BA Split Approach and the 787

[beerdrinker]

How are BA going to justify the use of their Split Approach on their soon to be delivered 787 which comes with the non-optional Head Up Display?

[Hobo]

And there speaks a flat Earther.

Why would BA have to 'justify' any of their operating procedure to anyone?

Regarding the 'monitored approach', it is a system that is proven to work better than any other.

[beerdrinker]

OK, Here we go. I was not going to start a thread on the merits or otherwise of the Split Approach.But...... ".

We called it a Split Approach as every Approach is Monitored - by the NHP. As for the idea that it is the idea that it is a system that is proven to work better than any other - says who? I will only ask why both major manufactures do not teach it on their conversion courses and why only one major airline uses it on every approach.

And as for me being a flat earther - I think not. We were not known as the FEW.

Any way back to my original question.

[seat 0A]

Whenever anyone says that their system is better "than any other" I start to get very skeptical :ugh:

[gorter]

If you don't work for BA, why do you care? FWIW my outfit does monitored approaches whenever the weather is poor and flight ops management swear blind it will increase the chances of seeing something at minima. BA just do it every approach.

[wiggy]

Why would BA have to 'justify' any of their operating procedure to anyone?


Just about sums it up - BA have just aligned most of their 777 procedures to the Boeing standard, the exceptions being a few items/SOPs they feel they want to retain. The "monitored approach" was one of very few procedures BA decided to keep because they felt it had it's advantages on the triple. Maybe they'll feel differently when they see the 787 in action on the line, maybe not, it's their trainset.

BTW I know it' semantics but the term has definitely been "Monitored Approaches" in BA Longhaul for quite a while now, I believe "Split Approach" was once a shorthaul term, which probably explains Hobo's comments........

[FlightPathOBN]

HUD pretty much standard for Alaska Airlines ops in AK...

[Hobo]

BTW I know it' semantics but the term has definitely been "Monitored Approaches" in BA Longhaul for quite a while now, I believe "Split Approach" was once a shorthaul term, which probably explains Hobo's comments........

'Split Approach' was never a BA shorthaul term, to my certain knowledge, at least up until the very late 90's. It was a term used by the flat Earth brigade referred to earlier....(ok, mea culpa for feeding the troll).

The term 'monitored approach' had two connotations, at least in the early days, ie the approach was monitored, and it was also 'the monitored approach to flying' ie the rational division of duties compared to the then Boeing standard 'one man band'.

[alf5071h]

IIRC the ‘shared monitored approach’ had its origins in Trident all weather operations and the then emerging two crew aircraft; the BAC 1-11 becoming Cat 3 capable.
There is a balanced view of some of the arguments for using the approach procedure in Eliminating "Cockpit-Caused" Accidents. (http://s92270093.onlinehome.us/CRM-Devel/resources/paper/last/last.htm)

A problem with HUD is that for true monitoring there should be two HUDs or a system which allows cross checking or internal self-monitoring with a very high integrity level - as required for Cat 3. One of the issues is how to monitor the display guidance, and for manual flight, how accurate the PF is following the command. This can be achieved with separate monitoring of conventional instruments or via the FD, but again the FD integrity requirements and possible need for dissimilar computation and certification proof might involve prohibitive cost – particularly Cat 3B.

Most modern aircraft have flight guidance systems capable of Cat 3 thus the use of the existing autopilot is a much cheaper option (and lower training/currency cost).
Where HUD is available then it could be used to aid monitoring the autopilot guidance (the aircraft flight path), but this can be done with similar accuracy with conventional instruments, and again at lower cost (training). Some concepts explored a mixed autos/HUD operation; IIRC the A320 with HUD may have such capability but AFAIK it is not used to its full extent - hybrid system.
HUD could aid the head up pilot locate visual cues and the runway, but arguably due to ‘conservative’ minima, few landing decisions would depend on this, and for fail op, it may not be necessary – nice to have but not essential.

