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View Full Version : Tackling Engine Fire After Take Off in Multi Engine Heli


gnow
18th Dec 2012, 09:45
This must have been discussed many time before..just bear with me! Let us say we have bad luck and there is a No 1 Eng Fire warning just after rotation on take off from the rig. Normal Emergency operating procedures will be to continue the take off, get the Vtoss, Vy , climb and fly the established profile before handling the emergency. At what altitude would you do the fire drill bearing in mind that the take off brief is " No engines to be secured below 500 ft".
Many years ago the brief was "No engines to be secured below 500 ft except in the case of engine on fire where I will initiate the drill". This was modified to avoid speedy gonzales from securing the wrong engine (Think of a worst case scenerio...night, marginal weather, some turbulence and a BRAND NEW co pilot!)
One school of thought is that Fire is very serious so you have to contain it straight away. The other school of thought is this fire is an external fire so you still get power from the affected engine so make use of it first to avoid getting into deeper trouble. Both are right to a certain extent. What are your views on this subject?

Bravo73
18th Dec 2012, 10:01
If something is on fire, I don't want the fire to get any worse or to spread elsewhere. I would want to fight it ASAP.

Establish the aircraft in a safe OEI configuration (PF), fly the profile (PF) whilst the PM runs the engine fire drill. Good crew CRM and training (ie confirmation of which switch or handle is being pulled) should avoid the wrong engine being shut down.

bigglesbutler
18th Dec 2012, 10:04
"No engines to be secured below 500 ft except in the case of engine on fire where I will initiate the drill"

That's what I do and it is what I am taught to do, fly the aircraft first whilst making sure full power is applied and look for positive rate of climb and airspeed.

Once I am climbing I ask the non handling to put their hand on SSL #1.

Look to confirm the correct SSL is being touched.

Ask for the SSL to be retarded to flight idle (or idle if its FADEC).

Retard and pause to confirm indications and the other engine is taking the load, THEN go through the remainder of the drill. Boost pumps, fuel shut off etc and fire the bottle.

Just my thoughts as I apply them to my flying.

Si

SASless
18th Dec 2012, 10:08
Do you have any idea of why the fire occurred?

In the history of helicopter aviation....how many simple engine fires have there ever been? By simple....I mean something like a fuel line leak that does not affect the Engine beyond causing a fire.

Commonsense would suggest the crew makes a decision based upon aircraft performance and any other factor that plays into the decision making process....and as soon as possible secure the Engine by means of the approved procedure.

That being said....are you sure the fire can be contained/extinguished by means of the approved procedure? What damage was caused by the fire? Has that damage harmed the aircraft to an extent continued flight is not a good idea?

Your question is way too limited.....beginning with the assumption you do in fact actually have a fire when you may only have a faulty sensing system.

I have had lots of Fire Lights illuminate....but have never had a Fire....and do not know anyone that has ever had a Fire. They are a bit uncommon unless something really ugly happens to the engine first.

Non-PC Plod
18th Dec 2012, 10:55
500 ft has probably been chosen becuase it is an easy figure to remember which will ensure that the aircraft has achieved a stabilised climb. However, it is still a bit of an arbitrary figure. If the aircraft is stabilised in the climb at Vy at 300 or 400 ft, I dont see any benefit in waiting till 500 before securing the engine.

mad_jock
18th Dec 2012, 11:25
Fixed wing pilot here.

The way we are trained is that even though the engine is on fire its still producing power so better to use the performance to get away from the ground and get some speed on then shut it down.

500ft is our nominal acceleration altitude away from V2 to Vyse this does vary with aircraft type and also local terrain performance.

Sorry to join in if I am not welcome I saw the thread on the main page and although we practise it in the sim etc and its interesting to see the way the rotary world deal with it.

gnow
18th Dec 2012, 11:38
Hi Mad Jock..you are most welcome to join here.I had actually discussed this with airline pilots from various airlines and what you say is true..Squeeze the available power and get some altitude before reacting to the fire. In fact most of the multi crew offshore flying CRM is tailored towards airline sort of flying. Gone are the days when the pilot's quick decision and actions are always correct. I have to go back to bush flying to enjoy that again!
Nowadays our machines are fitted with HOMS and whatever we do right from control movements to things that we don't know are recorded. The reason I put this thread up is in case the people drinking hot coffee while looking at the HOMS and doing post incident investigations point out.."Oh ...he reacted so fast and he was barely 350 ft when he pulled the eng back. Now what does our policy say?" !!!

gnow
18th Dec 2012, 11:46
SASless..I think you are right about the number of false fire warning to the actual fire warning incident in helicopters. Maybe based on this some one might have said "Lets get to 500 ft" before we react! I have personally know of two incidences where there was a Fire warning and they pulled the wrong engines. One was on a S 61 (military) many years ago and another was on a Bell 212(single pilot) at night. Both were fatal.

mad_jock
18th Dec 2012, 11:58
I must admit I was quite lucky and my intial type rating instructor was a bit of a star.

He gave a couple of us fresh meat FO's a couple of "sim calibration" sessions.

In these sessions we got to try the none SOP methods and pretty much proved that the SOP's were the best method of dealing with certain situations even though natural instinct said you either had to deal with it sooner or by a different method.

His training has proved invaluable over the years.

And to be honest I have had an injector pipe come loose on a garrett TP331. Fuel was pissing out of the hot section on shutdown big puddle of it at the bottom and loads of white vapour coming out of any vent it could find. Also had a hydralic pump "blow" and dump the whole of the hydralic tank into the hot section as well. Don't know if I was just lucky but no fire.

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2012, 12:58
With a fire warning it is unfortnuately very difficult to work out whether it is a false warning, how severe it is etc. Therefore I am of the opinion that a "solid" fire warning (as opposed to an intermittent one which, by its nature is most probably a false warning) should be dealt with immediately. If you wait until something else goes visibly wrong in the cockpt, it may well be too late.

To mad-jock I would say that perhaps things are slightly different for fixed wing for a few reasons such as the physical separation of one engine from the other, and from the wider distribution of flight-critical elements such as control runs. In a helicopter, if the firewall between the engine and the main transmission is breached by the fire, it can well take out all the hydraulics etc. So the first thing you would know, apart from the fire warning, would be complete loss of control, upside down in a second and dead in 5.

Ultimately I think it would come down to how the aircraft was certified against the requirements for dealing with fire. There is probably some presumption in the certifcation rules that the pilot will carry out the fire drill within x seconds of the fire warning (where x is not very long!) and the airworthiness of the aircraft will be based around that. So if you delay, you are into uncharted territory and flying on a wing and a prayer.

Its true that false alarm rate exceeds the real fire rate by a large factor, and that shutting down an engine near the surface is a high-risk thing to do, however this is why we have 2 pilots and lots of training! In a modern heli such as the EC225, the pilot just has to press the GA button and then there is nothing left to do except the fire drill - the heli will be climbing and accelerating whether on one or two engines. Therefore whether the drill is carried out at 500' or straight away at say 150' seems to make little difference to me in terms of ensuring a safe flight path. However hanging on blazing away until 500' could be fatal (ask the pilots of Concorde!).

That is why in Bristow we teach "nothing shut down below 500' except in case of a fire..."

Edited to mention that the EC225 has a little trick up its sleeve which is that if for example you operate the training idle switch, the engine runs down to idle at the maximum rate (ie very quickly!). However, if you move the engine control switch to idle, the engine slows to idle much more gently over several seconds. Thus if on that bad day you do move the wrong switch, you get a second or so to change your mind before significant power is lost from that engine.

SASless
18th Dec 2012, 13:00
I hope Instructors, Captains, and Mentors have passed on the very most important Trait of a Pilot during Emergency Operations....."THINK!", "FLY THE AIRCRAFT", "NAVIGATE".....then One can deal with Emergencies, Checklists, and Procedures.


The example I use is Bell 212/412 Single Engine Failure.....shy of a Catastrophic Engine Failure (say a Powerturbine Wheel coming apart and sending shrapnel about the place...and starting a big fire)....if One did nothing but fly the aircraft and ignore all the switches and affected engine throttle....thus not making the mistake of shutting down the last remaining engine by mistake....what would it matter in reality.

Being Slaves to Procedure can kill you too!

Prime example of that was the American Airlines DC-10 crash at Chicago after the engine departed the wing. The Crew applied the procedure called for by their SOP....reduce airspeed to gain max rate of climb. Never mind it was a stark clear beautiful day and there were no obstacles in front of them that demanded the extra rate of climb that provided. They did not know the engine had taken out the leading edge devices on that side of the wing.....and that the aircraft would stall and roll over to that side because of that damage. Had they accepted the rate of climb they had...maintained their airspeed....they would be here today.

Never think the EP's cover all possibilities.

