MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE [Archive]

Chugalug2

20th Sep 2012, 00:31

Nice Castle, the syndrome that you describe is both depressing and familiar, for others too have complained of the bureaucratic morass that "safety" has now become in HM aviation. The irony is of course, as you and others so rightly point out, that as well as being a pain in the proverbial, it actively reduces operational effectiveness and.... well, safety! The apparatchiks setting about rebuilding UK Military Airworthiness from Year Zero will have much the same effect as Pol Pot did.
As tuc repeatedly reminds us, it was not the existing Regulations that were the problem, but simply that they were deliberately suborned in accordance with orders from the highest levels! Better to get back to enforcing them, you would have thought, before completely and continuously revising them. Unbelievably the dilemma is that many of the Regulations were pulped even as those who were experienced in their implementation were sacked. So the MAA finds itself with a barren wasteland but, like many an RAF Board of Inquiry before them, under strict orders not to ask why.
If this were but a case of blundering staffing bogged down in endless paperwork one could sympathise but shrug it off with a "Well, what can you do?". But this is aviation and it doesn't tolerate such fatalism. 62 people have died in UK Military Air Accidents featured in this forum alone. The real total is almost certainly very much higher, but we shall never know because they were investigated by the very operator that suffered them.
Airworthiness related Military Air Accidents will go on happening, and the death-toll will go on rising, because the Regulator, the Operator, and the Investigator, are one and the same. Both Regulation and Investigation are as prone to unwarranted interference as ever, no matter what the sign says at the gate.
If that isn't the case why doesn't the MAA state unequivocally that Haddon-Cave's "Golden Age" of Airworthiness provision was in reality one of corruption, gross negligence, and deceit? It was in that "Golden Age" that illegal RTS's were issued to knowingly unairworthy types and the ARTs, that desperate attempt by DFS to air the scandal, were buried without ceremony.
The longer this scandal grinds on the longer the RAF's honour is sullied and the longer its aircraft will lack airworthiness. It has to bite the bullet, come clean, and face up to the gross betrayal by its leadership. Meanwhile the MAA and MAAIB must be released from the thrall of the MOD and be given real independence to get on with their vital work of avoiding avoidable accidents.

tucumseh

20th Sep 2012, 07:53

Any chance of moving forwards in capability is wrapped up by the mass of staff work required to alter Safety Cases and the like to bring forward absolutely clear-cut advances that would improve safety & op effectiveness - the process has become a negative link in the safety chain due to the inertia of the whole thing.
Correct.

The very fact realisation has dawned that Safety Cases must (a) exist and (b) be maintained is a step forward. 20 years ago, under the then RAF Chief Engineer (Alcock) instructions were issued NOT to, under any circumstances, maintain Safety Cases.

The natural outcome was that the only Def Stan dedicated to this task was no longer maintained. At the time, those of us who no longer had a job (as airworthiness was no longer to be maintained and the posts were chopped) railed against this. D/Stan themselves agreed with us and made many attempts to update the Def Stan in line with legislation, the last in 2002 when I was asked to chair the proposed committee. My bosses refused this temporary secondment, on the grounds safety was a “waste of money”. It was finally cancelled, without replacement, 3 or 4 years ago.

All the above was presented to Haddon-Cave. He praised Alcock and others.

Some here will note that 1992 is precisely the year the Chinook ART was published (Aug 1992) which advised Alcock and Bagnall that the aircraft was not airworthy. CHART was what would have proved us right, but it was withheld from MoD(PE) staffs, including Controller Aircraft. So, in the certain knowledge our concerns were valid, what did Alcock’s organisation do? In December 1992 we were threatened with dismissal by his 2* 2i/c if we continued our complaints. THAT was the Chief Engineer’s reaction to being told his airworthiness system was shambolic. This threat was repeated, in my case, in 1998; I now know the Nimrod ART had just been published. Again, it was withheld from those who could have corrected the failures, even though the specialist department had been closed in 1993. When the Chief of Defence Procurement advised the Public Accounts Committee in 1999 that the CHART criticisms remained valid, a report to CDP’s Deputy went unanswered and was ignored. My point here is there exists a long, unbroken chain of evidence, much of which is outwith the MAA’s terms of reference.

Today, it is highly unlikely MoD has more than a handful who are even aware of this Def Stan and its accompanying 20 Specifications. The REAL problem is that many who are sit in senior positions, having gained advancement by virtue of the part they played in the rundown of the airworthiness system. That is, they actively supported the Nimrod and Chinook 2* in the late 90s when he, too, disciplined staffs for refusing an order to ignore airworthiness and financial probity. Today, that remains an offence in MoD.

If aircraft offices had people trained in the application of this Def Stan, and the general process, then they wouldn’t need to ask the MAA any questions. MAA’s task should be simple. Manage routine updates to these Standards, ensure correct training (which was stopped in 1992) and fight the cases for proper funding. The very fact they are being asked questions means they are not directing their efforts properly.

The question is always this. Would MAA’s current focus and output have prevented the Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado or Hercules crashes? No. They would have been prevented by simple application of mandated, regulations; which were no longer in widespread use because staffs were instructed to ignore that mandate. That lack of focus is entirely down to the Nimrod Review actively protecting retired senior officers and the MAA being staffed by senior, serving officers, whose careers in part depend on their ability to protect the same officers, and their successors who still serve.

1.3VStall

20th Sep 2012, 10:42

Tuc,

Just a thought, but has the written evidence you refer to ever been brought to the attention of the Crown Prsoecution Service?

1.3V

Just This Once...

20th Sep 2012, 10:50

...or the Service Prosecution Authority. Incorrect, inaccurate or certification of airworthiness without having ensured its accuracy is now a specific service offence. No need for a crash anymore to earn a 2 year prison sentence; signing a bolloxs certificate linked to airworthiness is all you need.

The legal brief we had made quite a few go pale and I can name one PTL who changed his certificate at the front of an RTS as a direct result!

tucumseh

20th Sep 2012, 12:23

1.3vStall

CPS - no, not directly.

RAF Provost Marshall, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Thames Valley Police Chief Constable, Public Accounts Committee, various MPs, Prime Minister, 5 successive Ministers for the Armed Forces (the last time with the MAA present), MoD's PUS - Yes. None took any action and they continue to condone all that I describe. Now and again we "win" a case, such as Nimrod, Chinook, Hercules; but they don't seem to want to understand that the act of "winning" should lead to them overturning their previous rulings. Again, the compartmentalisation problem so typical of MoD.

JTO - As you say, what it needs is a prosecution. Making a false declaration has always been an offence - it is stated in letters of delegation; however, this was challenged by the senior officers I mention and Ministers have upheld their right to issue orders to make a false declaration, and confirmed it is an offence to refuse. This basic contradiction is the problem. I believe the specific offence regarding airworthiness is actually unnecessary, but does serve to emphasis the point. Now there is a new Min(AF) I'll be asking if he agrees with his 5 predecessors. The people who will prepare his reply will be the same old names and will no doubt advise him, yet again, to reject my submission.

Thanks for your interest. I'll let you know how I get on.

Antrim Kate

20th Sep 2012, 17:39

What you will get for your money (or just your time) is AM (Retd.) Terry, the outgoing MAA DG, the outgoing Ops Director, the new Technical Director, AOC 2 Gp, the incoming CoM - Air and the Head of the MAAIB, all in the same room, potentially at the same time...

Rigga

20th Sep 2012, 19:37

In my experience of similar corporate ignorance:

A company used to (they don’t now) evaluate air accident insurance pay-outs against the cost of reviewing system effectiveness for modification…it took several accidents with fatalities (totalling hundreds) to motivate the national authority to mandate the changes required to stop the accidents. The company had not yet reached its internal mandate…but, for fear of imposed fleet-wide actions, felt encouraged to comply with the NAA’s instruction and changed the errant system.

A friend of mine theorises the MOD’s corporate responsibility thus:

It took many cases over many years and several dozen millions in compensation payments, in increasing amounts of money to more and more personnel, for the illegal ejection from the Armed Services of pregnant girls and of those wearing comfortable shoes, to gain some sort of recognition in the higher echelons and some action to review what was causing those cases and the loss of money…

Just think of how much longer, how much money and how many other cases to challenge the institutionalised arrogance/ignorance it will take to change the current attitudes to airworthiness?

Easy Street

20th Sep 2012, 21:17

Tuc,

If officialdom is blocking your attempts to get politicians to take action, why not go to the press? It is a very dry, technical scandal for sure- but so was LIBOR and look at the fall-out from that (Alexi Mostrous at The Times was the journalist). You can be sure that ministers' private researchers will read your documents once their bosses' reputation is under question in the papers...

tucumseh

21st Sep 2012, 05:37

Easy Street

Not an easy task. As you say, a dry and complex subject. Let's face it, about 3 people in MoD understand it, so the attention span of Joe Public is 2 seconds at most. Editors are aware of this. They don't understand that the same basic failures are responsible for the higher profile cases, like body armour, "armoured" vehicles, batteries exploding etc. That is not a criticism, because MoD don't understand it either. Individuals do, but policy militates against being able to correct it at a corporate level.

MoD play on this; in fact their policies rely on it. The classic example is: the year before XV230 crashed, Adam Ingram (Minister for Armed Forces) was formally
advised, in writing, that the airworthiness regs were not being implemented and there were systemic failures. At first he refused to reply, but an MP (now a Minister) pressed. (Kudos).

AFTER XV230 crashed, Ingram sent the MP a holding reply, stating the issues raised (by me) were "too complex" for anyone in MoD to answer, so a formal reply would take time. Eventually, 9 months after XV230 crashed, when it was already well known the crash was caused by airworthiness failures, Ingram replied to that MP, asserting there were no airworthiness failures, the regs were implemented correctly, and he had personally satisfied himself this was the truth.

Clearly, someone in MoD lied to him. In fact, quite a few people. Two years before (April 2004) the same MoD people had advised his predecessor that I was the only person in MoD who thought the airworthiness and financial probity regulations should be implemented! (I know this, because the Minister's office accidentally provided the MoD briefing paper to me under FoI).

Despite the Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip reports revealing the truth (up to a point), Ingram's successors have placed in writing that they remain content at the quality and accuracy of advice from MoD. Sir Malcolm Rifkind was the only past Minister to publicly breach protocol by stating he was grossly misled by Wratten and Graydon when briefed on Mull of Kintyre. (Kudos again; I believe this influenced Lord Philip). But no-one takes the next logical step - prosecution of this offence. THAT would switch the press on.

That is what we are up against. If the press want to publish anything they invite MoD comment. They get the same crap as the MP did. When they spoke to Alcock and Graydon during the Philip Inquiry, both blatantly lied; and those lies became official MoD policy and were included in Liam Fox's speeches. If they push MoD, the reply is (and remains) that XV230 was a single event, Haddon-Cave's report solved all problems while it remained in service, and now it's gone there can be no further problems. The compartmentalisation I speak of.

They completely ignore the "systemic" nature of the failings - the fact that much of airworthiness is (was, should be) a core MoD function, so if there was a failure on Nimrod (no valid Safety Case), it followed that the same failures existed on other aircraft. That was true for Chinook in June 1994, as it was for the other accidents mentioned here.

What I've written above makes senior people in MoD topple. You know what it's like. People who understand detail are frowned upon. If you do succeed in getting your point across, you're rocking the boat. Junior MoD staffs are today taught that understanding such detail is a career killer. I've known very highly qualified staff doctor their CVs by removing all evidence of such experience, as it helps them advance. And the VSOs prefer to sail in calm waters, ignoring the turbulence above and below.

1.3VStall

21st Sep 2012, 09:57

Tuc,

I find all this utterly depressing. Surely there is a journo out there with enought nouse to pick this up and run with it?

just another jocky

21st Sep 2012, 10:02

Or perhaps a TV producer; Panorama, Dispatches etc.

tucumseh

21st Sep 2012, 10:37

A couple have tried. The last time, because there was irrefutable evidence, MoD's strategy was simply not to comment. If MoD doesn't comment, one way or another, the story goes away as far as the editor is concerned.

The same evidence was presented to H-C and Lord Philip. As you know, both noted the respective aircraft were not airworthy. The former spelled it out, the latter made a more oblique reference. But the press don't report that this calls into question the entire MoD process, over the past 20+ years. And MoD/MAA hide behind the H-C claim the problems only started in 1998.

However, it must be said that various Coroners are supportive and one has recently arranged for the audio tapes of a 2007 inquest to be handed to a family. This is one of the cases where MoD flatly refused to reveal ANY information, unlike Nimrod and, eventually, Chinook, where they handed over the evidence of unairworthiness. This is deeply suspicious and makes me wonder what they have to hide about this 2003 crash. (Same case as the one in my first paragraph).

The reason there is no record of the inquest is because the Coroner's stenographer posts had been chopped as a savings. So, if the families want a record, they have to arrange for forensic analysis of very poor recordings (in hand) and the acquisition of bespoke audio codecs owned by the Corner's Service (they quoted £600). This beggars belief, but luckily it is being carried out free of charge with the software provided by a well known professional mastering house. I submit that families should not have to go to such lengths to discover the truth. BTW, the first two days have been completed and the constant misleading of the Court, by omission and commission, is appalling. It will be up to the families what happens with the evidence. But as one bereaved father shouted out in Court, "What a fix!"

dervish

21st Sep 2012, 11:50

tuc

Is that the one where the IPT blamed the civvy programme manager for making the aircraft unsafe, but he produced the evidence to show he'd directed it be made safe and was overruled? IIRC MoD withheld that evidence from the BOI and the coroner.

1.3VStall

21st Sep 2012, 11:55

Tuc/dervish,

I am finding this more and more disturbing. The information to which you refer must be brought to public awareness!

tucumseh

21st Sep 2012, 15:35

Dervish

That's the one. The reason why the family sought the transcript was because MoD wrote to her a couple of years ago still blaming the PM; effectively denying the existence of the evidence and reports he'd submitted to investigators. They and their MP asked the BoI President (still serving as a 1*) to consider recommending re-convening. At first he was sympathetic, then suddenly changed his tone when (presumably) the implications became clear (senior officers and officials lying and withholding evidence).

However, the episode did serve to force MoD's hand and they revealed the aircraft were not serviceable, contrary to what was claimed by the BoI and in court. And, that the RTS was deeply flawed due to unverified "read across". In fact, very similar failures to Mull of Kintyre many years earlier, illustrating lessons had not been learned. These failures, and this evidence, would have explained all the unanswered questions posed by the BoI.

What I found particularly disappointing, as an ardent supporter of Boscombe Down, was the evidence given in Court by one of their former (but still serving) test aircrew. When asked by the Coroner if he had "anything relevant to add", he omitted to mention his MAR recommendations report which snagged an installation as unsafe, and the pressure he'd been put under to withdraw the report (i.e. leave the aircraft unsafe). I know he reads this forum and probably realises his failure to stand firm at the time led directly to 2 other deaths (although I think the greater blame lies with our 2* of the day who ruled it was acceptable to leave aircraft functionally unsafe, while making a false declaration it was safe).

Yes, 1.3VStall, it gets infinitely worse. But it needs good men to come forward, otherwise the likes of me are dismissed as liars. As I was in 2005 when Ingram was told of "systemic airworthiness failures". Despite the Nimrod Review and formation of the MAA, MoD still maintain I was wrong; which is utterly bizarre. BTW, the MAA are fully aware of this case and, like me, are waiting to see what the families decide to do. Unfortunately, legal action costs lots.

nice castle

21st Sep 2012, 18:07

Was there a reason he failed to mention it? I mean, that would only been an admission of having fulfilled his role at BDN. Did he simply forget, or was he cogniscent of the fact that it would end his career?

tucumseh

21st Sep 2012, 22:15

I don't know. I last spoke to him 3 years before the crash. But he clearly knew what he was saying, as at the inquest he totally contradicted what he'd said in his initial MAR report, adopting the line Boscombe had been pressurised to take. It was the same issue that MoD and Ministers had lied about on Mull of Kintyre in the mid-90s - that of the definition of Safety Critical. He knew the problem rendered the aircraft functionally unsafe (as he'd clearly stated it in the MAR report), but never mentioned this to the court, saying it was not Safety Critical. MoD used this evidence to claim the aircraft were serviceable and fit for purpose, when they were clearly neither. Sorry, but if your primary sensors are designated "No Go" systems, but are unserviceable, then the aircraft is not fit for purpose (in this case, war fighting). Under extreme circumstances you may choose to take the risk and "Go", but to what end?

Chugalug2

22nd Sep 2012, 08:49

nice castle:
...or was he cogniscent of the fact that it would end his career?
In the more general arena that is, of course, the dilemma of everyone who is prevailed upon to lie, steal, and cheat by their superiors. No matter how it is dressed up that is the ultimate decision one has to make, and when the result of doing so is often to leave whole fleets unairworthy or fatal accidents improperly investigated then the cost can later be measured in lives lost. That is why the default reaction of doing what you are told and keeping quiet is not only morally wrong but criminally so as well. It should not be left to the MAA to spell out the personal consequences of improperly signing off work known to be not in compliance with the Regulations, it should be anathema to anyone declaring themselves to be aviation professionals. That latter term would appear to exclude the MOD, the RAF High Command, the RAeS, and quite possibly the MAA itself.

squib66

30th Sep 2012, 11:10

I thought the point of the MAA's flagship regulation on Senior/Operational/Delivery Duty Holders was to prevent that sort of thing.

tucumseh

30th Sep 2012, 15:57

squibb

The problem is that MAA's remit is based on implementation of Haddon-Cave's recommendations; or at least those that MoD accepted.

