North Sea heli ditching: Oct 2012

[timmcat]

BBC News - 'Helicopter ditches in North Sea' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20033833)

(Maybe more suited to Rotorheads - mods, over to you).

[Heathrow Harry]

Lifeboats have been launched after reports a helicopter has ditched in the North Sea.

It is believed the incident is about 20 miles south of Sumburgh Head in Shetland.
It is not yet known if there are any casualties.


An RNLI spokesperson told BBC Scotland the Kirkwall, Aith and Lerwick lifeboats were launched after being alerted by Shetland Coastguard.


It is believed to involve a CHC helicopter.

[vee_why]

BBC News reporting that a helicopter has ditched 20 miles south of Sumburgh....

Operator is reported to be CHC.

Fingers crossed crew and pax are safe.

[DavidWoodward]

Just had a news alert for this. Sky are saying that SAR are "attempting to rescue 19 people from the sea." Fingers crossed!

[fa2fi]

Anyone know which rig it was going to/from?

[ChockIce]

Fingers crossed for a speedy and safe return to dry land.

[DavidWoodward]

Afraid not however RNLI have confirmed that they have recovered all 19 POB from a raft. Great news.

[tubby linton]

BBC reporting this:
BBC News - Lifeboats launched after helicopter ditches in North Sea (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20033833)

[whoateallthepies]

Any news on type?

[ChockIce]

Last update at 1625

BBC News - Lifeboats launched after helicopter ditches in North Sea (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20033833)

[Heathrow Harry]

CHC Helicopter confirmed one of its aircraft was involved but the exact details of the incident were not yet known.


It is not yet known if there are any casualties.

[handsfree]

All 19 safely recovered according to the BBC.

[crippen]

Sky News reporting that it was a soft controlled landing in the sea.(what ever that means!)

[ChockIce]

Sky saying all safe thankfully.

North Sea Rescue As Helicopter Ditches (http://news.sky.com/story/1001084/north-sea-rescue-as-helicopter-ditches)

[Heathrow Harry]

thank god everyone is Ok,,,,,,,

[Ikoyian]

Possibly a EC225, but not sure how accurate my source is.
I hear all pax & crew recovered ok.

[Flyingmac]

thank god everyone is Ok,,,,,,,


Nothing to do with crew skills then?

[NorthSouth]

STV reports it as en route from Aberdeen to the West Phoenix drilling rig.
NS

[NorthSouth]

Looks like it was Helibus 24T, left Aberdeen at 1415
NS

[riverrock83]

Beeb reports:
It is understood the Super Puma EC 225 had been heading to the West Phoenix drilling rig.

[DX Wombat]

From Yahoo. (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/north-sea-rescue-helicopter-ditches-151529608.html)

[212man]

Good job! (is too short a message to post, so bolstered with superfluous verbiage - Happy now pprune?)

[fisbangwollop]

Good report just now on BBC Scotland news. helicopter still afloat and visible from Fair Isle.....Lifeboat standing by. all 19 SOB safe and well. :cool:

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Pleased all safe; now we can all sit back and wait for that well known "aviation expert" Jim (no mates) Ferguson to tell us what happened in his usual inimitable style.:E

SND

[fatmanmedia]

bbc news has the story on the web site

BBC News - North Sea helicopter ditching: 'All safe' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20033833)

interesting analysis :rolleyes:

fats

[jayteeto]

Now everyone is ok, I can be sarcastic. I suppose we are going to blame Bond for this? Or are rig workers going to refuse to fly on CHC helis now?

[5711N0205W]

BBC Scotland news did manage to refer to it as a CHC Bond Super Puma....:ugh:

[Bravo73]

Danish chemical tanker Nord Nightingale rescued all 19 pob using her rescue boat, all then transferred to RAF Rescue 137 and flown to Kirkwall.


Some were transferred by a Jigsaw aircraft, apparently.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

The funniest part of an AAIB interview I had a long time ago was when one of the investigators said "We won't worry too much about what you tell us, we'll just read what that t**t jim Ferguson says and write the report from that!"

One day the media will properly read these pages and get the inside industry opinion of JF.

SND

[Sir George Cayley]

What yardstick do you measure that by?

[Lonewolf_50]

This sort of thing is becoming increasingly common.......

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/yeees.gif

Do you mean the petty sniping around posts 5-8? ;)

On the topic, glad to see that the ditch evolution was successful, in terms of getting the bird down safely, and the people out safely.

:ok:

[BTC8183]

7 survivors landed at Sumburgh by Rescue Bond 2.

[jimf671]

CHC Press Release.

STATEMENT: CONTROLLED DITCHING OFF OF SHETLAND, U.K. (http://www.chc.ca/AboutCHC/News/Pages/STATEMENT-CONTROLLED-DITCHING-OFF-OF-SHETLAND-U-K.aspx)



'Big' team on the case by the look of it.
Emergency Response | The BIG Partnership | PR & Digital Marketing (http://www.bigpartnership.co.uk/services/public-relations/emergency-response)

[Hummingfrog]

Well done to the CHC crew it is never easy to ditch but with good crew training the decision becomes easier. Glad everybody is fine and well.:ok:

I did find it interesting to ditch a 365N2 into the hotel swimming pool - even the sunshades moved under the effect of the downwash - damn good these French Simulators:E

HF

[jimf671]

SAR Aircraft MMSI 111232502 (OC?)

AIS track shows them almost stationary at 61.6N 1.3E at 1418 then 140kn to the hospital helipad in Aberdeen at 1646. Timings UTC.

[whitus1]

Be interesting to see if this is another gearbox issue....

[squirrelht1]

REF:- Danish chemical tanker Nord Nightingale rescued all 19 pob using her rescue boat, all then transferred to RAF Rescue 137 and flown to Kirkwall.

Ref Little Clouds statement!

Rescue 137 was asked to pickup 12 survivors from NN's bridge wing and proceed to KWL(Kirkwall)!
Rescue Bond2 recovered the remainder (7) and took them to Sumburgh due to prevailing weather at Kirkwall. Fact.... Landing at Sumburgh at 1655z.

Beep beep

[Harry the Hun]

I did find it interesting to ditch a 365N2 into the hotel swimming pool - even the sunshades moved under the effect of the downwash - damn good these French Simulators:E

HF[/QUOTE]

They better be damn good to prepare the crews of the not so damn good helicopters for ditching. It appears that the need to ditch this type of helicopter has increased slightly in the recent past.

[axefurabz]

Here's a report that may add a little more info for you ...

Shetland News | Rescued passengers praise chopper crew [5720] (http://www.shetnews.co.uk/news/5720-helicopter-ditched-in-north-sea)

[SUMBURGH DIRECTOR]

Very experienced crew it would appear. And sounded incredibly calm and professional on the radio. Well done! :ok:

[squirrelht1]

Just the ticket..... You must have been taking the picture!

Beep beep:

[fisbangwollop]

Just woke up to the dulcet tones of Jim Fergusson on Radio Scotland....ah bless him :cool:

[diginagain]

You have to admit, he's got a regular gig.

[QM]

Glad everyone is OK, wonder what the cause is this time?

[Impress to inflate]

Is Jim Fergusson to blame this time ??

[cyclic]

All three operators have suspended flights of 225s and L2s - time to sell your EADS shares?

[lowfat]

Mods

Shouldn't this thread be renamed "chc Helicopter ditching 22/10/12" to differentiate from the other 225 ditching threads?

I

[helen-damnation]

Does Jim Ferguson get paid. If so, I may have to learn to spout @£$& too! :E

I haven't seen any crew names yet. Have they been released? Only ask as I used to know some of the guys up there.

[SASless]

Shouldn't this thread be renamed "chc Helicopter ditching 22/10/12" to differentiate from the other 225 ditching threads?


How many ditchings have we had on the North Sea this month?

[lowfat]

It didn't have the month on it when I posted. sasless


But we do seem to have a plethora .

[SASless]

Well now.....I suppose it is time for HC to jump in here and tell us how superior the 225 is when compared to the 92.

In the past I posed the question re the design of the 225 MGB and whether there exists a design flaw that just does not pass muster. Have EC hung their Shoppo rouge on the wrong peg with this one?

[HeliHenri]

SASless Well now.....I suppose it is time for HC to jump in here and tell us how superior the 225 is when compared to the 92.



It floats better ... :rolleyes:
3 ditchings in 8 years since first introduction in 2004.

And Sikorsky will be welcome to join them because when you speak about MGB ...:bored:
.

[Milo C]

We may call it now EC225 "Hydrocopter"

[shetlander]

https://fbcdn-sphotos-b-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/293833_10150948091312168_1087515577_n.jpg

https://fbcdn-sphotos-h-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/409256_10150948091382168_1351580845_n.jpg

https://fbcdn-sphotos-e-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/63150_10150948091417168_311057006_n.jpg

https://fbcdn-sphotos-f-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/292834_10150948021847168_421056199_n.jpg


:cool:

[SASless]

Floats work a treat in flat water don't they!

[HeliComparator]

I suppose it is time for HC to jump in here and tell us how superior the 225 is when compared to the 92.

When it is flying, it is of course vastly superior to the S92. However, when it falls into the water (again), it is no better...

We don't yet know what happened, but if it is the same as the last one, that is going to be pretty embarrassing for EC.

In the past I posed the question re the design of the 225 MGB and whether there exists a design flaw that just does not pass muster

I don't think there is a conceptual design flaw, but the devil is in the detail and there was certainly a detail problem with the Bond ditching, and maybe there is still a detail problem lurking there (we won't know until we get more info). The only thing I can say is that detail problems are relatively easy to fix, fundamental design problems such as no attempt to permit flight after total loss of oil, are much harder to fix.

[cyclic]

a detail problem with the Bond ditching

I know what you are getting at but the main shaft fracturing isn't a detail problem, I would suggest it's more than a small detail. The Emergency Lube giving an indication of malfunction even though it hadn't may have been a blessing when you consider the shaft was left unsupported in the MGB. Another 30mins in this state could have caused a little more than a "detail problem".

[cyclic]

Floats work a treat in flat water don't they!

Yep, it might have been a different story in Sea State 6. EC have actually stated that they are very pleased with the performance of their floats. Tested in the Mediterranean...

[Colibri49]

"the shaft was left unsupported in the MGB". Correct me if I'm wrong (I usually am) but the schematic of the gearbox and bevel gear at the bottom of the shaft to engage with the oil pumps, in no way indicates that the loss of the bevel gear would leave the shaft unsupported. The weld holding the bevel gear to the shaft fractured and the gear dropped off the shaft. Shaft continued turning, fully supported by its bearings.

With any luck the latest ditching isn't due to the same cause, but due to loss of oil from somewhere else like a failed engine input seal. Hope it's nothing worse because I fly these truly delightful machines every working day from Aberdeen.

