Astute - Slow, leaky, rusty

[ORAC]

Apologies, not aviation related (except they are supposed to defend the new aircraft carriers), but of interest.

Grauniad: Slow, leaky, rusty: Britain's £10bn submarine beset by design flaws (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/nov/15/hms-astute-submarine-slow-leaky-rusty)

Exclusive: Royal Navy's HMS Astute 'has a V8 engine with a Morris Minor gearbox'

Britain's nuclear hunter-killer submarines were doomed from the start (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/nov/15/astute-hunter-killer-submarines-doomed)

The flawed thinking and design behind the fleet at the heart of Britain's navy is now coming to the fore

[VinRouge]

The nuclear engineering expert John Large, who led the team evaluating the risks from the reactors and weapons on board the Russian submarine, Kursk, said: "I expect there will now be some serious soul-searching at the MoD, what went wrong and who is to blame, but to conceal the detail of the failures is wholly inappropriate because it protects the incompetent and, quite possibly, permits an unacceptable element of the nuclear safety risk to persist.

Sound familiar? :hmm:

[BEagle]

Exclusive: Royal Navy's HMS Astute 'has a V8 engine with a Morris Minor gearbox'

No problemo......


http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/morris-minor-01.jpg

...BAE, which is responsible for building the boat...

't Bungling Baron bungles yet another defence programme? Shirley not.....:mad: I can understand a submarine built by BWoS being capable of submerging with little difficulty; surfacing, however, would likely be more problematic.

[mike-wsm]

Nice to know the gearbox is ok. Not sure about that V8 engine, is it the one Rover cribbed from an ancient Buick?

Now, what about those lovely new carriers, I wonder who's building them....

[NutLoose]

When I saw the title I thought it was a discussion on Buster, sorry to intrude.

[Evalu8ter]

Nice to see more screeching hypocrisy from Jim Murphy, who seems to continue to suffer astonishing memory loss from his party's awfully self-interested mismanagement of Defence.......

[Party Animal]

Hey - who needs these fundamentally flawed submarines when we have the brand new super duper Nimrod MRA4's coming into service!!

Oh, err, actually we don't do we. Forgot for a minute that they had all been sawn up just to make absolutely sure the govt couldn't change their minds.....

Lots of common denominators between Astute and Nimrod. Starting with BAE Systems and finishing with doing stuff on the cheap. Wonder if the lead for the reactor cover came off the roof of Preston Cathedral? :rolleyes:

[Pontius Navigator]

Apologies, not aviation related (except they are . . .

Known to the MPA community as targets.

Oh, I forgot, the RAF doesn't have an MPA community :(

[BEagle]

Known to the MPA community as targets.

And to the anti-shipping strike community!

Oh, I forgot, the RAF doesn't have an anti-shipping strike community either :(:(

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Lots of common denominators between Astute and Nimrod.

Like being condemned by the media? John Large has something of a reputation - and not for being professional.

The alleged turbine/reactor mismatch sounds like typical MOD "spoiling the ship for a ha'penny's worth of tar", but as for other complaints - vessels do experience floods, ferrous metals exposed to seawater corrode, and so on.

To qoute this guy from ARRSE (http://www.arrse.co.uk/current-affairs-news-analysis/190429-astute-cluster-f-k-2.html#post4731818):

Astute was the first submarine built by Barrow for quite a number of years and the contract to build was repeatedly pushed back by the government of the day (I believe both parties share the blame). As a result BAE was struggling to keep the yard open and experienced workers in employment for some years. Eventually the costs got too high and they had to lay people off. Result - when they came to build Astute they'd forgotten how to, exactly what they told the government would happen.

Another similarity with Nimrod?

[tucumseh]

If the report is true there are indeed many similarities with Nimrod, Chinook and others. If you asked me how to avoid most of them on aircraft, I'd say implement the regs governing Design Reviews.

That is, the regs deemed optional by DGAS2 (Nimrod MRA4, Chinook Mk3) and CDP (Astute and everything else) in the mid-90s. Savings at the expense of safety.

[Navaleye]

To get to “full ahead” on a submarine, you have to employ a procedure which disables the safety protocols on the reactor and cooling system. For this reason alone, to my knowledge it has only ever been done once. The argument put forward in the article is complete non-sense by some third rate journo. The early SSNs were slower than 29kts.