As Haddon-Cave omitted the evidence about the behavior Chug describes, the MAA does not address it. How convenient.

As has been said many times, the senior hierarchy of the MAA is mainly serving RAF officers. Not one of them reported the systemic failures when in previous posts, so either;

a. They have no experience in airworthiness, as anyone involved in the subject over the past 20+ years knows exactly what was going on, or,

b. They made a conscious decision not to report the failings, which is a serious offence (misconduct in a public office).

Which is it to be?

The MAA leader has a clear duty to report this serial misconduct by his fellow senior officers; past and present. He hasn't. How convenient. How illegal.

downsizer

30th Sep 2012, 17:49

You lot are like a giant self licking lollipop. You claim to have all this evidence (which may be true, I don't profess to be an expert) and are outraged by the lack of action, yet you appear to do nothing because you think it will be ignored. You can't have it both ways, introducing an airworthiness aspect to most threads yet doing nothing about it....If you feel that strongly then surely you should be doing something...:\:confused:

tucumseh

1st Oct 2012, 06:05

downsizer

Are you saying no evidence was presented to Haddon-Cave or Lord Philip by anyone on this forum?

Where do you think they got their evidence? Not from MoD.

What precisely is it you are objecting to or challenging in the recent posts? My last post raised a simple, obvious point.

In the past 25 years (since 13th January 1988, which is the date MoD(PE) found out about AMSO's policy that kicked off the rundown of airworthiness), anyone in MoD familiar with the airworthiness regulations would have known there were serious, systemic failings. Within days, one of MoD's internal auditors reported as such. Other major internal audits saying the same were dated February 1991 and June 1996. All the ART reports of the 90s said the same. The Public Accounts Committee heard similar evidence in March 1999. Since 1988, there has been a long, unbroken audit trail of formal notification to senior staffs of the problem. None was acted upon.

My point is that these notifications should have been coming from everyone involved in airworthiness. They didn't; they came from a few civilian staffs, who were ignored. Actually, their complaints were ignored; the individuals attracted the attention of Director General Support Management (RAF) when, in December 1992, he threatened dismissal for anyone continuing to demand that the regulations be implemented. (He has never made himself public, so it would be wrong for me to name him here, but he's on the plaque in the entrance to Bazalgette Pavilion at Wyton (if it still exists).

Those who knew, but did not notify, committed a very serious offence. Those who ignored the notifications committed, in my opinion, a greater offence. Those two groups of Staffs are part of the problem, not the solution.

The key question today, in my opinion, is what group does each member of the MAA fall in to? If they knew of the problems (and many did), but did not report them, who is to say they have changed this approach? Clearly, to do so would be hypocritical, making the person untrustworthy to hold such a position. MoD itself confirms none of the MAA staffs were in the group who notified the problems in the period January1988 to April 2004 - this has been stated in writing to an AUS and passed to an MP as part of the answer to his PQ.

That leaves those who worked on airworthiness since April 2004. We know that, in June 2007 (after XV230 crashed), Adam Ingram (Minister for the Armed Forces) was advised by MoD's "airworthiness experts" (whoever they may be) that the regulations were being implemented correctly, and always had been. Ingram stated this in writing to the same MP.

In December 2007, when the Nimrod XV230 BoI report was published (which noted systemic failure to implement the regulations) the RAF's Directorate of Air Staffs continued to rubbish claims any aircraft was a unairworthy; thus disagreeing with both the BoI and Des Browne's decision to set up the Nimrod Review.

In February 2008, Bob Ainsworth (Browne's successor) claimed only a few RAF aircraft, but no RN or Army, could be affected; thus ignoring the systemic nature of the failures. Whoever advised him to write this rubbish knew nothing of airworthiness management.

The admission, finally, that those few civilian staffs were right all along came in October 2009 with the publication of the Nimrod Review. Even then, the true breadth and depth of the problem has been concealed; the fact is the truth embarrasses too many senior retired and serving officers.

So, for a mere 3 years there has been general acceptance in MoD of airworthiness failures. One hopes that anyone trained in the subject since then has had this drummed into them; but this remains in some doubt, especially with the current problems the MAA has getting their own regulations issued. I submit that 3 years is not a long time to gain much practical knowledge of managing airworthiness. The MAA's direction and output proves this. There is a lot of hot air but the act of cancelling the only Defence Standard dedicated to maintaining airworthiness was an act of stupefying incompetence. With a bit of luck, those staffs who retain their own copy still secretly implement it, as it remains the bible. If anyone involved in airworthiness is reading this, you do have your copy, don't you? Not just the Def Stan itself, but Part 2 with the 20 Specifications? What? You don't? I didn't think so. D/Stan haven't been able to find a copy of Part 2 since June 1993, when the RAF Chief Engineer broght the final curtain down on the HQMCs. Yet staffs with airworthiness delegation were required to have their own personal copy, issued with their letter of delegation. Does that not tell a story? 19 years without anyone being issued with the definitive, mandated instructions on how to maintain a Safety Case.

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 06:40

I can't argue about any of that, but my question is far more simple.... What are you, with your (and others) vast knowledge doing about it? Anything substantial or just posting on here in the vain hope that the internet will magic up a solution? Your earlier posts on this thread imply the latter, hence my self licking lollipop analogy.

Chugalug2

1st Oct 2012, 08:49

What are you, with your (and others) vast knowledge doing about it?
I ask exactly the same question of you, downsizer. You are now in the same position as me, assuming you have actually bothered to read tuc's (and others).. posting on here What is your problem? You are presumably a Professional Aviator (or are you?). You now know that RAF Airworthiness was the subject of deliberate and sustained sabotage from the late 80's from which it has never recovered (because it has never been acknowledged). What are you doing about it, other than haranguing the messengers? If you are serving you have the duty to raise these concerns with the MAA, haven't you? If they do nothing about that concern is that not a comment on them and their ability to do anything anyway? Just because the civil police, the RAF Provost Marshal, the MOD, the Government, the aviation establishment in general and the RAeS in particular, choose to ignore specific evidence of gross negligence and criminality at the highest levels are you saying that we should wind our necks in because you find us irritating and boring? I will gladly admit to both of those failings which I intend to go on inflicting on the likes of you in the hope that "the internet will magic up" a professional response from supposed professionals . What do you intend doing, downsizer? Anything?

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 09:03

Wind your neck in fella, I never said you were irritating or boring.

The best placed people to start the ball rolling (again) are the SMEs obviously. The same SMEs who post the same posts on here again and again yet don't seem to do much else because they feel there is no point (as posted earlier in this thread). If they feel so strongly they should be doing something further about it and utilising the greater knowledge and depth of understanding that they have over the rest of us average joes....

Or are they too above questioning?

Chugalug2

1st Oct 2012, 09:55

the greater knowledge and depth of understanding that they have over the rest of us average joes....
What greater knowledge is required to know that an order to suborn Regulations is an illegal one? Any average joe knows that and what to do about it, don't they? Don't you? If you know of such an order or orders that resulted in Grossly Unairworthy aircraft being released into RAF service that subsequently suffered fatal airworthiness related accidents isn't it your duty to raise that as a Flight Safety issue? Any average joe knows that a systemic suborning of the airworthiness regulations will result in systemic compromised airworthiness to all fleets, including their own.
As to questioning, downsizer, do by all means. Might I suggest though that this is a problem that affects us all, and the question should be "what are we to do about it" Or are we above questioning ourselves?

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 10:09

I haven't seen the order, have you? I'm not suggesting it doesn't exist BTW. However the person who can prove the order was given should be doing more than posting on an internet forum IMHO.

I guess we'll have to disagree now because it appears to me (and others in my crewroom) that a handful of people here are happy to bang the drum but actually do little else in the hope that others will do their bidding like some kind of puppet master. I'm happy to be corrected if I've missed the current campaign to right these wrongs that extends beyond this fora...

Chugalug2

1st Oct 2012, 11:02

downsizer, specific and detailed evidence has been submitted to the Nimrod Review, the Mull of Kintyre Review, MPs, Ministers for the Armed Forces, Secretaries of State for Defence, HoC and HoL select committees, Chief Constables and the RAF Provost Marshal. It has either been totally ignored and unacknowledged or selectively filleted so that the inedible parts were left undigested. In short the law enforcement, judicial, military high command, government and parliamentary avenues have been tried and found wanting. This evidence has been factual, using much FoI as well as personal sources. If it were just about financial wrong doing I would have packed it in years ago, but lives have been lost and will go on being lost because "there is something wrong with our bloody aircraft". Unless and until the MAA and the MAAIB are released from the thrall of the MOD (and of each other) that will not change.
Don't worry, I know that I am irritating and boring but I see no option but to continue in the same vein. In the meantime some gratuitous advice to you and your crew room colleagues, the only bidding that will work is what comes from yourselves. If you can't bother yourselves in demanding that this scandal be addressed, that has compromised the airworthiness of the aircraft that you fly, then can you wonder that others that are more concerned to protect reputations than safety can't be either?

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 11:43

As I suspected then, those banging the loudest are doing the least. Preaching to the choir in effect....:(:sad:

tucumseh

1st Oct 2012, 11:46

Downsizer

I think I have proven, many times, that I am more than willing and able to do more than "bang the drum".

When Des Browne ordered the Nimrod Review by Mr Haddon-Cave QC, he expressly permitted MoD staffs, past and present, to give evidence. I know many of us here sail a little close to the Official Secrets Act wind when posting; the airworthiness saga is no different. Mr Browne effectively waived the OSA in this case. I later asked Lord Philip if the same applied, and he confirmed I could submit the same evidence to him. While of course he concentrated on the legal aspect, his report makes it very clear he accepted my evidence regarding the illegality of the Chinook Release to Service. That is, the aircraft had no proper clearance to fly operationally. I am unhappy he didn't spell out all my supporting evidence, as that served to protect the guilty, but the fact remains he supported my main conclusion; as did Haddon-Cave who similarly protected the guilty. At least Lord Philip didn't name and shame the innocent.

The matter is further complicated by the Freedom of Information Act - MoD withhold benign information yet, bizarrely, happily release information that you and I would not normally be allowed to discuss here. I asked the question of the Information Commissioner - If MoD release information under FoI, is it deemed to be in the Public Domain? The answer was woolly (I have no time for the ICO, they routinely collude with MoD to agree what answers they give and how complaints will be handled), but they agreed the precedent had been set by the press routinely publishing FoI replies.

Hence, for example, I can state here that on 23rd April 2003, MoD at AbbeyWood briefed PUS that, as of that date, I was the only person in MoD who thought it right to implement mandated airworthiness and financial probity regulations. I received this in 2005 and successive Mins(AF) (Ainsworth, Ingram, Moonie, Caplin) confirmed in writing to my MP that they supported this statement. This single item of background evidence is what demonstrates the Nimrod Review was a simplistic collation of a few well known facts; and not the revelation Haddon-Cave, MoD and now the MAA like to claim it was. Clearly, the statement is a lie as others in MoD demonstrably believe in aircraft being airworthy (although pprune reveals an astonishing number who don't). But it serves to demonstrate the lengths MoD will go to denigrate anyone who disagrees with their policies.

Perhaps THE key event in the weeks leading up to the announcement the Chinook pilots had been cleared was Lord Philip being advised MoD had lied to the widow of one of the passengers. They told her there was no such thing as a Release to Service until 1996, and the only Chinook Release was signed by Controller Aircraft, Sir Donald Spiers. I had discussed his many times on the MoK thread - the fact that MoD never mentioned the "RTS", only ever the "CAR". At first I thought it may be because there wasn't an RTS at all, but investigations revealed ACAS had ignored the mandated CAR and issued an illegal RTS. That was a significant breakthrough.

Clearly, this lie had only one purpose; to protect the signatory to the illegal RTS of November 1993. Min(AF), Nick Harvey, was forced to issue a grovelling letter of apology to the widow. Until that event, Lord Philip may have been thinking about not mentioning airworthiness. But, when you read the report it is obvious the sentence on the (illegal) RTS was dropped in at the last minute, as it is slightly out of context.

On Nimrod, C130 and Chinook there has been a single event like this when I think we all thought "Case won". To me, that was the key event on MoK. It was an extraordinary lie, so easily disproved, but it illustrated the sheer panic in MoD over the evidence the aircraft was not airworthy. And that lie was perpetrated after the MAA was formed. And it exposed a new RAF strategy - close ranks to protect the retired VSOs at all costs, this time at the expense of a named civilian 2 Star, from whom Alcock, Graydon and Bagnall had withheld the 1992 CHART report. It was one thing lying about two junior pilots - that is to be expected - but what would make them suddenly escalate their finger pointing to a 2 Star? The airworthiness evidence. That is, the "new" evidence MoD had always called for. Hoisted, and all that.

I can assure you everything I say on here, plus the detailed background, has been formally submitted to, for example, Mr Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, both of whom noted the same serious failings I've been "banging on" about on pprune since I joined in January 2003. It has also been submitted to the Provost Marshal, five successive Ministers for the Armed Forces (the Minister who deals with this subject), a former Minister for Defence Procurement, Secretaries of State for Defence, MoD's PUS, Thames Valley Police, numerous MPs and more. And when MoD and the retired VSOs lied to the press, I happily provided the evidence they had lied.

I discuss here the replies I receive, which are the same as others on pprune get. That is, MoD is allowed to judge its own case by briefing the above office bearers and 99% of the time they deny there is any problem. As I said, even after XV230 crashed and the cause was known, Adam Ingram claimed he was personally satisfied the regulations were implemented correctly. The very existence of the MAA gives lie to that yet, and this is my point, no action is taken against those in MoD who knowingly misled in their briefings. That is where the "campaign" is at the moment and why it is important to air as much of the truth as he rules permit.

tucumseh

1st Oct 2012, 11:53

Downsizer

As I suspected then, those banging the loudest are doing the least.

So, if what I have outlined is "the least" anyone has done on the subject, pray tell what others have done, including yourself. As many here will testify, I'm quite willing to meet you and compare notes.

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 11:54

Preaching in here isn't going to help though, it's largely the wrong audience and clearly isn't going to get picked up by the necessary figures. Are you thus saying the "campaign" is dead in the water and posts on here are all that is left?

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 11:57

So, if what I have outlined is "the least" anyone has done on the subject, pray tell what others have done, including yourself. As many here will testify, I'm quite willing to meet you and compare notes.

My post that you quoted was posted before your thorough explanation.... Hardly cricket to quote selectively after elaborating.

FWIW your "the least" makes interesting reading, but it's where "the campaign" is now that is the rub, and as a mere amateur on this subject it appears somewhat stagnant.

tucumseh

1st Oct 2012, 13:02

Perhaps it seems stagnant to an amateur because it is being conducted by professionals. :E

Please appreciate it is wise to keep powder dry. Anyone is free to post on pprune, and on the MoK thread it became clear to all that a retired VSO (3 Star) was acting as the mouthpiece for the others and continually fishing for strategy hints. He's now retreated, perhaps because he got found out and was identified as the 3 Star under whom the original policy that led to the rundown in airworthiness was developed! He kept challenging us to post evidence and probably got quite a shock when papers from 1987, including those promulgating his policy, were sent to Lord Philip, especially after he and his cronies had denied their existence. That became a common feature in the evidence. MoD denying policy papers existed, followed by them being provided to Lord Philip for the first time. In time, (December 2010), Lord Philip started asked us first for MoD papers, as MoD kept saying they didn't have them. Sooner or later such dissembling works against you, especially with a legal mind such as LP's. The resultant distrust of anything MoD says is ever more widespread.

downsizer

1st Oct 2012, 13:23

Perhaps it seems stagnant to an amateur because it is being conducted by professionals.

A cracking attitude to get buy in from those you'd like onside.

So we are back at square one where the majority of serving personnel think there is nothing left that can be done bar post on the internet and nothing will change.

VinRouge

1st Oct 2012, 13:51

Quite frankly, most on the FL counldnt give 2 sh*ts, are sticking it to hours build and just trying to keep their noses clean until recruitment starts up again.

Most feel its not worth rocking the boat, your line manager wont thank for it, neither will your bosses, neither will the AOCs for getting attention on another "Risk" which they dont have the resources to manage. This is the crux. If nothing changes when issues are repeatedly reported, as they havent been. (other than piecemeal meetings to document evidence that holders are ALARP) then why will people risk falling on their sword when its much safer to stick with the status quo?

All the seniors want is to get the next rank for the pension without ending up on manslaughter charges. All the lower ranks want is to get relevant experience to escape the mad house with a decent salary and conditions on completing their pensionable service.

Can anyone actually blame the above 2 groups? There is nothing new about this, its endemic in a force that is woefully lacking both manpower and now experience. Its the same in the police force, NHS and fire service and its only going to get worse, much worse once the private sector picks up. Until then, I will do my best for the interests of my "customers", my little pink body and the op in that order.

