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JustT
13th Dec 2012, 12:40
The Daily Echo are reporting live proceedings from Bournemouth Coroner's Court on the inquest into the death of Flt Lt Jon Egging. Link (http://www.bournemouthecho.co.uk/news/10105697.Jon_Egging_inquest_to_open_this_morning/).

fantom
13th Dec 2012, 12:52
Following the loss of Red 4 at BOH, the inquest has been told there was no evidence of mech failure and the probable cause was Jon Egging's loss of consciousness during the final break to land.

beardy
13th Dec 2012, 14:17
That is particularly sad, my heart grieves.

Temp Spike
13th Dec 2012, 15:41
How tremendously sad. Rest in peace young man.

Pure Pursuit
13th Dec 2012, 16:57
Sky ipad app has a picture of Sean Cunningham instead of Eggman...:ugh:

PAXboy
13th Dec 2012, 17:47
This is the BBC: BBC News - Red Arrows' Jon Egging 'almost passed out' before crash (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-20708693)

Duncan D'Sorderlee
13th Dec 2012, 18:51
LateArmLive,

Whilst I tend to agree with your sentiment, I'm not sure why you posted here.

Duncs:ok:

fantom
13th Dec 2012, 20:06
Duncan, I think Late may have reacted to a post which has been deleted.

LateArmLive
13th Dec 2012, 20:17
Fantom/Duncs, I was replying to a couple of now-deleted threads.

Maybe it was just me being oversensitive, but Eggman was a good wingman and a great friend to me. I'll go back and delete my flash :O

Duncan D'Sorderlee
13th Dec 2012, 21:30
Roger.

Duncs:ok:

FATTER GATOR
13th Dec 2012, 22:00
Desperately sad events. My heart goes out family, friends and my heart goes out to the team.

Keep doing what you do so well, it thrills me every time I see it.

The inquest must have been very hard for everyone. C L-S, much respect for holding it together during the hearing.

RIP Egg-man, RIP Sean

Eclat

212man
13th Dec 2012, 22:17
Just seen the BBC item. Is there a plausible explanation out there as to how one would experience G-LOC in a break to land, versus an aerobatic display?

orca
13th Dec 2012, 23:16
Your G tolerance will decrease with fatigue and as you dehydrate. It will also be affected by G onset rate, exposure time and the position of your head - it's possible to disturb or even close the carotid blood vessels looking over your shoulder for example. Whether or not you grey-out partially or completely will also be affected by how effective your Anti-G Straining Manoeuvre is and how timely it was.

So - not on the board and no idea what happened other than we lost a great bloke. But yes, it is more than plausible that one could A-LOC or G-LOC in a break to land having not been unduly affected by G during an aerobatic display.

RIP Egg man old chap.

Easy Street
13th Dec 2012, 23:50
The BBC report quotes 6.3G on the break. This would probably have been the highest G pulled during the sortie: Reds 1 to 5 fly a relatively benign G profile, at least by comparison to Reds 6 to 9. 6.3G is easily enough to cause some loss of consciousness if other aggravating factors are present.

Milo Minderbinder
13th Dec 2012, 23:58
I'm sorry to drag this thread down but....
looking at the link to the Daily Echo site, I cannot but help feel theres something fundamentally wrong in publishing a minute by minute account of the Coroners Court like that.
It just feels intrinsically disrespectful to me: its turning a serious issue, the investigation into a mans death, into a media circus masquerading as a public entertainment charade.
I've nothing against the facts being presented, but is a minute by minute "hot press" style of reporting appropriate to a case like this? I don't think so.

I have to say I don't know any of the people involved so I hope I'm not treading on any sensitivities, but to me the method of reporting, from the point of simple common decency, seems basically unsavoury.

Fox3WheresMyBanana
14th Dec 2012, 00:04
Agreed. 24 hour news mentality I fear. Doesn't matter what you say, as long as you're always saying something. We'll be right back after these messages.

