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tartare
27th Nov 2012, 22:10
How dreadfully sad (http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10850442&ref=rss).
Worried about the expense of staying in a hotel, a decision was made to fly before dawn.
End result of a sequence of many events - a UH-1H crash and three deaths.
Makes you feel for the RNZAF - a group of professionals trying to do their best, but woefully under-resourced and under funded, even with the A109s and NH90s - when they are worried about overnight accommodation costs for their aircrews.

Arm out the window
27th Nov 2012, 22:57
Very sad, yes.

The part about there being no training manuals due to under-resourcing sounds a bit odd, though - what's the story there? Is the report implying that the people who should be managing and producing that stuff are too busy with tasking, or are there other factors in play?

It seems the authorisation process must have been ineffective in this case, too, if the bits about the inadequate training and qualifications of various crew are true.

I worked with Graham Lintott many moons ago and found him to be a good operator with a lot of cred and integrity (as per most of the 3 Sqn people at that det); it seems the organisation he was presiding over at the time of the accident has suffered a funding-induced decline, if that article's telling it properly.

If the situation is as bad as is alluded to, is it just money, or what?

tartare
27th Nov 2012, 23:19
I think you're right about lack of money - probably the root cause.
Have never met Lintott, but those I know speak highly of him.
There's a general perception in NZ that defence is a waste of money, because
the country is so far away it'll never be attacked and Australia is nearby, therefore there's long term lack of investment well below regional peers as a percentage of GDP, which inevitably leads to downgrading of operational capability and cost saving being a primary focus.
Without pointing the finger at anyone - it shows how bad things have become when three young guys die in part because someone was worried about a relatively small hotel bill.
They punch well above their weight with some pretty outdated equipment.

500N
27th Nov 2012, 23:22
I was told once that the NZDF only really has a DF (Navy, Air Force)
because of the huge area of sea / ocean / fisheries it has to patrol.

Everything else is irrelevant for the reasons you pointed out
although what they do they do well.

herkman
28th Nov 2012, 00:00
I am afraid it is not only New Zealand who has this penny pinching attitude.

Most Air forces are faced with the Bean Counter calling the shots in areas that they are not qualified and so safety takes a back seat. When things go wrong it is hard for a non bean counter like myself, to compare the saving made with the total loss of life and injury.

The armed forces is something the polies like to have but when are tight do not want to help save the situation by making an effort in regard to their own wants.

Australia has just gone through a defence cost saving exercise where we no longer can do the job that is expected. Whilst this situation is on the boil, our PM get another pay rise (the third I believe) but this time is to the tune of $90,000.

This nonsense will only stop when we are involved in a major conflict.

Regards

Col

Arm out the window
28th Nov 2012, 00:33
A lack of resources is one thing, but I guess what I'm getting at is that the article implies (or so it seems) a drop in standards, failures of training and authorisation processes, as well as pressure to launch in adverse conditions, given where the crews were at in terms of training and preparation for what they were being asked to do, to save a few bucks.

As I said, the Kiwi crews I worked with in the past came across as having high personal and professional standards, which doesn't gel with these comments about their system not being up to scratch in terms of maintaining such standards.

From the article:

The report cited training problems with instrument flying and night vision goggles.
It found there were no instructor manuals or guides because of "resourcing" issues.
This was "common with most RNZAF flying units".
The report said four of the six pilots in the three helicopters did not have adequate flying qualifications for the flight, and the lead pilot was not qualified to lead the formation.


Newspaper reports can get it pretty wrong, as we all know, so I'm not trying to pontificate about what should or shouldn't be done - just seems that things sound pretty crook if that's how it really is these days.

tartare
28th Nov 2012, 00:35
Herkman - true - in UK as well.
Still have memories of walking into the mess at RAF Valley many years ago, after a flight.
To a civvy oik - it looked spartan and run-down in the extreme, and still remember the guys were munching on girl guide biscuits and drinking tea out of stained white cups.
Had just been up in a small jet which looked brand new and shiny black from the outside, but on climbing up into the office, everything was scratched, bashed, worn, faded and very well used.
People who accuse armed forces of wasting money need to spend a little time with those at the sharp end.