Ralph Kohn

1st Oct 2012, 14:26

downsizer

May I say that I, and a number of fellow pilots, have read every word of tucumseh's evidence to all the parties he mentioned. Not only is it a comprehensive and proficient body of work, but every document he made Reference to was sent to Sir Charles Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. What he says is irrefutable.

His efforts have led to significant improvements in Military aviation safety for which all aircrew should be grateful. It is a pity the MAA are so slow to implement his work.

Capt Ralph Kohn FRAeS

tucumseh

1st Oct 2012, 14:38

Vin Rouge

I recognise all that you say, which describes very well the culture that was allowed to fester for over 20 years. It emphasises the point I made before. Nothing in what the MAA is doing would have prevented the systemic failures. When people remain scared to meet their legal obligations due to bullying, harassment and withholding promotions by the people responsible for the failures, it is clear where the cull must start. Accepting that it is probably unrealistic to expect Ministers to sack those who still serve, and given these people are the ones who will be determining who is made redundant and not be at risk themselves, the solution in the first instance is to ensure the MAA is truly independent of this system.

Ralph, thanks. And here's me thinking nobody had read it all! :ok:

Red Line Entry

1st Oct 2012, 15:27

Tuc,

How about putting all of the material on the web somewhere so we can see everything at first hand?

VinRouge

1st Oct 2012, 15:38

Tuc,

Its slightly different than that. People arent afraid perse, they understand the culture has definitely changed post HC and much good work has happened on the periphery. The problem is after 2 failed campaigns and overstretch for 10 years and no pay rise,people are losing the will to care. They are getting on with what we have got and looking for the light at the end of the tunnel they are digging for themselves through career progression.

People know there are plenty in the system to replace their positions if it all gets too much and people would still much prefer to fly with resource limitations than give that up for a desk, face potential FP cuts or get posted to the @rse end of the UK.

They also recognize that people who create problems rather than muddle on arent particularly well liked in the military, not in some cases without good reason. I think the Operations issues we face are distinct from the Engineering/PT/Procurement ones. The overarching issue we face is the MAA are too focussed on ensurance (over regulation) and not looking at the assurance (sp?) piece (improved/wider training, more trained personnel, more spares attaining higher standards, training for excellence rather than simply competence). Its easy to change the MRP, its difficult and expensive to increase manpower, improve training etc. Such is life. :ugh:

tucumseh

1st Oct 2012, 17:28

The overarching issue we face is the MAA are too focussed on ensurance (over regulation) and not looking at the assurance (sp?) piece (improved/wider training, more trained personnel, more spares attaining higher standards, training for excellence rather than simply competence). Its easy to change the MRP, its difficult and expensive to increase manpower, improve training etc.

Vin Rouge. Agreed. I would say what you mention, above, is part and parcel of the same root problem. All are components of airworthiness.

In a paper submitted to the Defence Procurement Agency’s Deputy Chief Executive (3 Star, one David Gould) in January 2000, the process that is meant to provide these components was broken down and the status of each component analysed. If you read the report you’d think it an annex of the Nimrod Review of nearly 10 years later, explaining the headline criticisms and recommendations in the main body. It concluded that all but one of the required functions was no longer carried out. (Haddon-Cave omitted this bit).

It made six recommendations, of which 5 relate directly to airworthiness. #2 calls for specialist airworthiness posts to be resurrected (having been disbanded in 1993 by the Chief Engineer), noting dangerously fragmented IPTs. #6 calls for two procedural Def Stans to be mandated again, including the one that covers maintenance of Safety Cases and ensuring the components you seek are properly funded before approval is granted to proceed. (Called Requirement Scrutiny). Both had been mandated under our old Controller Aircraft, in his CA Instructions. When CDP and the CE decided to ditch these, without replacement, MoD staffs were taught no Def Stan was mandated; but not told what Standard should be used (which rendered another airworthiness Def Stan a buggers muddle). This led directly to a number of deaths, caused by staffs waiving Critical Design Reviews and regarding Safety as optional, to be ditched if it saved money. (Where Haddon-Cave got his catchphrase “savings at the expense of safety” from. You think he thought this up himself?) .

DPA DCE did not reply.

This report was an internal DPA response to the Public Accounts Committee report “Modifying Defence Equipment”, published the previous year. In March 1999, former specialist airworthiness staffs had been actively prevented from briefing our Chief of Defence Procurement before he appeared in front of the committee. Consequently, his evidence was a mixture of complete rubbish and embarrassing gaffes. However, this was also the day he admitted the primary failings noted in the 1992 CHART report remained extant, which probably didn’t endear him to a certain retired Chief Engineer. Of course, CDP didn’t mean to say this because that same year he upheld disciplinary action against his staffs for disobeying orders not to provide the very things you speak of.

Hope this explains the direct links between our mutual concerns.

Mandator

1st Oct 2012, 18:56

I see in the latest RAeS magazine "The Aerospace Professional" that a Charles Haddon-Cave has just been elected as a FRAeS.

4Greens

1st Oct 2012, 19:47

He is now a judge so cannot comment on anything.

Rigga

1st Oct 2012, 20:50

...except as a witness in an inquest or a court of law.

Distant Voice

2nd Oct 2012, 12:26

It seems ironic that the Chairman of the newly formed MAA Safety Advisory Committee, Air Marshal (Retired) Sir Colin Terry was Chief Engineer (RAF) from 1997 to 99 and must have been aware of all the airworthiness issues outlined in NART and CHART that lead up to the Nimrod and Chinook accidents. He was also aware of the requirement to install CWS in Tornado GR4s, as this was specified in the 1998 SDR. And, considering that CWS needs were first addressed in 1990, following the collision two Tornado GR1s and three fatalities, it has to be assumed that his predecessor Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock was also in the picture on the CWS issue. In July of this year, two Tornado GR4’s, and most important of all, three lives were lost in a mid-collision over the Moray Firth.

In fact we know that in 1987, Air Marshal Terry, along with ASAC, tasked the Inspectorate of Flight Safety to carry out a review of the Nimrod fleet. The review was carried out by NART and their report circulated in September 1998. Both CE (RAF) and ACAS were listed on the distribution. Furthermore, it has to be assumed that the NART report was the subject of some discussion by Fixed Wing Airworthiness Management Group (FWAMG) and comments passed up the line to the Defence Aviation Safety Board, chaired by ASAC (Air Chief Marshal Stirrup). There is no mention in the Haddon-Cave report as to what action, if any, Air Marshal Terry and Air Chief Marshal Stirrup took in their respective capacities as CE (RAF)/Chairman of FWAMG, and ACAS/Chairman of the Defence Aviation Safety Board with regards to NART recommendations. Having read the QinetiQ report of March 2006 one can only conclude that very little was done.

So why was this not brought out by Haddon-Cave? I believe that it could be of some significance that when Air Marshal Terry retired from the RAF in 1999, he became actively involved with the Royal Aeronautical Society. In the period 2003 to 2007 he filled the posts of Council Member, President designate, President, and Past President. During the same four year period, Haddon-Cave was Chairman of the Air Law Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. Under these circumstances it is possible that Haddon-Cave found it difficult to criticise a past President of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and someone with whom he had worked closely over a period of four years. Instead, he gave Air Marshal Terry a glowing report and then directed his criticism to those who followed. In praising Terry, Haddon-Cave implies that everything was fine in 1998/99.

So what has change since the H-C report and the formation of the MAA; very little if the Tornado case is anything to go by. In a 2010 provisional assessment of strategic risks to Air Safety, DG MAA reported;

"Mid-air Collision - a risk during both routine flying operations and on OP HERRICK. Incremental mitigation of this chronic risk, which has a high 'societal concern' factor, has suffered protracted delays over successive PRs since the 1998 SDR. A 'Delete Tornado Collision Warning System' Option is being run in PR11 which would prejudice the Dept's ability to declare this risk ALARP".(PR11 being MoD’s Planning Round for 2011 - the annual budget review)

However, in the DG MAA Annual Report, dated 10 Aug 11, he reported;

"The reprieve of the Delete Tornado CWS PR11 Option is welcome, but there is likely to be more that could be done"

But this "reprieve" is just a paper exercise to give the impression that CWS for Tornado is still under consideration, and therefore the risk can be regarded as ALARP. From experience gained with Nimrod, as long as it can be demonstrated that progress was being made towards ALARP MOD regards everything to be OK. The bottom line is that 15 years have passed since the 1998 SDR, and nothing has been done, or is being done. Worst of all, the same people seem to be running the show, with the same cavalier attitude towards airworthiness and air safety.

DV

1.3VStall

2nd Oct 2012, 15:41

So,

Is anyone intending to go to the MAA conference later this month and ask some awkward, pointed questions in public?

Attendance is free for serving MoD personnel.

BEagle

2nd Oct 2012, 16:18

Anyone is free to post on PPRuNe, and on the MoK thread it became clear to all that a retired VSO (3 Star) was acting as the mouthpiece for the others and continually fishing for strategy hints. He's now retreated, perhaps because he got found out and was identified as the 3 Star under whom the original policy that led to the rundown in airworthiness was developed!

He still lurks in the background on other PPRuNe forums, but has avoided the military aircrew forum ever since he inadvertently confirmed his identity.....

By the way, tuc, that's another B****ll beer you owe me....:=

squib66

2nd Oct 2012, 17:15

#6 calls for two procedural Def Stans to be mandated again

Which ones were they?

tucumseh

2nd Oct 2012, 17:34

Squibb66

Def Stans 05-123 and 05-125/2. Anyone involved in practical airworthiness should know them back to front. Both were mandated on all aircraft and aircraft equipment contracts by Controller Aircraft. In the early 90s, the RAF Chief Engineer's organisation (AMSO) (see ACM Alcock, above) issued instructions that neither was to be implemented and the necessary funding was cut in successive years by 28%. This order wholly contradicted the legal obligation we were under, set out in letters of delegation.

As I said, this continued for many years and the principle of them no longer being mandated was continued by MoD(PE) and then DPA, and was taught to embryonic project managers. Proper PMs ignored these illegal orders and did their best, but sometimes there is little one can do when the might of the MoD disciplinary machine descends on you for refusing to render aircraft unsafe.

DV - Excellent post.

tucumseh

3rd Oct 2012, 06:25

Squib66

If you want to follow this up, consider the Tornado ZG710/Patriot shootdown of March 2003 (2 killed). The recently released complete BoI report has Sir Brian Burridge stating that a properly integrated IFF system WOULD have prevented the crash (despite other contributory factors, this was the critical one).

Where are the (hitherto) mandated instructions on how to conduct systems integration and the Trials Installation (thus ensuring functional safety), which is a pre-requisite to the (hitherto) mandatory update of the Safety Case? Answer - Def Stan 05-125/2. (But not 05-123, which is a bit thin on such practical detail).

Then ask why MoD(PE)'s DGAS2 ruled in 1998 that implementing these (hitherto) mandated instructions was now optional. And that the contract could be paid off while making the false declaration that the regs HAD been implemented. And why CDP upheld this ruling, even though Boscombe had highlighted the friendly fire risk of ignoring this regulation.

In 1998 DGAS2 (later XD1 in DPA) was advised to order a fleet inspection of Tornado IFF failure warning designs. He refused. Similarly, XD5 in 2002. He walked away laughing.

Then ask if anything the MAA is doing would have prevented this behaviour. To put it crudely, would the MAA boss pin a 4 Star to the wall and tell him he was ****** insane to encourage staff to render aircraft functionally unsafe and vulnerable to friendly fire? I doubt it. Career suicide. But an independent MAA would have that authority without having to worry about his next promotion.

Distant Voice

4th Oct 2012, 16:41

Ref #67

In the Nimrod review report H-C stresses the point that the "R" in ALARP has a temporal element, and criticize the Coroner for calling for the grounding of the Nimrod, because in his (H-C's) opinion "a reasonable time is allowed" to mitigate identified risks. He makes constant reference to Lord Cullen's guidance in the Edwards v The National Coal Board in which Cullen states:

"'Resaonably practicable' is a narrow term than 'physically posible' and seems to imply that a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time OR trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it is shown that there is gross disproportion between them - the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus on them"

Having read Lord Cullen's findings, and the Health and Safety guidelines, it is clear that "time" in this context means downtime (lost time) of the plant or equipment and its associated costs and trouble. It does not mean, as MoD and H-C claim that "we have got time to reduce a risk to ALARP". In the case of the current Tornado CWS issues "time" means the downtime of the aircraft and/or the trouble of not having them operational. It does not mean that MoD have an indefinte period of time in order to complete any modification programe (a programme that has been on going since 1998). The risk associated with Tornado mid-air collision it is not ARAP, and according to H-C there is no such thing as "tolerably safe but not ALARP".

To the new DG MAA I would say, in Lord Cullen's findings "time or trouble" are linked and viewed as a "sacrifice", or cost to be borne by a company or organisation in order to achieve ALARP. To view "time" in the manner in which H-C and MoD see it can only be seen as a let out, not a sacrifice. To believe that the Tornado mid-air collision risk can be regarded as ALARP simply because the item is back on the agenda after its deletion from PR11 is a major error in the MAA's curent way of thinking with regards to airworthiness.

DV

tucumseh

4th Oct 2012, 17:57

DV

This precise point was discussed in evidence to Lord Philip, the example cited being the Chinook DECU connector problem, whereby they had to be checked every 15mins in fight. The specialist advice to Lord Philip was that this should not have been a Servicing Instruction, but a Class AA modification, requiring grounding until rectified.

The bottom line is the Committee whose job it was to assess all the factors you speak of, and make a decision as to priority “irrespective of cost, scrap or delay involved”, was disbanded by the RAF Chief Engineer in June 1993. Of course, the C-in-C can accept the risk if there is an operational imperative, but he must state this in writing and notify users. No such statement was made on Nimrod (or Chinook).

It is true that MoD is permitted a reasonable time to mitigate risks, but this refers to their legal liability and provides a defence to litigation. There are time limits laid down in formal guidance, but for the purposes of Nimrod all we have to know and understand is that the MoD(PE) 2 Star directed that Risk Management should, at most, consist of listing the risks; but under no circumstances was mitigation to be attempted. I have had many arguments with young direct entrants who have been taught this methodology, and who think RM is simply filling in the “risk” box in a piece of software. As a result of this policy, major programmes were not afforded Risk Manager posts and if anyone tried to establish a Risk Committee their colleagues were instructed not to attend. (I fully accept parts of the MoD controlled by sane senior ranks completely ignored this and did the job properly. But there comes a time when you have no money to mitigate).

He went further. His primary role as the 2 Star was “Management oversight”, requiring him to assess the top 10 risks on every programmes, every month. In the 6 or so years he was my 2 Star, not once did he assess any risks on any of my programmes. I approached him about serious risks, for example, the above friendly fire one – well, you know his reaction. Director General Air System 2 (DGAS2). Or, Didn’t Give A ****.

sox6

5th Oct 2012, 11:41

Not being a Brit I may have this wrong but based on my reading DEF STAN are simply standards on which to base procedures or a contract and are not mandated by anything other than policy.

It seems some malcontents on this thread are treating superseded policy as 'mandatory' to suit their argument.

However, what certain contributors here have failed to recognize is that the MAA has actually put 05-123 into their regulatory set as regulations in the 5xxx sequence.

Of course perhaps the paranoid will dismiss that because they see the entire RAF leadership as a secret mafia that meets in the bowels of the Royal Aerospace Society to plot new ways to sacrifice service personnel as part of their ongoing vendetta against the self appointed consciences of military aviation!

This explains the transfer:
http://www.maa.mod.uk/linkedfiles/regulation/mardstomrpcomparators.xls

It is perhaps significant that the critics of the British MOD do not actually cite actual clauses in the DEF STAN that are not complied with (and in fact only even refer the DEF STAN by number when pressed) but just make vague references to actions this disagree with being in contravention.

tucumseh

5th Oct 2012, 13:14

sox6

The point I made is that Controller Aircraft issued Instructions which his staffs were bound by. They stated that both 123 and 125 MUST be invoked in aircraft/equipment contracts. They are procedural Def Stans and there are no alternatives, unlike most other Def Stans which do have alternatives, such as BS, Mil Specs etc. This legal obligation was articulated in formal letters of delegation.

This was overruled by another regime (notably, by people who didn't actually have to put their name to anything), who declined to say what Standards should be used in their place (given there is a formal hierarchy of Standards, and everyone would agree some form of standard is required).

That 05-123 is in the MAA's document set is fine; it is only to be expected. But what of 05-125/2, which is the only Standard that laid down procedures to ensure a vast array of airworthiness components were satisfied, including the Safety Case?

The sole purpose of 125 is to lay down procedures for "Maintaining the Build Standard", so that the Safety Case can remain valid (as the Safety Case is developed against a stated and maintained Build Standard). I can state with absolute certainty that 99.9% of problems I encountered, in 131 Air, Land and Sea projects/programmes I managed, were solved by reference to 125. Implementing 125 from the outset is the primary means of avoiding the vast majority of problems that cause delays, overspend and inadequate kit,. That cannot be said of any other MoD document.

Your criticism of people whose interest is aviation safety is puzzling, and exactly what we have come to expect of those who have railed against airworthiness for so many years.