Two very Senior TRE/IRE's I know learned that lesson despite being told their SOP for Engine Problems after LDP did not do so. Fortunately it was a 212 Sim they crashed.

gnow
18th Dec 2012, 14:10
I thought when they design helicopters they are to follow a set of regulations in their design criteria that says something like this:

§ 29.861 Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts.
top

Each part of the structure, controls, and the rotor mechanism, and other parts essential to controlled landing and (for category A) flight that would be affected by powerplant fires must be isolated under §29.1191, or must be—

(a) For category A rotorcraft, fireproof; and

(b) For Category B rotorcraft, fireproof or protected so that they can perform their essential functions for at least 5 minutes under any foreseeable powerplant fire conditions.

So surely the helicopter MAY NOT fall out of the sky in the extra minute to climb to say 500 ft! But then again I believe some common sense may be the deciding factor to keep us alive. if I do smell smoke or burning or if the smoke has penetrated the cabin then I will not hesitate to apply the Fire Drill straight away. If the smoke is so thick and toxic that the pilots are likely to be intoxicated by continue flight (even though I have the speed and altitude) I may elect to ditch/ land immediately.

ShyTorque
18th Dec 2012, 15:01
Different circumstances demand different captaincy decisions. If it's just a fire warning light (!) it's probably less urgent that a big bang followed by a warning light.

As has already been stated, the most important priority is to fly the aircraft. Twenty five years ago I watched two pilots "kill" themselves due to incorrect diagnosis and actions following a fire warning in a twin engined helicopter. Thankfully this was only in the simulator!

I gave one a fire warning light (which was a spurious warning). The pilot, an overconfident ab initio, had just turned downwind. In his haste to carry out the full FRC Fire drills, without confirming anything, he lowered the lever far too much and then allowed the aircraft to fly him straight to the scene of the crash, still on the downwind leg. He was most most annoyed at me, his instructor, as he was convinced I'd failed both engines on him. I had done nothing except put on the fire warning light! I'd also taken the precaution of recording the whole thing (he was overconfident and tended to be "mouthy" in debriefs) and told him to sit back and watch the recording. He was astounded as the sim replicated his every move. Hopefully he learned his lesson; I'm sure he did because he went on to make Group Captain.

The second pilot was more worrying because he was more experienced. He was also prone to being far too rapid on the shutdown drills without correctly diagnosing the failure. Given a fire warning light on one engine, he closed down the wrong engine. Even worse, on a different sortie he shut down both when there was no need to do so. On that occasion he lowered the lever far too much for a single engine problem, watched the engines back off, and incorrectly assuming they had both failed, he went for the double engined emergency shutdown and failed to carry out a satisfactory EOL!

He was suitably debriefed and retrained. He later admitted that he had been criticised in his past for rushing emergency drills. Hopefully the sim training sorted him out once and for all. :ok:

Fareastdriver
18th Dec 2012, 15:33
That is why in Bristow we teach "nothing shut down below 500' except in case of a fire..."

....and it always has been that way....But at each stage; thottle closing; fuel shut off; there is a double check to assess whether the engine is actually on fire before you fire the bottle. When I started flying single jet fixed-wing aircraft engines disassembling on you was quite a common occurence and believe me you KNOW when a gas turbine catches fire.

I have had innumerable false fire warnings though I was never complacent enough to treat one automatically as a spurious warning but the overwhelming chances are that if there is a fire warning without any other signs of distress from the associated engine the worse thing you can have is a gas leak.

I had young 1st officer having kittens because we had had a fire light come on just after take off and I had just throttled the engine back whilst returning to the airfield. No point in having no engines if the other one decides to take a walk.

Years ago the RAF operated the Meteor as an advanced trainer. There was carnage because of the procedure of practising single engine recoveries with one engine shut down. If they had just ignored the possibility and told any pilot to bail out if he had an engine stop they could have saved hundreds of lives.

As previous posters have pointed out. Why construct your own crash when with a little bit of thought it's an incident.

ShyTorque
18th Dec 2012, 15:50
The most frightening engine fire warning I had was just after lift off after a rotors running refuel, where some fuel had overflowed, when it could be argued that a fire is more likely than at other times. It also the first sortie of the years after a long Christmas break; just what you don't need on your first day back.

I landed on with both engines running, shut both down then rapidly diagnosed that there was no actual fire at all, so we also saved the fire bottle (we only had one bottle between two engines, typical MOD cost-cutting :rolleyes: ). The nut and washers securing the wiring to an engine bay fire detector (bi-metallic strip type) had come off. The wiring had dropped down and earthed out, putting on the FIRE light.

18th Dec 2012, 16:18
Check for positive signs of fire - if you only rely on the firewire then you do risk panicking for no reason. If you have mirrors, use them - if you have a crewman get him to check - if not put in a turn and look behind you for smoke.

I have seen the effect of a fuel line fire in a Lynx and it burns so fiercely that the aluminium of the airframe starts to melt - now if you want to climb to 500' and sort it out well fine but I would be looking for a quick circuit back to the rig in case it doesn't go out when I pull the T handle or-worst case setting up for a ditching.

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2012, 16:27
gnow, your quote from CS29 indicates that para 1191 can apply - ie the need for a firewall. 1191 doesn't give much info about what a firewall must be (maybe its in the AMC?) but surely the sorts of firewalls on helicopters are only superficially fireproof, and if the fire gets hot enough (and bearing in mind you are still pumping fuel into the area) I am sure it could eventually melt, or certainly conduct enough heat to ignite something on the other side. I suspect that the presence of fire detection and protection is used as a means to comply with the rules, but that presumes they will actually be used in a timely manner.

SASless
18th Dec 2012, 16:29
If you only rely on the firewire...

Assuming something other than a SeaKing.....perhaps it might be a different system altogether....like an Infrared detection system that just loves some Sun Light shining through an opening on the fuselage or engine compartment.


Crab.....Landing a burning helicopter on an Oil Rig is NOT an option....ever! Likewise....if your bird is so damaged you need to land immediately....it is the Oggin you take it too....not a Rig.

NRDK
18th Dec 2012, 16:34
HeliComparator, are you deviating from EOP's in that one, with use of a training switch?...no good in the AW139, both engines are still going, it's just a 'pretend' shut down.

Agree with ' except in the case of a fire', (hence the confirm drills) couple up asap, when over the sea as long as you have a safe track/heading no point climbing to FL nosebleed as you may need to return to the surface if said fire isn't contained.

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2012, 17:17
NRDK - I think you have misunderstood my intent. I was in no way suggesting that the training idle switch should be used during a fire drill. Merely pointing out that the software has been designed to give a fairly gentle deceleration when IDLE (on engine control switch) is selected, rather than going for a max rate deceleration. This makes selecting idle on the wrong engine slightly less disasterous!

bigglesbutler
18th Dec 2012, 17:17
The original question was on rotation from a rig take off, hence normally no obstructions as the sea is relatively flat. Thus the priority SURELY must be to fly the aircraft (using automatics or mandraulic) then once going up fight the fire.

One thought about a hot gas leak, we pause at each movement of the SSL to confirm signs of fire and to diagnose if it is a hot gas leak. If the warning goes out at idle then likely a hot gas leak, but what now? A wise TRE suggested to me that a hot gas leak @ a couple of hundred degrees C can still cause a fire so shut it down anyway. I believe in his outlook and would rather recover one engine with much less fire hazards than to keep it going and risk further fire. This of course means you cannot restart the engine if it does indeed have a hot gas leak so it's time for a single engine landing. Not your day if that all becomes a problem.

Si

Fareastdriver
18th Dec 2012, 17:33
A wise TRE suggested to me that a hot gas leak @ a couple of hundred degrees C can still cause a fire so shut it down anyway

The problem with wise old TREs is that they are not going to be on your aeroplane if whatever you talking about happens.

NRDK
18th Dec 2012, 17:47
Edited to mention that the EC225 has a little trick up its sleeve which is that if for example you operate the training idle switch, the engine runs down to idle at the maximum rate (ie very quickly!). However, if you move the engine control switch to idle, the engine slows to idle much more gently over several seconds. Thus if on that bad day you do move the wrong switch, you get a second or so to change your mind before significant power is lost from that engine.

Why mention the trick? Surely just sticking to the EOP drill is all that is required. I appreciate that TRE's 'discover' quite a few oddities here and there, but keeping us on the straight and level standard is the priority. After all, most of us are simple creatures hoping to get it right on the day (K.I.S.S) and not have one of these 'funnies' pop into our head during that OMG moment.:ok:

Collective Bias
18th Dec 2012, 17:48
I think Nick said regarding fire in another thread, a long time ago, that certification regulation for FAR 29 cat A demands each engine bay to withstand something like 1100 degrees C for 15 minutes. Shawn might know.

