, B-2 and many others were quite successful in hiding their problems.

Please note that I'm not denying F-35 has problems and challenges. It does and they are significant. But a bit of perspective might help.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[ORAC]

Avionics? This would make a fascinating comparison with F-111 experience Yet another link for you LO. I think you'll download this to your iPad as well. ;)

See especially sections 3.6 and 3.8.

The BAC TSR2 – a historic overview from a personal perspective, by Ken Weaver (http://www.stevebroadbent.net/050a.pdf)

[Heathrow Harry]

We should have canceled TSR-2, bought off the shelf Phantoms with none of that nonsense about RR re-engining and forced the RAF to accept Buccaneers in 1968

That would have given us a workable, reasonably modern and effective airforce at relatively low cost

[keesje]

Stumbled over this picture. Do not know if it was really considered at the time.

http://i256.photobucket.com/albums/hh173/SPINNERS1961/WHAT%20IF%202010/RAFVIGILANTEGR1A01.jpg

Fully production ready, add Olympus engines, UK avionics..

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6b/RA-5C_Vigilante_RVAH-7_1979.jpg/770px-RA-5C_Vigilante_RVAH-7_1979.jpg

[Heathrow Harry]

one of the most beautiful planes ever built IMHO - but heavy on maintenance I believe

And for Gods sake get away from the "upgrade" with British kit - it always cost a fortune and rarely worked (see F-4K etc)

[BEagle]

The A-5 was designed for a very different application to the TSR2! With considerably more wing area than the latter (perhaps even enough for you, JF ;) ?), for maximum performance at extreme altitude (52 years ago, an early production aircraft attained 91446 ft with a 2200 lb payload....), its low level speed was restricted by structural limitations.

Bravely flown in Viet Nam flying hazardous recce missions, some 18 were lost in combat and more in operational accidents.

Not really a contender for GOR.339. Nice picture though.

[Engines]

Definitely a beautiful aircraft but.....

the Vigilante had a severe problem with releasing weapons from its 'interesting' weapons bay located lengthwise between the engines. Bombs were to be ejected aft out of the bay, attached to disposable fuel tanks. During trials, stores jammed half in and half out, stuck between the jet pipes, or the tanks burst (leading to one aircraft being lost). These problems were so insoluble that the attack variant never entered service, and the aircraft were converted to the RA-5 variant.

There were also problems with the avionics fit as well as the complex airframe and systems. It was, by all accounts, an extremely challenging aircraft to land back on to carriers.

Best Regards as ever to all

Engines

[Thud105]

I've often wondered what it would've been like for the crew of a TSR.2 blatting along very fast and very low in turbulent conditions. The cockpit seems to be a long way from the centre of pressure - I think it may have been like riding along on the front of a springboard.

[ORAC]

I have a print of a pair of TSR2 in RAF markings flying down a glen currently hanging on my sister's wall. Why, you might ask, on my sister's wall, when she has no great interest in aircraft?

A more familial connection. My father worked on the design of the TSR2 electrical generator system. Which, with yearly trips to Farnborough etc, is where interest in scary planes started....

[BEagle]

I've often wondered what it would've been like for the crew of a TSR.2 blatting along very fast and very low in turbulent conditions.

According to contemporary accounts, the ride quality was extremely good at high speed and low level - even under circumtances when the turbulence was sufficiently severe for the Lightning chase to pull out of low level!

[LowObservable]

Engines - Good points, but what I was thinking of was the original decision to build three versions around basically common requirements, with specific deltas on internal weapon size, range &c, and a common OML.

I don't think that the cost (in money and compromised performance) or risk of this approach were appreciated before 1996 - and at that point, all the CAIV in the world was only going to nibble at the ankles of the problem.

For instance, I don't think anyone thought that the JSF engine would weigh 1700 lb more than a brace of F414s, and be more expensive.

Now one might argue that the STOVL option is worth all this... but my point is that the cost was underestimated at the time.