[cyclic]

What I was driving at was that there was a shaft (bevel gear drive shaft) in the MGB that was no longer connected and the exact position of the bearing supports isn't present on the schematic. It had failed below the bevel gear (the bevel gear was still connected to the shaft above the failure thank goodness) and in dropping, the lower part of the shaft had damaged one of the roller bearings and the gear teeth of the pumps. However, you are quite right that this may not have caused a further failure as all the debris was no longer being circulated by the oil. I just don't like the thought that the shaft that drives the whole thing had even the slightest potential to fail without other cause and we are then in the realms of experimental engineering. EC obviously have used this technique when it comes to the design and test of the Emergency Lube system as it was never fitted to a complete system before entering service.

I fly 'em as well but not every working day...

[HeliComparator]

I know what you are getting at but the main shaft fracturing isn't a detail problem, I would suggest it's more than a small detail.

If you bear in mind that the design of shaft has run for millions of flight hours in the 332L, L2 and 225 without problem (up until last year), then the concept must be OK. Some detail changed in the manufacturing process recently (different surface treatments etc) and that precipitated the problem for the Bond ditching. (Whether or not for this one, we don't yet know.). So I would say that since a small detail change caused the problem - albeit a pretty catastrophic problem - it is a small detail change to fix it.

[cyclic]

HC, I totally agree, let's hope that they DID fix it. Let's also hope that they properly test any other new systems or detail changes as I never wanted to be a test pilot. If this was a fixed wing from one of the major manufacturers then I think it would be making a bit more impact. These aircraft aren't exactly cheap!

[jimf671]

Nice pics shetlander. Are you promoting it as a floating resort location?



Where do we go now?
- Super Puma gearbox: black mark
- S-92 gearbox: black mark


Anyone for S-61T?

[Pittsextra]

Cyclic - given you fly them surely the process of finding out what went wrong is a little more structured than "hoping" they fixed the problem??

[turboshaft]

Anyone for S-61T?
Not the epitome of program perfection either. Four years after the program was first announced we're still waiting for the first Triton to be delivered; the 15 or so shipped to date have all been refurb'd analog S-61Ns.

[Savoia]

Shetlander: Well done in getting these photos to the thread, much appreciated! :ok:

[MoodyMan]

Playing around with Shetlander's 2nd photograph in Photoshop uncovers a rather large soot / oil mark extending from the left hand engine to the tail rotor.

[jimf671]

... ... never fitted to a complete system before entering service. ...

When I read S5/2012 the other day I was quite surprised to read that.

One would expect there to be validation and review stages in the design control system that would have led them down a different path.

[iamthetroll]

@Moodyman:
As is quite normal for these machines, especially 225s after a day's flying. Very smoky.

[nessboy]

On its way to Peterhead on board a supply ship.

[HeliComparator]

Playing around with Shetlander's 2nd photograph in Photoshop uncovers a rather large soot / oil mark extending from the left hand engine to the tail rotor.

The engines do burn a lot of oil normally- the air oil separator is not very efficient so oil mist tends to find its way into the exhaust area, where it is cooked sufficiently to make it a black mess - but not sufficiently to burn it off.

The latest engine mod state has an improved separator and so a cleaner exhaust, but this is by no means implemented in the whole N Sea fleet.

[Clive J]

Olympic Shipping* (http://www.olympic.no/default.asp?menu=48)

Due in Peterhead at 03.30

[Offshorebear]

Wonder how much it cost to spot charter that vessel - or can they claim salvage rights (or ransom) on the helicopter ? :)

[heliwanab]

Great end result of course but Just wondered why lossie SAR and a bond jigsaw attended,where was Shetland coastguard?? Surely they were closer

[Sick Hors Ski]

Normally Puma`s migrate to Dutch beaches this time of year, give or take a month..............

[helicrazi]

Bond 2 are practically next door to the Sumburgh Coastguard, so no distance advantage there and they were on a tasking at the time.

[Ullevi]

Offshorebear :

£65k a day for the vessel according to Westshore Shipbrokers AS - A leading Offshore Shipbroker in Norway. | Home (http://www.westshore.no)

[nessboy]

"Shetland Coastguard’s own search and rescue 102 was on a medevac to Aberdeen Royal Infirmary when the call came in."

[jimf671]

Great end result of course but Just wondered why lossie SAR and a bond jigsaw attended,where was Shetland coastguard?? Surely they were closer

See data from AIS shown in my post on page 2.

[Variable Load]

I suppose it is time for HC to jump in here and tell us how superior the 225 is when compared to the 92.
When it is flying, it is of course vastly superior to the S92. However, when it falls into the water (again), it is no better...

HC, what a shame you have become a Rotorhead's character that is pilloried in public like Shell Management.
Perhaps it is even sadder that you don't realise it is happening. Your response was so very predicable, despite your undoubted ability to provide a more reasoned and balanced one.
The EC225 is just a machine - with flaws and weaknesses like any other machine. A small cabin, a totally inadequate luggage bay, an in service reliability rate that is embarrassing, and a DOC that is not competitive. Oh - it also has seems to have an affinity to lying on it's side as well as to water.
However it is a good machine from the pilot's perspective - shame the customers get such a poor product!
A "Super Puma" that has genuinely reached the end of it's useful life and perhaps isn't so "Super" any more?

[HeliComparator]

HC, what a shame you have become a Rotorhead's character that is pilloried in public like Shell Management.
Perhaps it is even sadder that you don't realise it is happening. Your response was so very predicable, despite your undoubted ability to provide a more reasoned and balanced one.

Or maybe I just have a sense of humour and don't take myself too seriously?

[BTC8183]

I think that is how we all remember you here in NL... Mr M!
;)

[Variable Load]

Or maybe I just have a sense of humour and don't take myself too seriously?

Well I'll certainly bear that in mind whenever I read your posts - not to take them seriously :ok:

[fatmanmedia]

BBC news is reporting that the pilots ditch because they thought the MGB had failed.

BBC News - Ditched Super Puma pilots 'feared gearbox problem' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20054080)

fats

[ericferret]

The comment above on cost of boat charter lead me to think about who is actually responsible for recovering the aircraft.

The operator, the insurance company or the AAIB.

Normally once an aircraft has had an accident it becomes the property of the insurance company I base this on having recovered a couple for insurance companies.

If the beast is going to be scrap does an insurance company want to spend a couple of days boat charter £100,000?

Just curious as to the process.

[Ullevi]

I see Bond have at least 1 flight going today.

Is it one of their AW139's?

[iamthetroll]

3 flights on a 139 I believe. Seems to be the bel-air that was working for them after G-REDW ditched.
Hearing word that there are N3s on their way up from Bond's bases down south.
Also a 155 from Dancopter (not sure who it will be flying for).

[Ullevi]

Thanks. I remember seeing it help with the catch up after REDW.

[FBav]

Also a 155 from Dancopter (not sure who it will be flying for)

It will fly for MOG and Dong/Hess in Denmark, (DanCopter has 4 EC225s not flying)

[Fareastdriver]

I was at a Eurocopter presentation last week and we were told that a 225 gearbox had a 30 min run dry capability. It had been proven by running a geabox drained of oil for 58 minutes, past the 45 minute running time required to prove the 30 minutes. This run dry capability has been banded around enough recently but is the 225 actually certified to be able to use that capability?

[FBav]

Its a part of the certification requirements, what Eurocopter has done to pass this is to install a emergency lubrication system that lubricates and cool the MGB in case of full run dry situation

And when the MGB lubrication fails and the emergency lubrication system fails(or indication of working system fails) you would like to land while still in control

[Tango123]

Are we talking days or even weeks, before the NS operators will have their 225s up and running again, and Eurocopter will guarantee the cooling of the MGB?

[cyclic]

The system has never been tested as a whole:

The emergency lubrication system was certificated by the EuropeanAviationSafetyAgency(EASA). Certification included a test on a ground rig in which the oil was drained from a MGB and bleed air and Hydrosafe 620 were sprayed into the gearbox. The test demonstrated that there was no significant damage to the MGB after over 30 minutes of operation. Although the emergency lubrication sub-systems were tested individually, no test was carried out on the complete system, either on a test rig or installed on the helicopter type.

from the G-REDW AAIB report

[malabo]

Not familiar with the geography, but just how far were they from the nearest possible dry landing area? Not talking instrument approach, offshore you can chop and drop until you see water. From reading the AAIB report, if this case were similar ( how sad would that be: Bond sinking a perfectly good 30 mil helicopter and nobody learning a lesson) for a "land immediate" they would have required a failure of the EMERG cooling system, otherwise stopwatch it 30 min and consider options. I don't fly the EC225 or L2, so if this sounds ingnorant (in the literal sense) go ahead and say so.

[helicrazi]

Malabo,

So you are saying you would elect to continue flying with a gearbox with no certified run dry time and a failure of the emergency lube, to the nearest land 14 or so miles away on the assumption that you have the exact same problem as a previous ditching because of a report you have read? Brave man!

[finalchecksplease]

AAIB G-CHCN (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S6-2012%20G-CHCN.pdf)

[malabo]

If the EMERG Lube was working, then yes I would drive the 14nm (thanks for that figure) or 7 minutes to a dry feet landing. If it was not working then I'd likely ditch on a flat sea, or maybe still drive 7 minutes if night and sea state 6 because I am not a brave man.

After the Bond incident recently, I cannot believe there would be any question that the EMERG Lube would absolutely work. No self-respecting operator, airworthiness authority or OEM would have taken the chance to dispatch without ensuring it works.

The Bond 225 had a short history of telltales that were discounted until the incident. Did the CHC one have the same? We can wait for the AAIB report, unlike other countries they are accurate, thorough, and eventually publish their findings.

[finalchecksplease]

Malabo,

See AAIB report link in my previous post, interesting reading ...

[HeliComparator]

So, an exact copy of the REDW ditching it seems. As far as I can make out from the report, the HUMS system detected the problem before the incident flight, but CHC did not look at the data - they were not required to do so, but best practice...

Whilst this might put CHC in a difficult place, it at least means that for the rest of us, we can be confident that HUMS, when rigorously utilised, can prevent a recurrence.

For the record, Bristow downloads the HUMS data at each return to base, and an aircraft is in not despatched until the HUMS data has been checked and found to be "green". That process takes less than 5 minutes.

Going to get some stick from VL now...

[helicrazi]

And as I understand it, its also standard practice at Bond to do the same, looks like CHC are on their own on that one!

[cyclic]

CHC aside, where are the rest of the faulty shafts? EC said they knew where they all were, which is obviously not the case. I don't think we should completely reliant on HUMS data to find components prone to failure. I'm sure there will be a lot of head scratching going on at the moment.

[morfmedia]

BBC News - Super Puma inquiry finds helicopter fault (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20076907)

[HeliComparator]

Cyclic, I agree - clearly the shaft in question was not subject to the 4 hr mandatory download, so something is wrong with the list of shaft numbers in the ASB. I suspect we will be back to all shafts being subject to the AD/ASB. As you say, that should be short term measure and fixing the underlying problem the closing action.