CB

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2012, 18:37
NRDK - Why not mention the trick? The point is that every little helps to make the HMI more error-tolerant. The more error tolerant a system is, the less of a "big deal" it is to carry related drills out near the surface.

If you imagine that "stick to the EOP" is all that is required from a manufacturer, you don't understand human nature, which is to err.

Sorry but if you suspect that this tiny piece of information will distract you during execution of an emergency drill, I don't think you should be flying.

Collective - so that is fine provided the temperature doesn't exceed 1100!

hillberg
18th Dec 2012, 19:05
Quick 180 turn, Look for smoke, If on fire LAND NOW. On the rig or in the sea, You have seconds, Seen an aircraft burn up in flight less than a minute, All dead, Better a controled landing now than having a smokin hole later.

Thomas coupling
18th Dec 2012, 19:06
I may have missed it but are there helos out there that DON't show which engine has the fire: T handles / associated fire wires/ lights?
This being the case (ie: ambiguity regarding which engine) I can understand a height climb whilst identifying the cause/source. BUT in helos which immediately indicate which engine is "on fire" why would any sane pilot climb away from the biggest fire extinguisher in the world?

Given that the a/c is designed to advertise which engine is affected, I would come off the rig at Vy and cruise at 50'/100' (day/night) whilst stabilising the fire. IF it couldnt be contained it would mean a very short trip into wind and a controlled ditching. Fires do give pilots a little time to sort their lives out, but a real (uncontained) one "probably" wouldn't allow you to get away with a climb to 500' and back again to sea level.

Something that occasionally goes unnoticed is a post shut down fire where T4/PTIT/outlet temp is rising. This is an internal fire and cannot normally be extinguished by onboard fire suppression systems as these are directed at the fire bay (external). The only way to deal with this is engine starter blow thru and hope it extinguishes the fire - or else you're back to uncontained fire.

mad_jock
18th Dec 2012, 19:56
What have you guys got in the hot section to burn?

Is the hydrualics and oil etc in there or is everything outside the fire wall and shut off valves block inlet/outlets?

NRDK
18th Dec 2012, 20:11
HC.
Come on now..as a wise TRE you should know that you shouldn’t belittle a pilot for sticking to EOP’s!..... err, that would be wrong, wouldn’t it?:rolleyes:

After TDP/Before LDP on a dark, poor viz night flight, Sticking to the manufacturers RFM procedures and Company SOP’s EOP’s and ECL drills is just what you should do. For the sake of standards and CRM. If you do and that still isn’t enough then so be it. If you don’t and it goes ‘Pete Tong’ then you’ll be hung out to dry if you survived.


I appreciate your lateral ideas as an experienced pilot and see where you are coming from. Having a good systems knowledge and ideas about how to tackle the subsequent what if scenarios is fine up ones sleeve. Just advocating a point for the sake of those lesser mortals hanging on the words of the wise.:ok:

TC..Has the right idea.

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2012, 20:37
NRDK - I have at no point suggested that SOPs / EOPs should not be adhered to. So I think you are finding argument where there is none.

My point had moved on slightly, and it was that thoughtful aircraft system design should consider being error-tolerant where possible, since humans are fallible. By having error tolerant system design and procedures, operating switches etc near the surface can become less of an issue.

If a manufacturer simply says "stick to the EOPs" without regard to how easy that is, and how error tolerant those EOPs are, it is failing in its duty to design good HMI. When it all goes wrong due to poor design and a pilot mistake, the bad manufacturer can then just blame "pilot error" and hope to get away with it, at least that's how it was in the olden, less intelligent, days.

I found it rather strange that you felt that any additional information over and above the bare minimum to carry out the drill, might cause you to malfunction. I am sure you didn't really mean that.

HeliComparator
18th Dec 2012, 20:44
mad-jock - each engine is in its own firewalled enclosure - apart from the cowlings of course, but I guess they are dispensible! However it you look at the nature of the firewalls, they never look that substantial to me, and just behind them is the main gearbox / flight control jacks and all hydraulic systems. Just underneath them is the passenger cabin.

Of course the firewall is to an approved standard, and will deal with the "standard" fire whatever that is, but trouble is the fire doesn't know what the standard is!

I recall a rotorbrake fire back in the early 80s, caused by carrying out a groundrun with the rotor brake on. The carbon brake disc became incandescent white, the caliper softened so the pistons popped out and sprayed hydraulic fluid over the white-hot brake disc. The resulting fire caused moulten titanium to drip into the cabin. Fortunately all this was on the ground, but the pilot knew nothing about it until he was walking away from the aircraft wondering why the rotor brake didn't work when he shut down, and what the smell and fuss was. (no transmission area fire detection in the UK reg AS332L).
Edited to add that the melting point of titanium is around 1650 deg C, so the 1100 deg C "standard" fire was clearly well exceeded.

Bravo73
18th Dec 2012, 20:58
Given that the a/c is designed to advertise which engine is affected, I would come off the rig at Vy and cruise at 50'/100' (day/night) whilst stabilising the fire. IF it couldnt be contained it would mean a very short trip into wind and a controlled ditching. Fires do give pilots a little time to sort their lives out, but a real (uncontained) one "probably" wouldn't allow you to get away with a climb to 500' and back again to sea level.


You haven't flown offshore, have you, TC?

soggyboxers
18th Dec 2012, 21:55
On 14 July 1982 (I remember it because it was Bastille Day :}), I was in a Bell 212 departing a drill ship 60 miles north of Port Said with 2 crew, 13 passengers, 35 degrees celsius and light wind and just as I had lowered the nose and committed to departure, the number one engine ran slowly down to idle followed by the fire T handle illuminating, my heart beat increasing in inverse proportion to the Nr decrease and the anal sphincter being put under some strain :}. My co-pilot immediately carried out the fire drill, pulling the T-handle, shutting down the engine and broadcasting a Mayday call whilst I was trying to fly away with the Nr somewhere around 82% decreasing, less than 20 knots and descending slightly through about 20 feet. At about this point the number 2 engine chip light illuminated, and the copilot assuming I was going to ditch, manually inflated the floats. Unfortunately as our Haskel booster was not working properly, the float bottle pressure was a bit low and the floats only partially inflated, but they did look very attractive fluttering in the breeze and made an already interesting day even more interesting :}. Just after this, the number 1 engine fire warning again illuminated and the one remaining shot was discharged into the engine bay. Luckily, this worked and I eventually managed to gain enough airspeed and Nr to climbed to 1000 feet, though I was unable to cruise at more than 60 knots, so the flight to Port Said, El Gamil airport left plenty of time to carry out the after take-off checks and 'subsequent actions', reflecting that the whole incident had been something out of Gerard Hoffnung's monologue, 'The Bricklayer's Story' :uhoh:. Heli-Onion kindly scrambled their Alouette 3 from El Gamil and we were relieved to hear the cheery voice of Guy who arrived to escort us in and assure us that there did not appear to be any major damage, though there was paint missing.

After safely landing, for some inexplicable reason, I slipped whilst disembarking and ended up sitting on my bruised bum on the taxi-way with lots of chalk dust from the floats on my trousers! One of our Newfie passengers produced a bottle of Seagram's VO and poured a large slug into my coffee to help revive my spirits :E. That evening, being Bastille Day I attended a party at the Forasol base manager's apartment, where after imbibing plenty of celebratory draughts of deliciously refreshing Cypriot Keo Othello red wine, then moving on to the slightly less refreshing Retsina and ouzo, our host revealed his tour de force; a case of French champagne, his sabre à champagne and educated us in the art of opening the bottles by sabrage :\ . It took me some days to recover my composure :}.

However, I digress. There was obvious fire damage to the aircraft, with paint having burnt off the engine and gearbox cowlings. It was subsequently discovered that the locking nut on the engine oil filler cap had sheared off its thread and the filler cap at some stage during the take off had come off. The lack of lubrication caused the engine to run down and shortly after, the oil on the outside of the combustion chamber must have reached its flash point. Evidently, although the first shot of the fire bottle had extinguished the initial fire, there was still enough oil to start a second fire.

I've always treated engine fire warnings seriously since then :). One excellent outcome was being presented with a beautiful engraved silver tankard tankard by Alan Bristow, which made the whole episode most worthwhile :cool:

gnow
18th Dec 2012, 23:46
I know this topic is going to be like a can of worms with each of us coming up with his own views and experiences. Now , if we are to write some thing in black and white in the company ops manual for EVERY PILOT to follow that is going to be very different. Some sort of figures has to come out. Most of the Cat A profile take offs ( at least for EC 225) calls for climb at V toss to 200 ft AGL then accelerate to Vy maybe I should say we proceed with the Fire Drill after 200 ft and above Vy might be a good idea.Of course very good CRM has to be displayed to prevent shutting down the wrong engine.
I did a very naughty thing at Helisim on the EC 225 sim recently. I asked for a Eng Fire emergency and did NOTHING about it while continuing with the other ex excises. Can anyone guess how long it took for the sim to crash?

newfieboy
19th Dec 2012, 03:14
Soggy,

Great story.......