And while the sacrifice of weight to manufacturabiliity in the 2002 design was there, the FW team had been firmly told to keep the cost down.

And the Viggie: fascinating machine, hated and feared by many including the pilots flying "escort" on a brute that would outrun them, leaving them to face the SA-2s that the NVs had aimed at the Viggie. Designed to launch at zero WOD, on the grounds that nuclear retailiation could not wait for the carrier to get moving.

And there was one version of the airplane on which the rear-ejected bomb worked well, as I can confirm from first-hand experience at the age of 8...

http://www.oldmodelkits.com/jpegs/Monogram%20PA53-98%20A3J%20Sld.JPG

[Pontius Navigator]

Also, as Simmons (p107 on) notes, the best accuracy in a low-level blind delivery was several hundred yards - so the concept depended on a sizable arsenal of kiloton bombs, which nobody was signing up for in 1964-65.

Actually they were. The WE177 was designed for the TSR2 amongst others with a maximum release speed of 1.05Mn. Given the yield of 450Kt even several hundred yards on an airfield type target was going to do considerable damage.

Target aiming was indeed truly blind unlike the V-bomber radars. The TSR would have employed SLAR and high accuracy surveyed fix points. This meant the aircraft would have had to enter designated fix boxes, the navigator could then compare the DR marker's designation of the fix point on the SLAR and apply the appropriate error correction. The fix would be late and tactical manoeuvre impossible given the need for the fix boxes.

You only have to look at a Soviet airfield to realise that you would need 2 or 3 precisely aimed nukes to really do the bizz. Given the accuracy the Vulcans were targeted on the target centre rather than any fancy aiming.

[walbut]

Since the Buccaneer and Phantom kept me gainfully employed from 1970 until they went out of service in the early 1990's I have been contemplating joining the discussion but seeing the post from PN above I could not resist starting with a fond memory.

Some years ago, Air Commodore Graham Pitchfork gave a very informative and entertaining presentation on his association with the Buccaneer to the Brough branch of the RAeSoc. Early in the presentation he was describing the intended primary role of the Buccaneer in attacking the Russian Sverdlov class cruisers. As he put it, 'we were not planning to blow a few holes in them with iron bombs, we were going to vaporize the buggers'

[Engines]

LO,

Thanks for coming back.

Yes, I agree that the decision to go for basically a common airframe drove an element of risk into the programme, but one of the aims of the JIRD/JORD process was to get sufficient convergence of the key performance requirements around a single engined single seat design. As I've posted before, it's my view that the Pentagon used STOVL to keep the aircraft single engined single seat to control costs. It's worth remembering that they were coming off the back of a series of major (and really costly) project failures involving large twin engined tactical strike aircraft.

There were a number of emerging technologies that were used to achieve the aim - these included a very high efficiency and very powerful engine, the F135. I can tell you that the engine has met its weight targets, cost I can't comment on as I don't have the figures to hand (GAO reports provide good data on this).

You are absolutely correct that the drive for manufacturability was driven by through life cost targets - but the problem was that LM failed to properly hoist in the fact that a powered lift aircraft cannot compromise on weight. Not ever. Not at all. Never. They had no excuse for getting their weight estimates wrong either, as BAe had offered (and briefed them) on all the lessons they'd learned on Harrier as well as Typhoon. These were pretty brusquely dismissed by LM.

At some time in the future, there's probably a good book to be written by insiders on the F-35 programme on what went right and what went wrong.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[John Farley]

Thanks BEages. Let's agree to disagree!

As to ride quality in turbulence given a cockpit on the end of a long nose IAM did some very interesting work on crew performance in these circumstances. Basically the human torso and arms when faced with heave type oscillatory inputs has a natural frequency of some 4 c/s. If the seat hits that forget any control or ability to do things. So you need to sort the structural modes out to avoid that area. Best of all if the CG is banged up and down the long nose experiences a sinusoidal type standing structural wave between the CG and the nose cone. So if you are clever you put the crew at a node and they don't feel a thing. I believe that the good ride of the Buccaneer was because this happened - albeit perhaps more by chance than design.