500N
14th Dec 2012, 00:16
Milo

Agreed as well.

For me, he lost consciousness is good enough for the general media.

The rest can be covered by the BOI and any changes required
implemented by the service involved.

Trim Stab
14th Dec 2012, 13:39
Well luckily we live in a democracy, so information regarding our military services is in the public domain, except where there are clear operational reasons for it to be kept secret. This was not the case here, so the public have every right to know why one of the aircraft they pay for has crashed.

fantom
14th Dec 2012, 13:56
The BBC report quotes 6.3G on the break.

I heard that too but don't understand it. That sort of loading coming off the target is one thing but a break into the cct? I don't think so; I expect something has been lost in the translation unless something has changed.

BOAC?

Party Animal
14th Dec 2012, 14:01
Milo,

Very well put sir. I agree with you completely and I suspect 99% of the readers of this post do so too.

Trim Stab,

I doubt you will find anyone on here who disagrees with the public having the right to know. It is how the information is being conveyed that's the problem. Turning the whole thing into 'public entertainment' is indeed unsavoury, indecent and lacking in respect. I would say that about any individual in similar circumstances too and not just because it is a fellow officer.

cuefaye
14th Dec 2012, 14:15
Party Animal

Quite agree. Watching the item with some others in my local yesterday, the general comment was 'We didn't used to get all this information pushed out, and at such length, why so now? We don't need it, let him RIP'

The BBC lust for reporting of this nature predictably results in accuracy. One newsreader 'quoted' the possible cause as A-Lock, and said that "had the ground been about 30-odd feet lower, the pilot would have survived the crash". Awful.

If you insist on pandering to the likes of Trim Stab, BBC - then please do so with knowledge and accuracy.

Uncle Ginsters
14th Dec 2012, 14:15
Easy Street:
if other aggravating factors are present.

Has there been any formal mention of what these could have been in this case?

I fear the rumour-mill caused by recent 'Hot Poop' directives may indicate some of the lines of investigation, if nothing more...
RIP Fella.

Nigd3
14th Dec 2012, 14:18
Firstly Im sorry to hear that some of you lost a good friend and colleague.
I have always enjoyed seeing the Red Arrows during my life and they were partially responsible for me getting into the aviation world and then blowing 1000's learning to fly, albeit rotary wing.

I recently attended a conference on the NASA ACAT system that is now being fielded on the US F-16 fleet and is designed to prevent incidents such as these, along with other CFIT occurences.
I realise that the ACAT equipped aircraft requires an autopilot and FBW control system but do the guys here with military aerobatic flying experience believe this system would have helped, or is there some operational reason/s that would make it impractical?

green granite
14th Dec 2012, 14:23
You really are a load of hypocrites on here aren't you? One minute you're shouting that the press are a lot of incompetent :mad: that don't get their facts right, the next you're condemning them for giving you factual information from a PUBLIC inquest that anyone can go and watch. You cant have it both ways.

ASRAAM
14th Dec 2012, 14:30
Fantom
Whilst 6.3 g may not be the norm there are a number of reasons a pilot might use it on the break. Firstly perhaps because the Hawk is a very slick aircraft and it's difficult to bleed speed without loading it up, secondly because you may wish to adjust the spacing within the formation to ensure it looks pretty downwind and that the spacing is correct on finals.

It's also of course possible a pilot was shooting for less than that and hit wake from a preceding aircraft.

These are general comments and not intended to reflect upon the specific circumstances in Bournmouth

cuefaye
14th Dec 2012, 14:48
gg

Try digesting what I said

pulse1
14th Dec 2012, 15:01
I didn't think that I would ever speak for the media but I think that, in this case, the Echo, a local paper, was reflecting the considerable interest of the local community in this tragic event.