[HeliComparator]

I see from the beeb article that our friend JF gets it completely wrong as usual!

[Wizzard]

From the BBC website:

Aviation writer Jim Ferguson said: "Unlike the 10 May Bond incident, this emergency saw the shaft crack actually taking out both lubricating oil pumps and hence the immediate water landing was absolutely essential and prevented a far worse outcome than a ditching.

Wrong again Jimbo :ugh::ugh:

[heli-cal]

Malabo,

So, as PIC, you're happy to gamble with the lives of everyone else aboard, and to continue flight, despite 'Land Immediately' being the correct course of action?

The aircraft cost is of no consequence in comparison to the lives of those aboard!

[HeliComparator]

In the news article relating to the recent ditching of an EC225 helicopter in the N Sea, once again the BBC chooses Jim Ferguson to give his opinion on the event, as if it were fact. Unfortunately Mr Ferguson is just a plane spotter and has no technical nor operational experience of helicopter operations. Whenever he is called upon to give his opinion in such matters, he always gets his facts completely wrong, as is the case in this report where he makes completely incorrect statements when comparing this event to the ditching of the Bond helicopter in May - despite what he says, the two AAIB reports show that the problems were virtually identical. This is a sensitive subject up here for the offshore workforce, and the spread of mis-information does not help. I can appreciate that it might be difficult to get statements from people who actually know what they are talking about, but the BBC should resist using Jim even if there is no one else - the BBC should stick to facts as published by the relevant experts such as AAIB, or perhaps the manufacturers and operators (but remembering that they have vested interests). Rather than asking Jim Ferguson, why not just ask the old lady who works in the local laundrette - she would have just as accurate a picture of the facts as Jim does, and might be more entertaining!

[HeliComparator]

If the EMERG Lube was working, then yes I would drive the 14nm (thanks for that figure) or 7 minutes to a dry feet landing.

Let's see, 14 miles at the maximum allowed speed of 80kts in 7 minutes - must be a very strong tailwind!

Anyway, if Emerg Lube was working, maybe. If not, definitely not unless you want to die and take everyone else with you. You stand a fair chance ditching in SS6, you stand no chance if the gbx gives up in flight.

[jimf671]

... 14 miles at the maximum allowed speed of 80kts in 7 minutes ...

To be fair HC, that might be the answer to the wrong question.

When the emergency started, the aircraft was not at the ditiching site but was a few miles further south and at 3000 feet. Out to the right of the flightpath was a piece of land that was not 14 or 11 or whatever NM further away than the ditching site. On the closest part of that land is a lighthouse and at lighthouses you find a big H.

Of course, Fair Isle does not have the world's most inviting coastline and staying the hell away from it cannot be faulted.

[HeliComparator]

New EC ASB out requiring HUMS download every 3 hrs for EC225. Bit of a pain but at least it gets us flying again.

[Tcabot113]

Historically HUMS can detect 50% or so of impending failures. It has generally been good at detecting the second occurrence. In this case it failed for whatever reason. HUMS is decent as a second line of defense, it should never be elevated to a go/no go system.

Conclusion should be all shafts inspected (and replaced if needed) prior to next flight and in case of a loss of oil pressure ditch. If the emergency lube is so problematic to give off false failure warnings, it can easily give no indication of a real failure. This would be the Cougar 92 crash all over again.

TC

[Camper Van Basten]

Conclusion should be all shafts inspected (and replaced if needed) prior to next flight

Yeah, let's do that.

Inspecting that shaft (visually) is a very long, laborious, and difficult task, especially considering the number of aircraft / flights we're talking about. Replacing it is an overhaul function.

I'm not sure what the best solution is, but that certainly isn't it.

[Tcabot113]

CVB

Making sure it did not happen the first time is the most cost effective approach. Having a second identical set of multiple failures is inexcusable. We have seen in this case relying on HUMS is not a substitute for airworthy components.

Also, I do not see a one time visual inspection to keep aircraft out of the drink is unreasonable in light of the current events.

TC

[Tcabot113]

TM

Original reports on the first event indicated a detectable manufacturing defect. Visually inspect for that! If it can not be inspected for then yes they all should be grounded until a replacement shaft is available.

If the back up lube actually worked with no false alarms this would be just a minor issue, but it now has a proven 100% failure rate which leaves no choice but to ditch. It will be interesting to see if the lube warning is miswired or has a CWA logic issue.

TC

[Pittsextra]

If the back up lube actually worked with no false alarms this would be just a minor issue, but it now has a proven 100% failure rate which leaves no choice but to ditch. It will be interesting to see if the lube warning is miswired or has a CWA logic issue

well maybe the logic that is when something has physically failed no about of lubrication is going to heal it??? I guess in the design of this system if there is other data that over rides the suggestion that lubrication is working OK it gives warning?

[Harry the Hun]

well maybe the logic that is when something has physically failed no about of lubrication is going to heal it??? I guess in the design of this system if there is other data that over rides the suggestion that lubrication is working OK it gives warning?


Please say again, you are coming in garbled.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

I'm afraid I have had to join HC on this one:

Sir, I have just read your news article concerning the ditching of a Superpuma helicopter in the North Sea on Monday ("Super Puma inquiry finds helicopter fault"). Why does the BBC insist on trotting out the buffoon Jim Ferguson at every opportunity whenever helicopters in the North Sea are discussed? Once again he has proved he is not nearly as qualified as he thinks he is to comment on such issues. His remarks on this event, plus his comments on a recently released report on the May 2012 Bond ditching, are blatantly wrong, yet will be believed by many as they has been given by an 'expert' on the BBC. Surely it is possible to find someone in Aberdeen who actually knows what they are talking about?

Regards

Obnoxio f*ckwit

[onesquaremetre]

If the back up lube actually worked with no false alarms this would be just a minor issue

Don't forget the Bond ditching had a chip warning as well because the shaft moved and teeth started to break up. That doesn't appear to have happened here but the origin of the problem appears similar. Hardly a minor issue.

[Pittsextra]

yes I'm sorry, haste and speed.

My point being that in the case of mechanical failure within the gearbox at some point no amount of lubrication is going to help. The false readings given in the case of REDW were suggested as

"it was concluded that a bleed air pressure sensor at the
top end of the specified tolerance could generate an MGB EMLUB caption, even though all the parts of the emergency lubrication system are operating within their specifications."

I'm not sure what the logic is with the system vis if the Emergency Lube is functioning very well when that is not the thing thats going to save you.

Edited to add:- perhaps the error and MGB EMLUB caption was a blessing when the bevel gear vertical shaft has failed.

[Harry the Hun]

Who designed and manufactures the MGB and Emer Lube system, is it EC or some other company?

[Bravo73]

If the back up lube actually worked with no false alarms this would be just a minor issue

I don't think that you understand the significance of the failure in both this accident and G-REDW. The main shaft in the gearbox has effectively sheared in two, due to the weld failing.

The emlub system is not designed to deal with a failure of this type, regardless of whether or not it gives an erroneous failure indication. The emlub is designed to work if there is a total loss of the gearbox oil (due to, say, the MGB case cracking). This is not what has happened to G-CHCN and G-REDW.

[Pittsextra]

@Bravo - exactly.

What is of concern is that why any conclusion is taking time. This stuff will be easy to track to back through the engineering process and one hopes in the fullness of time that its not commerical pressure coming into play.

[cyclic]

The whole of the NS is at a virtual standstill save for a few flights. The last time we had this, EC issued the 3hr HUMS inspection routine. The companies then realised that you can't do much with a 225 in 3hrs especially if you have rigs in the ESB served from Aberdeen. It was then extended to 4hrs. Technicalities aside, what do you think the customers are thinking? They want to get on with their business but have a workforce, quite rightly, who may not be convinced. We also have a workforce of pilots who, in some cases, have seen three MGB failures in 3 years. It will be extremely interesting to see how this pans out and will give a true reflection on the real ethos of the industry.

[S76Heavy]

Once the bears stop boarding there is nothing the oil companies nor operators can do.

As a pilot I would be very reluctant to go out and operate a machine with a proven deficiency as long as there are no clear and decisive steps taken to mitigate the risk. I would want proof that my MGB is not about to thrash itself to bits, not just a general assurance that with a bit more monitoring it will be ok. That did not work last time either.

And I speak from personal experience of my type being grounded after a fatal accident caused by technical failure. The first few flights after we were cleared to operate again where still quite scary and all of us were extremely vigilant.

[Offshorebear]

Was there any history of gearbox problems on Super Pumas / 225's prior to the 85N tragedy ?

Would seem odd that it has just become prevelant in last three years or am I being a bit oversimplistic ?

My personal opinion is that if you guys are happy to fly the aircraft every day then I think my hour and a half each way every month is no big deal, unfortnately a fair few of the punters offshore don't think the same so may have to find a new line of work .

[Pittsextra]

http://http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/august_2012/s3_2012_ec225_lp_super_puma__g_redw.cfm

Page 6 onwards....

and perhaps when they say this in July you'd think you would have an answer by now:-

The investigation will continue to review the results from the fatigue tests, with other data and evidence, to establish the mechanism that caused the initiation and propagation of the fatigue cracks in the bevel gear vertical shaft. It will also review the manufacturing process, dimensional inspections and quality system.

[Fareastdriver]

Offshorebear
There was no problem before the last few years. The reason is that previously the gearbox shaft was different; the part No was 331 something as opposed to 332 something. Super Puma 332Ls were fitted with the old shaft and those that still have them are not affected. Those that were replaced with the new shaft and all 332L2s and 225s that are fitted with the new shaft are under investigation.

[HeliComparator]

Fareastdriver, that's true but it is strange that we have been operating EC225s for the past 7 years, with over 70,000 fleet hours and never had a problem. This spate (well pair) of problems with the vertical shaft does suggest something has changed since the introduction of the 225, I am just not sure what it is.

[Pittsextra]

Well in the AAIB report it suggests that a process changed in 2009...

Without trying to be smug but this isn't complex. The process involved will be well documented at all levels, and Eurocopter has annual revenues of around €5 billion.

How hard can it be?

[Dry wretched thunder]

Gearbox failure caused helicopter with 19 on board to ditch in North Sea | Aberdeen & North | News | STV (http://news.stv.tv/north/196593-gearbox-failure-caused-helicopter-with-19-on-board-to-ditch-in-north-sea/)

[onesquaremetre]

One of the previous AAIB bulletins said that the base material of the old bevel gear vertical shafts were carburized steel alloy and the new ones on the EC225 and modified L1 and L2s are nitrided steel alloy. The other main difference is stiffened conical housing.

[good-vibes]

S76Heavy, you say "... The first few flights after we were cleared to operate again where still quite scary and all of us were extremely vigilant."