Also, you are wrong to say actual clauses have not been cited; this was precisely what happened on Nimrod and C130 when evidence was presented to the respective Coroners. Remember the MoD's reply at the Nimrod inquest? JSP553 and Def Stan 00-970 were "irrelevant". I'm quite happy to cite specific clauses if you wish, but I think your comments would be better directed at MoD, just in case they still think the entire Airworthiness Regulations "irrelevant".

Finally, if you don't like someone saying the regulations should be implemented, then please specify which ones should not be. I'm sure that would make the MAA's job a bit easier if they agreed with you; although I'm not sure aircrew would agree.

Chugalug2

5th Oct 2012, 19:37

sox6, interesting that MOD apologists are now being garnered in from outside of the UK. Are we to suppose that they are now completely devoid of UK "contents"?
Speaking as one of the "malcontents" to which you refer, I would deny being in a state of paranoia, when the case against the MOD as UK Military Airworthiness Authority (now vested in its MAA subsidiary) has been established in Coroners Courts, as tucumseh says.
Chickens are coming home to roost and the MOD and its subsidiaries are looking to be increasingly beleaguered. One can but admire your seemingly detached benevolence in speaking out on their behalf. Perhaps you do so though from a position of being blessed with a military with airworthy aircraft and unhindered accident investigations?

flipster

7th Oct 2012, 19:32

It was mandated by the Def Stans that the Hercules fuel system was to be protected against a table of threats (including small arms fire). The options open to IPTL and DA were to fit ESF or Inerting Gas. It had neither and so, by definition, the Herc (all marks) was not airworthy in this respect. The MoD did not contend this assertion in court.

This situation remained extant until all ac were eventually made safer by the fitting of ESF post the loss of XV179 - many years after it should have been done and too late for some of my friends. Also, it is arguable that the MoD did not meet their obligations because they realised that the ac was unsafe and did not meet the regulations but beacause they had to be pushed into action by public pressure.

high spirits

7th Oct 2012, 19:49

I know of at least one britmil frontline ac that was bought with TCAS, but has since had it disabled due to cost of upkeep. The number one risk of the command to which that ac belongs is mid air collision. I would (if I could attend), like to ask the MAA how this can be allowed to occur. Especially when other slightly less frontline ac such as tutor have TCAS fitted, supported and working......

Just This Once...

7th Oct 2012, 19:50

Flipster, the trouble is that the DefStan did not mandate it or require it by regulation.

tucumseh

8th Oct 2012, 05:50

JTO

I posted above that MoD staffs were under Instruction to mandate certain Def Stans in contracts. Included was 00-970, Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft (previously, Design Requirements for Service Aircraft).

The point I make in my various posts is that there came a time when, to save money, orders were issued that this Instruction, and others, could and should be ignored. (In practice, implementation funding was withdrawn). But, what we weren't told was, what Standards should we now invoke.

In about 1993 these Controller Aircraft Instructions were to be replaced with Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions (CDPIs). The CAIs were duly withdrawn, but the CDPIs never issued. A few appeared in draft form, but their content would embarrass a five year old. At precisely the same time the Chief Engineer was running down airworthiness with even more draconian cuts (~28% per year, as stated in CHART in 1992).

Bearing in mind that in one sense, a "generation" of MoD staff is the length of a 2-3 year tour, many generations have now been taught that "Def Stans are not mandatory" and "Safety is a waste of money".

I retain full records of an instance in 1998 when I was instructed not to invoke JSP553, 00-970 and 05-123 for this very reason. When I pointed out my legal obligation was to produce an airworthy Military aircraft, so what Standards should I use in their stead, my boss (non-engineer, with self appointed airworthiness delegation:ugh:) completely toppled. He hadn't been taught that bit at his half day seminar. I ignored him, as did my contractors, but a few years later, after I moved posts, he over-ruled me and amended the contract. This explained the three main contributory causes in a subsequent BoI, but the evidence was actively withheld from the BoI and Coroner by the IPT.

Personally, I never invoked one of these CDPIs, and can't recall ever seeing one at formal Issue 1. The sensible among us continued to adhere to the "old" rules, if only because there were no "new" ones to implement. You can appreciate that, if you are a contractor and an aircraft related contract is being negotiated, you want to know what Terms and Conditions MoD, your customer, is seeking to apply. Industry were not part of this ill-fated CDPI fiasco (itself a huge waste of money) and in negotiations rightly assumed the only relevant Def Stans would be applied. To the likes of Westland, MoD were a laughing stock. It was rightly pointed out above that, for example, 05-123 is in the new MAA document set, but what the MAA don't tell you is we were told not to use it for over a decade. Question - Why does the MAA not just come out and acknowledge this? In fact, how many of their staff actually know this background? And if they don't, then what makes them suitable and who is training them? I think this pretty important in an organisation whose job is to correct past failures. If you don't know what the failures were, then how can your work be validated? That is not a criticism of MAA staff, per se, but of the system and culture. And part of that culture is an overly cosy relationship with, for example, those who are meant to be independent auditors of the MAA. Witness, the speakers at the forthcoming conference. For example, what are the two audit panel members going to say in their presentations? One of them is talking about "Safety Culture". Does she realise that MoD's approach to the subject was draconian disciplinary action against those who sought to make aircraft safe? The Chair of the audit panel is talking about "Implementing the Nimrod Review". Is he going to start with "The Nimrod Review is deeply flawed, and therefore so too is the MAA's terms of Reference"? I doubt it, because MoD hasn't told him this.

In the case of Hercules ESF, the relevant Def Stan requires a vulnerability analysis to be carried out. You do not have to dream up threats in the first instance - they are listed. The very first is "inert projectiles", which all agree is what brought the aircraft down. The second is "incendiary projectiles", and so on. In the last column of the table is the required mitigation. ESF. It calls up two MoD specifications for ESF, in Fuel Tanks and Dry Bays. It is true that one can choose not to fit it, for whatever reason, but then the Build Standard, the RTS and Statement of Operating Use and Intent must be reconciled, with the Use and Intent parts excluding the possibility of being in a position whereby these threats exist. And if circumstances dictate there is an operational imperative, then in parallel mitigation must be put in hand, accompanied by formal acceptance of this risk. I suggest that 35+ years after delivery is far too long. But that is entirely in line with MoD's stated Risk Management policy of the 90s/00s - Do not mitigate, wait until something happens and then deal with it. Trouble is, when "something happened" people died. That applies equally to Chinook, Nimrod, Sea King ASaC and Tornado, where the record shows the failures were well known, yet ignored for this very reason. Savings at the expense of safety.

At the inquest, and I'm sure Flip will provide the precise words as he was there, MoD denied knowledge of ESF prior to the accident. Can you imagine how ludicrous this lie looked to the Coroner in the face of two MoD specifications that can be downloaded from the internet? As I always say, to get to the truth, follow the lie.

Which gets us back to the forthcoming conference, at which Marshall Aerospace is represented with a guest speaker. (Mr Steve Fitz-Gerald, their CEO and Accountable Manager). I hope someone asks him at what point ESF was offered to MoD, and when MoD declined it. At the time of the inquest, I opined it was inconceivable that the Design Authority would abrogate their legal obligation to point out the UK build standard was (a) at variance with what was considered safe in the US and (b) non complaint with MoD's own regulations; resulting in a Safety Case that could not be reconciled with the SOUI. From MoD's viewpoint, they are required to retain the signed declaration that the regs have been waived, and for what reason. Lack of ESF would have been a major risk, especially given the content of 00-970. At the very least, one would have to annotate the risk register to say why the risk was not mitigated, even if that were "not enough money".

flipster

8th Oct 2012, 08:54

I think Tuc has said that far more eloquently than ever I could have done.

The question I was asked in the Coroner's Court by, I think, Mr Stead was:

"Is the Hercules airworthy and fit for purpose?"

I don't think I was wrong to say

"No, it is not."

That this was so was the culmination of many years of degraded MoD airworthiness provision - in turn, caused by a 'skewed safety-culture' at the highest levels of MoD PE, DPA/DLO, DE&S and various IPTLs.
When the leaders take a dim view of safety vs cost, what chance do their subordinates have?

It is because many of those 'leaders' are still about, spreading their poison, that I fear the gargantuan task facing the MAA will be too great for their resources. But although the MAA has made many great strides, I feel that its task would be much easier if it were truly independent from the MoD, had sharper teeth and was prepared to use the latter to maul the architects of this skewed culture. Some of these culture-criminals have many stars and/or a whopping pension - while our friends and comrades take unnecessary and unknown risks with their own lives - and with those of their crews and passengers. Any of these could be your sons and daughters and I know that troubles many here.

Is there any evidence out there that the MAA is being thwarted in its efforts by unwarranted high-level interference or indifference - is the skewed culture extant despite the MAA's efforts?

Are the lower levels still saying

"This is not (functionally) safe!" but the hierarchy then ignores their pleas?

If so, the MAA conference might be the time to stand up and be counted, if it is not to become a back-slapping, self-licking lollipop event.

Chugalug2

8th Oct 2012, 09:49

Well said, tuc and flip! :D
What we have here is an MAA that is built on sand. We repeatedly hear that its foundations are set in the Haddon-Cave Nimrod Report, but that was deeply flawed as we have since learnt. By taking the Report as its gospel, the MAA is preaching a false doctrine. That may work in the ecclesiastical sense but it can't work in Aviation. People have died already and more will die unless and until it speaks the truth, that Haddon-Cave's Golden Period of Airworthiness was anything but and culminated in the issuing of an illegal Release to Service to a knowingly Grossly Unairworthy aircraft type. 29 people died in one within months.
With all due respect for Vin Rouge, and indeed for all who are now serving, I must respectfully disagree with your sentiments. Of course people are disheartened, clinging on, hoping for the best. The same could be said for the people of the newly occupied nations of Europe under the Naziis in WWII. Some though knew what to do and at great personal risk joined the resistance. They did what was right. This conference gives that same opportunity, as flip says. The liberation of Flight Safety that would follow the removal of the MAA and the MAAIB from the thrall of the MOD is an outcome that will save lives and is well worth the fight.

Rigga

8th Oct 2012, 15:54

Wow.
It's not often that I get to read something like this brilliant reasoning behind potentially important happenings.

All I can say is...Hear Hear!

Just a shame that these arguments are not in the right place to be read by the right people.

Mr Bollo

8th Oct 2012, 18:29

Tucumseh

You regularly appear on this forum whenever a thread touches on Air Safety (term deliberately chosen). You repeatedly state that the problems stem from the early 90s or thereabouts and were a deliberate act of policy by certain very senior individuals who also instigated severe budgetary cuts. This contrasts starkly with Haddon-Cave's view of the 90s as the "golden age". So assuming that the" golden age" in your view was prior to the early 90s, how come the system of the day didn't sort out Hercules ESF after its entry in service in the mid 60s in the nearly 30 years until the early 90s.

PS As an aside I was an EA with letter of delegation in the Aero engine MDG in AMSO's area which became AML's in the early to mid '90s. My experience of how airworthiness was managed was distinctly different to how you experienced it.

Just This Once...

8th Oct 2012, 18:36

Tuc & Flip,

I'm not denying the DefStan, nor the ridiculous statement from the MoD regarding the knowledge of ESF (and the position it put me in, given my evidence) but the DefStan did not explicitly mandate it.

As Tuc has covered already the DefStans did (and still do) require quite a path to get there (eg threat assessment). Unfortunately, as Tuc has described elsewhere, the route to the DefStan in question was via a path that a number in the MoD believed was optional. I am not sure we have eradicated such tendencies.

If you give people wriggle-room and don't enforce standards then these events will repeat themselves. The MAA need to get this sorted before it becomes a self-licking lollipop. As it is, people are declaring ALARP & Tolerable having failed to achieve the minimum standards prescribed by the regulations. ALARP is becoming shorthand for 'doing the best we can right now with no money or people to fix the issue at hand', this is not what H-C had in mind.

tucumseh

8th Oct 2012, 19:31

Mr Bollo

Thank you.

First, I have always said the implementation was variable. I have mentioned a paper submitted to DPA’s 3 Star DCE in January 2000, which specifically praises certain parts of DLO, but notes their competence and adherence is largely down to the background of the staffs they had. That is, they were taught properly.

I stand by my statements regarding my own experiences, in MoD(PE), AMSO (when we were forced to move there) and DPA. When I was handed my first letter of delegation in MoD(PE) in the 80s I was given one piece of advice. Always retain a copy of anything you put your name to when exercising your delegation. Apart from anything else, you are required to be able to justify decisions for all time. Many years after leaving a particular job, I have been asked to give evidence to BoIs, Coroners, MPs and others. My files are voluminous and have come in very handy! Later, in 1990, I was given a second piece of advice – If someone lies to you, record all subsequent conversations. That was after a meeting in Harrogate at which AMSO supply staffs passed on their bosses’ directions – I was not to maintain airworthiness on my programmes. That specific example was smoke in RN Lynx cockpits. AMSO’s view was – let the RN ground their fleet and come a-begging next year for funding. Not sure the aircrew in sickbay agreed. I didn’t.

To further support what you say, the Director Internal Audit report of June 1996 only praised one section across the entirety of MoD(PE) and AMSO/AML – Aero Engines. That reprot was submitted directly to PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer. It was initiated in January 1993 (I know, 3.5 years, but that’s MoD for you) with the sole aim of protecting the jobs of civilians who had been threatened with dismissal by AMSO’s DGSM in December 1992, for refusing to obey orders (above) to make false declarations about airworthiness and financial probity. That is a simple matter of record, and DIA reaffirmed this when they sent me my own copy. Under FoI, a few years ago MoD confirmed the original no longer exists, as it was destroyed after being marked “No Further Action”. Of 19 recommendations, #13 stands out as implementing it would have nipped the airworthiness failings in the bud. Most of the rest relate to (lack of) financial probity, a euphemism for staffs being instructed to commit fraud.

You make an excellent point about C130. First, I’d say I’ve never claimed any age was “golden”. That was a phrase coined by Haddon-Cave after permitting a retired Chief Engineer to judge his own case. Haddon-Cave offered no evidence to support his claim, but completely ignored evidence to the contrary; not just in written submissions, but from MoD’s own hand. The 1992 CHART report is the best example. At a stroke, it clears General Sam Cowan of the appalling accusations levelled at him by Haddon-Cave.

I can only offer an opinion what happened in the days of the C130K, and then J, buys. MoD will not, or cannot say, because they haven’t kept the records. I do know, however, that a long time C130 project manager from the early 80s still works in Air Systems on DE&S, so no doubt he’d be able to cast some light, but has obviously decided not to. In my opinion it was a financial decision. I would not go so far as to claim it was “savings at the expense of safety” of a deliberate nature reported to Haddon-Cave, but the fact remains MoD would have known of ESF very soon after the C130K was delivered, if not sooner, because the US build standard of the day included it and the Lockheed patent is dated 1968. Also, the retrofit was costed. Not long after this, in the early 70s, MoD issued the two DTD specs I mentioned above, which they claimed to know nothing about, despite being called up in Def Stan 00-970.

As I said, I have no problem with a decision not to fit it if the reasoning was sound, and recorded, but what MUST go hand in hand with such a decision is a root and branch review of the Statement of Operating Intent and Use (not called that in those days, but there was an equivalent), against which the Constraints Working Group would assess Operational Constraints and Limitations. It would be absolutely clear to the CWG that not having ESF meant one would be at risk of, in this case, fire if hit by inert projectiles.

Again, in my opinion, this is such a huge Operational Constraint (i.e. a C130 not being allowed to fly at low level) that it would automatically be afforded “Critical” status (not Major or Minor). Additionally, it would be annotated “Safety” and/or “Airworthiness”. This is how OR Branches (DEC) are prodded into initiating programmes. Their priority is set by the CWG decisions. It is the answer to the age old question project managers get from front line - “How do we influence procurement?” You attend CWG, try to reconcile the SOUI against what you actually do, and fight your corner and prioritise what you need to reconcile the build standard and SOUI.

In parallel with all this, lack of ESF should have been more or less the top risk in the C130 Risk Register for nigh on 35 years; also reflected in the Safety Case. If there came a time when MoD’s corporate knowledge reduced so far they lost sight of this (which, as I’ve said, was a dead cert from the early 90s-on), the fall back was the obligation Marshalls were under to advise MoD. They would certainly appreciate that the Safety Case, Build Standard and SOUI could not be reconciled. Of course, this assumes they were under proper contract to maintain the Safety Case; and we know from the various ARTs that this was not the case.

I hope this helps. I strongly recommend you read the HEART (Hercules Airworthiness Review Team) report of 1997. You will be appalled at how variable the approach to airworthiness was, even within AML, at this time. I know many here don’t quite believe all that I say, but every word is supported by the various ARTs (1992-98), plus the audit reports I mention.

Just This Once...

8th Oct 2012, 20:14

I'll never understand why MoD denied knowledge of ESF especially as they part funded the development of it, as well as other methods of fuel tank inerting. Indeed, one of the first aircraft ever fitted with reticulated foam was a Lyneham aircraft decades before the loss.

Why the BoI missed these facts is also one of the XV179 mysteries, but at least the BoI president passed all the (unread?) information to the coroner; he relished reading 40 years of MoD-owned research on a topic that they 'knew nothing about…'.

tucumseh

9th Oct 2012, 06:13

JTO

Yes, kudos to the BoI president and those who gave evidence. My opinion is one should always ask who the lie is designed to protect. The field then narrows considerably.