Bournemouth has had a long, close association with the Red Arrows ever since they have used the local airport as a base for displays in the South. They stay at local hotels and support many local charities. Supported by the Echo, the local community stepped up to ensure that John Egging will never be forgotten in this area. I think they could be forgiven a bit of excess reporting on this occasion.

green granite
14th Dec 2012, 15:17
Try digesting what I said

I did and spat it out as unpalatable censorship. I can appreciate your sensitivity, but the media is not there to just keep you informed, nor is it there to suppress information that might offend or upset people. It is there to keep everybody informed of what is happening which I thought the Beeb did quite objectively in this case, but as usual the thread settled down to the usual irate lambasting of press after only 15 posts which ended rational discussion.

BOAC
14th Dec 2012, 15:17
fantom - I really want to stay out of this thread and 'wait for the BoI' if you don't mind.

Regarding the 'Echo', yes, I find the minute by minute tracking a little distasteful and unnecessary although I am well aware of the relationship the team has with Bournemouth and the local interest there. .

fantom
14th Dec 2012, 15:40
Thanks ASRAAM.

BOAC, I was just about to delete you from my post - unfair to you - but you beat me to it. By the way, I thought the BoI had already taken place; didn't the Wg Cdr appear at the inquest?

BOAC
14th Dec 2012, 15:52
Yes - however somewhere in the 'Echo' someone says the 'release' date is not far away.

5 Forward 6 Back
14th Dec 2012, 16:28
Fantom et al,

Anyone who's flown the T1 will tell you that 6+G on the break from something of the order of 400kts isn't remotely uncommon. I don't think you ever pulled less than about 4.5G to slow it down, and if you were tightly-packed or wanted to slow down rapidly then 6 was the order of the day.

orca
14th Dec 2012, 16:33
Chaps,

I think we need to zoom out a little here.

We now, rightly or wrongly, live in an age where information (of all grades of accuracy) flies around the world via many media, at a speed, that we would not have recognised even 10 years ago.

We live in a world where, rightly or wrongly, people's primary instinct appears to first capture any incident of any gravitas on film or in a picture and then publish it to the web without a thought for how appropriate that might be or how sensitive or otherwise the timing is.

We no longer live in a world where the only source of information is an accident report on the crewroom coffee table.

In this specific instance we are discussing a tragedy that occurred not only in the public eye, but to a (much admired, desperately missed) colleague who lived in the public eye - being as he was a RAFAT pilot.

I'm not convinced we need some of the reporting we see as I think it is unnecessary and invasive. I don't really buy the argument that the tax payer bought the aeroplane so has a right to know what happened. After all - many of those that get the information do not pay taxes and the tax payers that bought that particular aeroplane are probably few and far between. And (key point) this is nothing to do with the festering aeroplane - it's about the hero who was driving the thing.

But we will drive ourselves into misery if we don't rise above it. I personally don't care if someone wants to make statements such as 'if the ground wasn't there he wouldn't have crashed'. I personally don't care which media outlets want to run a minute by minute account of what goes on in a coroner's court. I know that my aviation knowledge is at a sufficient level that no-one from any newspaper or website will be able to tell me anything I don't know. So I leave them alone. Likewise I have, and cherish, my own memories of Eggman - which will not be replaced by anything said, written or published about this tragedy.

I suggest we leave this as a sad symptom of the age we live in - and at the same time concentrate on the actual headline which is that those that need to know what happened on that awful day are a step closer to finding out. And if that brings the loved ones closure, or stops it happening again - well that's a good thing.

RIP Eggman, Fly safely everyone else.

LateArmLive
14th Dec 2012, 16:45
Well said orca.

Although I would suggest that those who "need" to know what happened on that awful day knew about 16 months ago.

RIP buddy.

5aday
14th Dec 2012, 17:12
Orca,
Nicely said,
Dave

CoffmanStarter
14th Dec 2012, 17:41
Very sad indeed ... we should also spare a thought for his courageous wife Emma.

cuefaye
14th Dec 2012, 19:33
Well put orca

Perhaps we should all let this rest?