BEages will know more.

[mike rondot]

Dr Ivan Yates, who became TSR2 Chief Project Engineer at Warton, told me in recent conversation that the TSR2 wing was attached to the fuselage by "sprung bolts" to ease the problem of turbulence at low level and high IAS. In layman's terms that I could understand, the wing-to fuselage mounting was not rigid. Just one of the innovative design features of TSR2.

Here are some contemporary observations....

http://i1188.photobucket.com/albums/z409/5dilly/Cartoon4.jpg
http://i1188.photobucket.com/albums/z409/5dilly/Cartoon3.jpg
http://i1188.photobucket.com/albums/z409/5dilly/Cartoon2.jpg
http://i1188.photobucket.com/albums/z409/5dilly/Cartoon1.jpg

and a recent piccie

http://i1188.photobucket.com/albums/z409/5dilly/TSR2.jpg

[Rosevidney1]

"Making predictions is very difficult," the Danish physicist Niels Bohr was fond of saying, "especially about the future."

[BEagle]

BEages will know more.

Not me, although my limited time on the Bucc included very comfortable low level trips at up to 480 KIAS. The experts, such as Bruce C*****e summed it up by saying "You don't fly over hills, you fly through them. Then you look for someone to ram!".

Long moment arm movement nearly stopped the early XB-70 flights due to the large vertical motion experienced on the flight deck when taxying.

The nHz natural frequency has led to some nasty infrasound experiments. It was also thought that juddering through the steering of fat-tyred racing cars at around that frequency when cornering hard probably caused a few accidents in the 1960s; also, the spooks developed some infrasound devices using the beat frequency between 2 ghetto blaster speakers radiating sound at slightly different frequencies to 'inconvenience' rioters - and similar beat frequency devices have been built into binoculars to nobble race horses, I gather....:eek:

You could often see the node/antinode effect on AAR hoses as they were wound and trailed; fortunately there was usually sufficient damping to avoid any movement becoming divergent - although I've seen recent film of precisely that effect when a new generation tanker with a low inertia drogue encountered mild turbulence which was at just the 'wrong' frequency, causing significant excitation. Both to the drogue and to the tanker and receiver crews!

I also noticed some odd physiological effects when demonstrating stalling in the VC10K flight simulator as the motion rams simulated the vertical bounce motion just prior to stick push. You felt shortness of breath and difficulty in pattering to the student pilot if the regime was maintained for any length of time; however, all was well once the stick pusher operated. I don't think that it did the simulator motion system much good either!

[LowObservable]

It is also said that "Insanity is repeating the same actions and expecting different outcomes." (Apparently not by Einstein.)

Engines - "It's my view that the Pentagon used STOVL to keep the aircraft single engined single seat to control costs. It's worth remembering that they were coming off the back of a series of major (and really costly) project failures involving large twin engined tactical strike aircraft."

Interesting and possibly true, although I don't remember that from my association with the project in its formative years. What I heard from most people at the time was that the main weapon against cost - and against Augustine's "one tactical aircraft in 2054" theory - was commonality, and consequent high-rate production and unified support.

Of the pre-JSF projects, only A/F-X was a large twin-engine, two-seat aircraft and it was Navy-led. MRF looked bigger than an F-16 (range) but was not to be a two-seater. It was mainly the Navy who had to be talked into a single.

"At some time in the future, there's probably a good book to be written by insiders on the F-35 programme on what went right and what went wrong."

I hope it doesn't take 34 years...

[Engines]

LO,

Thanks once again for coming back.