[Pontius Navigator]

NE, without divulging anything, the article says high speed might be needed to get somewhere. To travel at even 20 kts is, presumably, akin to driving on a motorway in fog at 70+.

He also says the odd shape is dictated by the reactor. Looking at the pictures in the article it looks rather like area rule. Is that valid in a boat?

[Heathrow Harry]

Driving around at 20+ knots isn't too dangerous - your ability to listen out for other traffic is very poor but then how many submarines are there tanking about under the N Atlantic at one time - maybe a few US SSBN''s, a couple of French & Russian boats.... in an awful lot of blue.... and they will hear you coming a long way off and can get out of the way

the risk is when people are playing games at very low speeds tracking each other close too - easy to lose the big picture and hit the other guy (ask the RN & the French navy)

[VinRouge]

The way I understand the article, the reactor is bigger than required, as its the single most expensive research component on the boat. Much cheaper to reuse an earlier design than start from scratch. The turbines probably are smaller than the max coutput of the reactor and its this they are getting confused about. As for wrong bits, the fact it has been spotted and the audit revealed snags in manufacture demonstrates that things aren't perhaps as bad as made out?

[Pontius Navigator]

HH, it isn't only other submarines that might get out of your way, some might actually want to get in your way.

Then there are other things you might hit too.

[Lyneham Lad]

...that things aren't perhaps as bad as made out?

Is that not the norm for defence-related issues in the Grauniad?

[Union Jack]

To get to “full ahead” on a submarine, you have to employ a procedure which disables the safety protocols on the reactor and cooling system. For this reason alone, to my knowledge it has only ever been done once. - Navaleye

Interesting - we seemed to manage going "full astern" without too much fuss ....:)


Known to the MPA community as targets. - PN

As indeed surface ships are known to the Submarine Service.:ok:

Jack

[Navaleye]

Union Jack,

I was referring to the Battle Short Switch. Seeing an SSN moving astern at 25kts would be quite memorable

[Roland Pulfrew]

UJ

As indeed surface ships are known to the Submarine Service

Submarines join Ships as being know as targets in the MPA community :E

Oh, I forgot, the RAF doesn't have an MPA community :{

[hval]

I'm with The Grauniad on this one. I know that Astute has problems, after all it keeps sinking, dun nit?

[ORAC]

It has it's ups and downs.......

[JFZ90]

In defence of HMS Astute: the commanding officer's statement | UK news | The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/nov/16/commanding-officer-defence-hms-astute)

CO seems less bothered, and makes a probably valid point that its miles better than what has gone before.

I'm getting bored of the constant mod bashing - read the comments and its clear the mod has a critical negative perception by the UK public, with highly critical comments by those completely sucking up the media slagging whilst appearing to have little appreciation of reality. Twas ever thus, but christ it is getting tedious. The French don't carry on like this.

[hval]

JFZ90,

I think you might find that the public are somewhat miffed at the billions wasted on cancelled projects, projects that come in years late and well over budget. Being over budget and delayed are due to piss poor project management on behalf of MOD Abbey Wood, the armed forces changing their project managers all the time and changing requirements, political decisions that delay projects and add billions and finally, being ripped of by main contractors like BAE.

I can totally understand the negative perception that Civvies have. Stop all the above and the public will stop their questioning and change their attitude.

[orca]

I might be wrong but the French don't carry on like this (IMHO) because when they want an aeroplane and things are getting complicated they simply say to Dassault - "Make us Rafale" - which they then do. When they weren't getting their way on the Horizon class they stuck to their guns and got the ship they wanted.

On the lighter side isn't it nice (and refreshing) to hear a Brit speak up for himself for once. "We're the best, and I'm the CO - which means I'm better than everyone else, so you can listen in or f### off!"

(Or words to that effect - BZ!)

[hval]

Orca,

What really, really annoys me is that the UK has the worlds fourth largest military budget, yet we seem to have absolutely nothing to show for it. I get the impression we actually throw 50% of the money straight in to a bin. Then we mis spend 30% of the rest.

How can we have such crap equipment and so little of it?

[Not_a_boffin]

We don't actually have crap equipment - in most cases. What we tend to have is equipment that isn't quite what we wanted, delivered much later than we wanted, after much political masturbation, for more money than we'd budgetted for.