As a regular passenger on 225s, I would like to think the flight crew are always EXTREMELY VIGILANT :\

AND another thing - further to the discussion on frequency of data analysis, I don't understand why the bevel gear and oil pump gear mesh frequency detectors aren't clagged up to orange and red lights on the dashboard not to mention remotely monitored.

Oil platforms do continuous vibration monitoring on safety and business critical kit - if a compressor or turbine throws a wobbly, it is displayed real-time on a computer screen on-shore.

How come the aviation industry is so negligently lax in this respect?

[c53204]

If a new or changed material is the cause of this, the question should be why was the change made. Being cynical I have to say cost.

I owned a Citroen car (the ones with hydraulic suspension). After 6 weeks from new the High pressure pump failed. Reason? They had changed the type of bushes to cut costs. They eventually reverted to the old type bush, but the whole episode must have cost more than using the 'cheaper/inferior' bush in the first place.

[Colibri49]

"I have the EC ASB now giving 3 hours between downloads for the EC225."

Whether it is 3, 4 or 5 hours between HUMS downloads, I believe that the specified maximum period will have to include all rotors running time on the ground and helidecks. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the lubrication pumps and the bevel gear on the shaft are incurring the same or similar wear and tear, airborne or not.

This will impose a serious limitation on the radius of action, because non-airborne time accounts for something like 15% to 25% of total running time. Senior Management is aware of this.

[Fareastdriver]

There's an old saying; 'If it ain't broke don't fix it.'

This gearbox design has been going since 1966 and over the years, 1971 to 2008 in my case, and it has performed flawlessly. It wsn't until it entered civil service in the mid seventies that a gearbox oil pressure guage was even fitted; before that it was just an MgpP warning. The obvious structural difference between the two is that on the old ones the pump was mounted on the back with the alternators and hydraulics as the shaft had to be kept hollow for gunsights etc. I can understand using the shaft as an alternative drive for a standby system but why the main one as well? and if it did work why change the material.

Another example of this saying was with the BV 234 Chinook. They had millions of hours being beaten to death in Viet Nam without any trouble; the North Sea was going to be a walk in the park. For some reason they decided to make the front gearbox bevel gear in two pieces; possibly so that only the wearing surface needed to be replaced at the TBO. What they did not expect was corrosion to fracture the coupling between them and cause the gear to fail and cause the disaster at Sumburgh.

One must wonder how many problems are caused by nothing more than change for the sake of change.

[HeliHenri]

Who's going to accept something like : "trust me, I made calculations, should be ok if you don't use it too long" ?... :rolleyes:

Or you answer : "come on board to tell us when it's time to go back" :bored:
.

[Pittsextra]

Who's going to accept something like : "trust me, I made calculations, should be ok if you don't use it too long" ?... :rolleyes:


You already do

[jimf671]

You already do

Yes. Design Verification.

[HeliHenri]

You already do
To use something that had several severe technical problems (that can kill me and people I'm responsible for) with no other corective action than "don't use it too long" : I can be wrong but I don't think so.
.

[dickmct]

Are L2/225s grounded worldwide?

[EESDL]

http://http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=5265 (http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=5265)

[SASless]

HC....tell us again how the EC products are so vastly superior to the 92.

[TipCap]

A specified operator must not conduct a public transport flight or a commercial air transport operation in accordance with JAR-OPS 3 over a hostile environment with any AS332 or EC225 helicopter to which European Aviation Safety Agency Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2012-0225-E dated 25 October 2012 applies.

Interesting! I guess this doesn't apply to the Mk1. Mind you I don't know how many Mk1's there are still around

[TipCap]

HC....tell us again how the EC products are so vastly superior to the 92.

As I am no longer flying, I don't have a technical opinion on either type, but hasn't the S92 had its fair share of MGB problems too?

And before I get blitzed I was a high time pilot on both Sikorsky and As332L's :ok:

[Geoffersincornwall]

I think the nation that gave us solid rocket boosters that go 'pop' should at least avoid sticking their necks out quite so far.

You know the old saying, what goes around comes around. Crow now if you want but beware of having to eat crow pie sometime later.

G. :}

[Bravo73]

Interesting! I guess this doesn't apply to the Mk1. Mind you I don't know how many Mk1's there are still around

FYI, AS332L, L1 & L2 are all included if "equipped with Main Gear Box (MGB) bevel gear vertical shaft Part Number (P/N) 332A32.5101.00, P/N 332A32.5101.05, P/N 332A32.5101.10 or P/N 332A32.5101.15, all Serial Number (S/N".

[Grenville Fortescue]

Sorry, I've not understood properly so clarification would be appreciated but - did I read in the previous pages that Eurocopter are now saying that with regard to the 225 vibration (HUMS or whatever it is called these days) analysis must be conducted after every flight as Bristow (apparently) already do?

[Soave_Pilot]

Isn't every 25 hours? I think I saw that at the other thread (G-REDW)

[Special 25]

Aircraft with the affected Drive Shafts, which include 225, and some L2's and even 332's are subject to varying levels of scrutiny.

332's can fly for 6 hours between HUMS checks
L2's 4.5Hours
225's Just 3 hours between checks

So effectively after every flight. But even if allowed 6 hours flying, why wouldn't you do it after every flight???


In addition, the CAA have just effectively banned flights on these aircraft types (fitted with the suspect part) from flying over a Hostile Environment.

Lets hope for the benefit of the whole North Sea industry that we sort this issue out quickly, safely and permanently

[SASless]

Geoffers....twas not I crowing about the 225 back when Brother Lappos and HC were arguing the various merits of the two aircraft.

As you rightly say....what goes around....comes around.

I anticipate the same folks that were so critical of the 92...rightly so in a lot of regards....should also rightly hold EC and the 225 to the EXACT same standards they did of the 92.

The key difference between the two situations is the 92 was a new design and being fielded without a long history of good service to allow for generating a historical data base for comparison purposes, encountered some very unforeseen problems, and seems now to have overcome its initial problems.

The 225 on the other hand....did just the opposite....used legacy engineering based upon a well proven design and just recently has encountered some very severe problems that are the result of tinkering with a basically sound design (in most regards) despite having some adverse design issues.

I just like to see some fair play when it comes to discussing the relative merits of two very different designs....each has its strong points and each has its not so strong points.

[Fareastdriver]

If they had not altered the main gearbox shaft on the Super Puma none of this would have happened.

[HeliComparator]

HC....tell us again how the EC products are so vastly superior to the 92.


Well SAS, for a start how many have been killed in S92 vs 225? Anyway, a heli is only as safe as its weakest part, for 92 it was the gbx oil system (filter) and for 225 it seems currently to be this shaft. S92 had a head start on catastrophe, now it is 225's turn to catch up a bit, but now that the fleet has effectively been grounded this problem will be fixed and without loss of life. Apart from these weak points in each fleet, the 225 remains by far the best from the HMI point of view but since you have flown neither, you wouldn't know.

Everyone else - SAS loves to throw bait at me and if I didn't bite on it, I would be depriving the old chap of his only pleasure in life, so I just have to do it because I am such a nice chap and hate to see a grown man sobbing...

[kerrdavidson95]

Realistically, what replacements are there for the EC225?

[HeliComparator]

Remember you passengers are reading this forum (probably) so best avoiding comments like the above.

I disagree. Although no-one wants to end up in the drink, chances are that in a controlled ditching, everyone will be OK even if the weather is not as good as it was for these events. IIRC no-one has ever died from a controlled ditching in N Sea in its entire history, and that is an important concept for everyone, especially our passengers, to bear in mind.

[wire_less]

Its called "needing a wash" got one in the end!!

[JohnDixson]

That you are, P3.

Especially so if, with rough seas, the pilots chose to ignore the published procedures.

[kannad405]

With regard to the frequency of HUMS downloads...EC allow up to 25 hours without data. I presume this will now be reduced to, as mentioned before, somewhere in the region of 3/4 hours/between flights

[Sanus]

So the UK CAA have unilaterally grounded NS Puma's. Shouldn't this action have come from Cologne, EASA HQ?

Are EASA scared of upsetting Eurocopter or possibly the French DGAC? So prevaricate and choose to do nothing more than rehash an old AD!

At times like these you want strong leadership from the authorites and congratulations to the UK CAA for taking the lead. :ok:

[cyclic]

HC, this is true but one of our 332 family accidents was fatal. It wasn't just the passengers that were killed, some were our colleagues. There still isn't a positive conclusion from this accident that was MGB related. Just because it didn't happen at Bristow doesn't mean that it isn't very much still in our minds, particularly in the light of recent events. At the time, EC were very keen to lay as much blame as possible with the operator to protect their reputation - ironic doesn't even get close.

[cyclic]

I think that if you do a little digging you will find a close connection with EC at EASA. Well done to the CAA for taking this decision, it renews your faith.

[HeliComparator]

Cyclic yes I know, but that tragic accident is nevertheless unrelated to this one from a technical point of view.

[Bravo73]

Unrelated???

The MGB failed in all 3 accidents. How on earth can you claim that they are unrelated? :rolleyes:

[teen_pilot_95]

What replacements are there for the EC225? A civilian AW101 or further S92s?

[Pittsextra]

Yes. Design Verification.

ha yes but acceptance testing is supposed to be none destructive.

Joking might be excused under the banner of gallows humour in this particular instance given all are well, although in no small thanks to the pilots.

Fair play to the CAA but actually I'm not sure the terrain - hostile or not - cares too much when the gearbox internals are sh1tting themselves.

This is going to end up as a Harvard business school case study. Eurocopter have winged it since May in a vein attempt to avoid what is now the almost certain fact that they will need to say that a design, material, manufacturing (or combination) has caused issues. The failure of the Emergency lubrication system is a sideshow.

Beyond that the failure of the MGB in the 2009 crash of G-REDL suggests a more worrying attitude. In the case of REDL it was suggested in the AAIB report that the planet gear was lifed to 6600hrs in the AS332, 4400hrs in the EC225. I think I'm right in saying that the failure occured at around 3800hrs but then the manufacturer seeming to want to rely heavily on HUMS which whilst mandated what are the thresholds of the condition indicators before the operator is well over the line?

Two things seem to hold true. The manufacturer in the event of a failure seems to rely very heavily on the HUMS and whilst they don't suggest it is the primary method of detecting gearbox degradation thats exactly how it seems to be spun when a EC225 ends in the sea.

Beyond that as has already been said before an alarm is fine but without strict guidelines of what exactly means "no go" I'm not sure the alarm was anymore help in the case of REDL.

[Pittsextra]

Cyclic yes I know, but that tragic accident is nevertheless unrelated to this one from a technical point of view.


Totally disagree. It absolutely seems that Eurocopter use the HUMS to provide a layer of technology in conjunction with blurry guidlines which allow the manufacturer to say "hey if the operator just looked at the technology we provided everything would be ok"...

The problem with that is you are using tech to cover up flakey mechanicals and when the technical specialisms are such that the manufactuer knows more than the authority its not hard to see how they can cloud issues.