The projects I'm referring to were A/F-X, NATF, MRF (yes, single seat, but a large and expensive twin engined design), AX, and not forgetting the A-12. I can confirm that around the time JAST was being developed as a programme, there was real concern in some US quarters that the DoD was becoming institutionally incapable of executing a tactical combat aircraft programme (their words, not mine). Yes, the Navy were really unhappy about going for a single engined design, but don't forget that the USAF had already driven through a large twin engined solution for F-22, and were happy to accept JSF as the 'low end' part of a future combo. In the event, they had to accept that the original '1000 aircraft' F-22 programme was simply unaffordable.

You are, as usual, right on target about the early years, when the JSF mantra was 'commonality and high production rates' - although many of us were less convinced about the need to build one aircraft a day as opposed to say. one every 48 hours.

It's absolutely true that the need to drive weight out (of all three variants, by the way) has reduced the amount of commonality in the airframe area. (Although they are still able to use 'cousin' parts that are machined from common billets and forgings).Where they have achieved commonality is in two major cost drivers - avionics and engines. That will work in their favour going forward.

As ever, best regards to those actually working their rear ends off to deliver the capability to the people out there doing the hard stuff,

Engines

[walbut]

Reverting to the original theme of the thread, I admit to having a vested interest in what might have been done differently. Back in the 1960's I suggest the RAF should have taken the Buccaneer about 5 years earlier, when various options were offered to the UK MoD. HSA should have been allowed to sell the anticipated Buccaneer Mk 50 follow on order to the SAAF. This might have encouraged other potential export customers to take the aircraft rather than be frightened off by the government's attitude to export weapons sales.

For information on the many potential Buccaneer variants see Roy Boot's book, but in summary they included inertial nav much earlier, terrain following radar, replacing the Blue Parrot attack radar, flat screen displays and a new HUD, internal guns, zero zero seats, 8 pylon wings, additional internal fuel, soft field bogie undercarriage, self starting APU, quick acting blow and even, towards the end of its life, a 'Wild Weasel' variant with the bomb bay stuffed with jamming equipment. An opportunity was probably missed when the engine rings were replaced after fatigue cracks were found emanating from some tapped holes where a bleed air duct passed through. If the replacement rings had been made with a bigger internal diameter it would have been possible to fit a 'large turbine' variant of the Spey and increased the thrust. There were even reheated variants suggested but I think by then the ideas were getting a bit silly.

We should have persisted with the proposals for bigger carriers which could have operated a mix of upgraded Buccaneers with the Phantom FG Mk 1 and would probably have prevented or drastically shortened the Falklands war. With a bigger RAF Buccaneer fleet, all the Phantom FGR 2 aircraft could have been dedicated to air defence rather than many starting life in a ground attack role. This would have helped defer some of the fatigue problems that beset the Phantom in later life.

With a bigger, more capable Buccaneer fleet in service with the RAF, our competitors on the other side of the Pennines could have skipped the Multi Racial Compromise Aircraft and moved, via fly by wire Jaguar and EAP to start a UK only Typhoon programme about 10 years sooner.

Moving from phantasy to the Phantom as some of the earlier posters have pointed out, there were several reasons for fitting the UK aircraft with Speys. The engineering reason was that the increased static thrust was required to permit the aircraft to operate at high all up weights from the smaller UK carriers. (Maybe that would not have been required if we had gone on and built the bigger ones?) The political reason was that it provided work for UK industry and there were lots of other areas where the aircraft were 'Anglicised.' If I remember correctly the rear fuselages were buit at Warton which must have been quite a challenging project at the time as its was a complicated titanium tiled, heat resisting structure. I believe that McDonnell Douglas anticipated many more Spey Phantom orders but none materialised so it must have been a very expensive development programme which I guess UK taxpayers funded.

Although the Spey had more static thrust and better SFC than the J79, the increased air mass flow and bigger intakes meant there was was more momentum drag as speed increased. In addition the reheat variable nozzle was quite a dirty design and the translating shroud and petals created a significant 'dead' area which caused a relatively large base drag penalty. There were proposals for uprated Spey 200 series engines with true convergent/divergent nozzles but they never materialised. However Rolls Royce did eventually allow the Chinese to licence build the engine - I wonder how many are still in service and what changes they made?