GreenKnight121
28th Nov 2012, 01:43
Oh, there certainly is lots of money being wasted in Defense... just not anywhere near "the sharp end"!

Brian Abraham
28th Nov 2012, 01:49
Thread ran here shortly after the accident

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/413192-rnzaf-helicopter-crash-near-wellington-april-2010-3-killed.html

I have a copy of the official report should any one be interested. Send a PM with your email addy that will accept attachments.

tartare
28th Nov 2012, 05:04
Point taken Green Knight.

Joker89
28th Nov 2012, 08:03
Such a terrible accident

I hope commanders in all flying units take note of this. How many times do we need to push the limits of crew duty and beyond to save some trivial amount of money that has to come out of a different bucket.

Whenurhappy
28th Nov 2012, 09:16
In 2008 the RAF Air Staff conducted a Capability Health Check which identified, amongst other things, the impact at point of delivery (hangar floor, cockpit, office) of accumulated risk from unconnected and unrelated change programmes - many of which were outwith the control of the RAF. Morover, becasue fo skills dilution in many areas, risk was being taken on areas where risk had already been taken (ie cutting corner on corners that had, err, already been cut, if you get my drift).

The findings of the study correlate very very closely with the RNZAF observations; the tragedy is that it has taken 3 fatalities to highlight impact of accumulated risk.

chute packer
28th Nov 2012, 11:00
Official report here (2mb)
http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2012/Redacted%20COI%20report%20for%20Iro%2006_UPDATED.pdf

Really eye opening, lots of failures all the way up the command chain and a history of bad decision making being shown within the Sqn, events covered up or not reported, or only reported later when evidence came to light.
Have a read, its long, around 100 pages but there is a lot of lessons in it.

oxenos
28th Nov 2012, 11:51
I find it extraordinary that in deteriorating visibility over the sea, the turn to reverse course was made towards land.

Samuel
28th Nov 2012, 13:42
Newspaper reports can get it pretty wrong, as we all know, so I'm not trying to pontificate about what should or shouldn't be done - just seems that things sound pretty crook if that's how it really is these days.

Sad reading indeed, but there are some red herrings in the Newspaper article. The author, David Fisher, is not employed directly by the NZ Herald, but is freelance, and he doesn't know any more about this accident than anyone else who has read the report. He's simply "cherry-picking" that which he considers sensational! He has no aviation connections whatsoever.

The Wellington hotel cost has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on anything as operations conducted from Ohakea, which is a mere 90 miles away, have NEVER required such accommodation. The flight in question has been carried out many, many times.

Odigron
28th Nov 2012, 14:14
Oxenos,

Although I don't know, it may be that a turn about toward land was initiated in the belief that the landward turn would have offered more visual references for the crews, who at the time hadn't IF aborted. Just a guess.

A sad loss.

onesquaremetre
28th Nov 2012, 16:57
Is there no end to the recent crash reports involving un/under-qualified and over-confident helicopter aircrew? Whether it's the Puma in Catterick, the SAR heli in Almeria, the guy at the slate mine in Cumbria or this appalling read (and that list is just off the top of my head), the story doesn't seem to change all that much. For God's sake guys, wise up.

tartare
28th Nov 2012, 20:04
Not being a helicopter pilot or intending to cast blame - can someone explain to me why - when finding oneself inadvertently in IMC, and not sure if you are still below MSA, the immediate procedure is not to slow to as near to stationary, pull collective and climb near vertically to above MSA?
Is it because of the difficulty of maintaining level flight IMC in a rotary wing aircraft; having only flow one once, they're difficult enough to hover VFR.
Why persist in maintaining forward speed in IMC, even at a relatively slow 60 knots?A web search seems to suggest there is a factor called Vmini - instrument flight minimum speed, and also assume that a feeling of `the leans' may be made worse by a rapid deceleration from cruise at say 120 knots to a much slower speed.
Even for special tactics trained military pilots, it must have been nightmarish - down at 200 feet or lower in a wobbly old Huey, Radalt set to 50 feet, in the dark, on NVGs, with State Highway 1 and township lights and big hills on one side, and a huge black hole where the ocean is on the other. And then to go IMC... poor buggers.