HEART report (1997) Download 7.2 Hercules Airworthiness Review Team Report 30.9.97.pdf from Sendspace.com - send big files the easy way (http://www.sendspace.com/file/ewjdpz)

A Discussion of the "Principle Airworthiness Hazard to the Operation of the Aircraft"

Download 7.1 Hercules Airworthiness Review Team - Discussion Paper.pdf from Sendspace.com - send big files the easy way (http://www.sendspace.com/file/dxrh25)

One really has to read the ARTs in sequence, commencing with CHART (Aug 1992). Only then can you appreciate the sheer frustration evident in the Inspector of Flight Safety's words, as each report simply repeats the systemic failings of the previous ones. In 1999, CDP gave evidence to the Public Accounts Committee that the main criticism in CHART remained extant. So, in Haddon-Cave's "golden period", nowt was done.

The second paper may seem at first glance to be criticism of the HEART, but please remember that the ARTs' terms of reference were set by the Chief Engineer, who instructed them NOT to speak to anyone outside a narrow range of RAF offices; thus excluding Design Authorities and MoD's own specialists. Therefore, some of the conclusions in the report are very wrong, but they got close.

flipster

9th Oct 2012, 06:55

The fact that HEART missed the ESF issue was partly down to its narrow TORs (as you say, constrained by CE and ACAS). One other reason why perhaps ESF was not fitted at initial buy (early-mid 1960s) was perhaps that it wasn't offered, or that it was too 'immature' (ESF fitted to USAF ac in 1968 IIRC). But I think it could have been because, in Transport Command, the Herc was initially used mainly in the 'strategic-lift' role. I might be wrong but it was only in the early 1970s that it started regularly going 'sausage-side' in Africa etc - an opportunity missed? But the fact the IRA were becoming increasingly well-armed in the mid 1970s should have brought the fitting of ESF to go with IRCM. Why it didn't, Lord only knows - perhaps even then the experience in PE, OR and on the Sqns had already disappated? For sure, too many 'shiney-types' at Group HQ has always been a hindrance to the TacAT fleet (I recall it still was in 2003/5 when SASO and AOC were super-shineys). JTO will confirm this I'm sure.

However, JTO makes a hugely valid point if he is correct that some officers are saying a risk/threat is deemed ALARP when all they have done is identified the problem but not actually mitigated/addressed it (ie no funding). If so, this is criminal and I think it is morally indefensible - these should become constraints and passed onward/upward and the responsibility taken at a much higher level. Certainly, this needs to brought out at MAA Conference because DG MAA cannot allow the MoD to get away with it - otherwise he is undermining everything the MAA has acheived so far and it risks being seen a lap-dog of MoD..... if it is not too late already? More independence is the only way, I fear.

tucumseh

9th Oct 2012, 08:26

However, JTO makes a hugely valid point if he is correct that some officers are saying a risk/threat is deemed ALARP when all they have done is identified the problem but not actually mitigated/addressed it (ie no funding).

Spot on. This is directly linked to my comment above that it became common practice to regard Risk Management as simply the identification and recording of risk, without mitigating them.

I recall one Shrivenham type who, when the subject came up, always shouted out "What software do you use?" Post 1996, the answer was "Pandora" as that was MoD's own tool. His reply was always "Pandora's rubbish". That was all he'd been taught on a Defence Administration MBA - to fill in the boxes in Pandora. But of course filling in the boxes doesn't actually create a mitigation plan or implement it. The concept of mitigation was completely alien to him (an otherwise quite intelligent young man). To us dinosaurs, it merely confirmed our thoughts on people who are given huge responsibility while being allowed to skip 5 or 6 grades. Flip's super-shineys!

This culture was widespread in MoD(PE) and then DPA, largely because our 2/4 Stars (2 Star was the same one as Nimrod and Chinook) refused to allocate resources to mitigation. If you insisted on mitigating risk, you had to do so in your own time, at home and with no funding. Not much has changed and I'm not sure the MAA has the authority to force change.

1.3VStall

9th Oct 2012, 10:07

I refer back to my post no 68. Is anyone with an in-depth knowledge of the MoD's historic failings going to be at the conference to ask awkward questions of the MAA?

downsizer

9th Oct 2012, 11:26

I think the answer to that is sadly not....

flipster

9th Oct 2012, 18:51

It would be interesting to set up a video conf with tuc abd JTO asking the questions!:):)

Just This Once...

9th Oct 2012, 19:29

I'd be glad of Tuc's help as my last session was a one-on-one, except the MAA came mob-handed!

:uhoh:

Rigga

9th Oct 2012, 22:29

Oh dear. I do know how horrible that feels.

My "session" with a rent-a-crowd / mob-handed PT ended in me backing out of the building and raising a "risk" from my home turf against him/them. Very slow, but more positive/productive than a one-sided argument.

Still, I won't have to do that anymore.

ancientaviator62

10th Oct 2012, 00:56

'tuc'' is correct when he says the TORs of the HEART were very narrow and as I recollect it via my fading memory they were narrowed even further once we had started. This I think was a reaction to the previous reports especially the 'in house' Canberra report.
I had left the service by the time the report had been staffed and printed so had no way at that time of knowing what had been 'staffed' out or altered.
Part of the HEART remit was a 'glance' at the incoming C130J. We were told very firmly that there would not be any upgrades to this a/c to enhance any aspects.
So for example the well know fact that the insulation blanket in the cargo compartment gave off phosgene gas when heated above a certain temperature was not deemed worthy of action. So I assume the risk still exists on the 'J' unless the lessons of the Belgian AF C130 crash at Eindhoven were eventually taken on board. The system showed no signs of doing so when I left.

tucumseh

10th Oct 2012, 06:13

Ancient

Thank you for those comments. In general terms we knew the ARTs had very narrow remits, but the only one we had firsthand knowledge of was CHART in 1992 (which also covered Puma and Wessex). The RAF Chief Engineer delayed their start, spending 2 months “adjusting” the TORs to stop CHART speaking to anyone outside the RAF; specifically excluding anyone in MoD who managed attaining or maintaining airworthiness. But he kept their target delivery date the same – August 1992. (i.e. 3 months instead of 5). This meant they were spread very thinly with a fixed number of Air Stations and departments to visit, so for example a non-engineer would have to conduct interviews with Engineering/Maintenance staffs (and engineers with aircrew).

Nevertheless, the CHART team did an excellent job and, had the ZD576 BoI been shown, for example, the Annex discussing RAF Aldergrove, then I imagine things would have been very different. Also, given the criticism of aircraft documentation by witnesses, I’m sure the BoI would have mentioned the use of captured Argentinean pubs, used because ours weren’t up to scratch. (By definition, this alone renders the RTS invalid).

If I were to criticise the ARTs, they made the common error of confusing airworthiness and serviceability, although given their narrow remit this was perhaps understandable. The result is they identify a subject (typically a systemic failure) and get so far, but then stop. They seldom dig deep enough to reveal the root cause (but maybe didn't have the time, and their interviewees wouldn't understand that detail anyway). For example, the use of Argentinean pubs draws a simple criticism of Guttersloh (from memory) for using them (which was a good spot by the team), but doesn’t take the next step of asking why the UK versions are crap. The answer was that the Chief Engineer’s department had directed that AP updates should cease. However, I may be doing them a disservice because I know there were a number of draft CHARTs which were diluted. I only have one of them, and it is obvious word came down not to criticise senior staffs.

What I found interesting was the Executive Summary and Covering Letter (to CE and ACAS – Alcock and Bagnall respectively) was taken out of the hands of the Team Leader and written personally by IFS. Clearly, this was to send the message that the report raised very serious concerns about BOTH Mk1 and Mk2. Graydon, Alcock and, ultimately, Fox, lied about this aspect, claiming CHART only addressed Mk1. The TORs make it very clear they were instructed to assess Mk2. Graydon, Alcock and MoD claimed CHART didn’t mention Mk2; it did, 363 times!! Lord Philip wasn’t impressed by that lie either.

Rigga

My "session" with a rent-a-crowd / mob-handed PT ended in me backing out of the building and raising a "risk" from my home turf against him/them. Very slow, but more positive/productive than a one-sided argument. I had the same experience. Asked to present to an IPT at AbbeyWood some years ago (2002 I think), when I told them they were required to have a continuous contract with their Design Authorities to maintain the Build Standard and Safety Case (essentially, the Nimrod failing), almost to a man they jumped up shouting “Waste of money”. Much the same at Shrivenham the same year, although to be fair a couple of DEC Brigadiers told their Colonels to shut up, I had a point (even though they didn’t understand it!) But then they were over-ruled!

ancientaviator62

11th Oct 2012, 00:56

Tuc,
spot on again ref the serviceability/airworthiness confusion at least with the other aircrew member and myself. I think it is fair to say that our knowledge of the airworthiness chain was restricted to the chap who signed the F700 and the line chief ! The two engineering members of the team were much better qualified than we to assess the 'snakes and ladders' of the RAF airworthiness structure. We were given the Chinook report to read as a template and tried to follow that as far as possible. I recall that a great emphasis was placed on the concern that counterfeit parts may be infiltrating the system. I do not think we found much evidence of that. What did astound me despite my almost 30 years with the Hercules was the number of people with their fingers in the Hercules 'pie'. Many seemed to be duplicating work already in hand. Not very many had seen the a/c 'in the flesh' and even less seemed to want to.

tucumseh

11th Oct 2012, 06:47

Ancient

The CHART consisted of 2 engineers and a pilot. Not a big “team” for such a task! I looked through my records and was reminded they were instructed not to look at engineering aspects, but tended to ignore this when so many issues were revealed. But, given the lack of staff and time constraints, they couldn’t dig deeper. Now, why would a Chief Engineer instruct an airworthiness team not to look at engineering?

Your comment about counterfeit parts is interesting. I can’t recall ever coming across a case, but lack of Quality Control was rife, especially when MoD ran down their Quality Assurance Directorate General (DGDQA). Once the Chief Engineer stopped proper training, a typical problem was mismanagement of Production Permits and Concessions, which allowed sub-standard (but not counterfeit) components into the system. (That is, the paper trail would be complete and valid, but too few realised what “MF77” meant in the small print, so the aircraft documents wouldn’t record a sub-standard component was fitted and, for example, had to be checked more regularly until replaced with a proper one). That mismanagement would hide the problem from you (the ARTs), and because (e.g. CHART) was not permitted to speak to the staffs who were responsible, the problem was effectively hidden from everyone. More so because CE had slashed the budget that undertook the mandatory follow-up action.

Rigga

13th Oct 2012, 21:14

I've had counterfeit parts for Hueys and Jetbangers (millions of 'em made in Vietnam after their war) mainly made from Brass instead of Ally! All painted up well and good castings - non-magnetic, but too heavy.

Also found one 206BII Rotor Head with no Serial Number (optional extra?) All reported to civil authorities very quickly.

However, I've also seen many genuine parts installed well past their official lives have expired due to lack of control in military regimes. All "forgotten" very quickly...

1.3VStall

16th Oct 2012, 20:41

Back to the top!

I'm still hoping that someone with inside knowledge will turn up and ask very awkward questions.

The conference, by the way, is next week and is free to serving military.

vascodegama

17th Oct 2012, 06:25

C130 ESF

I remember my late father telling me that the ESF was removed entirely for financial reasons. I suppose that we should be grateful that we didn't pay extra for the removal.

John Blakeley

17th Oct 2012, 14:34

Vascodegama,

I do not know the history of ESF, but I would guess that that if ESF was "standard" MOD could well have paid to take it out. It was alleged that MOD had paid extra to have the standard fit radios taken out of the "plebs" staff cars in the 80s, and from first hand experience I remember that a "bright" contracting officer decided to save money by not fitting the rear speakers in the senior ranks staff cars - given that the VSP normally sat in the back this "incorrect" decision had to be put right by paying a lot extra to retrofit them - plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose - as we still see every day of the week with this and indeed previous governments!

ancientaviator62

18th Oct 2012, 01:18

The C130K was not fitted with an ADR 'black box'. Almost certainly to save a few pence. Would surely have been a great help after the first crash of XV 180 at Fairford. Did they put one in the 'J' ? Oh and of course the FSII Saga !

Shell Management

18th Oct 2012, 15:00

ESF is not an MAA / air safety issue. Thats operational risk not operating risk - a different safety case.

dervish

18th Oct 2012, 16:35

Shell

So what you're saying is the aircraft was not fit for purpose? We already know that and MoD eventually admitted it. I wish the deceased were still here to argue semantics with you.

Rigga

18th Oct 2012, 17:59

"The C130K was not fitted with an ADR 'black box'."

Is that like an FDR 'black box'?

dervish

18th Oct 2012, 18:57

Am I right in saying the Hercules IPTL (a Group Captain?) claimed at the inquest he had nothing to do with fitness for purpose and didn't know how the RAF achieved it? What did he think? The squadron bought the necessary kit out of mess funds?

ancientaviator62

19th Oct 2012, 00:56

Rigga,
when I was on the HEART THE TERMS ADR and FDR were both in use across a variety of sources . You obviously knew what I meant, so can you contribute anything useful to the question?

Rigga

19th Oct 2012, 17:16

AA62,
I was only trying to clarify what you were taking about. I have dealt with civil aircraft for some years now. ADR - to me - means Air Data Recorder..a totally different thing.

My only dealing with similar systems in the military involved two (Mk1) Chinooks which were fitted with HODR in the 80s, (Helicopter On-board Data Recorder) but both proved hopeless as they relied on "bog standard" cassette tapes which sadly melted just when at least one was needed, but, instead of upgrading the system to a metal media "they" just scrapped the idea. Or that's how it seemed to me at the time. As far as I know there is still no FDR or CVR systems fitted to Chinooks, the one helicopter that is regulary described and the most inherently dangerous (not by me though).

Phoney Tony

19th Oct 2012, 18:37

How would you provide a RTS on an ac with an ADC with no civil or military clearance?

Chugalug2

19th Oct 2012, 20:16

PT:
How would you provide a RTS on an ac with an ADC with no civil or military clearance?
As easy as granting an RTS to a known grossly unairworthy aircraft, because the Regulatory Authority, the Air Accident Investigator, and the Operator are still one and the same, ie the MOD including its subsidiaries. How many avoidable accidents and needless deaths will it take before this corrupt and incestuous trio is broken up into three entirely separate bodies that are truly independent of each other?
Those who are most affected by this scandal are those military aviators who are now serving. They have a unique opportunity to express their concern directly to the MAA/MAAIB at the RAeS on 24/25th October. They alone are offered free entrance to the conference. What was planned as a rubber stamp approval of the MAA could turn out to be anything but if its customers upset this self congratulatory jamboree. It doesn't need deep arcane knowledge to do that, for it is neither the time nor the place for long expositions. A general outbreak of audience dissatisfaction would say much about who the true professionals are, those selling the snake oil or those who refuse to buy it.
Self Regulation Does Not Work and in Aviation it Kills!

ancientaviator62

20th Oct 2012, 01:09

Rigga,
understood. It must be jet lag (I am in Perth Australia) that has allowed my normal equilibrium to be disturbed !

Antrim Kate

20th Oct 2012, 17:51

It's now sold out, so there'll be a couple of hundred people there. Recently added to the list of presenters is the incoming DG, MAA. Dress of the Day is No. 1s, so if someone does say something to make any of the top people spill their coffee, it'll be all over their second-best uniform...

Just This Once...

20th Oct 2012, 18:20

A conference in No1s??? Are they trying to put people off?

Think I would pass-out wearing mine for any length of time.

1.3VStall

23rd Oct 2012, 21:41

Well, the conference starts tomorrow. I hope someone has the b@lls to ask some very pointed and awkward questions of the senior RAF officers who are speaking. People, who clearly have detailed evidence of the MoD's historic and ongoing failings to assure airworthiness, have posted on this, and other, threads over many years.

There is certainly enough concern to make it essential that the MAA Conference should not be allowed to pass itself off as a self-congratulatory exercise, but I fear that will be the case.:ugh:

Rigga

23rd Oct 2012, 22:48

Best of luck then...I'll chip in for the Lawyers if you need them!

tucumseh

24th Oct 2012, 06:36

A conference in No1s??? Are they trying to put people off?Clearly a device to identify MoD trouble makers who ask awkward questions!

I'm most interested in the opening speech by the RAeS, given the speaker has recently stated the subject (MAA, Haddon-Cave, airworthiness etc) is "no business" of his Society. :ugh:

Antrim Kate

24th Oct 2012, 18:53

I'm most interested in the opening speech by the RAeS, given the speaker has recently stated the subject (MAA, Haddon-Cave, airworthiness etc) is "no business" of his Society. :ugh:
(my emphasis)

This would be the Chief Executive - an unelected appointee - of a Society "dedicated to the entire Aerospace community"? (my emphasis)

1.3VStall

25th Oct 2012, 09:33

Does anyone have any feedback from the first day of the event?

salad-dodger

25th Oct 2012, 11:49

well it's lunchtime on the second day now so the conference should be over. This was organised as a one day conference spread over two days - first day PM and second day AM - for some reason (p!ss up perhaps).