Retaining existing operating methods may have greater safety benefits from interoperability where pilots move between fleets, and by reinforcing conventional flight instrument monitoring skills.
BA should not need to justify this, particularly with their proven approach to safety and all weather operations.

[FE Hoppy]

Can't you just stow it?

Or better still, deactivate and remove it.

[TopBunk]

Pretty sure that I have flown on the B747-400 with Beerdrinker, so I can assure people that he is certainly not a troll!

His terminology may be wrong, but that is another matter.

[banjobill]

All longhaul approaches used to be monitored by the F/E.

[beerdrinker]

Thanks TB. No Hobo I am not a troll and flew and instructed on both types of approach in my time so I do know what I am talking about.

Alf, BEA were doing "Monitored Approaches" before the Trident. The philosophy was that the old fellows flying Elizabethans, DC3s, Viscounts etc were pretty good at hand visual flying so it was thought that it would be better if the co pilot flew down to minimums and the old fellow took over to land when visual. At the time (late 60s) BEA (although the first) were not the only people doing Autolands. BOAC managed to do them very well on the VC10 without using the "Monitored" approach. And regarding the article you quote, I do remember Steve. I am afraid I will disagree with you about balance as he was always very pro monitored approach, would not tolerate any opposition and took those views with him when he went to the FSF.

I think the best description of the "Monitored" approach was when the BOAC and BEA teams were at Palmdale and Mr Lockheed asked them to explain it to them. Before the BEA team could launch into their description the inestimable Hugh Dibley replied quickly " It is rather like w*****g - you know 99/ change hands." Mr Locheed was most amused - the BEA team were not.

For me the best argument against the approach is what I mentioned earlier. Neither of the two major manufacturers positively promote it and I have faith in what they say rather than what a few people in BA say. And no other major airline does it on every approach. Some airlines do it on bad weather approaches ( I suspect that the likes of Jet2 do it then because they were persuaded when ex BA proponents joined them on retirement from BA) but again other airlines who did do it (GO when it was the LCC of BA) stopped when they were taken over. (EasyJet did not pick it up when they took over GO)

[Stuck_in_an_ATR]

FE Hoppy

Can't you just stow it?

Or better still, deactivate and remove it.


Somewhere I've heard a story of BA wanting to order the 787 without the HUD and being told 'NO' by Boeing... Is that true?

[alf5071h]

beerdrinker (#13) thanks. My history of the subject was based on all-weather ops, but I agree that the concept can be applied more generally or not.
One angle was that the ‘sharing’ of duties alleviated problems of the all-powerful Captain or P1 dominated operations, which were common post WW2; perhaps shared-monitoring was a forerunner of CRM.

Nowadays it could be argued that with recent technology based operations, particularly the bias towards automatic approach and landing in bad weather, that the sharing aspect is no longer required. Monitoring can be accomplished by both pilots; but have the manufacturers assumed too much - are both pilots sufficiently ‘experienced’.
With more recent problems from reduced/changed training and low experience levels, the acceptability of the P2 monitoring function is questionable. If so, then Steve Last’s views (link @ #9) are highly relevant and suggest that the monitoring function be conducted by the pilot with greater experience – a shared monitored approach.
The existence of HUD or not is irrelevant as in the 787 class of aircraft it is only another (different) instrument display. This may not infer any greater capability, vice some previous non Cat 3 aircraft now fitted with HUD.

The next ‘giant step’ in procedural change might only occur if HUD was available to both pilots and was certificated as the primary (only) flight instrument reference – like the C17. However, considering equipment cost, training, experience, etc, this is unlikely; at least until they are fitted in basic training aircraft.

[TURIN]

Can't you just stow it?

Indeed you can.

[BOAC]

and suggest that the monitoring function be conducted by the pilot with greater experience – a shared monitored approach. - I think you will find this is what happens in BA anyway - if the weather warrants it. Generally in my day the bright young things flew very decent ILS's leaving me to make the possibly 'difficult' decision on limits on landing..The only 'problem' with the BA system, which took a while to get used to, was having to hand over on a CAVOK day when you just wanted to 'slip the ship' onto the runway in immacculate style (and could you persuade young Biggles to fly a visual........?).:)

[Pontius]

Or better still, deactivate and remove it.