Its surprising how threads sometime drift off on a seemingly irrelevent tangent but then miraculously return to the original theme. Mention of low frequency vibration is a case in point. One of the early problems with the Phantom Spey was reheat buzz which was a low frequency, around 6 Hz, combustion instability. I think it was first seen during extended reheat runs during the early testing of the water cooled jet bast deflectors eventuially fitted to Ark Royal. People in close proximity to the aircraft just keeled over and collapsed on the floor as their innards were excited by the resonant frequency pressure waves. I can't remember what fixed it but I think there was some association with 'red standard' engines.

The FAA aircraft were fitted with fast reheat to improve their ability to bolt from the deck if they missed the arrester wires. This was not achieved with a catalytic igniter as suggested earlier as all the reheated Speys had that system. I can't remember all the details but one change was to ensure the throttle valve at the inlet to the reheat vapour core pump was held fully open whenever the engine was above 80% Nh. When reheat was selected, fuel rushed into the vapour core pump inlet as designed, but once the initial demand was satisfied the fuel in a long length of 3 inch pipe had accelerated up to high speed and suddenly had to slow down again. This generated a whopping water hammer pressure spike in the engine fuel feed system and began to damage all the flexible sections of pipework where braided bellows had been fitted to provide some installation compliance. This gave me some very interesting work for a few years and a particularly entertaining visit to RAF Leuchars.

I look back on my association with these two iconic aircraft with great affection and I learned a lot of valuable engineering lessons from my involvement. However with hindsight I have also come to realise just how risky aviation was in that era. When you look at the number of Buccaneer and Phantom aircraft and crews lost because of airframe structural failures or uncontained engine failures it brings home just how far military aircraft engineering has progressed. Whether that justifies todays astronomical costs is perhaps a subject for another discussion

[LowObservable]

Before taking this back to a JSF thread...

"Where they have achieved commonality is in two major cost drivers - avionics and engines."

The latter, we already had, with basically the same donk in F-16, F-15, F-14, U-2 and B-2. (And, nearly, F-18 and A-6F.)

Avionics could have been done - although most of the US had a bias towards an integrated approach, which was a hard way to go and has been somewhat overhauled by Moore's Law, which favors federated avionics: hence the Super Hornet's large bag of tricks today.

(Getting back on subject, it does seem the UK backed away from centralization after TSR.2.)

The final bit that would have made sense would have been a common tool-kit of subsystems, specs and standards, materials (including RAM) and processes.

And I would add "in hindsight" but I was saying that in 1998...

[LowObservable]

Walbut - Note all the comments about the Bucc's relative sloth in the big TSR2 history document, talking about a max low level speed of 0.85.

On the other hand, you're not going to sustain a speed much faster than that (.05-.10 Mach faster, tops) and the faster you go, the harder you're going to work to follow terrain. And the difference is more marked as you get into TA rather than pure TF. From talking to Rafale people, they seem to do low-level at 550 kt, which is about 0.85 on the deck.

However, it was really only the RN and the USN which managed to resist the lure of supersonic speed (Bucc, A-4 and A-6). Probably for the same reason - supersonic, A/G-payload and long range off a carrier could be done, but at vast cost and not in a very flexible manner.

Personal view: the Bucc could have done the RAF strike mission at least as well as the Tonka, which added a lot of complexity in order to cover the interceptor role (which eventually involved a lot of Sturm und Drang and massive redesign. Or did the 800 kt capability add a lot to the Tonka's capabilities? I am truly all ears and would be ready to be corrected.

(At least the RAF didn't try to make a low-level strategic bomber do 2.2, and then finally field the bu$$er in a configuration that was to all intents and purposes subsonic.)

[tornadoken]

(Could we pass lightly over ulterior motives {Wilson as Red stooge or worse; TPs with career agendas; Benn in any context}. In the Committee-haggles that decide such things as Defence/Procurement Policy, consensus emerges around a least worst option. No conspiracies).