S-D

NorthernKestrel

26th Oct 2012, 08:01

Report on the highlights of the conference now up on the RAeS site...

Empowering military air safety | Aerospace | The Royal Aeronautical Society (http://media.aerosociety.com/aerospace-insight/2012/10/26/empowering-military-air-safety/7460/)

Seems the wording of the Duty Holder role is quite motivating...

“It scared the life out of my wife, and anything that scares the life out of her I attend to.”

tucumseh

26th Oct 2012, 12:28

A form of synergy here, given the latest correspondence received from the Crown Prosecution Service regarding the Nimrod XV230 case and the attempt to scapegoat Gp Capt Baber and Wg Cdr Eagles. It would seem Duty Holders have nothing to fear because the CPS have confirmed they were aware during the deliberations over Baber and Eagles that;

1. MoD staffs had been routinely instructed to make false written declarations about airworthiness and financial probity since 13th January 1988.
2. Refusal to obey this order has been deemed a disciplinary offence since 16th December 1992; but issuing the order is not.
3. That this ruling had been upheld and reaffirmed on numerous occasions in 2000-02 by MoD’s Director General Air Systems 2 (Nimrod, Chinook etc), Chief of Defence Procurement and Director of Personnel, Resources and Development (Fauset, Walmsley and Baker respectively).
4. Similarly, between 2003 and 2007 by various PUSs and successive Ministers for the Armed Forces (Moonie, Caplin, Ingram, Ainsworth). In his ruling of 23rd April 2003, PUS specifically cited CDP’s ruling of 19th November 2001, advising MoD staffs to heed it.
5. On 15th February 2007 PUS ruled that no action would be taken against staffs who breached, for example, the Air Force Act or the Civil Service Code, if they “have either moved on or retired”.

And that they, the CPS, are content with all of the above. Interestingly, they used the old MoD line from Mull of Kintyre - “Only if new evidence is found” would they entertain further representations or formal complaint.

So, on one hand it would seem I must apologise to either the RAF Provost Marshal or Thames Valley Police, who it would seem indeed passed this evidence on to the CPS. (I suspect the former, because TVP have taken the CPS’s line, although their wording is rather vague).
But on the other hand, it reaffirms Haddon-Cave (and the MAA) knew of these facts and declined to put them in the Nimrod Review. That means the MAA’s Terms of Reference are based on the false premise that the failures commenced in 1998 (repeated on the RAeS’s website); and that they know this but do nothing about it.
So, to repeat the lesson that has been common knowledge in MoD for nearly 25 years. Duty Holders – Delay signing anything until your last day in post. Shoot off home quickly, because in a few hours you are immune from prosecution; in fact you will gain the everlasting gratitude of VSOs because the delay will save MoD billions. Never mind that our aircraft may not be safe, it doesn’t matter. To repeat DGAS2’s ruling, when asked on 6th December 2000 “What is the greater offence, issuing the illegal order or refusing to obey it?” On 2nd February 2001 he confirmed that there was only one offence; the refusal.

The day the MAA acknowledge the above and state they disagree with these rulings is the day I’ll gracefully withdraw!

Just This Once...

26th Oct 2012, 12:42

Hi Tuc,

PUS ruling in 2007 has been overtaken by the Armed Forces Act (enacted Oct 2009). Not only are the offences pertaining to airworthiness more clearly defined, the decision to prosecute or not is outside of the chain of command and the sphere of influence of PUS.

Of course, this does put serving and ex-serving personnel (yep, ex-service can be prosecuted even after leaving if deemed in the public interest) at more risk of prosecution than their civil service counterparts.

Oh, and you do not need an accident to be prosecuted under the revised Armed Forces Act.

tucumseh

26th Oct 2012, 13:26

Thanks JTO. The context here is a formal complaint to TVP and CPS; both have declined to investigate saying the matter is closed and no offences were committed.

My own view is that these "offences" have always existed; the new Act changes little. The repeal of Sect 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act (1947) meant Crown Servants could be prosecuted for failure to implement, for example, JSP 318 and CA Instructions. The resultant change in the airworthiness regs was promulgated in DCI/Gen/89/93, and subsumed within 318 and CAI.

When our letters of delegation were changed to reflect this, we pointed out that a conflict existed, because the Chief Engineer's immediate subordinate (DGSM) had been threatening staffs with dismissal for disobeying orders to knowingly breach these regs.

It is that conflict / contradiction which we sought to resolve over many years. MoD has a formal 3-tier process, but the regs say PUS is the final arbiter (although I know of one case that went to the Cabinet Secretary). The consistent rulings, some dated AFTER the Armed Forces Act became law, was to uphold the original ruling of December 1992.

The only change today is that there is a different Act. The "offences" remain the same, although some are articulated better. My point is that the CPS has stated that the "offences" I mention are not offences at all - reaffirming the above rulings. They acknowldge that, despite all the irrefutable evidence presented to them, there were no grounds to proceed against those named during the two inquiries.

It would indeed be an interesting day in court when someone charged with such an offence simply cited precedent and MoD, Ministerial and CPS rulings! But history suggests it will never come to that.

Chugalug2

26th Oct 2012, 20:18

Thank you as always tuc for spelling out the real world to us, as against the sunny uplands featured in the RAeS blog. Here is a corrupt system just as existed in the German Wehrmacht when it went to war in 1939. Theoretically it too had its equivalent of the Armed Forces Act. Much was made of the Military Honour Code that those commissioned in it truly believed in. Yet we now know that it was encouraged to commit atrocities on an industrial scale from the very outset, that those who committed them flourished and those who opposed them punished, often paying with their lives.
That is the path that the MOD and its subsidiaries, the MAA and the MAAIB seem to be setting out on, to knowingly base their policies and actions on the falsehoods espoused by Haddon-Cave instead of facing up to the reality of a High Command policy dating from the late 80's of subverting the Regulations, ordering those responsible for implementing them to suborn them instead, and of punishing those who would not comply. The MOD should note the angst being suffered by the BBC who similarly had a policy of covering up past "indiscretions". Like Saville those who are being protected will eventually be outed. The longer it takes the more lives it will cost because protecting them means that the MAA and MAAIB will have to continue to be based on lies. So much for independence!
Self Regulation Does Not Work and in Aviation it Kills!

vascodegama

27th Oct 2012, 07:10

Didn't the war crimes trials in Nuremburg establish the principle that issuing an illegal order was in itself a crime?

Chugalug2

27th Oct 2012, 07:55

It didn't need Nuremburg to establish that vasco, it has always been an offence under Military Law (or for our purposes, Air Force Law) to issue an illegal order or to obey it.
Catch 22 is of course that if you do your duty and report it instead you would expect the CoC to invoke Military Law and prosecute the offender(s). Like it says in the Nationwide Ad though, it doesn't work like that in the case of the Royal Air Force. CS are instead deemed to have committed an offence by not obeying such orders, deceased JOs made to carry the can for 17 years, and the VSO's who issued the orders protected even at the cost of compromising the foundations of the MAA and MAAIB on a lie that goes on costing lives.

tucumseh

27th Oct 2012, 09:19

It is worth repeating that many of those whose decisions led directly to airworthiness related fatal accidents were not subject to the Armed Forces Act or general Military discipline, but the Civil Service Code.

Most commentators talk about "RAF" failings when, in fact, what they mean is "MoD". This is unfair to the vast majority of RAF personnel, and really only applies to a few VSOs and some of their hangers-on who filled their posts upon retirement.

However, the myth is perpetuated by, for example, the majority of Service posts in the MAA being RAF. Why? The logical thing would be to staff the MAA with people with a good track record (which MoD's own internal auditors say are few and far between, and MoD themselves say is only one man). If the MAA staff are so experienced, I've one question to ask. When, and to whom, did you report the systemic airworthiness failings you MUST have been aware of these past 25 years? If you didn't report them, you are part of the problem and have committed an offence. If you didn't know of them, then your gross inexperience means you have no place in the MAA. As it stands, there are a lot of hypocrites filling posts and we can have no confidence they are going to openly criticise their own past actions.

Just This Once...

27th Oct 2012, 09:27

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

tucumseh

27th Oct 2012, 10:45

JTO

Easier said than done if the MAA is not independent!

Chugalug2

28th Oct 2012, 14:01

JTO, In my view the answer to your question is, "themselves". Given that I am forever railing against self regulation that might be seen as a contradiction and somewhat ironic one at that, but if this scandal has shown us anything it is that you can have all the procedures and regulations in place but if malevolently minded people are bent on circumventing them it requires determined and decently minded ones to resist them, or they will succeed. That is why the guardians of airworthiness and accident investigation must be independent to resist such attempts succeeding yet again.
I pay tribute to all those who have stood firm in the past and to those who stand firm now. Doing the right thing is never easy at the time, but that is the point, for in the fullness of time you will be able to look back and can be at peace with yourself. There must be many who cannot do that now. Given the cost of such moral ambivalence I cannot pity them.

tucumseh

31st Oct 2012, 07:30

Short summary of Backslapping Fest 2012.

BoI and Inquest not mentioned.

Prior warnings by MoD staff of systemic failings, dating to January 1988, not mentioned.

Evidence of above to Haddon-Cave not mentioned.

Therefore, the uninitiated (Press, MoD etc) would think Haddon-Cave spotted failings, initiated a Review and his findings came as a complete surprise to MoD.

A complete re-write of history, which the MAA leadership should be ashamed of. From the very start (AMSO policy of June 1987) this has been about one thing. Protecting senior staffs who made the deliberate decision to waste money in the interests of short term efficiency, and then rob the airworthiness pot to compensate. Timo Anderson et al; successive AMSOs, AMLs and CEs from the 80s/90s will be proud of you. If you were truly independent, you'd simply tell the truth.

Oh, and despite stating airworthiness, Haddon-Cave etc was none of their business, the RAeS hierarchy turned up.

Antrim Kate

31st Oct 2012, 18:04

Good point Chugalug, but it doesn't take malevolence to create a conflict of interest - if you're ACAS one week and MAA DG the next (as Anderson was, and North will be) or you're MAA Tech. Director now (and responsible for overseeing the introduction of Airseeker) but were Head of Air ISTAR last year (and responsible for procuring Airseeker) then, with the best will in the world, there could be problems.

On the other hand an assurance organisation does need both independence and credibility, and MAA do acknowledge that there is a trade-off in this respect. Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance?

Rigga

31st Oct 2012, 19:37

"Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance? "

Being right and being consistent against the opposition to change.

thefodfather

31st Oct 2012, 21:36

I do find it hard to contemplate how a regulator could be totally independent from the military yet not immediately seek to stop military flying immediately. Without the right military experience regulation would be impossible. The relevance of the skills of civilian flight ops inspectors are frequently called into question by those who they regulate.

If the MAA was actually independent in the manner many suggest, how would it be manned. Practical answers on a postcard please.

Mandator

1st Nov 2012, 06:59

The RAeS has published a report on the conference:

Empowering military air safety | Aerospace | The Royal Aeronautical Society (http://media.aerosociety.com/aerospace-insight/2012/10/26/empowering-military-air-safety/7460/?utm_source=The+Royal+Aeronautical+Society+e-communications&utm_campaign=56dac154e1-raes_nl_nov12&utm_medium=email)

4Greens

1st Nov 2012, 09:14

Does the MAA include Army and Naval aviation?

tucumseh

1st Nov 2012, 11:02

One method of achieving independence was outlined on another thread. First, one needs to break down the process. In simple terms;

(1) Attaining airworthiness.
MoD tend to do this pretty well, as the process is largely managed by the Contractor and Boscombe Down. The regs are simple. Follow them and an airworthy aircraft will be delivered. The problem today (and for 20 years) is that MoD do not train their staffs to understand what the Contractor is up to and how he achieves his goal. This causes fatal knock-on effects when it comes to.....

(2) Maintaining airworthiness.
This is the component that broke down so badly on all the examples we discuss. If you take Chinook HC Mk2 as an example, the baseline for the upgrade programme (Mk1 to M2) was flawed, as the Mk1 had been allowed to deteriorate. (In fact, the deterioration had been ordered by senior RAF staffs). Therefore, the Mk2 was grossly unairworthy, as outlined in detailed evidence to Lord Philip, which he accepted. That evidence (here) https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/ explains how much of the process DID work well on that occasion, but the good work (by Boscombe in the main) was undone by the actions of senior RAF officers; especially ACAS, CAS and Chief Engineer.

The CHART report of 1992 outlines a host of systemic failures by MoD, yet on the Chief Engineer’s instructions did not even go near the part of MoD which provides the basic foundations. This one report (among many) reveals the lie perpetrated by MoD as recently as last week that the failures commenced in 1998. It has been written out of history, but if you don’t understand the history, you cannot hope to correct the failures.

What can the MAA do to overcome these failures? It could achieve much, but has shown no will to do so. The common behavioural trait it has with its predecessors is the overwhelming desire to protect the guilty. If it’s DGs are former ACASs, there is a cultural tendency to protect their predecessors, who perhaps have been instrumental in guiding careers. (The Civil Service is the same!) If Baz North would just come out and say “Our remit and Terms of Reference are fatally flawed as they are based on incorrect conclusions by Haddon-Cave”, then I’d be a lot happier. But the blind adherence to the Haddon-Cave Bible is their worst flaw. If the MAA truly believe all that H-C said is right, then it truly is the blind leading the blind.

These two components of airworthiness can be made truly independent of MoD. Much of it already is, but we need to negate the main risk – that of career minded sycophants making savings and acting corruptly at the expense of safety. Forward of (1) and (2) is an important control boundary.....

(3) The component which causes most angst, the concept of “Fitness for Purpose” or Operational Airworthiness. Not least because it is ill-defined, largely because it sits in conflict with other mandated regs.

For 20+ years, FFP has been construed as accepting operational risk by allowing a sub-airworthy aircraft to be flown operationally. (Ignore serviceability, it is facilitated by airworthiness). Needs must, and this aspect and the attendant risks are reasonably well understood and managed. But what many don’t accept or understand is that an aircraft often needs to be enhanced to be FFP. C130/ESF was a good example, and in court the IPTL claimed he didn’t know how this process worked. (I accept he did not, because most IPTLs are not selected for their knowledge or practical experience of the procurement system – although common sense says they should be. But he should have known the question was coming and that naivety illustrates MoD’s failings as much as anything).

Another is IFF. In the early-mid 90s, aircraft IFF systems were routinely left unintegrated, so functionally unsafe, because airworthiness was a “peacetime” concept, so IFF systems (esp. Mode 4) didn’t have to actually work. (See Tornado/Patriot shootdown discussion in above link). I think this whole argument fatally flawed, not least because the transition from “peacetime” to “warfighting” can be necessarily short, and there is no time to buy, trial, fit and train on the new system. The need to train negates this whole argument entirely! The IFF office didn’t even bother modifying simulators. The basic “peacetime” Build Standard must be fit for purpose, and that purpose is warfighting. (I accept one cannot cater for all eventualities, but there exists the Minimum Equipment List concept, and that should include, for example, a working and safe IFF). Boscombe and knowledgeable project managers in MoD have railed against this nonsense for decades, but the MoD hierarchy has ruled that aircraft delivered to the Services need not be functionally safe. This whole aspect needs revamping. This is where the “Savings at the expense of Safety” is most visible to Users. Unscrupulous PMs (but primarily their seniors) hell bent on being seen to complete their project, have routinely signed off on contracts knowing the aircraft does not meet the Aircraft specification and is functionally unsafe. Against this baseline, front line commanders cannot hope to achieve FFP.

If this requirement, that Operators/Users somehow make their aircraft FFP without any resources, could be taken out of their hands and transferred to (1) and (2) above, then (3) can be readily managed by MoD. It doesn’t need to be independent, and shouldn’t be. In other words, give them the proper (airworthy) tools and let them make operational decisions. The basic failure is in this proper provision in the first place.

So, a boundary exists, and like all boundaries it needs to be defined and controlled. The Operators who control (3) should have a say in what (1) and (2) do. Likewise, (1) and (2) should have to demonstrate they have catered for the needs of (3). A small MAA can police this boundary, but for goodness sake don’t let them control what happens either side.

This is not a new concept. In fact, it used to be mandated. But then it fell apart when AMSOs and CE made savings at the expense of safety in the late 80s/early 90s, and ACAS went along with them and ignored his role. Chinook is the best known example. His role was to agree, in writing, with (1) and (2) (represented by Controller Aircraft) that he accepted the CA Release and would subsume it without amendment as Part 1 to his Release to Service. Part 2 (Service Deviations) is one manifestation of his FFP role; and this, too, was grossly mismanaged on Chinook, as were SEMs. Lord Philip obliquely criticised ACAS (AVM Bagnall) and his boss CAS (ACM Graydon), confirming ACAS was legally bound to accept the CAR without amendment (confirming the regulations, that this was “mandated”). However, Bagnall (and by extension, Graydon) had ignored this legal obligation and issued an operational release. MoD were unable to provide the evidence that Bagnall had discussed this with CA, Sir Donald Spiers. MoD did, however, confirm CA’s “Training and Familiarisation Only” release remained extant on the day of the crash; in fact, ACAS had sought an extension to it only the previous week (May 1994), a clear acknowledgment that the aircraft was neither airworthy nor FFP (the “purpose” of ZD576 being a pax transit). This systemic breakdown of October and November 1993, and the wasteful policies by AMSOs and the CE that lay behind these failures, is what the MAA needs to prevent happening again. As I’ve said, they show no will, and MoD as a whole has written the failures from history. (Good job we have the evidence they deny the existence of). Remember, faced with this irrefutable evidence during the Philip Inquiry, in a blind panic MoD actually denied RTSs existed in 1993/4, naming and blaming Sir Donald Spiers for the illegal release. What is the MAA doing to prevent that cultural corruption, maladministration and misconduct in a public office? Why, they join hands with the very body that has represented these senior staffs and protected them for 20 years by, for example, ordering its members to “burn” reports that contain the truth. The MAA should be actively distancing itself from the culprits, not glad handing them at bean fests.