Why would you want to do that? HUDs are a great bit of kit, easy to use and get your eyes out of the flight deck. I can see no disadvantage to having all the information you need presented in front of your face and can certainly see no good reason for going back to dials and needles because that's the way in was done 'back then'.

As for the BA system, why does it matter how they chose to operate? If you fly for BA you do it their way, if you don't, you do it your airline's way. BA have no need to 'justify' anything; if they're happy and the CAA is happy then let them continue with something that has worked well for them for a fair few years. I can't see why the 787 and its HUDs will affect the price of fish. The same 'shared' approach can continue as is, you just look out the window for all information you need rather than down at the EFIS.

The only 'problem' with the BA system, which took a while to get used to, was having to hand over on a CAVOK day when you just wanted to 'slip the ship' onto the runway in immacculate style

Is that what you used to call it :} As for the visuals, it was just you they were scared of...did you never read the writing on the walls of trap 2 in JBH :eek:

[slast]

FYI:
From FAA Docket Number FAA-2008-0370 (exemption from Approach Ban for FedEx a/c equipped with Head Up Display)

"The current FedEx flight crew procedures for approaches reflect the philosophy of maximizing safety through the use of monitored approach procedures for all low visibility approaches in conjunction with standardized callouts for all approach operations............ Based on these existing procedures and callouts for the FedEx MD-10/11 airplane, the integration of the HUD/EFVS will be seamless with minimal change."

FAA Docket Number FAA-2008-0370

[Chris Scott]

I used to do Cat 3B landings as a skipper on A310s and DC10s in BCAL in the 1980s, having flown the whole leg and the approach as PF. When we obtained our A320s in 1988 with Cat 3B (No DH) capability, we had just been taken over by BA.

This is my take on what the transition to monitored approach was like for us, and what the rest of BA was doing at that time:
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/488300-g-arpi-trident-tragedy-40-years-ago-today-8.html#post8169437


"At the time BA took over BCAL, we were just introducing the A320 into service. We handful of crews - nearly all ex-BCAL for the first year or so - were generally resistant to the imposition of monitored approaches; knowing little about them and mostly not keen to learn. Fortunately, our fleet management was committed to making the A320 fleet the best in BA, and apparently all fleets would have to conform to them as a BA standard. We soon knuckled down, particularly when we moved up to LHR permanently after a summer of LGW ops.
"If the destination wx necessitated an autoland, the captain had to do the leg, but in other respects the leg-for-leg philosophy was retained. It's fairly unusual for two consecutive landings to be affected. Our handover of PF duties to the PNL usually took place not at TOC, but just before the PL (landing pilot) conducted his/her pre-descent briefing. If the PL became visual early on finals, (s)he could take over early - configuration changes and checklist permitting. If the wx was worse than Cat 1, the captain would handle the G/A or autoland, but otherwise role-reversal was complete. It all became second-nature.
"Up at LHR we gradually became aware that not only were the B747 fleets not conforming to the standard, but neither was the recalcitrant B737. I wonder what the situation is today, but any suggestion that the monitored-approach philosophy in BA might allow below-average captains to be propped up by their copilots simply doesn't make sense today."


Seems to me that even if the B787 HUD is on the L/H side only, it would be an excellent tool for the PNF-captain (and in BA it always is the captain below Cat 1) to look for the runway and monitor the instruments at the same time.

[ajd1]

It's on both sides on the 787

[gonebutnotforgotten]

As far as I know, once the 747 classics retired, all BA fleets flew the standard BA approach, and I'm fairly certain the the chief pilot 747 Classic at the time regretted not having forced the issue when the NO incident occurred. Monitored approach turned out to be a rather good way of ensuring that both pilots were fully involved in the approach decision making, even though it had been developed (as has been said above) in the 50s as a way of ensuring appropriate visual accommodation nearing DH.