One of our Newfie passengers produced a bottle of Seagram's VO and poured a large slug into my coffee to help revive my spirits ......

Mmmm.... Enroute through main base en route Newfieland and time off.....too funny but yep, typical Newfie, they haven't changed, I'm an honoury Brit Newfie ha ha....live in StJohns, love it......

212man
19th Dec 2012, 03:52
Can anyone guess how long it took for the sim to crash?

Last time I used the Helisim IOS, a fire on its own would not have caused a crash - but maybe it's changed? Regardless, real world fires can be very fierce and cause catastrophic damge very quickly, as this example shows:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/dft_avsafety_pdf_503163.pdf

I believe the MGB was collapsing through the roof within 3 minutes of the initial warning, but others here will be nearer the detailed facts I'm sure.

Swinging Spanner
19th Dec 2012, 04:48
Hi all,

as an engineer :8 I can appreciate all POV's from aircrew's regarding fires.

A visual aid would be of great help in these types of testing times for example.

I work with a fleet of AW139's and they all have a camera mounted on the verticle fin, so gives a great view looking forward from the tail and can be easily accessed via the displays in the cockpit. Would be a useful visual aid when presented with a fire warning.

I would think that from a commercial POV that this type of kit (which is a kit from the manufacturer) would possibly lower insurance premiums...and/or pay for themselves so to speak?

Just a thought.

HeliComparator
19th Dec 2012, 07:13
Gnow, I suggest that if you want to tie this down, you just require the airspeed to be above Vtoss before actioning the fire drill. If coming off a rig you clearly don't want to shut down the engine until you reach OEI climb speed, and getting to that speed and starting to climb is the critical flight period. After that, what difference does it make whether you are at 200 or 100'? The aircraft will be flying itself, and carrying out the fire drill on the wrong engine would be a disaster whether at 100 or 200'.

bigglesbutler
19th Dec 2012, 08:48
212man you are right the time elapsed was about 3 minutes as I recall also, scary and the crew did a good job to land on an MOD playing field thus allowing MOD police to instantly secure the area. Thankfully no one was playing at the time.

Si

212man
19th Dec 2012, 09:06
I work with a fleet of AW139's and they all have a camera mounted on the verticle fin

We fitted them to our S92s too - because of too many spurious fire warnings!!

Fortyodd2
19th Dec 2012, 09:37
Quote:
Originally Posted by Thomas coupling

Given that the a/c is designed to advertise which engine is affected, I would come off the rig at Vy and cruise at 50'/100' (day/night) whilst stabilising the fire. IF it couldnt be contained it would mean a very short trip into wind and a controlled ditching. Fires do give pilots a little time to sort their lives out, but a real (uncontained) one "probably" wouldn't allow you to get away with a climb to 500' and back again to sea level.

Bravo 73 wrote: "You haven't flown offshore, have you, TC? "
:eek:

Attention - all personnel within viewing distance to don helmets and get behind hard cover..................

mad_jock
19th Dec 2012, 09:42
Sounds like you offshore guys need to have a conference and bash this out properly.

Then get an industry standard.

bigglesbutler
19th Dec 2012, 10:03
Sounds like you offshore guys need to have a conference and bash this out properly.

Then get an industry standard.

I thought we had, and it was simply as I stated back on the first page with pauses to confirm fire indications. Bear in mind the majority of offshore pilots don't actually post on here.

Si

ShyTorque
19th Dec 2012, 10:12
I work with a fleet of AW139's and they all have a camera mounted on the verticle fin, so gives a great view looking forward from the tail and can be easily accessed via the displays in the cockpit. Would be a useful visual aid when presented with a fire warning.


The RAF's Puma HC1s had an interim mod in the late 70s/early 80s, to slightly extend the cold weather operating envelope. Rear view mirrors were fitted, which allowed us to look into the engine intakes for signs of ice.

When the Polyvalent intakes mod was fitted, the engineers began to remove the mirrors. We (the pilots) tried to retain them, because they were so useful. We could see down the whole sides of the aircraft and beyond the tail. The engineering answer was a resounding "No". Stupid, totally stupid. But there was seldom any squadron pilot input allowed in any engineering decision. :rolleyes:

Attila
19th Dec 2012, 11:59
For what it is worth, during my flying career, I suffered two indications of engine fire, both at opposite ends of the spectrum, one real and one spurious.

The first occurred when I was working in the Middle East, single pilot, flying a Bell 212. I had just departed an offshore platform and was levelling at 2500 ft when I heard a muffled thump from the rear of the aircraft. The CWP showed a chip light on the No 1 engine. I checked the instruments, saw that the No 1 ITT was a little warm, indicating 1200 degrees. I closed the No 1 throttle to flight idle, the ITT dropped to 1100 degrees, and as I looked at the No 1 Fire Warning light, guess what, it illuminated!!

I shut the engine down in accordance with the Bell flip cards, put out a Pan call and turned towards shore. As the fire was still showing after engine shutdown, I fired the first bottle. Some 45 seconds later, (yes, I started the stopwatch) it was still burning, so I commenced a descent and fired the second shot. About two minutes after that, still with a positive fire indication, I put out a Mayday call and landed on the water. The seven passengers were quite relieved as I shut everything down.

As I landed on the water, the Fire Warning was still illuminated and smoke was still coming from a hole in the top of the engine cowling.

Once the aircraft had been recovered back to base, and the engine stripped, it was found that something had gone through the free turbine blades. It actually looked like the blade of a circular saw.

The aircraft flew again some 6 months later.

The second incident happened when I was flying an S61N in the Falklands. I was the commander, my copilot was the Base Manager, the Loadmaster was the Base Senior Loadmaster and we had the Company General Manager onboard.

We were on west Falkland and had just departed from Hill Cove refuel site heading west. As we levelled at 1000 ft, the number 1 Fire warning illuminated. At that time, a new procedure was being introduced concerning the No 5 bearing failure and involved resetting a circuit breaker. It did not, at that time, indicate how many times you could reset the breaker. Legal jargon, I know. (This has now been amended)

We turned back to Mount Pleasant on east Falkland, looking for fire indications as we went, (there were none) and constantly resetting the CB. Once we had crossed Falkland Sound I told the P2 to close down the engine and put out a Pan call. Funny old thing, the Pan wasn't received until we could actually see MPA (Mount Pleasant Airfield).

After an uneventful landing, it was discovered that an electrical short had caused the problem.

Fareastdriver
19th Dec 2012, 13:21
Rear view mirrors were fitted, which allowed us to look into the engine intakes for signs of ice.

That was part of the 330J anti icing fit; instigated by me. When Bristow started using the 332L we ex 330J pilots complained because there were not any mirrors that we were used to. We were told to wind our necks in as this was a SUPER PUMA and a certain chairman's son had decreed that their weight was superfluous.

Doogle had a double engine failiure owing to the chip baskets icing up. One week later all the mirrors were on.

Fareastdriver
19th Dec 2012, 13:42
The most amusing spurious fire warning I had was a double fire warning on a Puma in Northern Ireland.

Early Pumas had ventilated engine cowlings with ribbed ventilators along the top to keep the engine bay temperature down. Some noddy had decreed that this would reduce the efficiency of the fire extinquishers so they were blanked off. The result off this was that the engine bay temperatures increased and in certain conditions, hovering or ground running downwind, the fire lights would come on.

This day I was operating in South Armagh with an aircraft that was very prone to this and I also had a VERY senior officer in the jump seat who was coming along to see how the chaps were getting on. I swung into the LZ at Crossmaglen and as usual it was a downwind approach and landing and as I landed both fire lights came on.

There then followed five minutes during the troop changeover when this senior officer was shouting at me because the fire lights were on and I was shouting at him to shut up because I already knew about it.

As soon as we got airborne and took off into wind both lights went out.

He didn't even say thank you when we got back to Aldergrove.

Thomas coupling
19th Dec 2012, 16:30
Fortyodd: A few years ago - yes maybe..........:E {how are you anyway}.

Bravo73: Now what information did you glean from my contribution, to reach that conclusion son?:=

76fan
19th Dec 2012, 17:33
Perhaps because the idea of "cruising" at 50-100 ft on a black wild North Sea winter night whilst dealing with an engine fire sounds a little naive?

19th Dec 2012, 18:31
Why? don't you have a height hold? If the fire doesn't go out and you have to ditch - better to do that quickly from 100' than all the way from 500'.