Bushranger 71
28th Nov 2012, 20:14
Hello Herkman; re your post #5.

I cannot abide the clamour for increased defence spending in Australia that is largely driven by a big lobby with associated vested interests. What is not being challenged by most analysts is the dysfunctional defence realm and multiple inappropriate hardware acquisitions, both generating huge waste of funding.

Relating any national expenditure to GDP is just accounting trickery because the cost of any government activity has to be funded from revenue. Consider the table (for Year 2010) at the following link: Comparison Defense Budgets & Military Spending Top Countries (http://www.comw.org/pda/120618-Military-Spending-Comparison.html). Australia rated quite high compared with some other nations that have more active military commitments. US revenue for 2010 was $2.2trillion and about $700billion of defence related expenditure represented 31 percent of government income, which is a major reason for their parlous economic situation. They of course endeavour to coerce increased defence spending by other nations to help keep their powerful military-industrial complex ticking along and large European arms conglomerates act similarly.
Australia has just gone through a defence cost saving exercise where we no longer can do the job that is expected.Have to disagree with you Mate. It is not the recent supposed cost-savings initiative that has debilitated ADF capabilities; that stems from mismanagement at political/Public Service/military levels. In my view, the defence realm cannot expect preferential treatment above many other competing national imperatives. Australian defence expenditure would be quite adequate if pegged at 7.5 percent of revenue and taxpayer funding just has to be better managed.

The tip of a very big iceberg is only just beginning to show for the ADF. The operating costs for much of the dubious merit hardware being acquired are going to soar compared with other platforms being unnecessarily shed. ADF and RNZAF Iroquois for example were readily deployable by C-130 for regional contingencies, were also very cost-effective with significant upgrade available for less than $2million per airframe. However, the hugely expensive (and relatively unproven) medium lift MRH-90 requires C-17 airlift and costs perhaps 5 times the Iroquois to operate per flying hour. Whether aircrew will be able to get adequate flying to maintain proficiency is another question.This nonsense will only stop when we are involved in a major conflict.Methinks worldwide economic stagnation is looming and Australia in particular will be appreciably affected, leaving the Federal Government no choice but to raise taxes. Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that either of the major political parties would commit to increasing defence expenditure.

500N
28th Nov 2012, 20:18
If we hadn't wasted so much money on various bits of equipment
or on modifying equipment that maybe we should have bought
"off the shelf" maybe we wouldn't be in such a state.

.

Trojan1981
28th Nov 2012, 23:00
:D:D The two above posts :D:D

Up until around 2003 I worked closely with the NZDF guys/gals both in Timor and exchange programs, and I always found them to be a very professional and capable bunch who achieved extraordinary results with limited resources.

That said, the NZDF of old no longer really exists. The 'force' has been stripped out of it; the teeth pulled and the very keen staff who remain are left with inadequate funding and what is basically civilian hardware. Things cannot continue this way. I would propose allowing the RNZAF to conduct commercial ops (at commercial rates) and EMS/SAR in order to help subsidize training activities. Either that or break it up into it's functional groups and distribute among civilian departments where they are accountable for maintaining standards ie. P-3K's to customs etc.

oldpinger
28th Nov 2012, 23:21
Thread drift warning but "Off the shelf" seldom works 100% for Helos in my humble opinion- unless you intend to operate it in the same climate/role/fit/tactical manner and crew concept as it was painstakingly designed for by the makers. Works for a big transport aircraft- C17 as it is designed to do the same thing just about anywhere.
It's not the saviour everyone thinks it is, compromise is essential.