As for sub Cat 1 approaches being reserved for the more experienced pilot, it's true it could be said that's how it worked out, but it was only the outcome of a quite hard headed decision not to double the amount of Cat 1 and 2 training we would have had to do if we retained the option to have both pilots qualified to do both roles. I for one would never have dared to suggest that the RHS were any less competent than I was

[Jwscud]

As for "no other airline", the largest European 737 operator going routinely flies monitored approaches when the weather is below certain minima (300ft/1000m precision, 3000m/1000ft NPA).

I very much doubt they got it from BA imports!

[suninmyeyes]

Gone but not forgotten you wrote


As far as I know, once the 747 classics retired, all BA fleets flew the standard BA approach, and I'm fairly certain the the chief pilot 747 Classic at the time regretted not having forced the issue when the NO incident occurred.

Not quite true. The 747 Classic introduced the monitored approach several years before the classic retired. They also changed things and made the non-handling pilot select reverse thrust. All fleets did not fly the standard BA approach as Concorde never adopted the monitored approach.

As for the NO incident, so many factors involved in that, but for autolands as the Captain took over at 1000 feet radio post monitored approach or maintained control at 1000 foot radio pre monitored approach I do not see much difference as the Captain would have been the handling pilot below 1000 feet radio with either method.

[Chris Scott]

Hi gonebutnotforgotten - or any of you BA long-haul guys,

Can you remind me, who never did L/H in BA:

(1) when the 747 Classics finally retired?

(2) when the 744 adopted the monitored app as an SOP, and whether it was discretionary at any stage?

Also, can you confirm that the B777 fleet adopted it from Day 1?

If the HUD is to be on both sides, I just don't understand why it should impact on whatever the cross-fleet SOPs are these days.

BTW, does the capt still take over at 1000ft for autolands when wx is below Cat 1?

[misd-agin]

"Somewhere I've heard a story of BA wanting to order the 787 without the HUD and being told 'NO' by Boeing... Is that true?"




Boeing guy said a customer wanted the 787 without HUD's(or not on the FO's side). Boeing said 'no'. it's standard equipment on both sides and they weren't going to certify various HUD combinations.


Don't know if it was BA.

[galaxy flyer]

Sometimes the old ways just become irrelevant, no matter how superior they may have been.

OK465,

You do know we are posting about BRITISH Airways? You're kind of thinking just isn't on back Merry Ole England. "Good enough for Gramps, good enough for me".

[4468]

Calling this a 'Spilt Approach' is a compete misnomer. In the 30 years I have been flying them I have never heard that name. A more correct description would be a 'Joint Approach', as both pilots have a very real investment in the flying of it. HUDs are utterly irrelevant to the concept, not least since at 1000' the captain takes control, with the full expectation of landing without needing to see anything as there is no decision height!

A 'Split Approach' sounds more like the kind of approach flown by others, whereby one pilot flies the approach, whilst the other falls asleep! What could be more spilt than that?

As others have said, why even worry about it? If you work for BA, do it, and if you don't work for BA, why do you care?

[TheChitterneFlyer]

Does it really matter what the title of the approach is? We also flew the "Monitored Approach" technique on the BA and KT TriStar (for standardisation) and it worked very well. So, what's the "beef" about? It very much sounds like someone is having a pop at a technique that proved to work very well for BA... it was an Ops Manual requirement; a Company SOP. If you don't like it... challenge your management and do what's safe for your SOPs!

[JeroenC]

It seems to me here that the focus of MA are on the landing? We do it in marginal wx so that the PM/PNF can look outside, so that the PF can operate/monitor the AC. When landing is assured, AT MINIMUMS the captain takes over and lands, having been and remaining to look outside, preventing a transition from looking inside to outside. This keeps the AC stable.

[FullWings]

One of the plus points of a monitored approach with late handover is that the pilot flying the approach is prepared/expecting to fly a go-around, rather than trying to make a landing. Our SOP in BA now is to tie in SAC with the control handover, i.e. the approach must be stable for P1 to take over. If it isn't, they call for a G/A, remaining as PM.