Its a very dangerous situation.

[henra]

Unrelated???

The MGB failed in all 3 accidents. How on earth can you claim that they are unrelated? :rolleyes:

You might want to look a little closer what failed in the three instances and would then very likely come to the conclusion that technically there does not seem to be a causal connection between the two 225 shaft failures on the one side and the 332 sun gear failure on the other side as per HC's statement.
Or to make the reasoning more obvious: Do you think fixing the one issue will do anything to prevent what happened in the other case ?!.

[500e]

HC says
"For the record, Bristow downloads the HUMS data at each return to base, and an aircraft is in not despatched until the HUMS data has been checked and found to be "green". That process takes less than 5 minutes".
(Could be 4 hours of data?)
If correct surely it is no beyond reason to mandate this, 5 minutes v £XXm seems a good return.
I presume the new data is run against legacy data, & anomaly's logged\displayed, it is still not clear why there is no way of presenting real time information even in crude form,by continuous data streaming over air.
Formula 1 seems to have a fair grip on what is happening within engines, gear box & hydraulic systems, G force, steering angles, throttle & some life science for driver +++

[SASless]

Shoes pinch a bit when they are on the other foot don't they?


S92 had a head start on catastrophe, now it is 225's turn to catch up a bit, but now that the fleet has effectively been grounded this problem will be fixed and without loss of life.


If the Cougar Crew had complied with the Checklist (as the Co-Pilot reminded the Captain at least twice)....what would the score have been?

The accident analysis clearly demonstrated a prompt controlled ditching would have prevented the Gearbox failure that caused the uncontrolled crash into the water that proved fatal.

In the North Sea events the crews DID follow the Checklist.....despite the temptation in one case of having land quit near and all turned out well. That they did because of a false report of a failure of the Emergency Lube system does not change the fact they ditched rather than continue to fly a machine with a suspected gearbox failure.

We cannot say that about the one that shed its rotor head can we....and do we really know what caused that one? We know what failed....but do we know with definity what caused that to happen?

Why is it we see the EC aircraft being limited to a HUMS download every three hours.....are the MGB's that susceptible to failures that such monitoring is necessary?

You are quite correct I have flown neither the 225 or the 92 and that allows me to be absolutely impartial in my evaluation of the two. I never worked for Sikorsky or EC...I have not been a Company Type Captain, have not been involved in making recommendations to Management about which aircraft to buy, and have had no involvement in formulating SOP's, writing Checklists, or anything like that for an Operator for either of the two aircraft.

Are you that free of bias?

Face it....EC has a problem every bit as serious as Sikorsky did. Like it or not....currently your favorite helicopter is grounded as being unsafe to fly in the Commercial Market.

I would suggest implying Bristow is bullet proof on this is just Whistling as you walk past the Graveyard.

The fact Bristow has not had one of these events does warrant examining to see what is being done different by your Engineering staff that might not be happening elsewhere....as there might just be something there worth duplicating by other Operators.

Yet....the absence of an event does not mean it cannot happen to Bristow.

[cyclic]

technically there does not seem to be a causal connection between the two 225 shaft failures on the one side and the 332 sun gear failure on the other side

I think you will find that the epicyclic failure was the final result - probably. There still hasn't been a definitive answer as to the cause. The likelihood of it being due to the shaft is unlikely as you say but it is still an unexplained MGB failure. The shaft failures are not a stand alone issue, hence why there are different inspection periods for the L2 and 225 fitted with the suspect shaft part numbers. A MGB failure like this hadn't been seen before and as EC quite happily quote the thousands of safe hours flown by the fleet (before the last 3 years), it is a possibility that something else has/had changed. I'm afraid, without being overly dramatic, I don't believe a great deal that is being said by EC. We were told they had identified all the suspect shafts, they hadn't. They issued the same AD as last time and yet hours later, our national authority effectively overule it for flying over the water. It doesn't inspire confidence in a leading manufacturer and we must have this confidence so that we can transfer this faith in the aircraft to the passengers in our care.

[Helinut]

Congratulations to the CAA for having the balls to issue their Directive. :D

When I read the EASA AD its logic and rationale seemed to have so many holes it looked like a Swiss cheese.

The CAA do not appear to be advertising their initiative by broadcasting it on their website on the pages that the media might check. It must be a difficult thing for them to do politically, in essence publically disagree with the all-powerful (but wrong) EASA bandwagon.

Cannot but wonder at the pressures that may be being applied. I wonder if the general media will catch-on to what is happening?

[Bravo73]

I wonder if the general media will catch-on to what is happening?

The BBC know about it:


Restrictions imposed on Super Puma helicopter (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-20081728)

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has banned the use over sea of helicopters similar to one which ditched off Shetland.

The CAA order applies to all Super Puma EC225s and some AS332s, except those involved in "life-saving" operations.

The manufacturer has ordered extra safety checks in an attempt to prevent a repeat of the incident.

An air accident report on Monday's ditching said it was caused by a serious gearbox failure.

All 19 men on board the Super Puma EC 225 survived.

Continue reading the main story
“
Start Quote


I understand that Eurocopter has to rebuild confidence in our company. Two ditchings are two too many”

Derek Sharples
Eurocopter executive vice president
Eurocopter said gearboxes should be monitored more closely and at more regular intervals.

The French company said Monday's problem was similar to one which caused a helicopter to ditch in the North Sea in May.

It said all its efforts were now being devoted to fully understanding the root cause of the failure.

Eurocopter executive vice president Derek Sharples told the BBC Scotland news website: "I understand that Eurocopter has to rebuild confidence in our company.

"Eurocopter has issued a new set of measures to reassure operators, crew and passengers that the aircraft is safe to fly. With these measures we seek to eliminate any reoccurence.

"We understand these concerns and take them seriously. Two ditchings are two too many."

Investigators found a failure in the lubrication system of the helicopter which ditched near Fair Isle.

A special bulletin issued by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said the main and standby oil pumps were not working.

Shaft crack
All those on board the Super Puma EC 225 were rescued safely after it ditched during a flight from Aberdeen to the West Phoenix rig, west of Shetland.The AAIB report suggests that the helicopter came close to being involved in a much more serious incident on Monday.

The bulletin said a 360 degree crack was found on the bevel gear vertical shaft of the helicopter.

This crack prevented the oil pump gears from being driven.

The AAIB said the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the manufacturer were urgently reviewing the effectiveness and scope of an airworthiness directive previously issued for this helicopter type.

Flights by other aircraft of the same type have been halted.

'Growing concern'
BBC Scotland has also learned that two North Sea search and rescue Super Pumas operated by BP have been restricted to "life-saving" operations only in the wake of the incident.

These are rescuing people from the water, and "life and death" medical evacuation cases.

BP said it was looking at bringing in Sikorsky aircraft to provide temporary cover while the industry examines the evidence from the CHC-operated Super Puma ditching.

Balpa, the union which represents professional pilots, said there was now "growing concern" amongst pilots and offshore workers.

'Saving lives'

Willie Wallace, regional industrial officer with the Unite union, said: "We clearly have a problem with the gearbox components on these particular helicopters.

"The manufacturer Eurocopter has ordered safety checks and said that 'two ditchings is two too many'.

"We agree. We cannot rely on luck to keep saving lives."

The crew of another Super Puma helicopter ditched in the North Sea in May after a gearbox failure.

All 14 passengers and crew involved in that incident, about 30 miles east of Aberdeen, were rescued.

A special meeting of the industry's helicopter safety group is due in Aberdeen on Thursday afternoon.

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/63701000/jpg/_63701137_super_puma_oct3.jpg

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/63675000/jpg/_63675475_chopthree624.jpg

[lowfat]

Don't forget this Bristows Puma ditch

Puma ditching Nigeria - YouTube

That no one knows the circumstances of.

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/486337-bristow-puma-ex-g-pumi.html

[heli-cal]

I was a bit disappointed by the Eurocopter man on the telly last night saying that the EC225 is a very safe helicopter.

And prior to tv interviews, he was saying it to any media that would listen.

What do you expect him to say?

He has to say that to one and all, it's his priority!

[Jetboxer]

Well done to the crew of CHCN on a job well done!

Lowfat

I believe that PUMI was an unplanned ditching of a perfectly serviceable helicopter due to poor handling.

No Gearbox issues, hence irrelevant in this discussion apart from the ditching aspect (which was not planned), and evacuation process...

similar to the Bond ETAP 'ditching'.

[terminus mos]

The problem with effectively grounding the EC225, even with the EC enhanced monitoring is that there will have to be a very solid reason to rescind the grounding. Without some concrete assurances that this problem is somehow fixed (with a new shaft?) which could take a long time, the EC225 could be having a long rest. In this instance, I think that increased oversight would have been better than a grounding.

[Pittsextra]

Increased oversight in terms of what?

[Colibri49]

"Oversight" can only be maintained by the HUMS being downloaded within every 3 hours of TOTAL running time, airborne and non-airborne. However I don't believe that we should be flying again until the emlube is made not only 100% reliable, which it is, but that the problem of false warning of emlube failure gets convincingly sorted out.

IMHO the present shaft has to be replaced with the older type which used different processes and techniques to join the bevel gear to the shaft. That will obviously take a long time to achieve. The French told our bosses that it can't be done, but I don't understand why. It has to be done!

With these provisos, I'll feel comfortable to fly again while a replacement for the existing shaft is being produced and tested. However our passengers will understandably need a lot of convincing.

[cyclic]

With these provisos, I'll feel comfortable to fly again while a replacement for the existing shaft is being produced and tested. However our passengers will understandably need a lot of convincing.

Just out of interest, what time scale are you suggesting? 6 months, 2 years? Or until we have a similar but worse accident. I still don't think that relying on HUMS data is really the way forward as there are only two bits of data to base these critical decisions on. The Emerg Lube monitoring will also take some time to rectify as it has never been tested (until the last few months for real) on a complete system attached to an aircraft. The tone of the first ditching AAIB report indicates how incredulous this appears to be.

[terminus mos]

Pitts

Increased HUMS downloads as Colibri says, not much else can be done. The 3 hour downloads should be sufficient to show the beginnings of propagation if past experience is anything to go by.

Now that it is grounded, what action can be taken to rescind the grounding?

New shaft? Design, test, manufacture and install; 1 year?

If it is 1 year, there are not enough spare 332Ls with functioning MGBs or S-92s around to make up the deficit. The oil companies will be looking for a way to not continue to pay the operators, who won't be making enough revenue to pay the banks. How long before some jobs may have to go?