As a standard exercise I give an engine fire at 200' in the cruise (IMC or night) over the water so the pilot can trans down whilst dealing with the fire. If it goes out then trans up, if it doesn't you are in a perfect place to ditch from 50'. If you wait for the prescribed time (30 secs on the SK) after the second bottle goes in, it will still take you a further 20 secs to get the aircraft on the water, even from 50'.

Fareastdriver
19th Dec 2012, 19:04
I believe that historically the 500ft figure came from the fear of the second engine following the first. This was especially so when an engine fire was normally the result of an engine disintergrating. With two close coupled engines there was felt to be a good chance of the result being no engines because of collateral damage. 500 ft gave you the time to gather it together to make a reasonable engine off possible.

NRDK
19th Dec 2012, 19:15
With CRAB on that one, modern cabs with 'automatics' allow that option. It should be a regular training drill. SAR units practise it a lot and certainly discuss EOP drills often. O & G has the potential to draw from the 'low level' operators in their companies.

Thomas coupling
19th Dec 2012, 19:34
76fan: So now we are adding a "black wild winter night" to the equation, eh?
What happened to the rest of the majority of the year then?
Why don't you add water spouts/wind farms/gas carriers and hoar fog?

Perhaps Bravo, when he said "offshore" meant the taxi drivers route between rig and shore, no? Hands up, I've never worked the oil rigs as you know it.

I have however flown and instructed MCT techniques, conducted carrier ops at night for weeks on end between still calm mill pond no horizon and SS 10 storm force. Operated as SAR off newfie and the arctic. Flown the caribbean during water spout season. Oh, and flown NVD in the Norwegian Fjords.
So perhaps I am a little naive when it comes to fires and how to deal with them on heavies, LL over water - sorry.

Let me try to understand where people are coming from here: They experience a major engine bay warning. Statistically the evidence provides for the vast majority of fire warnings to be spurious. But, because we are professionals, we treat it for REAL. There are real jets of very hot gas running out of control just yards behind your head and inches above the pax.
In my experience there is very little or NO reason to identify the wrong engine during a fire warning (There may be helos out there that are poorly designed - please advise). Why then would you aggravate the situation by climbing to 500' or above whilst STILL trying to stabilise the fire????
By all means deal with the aftermath at height, but IF you can't put the fire out, why on God's earth would you climb and then decide: Ooops we have a permanent fire onboard, best we ditch???? You have just come from the safest place on earth: 70kts/100'.
Get real guys - think about this (for 2 seconds!).

[Does anyone out there (taking 76Fan's setting) think that conducting a DEF with fire, from 500' on a dark pitch black north sea night, result in a smooth safe landing - ermmm, :eek: I think you would ALL die violently. (even if you were into wind).
Naive eh.......................................................... .......

Fareastdriver
20th Dec 2012, 08:22
It is all very well quoting years of experience crawling about the waves all over the world but we are talking about commercial offshore operations. They continue the climb to height because it says so in the checklist. The pilots are paid to abide by the checklist and SOPs. The company that enploys them has an AOC because it has SOPs to cover forseeable emergencies. Last but not least; the aircraft is only INSURED if it is flown IAW the AOC.
Anything else; the captain is responsible.

20th Dec 2012, 08:24
Perhaps then the SOPs need a review?

76fan
20th Dec 2012, 12:33
TC.

Perhaps you have not yet realized that you are not the only one with worldwide flying "experience" and that some of us here may have actually had you as one of their students. I take it that you are not self-taught. Some of us have also done all or most of what you have done, perhaps more, and flown in times when we did not have autopilots but had to fly hands-on at all times. Your description of being a "taxi driver" between rig and shore indicates that you lack knowledge and experience in that field of operation......Okay laddie?

Bravo73
20th Dec 2012, 13:29
Oh, goody. I've been patronised by TC.:rolleyes:

Perhaps because the idea of "cruising" at 50-100 ft on a black wild North Sea winter night whilst dealing with an engine fire sounds a little naive?

I was just as intrigued about the comment about coming off the deck at Vy (ie 80kts). Now, maybe it was a typo, or maybe I was just reading it a bit too literally, but 80kts? Really? 8kts maybe, not 80kts. It's a helideck, not a bleeding runway.

If you pulled your stunt, apologies, 'profile' in the sim, I imagine that you would have a nice long de-brief with the TRI, followed by some re-training. If you did it for real, I imagine that the de-brief would probably come from your Chief Pilot and your Head of Training. Followed by some re-training. As FarEastDriver has so eloquently described, SOPs are there for a reason. What you suggest is some way outside what would be considered an SOP.

When I first read the comment, I thought that it would have been more likely to come from one of your arch-nemeses, nigelh or chopc*ck. But what it really did was to highlight either a) your (no doubt, considerable) age or b) your ignorance. From your subsequent post, it would appear to have been b).

20th Dec 2012, 15:09
I think TC was talking about getting to Vy after leaving the deck as you will need to establish a safe single engine condition before you T handle the one that is on fire.

So your TRE is happy that you slavishly follow your super SOP and that you leave the deck and immediately get the engine fire warning, climb to 500' (engine still burning) carry out the drills (engine still burning) use both bottles (engine still burning) and then decide to get down (in the dark) from 500 feet to ditch (engine still burning).

Frankly I would rather take the bollocking and get the aircraft in the water before the fire takes out the controls/hyds/TR drive but what do I know, I'm not an offshore pilot?

Fareastdriver
20th Dec 2012, 15:42
Crab. You have had a lot of flak over the years and generally I have, if not in posts because I am not a professional SAR pilot, but in thought, sympathised with your views and opinions. With respect; you know damned all about civil offshore helicopter operations apart from being an interested observer.

Perhaps then the SOPs need a review?

These SOPs have been in force for at least 45 years to my personal knowledge and have yet to be caught out in any situation.


As a standard exercise I give an engine fire at 200' in the cruise

How do you cruise at 200' when the helidecks you are traveling between are 200/250 AMSL?

you are in a perfect place to ditch from 50'. If you wait for the prescribed time (30 secs on the SK) after the second bottle goes in, it will still take you a further 20 secs to get the aircraft on the water, even from 50'.

What about the passengers? It is all very well you and TC talking about flogging about the oggin at 50' but you only have pingers or winch crew on board. You haven't got a fuselage packed with humanity that are already celebrating their trip home. Have you smelt the aftershave and deodorent? A military aircraft only does half it's T/Os at MAUW; an offshore helicopter does them ALL at MAUW and the first thing it goes for is VTOSS. That is secondary to any emergency. Should you have any emergency you still go into the climb profile because you need SPACE. Space to assess what is happening. Space to warn the passengers so they have time to zip up their suits and arrange there rebreathers. Space to allow the flotation gear to inflate properly so that it does turn you upside down by not being properly inflated. Space to orientate yourself and brief the other pilot so that there is the best chance of surviving. Trying to do it all from 50' will only end in tears.

Especially your bank manager's.

thechopper
20th Dec 2012, 15:55
Would love to get you all into a SIM and prove each of you right or wrong depending on my scenario. What a hoot. If I win the lottery, I 'll send out the invite. Just stay :cool: even if it involves FIRE; and have a nice X-MAS and no FIRE.

Hummingfrog
20th Dec 2012, 17:00
I do love it when experienced pilots put forward theories that are fine in their own little worlds but don't translate well across to another operations.

Let us think about how offshore operations are conducted. They are mostly to helidecks which are in the region of 200ft amsl. So Crabs cruising at 200ft is not a scenario that fits in with what happens offshore.

On takeoff the idea is to minimise the chance of a tailstrike should one engine fail therefore there is a SOP for each aircraft type which basically is a dynamic t/o which gives a ballistic profile should an engine stop - this clears the tail from the edge of the helideck. This profle entails high power settings which as the a/c accelerates give it a good rate of climb. The time taken for the a/c to reach 500ft is therefore very short so the SOP to reach 500ft is a good one.

Remember the SOP has to cover all weather scenarios from CAVOK to a dark and stormy night. So the non NS pilots ideas of descending to 50 - 100ft (TC) is dangerous. You are asking the HP to make a fairly major attitude/power change to start a descent towards the sea with the chance he misses his 50ft level off either through distraction - in Crab's words (engine still burning) or intertia because the a/c is going down too fast.

The a/c have autopilots with more and more sophistication but none has auto letdown as does the Seaking. The SOPs also have to cater for a wide variance in crew experience so that any Captain can fly with any copilot. NS operations are not like cosy SAR flights where you know the weaknesses of the 4 copilots you always fly with. On NS operations you may not have flown with a particular copilot for months but you need to know how he will react to any emergency.

We all know that having a burning airframe is potentially very dangerous but there is no point in putting a serviceable a/c in the water, endangering 19 pax who haven't a clue what is going on outside the warm cabin. They are not on intercom like a military crew who will be aware of the emergency from the very start so we also need time to brief them - remember some of the pax on the recent ETAP ditching thought they had landed normally until water started to come into the cabin.