[hval]

NaB,

I still believe we have/ had crap equipment. Combat high for a start. SA80 as it originally was, Northern Ireland gloves, 58 webbing, Type 42, those aircraft carriers, Upholder class and much, much more.

I tend to agree with your comments otherwise. Look at the Type 45. It could have been so much more. Look at the poorly thought out QE II aircraft carriers. Which gibbering moron had thought processes that do not allow for much the vessel requires.

I happen to like the Astute. Yes it cost more than it should, but blame the politicians for that. Yes there are some quality and design issues, but I am surprised there aren't more. After all it's a bloody complex system. Just a shame it doesn't do Mach 1.

EDIT
Have a look at what Japan and France have for their budgets. Why haven't we got similar or better? Their budgets are smaller than ours.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Back to Mr Large and his expertise (from here (http://www.arrse.co.uk/current-affairs-news-analysis/190429-astute-cluster-f-k-5.html#post4732909)):

That's the one. Such an expert is he that they had to suspend a meeting in Gibraltar (where he had somehow conned the Gib government into believing that he actually knew what he was talking about and was therefore suitably qualified to represent their interests regarding Tireless) whilst he had Boyle's law explained to him. Slowly. And repeatedly.

[JFZ90]

hval

its a media myth

as an example, without going into too much detail, who fields effective manpad defences on their large aircraft, and in what numbers?

how do the air forces you quote fair on that score?

[glad rag]

The point you all seem to be dancing around is NOT what has failed already [as some moron pointed out on an-other forum the "leak" was only in the tens of liters :ugh:] but what corporate failings of Bae have yet to surface.

[hval]

JFZ90,

So MRA4, AEW3, FRES, Delays in QE II, Cost over runs in Astute, Chinnook FADEC project, AH 64 project, Main Battle Tank replacement project, cost over runs and time delays in Typhoon, Swan Hunters contract for Royal Fleet Auxilliary vessels Lyme Bay and Largs Bay and many, many more project failures didn't actually happen? :)

It is still going on. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has awarded the contract for the delivery of payroll and personnel services to serving and veteran communities to CSC. CSC is currently in legal discussions with the government over its £957 million failed NHS project. I can not see this one being a great success. You can add the MOD Logistics system that loses track of supplies.

The project you quoted is one of the few contracts that has worked.

[lasernigel]

Think whichever country you're from that military projects always go over budget, and never work as they were planned to.

I might be wrong but the French don't carry on like this (IMHO)

Think the last aircraft carrier they built has spent more time in dock than at sea.

[JFZ90]

cost overruns are not unique to the UK

look at the history of C17 - in the nineties as a project it was a true technical/cost basket case - now look at it. We in the UK are too quick to criticise, often over non-issues.

the example i quoted is, I believe, not just a one off but a great example of where the UK has a significantly better capability than others - conversely you can argue other air forces have serious shortcomings - to the point I wouldn't want to go into theatre on their ac.

you shouldn't belittle that latter point, as at the end of the day that's what its all about!

No leak inquiry it seems on the astute memos - is Bernard leaking to further his absurd GO-CO fantasy one wonders?

[Pontius Navigator]

CSC is currently in legal discussions with the government over its £957 million failed NHS project. I can not see this one being a great success.

But the MoD is much smaller so would be easier to shaft.

[Blacksheep]

Q. What corporate failings of BAE have yet to surface?

A. Its a big organisation that cannot manage communications with its customers.

Boeing used to have a subsidiary called Boeing Electronics that made such items as printed circuit boards and control panels for Boeing aircraft systems. In a corporate reorganisation the electronics subsidiary was sold to BAE Systems. Since then it has become all but impossible to get customer support information on these PCBs and panels. They have the most complex and confusing directory system known to man.

[tucumseh]

hval

The programmes you cite were indeed high profile screw ups. But I can also see JFZ90's point.

What I always say here is that MoD consistently and flatly refuses to learn from those programmes that are delivered with effortless competence, to time, cost and performance, or better.

If you assessed the history of many of those projects you mention, the common denominator is that people who managed other programmers successfully, in addition to many very experienced and knowledgeable Service personnel, predicted exactly what would go wrong, and were proved correct.