[Bravo73]

This is what the passengers are being told/briefed:

G-CHCN ditching incident - Step Change in Safety (http://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/about/GCHCNditchingincident.cfm)

http://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/templates/asset-relay.cfm?frmAssetFileID=1562

[cyclic]

If it is 1 year, there are not enough spare 332Ls with functioning MGBs or S-92s around to make up the deficit. The oil companies will be looking for a way to not continue to pay the operators, who won't be making enough revenue to pay the banks. How long before some jobs may have to go?

and this is the great dilemma isn't it? The pressure on EC to find a workable solution based on real science is immense. We can fly the 225 like a L/L2 with no Emerg Lube but whether this will be acceptable to all, who knows. The Sea King that is being replaced with new technology has had it for about 20 years...

[paull]

false warning of emlube failure gets convincingly sorted out.

I think that if one reads the message not as "EMLube failure -Ditch" , but
"EMLuBe Fail(ed to fix the problem) - Ditch"

then in fact it is working properly, If I were writing the software, I might well decide to not have a host of different error messages when the conclusion is the same.

[902Jon]

Just out of interest - how many Aberdeen aircraft does this affect (all 3 operators)?

[Helinut]

As it stands, that message from the StepChange website is out of date. If I understand the effect of the CAA Operational Directive, it will prevent the use of any UK-Reg Pumas and variants offshore, if they have the relevant part number shaft.

The "Step Change" party line is really just the view of the offshore installation operators. It is clear they wanted Puma shuttles to resume with limited restrictions. I wonder whether this will change, in the light of the CAA action?

[Sanus]

Is relying on HUMS acceptable?

CAP 753 (8.3) states that HUMS must detect no less than 70% of failure modes that it is directly monitoring. The oil pump shaft is not directly monitored so presumably the rate of detection may be less than 70%.

At what percentage do you say the risk is mitigated and it's OK to fly?

Can EC or an operator demonstrate 225 HUMS will always give an early warning of impending failure?

[Bravo73]

As it stands, that message from the StepChange website is out of date. If I understand the effect of the CAA Operational Directive, it will prevent the use of any UK-Reg Pumas and variants offshore, if they have the relevant part number shaft.

The "Step Change" party line is really just the view of the offshore installation operators. It is clear they wanted Puma shuttles to resume with limited restrictions. I wonder whether this will change, in the light of the CAA action?

FYI, the Fact Sheet (the second link) includes a reference to the CAA Directive:

Why is the EC225 still suspended?
The helicopter operators took the decision to continue to suspend the EC225 until further guarantees can be provided on its safety. Independent of this, the UK aviation regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has since issued an operational directive forbidding its use for offshore transport. This continued suspension of the EC225 is fully supported by the Helicopter Safety Steering Group and the trade unions.

[Helinut]

Exactly the point Sanus. You have answered the question yourself.

This failure of the defective part is known and at the moment has an apparent return period of 6 months in the UK fleet. Apparently the HUMS has only a relatively small chance of preventive detection, so the frequency of further undetected failures is pretty significant if the affected aircraft continue to fly.

Its only a satisfactory resolution, if you are happy with a reasonable prospect of North Sea "controlled" ditching, in the winter months.

We have been very lucky so far, that the outcomes have not involved injury or worse. What is the conditional probability of benign conditions in a North Sea winter? It gives the expression "wing and a prayer" new resonance.

B73 - thanks for pointing me at the second link. However, is it not less to do with the aircraft type/variant but more with the gearbox shaft batch part number/method of manufacture?

[Bravo73]

Just out of interest - how many Aberdeen aircraft does this affect (all 3 operators)?

From the HSSG 'Fact Sheet':

The return to flying will see an additional one AS332L1 and eight AS332L2 aircraft amongst the three Aberdeen-based operators.





So, in essence, the CAA directive effects all but 9 Super Pumas in ABZ.

[roundwego]

I wonder what the time scale is for going back to original design shafts on the L and L2 models. I also wonder if it is possible to rework the existing new design shafts which are in service now or will EC have to start from scratch. I assume it takes a long time to make a shaft due to the manufacturing, chemical treatment and ageing processes involved so the North Sea (and other areas) is probably in for a lengthy disruption.

The loss of a significant proportion of O & G helicopter support worldwide is bound to cause serious concern at the highest levels of the oil companies management and governments.

[SASless]

To think all those S-61's that got flogged off for junk prices!:(

[Bravo73]

B73 - thanks for pointing me at the second link. However, is it not less to do with the aircraft type/variant but more with the gearbox shaft batch part number/method of manufacture?

It is indeed. And the next section of the 'Fact Sheet' addresses that very point. (Bear in mind the target audience (ie the passengers) so the serial and part numbers themselves are not mentioned). Also, PPRuNE/vbulletin doesn't want to accept the original tabular formatting so I've had to re-jig it slightly:

Why are some Super Pumas flying and others not?
The difference is down to a certain type of component – the main gearbox vertical shaft. For ease, these have been labelled below as shafts 1 and 2.

Type of shaft.......Can be fitted in.......What is it?.........Approved for use?

“Shaft 1”......L, L1 and L2 models........This is the original design of shaft. Has accumulated 4.5 million flight hours without incident......Yes

“Shaft 2”...... L, L1, L2 and EC225 L, L1 and L2 aircraft can be fitter with either Shaft 1 or Shaft 2 If not already so, these will now be re-fitted with shaft 1 in order to be fly again. All EC225s feature shaft 2 and cannot be fitted with Shaft 1........... A change in the manufacturing process of specific batches of Shaft 2 was originally thought to be the cause of the G-REDW ditching in May. New evidence is coming to light which suggests that the scope of the problems associated with Shaft 2 are wider. Use of aircraft which feature this shaft is not supported by the aircraft operators and is also no currently permitted by the CAA.

[Pittsextra]

I thought the EC225 fleet leader has nearly 40K hours accumulated?

[roundwego]

40,000 hours???? It was only certified in 2004 so that would mean the aircraft flying something in the order of 13 hours a day, every day, for the last 8 years.

[HeliHenri]

First introduction a little bit less than 8 years ago so the answer is : no

G-TIGC, a 332L from Bristow for sale (up to now...) is 30 years old with about 34000 Hrs TT.
.

[kannad405]

Not far shy of 10,000 hrs on one NS 225 that I know of

[Ian Corrigible]

As of December 2011 there were two aircraft with 9K hours, so current EC225 fleet leader is likely to be at ~10K.

I/C

[Pittsextra]

I'm just using Eurocopters own data:-

Puma helicopter, super puma - Eurocopter helicopters - Eurocopter, an EADS company (http://www.eurocopter.com/site/en/ref/Characteristics_117.html)

which says:-

The EC225 has evolved from the vast experience accumulated by some 100 Super Puma operators; some 900 helicopters have been ordered in 52 countries. The in-service Super Puma fleet has logged more than 4,4-million hours and the fleet leader has flown 39,300 hours.

One assumes therefore that they are now being clever with the mix and match of types.

[Bravo73]

Not really, to be fair. The 'in-service Super Puma fleet' includes all the various variants of the AS332 and the EC225. (The EC225 is, in essence, an AS332 L3).

[Pittsextra]

ha yes but Bravo I think we are seeing that some Super Puma's are more Super than others...

One truely wonders how that approach was used in the approval process. Over simplification no doubt but do you just take AS332L2 then say you've ran the new gearbox on a rig for X hours and therefore we are good to go with the EC225?

The focus on the emergency gearbox cooling system is all well and good but remember thats just the short term fix if you have one type of in flight issue. As has been said before when parts of the gearbox are departing through the fuselage a cooling system isn't going to save you.

The only real solution short term is limit the torque of the 225 to protect the gearbox that it has and for the manufacturer to give a strict limits on checks. Although one might note that in the case of REDL the suggestion was that existing detection methods wouldn't have provided further indication of issues.

Now I know the failures are different but with no explaination why a 3000hr gearbox shat itself which was lifed to 6000hrs and with 2 further gearbox issues in 2012 I think an engineering solution is needed not just a software update and the responsibility dumped on the operator or worse maintenance for the operator. Would you want that on your conscious?

[HeliComparator]

The only real solution short term is limit the torque of the 225 to protect the gearbox

People often say this when there is a problem with a gearbox - reduce its load and it will be OK, however in this case, since the failure occurs between the bevel gear and the oil pumps, I am not sure how reducing torque would affect anything, since the torque on the bit of the shaft that is failing would remain the same (just driving the oil pumps). I suppose there could be some reduction in bending caused by less torque, but I think you would need to be a transmission expert to understand if this were the case (which I am not!).

[212man]

(The EC225 is, in essence, an AS332 L3).

Sadly, that's not quite true - it was officially the MK 2+. The Mk3 was scrapped but - had it come to fruition - would have been a superb piece of kit. S92 sized cabin (more or less) with EC225 dynamics and MMI!

[212man]

I agree with HC (where's graviman when you need him!)

[Special 25]

Don't see it mentioned, but there is an acknowledged 'Shaft 3' currently being tested in France. I don't know if it was in development before REDW but it certainly has been manufactured with that accident in mind. I guess they will have to add in data from CHCN to ensure that it still makes the grade.

No idea how much testing such a critical part will have to undergo before approval.

[Wizzard]

Where the fracture occurs the shaft is not under a huge amount of loading. As HC states it's just driving two well lubricated (by the gearbox oil) gerotor pumps. Perhaps the problem is bending?

Also if this shaft was developed solely for the 225, does the other change from the rest of the 332 family - the lift housing - have an influence?

[detgnome]

Those that have read the EASA paperwork will no doubt have picked up on the fact that it mentioned that the failure was not necessarily due to either the amount of torque applied or the number of hours accumulated...

...therefore why does the L2 have 4 1/2 hrs compared to the 3 hrs for the 225 with the 5101 shaft?

Is it reasonable to assume that the overall load through the 225 gearbox and different harmonics (5 blade head etc) produce a different type of fatigue/vibration pattern and therefore a greater chance of failure?

[Helinut]

It would certainly be interesting to know what the best guess was of the failure mode.

[Special 25]

Is it reasonable to assume that the overall load through the 225 gearbox and different harmonics (5 blade head etc) produce a different type of fatigue/vibration pattern and therefore a greater chance of failure?


It doesn't alter the fact that this aircraft has flown for 7/8 years, nearly 100,000 fleet hours, without a single aircraft induced accident, and then suddenly 2 in 5 months - With the same cause.

Something must have changed??

[jimf671]

144 million shaft cycles per 1000 op hours? How many hours on RW & CN?

[ericferret]

The fatal accident to G-XCEL AS 355F (3 killed) might be of interest from a technical point of view, AAIB report available on line.

The cause was put down to a batch of free wheel rollers that had a manufacturing change applied.

Manufacturers are changing process all the time so what works today might not work tomorrow.

As has been pointed out the 225 has flown thousands of hours without incidents of this nature till recently so a change is a likely cause.

This failure doesnt affect the fundamental safety of the design but has to be addressed urgently..

Have a read at the report above it offers some insight in to this isssue.

Two engineers and the pilot were killed in the 355 on airtest. One of the engineers was a good friend the second the son of another well known engineer. Very sad indeed.