Easy Street
16th Dec 2012, 09:57
Although I would suggest that those who "need" to know what happened on that awful day knew about 16 months ago. If that was the case, all those who currently fly high-performance aircraft would know. Sadly that is not true.

The vast majority of FJ aircrew (of my acquaintance, anyway) correctly 'guessed' G-LOC as the cause after seeing video footage of the accident, so in that sense LAL is right. However, the restricted internal distribution of interim SI reports (which has seemingly got tighter in the MAA era) means that aggravating factors continue to enter the rumour mill following the occasional release of a brief arse-covering note from the hierarchy (with no indication that it's related to any accident investigation, let alone a specific one). One such note was obviously linked to this accident, but what about the other seemingly un-prompted and utterly trivial pronouncements of recent months? In the absence of a joined-up report it's inevitable that the crew-room investigators will come up with additional 'causes' - and that's no way to run a safety system. If the rumours are correct, the aggravating factors have probably been brought together hundreds of times since the tragic loss of Eggman. I for one will be interested to see how the reviewing authorities square one of the rumoured aggravating factors against a long-standing RAF policy - enough said, as those on the inside will know what I'm on about.

hurn
18th Dec 2012, 15:15
The Service Inquiry report is now available to view here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/service-inquiry-report-into-the-accident-involving-red-arrows-hawk-t-mk1-xx179-on-20-august-2011

BOAC
18th Dec 2012, 17:02
Thanks hurn. Do we have any idea when the BoI into the inadvertent ejection is likely to publish?

Trim Stab
18th Dec 2012, 19:10
Trim Stab,

I doubt you will find anyone on here who disagrees with the public having the right to know. It is how the information is being conveyed that's the problem. Turning the whole thing into 'public entertainment' is indeed unsavoury, indecent and lacking in respect. I would say that about any individual in similar circumstances too and not just because it is a fellow officer.

Party Animal - I agree there is a need to balance the need for openness with the need for privacy for the family and friends. However, I think the balance is right here.

All inquests reveal a great deal about the individual and the circumstances leading to their death, much of which is uncomfortable reading for family and friends. It is not "public entertainment" as one facile poster put it - it is simply the result of us being lucky enough to live in an open and rigorous society where accidents are properly investigated.

overstress
19th Dec 2012, 09:08
Reading the BoI report, there are some references to loss of 'corporate knowledge', in other words, things had happened in the past and over time had been forgotten about. This tragic accident shows, I suppose, that just because things haven't happened for years and years, that doesn't mean that they will never happen again.

Sandy Parts
19th Dec 2012, 09:43
maybe something to do with the rush to put all our 'learnings' in e-format (where you have to know what you want to read about and where it is)? I know I learnt plenty of old lessons by browsing through hardcopy BOI and UI reports lying around the t-bar. Having a centralised, ordered, fast-access database of knowledge (ASIMS) is great but you don't see people browsing through it....

overstress
19th Dec 2012, 10:54
SP: - so there is no stack of reports in the coffee bar any more? Used to be required reading in the 80's and 90's.

Easy Street
19th Dec 2012, 11:21
The crash mags have made a "welcome" (if I can use that word) reappearance in the last year. They never truly disappeared, but a massive back-log built up - I think it was almost 3 years between issues, which I think can largely be ascribed to the continual churn between DASC / DARS / MAA and the length and complexity of SIs. Whatever blockage did exist has evidently become un-blocked because they are gradually catching up. It still seems to be a few months between SI report and crash mag, though, presumably because whichever SO3 gets the task of distilling the report has got a bazillion other things to do.

overstress
19th Dec 2012, 12:27
I think it was almost 3 years between issues

Individual accident reports were circulated as well - does that no longer happen?

Obviously by reading such reports the squadron pilot can add to his store of knowledge and hope to avoid or mitigate whatever the cause was from happening to him/her.