B71, if you think any aspect of Defence spending is not influenced by a lobby of some kind you're dreaming!

500N
29th Nov 2012, 01:38
oldpinger

By "off the shelf", I mean with mods included that have been done by others
- US or UK mil.

Name me two areas that we operate Helos that are not
already covered by US Military Helos already in that they
operate in the same environment as we do ?

I do not believe we have a big enough defence force to warrant
Australian customisation of the majority of equipment and therefore
should look for equipment.
- NOT first cab off the rank / the guinea pig - leave that to others
- buy what is already in use by one of the bigger boys
- consider interoperability with the US as a major factor
in decision making of the equipment we buy.
- 90% AND in operation is better than 100% but take years to get to operational levels.

Tiger ?

What does the Tiger provide that the Apache can't or couldn't ?

What does the Tiger provide by a factor of 20% more than the Apache
because the fact it is taking so long probably costs us that.

If we had purchased Apache, would it be operational by now ?

Would it have been able to be sent to Afghanistan to support Aussie troops
- political will allowing ?

Bushranger 71
29th Nov 2012, 07:37
Hi oldpinger. I reckon I said that defence expenditure is largely a consequence of lobbying. There are over 4,000 registered lobbyists in Canberra and both of the major political parties recently declined to implement tighter controls on their activities.

I have difficulty abiding the big defence spend cheer squad (which includes some former and incumbent military chiefs) pushing for increased defence outlay when they have been complicit in bad acquisition planning decisions that have squandered tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. If somebody was to run an objective operational evaluation of all 3 Australian armed forces, I assure you the outcome would be truly alarming.

Hello 500N. DWP2009 has this to say re Interoperable Capability:

'8.65 Interoperability is principally concerned with the ability of personnel and systems of different nations and agencies to work effectively together, safely and securely. Where it makes sense to do so, and it is cost-effective and in keeping with the policy settings in this White Paper, capabilities and systems should be designed to be interoperable from conception, not as an afterthought in the capability development process.'

Interpreted sensibly, this points to meshing of operating doctrine for combined and joint operations, communications means and procedures, advantaging military and manufacturer supply chains throughout the world, ammunition standards and so forth.

It does not mean operating exactly the same platforms as other forces with which Australia might become involved, as is trumpeted by many in support of acquiring say US-sourced hardware. Consider for example various RAN warships which are platforms from non-US sources but fitted out to have some commonality of weapons systems with US forces.

Some of the platforms Australia has and will shed (on present planning) could have been very cost-effectively put through US manufacturer upgrade programs; yet DoD planners have forfeited them. I would argue that neither the Abrams tanks, Tiger (or Hueycobra or Apache), MRH-90, MH-60R have the versatility necessary for an ADF that might soon find itself having to shed or mothball some capabilities because it is trying to be too diverse for a pretty small force.

All 3 Services ought really only have what can be properly manned and operated effectively within affordable defence spending.

Some defence debate is now bending more toward focus on the Indo-Pacific and need for deterrence against interference with sea corridors to be Australia's primary focus,in lieu of unachievable defence of Australia against armed attack. If that thinking gets cast into DWP2013 (as I believe it should), then the whole Force 2030 vision might be duly consigned to the shredder. Year 2013 might bring a big reality check for Canberra in terms of what is affordable.

Felix the Cat
5th Dec 2012, 10:00
can someone explain to me why - when finding oneself inadvertently in IMC, and not sure if you are still below MSA, the immediate procedure is not to slow to as near to stationary, pull collective and climb near vertically to above MSAHelicopters are inherently unstable and the huey has no stability augmentation. In forward flight the aircraft is more stable due to the slip stream effect on the tail fin and fuselage, and less power is required because you are above effective translational lift speed. I think that 60 KIAS is about the best rate of climb speed for the UH1.