The glaring omission from your list is BOWMAN. The fact that the upgrade to it's HF system (i.e. Comms of choice in AFG) was delivered and fielded before the main BOWMAN contract was even let, is one the THE great embarrassments, which MoD has sought to hide for many years (although, granted, few would know what question to ask). There is something very wrong when a URD is endorsed that begins "As BOWMAN won't be good enough....". MoD should try to learn from this; instead the Programme Manager's biggest obstacle was fighting off those who sought and ordered cancellation, on the grounds BOWMAN could not be seen to be embarrassed. As it was, the anti-brigade couldn't get their act together quickly enough, as it took all of six weeks for the PM to specify, trial, deliver and field a better system than BOWMAN took 20 years to. When the cancellation order was given the kit was en-route to AFG. When the first users later got their BOWMAN kit, it was chucked in a corner at Wattisham.

The MoD culture is to regard these people as "tainted by their experience" and an "embarrassment to the Department", rather than assets to be nurtured. THAT is what is wrong with the procurement system.

[orca]

If we look at the French carrier situation let us be very clear about one thing. They might have maintenance issues with CDG, but they've had her for ages and have had Gen 4 cat and trap jets at sea on her for donkey's years. In that time we've found CVS too expensive, binned our Harriers to save cash, halved the FF/DD fleet to pay for the monsters that are now at last taking some semblance of shape and are only going to be STOVL carriers.

Which is value for money as far as a taxpayer sees it?

[Not_a_boffin]

I think the phrase to describe it (CdG) is "maintenance of the aim".......

[thunderbird7]

Astute is a bit of a red herring but as ever, the one constant, is those contract 'lawyers' at the MOD and the ever changing 'specs' of all military projects...

..HS125/Dominie reinforced floors? Tucano bang seats/engines? The list goes on....

[Shannon volmet]

Astute - Slow, leaky, rusty
Apologies, not aviation related (except they are supposed to defend the new aircraft carriers), but of interest.

Grauniad: Slow, leaky, rusty: Britain's £10bn submarine beset by design flaws

Exclusive: Royal Navy's HMS Astute 'has a V8 engine with a Morris Minor gearbox'

Britain's nuclear hunter-killer submarines were doomed from the start

The flawed thinking and design behind the fleet at the heart of Britain's navy is now coming to the fore



Sorry, but found this on another forum, liked it so much I just had to share it!

S.V.:ok:

f******g MOD procurement.

If it was their turn to buy a round of drinks at the bar it'd be pot luck whether they returned with a round of trebble sambukas nobody wanted, came back empty handed demanding more money off everyone because they'd knocked several tables drinks over on the way, or got everyone chucked out because they'd been across to the offie and come back in with a crate of special brew on their shoulder, or simply disappeared with the cash only to show up again several days later proffering the dregs of a couple of cans with tab ends in them muttering something about cost over runs before putting several bottles of champagne on your tab.

:E

[Wensleydale]

Think whichever country you're from that military projects always go over
budget, and never work as they were planned to.





Quote:




I might be wrong
but the French don't carry on like this
(IMHO)


Think the last aircraft carrier they built has spent more time in dock than
at sea.


To say nothing of the Maginot Line...

[orca]

You are of course correct old chap. All MoD procurement should be measured against the Maginot Line as a baseline to determine whether or not it provided value for money, on time.

[kbrockman]

The CDG did have indeed more than its fair share of problems between 2000 and 2007 but it has to be said that they did a wonderfull job in 2007 and 2008 refitting, refueling and repairing her.

I seem to recall that ever since it is by far the most intensively used carrier currently in use with state of the art Satrap stabilization system, comm systems and very effective high level of automation ,all of the new big French vessels are operated with less personnel than their US or UK counterparts (eg Mistral, their newHorizon class and in the future the Baracudda boats).

[JFZ90]

i should clarify that i'm not knocking french procurement - my first hand experience is they do somethings very well, others I think DE&S is actually better.

The point is you don't see the continual assault in the press in France like you do in the UK - if they are similar, what is the difference? Culture, IMO. The UK just love saying the MoD is sh*t - like engineering in general, it is treated with more respect in France.

I would support a scheme whereby those who love to criticise large procurement programmes from their armchairs - who don't have a fig about what risk or development means - are actually banned from access to modern technology. They may then think twice before they tell all what they 'reckon' :)

[hval]

tucumseh,

Good lord sir! Yes! I had totally forgotten BOWMAN. Probably since most the time it hides in stores unused and unwanted. What a heap of sh1t that is.