From reading the link to this enquiry, it also seems that the language of the civilian H&S culture has permeated the service - yet there is little priority to disseminate the vital info to the troops?

If a flight safety publication 'disappeared' for 3 years then how were aircrew getting their info in that time?

On the subject of G-LOCI was once G-LOCed by a colleague in a JP, I don't think we ever reported it, it was most disorientating. I was out for 30 seconds, when I came round I firstly had no idea I was in an aeroplane and it took quite a while before I could function again - please take it easy out there guys.

Easy Street
19th Dec 2012, 13:09
I was using the term 'issue' pejoratively there to match the phrase 'crash mag'. They are still issued as individual publications for each accident, although perhaps a little thinner now than in years gone by.

In the period where the publications were thin on the ground, there was a bit of communication down the flight safety chain with things like 'Feedback' - essentially brief summaries of incident reports. But it was all a mess, which is why (rightly) the decision to rebuild the IFS was eventually taken.

lightningmate
19th Dec 2012, 14:18
Please note this is 'lower case' lightningmate :ok:

An individual's recovery from GLOC can be very varied, both in characteristics and duration. Most will have seen video of people suffering GLOC whilst riding the Farnborough Centrifuge and will recall the extreme bodily 'twitching and jerking' that some people demonstrate during recovery. However, when pilots experience GLOC the critical factor is time taken after recovery to become fully aware of the situation and capable of responding correctly. This is the area where risk rises exponentially, particularly when close to something solid.

Some time ago, I reviewed a cockpit video that included a GLOC incident affecting the non-handling pilot; a Hawk with 2-up, luckily for the GLOC guy. The aircraft was operated up to +8Gz and the Guy in the front cockpit went to sleep. Some 5-10 secs after the manoeuvre was completed, the GLOC Guy come onto the intercom muttering 'what's happening etc, I nearly ejected!'. In excess of 3 mins later, the Guy confirmed he felt sufficiently recovered for the aircraft to be gently manoeuvred again.

Thankfully, I recover almost immediately and my brain is fully on-line at the same time - were it different, I would have been a charred mess in a German field!

So, 2 extremes of the human recovery duration spectrum following a GLOC.

lm

BOAC
19th Dec 2012, 14:28
Sad to say but the black/grey out appears to have been fairly short-lived, and it would appear he was in the process of recovering the aircraft at impact.

Anyone know what the 'normal' peak g on a 380kt team break would be and what Red 8 pulled? In my day the break was 'punchy' but not 'extreme' and tailored by later 'breakers' to follow the preceding and maintain spacing.

overstress
19th Dec 2012, 15:16
BOAC, have a look at the BoI (or whatever its called now) report by following the link in an earlier posting.

All that 'g' info is there, it very lengthy.

I had posted earlier (deleted) about the team not wearing g-suits except the synchro. This info was based on a ride I had with them in about 1996. Sometime after that they changed to wearing them as a result of a near g-loc experience in the break to land. This is mentioned in the report as well.

On my trip, my pilot, whom I knew well, specifically warned me that the most 'g' pulled would be on the break to land, he certainly snatched hard to over 6g. This was a struggle without a g-suit, and I was a current QFI on type at the time.

I suppose no matter what type you fly or in what role, 'corporate' experience can get lost. It helps if everything is written down, but even then things get omitted during revisions to manuals etc.

TyroPicard
19th Dec 2012, 19:15
Ibuprofen...
From the internet so treat with caution.
In general, ibuprofen also acts as a vasoconstrictor, having been shown to constrict coronary arteries and some other blood vessels mainly because it inhibits the vasodilating prostacyclin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prostacyclin) produced by cyclooxygenase 2 enzymesThe report mentions other side-effects of the drug, but not that one...