I've flown many "self-handled" sectors in times past and it is very satisfying to land off your own approach but in an environment where you do long flights through the day/night to far off time zones in iffy weather, I think a monitored approach adds an extra layer of safety. When neither of you are feeling like the sharpest pencil in the box, spreading the workload makes sense, especially in what is a multi-pilot aircraft by design and certification.

[Fly3]

Having completed my B787 conversion last month I found the HUD to be an excellent tool for both flying and monitoring approaches. In LVP the runway edge lines which appear at 300ft RA are particularly useful in guiding your eyes where to look for the lights. The flight guidance is quite sensitive in the HUD compared with the PFD so it does take a little getting used to.

[Citation2]

The PF is the autopilot

[wilsr]

I can't believe that this old, old kerfuffle is still doing the rounds!

The "monitored approach" - call it what you will, if that's important to you - was well established when I joined BEA in the early sixties. IIRC it started around the turn of the decade: after too many bent airframes a cadre of trainers and management were sent away to a hotel and told to remain there until they had analysed the failures and come up with a solution.

Part of the problem was the fact that approaches were hand flown or coupled to what are now seen as primitive autopilots to very low limits, and go-arounds were far more common than what is acceptable today.

What came out of the deliberations was a fail-safe philosophy: the PH would fly the approach and go-around at decision height (QFE was used.) If -IF - the captain was satisfied that he had the runway and was in a satisfactory position to land (remember many approaches were non-precision, GCAs, radio ranges etc) he would interrupt the planned go-around and land.

The icing on the cake was that, freed from the mechanical business of handling the thing the captain had more mental capacity to manage the operation.

It works very well but no-one would argue that with the digital avionics that are the norm today it is necessarily the last word.

[scotbill]

Started in the late fifties actually - and coincided with an influx of experienced ex-RAF co-pilots with considerably more jet experience than most of the captains.

Although BEA safety record in the 60s and 70s was not good, critics of the monitored approach fail to recognise that none of the incidents occurred in the approach and landing phase - where about a third of industry-wide accidents were expected to happen.

[Bergerie1]

wilsr


While I can readily see the advantage of the split (monitored) approach when hand flying, or using primitive auto-coupling, to low limits, I fail to see its advantage when using modern autopilots and auto-land.


But, I am just a happy old retired BOAC man!

[Mansfield]

The monitored approach was SOP at TWA for approaches when visibility was less than 4000 or 3/4. It was also used at American, but has been discarded there for some time. For operators that still retain the ability to fly a CAT II approach to a manual landing, the monitored approach is a much better procedure...it is actually recommended in the FAA's Air Carrier Inspector's Handbook (now 8900.10). However, if autolandings are the SOP for low visibility conditions, then Bergerie1 hits the nail squarely...

I remember using the procedure when flying Metros back in the 80's. On one six leg day, we flew six monitored approaches, and both the FO and myself felt that we were far less fatigued than we might have been using the the more traditional methods.

I do also seem to recall an interesting dinner conversation at an IFALPA meeting in Geneva with Captain Last and a particular Lufthansa captain debating the pro's and con's of monitored approaches...:hmm:

[slast]

This 1964 paper by BEA's General Manager Flight Operations can give those interested a definitive record of the background. I think it indicates that the attitudes on this particular subject are not actually those implied by some of the comments found in this thread.

Bear in mind that this was written 50 years ago. In the wider global aviation environment not much appears to have changed since then. Some aspects may have been adapted to reflect developments but the principles appear sound today.

Apologies for the length of the post but I felt it better to give you it with no editing. ____________________________________________________________ ___


THE MONITORED APPROACH. Paper by Capt. W. Baillie, June 1964.

BEA's active interest in this aspect of operating techniques really began in 1948, not long after the formation of the airline, when a serious accident involving one of our aircraft raised questions about the division of workload in the control cabin.