[helicrazi]

I see Talisman have started to use a boat to 'crew change'.

How long until other companies do the same?

Cant be good for CHC/Bristow/Bond???

[Woolf]

I don't think crew-change by boat is going to be bad news for the helicopter companies. The limitations in terms of sea state (for basket transfer or similar) are very restrictive and that coupled with a 10h+ journey to and from the rig is not going to be a sustainable long term solution. However I'm sure it will provide welcome relief in the short term (at least for workers stuck offshore).

The real question is going to be over who picks up that tab for consequential losses due to the unavailability of the aircraft? My guess is that Eurocopter will have some liability however I can't see them paying for lost revenues because oil companies can't get their staff to and from the rigs ...

[terminus mos]

Most helicopter contracts do not have a consequential loss clause so the oil companies will be responsible for their own losses resulting from this.

A bigger problem is that many contracts have the oil company paying during temporary groundings. The question will be how long is temporary, and at what point will force majeur be declared? That could mean that Bristow / Bond / CHC don't get paid during the period of force majeur. But their respective financiers will still want to be paid.

Even if force majeur is not declared, the clock to release contract aircraft or even terminate the contracts has started ticking. The fact is that most contracts can be suspended for much lower rates within 15 - 30 days and terminated within 30 - 60 days. If this is not fixed to allow some flying with restrictions within the next 7 days, it could start to impact operators and their staff.

[coatimundi]

Just to make things clear. the Talisman boat transfer for offshore workers does not involve basket transfers to and from the platforms - the vessel is taking personnel out to the Auk/Fulmar/Clyde area and the transfers are being done from the vessel to the rigs by helicopter.

[Helinut]

CAA website has just issued a second version of their Operational Directive. Not yet looked in detail but it seems to be a minor change of words: the ban on hostile terrain flights is still in place for affected aircraft.

[Peter PanPan]

It seems like pretty much most offshore operators out there have grounded their 225/L2 fleets, at least in the UK, Brazil, Angola... are there any 225 flying for revenue offshore at the moment?

[Harry the Hun]

How close is a Cougar to the 225/L2? Are they affected as well?

[ramblingrotors]

All 225 in Malaysia are grounded as well.

[Peter PanPan]

FH1100 Pilot prophetically wrote on 26th November 2011 concerning the S-92 Cougar crash:

"Well of course the S-92's airworthiness certificate should have been revoked following the Cougar crash! Of course. That's not even in question anymore.

SAC managed to convince the FAA guy (whose name we don't need to mention because everyone already knows who signed-off on it) that the ONLY possible source of a leak of transmission oil would be the lines leading to the oil cooler. Filter won't/can't leak...driveshaft inputs can't leak...the mast seal can't leak...the list goes on!

And the (unnamed) FAA guy said, "Yup, I agree!" But if they were using the S-92 design to justify that "extremely remote" crap, they had no historical base to draw from. If they (SAC) were using an industry-wide base for loss of transmission oil, they STILL were not on solid ground, because such things happen more than extremely remotely. (Admittedly they don't happen often, but "extremely remote" is a defined term.) SAC took the awkward wording of section 29.927(c)(1) and used it to their financial advantage.

So no, the S-92 does not IN FACT meet the requirements of FAR part-29 when it comes to the transmission. I would venture to say that there is no helicopter in existence that would qualify under that "extremely remote" clause. Why do we care? Because when you design an aircraft that's going to take LOTS of people out over some very inhospitable parts of the earth, then you are - and should be - held to a higher standard.

We know now that the S-92 transmission cannot withstand a complete loss of oil. Sikorsky admitted that their testing showed (and Cougar proved in the field) that you get "about" ten minutes of run time with no oil. This is undisputed. What's truly disturbing to me is that so few people seem to care. Pilots in particular are so very cavalier about this, as if it's a trivial or inconsequential point. It boggles my already-feeble mind.

What it boils down to is that it would have been economically unfeasible, unrealistic and unreasonable to summarily ground the S-92 fleet and force Sikorsky to redesign the transmission. Passenger safety takes a back seat to money. It's not the first time this has happened in aviation. Shamefully, it probably won't be the last. Personally, I think we owe the paying passengers - and the pilots who fly them! - more than that...better than that.

I mean, why have rules at all if exemptions and "work-arounds" are allowed and applied so freely?"

Are we facing a similar situation with Eurocopter and its EC225 this time? :mad::mad:

[SASless]

Are we facing a similar situation with Eurocopter and its EC225 this time?

Yes we sure are!:uhoh:

[HeliComparator]

To some extent yes, but there are differences. The S92 blatantly does not meet the certification criteria, but as you said, it was too commercially and politically difficult to withdraw the certification. A technical fix is probably n the way but these things take a long time.

Of course one of the reasons it takes a long time, is the time to get certification. So we have the ludicrous situation that the certification system that rolled over to allow the 92 to achieve certification when in most people's opinion it was not compliant, is the very same system that delays fixing the problem. It would be funny if not so depressingly serious!

From the UK CAA perspective, the accident that killed a number of people was not in their back yard so had less impact on any possible decision to ground the heli.

The EC 225 does meet the certification criteria, but there is clearly a design or manufacturing issue with a single component that has caused 2 ditchings in the UK CAA's back yard. That issue needs to be fixed, and then the heli will resume flights and be fully compliant with the spirit and letter of the certification rules.

[The Sultan]

Heli,

The fact is the 225 has a lot more than one problem. One problem would be no issue in the 225 design, two+ resulted in two ditchings.

SAS

If the Aussie S-92 had ditched instead of landing on solid ground for the same failure it is doubtful that Newfoundland would have happened. So "any we are better than you" is BS.

All,

The Bell 429 main transmission ran 4+ hours in the same basic test the 92 failed in 12 minutes with no backup lube system (high torque and everything else).

The Sultan

[SASless]

HC,

Normally I try to give you a gentle poke in the ribs over things you say....and usually do so to evoke some reaction from others to move the discussion along.

This time I think a firm kick in your backside is more what is called for.




From the UK CAA perspective, the accident that killed a number of people was not in their back yard so had less impact on any possible decision to ground the heli.

So I take you to mean that the UK CAA turns a completely blind eye to fatal crashes elsewhere in the World despite the very Type and Model Aircraft is being operated under their Authority within their jurisdiction.

If anyone was silly enough to believe that....he certainly does not pass any medical grounds for issuance of a Flying Medical. That is sheer idiocy.

The decision may have been a "political" decision but it certainly was never made for "safety" or "certification" reasons.....unless they concurred with the other Aviation Authorities investigating the accident and who had also certified the Aircraft.

If I were a CAA Inspector, I would take great exception to your comment as it implies the CAA does not consider Safety of Pasengers and Crew to be an important part of their function.

You want to revise what you said and perhaps pass along what you meant to say as surely what you said cannot be what you really meant to say....is it?

The EC 225 does meet the certification criteria, but there is clearly a design or manufacturing issue with a single component that has caused 2 ditchings in the UK CAA's back yard. That issue needs to be fixed, and then the heli will resume flights and be fully compliant with the spirit and letter of the certification rules.



If there is a design or manufacturing issue that causes two ditchings in a short time frame....how does the EC-225 then be considered meeting the Ceritication Criteria in your opinion? You cannot have your Kate and Edith you know.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, you have your views on how the location of an accident affects how seriously it is taken by an aviation authority, I have mine. If you think I am insane, I think you are naieve.

Which para of the certification rules require the heli to be able to continue flight after main and backup oil pumps fail?

Of course we would both like the certification rules to say that a heli can never need to ditch, but they don't say that and if they did, no helis could be built.

[SASless]

We are not talking ditching HC...we are talking the reasons for the MGB failures.

If the aircraft still meet certification requirements....why are they GROUNDED?

[industry insider]

The EC225 is grounded by the UK CAA. Not all NAAs have followed yet but probably will.

Surely, if a new shaft has to be designed, manufactured, tested then certified then the EC225 is no longer certified?

Surely, by grounding the aircraft, its certification has been suspended by the participating NAAs.

[NotaJockey]

I thought they were only prevented from flying 'over hostile terrain' - ie offshore, not grounded as such.

[TalkSpike]

HC,

You my friend are a nincompoop! Continually referring to which helicopter has caused the most fatalities is not only insensitive, but demonstrates that you have nothing good to say about your aircraft and have resorted to trying to bash the competitor to make yours look better! It’s a form of argument called ad hominem.

Yes the 92 has had its problems, all new aircraft do. Luckily the initial fix for the 92 only required waiting for some new bolts to arrive in the mail, waiting for a redesign of internal workings in a gear box may take a little longer. Since the Cougar incident the 92 gear box has been redesigned and the chances of the same incident happening again are as close to zero as it can get. Will there be other problems, who knows, but as it stands the gear box is working just fine thanks.

The 225 gear box achieved certification with the help of the emlube system which has proven to be 100% ineffective in the field. If it was not for this additional shonky engineering the outcome of the two ditching may have been different. Thank god they were not!

Enjoy your six months of admin duties HC.:ok:

[HeliComparator]

II and TS, I don't think you have any concept of how certification works. First of all, with which para of CS 29 is the 225 no longer compliant? Is is TCDS still vald? Has it been grounded by EASA, FAA or even CAA (no it has not, only severe operational restrictions applied). If you know the answers to the above, it is obvious that certification has not been withdrawn or reasonably could be.

10-post TS you are perhaps not aware of the history of the whole 92vs225 slanging match on Prune, something started by Nick Lappos in 2005. SAS likes to wind me up about it, I respond, and let's face it, there is not much else going on in Prune at the moment. Feel free to not read my posts in future.

[Madbob]

Looking ahead does this create an opening for some other machinery? What about AW101 (Merlin) for instance? It's a good load carrier, has speed and range and with 3 engines pretty good redundancy when operating over the sea where land-immediately options are few.

Also what about some of the former Soviet bloc machines. The Mi-17VS (with Western avionics) and flotation gear?

MB

[SASless]

HC....using your logic...why should the FAA do anything about the 225....all the problems have been with British operators. You criticize the FAA for not doing anything about the 92....yet you defend them for not doing anything about the 225.

[industry insider]

HC, It may be an idea to think quite carefully and tone down your rhetoric before saying someone has "no concept". They may know more than you think.

But, I take your point that the EC225 is only restricted, not fully grounded in the UK.

But, there are other markets where there are currently no restrictions on flying the EC225 imposed by the regulator. The only restrictions which apply are those (3 hour MARMS) limits placed on the type by the ASB. However, your company still isn't flying the EC225 in those "unrestricted" markets.

Why not, have you lost confidence in the 225 and the ability of the MARMS to diagnose a problem in sufficient time?

[JohnDixson]

Given:


The two different failure modes of the main box.
Absence of a published retrofit design corrective action for the first ( I could have missed it ).
That after the first lower shaft failure, an incorrect technical assessment was made.