So, it's January,1968 and Cabinet decides to let India, Malaysia &tc. face up to sovereign Defence Budgets. UK will do Luneberge Heide, Bodo, Akrotiri, SSBN, N.Atlantic, and bits of colonial baggage. Quite enough. Onway was a pile of good kit largely on fixed price/deferred terms from US. Overwhelming logic was to inter-operate (=mercenary crew) with US everywhere, and just add F-newest every few years to the never-never $ invoice. Some UK jobs in inventory ownership: repair much, make little (some licence build if quantities are there - say ATM), because Economics favour US volume. Put UK engineering industry someplace US can't catch us: say sensible autos.

What Healey/Wilson actually did was invest vast resources into UK Defence, favouring Aero. Chevaline, Jaguar, Tornado, 26 new to add to 65 ex-RN Buccs for RAF, Hawk, Seawolf, Rapier, a UK-solo NDB, 8xT.21 Amazon, DDG 14xT.42 Sheffield...and on...and on...all initiated/continued despite the Nation being broke. Before 1971 kids could leave school at 15 and most did: only in 1970 did Education at last overtake Defence's share of GDP (5.1% cf. 4.8%). They did all that because they knew quite as much about the Red Threat as did anyone, and they did their best to gird...affordably. That Threat went away in 1990 because Reds did not know how much was enough, and spent their regime to death.

I would have chopped Puma post-AFVG and bought whatever USArmy/Germany had. Leave the rest alone.

[typerated]

I think we should have made lots of Viggens at Warton ( I think they would have been gutless with Speys though, unless you squeezed in two!) and pretty much replaced the fast jet inventory with them

Helped out by a few sqns of new Buccs and taken a clue from the Germans with the Alpha jet and built a dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.

[longer ron]

dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.
This one do :):):)???


http://i695.photobucket.com/albums/vv316/volvosmoker/CompassswingHawk200Prototype-2.jpg

[typerated]

Pretty much - not sure it would have needed a radar though (in this role)

Surely something cheap and cheerful but that could be afforded in numbers for the last ditch CAS role if Ivan had drove across Germany.

Save the radar for AD - I imagine a handfull of radar equiped Hawks (as formation leaders) would have dramtically improved the usefulness of the trainer version in AD

[Dan Winterland]

What would I have done differently in 1968? Well, I probably wouldn't have believed my mate when he told me the toy parachute in his soldier's dressing up outfit was a real one and not jumped off the garage roof.

[keesje]

Quote:
I don't see much space to put fuel other then behind the cockpit.
Internal fuel capacity was 25425 litres, of which roughly 80% was in the fuselage, with the other 20% in the wing. Additional fuel could be carried in under wing tanks or in a fuselage ferry tank.

25000 litres for TRS2 sounds a lot, are you sure?

[ORAC]

TSR2: (http://www.targetlock.org.uk/tsr2/systems.html)

Structurally TSR.2 consisted of five main elements: two centre fuselage sections, the nose section housing the two crew in tandem, the tail section with the fin, and the complete wing. Since about 80% of the fuel was carried in the fuselage, the structure was designed as an integral tank, with fuel in the forward tanks extending aft from the equipment bay to a point between the air intakes, and with rear tanks built around the engine tunnels......

Aircraft empty weight was 54750 lb (24442kg). Take-off weight for an 1125 mile (1800km) sortie would have been about 96000lb (42800kg). Maximum take-off weight would have been about 102200lb (45625kg).......

Total internal fuel capacity was 5588 gallons. Extra fuel was available in the form of 450 gallon under-wing drop tanks, a 570 gallon tank in the weapons bay and a jettisonable ventral tank holding 1000 gallons under the fuselage. Production aircraft would have had an in-flight refuelling capability......