This accident occurred during an instrument let-down in cloud to an airport which was surrounded by higher ground. Following the customary procedure of that period the Captain carried out this operation more or less single handed, the co-pilot merely obeying such instructions as the Captain gave him. Owing to a high wind and failure to obtain the outer marker the Captain eventually let-down into a hill some sixteen miles from the field. Fortunately everyone escaped with only minor injuries.

Clearly there were aspects of this operation which went beyond the question of the competence of the pilot. Was there any way in which the work-load on the principal figure could have been relieved? Why did not the co-pilot realise and point out that the Captain was seriously in error? Was it right to assume that the let-down must be carried out by the Captain?

From this germ grew the whole of BEA's philosophy on the “monitored approach" and the principle of crew cross-checking with which it is closely associated. Leaving aside for the moment the general consideration of cross-checking during other phases of flight, let us consider this vital let-down, approach and landing phase. To an increasing degree aircraft are being equipped with integrated flight systems, auto-pilots and improved radio-aids which greatly ease the task of letting-down on instruments. To an increasing degree let-down patterns and the associated equipment are becoming standardised. It follows that a well trained co-pilot who is fully conversant with these aids should be able to carry out a let-down to acceptable standards. This leaves the final approach and touch—down phase to be considered.

It is well known that the most dangerous phase in an approach under marginal conditions is that indeterminate period when the pilot has half his attention on the flight instrument panel and half on the visual references which are appearing outside, while a further part or his brain is doing its best to correlate the two sets of references and translate them into manual movement of the controls. Quite apart from the obvious difficulty of this task, there are the inevitable psychological factors which tend to cloud the pilots judgement. The feeling that if he goes a little bit lower he could get in and avoid going through the whole procedure again; the seldom acknowledged personal pride factor which puts a premium on "getting in first time". Many an aircraft has been lost through the insidious promptings of such voices as these.

The obvious solution to these problems was to divide the task so that one pilot handled the let-down and remained firmly on instruments while the other carried out the landing as soon he had adequate visual reference. If visual reference failed or was never obtained the pilot on instruments was in a position to control the aircraft with a minimum of uncertainty. If the Captain was satisfied that he had full visual reference he would then carry on to do the actual landing.

It was therefore decided to invite Captains to try out the first system on a voluntary basis. They were asked to report their reactions to the idea and to actual experience. The response was particularly interesting when it is compared with that of a group of Electra pilots in Australia who as recently as 1960 took part in a controlled experiment on these lines (Australian Department of Supply, Australian Defence Scientific Service, Aeronautical Research Laboratories Human Engineering Note 3).

Comparison of the remarks of the pilots shows that in each case there was a slight balance in favour of the system which I shall for convenience call "Monitored Approach", which could be defined as Co-pilot let-down to break-off point, Captain visual approach and landing".

The average pilot is conservative in his approach to innovations. He has to very sure that new a new idea does not one difficulty and raise half-a-dozen new ones. Above all he wants to be certain that his present system, which may have shortcomings but does work, is not swept away in favour of something which is possibly dangerous. His first reaction is therefore likely to be one of doubt if not of active opposition.

In BEA’s case we had exactly this experience. As a group, Management PiloLs, Training Captains and a small number of "innovating" pilots agreed that the system had much to recommend it, although reservations were expressed on such aspects as change of trim on handover, standardisation of system and the quality of co-pilots’ instrument flying. On the other hand, some very experienced pilots expressed strong opposition to the scheme.

During the period of about three years during which the Monitored Approach System was operated on a voluntary basis there was a stead swing of opinion in its favour. Typical of the ‘conversions’ which took place was that of a Captain who had long expressed his opposition. One day he made three unsuccessful attempts to get into Hamburg and finally on the fourth he decided have a go at Monitored Approach. To his intense surprise he got in easily and he found the whole operation so relaxed and different from his previous 'single-handed’ efforts that he was thereafter an ardent supporter.