So the climb to 500ft isn't as "dangerous" as Crab and TC try to make out

HF

Thomas coupling
20th Dec 2012, 17:49
76Fan, I take it that's your age then? Because that's how old you'd have to be to have taught me anything:p
Bravo and Fareast: C'mon guys, SOP's are an amalgamation of chief pilots thoughts and ideas gleaned from the rest of you coal face workers over years of experience. I have flown a fleet wide AOC for 14yrs and all our SOP's are through communal agreements throughout that fleet. What's more important is that they are revised and reviewed very frequently. For you to say they are SOP's therefore we must obey....is pathetic and shows how immature the industry is in this particular regard.
Secondly, I bet even your SOP's have clause that allows the Captain to extricate himself from said rules in the exigencies of safety. And flying all the way UP and then all the way back DOWN just because you think that the difference between bernoullis at 500' or 100/200' will give you "breathing space" is a fallacy. Does the helo in autopilot care or even know it's at 500' or lower? Of course not, so why climb? Granted, 50' is suicidal, but 100 or 200' dependent on ambient conditions most certainly should NOT be excluded.
[Perhaps the colder temp at 500' will put the fire out :D].

IF you gentlemen are old or bold or even both and have been in your industry for many years, shame on you that you have adhered unblinkered to 45yrs worth of SOP's without a second thought or challenge.

Am I really hearing that a wisened old bus driver will diengage brain and climb to 500' because it says so in a BOOK? Get a life guys.

Hummingfrog - A much more enlightening insight to your ops - thank you. I admit to being a little too hasty w.r.t. climbing from low to medium level (based on the OP's comments) now that I understand you are already close to said height from the start. That said, I stand by my comments about:
IF one is low level to start with, don't leave that level, simply to fight a fire.

[Let's not get into a pi**ing contest over offshore rig driving and real flying now.........]:eek:


Flexibility - sorts the men out from the statistics:hmm:

Fareastdriver
20th Dec 2012, 21:17
I have flown a fleet wide AOC for 14yrs

Get some time in. Most of the posters here from Aberdeen cannot remember 14 years ago. I can; it was the year that I officially retired from a North Sea company and I managed another eleven years flying contract for various companies in three different continents. However, forget the willie waving and ask yourself why the CAA and all three major offshore companies all have the same procedures in the event of an indicated engine fire. Despite the recent accident a couple of years ago which was a i/4,000,000 occurrence, despite the recent spate of ditchings, the North Sea helicopter has a superb safety record considering the number of hours and the stresses that their helicopters have to cope with. The UK military, or any miltary, cannot hold a candle against them when comparing peacetime accidents.

In the late 90s I was flying in China teaching Chinese pilots to operate to Western standards. Chinese aviation during that time was appalling. We had British CAA personnel who refused to fly in Chinese airliners. The stories going around were unbelievable; if an airliner crashed and there were no Westerners on board they just bulldozed over the hole, if an ATC bloke caused an accident they took him round the back and shot him. We Brits, Ozzys, Kiwis and Yanks in both the rotary and the fixed wing civil aviation world slowly brought them around to our way of thinking using our proven SOPs. Chinese aviation is now as safe as any aviation system in the world.

I do not know how much of the S61 is made of magnesium but a lot of the mystique in miltary circles is based on the speed at which Whirlwinds and Wessexs would evaporate if they caught fire. I can remember having to put a parachute on in order to do an air test involving climbing above 3,000 ft. because if it caught fire it would burn out before you could autorotate to the ground.

North Sea helicopters are not made like that any more. They are made out of alloy and steel and the designers look at it and think that if that bit catches fire what do you need to stop it going to that bit, and so on. Logic says that an engine will not run with an uncontrollable fire because the fire is burning the fuel that the engine is supposed to be using. Shut off the fuel, the fire stops. The days of helicopters catching fire and burning out in the air have gone. It is now an orderly progression through the checklist which will, and has been proved, controls the problem.

shame on you that you have adhered unblinkered to 45yrs worth of SOP's without a second thought or challenge.

I am stiil alive.

handysnaks
20th Dec 2012, 21:28
mad-jock - each engine is in its own firewalled enclosure - apart from the cowlings of course, but I guess they are dispensible! However it you look at the nature of the firewalls, they never look that substantial to me, and just behind them is the main gearbox / flight control jacks and all hydraulic systems. Just underneath them is the passenger cabin.

For what it's worth. I have had the unpleasant experience of seeing my pride and joy burnt to the ground:{ I did however derive a lot of confidence from the fact that the engine firewalls meant that the engine bays and engines were 'relatively intact'. If you saw the condition of the crew compartment post fire, close up as I did. You may have more confidence that an engine fire would be contained behind the firewall!! Isn't the theory, fly the aircraft then deal with the emergency? Remaining low level strikes me a bit as prioritising the emergency over flying the aircraft!!

https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSRfx9C_U4k8mXg-Dp3EY2p_xRi2GSiw1MZ5b9qKUYls6ctBllLSw

HeliComparator
20th Dec 2012, 22:00
What's more important is that they are revised and reviewed very frequently.

mmmh, not very "Standard" if they are revised very frequently, and presumably not very good for the same reason - I think it would be better to get them right 1st time, or certainly after perhaps 1 or 2 revisions. Frequently revised SOPs is nothing to be proud of.

For you to say they are SOP's therefore we must obey....is pathetic

So, not only are they changing all the time, but there is no inclination to apply them. Just remind me, what exactly does the acronym SOP stand for and what is their point?

Perhaps you could let us know which operator you have been flying for, so we can have a good laugh!

21st Dec 2012, 07:31
Never mind TC - it has been good sport just before Christmas and, as always on PPrune, educational:ok:

mad_jock
21st Dec 2012, 07:35
Sounds like they same issues the fixed wing pilots went through 15-20 years ago regarding SOP's.

In the west is pretty much a done deal now with most if not all now sold on the fact that SOP's are the way forward and to stick to them. Some of the SOP's it has even been admitted that they are not the best. But....

When you take into account the average pilot skills, fatigue, poor wx conditions etc etc it has been shown that the SOP has a more successful out come than the best technical solution.

I find this sort of thing very interesting but its hard to discuss it clinically because emotions get high and people focus on individual events and types and that deflects away from the core subject. There is also a huge difference between multicrew and single crew. Single crew experenced pilots have a different way of dealing with things which is quiet hard to break them away from. Hence some airlines preference for straight out of school pilots which they can mold with relative ease.

And yes it does take some sitting on your hands when a bus tie is clacking away waiting for your FO to get the QRH out to eventually work out that one of the generators is rubber ducked. But there is minimal chance of turning the wrong one off. The flight profile won't have changed and apart from a bit of clacking the punters in the back won't have a clue that anything has happened. Yes it could have been sorted on the first couple of clacks but such is life. That example wasn't meant to be condersending it was just the first one I thought off because it happened last week when I was line training an FO. All very exciting for the FO and he did very well. My main though was I wonder how much charge is in my kindle thats us grounded.

HeliComparator
21st Dec 2012, 10:42
mad-jock, yes I agree with all that although
That example was meant to be condersending was possibly a typo?

I wouldn't like you to think that the vast majority of N Sea Oil and Gas pilots share some of the views expressed by the old and bold (and in some cases, retired many years ago) dinosaurs. Whilst we may be slightly behind fixed-wing philosophy in a few areas, we are not that far behind and certainly SOPs and following the Emerg Checklist is the order of the day for all the 3 main operators, for the reasons you have mentioned.

mad_jock
21st Dec 2012, 11:06
Well it was meant to be "condescending"

And it was the trivial nature of the example that I didn't want you to feel I was preaching how to suck eggs with.

I had no doudt to be honest that would be the case in ABZ.

21st Dec 2012, 11:08
The days of helicopters catching fire and burning out in the air have gone. It is now an orderly progression through the checklist which will, and has been proved, controls the problem. no, they just fall out of the sky nowadays - so much for your implicit trust in the progress of helicopter engineering :{ And the S-92 in Newfoundland highlighted that checklists are not the answer to all problems either.

Whilst I accept that percentage-wise, the SOP and checklist mantra will work - why automatically accept that it will always be so - if you remove the pilot's ability to recognise and react to an unusual emergency, you might as well have a robot on board. I think I would still rather risk scaring the pax than running out of ideas and time just because the SOP says so.

HeliComparator
21st Dec 2012, 11:18
And the S-92 in Newfoundland highlighted that checklists are not the answer to all problems either.


??? I think you will find that it was failure to follow the checklist that lead to the uncontrolled water impact. Had the checklist been followed, a controlled ditching would have resulted which would most probably have been survivable even given the poor sea state. So your argument seems a bit of an own goal!