Rounded figures:

5588 Gal = 25400L
450 gal x2 = 4000L
570 Gal = 2600L
1000 Gal = 4500L

http://i30.photobucket.com/albums/c326/jvoc/tsr-2_zps41f1f60a.jpg

[RedhillPhil]

I think we should have made lots of Viggens at Warton ( I think they would have been gutless with Speys though, unless you squeezed in two!) and pretty much replaced the fast jet inventory with them

Helped out by a few sqns of new Buccs and taken a clue from the Germans with the Alpha jet and built a dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.

Just what we needed, another short range aircraft.:sad:

[CoffmanStarter]

I hope you all have your commemorative TSR2 bolt or rivet :(

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/85/TSR-2_bolts_on_sale_at_RAF_Museum_London.JPG

[vascodegama]

So just how would the Viggen range compare to Lightning or that other well known long range AC Jaguar??

[RedhillPhil]

So just how would the Viggen range compare to Lightning or that other well known long range AC Jaguar??

From what I've been able to ascertain the Viggen has the longer legs but - depending on the mission/load - it, like all, is variable. Centre line drop tanks always seemed to have been carried.
Damn fine aircraft though I've always thought.

[tornadoken]

#79, BEagle: Rotodyne. Funded not as a LCY downtown girl -economics would make no sense, but as upfront military inserter. We tussled with the legacy of Heavy Gliders and of paras excreting from Daks. Expensive, in every way. We had an on/off thought in 1953 of (free) C-119 Packets, then in 1957 contemplated DHC-4 Caribou...or Rotodyne. We chose to take SAL TwinPins. Rotodyne dribbled on a MoS Research budget where RAE's bright ideas sat, as yet unwanted by Requirors (V/STOL, jet flap, BLC by suction...those things). Hovercraft sat there too. By 1960, as Westland took over all UK rotors, big turboshaft helis were becoming credible (to be Chinook was in hand!) UK chose to put its money into turbine S.58 (to be Wessii), some, not much, into Belvedere as inducement to WAL to take Bristol Helicopter Divn. Rotodyne as orphan.

#52 SOSL: Spey into Phantom as dole. No. RN wanted out of P.1154 and told Ministers that Spey, and only Spey, could handle the bolter case on Ark Small. (It doesn't actually matter whether anyone here cares to contest that. Ministers accepted professional advice, remembering the very public loss of O/C of first Scimitar Squadron embarkation).

When P.1154(RAF) was chopped, RAF wanted 175 F-4D, bog (J79)-standard, offered at fixed price, fixed delivery, on credit. Roy Jenkins, MoA, turned that into 66 Harrier GR.1 and 116 F-4M/Spey: he knew TSR.2 was about to expire, and saw this package as means of preserving, not dole for some, but any industry at all.

[keesje]

Wiki, citing Burke 2010, says:

Costs continued to rise, which led to concerns at both company and government upper management levels, and the aircraft was also falling short of many of the requirements laid out in OR.343, such as takeoff distance and combat radius. As a cost-saving measure, a reduced specification was agreed upon, notably reductions in combat radius to 650 nmi (1,200 km), the top speed to Mach 1.75 and takeoff run up increased from 600 to 1,000 yards (550 to 910 m).

BTW Viggens mentioned proved to have excellent short field performance.
SAAB Viggen Quick Turnaround - YouTube

Wiki also says Viggens they had no problem locking SR71s.
Swedish JA 37 Viggen fighter pilots, using the predictable patterns of Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird routine flights over the Baltic Sea, managed to lock their radar on the SR-71 on numerous occasions. Despite heavy jamming from the SR-71, target illumination was maintained by feeding target location from ground-based radars to the fire-control computer in the Viggen. The most common site for the lock-on to occur was the thin stretch of international airspace between Öland and Gotland that the SR-71 used on the return flight. The Viggen is the only aircraft to this day to get a radar lock on the SR-71.[26]

The last statement is unlikely IMO. The huge FoxHound radars should also have had a good chance IMO..