My guess is that there are some design guys/girls at Eurocopter that would love to only be worrying about things like oil filter attachment bolt material and pattern*. Excedrin Headache No 89 would be if they have to redesign and requalify a new shaft.



*Should have added the transmission foot cracks, too. ( That one should have been a major embarrassment to anyone at SA who remembers the S-61 station 290 transmission support cracking 10 year saga ).


Thanks,
John

[Variable Load]

92vs225 slanging match on Prune, something started by Nick Lappos in 2005

HC

Reminds me of a certain Fawlty Towers sketch :)

Anyway, irrespective of who started it (albeit not by invading Poland!), the fact that you continue the "225 vs 92 PPrune war" makes you just as culpable IMHO. Especially as Nick L is no longer present to be your adversary.

Do yourself a favour and give it a break!

[Geoffersincornwall]

The Mi 17 will need an EASA Certification and from I have seen of it I think that would be a tough call.

The fuel cells amount to four thin wall aluminium external tanks with no liners. Imagine those in a crash! Not sure how many emergency exits they have now but Shell have managed to get the 'porthole' windows replaced by push-outs although their size might be a bit of a challenge for the larger 'bear'.

I've taught some ex-Mi 17 crews in the last few years and they were not terribly complimentary about certain aspects of its handling. Hearsay is a bad basis for conclusions I know but maybe someone with actual Mi 17 experience can comment.

G.

http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8468/8142706513_7db533d3d1_b.jpg

[Pittsextra]

...back to the 225.

So eurocopter engineers have been sat around tables with paper and cappuchinos figuring how to resolve the latest gearbox failure but what is the process to get the type back in service??

Testing? Or is that of the have a go and see type?

[belly tank]

From flight global magazine today

North Sea helicopter operators are scrabbling to acquire additional aircraft as they struggle to cope with the effective grounding of certain Eurocopter Super Puma types following a controlled ditching of an EC225 on 22 October.

Although a European Aviation Safety Authority emergency airworthiness directive states the aircraft are allowed to fly, providing data collected by vibration monitoring systems is downloaded with increased frequency, a ruling issued by the UK's Civil Aviation Agency on 25 October prohibits overwater flights of EC225s and AS332s fitted with a potentially faulty gearbox component.

CHC Scotia, which operated the helicopter (G-CHCN) involved in the incident, has nine UK-based aircraft out of service - five EC225s and four AS332 L2s. Bristow Helicopters, meanwhile, has grounded 11 EC225s from its UK fleet. The other large-scale operator in the region, Bond Offshore Helicopters, has also pulled four AS332s from service, along with three EC225s.

"We are trying to bring in helicopters where we can, but there's not a lot of them just lying about," says CHC Scotia.

Its comments are echoed by Bond: "The whole industry up there has been thrown up in the air. We are trying to bring in additional assets but there is a chronic shortage of airframes."

Bristow adds: "[Our] European fleet comprises 55 helicopters, of which at least 75% remain operational across the region. We are currently calling on additional support from other areas of the business to help us best match capacity with our customers' critical needs in the short to medium term."

The problem is not only affecting the UK. Bristow is not flying three EC225s in Australia, another EC225 in Norway, and an AS332 L2 in Nigeria, it says. CHC has grounded its EC225 and AS332 L1 and L2 fleets globally - a total of 64 airframes, including those in the UK.

For its part, Eurocopter has begun a detailed examination of G-CHCN's gearbox, which arrived at its factory in Marignane, France on 29 October. It is still trying to trace the root cause of the incident, which was triggered by the failure of the bevel gear vertical shaft in the main gearbox. A ditching in May involving an EC225 operated by Bond was downed by the same fault.

It is also testing the emergency lubrication system fitted to the EC225 using a test bench at a site belonging to engine supplier Turbomeca.

In the May ditching, the back-up system was functioning correctly but sensors indicated a system failure. Although Eurocopter says it is too early to definitively link the events, indications are that a sensor was again at fault.

[HeliComparator]

Industry Insider, my apologies, I hate it when posters make personal attacks as a substitute for a good point and now I have pretty much done that myself. Sorry about that. However as I think you now realise, your point that the aircraft is no longer certified was incorrect for the reasons you state in your later post. There are ways of pointing that out though!

VL, if you actually read this thread properly you would have seen that a comparison of the issues affecting the S92 and 225 were raised by PeterPanPan in post 227. I was responding to an interesting and valid question.

Were this your forum, I am sure you would promulgate a list of those questions I am allowed to answer and those I am not, but since it isn't, you will have to like it or lump it. Since you have made no useful contribution to this thread at all, instead using it only to attack me, it would be better for everyone if you stopped reading it.

[Lonewolf_50]

it would be better for everyone if you stopped reading it.

No, but it might be better for everyone if comments not germane, or personal attacks, were not presented. :ouch: (By your addressee and any of the rest of us).

In re the post by belly tank:

"We are trying to bring in helicopters where we can, but there's not a lot of them just lying about," says CHC Scotia.

Its comments are echoed by Bond: "The whole industry up there has been thrown up in the air. We are trying to bring in additional assets but there is a chronic shortage of airframes."

It appears that when operating at certain margins to make a profit, the ability to have airframes in reserve cannot be met for a fleet grounding.

Some crashes have more profound after effects than others, and I suspect this is one of those.

[SASless]

Whoever decided to sell off all the Bristow 61's is probably wishing he had remembered the Old Man's practice of shoving surplus machines over into the corner just in case of a rainy day or a golden opportunity presenting itself.....just as he used to do the "Gardening Leave" thing for pilots and engineers.

[HeliHenri]

Some crashes have more profound after effects than others, and I suspect this is one of those.

Hello Lonewolf_50,

Which crash are you talking about when you say "this is one of those" ? Are you saying that this 225 crashed ? :confused:

And about the S61, those of British International (ex Penzance) should become very interesting for some operators ...
.

[Cuddles]

Oddly enough I was having just this conversation with a crew on their way into Norwich last night, and, co-incidentally, they'd also just finished said discussion when I butted in and interrupted their consumption of snack - a - jacks.

[Helinut]

Could/are BIH's S61s being used to fill gaps??

[902Jon]

Some crashes have more profound after effects than others, and I suspect this is one of those.

Which crash are you talking about ?

The Chinook crash (BAH) had a huge effect on the North Sea. Following this accident, the Shell offshore workers refused to fly in the type, and so it became useless in Aberdeen. The airframes were eventually sold, and the type has never flown on the North Sea since.

In contrast, the S76A+ that crashed out of Norwich 10 years ago was seen as an exceptional accident, due to having had a lightning strike on the blade in the past. Engineering inspections were carried out and procedures changed, and the aircraft returned to service. S76's are still flying on the North Sea (including now 2 in Aberdeen covering from this latest incident).

Whoever decided to sell off all the Bristow 61's is probably wishing he had remembered the Old Man's practice of shoving surplus machines over into the corner just in case of a rainy day or a golden opportunity presenting itself.

Unfortunately that mentality has long gone. Each "business unit" has to "lease" the aircraft from the parent company. So if an aircraft is not on contract and earning money, it is seen as a huge drain on that unit. This also has the knock-on effect that that business units' manager is not achieving budget targets, and their personal bonuses are affected.

[SASless]

Ah yes.....the "Manager's Bonus" and Quarterly Report....which now drives all thinking. When we use a 90 day window for planning....and pay manager's bonuses for squeezing every last penny from an Operation we foster some very short sightedness don't we! Almost like some Nigerian Grocery Stores I remember!

[Pittsextra]

I see Flight international journo's are on the pulse. In future maybe they could cut costs at the magazine and just publish press releases from various parties.

[js0987]

My guess is the old man stuffed them over in the corner because there were no available buyers not because some unforseen incident 5 years hence might require them.

There is the matter of cost. A certain amount of hull insurance may be neccessary. Do you pull them out peridically and exercise them or just let them sit? If you exercise them - another expense. How about crew training? Do you keep crews current or just try and get them up to speed when the aircraft are pulled out of mothballs?

Remember in business you spend a dollar (or euro or pound) and hope to earn say $1.10-1.25 in return. You save a dollar and you just earned a dollar.

[albatross]

The 225 EMLUBE system was, I believe, designed only to deal with a loss of transmission oil not the loss of 2 oil pumps.
In these 2 cases there was not a loss of fluid but an internal failure of the shaft.

So my question is this:
Would proper indication of functioning of the EMLUBE system in this scenario have allowed the safe continuation of flight for the "sacred" 30 minutes (29 minutes 59 seconds as one friend defines it) or would there have been a catastrophic failure of the transmission shaft beforehand?

There would be no way for the crew to differentiate between the two failure modes - except perhaps increasing vibration levels in the event of further shaft failure. With no oil flow through the system there would be no chip detection to advise of things going pear shaped.

I am also told that with dual pump failure and no oil loss from the transmission that the EMLUBE system injecting glycol into an already "full" transmission would cause overflow of a mixture of glycol and oil from the transmission vent which would flow around the transmission area and perhaps even down into the passenger compartment. Would this venting cause a fire hazard?

It would be interesting to see if EC is going to test the transmission and EMLUBE system with this failure model and a fully set up system (alternators producing power ect.) on the test stand.

Edited to add a thought: Since the transmission is still full of oil or an oil/glycol mix would the crew still have an accurate transmission temperature? Don't have my 225 manuals close to hand unfortunately.

[kannad405]

I see what you are getting at with regards to the mix of oil and glycol, however, the glycol isn't pumped in as such and is actually mixed with the P2.4 air from #1 engine and sprayed onto the hottest parts of the box. I think I'm correct in saying it sprays periodically rather than dump it all in one shot. Also, the actual volume of glycol isn't that much (can't recall exact volume) and as such, I don't think venting out the box would be too much of an issue especially when 1. I'd hope the crew would be landing sooner rather than later and 2. The box vents to the aft of the mgb area and would run along outside of sliding cowl

[Fareastdriver]

One must wonder how much lubrication there is with a tranmission case full of oil and inoperative pumps. The input pinion and bevel gear would be totally immersed going around at a cosiderable rate. Gears have rough edges so it would be like a big high speed food processor inside the gearbox. How much would this activity lubricate the reduction gears and more importantly, how much oil mist for the top bearing? Obviously in a fairly short time the oil would start to overheat but how long is a fairly short time?

The Newfoundland S92 ran out of oil. The Puma Mk2 had a component failure internally, the first for 4 million hours. Both the 225s ditched with no apparant complaint from the gearbox apart from warning lights. All the trials so far have assumed the gearbox to be dry. Have they tried to run one without oil pressure to see what its running time is? It could be a nice surprise, there are enough gearboxs in this world that do not have the luxury of an oil pump.

The biggest problem is working out whether you have lost your oil or your oil pump, that is for somebody else to sort out.

[Cuddles]

They run electric fuel and hydraulic pumps, why not an electric GB oil pump?