JFZ90,

Other countries errors do not excuse our extremely poor showing on programme management. It is totally inexcusable to waste so many billions; totally. I do not see the French, Japanese nor others cancelling projects after billions have been spent on them (USA excepted with Comanche).

I agree that there are a number of projects that do reach completion acceptably; there are others which reach completion only after the goalposts have been shifted to allow completion to be achieved, and those projects I have listed, plus many more, which do not achieve a successful completion.

[Heathrow Harry]

The USA has cancelled dozens of programs over the years

Skybolt
Navajo
B-70
A-12 Avenger
B-1

come to mind instantly

and god knows how many helicopter programmes

and then there are those which had very restricted numbers bought compared to the original plans

B-58
F-111
B-2
F-117
F-22

[hval]

Heathrow Harry,

You are correct. My poor writing. What I meant to type was e.g. Comanche.

This still does not excuse our cock ups.

[JFZ90]

I think the A-12 Avenger was nearly $2bn down the toilet and didn't even get near a prototype.

Cancelled in the early nineties they are still arguing about getting some money back....

The MBT-70 and Crusader also also notable, as are the Cheyenne and Commanche - these would be regarded as cock ups & mismanagement if done in the UK.

I have a feeling that hval will only see bad in UK with no mitigation; this kind of proves my point that UK procurement gets knocked irrespective of the facts.

The well known NAO example of QEII being delayed and costing more has nothing to do with poor programme management - seemingly a request was made to save short term money and the outcome was increased cost and delay. Such a decision was made in the full knowledge of the impacts - it should not be implied otherwise - hence programme change control (hence pm) was operating correctly. You can question who approved such a decision & why (lack of money trumps all other considerations), but it won't have been in DE&S. The same principle applies to MRA4 cancellation - its suits some to imply it was technically a total goat, but in reality the decision was driven to save future support money. DE&S can't deliver programmes if the money is withdrawn.

Avenger was heading towards being a $60bn programme, and really out of technical / reqt control on a totally different scale to anything in the uk. Its EVM system did spot the issue and precipitate its cancellation however.

Bottom line is, if you benchmark uk vs others - it is no where near as bad as it is perceived and portrayed, though I'd agree that recent financial cuts have had a big & very visible impact on the equipment programme.

That said, the UK maybe about to embark upon the biggest procurement cock-up in history, ironically with the intention of doing the opposite. What do you think will happen (and how) when you try and make changes to project funding/reqts with the DE&S GOCO!? Who will control that & how (effectively?).

[hval]

JFZ90,

I have a feeling that hval will only see bad in UK with no mitigation

Not at all, not at all. This discussion has been UK centric, as were your comments re UK project failures. I was keeping my comments focussed on the UK as we were discussing the UK. I see all project failures, on such a large scale, as being unacceptable, irrespective of nation.

My basic comment should be "No nation can afford procurement mistakes. The mistakes always come at the cost of a loss in defence of the nation".

As for political interference I consider that as potentially being part of any project, and definitely part of all large, expensive projects.

[hval]

I believe the loss of Crusader for the USA to be a dreadful mistake. Here is a link to a report on the cancellation of Crusader written in 2003.

The Cancellation of Crusader: A Study in the Dynamics of Decision-Making (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA414123)

Part of the conclusion says: -

Post 9-11 finds the Army at a crossroad of changing and new times. The old ways of doing business no longer applies. Things are moving quickly and transformation is occurring not only in the way we expect to fight but also in how we are doing business in DoD. The lesson from the Crusader cancellation debacle is that the Army needs to revisit its justification for the entire family of “new programs” and seriously question the utility of future FCS (Future Combat Systems). Those programs at risk may need to be re- validated lest the shifting sands of the new geo-strategic era bring them down as they did Crusader.

In retrospect, regardless of how clumsily the decision was made, Secretary Rumsfeld was completely within his authority to deviate from the systems his subordinates were using to arrive at decisions and to do so at the slightest whim. It was for Congress to discipline him and the Bush administration, should it have appeared to them that Secretary Rumsfeld was wrong in his decision. That Congress chose to abide by the decision removes from the overall debate any criticism on how the decision was arrived at.