When sufficient evidence had been obtained to show that the Monitored Approach System offered solid advantages and was gaining a general acceptance amongst pilots of all grades, we decided to move to the final stage involving its adoption as a standard operating procedure.

Before this could be effected we had to prepare more detailed instructions than had hitherto been in force. Certain points such as the discretionary powers of the Captain had to be considered and included in the final document. Perhaps most important of all, the ground had to be carefully prepared by the issue of a comprehensive Bulletin summing up the problem we were facing, the proposed solution, the trial experience so far obtained and the reasons for the decision to introduce the system as a practice. In describing the trial period, the Bulletin listed the main objections which had been voiced and showed how these objections either lacked substance or could be overcome.

The ultimate responsibility of the Captain for the safety of the aircraft is recognised. He is responsible for deciding whether or not a monitored approach is carried out on any particular occasion.

Finally the adoption of the system as a standard procedure was promulgated and incorporated in the Standing Instructions. It is now in use as the normal procedure when weather conditions necessitate an instrument approach.

As practised in BEA the Monitored Approach is initiated on all occasions when circumstances are such that it is necessary to rely on instruments after passing the holding or main approach beacon, and under these conditions the handover of the controls takes place not later than passing the beacon.
Modern performance criteria prohibits the principle of holding the critical height when visual reference has not been achieved. Under the new regulations the aircraft is assumed to be descending on the correct approach path and, therefore, when it reaches critical height it is in the correct position for continuing a sate approach. If visual contact is not obtained the aircraft must immediately climb away in the overshoot pattern.

Under the Monitored Approach System this means that the Captain gives the order to overshoot, but if he does not do so the co—pilot is under instructions to overshoot on his own initiative on reaching the critical height. The co-pilot is never permitted to fly below the critical height so that we have a "fail safe" system in this respect.

Full details of the practical application of the system are given in the Appendix 1 to this Paper, which is a direct extract from the relevant section of BEA's Operations Manual.

Arguments For and Against.