As there are so many legal principles at stake here, I’d recommend a small body polices the MAA, headed by a legal person reporting direct to the Secretary of State. The recent bi-annual and supposedly independent audit by the HSE, which also blindly accepted the H-C report, is meaningless; not least because they are demonstrably too close to the MAA. Witness, none of the HSE panel members spoke about the root causes last week, despite being aware of the full facts. That makes them party to the collusion. Presumably, they wanted to be retained to write the next box ticking report. But it doesn’t even have the correct boxes.

The “MAA” would then be free to do the oversight role they’ve barely touched, even after 2 years. I have no objection to the MAA as a body; after all, it is merely a reorganisation of existing (and failed) bodies; the problem they share is failure to do the job properly. The MAA DG clearly has a key role. I accept the arguments that he should be an MoD man. But not necessarily an RAF officer, not least because the primary systemic failures were perpetrated by senior RAF officers. Because of this conflict, the MAA has never been focussed on the job, ignoring the root failures.

In summary, the MAA has a role, but it needs to be policed by a truly independent legal body. This does not have to smother the MAA, but merely “prod” them toward implementing legal obligations and mandated regulations, which is where the failures lay. And I suggest, again, that the boss of the MAA is appointed because he is nearing the end of his career and “has nothing left to lose” if he jumps on senior officers who would otherwise influence his career path. If you don’t acknowledge the truth, and actively rewrite history, then you are doomed to failure. That is a powerful type of independence.

Finally, a classic from the HSE report. The MAA are apparently “recalibrating” the airworthiness process. Now, I was in charge of a Calibration Lab in my younger days and one calibrates something against a known reference, traceable to national standards. We have the “national standards” in the form of mandated regs, but what is the MAA’s known reference? By denying the history I describe, they have no reference, and so proceed by trial and error. The audit trail is broken straight away. There have been too many errors and we can’t afford any more. May I suggest, the “known reference” is known by very few (MoD themselves claim only one person, but there are more), yet the MAA has not once sought to speak to anyone who successfully by-passed illegal orders and implemented the regs properly.

Rigga

1st Nov 2012, 20:34

What a "well worth it" read!

Well done Tuc.

If only I could articulate the things I see like that...

Chugalug2

1st Nov 2012, 23:07

Antrim Kate:
Good point Chugalug, but it doesn't take malevolence to create a conflict of interest - if you're ACAS one week and MAA DG the next (as Anderson was, and North will be) or you're MAA Tech. Director now (and responsible for overseeing the introduction of Airseeker) but were Head of Air ISTAR last year (and responsible for procuring Airseeker) then, with the best will in the world, there could be problems.

On the other hand an assurance organisation does need both independence and credibility, and MAA do acknowledge that there is a trade-off in this respect. Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance?
If you read tuc's post carefully you will see plenty of malevolence from the then AMSO, ACAS and C.Eng who reneged on their duty and together subverted the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations. You will find yet more malevolence described in the link that tuc posted and I repeat here:
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
I commend it and encourage everyone who cares, not only about airworthiness, but about the Royal Air Force itself to study it carefully. This is a warning from history, and the main lesson to be learnt is to never, ever, go down this road again.
You ask how that might be avoided? You have to remove the means by which the Regulations can again be suborned. The only way that can happen is for the MAA (and of course the MAAIB) to be independent of the Operators, which means the MOD and its Service subsidiaries. I often quote the civilian parallel of the CAA and the airlines. They work together to ensure Safety but they are separate and independent. Note that the issue is that the organisations are independent. The personnel can, and indeed should, pass from one to the other, much as an exchange posting takes you from one military organisation to another. So the MAA may be staffed in part by serving personnel, bringing pertinent operational experience and appreciation, but when they are with the MAA they serve it and not, for instance, the RAF. As tuc points out, the higher up the food chain you go, the more this independence matters, so that the DG should be a civvie, or ex Service, or possibly about to be ex Service. That's my take anyway, and just to confirm, the MAA and the MAAIB must be separate and independent of both the MOD and of each other, but of course work closely together to ensure Airworthiness and hence ensure Military Aviation Capability.
What is the first step on this 1000 mile march? Acknowledge the lessons of history, or be forever damned! Lies cost lives!

4Greens

2nd Nov 2012, 06:58

Can someone please answer my question as I am a novice in the matter. Does the MAA cover the Navy and Army aviation systems?

pulse1

2nd Nov 2012, 08:30

From another novice, yes, the MAA is responsible for the FAA and AAC. I believe that, for the front line of both services, it is generally seen as a retrograde step. The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation. This has now been lost.

tucumseh

2nd Nov 2012, 11:29

4Greens

Sorry, I meant to reply. Pulse1 is correct. One of the positives from the Nimrod Review (and there were many) was that Haddon-Cave accepted the evidence that the failures were systemic, despite MoD's claims it was a one-off. (The problem was he presented it as a revelation). Hence, he recommended a "Military" Airworthiness Authority, not a "Nimrod AA". The Secretary of State had been given the same evidence before Haddon-Cave, and he too deserves credit for accepting the systemic nature of the failings.

What I'd say though, is that the "system" became very RAF-orientated in the late 80s, with MoD(PE)'s specialist airworthiness staffs being transferred to AMSO in 1991. This transfer of independent (from the Services) staff meant PUS's regulations covering independent scrutiny could no longer be met. This conflict meant, for example, that some key airworthiness regulations could not be updated, as MoD policy now contradicted SoS's mandated regs and no-one was prepared to put his name to an update. This explains why conducting independent scrutiny became a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation.

The evidence (see link above) explains that at an HQ level, the RN removed their "Management" role from their own TORs, replacing it with "Monitoring". "Engines" has posted many times regarding the RN approach at 1st and 2nd Line, which remained excellent despite their HQ's abrogation (especially the appalling mess that was ASE). As did the RAF's, although of course they were closer in Command terms to their senior staffs who were hostile to what they were trying to achieve.

The RAF's perspective is best explained in the various Airworthiness Review Team reports, staring with the Chinook/Wessex/Puma one of August 1992. They articulate very well the day to day problems that faced RAF stations at the time, but because the Teams were actively prevented from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists, the underlying reasons for the problems were not explored.

Perhaps the most "entertaining" example is the use of captured Argentinean aircraft pubs. The "system" is heavily criticised, but the underlying reason why our own UK pubs weren't good enough is not explained. The answer was that, quite simply, instructions had been issued not to maintain pubs and funding was withdrawn. You'd have thought the Chief Engineer would at least fix that embarrassment, but it was his policy to chop funding, which may explain why he kept quiet. Most of the failures have similar simple explanations.

Pheasant

2nd Nov 2012, 11:46

The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation.

Er, no. The FAA had a culture which allowed those running the safety system (including Boards of Inquiry etc) to operate with an independent mind and without any fear that the "higher ups" would place pressure on them to alter their view or follow a different track. The FAA really did operate a "Just Culture".

Rigga

2nd Nov 2012, 19:45

Pulse 1:
"From another novice, yes, the MAA is responsible for the FAA and AAC. I believe that, for the front line of both services, it is generally seen as a retrograde step. The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation. This has now been lost. "

Despite the obvious confusion over its published purpose; the MAA is actually responsible for both "Forward and Depth" maintenance of all MOD owned aircraft (that's Line and Base maintenance to most people).

And I totally agree with your second point about the loss of independence.

dragartist

3rd Nov 2012, 21:06

Just felt the need to join this forum. (perhaps more later about why) I would have liked to have gone to this event. There is a really good summary of proceedings on the RAeS web site added this week.

Good discussion about the personalities and their past and future agenda in the banter but honestly the situation can only get better. let us hope those in authority can learn from their past follies.

The RAF put up the best people they have at the time for the jobs. even if they may be deficient in some quarters. The second division would be far worse and the frames managed less safely.

I do feel there is a lot of weeding to do amongst the people managing safety in the individual IPTs. If the majority had been any good at Engineering they would have jobs where thay had more influence over safe outcomes - the bulk I came across were not even "had beens" -no experience of having done anything to speak of.

If I had just one wish it would be for there never to be another XV230 or Mull of Kintyre. That is just a dream. I am afraid that my confidence is low. they talk the talk but between the lines they are smilling vipers

flipster

7th Nov 2012, 12:23

What I would give to know that Baz North has read, digested and understood the comments on this forum?!

He, at least, will have a grasp about what is being said wrt Chinook Mk2 intro into Service. I would like to think that he was astounded to hear that the Mk2 had only been given 'switch-on only' clearance by CA in 1993/1994 but that his predecessor (ACAS/CAS/CE) had somehow managed to concoct an almost full RTS, while criminally omitting to tell the crews (esp that of ZD576) that the ac systems were so immature as to be 'positively dangerous'. If AM North accepts that much but also acknowledes the systemic airworthiness failures involving Hercules XV179, Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710/Patriot, Sea Kings XV704/650, I would also hope he is of a mind that drastic action is needed to allow the MAA to work to the correct time frame - i.e to regress to before 1987 and not just 1998. To do so, he would be well advised to ask questions of those who could 'do' airworthiness properly - many of those are retired but still have their vast experience and knowledge. It would be insane not to ask their opinion.

I feel that, at the moment, the MAA is a bit like an alcoholic who can't quite admit their drinking problem and is 'just cutting back'. Once the MAA openly admit that the systemic failures go deeper and farther back, only then can they go 'cold turkey' and begin proper rehabilitaion and recovery.

Please stand up........

Engines

8th Nov 2012, 07:48

Guys,

After a break, I'd like to post a few observations (having recently been mentioned, which I very much appreciate). Tuc, as ever, makes a number of excellent points. I'd like to pick up on a couple of them. The first is the 'safety/airworthiness/fitness for purpose(FFP)' angle that he rightly exposes.

I have a concern that these areas continue to be confused, mixed and in some cases badly understood. I'd suggest that one way of approaching the airworthiness issue is to consider three related categories, namely 'safety', 'fit for purpose' (FFP) and 'operational effectiveness'.

Taking an example, a radio modification (or baseline design) meets 'safety' criteria if it meets the basic regulations available to contractors and PTs. If met, it won't blow up, melt wiring, fall out of the aircraft, irradiate the crew, set other devices off, and so on. (For EFP, this would have been making sure it didn't screw up fuel supplies). This is core QinetiQ/ITE stuff

Next up is FFP. That means that the radio meets its specified performance targets, can be used by the aircrew in an operational environment, doesn't screw up NVGs, meets reasonable maintenance criteria, is sufficiently reliable, and so on. (For EFP, this would have involved any maintainability aspects). This is also an ITE area, but OEUs should get involved here.

Finally, Operational effectiveness - this means that it meets the needs of a particular operation - for a radio does the secure programming work, are the frequency ranges correct, and so on. (This category is more applicable to things like DAS systems and weapons, but hopefully you get the drift) (For EFP, this would have involved meeting a specified (and testable) level of ballistic protection). Testing in this area will mainly be the province of AWC and possibly Dstl for other areas.

These three categories of 'airworthiness' are complementary, and some overlap is inevitable. Nevertheless, I've found them to be a useful way to 'slice and dice' the complex area of development, testing and acceptance into chunks that one can handle one at a time. I'd be interested to hear from others on what they think of this approach.

The next important issue Tuc highlights, which went so badly wrong on the Chinook Mk2, is the function of the RTS and the role of the RTSA. This has also attracted comments from others. I'm not at all surprised that the MAA have still not published a formal statement of the roles and responsibilities of the RTSA, as it's such a political subject.

The function of the RTS, in my view, was to allow the user (service operating authority on old speak) to take the output from the PE (or DLO, or DPA, or DE&S), add in any items not covered by the PE owned configuration (i.e. SEMs, NSMs) add in any other instructions or cautions that the operators deemed necessary, and publish them to the users in a clear and auditable form. (I will declare my hand here - after some excellent work between the PE and my team in DGA(N), we prepared the first of the 'new' RTS documents in 1993 for the Sea Harrier FA2).

The big question is who should be the RTSA. In my view, compilation and ownership of the RTS needs to rest with an organisation and people that (in MAA yuckspeak) are 'SQEP'. That is, they can build, understand, and manage a complex technical document. Again, my view only, but that needs to be engineers, working with pilots. Building an RTSR and running an RTS require basic systems engineering expertise, deep technical knowledge of the platform, and a full understanding of how the RTS must mirror configuration. Sorry, but that's engineer land. Yes, there has to be a lot of pilot input to get the limits and other aspects right, but 90% of an RTS is tech stuff.

That's why the RN used engineers in DGA(N) to produce and own the RTS. These RN engineers are the 'middle rank officers' mentioned by Pulse1, who now reside at Fleet and run the RTSs for FAA aircraft. Once DGA(N) was canned, that's where they had to go.

After a number of years doing this sort of stuff, I honestly and soberly conclude that the RAF's system of having the RTS owned by ACAS and managed by aircrew is flawed. It failed for the Chinook Mk2, and I have watched it continue to fall short to this day. (Aircraft still entering service with 'switch on' clearances for operationally essential equipment - still happening. RAF aircrew officers 'signing off' on use of time expired weapons to meet deployment dates - seen it, objected to it, got the t-shirt).

Moreover, and here is where the MAA is, i suspect, having a problem or two. First off, ACAS will be jealously guarding his RTSA role. It's a 'badge of honour' sort of thing, and is linked to the 'run by pilots, for pilots' aspect of the RAF I've posted on before. The problem, in my view, is that ACAS owning the RTSA opens up all sorts of potential for operational demands to drive issue of defective RTSs. I'm afraid I think it's still happening.

Moreover, I'm having some difficulty working out what you now need an RTSA for. PTs produce the RTS recommendation (RTSR). We have an MAA that issues Military Type Certificates for all aircraft (and mods). We have SDHs, ODHs and DDHs that use the RTS. Would it nor be logical for the PT's to produce an RTSR as per the MAA regs, get the MTC 'tick' and submit it to the ODHs for approval and use? What is the rationale for having ACAS involved in approving and managing a core safety management document, when the DHs are responsible for managing safety in service? I really think the time's come to 'pull the plug' on this arrangement.

I'm quite aware that I could be criticised for coming to these conclusions based on my own FAA background. However, having worked closely with all three services for a number of years, i honestly think that the time has come to remove the RAF from this area of the airworthiness management chain.

Sadly, given the RAF's success in getting control of the MAA (and I do, reluctantly, tip my hat to them for a quite excellent campaign) I think the chances of this happening are about zero. (I'm dismayed to see an ex ACAS getting the MAA, but if you write the SQEP specs to require a 3 star military aviator, well I suppose that means the RAF.)

I'd be interested to hear from others on these thoughts - this is a forum, let's exchange honest and polite views for mutual benefit. I certainly learn a lot from this stuff.

Best Regards as ever to all those at the pointy end doing the pointy stuff

Engines

tucumseh

8th Nov 2012, 09:07

Engines

Correct in every respect.

You mention DGA(N). It was no surprise that it was a retired DGA(N) (Admiral Ron Holley RIP) who was initially most vocal about the fundamental airworthiness failures on Chinook Mk2. He was one of those people whom you could rely on 100% - if he said it wasn't airworthy, it wasn't.

The very last time I saw him he was standing on a table at an RPC in DGA(N) HQ telling his junior officers (up to senior Captain!) exactly what you've just said about engineers. Later, he was appalled at the new concept that emerged in MoD (not just RAF); that non-engineers were permitted to self-delegate technical and airworthiness approval, and over-rule safety/design decisions in the interest of achieving Time and Cost targets.

But what the system does not legislate for is senior officers, of whatever persuasion and specialism, lying through their back teeth to further their own careers, and protect their predecessors. A madness overcomes some of them when they acquire power. Do we not have a form of assessment that can divert their career paths to somewhere like Broadmoor?

I just don't think the MAA has the bottle to go there. For all they are doing, I do not think they can prevent another Bagnall, Alcock and Graydon, whereby CA's Switch On Only clearance was magically converted into a full operational RTS; and when challenged, their successors in D/Air Staffs denied the very existence of an RTS (in 1993, so according to them you can't possibly have prepared one for FA2!!).

Min(AF) issued a grovelling apology to the family (the first I've ever seen), but no action was taken against the perpetrators. The beautiful irony is that in their attempt to protect their VSO predecessors and blame the pilots, they actually shot themselves in the foot, because Lord Philip was utterly disgusted at the lie (and the attempt to blame Sir Donald Spiers). Now, what the MAA needs to do is acknowledge all this; only then can it move forward in the right direction.