It will be interesting to observe the DoD decision-making process in the coming months and years to see if these process continues on its present course or a more congenial tone will emerge on the Hill and within the DoD infrastructure.

Look what happened to FCS - The DoD released a memorandum on 23 June 2009 that cancelled the Future Combat Systems program and replaced it with separate programmes.

[dervish]

I would support a scheme whereby those who love to criticise large procurement programmes from their armchairs - who don't have a fig about what risk or development means - are actually banned from access to modern technology. They may then think twice before they tell all what they 'reckon'


Precisely. There's a lot of ill informed comment about procurement here but I doubt if 5% of posters have the faintest idea how it works. I wish MoD would publish a project diary. The Nimrod MRA4 one would be sensational.

[SASless]

Sometimes one wonders if those doing the procurement know anything about the process as well!

It ain't like the MOD have exactly excelled over the past many years.

[tucumseh]

Sometimes one wonders if those doing the procurement know anything about the process as well!

One of the points I often make is that very many DE&S staffs don't actually serve at the 5 grades below the DE&S project manager basic grade; so cannot possibly know very much at all about the process, or the practical application of the procedures. In simple terms, if you haven't served in the lower grades, you can't recognise the mistakes for what they are - primarily those in Materiel and Financial Provisioning, which is something you should learn before being promoted into DE&S. Therefore, it could be reasonably said that it is not MoD policy to have knowledgeable project managers, and those who are are an increasingly rare breed.



It ain't like the MOD have exactly excelled over the past many years.

But I also make a point of noting very many projects are delivered to time, cost and performance. The problem is that senior staffs in MoD regard those who do this as trouble makers, as it raises the bar for the rest. Such staffs are "encouraged" to move on to jobs where they require a long, steep learning curve, so allowing their old department to dumb down to it's natural level. A great advocate of this management strategy was, for example, the Nimrod MRA4 2 Star.


I wish MoD would publish a project diary.

What an excellent idea! But you'd have to be careful that MoD produced the original diary (or closely related Risk Register) because some years ago various senior staffs, including the above 2 Star, ruled it acceptable that 2nd and even 3rd sanitised versions be created which did not record risks or events that were in any way embarrassing. These were the versions that would be produced to justify claims that "events" didn't happen.

On one programme of mine I discovered this when a 3 Star General came visiting and asked if I had recorded airworthiness/safety as a risk. I said "Yes", but up piped a consultant employed by my boss who, at the same time, said "No". We all looked puzzled until the consultant declared he'd been employed to create a 2nd Risk Register, but omitting certain risks (as the boss had decided to save money by cancelling airworthiness contracts). This was not conveyed to a later BoI, when it criticised (using different words) the mismanagement of those risks. The risks HAD been identified and managed properly, but then that work was cancelled. One Risk Register recorded all these events; two others didn't.

THAT is practical project (mis)management in action. The rules and procedures were perfectly fine, and 99% of staff implemented them well. The culture that allowed the 1% to prevail, and then be protected, is what was wrong.

[Burnt Fishtrousers]

So I guess the MOD compromise will be to fit Morris Minor gearboxes to our carrier fleet (that have no aircraft) so their submarine escorts can keep up -

Presumably those at the MOD will be wise enough to make sure that when they have sorted the Astute class speed issue, they will make sure the torpedos used are fast enough not to be caught up by the vessel that fired them in the first place?

Monty Python couldnt do it better

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Whilst it's a popular jolly jape to take the p**s out of Director Ships, who considers the INVINCIBLE Class Carriers/Through Deck Cruisers a procurement disaster? I recall very well the significant gearbox failures suffered by INVINCIBLE before she saved our bacon (or mutton) down South. Indeed, ILLUSTRIOUS suffered a spectacular gearbox failure as late as '86.

First of Class usually have problems. It's usually called the road to progress, without which we'd still be building CHURCHILL Class boats. That said, much of what tucumseh has written may well have migrated sideways.

[t43562]

Possibly relevant in the sense that one might view industrial, engineering and scientific preparedness for war as being as necessary as the purely military:
Britain's aerospace capability needs safeguarding | Opinion | The Engineer (http://www.theengineer.co.uk/opinion/viewpoint/britains-aerospace-capability-needs-safeguarding/1014702.article)

[GreenKnight121]

Or the infamous collapsing lifts in the Invincible class?