21st Dec 2012, 11:21
That opens up the discussion of why he failed to follow the checklist - ISTR it was to do with confusion over lack of oil temp increase (no oil left to give the sensor input) added to the belief he had a 30-min run dry. That doesn't prove that checklists are infallible (nor pilots, sadly).

HeliComparator
21st Dec 2012, 12:03
That doesn't prove that checklists are infallible

No, but it does prove that failing to follow the checklist when you think you know better can be a really bad idea.

Hummingfrog
21st Dec 2012, 14:23
HC 30 Crab 0 Crab to serve:E

HF

21st Dec 2012, 15:16
So let me get this straight - in every situation, regardless of the problem or scenario, following the checklist and SOP is the only option?

Thomas coupling
21st Dec 2012, 15:56
Helicomparator: don't be so simplistic/pedantic. You know what i mean when something is revised. Is it necessarily changed everytime it is revisited - of course not.
Have I said SOP's should not be followed - of course not. I did stress that in the exigencies of the service one is expected to be flexible, that is why some people are Captains and others make the coffee.
Here (in this thread) we have persons explaining that SOP's haven't changed for 45 yrs and then others explaining that modern helicopters have changed beyond recognition. If the latter is correct (and of course it is) then SOP's are at the very least out of step - QED. Eat your shorts:D
As we speak, SOP's are being changed for gearbox mals over inhospitable terrain. Don't tell me they will remain in their new format until 2057+
Hummingfrog: TC. 1, HC. 0.

Crab - I love it, especially with the rig drivers, most (certainly not all) who dream of breaking away from SOP's just for 5 minutes. And when no -one is looking, to actually fly the helicopter for real.

Happy Christmas to you all, fly safely (unless it says otherwise in your SOP [Santa Operating Procedure].;)

Hummingfrog
21st Dec 2012, 15:59
Crab

It is never the only option but it is the basis for what ever the Captain does. It is a framework that has been distilled over many thousands of hours of NS flying by hundreds of experienced NS pilots and believe it or not Crab it works!

There will always be "out of the box" scenarios that require experience to satisfactorily solve. You would, however be hard pressed to point to an offshore emergency that has ended badly due to someone slavishly following the SOPs/Checklist whilst HC has already shown you one which did when the checklist wasn't followed and erroneous technical information was used to justify that decision:(

I would, also, hazard a guess that every NS pilot has had a false fire warning but very few have had a real one. So SOPs help prevent a non-event becoming an event.

I am sure the RAF still has SOPs written in the Flying Order book and GASOs or what ever they are called nowadays. RAF checklists are also far more extensive than civilian ones - perhaps to prevent RAF pilots making an emergency situation worse by doing their own thing:{

HF

Hummingfrog
21st Dec 2012, 16:17
TC

You don't work for the Scottish Executive do you as they are quite happy to trot out rubbish as fact. Though they normally use 1 in 4 rather than most.

Crab - I love it, especially with the rig drivers, most (certainly not all) who dream of breaking away from SOP's just for 5 minutes. And when no -one is looking, to actually fly the helicopter for real.

That sentence hardly deserves a reply but I will bite. Responsible NS pilots don't dream of breaking away from SOPs - all we do is get the offshore workers to and from the rigs, in all weathers, as safely as we can. Then go home and look at our bank balance:ok:

If you are the sort of pilot who likes to do more than that then there are ways and means. I for instance take ATC Cadets on aerobatic flights (fixed wing;)) at the weekend, others glide.

I also don't think that HC has ever said that SOPs are cast in stone - of course they get revised as more information is discovered about our operations. However, most are pretty robust as they have been distilled from experience. When technical issues, aside from flight profile issues, come to light - as per the 225 gear shaft then Checklists/SOPs are modified fairly quickly.

HF

HeliComparator
21st Dec 2012, 17:14
crab, yes, where the scenario fits the checklist drill, it must be followed. But I agree that once in a blue moon there may be a scenario not previously thought of, not in the RFM and not in the EOPs and then yes, you are allowed to make it up as you go along.

This has happened a few times on our fleet due to the technical complexity of the 225 and the limited number of failure considered in the FMEA and hence in the RFM. In some cases it was handled very well, but in other cases very badly, which just goes to show that the more comprehensive the EOPs and SOPs are, the better.

You have to bear in mind that you military chappies were born with Raybans already attached, a square jaw and steely blue eyes with no sense of fear and cold live-or-die logic circuits for a brain. However us civilian chappies are less blessed, we fly along thinking about the necessary trip to Sainsburys to pick up toilet roll and milk on the way back home after the trip, rather than who we are going to shoot down next.

Horses for courses, we need SOPs, you don't need SOPs to shoot to kill, just an itchy trigger finger.....

21st Dec 2012, 17:15
HF - you seem you want to have your cake and eat it - either SOPs are the only options or There will always be "out of the box" scenarios that require experience to satisfactorily solve. - I would suggest that an engine fire that doesn't conveniently go out when you hit the fire button might come into that category.

Yes we have SOPs and FRCs but they are 'handrails, not handcuffs' to quote one senior examiner - Standard operating procedures are for Standard scenarios and if something unusual occurs (ie a fire not going out), being (potentially) IMC at 500' really isn't going to help either the pilot or the pax, regardless of what the SOP says.

Neither TC or myself are suggesting an 'off-piste' approach to normal ops, only to retain the flexibility and captaincy which, apparently, we have been trained for when something unusual happens.

RAF checklists are also far more extensive than civilian ones my FRCs are a small A5 document half an inch thick that fit in my flying suit leg pocket - if the 139 checklist is anything to go by, it is massive and very complex by comparison - as I understand it, you are required to have all the aircraft documents on board so you can refer to them in flight if necessary (again judging by the 139 that is a serious amount of paperwork to plough through in the air)

I would, also, hazard a guess that every NS pilot has had a false fire warning but very few have had a real one. So SOPs help prevent a non-event becoming an event hence my initial post on this subject which was 'check for positive signs of fire' not 'climb to 500' and consult the checklist'.

Thomas coupling
22nd Dec 2012, 12:20
Touche Crab.

Hummingfrog
22nd Dec 2012, 18:08
Crab

You must read people's post properly and not try and quote posters with what you think they said.

HF - you seem you want to have your cake and eat it - either SOPs are the only options

I never said SOPs were the ONLY option. In post 61 I described how we operate in the NS - it is not a the low level environment you are used to. In post 77 I said quite clearly

It is never the only option but it is the basis for what ever the Captain does


Below I quote the fire drill for a 365N2

ENGINE BAY FIRE IN FLIGHT

Indications: FIRE

1. Engine IDENTIFY
2. NG REDUCE TO ABOUT 85%
3. Airspeed REDUCE TOWARDS 80 KIAS
4. Signs Of Fire CHECK
5. Affected Engine Red Handle CLOSE
6. Affected Engine Yellow Handle CLOSE
7. Heating OFF
8. Affected Engine Boost Pumps OFF
9. First Fire Extinguisher OPERATE BELOW 80 KIAS
10. EXT RH or EXT LH CONFIRM ON
11. Radio MAYDAY CALL
If fire persists (1 minute after item 9):
9. Second Fire Extinguisher OPERATE
10. EXT RH or EXT LH CONFIRM ON
If fire warning persists and other signs of fire:
11. LAND IMMEDIATELY

If fire extinguished or warning persists but no other indications of fire:
12. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
If signs of fire subsequently appear:
13. LAND IMMEDIATELY



You will, I hope, see from the drill that after lifting off from a 200ft helideck you will be at 500ft by the time you complete the drill. I doubt any Captain would still climb past 500ft with an firelight on.

I look forward to TC scoring the reply;)

HF

Thomas coupling
22nd Dec 2012, 22:37
HF: My serve:
The FRC's would be used AFTER you had secured safe flight and NOT before. So everything on the checklist you showed is read when you are above SES and at a SAFE HEIGHT / HDG.
Then you tell the NFP to 'out cards'.

For some a/c a suspect fire is an immediate action and must be recalled from memory without reference to flip cards, I take it with your a/c you use FRC's.

To do this in my defence, I have now to be pedantic.(ie: pick the moment my fire light came on).

So:

ASSUME you have come off the rig in the climb and the fire caption illuminates shortly thereafter, I would 'hear' the SOP's calling, but I would LEVEL the a/c at whatever height I was at, at the time of the fire, establish min pwr speed and ensure ht/spd/hdg was appropriate before moving onto fighting the fire. I most certainly would NOT continue pulling power and climbing.

Obviously if the light came on minutes after t/o, I may well be at 500' by then and so, would level off to move onto the FRC's ASAP. Assuming the NFP was competent and capable of fighting the fire at this stage, I would fly the a/c down hill to a more appropriate height (how you do that in your a/c is your decision. But I would back up the descent with some sort of ht hold. I would be striving for around >200' to bring the FRC's to a conclusion before deciding what to do next.