Easy Street
19th Dec 2012, 20:27
I'm no doc but I understand vasoconstriction to help g-tolerance by providing less room for blood to pool in the lower body. Long as these SI reports are, I wouldn't expect them to have listed all ibuprofen side-effects, just those that might have been a factor in this or another scenario.

Have flown several back-seat trips with RAFAT during pre-season training. It is still the case that pax do not wear g-suits, to avoid them inadvertantly fouling the flying controls. This makes for a challenging experience - and it wasn't the 6g display breaks that I found hardest, it was the 6.5g break to land (complete grey-out despite my best AGSM) and the sustained 4g turn that 8+9 pull at crowd rear whilst holding for what seemed like minutes while the synchro pair did their thing. Brutal!

baffman
19th Dec 2012, 20:45
The BBC lust for reporting of this nature predictably results in accuracy. One newsreader 'quoted' the possible cause as A-Lock... etc.

cuefaye, I appreciate it is SOP to blame the media and that your comment was made before the Service Inquiry report was released, but in fact the SI report does discuss A-LOC ('Almost' Loss of Consciousness) and I suspect that the same term would have been used at the inquest reported on.

RIP.

AR1
19th Dec 2012, 20:59
For what it's worth I understand why the local media would choose to have someone reporting live. It's a big story for them, which they have reported in a factual way and not sensationalised.
I felt that due respect was made to Mrs Egging and her trust work in Johns name was promoted. As unpalatable as the whole tragedy is to those of you who knew him, I feel they did a decent job.

TyroPicard
19th Dec 2012, 21:14
Easy Street
I'm no doc either but I would think that during a display natural vasodilation would be the normal state of affairs. And the wikiextract specifically mentions coronary arteries and "some other blood vessels".. not enough info...
TP

Dominator2
20th Dec 2012, 09:18
I have just read the Service Inquiry Report into Jon’s accident. There are a number of issues in the report that I, as a recently retired fighter pilot, find disturbing.
As most of us thought, the main cause was that, for some reason, Jon blacked out. That could have been due to a rapid onset of G. These days we want to call it G-LOC, A-LOC and other things but it is not something new to fighter aviation. Even in an F4 at 650 kts you could achieve a rapid onset and high peak G, ask some F4 navigators. The benefit we had years ago was we flew twice a day and operated our ac to their limits. The present day pilot is limited by rules and micro-management.
Over the past few years aircrew, and engineers, have been over whelmed in paper work. The total restructure of “Flight Safety” has generated an unmanageable amount of work. This has been to the detriment of Flight Safety. As I left the Service I observed double the number of FSOs on a station, non-of who ever left their office. Everywhere people were worrying about Risk Registers, ALARP, New Management System, and so the list goes on. No time to concentrate on the job in hand.
The change to all Order Books being electronic is fundamentally floored. The hierarchy have been told many times but they choose not to listen. Consequently, pilots are not conversant and familiar with extant regulations. Most of us did not deliberately break the rules but at least in the old days there was a book at the Ops Desk or in the Crew Room to refer to.
The majority of the Recommendations from the Inquiry are modern day “Staff Speak”. Operating fast jet aircraft is a risky business. Obviously you reduce the risk as much as possible but it must not reduce your mission effectiveness. If you partake in Extreme Sports you must accept the associated risk. One of the best ways to mitigate risk was to operate close to the limits on a regular basis. The other way is to not partake. I observe that a cash strapped, risk adverse Air Force has got it’s work cut out if it wishes to maintain the credibility built up over the past 90+ years.

Megaton
20th Dec 2012, 11:59
Dominator2

As a retired fighter pilot, you are much more qualified to comment on the substance of the inquiry than me but you are barking up the wrong tree with some of your comments. You may have flown twice a day in an F4 but each one of RAFAT's pilots was flying three times a day five days a week during winter work-up so I don't think lack of exposure to repeated high-g manoeuvring inflicted by defence cuts and micro-management is to blame (this time).