It is not suggested that the Monitored Approach is the perfect answer to the problems of getting down safely. On the other hand, we do feel that its logic should appeal to many operators and pilots who are beginning to realise that the latest generation of aircraft can be operates safely only if the crew duties are correctly allocated and the full value is obtained from the experience and ability of each crew member.
Use of the Monitored Approach Procedure enables a constant double check to carried out. The chances of both pilots making the same mistake are relatively remote, so any errors should he immediately detected. As the Captain is relieved of the routine of concentration on the instruments he can initiate the checks necessary for the safe operation of the aircraft. He can also carry out the R/T communications himself, an important consideration in terminal areas where speed and accuracy of acknowledgment are particularly necessary.
He is also free to consider the implications of weather reports and ATC instructions and to relate them to the local traffic conditions.
Although the Captain's overall responsibility for the operation of the aircraft remains entirely unchanged, the co-pilot assumes a greater share of the physical responsibility of flying the aircraft, thus relieving the Captain of a good deal of strain.
One of the most important advantages of the system, particularly when the weather is marginal, lies in the fact that during the let-down the Captain has been free from concentration on instrument flying. Instead of being "amongst the trees" he can take a good look at "the wood"; in other words, he has a better idea of the whole situation and is able to concentrate on those factors which affect his decision to carry on or to discontinue the approach.
Throughout the let-down the Captain can scan ahead and inside the control cabin. His eyes will be far better adapted to picking up visual references than they would if he had been gazing at his flight instruments. He may well obtain visual reference before reaching break-off height, in which case he will have longer to establish himself.
If the co-pilot does make a mistake during the let-down, experience shows that the Captain is quick to see the error. Recent experience of auto-coupled approaches has shown an even greater need than ever to supervise the co-pilot‘s selection of "feed-in" facilities as this can be a ready source of error or omission.
Finally, the is every incentive for the Captain to use the secondary aids which may act as a further cross-check on the accuracy of the approach.
The success of this procedure obviously depends on two factors:—
1. The use of “recommended procedures" by all pilots. This reduces the risk of undetected error or misunderstanding, and makes it possible for two pilots to work together as a team, even though they may not have flown together before.
2. The instrument flying ability of the First Officer. All First Officer are trained to he required standard during type conversion and Captains should ensure that this standard is maintained by adequate Practice. A monitored should only be continued if the Captain is satisfied that the First Officer is up top the required standard.
The importance of ensuring adequate standards for co-pilots has already been mentioned but it can hardly be over-emphasised that this is the key to general acceptance of the procedure by line Captains. The word ‘standards’ has been used here to cover all aspects of the co-pilot's duties, although instrument flying ability is obviously the main consideration. The general feeling of mutual confidence upon which sound teamwork is built derives not so much from tghe knowledge that crew members are competent in certain narrow spheres but rather from the belief that they are professional men who thoroughly understand the work and responsibilities of their colleagues.
The job of the co-pilot is a responsible one which demands the best that a man can give. Under the monitored approach system he is given a vital part of the operation. Granted the co-pilot is under supervision and granted that he probably has an auto-pilot with numerous feed-in facilities, it is still a highly important job. No let-down is entirely routine, each has its subtleties, many are extremely critical. This is a sphere in which the co-pilot may really feel that he is in no sense a mere recorder of events and a manipulator of ancillary controls. In practice it has been found that co-pilots gain confidence and skill very quick1y once they are given the responsibility. For these reasons we have found that the co-pilots like the Monitored Approach Procedure very much.
Another common objection is the possible deterioration in Captain’s instrument flying standards. This is easily overcome by taking every opportunity of practising let-downs in good weather which, together with routine refresher flying, should prevent any marked falling off in standards.
in BEA this has never presented any problem and our check flight reports show that there has been no falling off in Captains standards in this respect.
The adoption of the system of cross-checking and the monitored approach demands a fundamental change in the respective functions and indeed, of the conventional relationship between Captain and co-pilots. In this new relationship it is up to each crew member to adopt an attitude of mind which “asks the reason why”. No action which appears to be contrary to the control instructions, the let-down sheet, the Operations Manual or the Drill Cards can be allowed to pass unchallenged. We have long ago passed the stage where the unhappy co-pilot would merely raise his eye-brows, shrug his shoulders, say to himself "I suppose he knows what he's doing” and return the contemplation of his log or the vagaries of the radio—compass. There may well be some reluctance to accept these changes but it is contended that the potential advantages of the system are such that these changes are worth accepting.

[blind pew]

Steve you seemed to have missed a salient point, that is when was it decided to split the flying duties and when was this procedure changed to the industry standard?
IE...when was and wasn't the flying pilot allowed to operate and monitor his own thrust levers (throttles ..english).

[slast]

please explain relevance to my post?

[blind pew]

Do I really need to?
You talk about BEAs monitored approach but the version I flew had split duties with PNF playing with the levers.
I had dinner with two of my course mates a fortnight ago and both had bent BA aircraft on landing...one was because PNF didn't operate the throttles correctly.
I operated a complete monitored approach in SR with a continue faze down to 100ft - hand flown of course. Now that was a slick operation.

[slast]

I still don't understand. You say my posting missed something significant out and imply I am therefore misleading people. Let's just be clear about this. Other posters have asked when and why this concept came about in BEA. I just posted (without significant comment) an official source showing it goes back to the 1940s, and what that source's concept was. It's a general principle for minimising "pilot errors" in visual transition for landing, and for improving the reliability of internal crew monitoring and crosschecking during approaches in general. Summarised as perhaps "It's safer if the pilot-in-charge is Pilot Monitoring not Pilot Flying, until a safe landing on required visual cues can be achieved".

You are for some reason now adding in that I have some obligation to satisfy YOU with details of one specific aspect of aircraft handling (thrust lever management), because an operator that used this principle ALSO at one time had a thrust management procedure that you didn't like. The pros and cons of that are a separate issue and would be applicable regardless of whether these principles are in use or not, i.e. for "pilot-in-charge monitored" or "conventional" approaches.