A very nice (or not-nice) long article with drawings and photos on the subject:
World Naval Ships Forums - View Single Post - RN Aircraft Carriers (Engineering) (http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10048829&postcount=77)
You will need to join the website, but that's a reward all its own.
© Crown Copyright/MoD (1987).
CVS AIRCRAFT LIFTS
BY LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER D. STRAWFORD, R.N.
(H.M.S. Ark Royal, formerly staff of C-in-C Fleet)

Introduction

Traditionally aircraft lifts in R.N. aircraft carriers have been of counterbalanced
design carried by multiple chains on two or more sides of the lift
platform, and driven by electric motors.

The advent of the INVINCIBLE Class into service, however, introduced a radical
change in lift design that utilizes a non-counterbalanced platform driven by an
electro-hydraulic system designed and manufactured by Mactaggart Scott & CO Ltd.

As with most new design equipments, initial teething problems were to be
expected. Since its introduction into service the CVS aircraft lift has been
beset by problems. Most of these have been of a minor nature, but early
operating experience revealed a more serious shortcoming in design that on
several occasions resulted in near catastrophic failure of the lift machinery
with serious operational implications. Poor material and documentary support
exacerbates the situation and adds to the frustrations of the equipment
maintainers.

This article seeks to clarify the issues surrounding the aircraft lift design
and outlines the measures that have been and are being taken to overcome
the known shortcomings in design and support.

.....

MAJOR LIFT FAILURES Since introduction into service there have been several serious and near catastrophic aircraft lift failures due to uncontrolled tilting of the lift platform (FIG. 14). In each case ships have had to withdraw from operational commitments and expensive and manpower-intensive base support has been required to return the lifts to normal operation. In the majority of failures the prime cause of loss of control of the platform has been centred around the synchronizing system.
.....Right way (fig 2):
http://i22.photobucket.com/albums/b336/Bager1968/Carriers/RN%20cariers/fig02.jpg

Wrong Way (fig 14):
http://i22.photobucket.com/albums/b336/Bager1968/Carriers/RN%20cariers/fig14.jpg

[tucumseh]

GBZ

My experience of Ships, apart from managing aircraft related electronics, is that MoD managed the vessel itself very well with limited resources (which could be said of much of MoD’s routine work). Of course, plentiful resources don’t guarantee success – see Nimrod.



From an aircraft perspective, what was very wrong was the integration of the aircraft and the ship. I recall Director General Aircraft (Navy) used to have a “Ships and Bases” section, which was our first port of call (note, lingo) for such matters, but they largely disappeared after about 1988 (formation of ASE). The next time I was modifying a CVS-borne aircraft, meaning ships’ procedures had to change, the reply was “Wait to see if there’s a problem, then we’ll see if we can fix it”. In other words, keep on using old procedures which the new aircraft perhaps renders unsafe.



In more general terms, this policy of not mitigating risks until they were proven to exist in-service became formal MoD policy in the mid-90s. Hence, on occasions the first manifestation resulted in unnecessary and avoidable deaths; and the BoI reports simply (and unwittingly) regurgitated a decade-old risk register which had been marked “waste of time, no further action” by a bean counter.



I fully agree First of Class (of anything) usually have problems, but the project manager's job is to avoid the avoidable and manage the unavoidable. In design terms, the way of doing this is meeting the mandated Configuration Milestones, which includes Design Reviews. In 1999 DGAS2 (Nimrod) and CDP ruled that a Critical Design Review can be waived if it means saving money. Very often, BoIs note failures which should have been addressed at CDR or before. But because they lack the necessary experience, they don't recognise the failure for what it is, and certainly don't criticise VSOs for knowingly allowing the failure. So, the system disintegrates at a late stage, having been managed perfectly well for 95% of the time.




On a lighter note, a good example was the Lynx upgrade of the 80s, resulting in her sitting higher on her undercarriage. HMS Endurance wasn’t modified, so the top of the rotor head caught the hangar door runners. This was quickly transformed into a savings measure by announcing Endurance would retain the old variant, which meant the aircraft conversion programme cost less. But what this did was hide a serious failure to fill in the MF714 box “Affected Contractors” properly (and then manage what was affected), which is the primary means of initiating system integration and functional safety. By 1992, this too was formal policy, whereas the Lynx error was a rarity.