5 Forward 6 Back
20th Dec 2012, 16:47
Dominator,

Things aren't that bad! No-one's said that G-LOC is a new concept, and Ham Phisted's already pointed out that RAFAT fly 3 times a day and operate up to their limits on every sortie. I'm sure even the F4 force had some published limits and you were told to stay inside them?

I haven't been to a station with more than one full time FSO, and the sqn FSOs certainly did leave their offices! The introduction of things like risk registers were due to the issues surrounding XV230 and the subsequent stand-up of the MAA; which I'm sure most people think is a positive step. All my FSOs did a pretty good job of keeping us informed and operating within the rules, and even on a busy front line FJ squadron I didn't have any problems concentrating on the job in hand. I certainly didn't find rules or sticking to them got in the way of our training.

We also had paper copies of the vast majority of our books too. Aircrew manuals were still paper, and syllabi, orders books etc were managed by a sqn pubs officer who made sure any electronic updates were printed out and publicised. Frankly, most aircrew now are perfectly capable of logging on to a PC and finding the electronic copy of the FOB, GASOs, MAA documents, their platform training syllabus etc; we're not all flummoxed by the lack of a book plonked in front of us on the ops desk.

Every aircraft I've ever flown was operated up to and very occasionally beyond its published limits, and in some I even flew 2 or 3 times a day as well, supported by a pretty robust FS system that didn't generate any extra paperwork for me as an operator.

Dominator2
20th Dec 2012, 18:20
5 Forward 6 Back

I only made my observations as one who is now on the sideline and thus not directly involved any more. From your comments you appear to be defending a particular corner. You are obviously involved, may I suggest that you step back for a second. I am aware of two stations in Lincolnshire where 2 persons are fulltime employed in FS paperwork.
I fully accept that HC opened up a number of areas where we were not too good. I do, however, believe that the RAF has gone headlong in taking up the recommendations from HC in a belief that this will make all of the problems go away and make flying totally safe.
What is the point of electronic docs if each sqn is going to print it own "unregulated" documents. I have seen first hand a number of times how ammendments to electronic docs at Stn and Gp level have not been promulgated properly and aircrew have flown without being aware of a change in regulations.

SOSL
21st Dec 2012, 08:55
Dom...2.

" The change to all Order Books being electronic is fundamentally floored."

Was that a Freudian slip, or just too much polish?

5F6B

"supported by a pretty robust FS system that didn't generate any extra paperwork for me as an operator."

Then you weren't doing it properly. Any FS system requires feedback (e.g. reporting) which, of course, requires extra paperwork - it has been so since Pontius was on the OCU!

But, mostly, deep respect to Jon and his beautiful wife. What a wonderful example they both give to the young people of this country. They are truly heroes!

Rgds SOS

woptb
21st Dec 2012, 11:10
It’s been my recent experience that Flt. Crew ‘say’ they are already doing it (reporting) when they are only reporting compulsory incidents not the near misses and hazards. Had conversations with a number of individuals in 22 Gp who were “already doing it”.
Furthermore, there is reluctance by aircrew to ‘stick a head above the parapet’ and be held accountable for reporting anything that will get in the way of delivering ‘operational capability’.

Comments like ‘it will affect’ anything like ‘my career’ or ‘my next posting’ are being used to support reluctance to report violations for organisational-gain. It’s so sad when the evidence could be gained so easily. The ‘Dry your eyes princess’ culture, is still alive and well as evidenced by this report and (anecdotally) mine and others experiences. Some extracts from the report below;

• The cultural attitude to G, resulting in a false sense of security.
• Inadequate occurrence and fault reporting.

Hopefully something good will come out of this awful event. Accident reports are the worst way of learning lessons. If we speak up about the near misses and close calls and more importantly feel empowered to report them, we can reduce the chances of this happening again – before this hard lesson fades.

cuefaye
21st Dec 2012, 13:58
Baffman - thanks for that, I stand corrected.