New balls:)

212man
22nd Dec 2012, 22:53
If fire persists (1 minute after item9)

Interesting to see that. A few years ago (2001) I queried the EC155 programme test pilot (DG) about the period of 60 seconds between fire extinguisher discharges. He said it was the publication dept taking out of context the guidance given, and that the intent was to use the English expression "wait a minute" to suggest pausing for a while. Not literally 60 seconds!

23rd Dec 2012, 06:47
HF - how long do you think it will take you to land immediately from 500'?

You have got to set up a safe, single engined ditching and that will take time from 100' or 200' - significantly longer I think from 500', especially if you have gone IMC whilst following your SOP!

Sir Niall Dementia
23rd Dec 2012, 07:33
Another little joy about engine fire warnings, spurious ones tend to bring the light straight on, real ones it glows dimly and gets brighter. I used to fly one aircraft where the lights were on when you switched on the batteries and went out when you started the engines! (that was a very smoky old 355) IIRC the S61 system was a wire full of a really poisonous substance (cyanide?) which regularly gave false warnings if someone had been careless on the A check, the 332 had bi-metalic sensors which became weak with age, as for the 76 I can't remember, I had a few spurious warnings over the years until the day, on a go round, when there was a nasty high speed vibration, followed by a humungous bang and no 1 stopped. the fire warning took some time to come on, but needed both bottles, by that time we were at VTOSS, climbing nicely away from some very tall platforms, towards MSA and had loads of time to sort the problem. The P2 was able to confirm the fire in his mirror and we both said afterwards how much like a drill it had been.

If the warning had not gone out after the second bottle we would have gone into the water, which would have been hard work as the go-round had been caused by low clouds, poor viz. If we had held the height at 50-100' to sort the problem we would have been flying towards a lot of much higher structures, with one pilot concentrating on low flying while the other did the drills without much confimation from PF.

There was a long discussion in the crew room about this at the time and one guy was very aggressive in his opinion that the engine shut down drills should have been done before anything else. A couple of months later he flew into the hill west ABZ while executing a perfect engine shutdown and not flying the beast, luckily for him the TRE could re-set the sim and send him off again.

SOPs are for the protection of all, but certainly with that company a captain was allowed to deviate from them if he believed his actions were were the safer route.

SASless
23rd Dec 2012, 11:23
Why wait at all to fire the second bottle....surely if one is good...two are twice as good!

pilot and apprentice
23rd Dec 2012, 11:50
In my limited career as a TRE for a couple offshore operators, I tried to follow a simple set of rules for assessing the SOP/regulation adherance by propective captains:

1. Did he know the rule (SOP, etc)?
2. Did he know he broke it? And why?
3. Did he understand the consequences?

This long drawn out argument, that I have read with much interest, has highlighted the fact that it is impossible to write a regulation or SOP for every occassion. Hence, at some point, a pilot will need to use their judgement.

I would like to point out that not all over-water flights are in the North Sea, in a Sea King or a 225. Not all multi-engine a/c fly over water either. Even in that limited scope the environment can be much more unpredictable than most of the airline flying that so many seem to be aspiring to (airports don't move around for instance). Writing an SOP also must take into account who is going to be following it (skill, experience, language) as well as varying conditions.

I must admit that I have not been a pillar of SOP adherance over my flying career, but I have made it a point to know them intimately and to try very hard to research 'why' they were written the way they were, then to back them up with the Air Law and the RFM and anything else I could get my hands on.

They are a great tool for keeping both crew members (or more) on the same page and for getting a head start on solving a situation or problem. I also believe that when SOP's seem to be getting the way of the operation, rather than helping, we need to start asking pointed questions.

Bringing Cougar 491 up is a sore point with me. I see far too much armchair quarterbacking on Pprune by people who have either not been there, or fail to mentally put themselves there when they read the reports.

It isn't easy to make the decision to deliberately turn off the engine(s) or to write off a helicopter unless mentally well prepared for it in advance.

SASless
23rd Dec 2012, 12:04
Well said.

As to the Cougar crash.....as tragic as it was....it has proven to be beneficial in evoking a meaningful professional discussion about several topics and issues. The vast majority of folks here garnered some excellent input as a result of those discussions and if there is some good side to what happened....this may be it.

That event proves the wisdom of what you say about one shoe not fitting every foot and that when bad things happen....Pilots shall have to exercise their judgement and make decisions....oft times some very hard decisions and not have very much time to dwell upon them.

That is where good SOP's, excellent training, a good operational environment, and crew coordination combined with experience will hopefully lead to a good outcome.

When it does not, especially when it does not, then we need to very closely examine what happened, what went wrong, why it went wrong, and see if we can learn from that.

What is the real tragedy in these events is the price we pay to have something to study.....but then that makes the information that is gleaned all the more valuable as hopefully we do not have to pay for that particular bit of knowledge another time.

pilot and apprentice
23rd Dec 2012, 13:51
Also well said SAS,

Learning over judging.

As an aside, I think we have some friends in common.

Hummingfrog
23rd Dec 2012, 13:57
Again TC you have commented on what you think happens against what actually happens:ugh:

HF: My serve:
The FRC's would be used AFTER you had secured safe flight and NOT before. So everything on the checklist you showed is read when you are above SES and at a SAFE HEIGHT / HDG.
Then you tell the NFP to 'out cards'.

The following explanation should produce your willingness to concede the game;)

ITEMS 1 TO 11 on the checklist I quoted are from memory so no cards are used. There is also a caveat in the SOPs/checklist which says:-

NOTE: Engine or fuel controls should not be moved in flight below 200 feet agl or when the IAS is less than VY unless there are visual signs of fire (other than the FIRE warning). If rejecting before TDP, there are no PNF actions until the aircraft has come to a stop on the ground.

So while 500ft is generally used as a safe height to sort out an emergency, and avoid bumping into the many rigs there are in the NS it is not the height we start sorting out the emergency.

Crab

HF - how long do you think it will take you to land immediately from 500'?

You seem to have it in your head that we always climb to 500ft, not true see above as for time probably less than 1 min at say 700ft/min ROD, flare land on water!

SASLESS

Why wait at all to fire the second bottle....surely if one is good...two are twice as good

Not entirely true the a/c firebottles are certified to fill the void around the engine to such an extent as to deprive the fire of oxygen. The other firebottle used is the second engines so if you use that too quickly you are getting no benefit while depriving your self of fire cover on that engine.

I am now bored with explaining NS procedures to those who think they know how we operate TC + Crab. Off to start Xmas celebrations:ok:

Everybody have a safe Xmas and do follow the SOPs but above all be a CAPTAIN:ok:

HF

SASless
23rd Dec 2012, 15:34
We don't cruise at heights less than 500 feet AGL when things are low stress and normal. Why would we then do it during high stress situations?

Some have even advocated that during night and/or bad weather.

Have we lost sight of the basic rules of thumb we have generated over the many years we have been doing this helicopter flying stuff?

Are not Engine fires in somewhat the same category as Lightning Strikes in frequency of occurrence? Why add other risks unnecessarily?

Accelerate and climb to a safe height....fire both your bottles and then decide what to do then.

If 500 feet is considered minimum safe height during normal operations....why is lower than that safer during an emergency situation?

NRDK
23rd Dec 2012, 15:46
Great...after dealing with the first engine fire and using the 1st bottle. Gratuitous use of the second one if you feel so inclined won't be that bad.:ok:

SAVING it for the other engine is a waste of time....any problem in that one will see you earth bound just after the T handle is pulled and before your PNF gets a chance to fire the bottle:D

This will be the reason that Crab and certain other overwater low level operators like the idea of remaining low to deal with the emergency and then when satisfied all's well climbing if needed.

Get your TRE to give you a fire on the next SIM LPC/OPC after the TDP call offshore, tell him you want number 2 to give you a fire just after you fired bottle 1:}

pilot and apprentice
23rd Dec 2012, 18:02
A fairly standard system knowledge exercise. If one engine is shut down already and you want to fight a fire in the other (to buy a little time) without going into an auto, how do you do it?

I haven't been blessed with a new-fangled 92 or 225 endorsement, but it was a part of every sim trg session I've been on in the last couple decades. Good fun and makes the grey matter work a little harder.

SAS, I agree with everything except firing both bottles together (if that is what you meant). I'd keep the option of a second try in case #1 goes south.

mad_jock
11th Jan 2013, 12:10
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/504963-engine-fire-short-final.html

Just to show you that the fixed wing have the same problems.

Thank goodness there arn't more engine fires full stop!

SilsoeSid
11th Jan 2013, 12:43
Not a fire as such, but a cracking example of handling an emergency;

Boeing 757-200 from Thomsonfly at Ringway/Manchester Intl Airport by Simon Lowe - YouTube