Chugalug2

8th Nov 2012, 10:53

Engines, as ex-RAF pilot may I say that your lucid and critical expose of the ACAS/RTS system really hurts, as it is so true! The RAF has a lot to account for in this scandal, in that where the guilty party is the "MOD" it was often serving RAF VSOs that were the perpetrators of the deliberate subversion of the Airworthiness process. That peoples lives might still be unnecessarily hazarded because of inter Service politics is unacceptable. As you say, the whole RTS procedure needs to be challenged by the MAA, but by an MAA that is independent and separate of the MOD and not RAF dominated!
Safety, be it Flight, Air, Aerospace, or whatever today's buzz word is, has got to stop being a football booted around the corridors of power and instead become once again the military asset that it used to be, a Force Multiplier, to use a very ancient expression. It isn't soft to try to make military aircraft safe for their occupants, it's sound military thinking. Time we started getting more of that in the High Command, instead of yet more of these endlessly smooth presentations.

dervish

8th Nov 2012, 11:19

I've read all the evidence linked above. I'd have loved to be a fly on Phillip's wall when he was digesting the section that dissected the Chinook RTS and listed about 50 critical failures. I can imagine he wouldn't know what to make of it and may even have tried to ignore it, but MoD's denial that an RTS existed at all would have had him salivating. If you're going to challenge an assessment of a document you've supplied under freedom of info, for God's sake don't deny it's existence! What a bloody own goal. I hope none of these idiots work in the MAA.

Bismark

8th Nov 2012, 11:22

As always Engines sums up the situation beautifully. Sadly the common thread always seems to be senior RAF officers. In my long career in the FAA I can never remember a senior RN aviator ever putting pressure on the RTSA to release a capability to service that was unsafe. In general the "junior" engineers and aircrews' advice was trusted and acted upon. The same was true for the way BoIs were conducted.

Engines

8th Nov 2012, 12:41

Tuc, Chug and others,

Thanks for the positive replies. Yes, Ron Holley was a fine officer, great engineer and a gentleman. He always stood 100% behind his junior air engineers, and gave us the confidence to do our jobs with the aircrew (not FOR the aircrew, but WITH the aircrew).

Chug, you make a good point - it's easy to blame 'the MoD', but I do honestly think that the RAF's core approach to 'engineering airworthiness' has not been up to the demands of modern aviation. In some ways, strangely, the RAF can be 20 years behind the 'curve' - I vividly remember my wife coming home in a foul mood from a High Wycombe lunch in 2001 - she had been asked to move over to another table because she was a 'junior officer's wife' - I was an SO1 in JFH. Un believable.

Basically, you HAVE to give engineers the backing to 'do the job right'. They will always strive mightily to get the job done on time. But if they are having problems, good leaders listen and adjust. They don't bully, harangue and then use dishonest devices like 'ICARs' and 'training releases (and my special pet hate, STFs) to deliver a half arsed job. It pains me to say it, because I have many friends in the Air Force that I respect and like, but the RAF has a cultural problem with managing airworthiness that only its engineers can fix. And part of that will be getting the pilots' 'tanks' off the airworthiness 'lawn'.

I'd like to offer a possibly hopeful thought. In my honest view, the MAA has not fundamentally changed the way military aviation is discharged. It has changed some regulations, but the basic job remains the same for engineers. My 'to do' list is as follows: Set the requirements. Manage the programme. Ruthlessly control configuration. Work the detail. Understand the detail. Understand the risks. Fix them if required. Listen to the pilots, but do not obey them. Get the paperwork right. Control modifications. Never neglect the pubs and the spares. Aim to meet schedules, but never be a schedule slave.

I honestly think that our young engineers are up to the job - leadership, guidance and the occasional size nine two lace holes in will do the rest. Senior officers will do what senior officers have always done - at the coal face, do your job professionally and to the best of your abilities and things will, I think, turn out OK. Oh, and whatever you do don't listen to old farts like me.

All the very best to all those young engineers out there at the front, doing stuff we never could have,

Engines

Just This Once...

8th Nov 2012, 17:58

I've had a foot in all the camps stated above and whilst I agree with a lot of the narrative so far I think a lot of the failings are due to a lack of integrity by key individuals in the airworthiness chain. When I see very senior people making knowingly false claims regarding airworthiness to protect their own personal interest or professional standing I cringe. When I see no enforcement of standards or no action against those who make false statements I cry.

I do not think it is fair to lay the blame at the pilots in RTSA. Day in and day out I see them challenge the actions of DE&S. They seem to clash heads regarding the integrity and honesty with the same few senior individuals in DE&S on a routine basis. As described above I still see DE&S recommend 'switch-on only' clearances with no evidence, only to see these uplifted to full clearances after a period of use with the frontline with little or no independent evidence. RTSA catches some of these, but not all and the suggestion of adding engineering knowledge to the RTSA team is well made. But my point is that no action is taken against those who repeatedly subvert the airworthiness system. At times it seems that some in DE&S are playing games to see what they can get away with. I wish we had a system where a tally was kept when false airworthiness claims were made - 3 strikes and you are out kind of thing.

As we stand a number of senior people in DE&S are continuing the same self-serving agenda noted in the H-C report. RTSA and MAA should not be called upon to be the DE&S police, especially when the only punishment is a wry smile for those who are caught.

nice castle

8th Nov 2012, 22:38

Engines, I agree with all you say.

Bismark, unfortunately I have experienced a certain RN Captain who has done precisely this.

Engines

8th Nov 2012, 23:36

JTO,

I'd like to sincerely and fully apologise if it appeared that I was criticising the pilots in the RTSA in any way. My concerns lie with the ownership of the RTSA, and the basic function of an ACAS owned RTSA with the advent of the DH system. Expert pilot input into the RTSR is absolutely vital to a decent product.

I have had the pleasure of working with a set of absolutely outstanding RAF SO2s in the RTSA over the past few years. As ever, once you get to the working level (and by that I mean SO2) my experience is that you find dedicated and very able service personnel doing the very best job they can.

But JTO opens up a very important point, which is the relationship between the RTSA and the DE&S staffs providing the product. I absolutely agree that RTSA must not try to 'police' the DE&S. It's absolutely not ACAS's job to do that. MAA regulate the DE&S (and everybody else in the airworthiness chain), and also carry out a 'policing' function of sorts. However, any organisation MUST (do discharge its safety management obligations) have an effective internal system to assure delivery of safe products.

I do think (and have advised teams so) that DE&S should consider setting up a more effective internal project review system to ensure that its teams are doing what they should be. If an effective and thorough process is followed (and as Tuc often points out, it's not an especially hard thing to do - just work the detail, record the results and properly manage the risk) ten there should be no room for the sort of shenanigans that JTO describes.

Despite the hammering they often get in these forums, BAE Systems have a very effective 'phase review' system where projects get very thoroughly 'peer reviewed' by qualified and trained experts at a number of stages. I've taken projects through these and it's my considered conclusion that if DE&S ran something along these lines, many of the problems described would be bowled out at an early stage. It would also help prevent the 'integrity' issues you describe. I do think that DE&S could learn a thing or two from it.

Best Regards as ever to all those hard working SO2s doing the spadework,

Engines

Engines

9th Nov 2012, 05:53

Engines, I have a lot of respect for what you have said, but I do question your suggestion that you could delete RTSA and go directly to the ODHs. By doing this, you're going directly to where the operational pressure is and, surely, run the risk of the ODH making their own interpretations to suit those pressures. I think there needs to be a step back from that and RTSA can fulfil that need, albeit with changes in its manning and, possibly, reporting chain.

tucumseh

9th Nov 2012, 06:10

Excellent posts by JTO and Engines. For those who haven’t read the evidence, the point with the Chinook RTS was that the Switch On Only clearance applied to the ENTIRE Nav and Comms systems; brought about primarily because there was no supporting certification to even permit the FADEC to be fitted to the aircraft, because its Safety Critical Software did not have a Certificate of Design.

Forget for a moment about the hundreds of anomalies found by Boscombe; it was far more basic than that. There was no certificate, therefore it wasn’t allowed within a country mile of a production standard aircraft. End of. Controller Aircraft reflected this in his CA Release of November 1993. The AAIB confirmed the software standard remained in this condition (“positively dangerous”) at the time of the accident.

The regulations stated that ACAS was NOT permitted to sign an RTS and grant authority to fly operationally against such an Interim CAR. He did. Lord Philip confirmed the Switch On Only clearance was “mandated” (i.e. not permitted to rely in any way whatsoever on those items which were SOO). The CAR and supporting papers (Oct/Nov 1993) described an aircraft that was over two years away from sufficient maturity to fly operationally. A legal RTS was only issued in 1996, confirming this.

As JTO so rightly says, this was down to the integrity of key individuals. As those individuals had the same degree of control over all RAF aircraft (and some of them, like Alcock, over all MoD aircraft), then the failure was systemic. Until resolved, it remains so. It has not been resolved – again, JTO cites ongoing failures in DE&S. As I’ve said before, I look at the DE&S hierarchy and equate certain fatal accidents to names. The MAA will never change this cultural problem until those individuals and, I submit, anyone trained or influenced by them, are gone.

As the evidence to Philip describes, a Switch On Only clearance is designed to apply to, for example, a known airworthy build standard to which you add, say, a single radio. The SOO applies to that one radio. In simple terms, if you switch it on and it causes an EMC problem, then you know if you switch it off again you revert to a known safe configuration. At no point could the ZD576 pilots revert to a known safe configuration. Thus, the "gross negligence" was committed long before 2.6.94.

The very fact Boscombe felt the need to apply it to entire systems like Nav and Comms is indicative of (a) gross immaturity of design and (b) the pressure being applied by the RAF to declare it airworthy. One could criticise the Superintendent at Boscombe for not refusing, but I think he did the right thing – issued an Interim report “in the form of a CAR” and firmly stated the aircraft was not airworthy. After that, he would not conceive ACAS being foolish enough to turn that round as an operational RTS.

If the MAA or MoD are to address such behaviour, then they need to cite examples. This means criticising retired VSOs. They won’t.

Engines

9th Nov 2012, 08:47

MG,

Thanks for the response. I understand where you are coming from, but let me explain more clearly what I am getting at.

Back 'in the day', the RN had a system where the Engineering Authority (DGA(N)) took the CA Release from the PE, and turned it into an RTS. DGA(N) was the RTSA. The job of creating the RTS was given to the engineers, working with the pilots in the Operating Authority (in those days FONAC). DGA(N) (2 star engineer) signed off and authorised the RTS. This was a system that, generally, worked well and delivered good results. (I know this not because I think so, but because the FAA RTSs all went through independent audit in the late 90s with good results. A number of RAF RTSs had a worse time)

Now look at the situation. The PT (mainly engineers) are doing the PE and a bit of the EA job, building the RTSR (RTS Request) submission. Any half sane PT gets BIG input from the RTSA while building the RTSR. That RTSR is signed off by the PT leader (can be a one star) and then passed to the RTSA. RTSA (ACAS) then accepts the RTSR by releasing an RTS, which it builds from the RTSR. That's the rest of the old RN EA task.

The problem (in my view) is that building a decent RTS should be an integral part of the RTSR. If the PT haven't got it right, the RTSA must refuse the RTSR submission and get it reworked. All the RTSA SHOULD be doing is reassembling RTSR evidence into the RTS. My view (and I accept that others will disagree) is that the job of building (and maintaining) a decent RTS is essentially a systems engineering task best done by engineers, with pilots.

Honestly, from what I have seen, ACAS staffs are no more insulated from operational pressures than FLC staffs. You could argue that they are even more exposed. Horses for courses, and in my view, not the key issue. The key is a properly built and evidenced (is that a word?) RTS that the Front Line can use WITHOUT any amendment. That's exactly what DGA(N) did for years (and, I must add, with far less personnel than the current system). I have seen (and keep seeing) the current system delivering some less than sparkling RTSs, when the right course of action would have been 'no RTS at all'. And if pilots are unhappy about that, well, it's the job of the PT PMs to deliver the products, sack them if they don't perform.

At the risk of incurring the wrath of some distinguished contributors, I do think that asking for RAF VSOs to be criticised and 'named and shamed' is a) not going to happen - that's the British establishment way and b) probably not what the system needs now to move forward.

I will be fascinated to see what the MAA finally coughs up on RTSA roles and responsibilities. (I'd place a decent bet that there is already a big pile of anguished correspondence between RAF VSO on this one). It also makes selection of the current ACAS as the next Head of the MAA a questionable decision. I'm afraid that I have to predict an 'RAF VSO friendly' outcome. That's not necessarily bad, but I honestly don't think it will be optimal from a safety management point of view.

By the way, i don't recommend a 'rebuild' of the old RN RTS system - too much 'joint' water has passed under the bridge for that. But I'd love to see an impartial analysis of the 'pros and cons' for the various options.

But this is a forum - opposing views are insanely great!

Best Regards as ever to all those draining swamps and wrestling alligators,

Engines

tucumseh

9th Nov 2012, 11:26

Engines

-re VSOs. Under almost any other circumstance I would agree wholeheartedly about there being nothing to gain from naming and shaming.

But in this particular case (the series of avoidable deaths, commencing with Chinook ZD576, if not before) these VSOs have not only made gross mistakes (which is excusable in anyone) but have compounded their actions by seeking to blame innocent staffs (not just the RAF pilots, but civilian staffs on other accidents) and withholding evidence (to protect themselves).

It is not a one-off. It has been a systematic subverting of the regulations and their legal duty of care, amounting to gross misconduct in public office; which current staffs perpetuate despite the formation of the MAA. They have demonstrably lied to their own junior staffs, to Ministers, a Sheriff, the Church, Coroners, Houses of Commons & Lords committees, the Public Accounts Committee and more. Last, but by no means least, they have shamefully lied to the relatives of deceased aircrew and passengers.

I appreciate it is perhaps not the MAA's job to do the naming. But it is most certainly obliged to acknowledge the truth that these failures go back long before the 1998 baseline Haddon-Cave inexplicably arrived at, despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary. In fact, Haddon-Cave's actions are in some respects highly questionable and I believe only the fact his report was prepared on behalf of the Secy of State protects him from legal action. I know my own evidence to both he and Lord Philip was meticulously supported by written supporting evidence - in fact, Lord Philip was given 400MB of supporting papers to both prove the audit trail and demonstrate MoD had lied over many significant components of the case (the criticality of FADEC software being a good example).

I don't disagree with you, I just have my own view based on personal experiences.

Engines

9th Nov 2012, 14:43

Tuc,

I absolutely appreciate your well made points. I fully agree that if there has been gross misconduct in public office then it should be pursued, probably most effectively via the legal system. The MAA is not really in a position to do that, given its remit.

My concern is that RAF VSOs have an almost unbreakable hold on the political establishment where 'air matters' are concerned. The long battle to get the MoD (and the Government) to release key documents shows how effectively the VSOs are able to fight their corner. I don't think it's right, nor do I think it serves the nation especially well, but that's how I think it is. The law is really the only option left. But, let me be clear - if there is ever anything I can do to help get legal redress, any evidence I might be able to offer, just call and I'll be there.

Where I was coming from (and I apologise for not being clearer) is that fixing the airworthiness system will not now, in my view, be helped much by any such legal action, as justified as it is. What needs to happen now is a concerted move forward to a coherent, organised and competent system that delivers airworthy systems and keeps them that way. The main target area has to be, again my view, DE&S and the new Duty Holders in the FLCs.

I hope this addressees your well made points - I have too much respect for you to want to be seen to disputing your point of view.

Best Regards as ever to all those fighting the good fights

Engines

tucumseh

9th Nov 2012, 15:35

Thanks Engines.

The point you make about DE&S is absolutely key to this issue. It highlights that failures occurred far earlier in the process (as well as earlier in time) than MoD/MAA are prepared to admit. By “attacking” 1st and 2nd Line activities, they are misleading all concerned into thinking that is where the problem lies, while perpetuating the notion that airworthiness and serviceability is the same thing. In doing so, they are hiding the truth and defending the VSOs. And, I hasten to add, the civilian staffs (both engineers and administrators) who instructed their juniors to knowingly render aircraft unairworthy.

The MAA don’t mention this, primarily because I believe it is they who continue to brief Ministers that past VSOs/CSs were correct to take disciplinary action against staffs who refused to obey these orders. They can say all they want in the media, but the simple fact remains that a Director Internal Audit report was commissioned in January 1993 with the sole purpose of gathering evidence to protect the jobs of those under threat of dismissal by AMSO’s DGSM (an AVM). DIA reported to PUS that the civilian staffs acted correctly and the immediate threat reduced. But it didn’t go away, and was repeated in 1998-on, when 2-4 Stars were specifically warned about safety failings and made similar threats. These facts were actively withheld from subsequent Coroners’ Inquests.

The day the MAA acknowledge the above is the day I’ll put my feet up.

Going back to our mutual boss, Ron Holley, I recall precisely what his reaction was if any of his staff identified such a problem, or financial waste. You were invited to the 5th Floor for a glass of (very nice) sherry and a pat on the back. Contrast this with a few years later and being threatened with your jotters.

1.3VStall

9th Nov 2012, 15:56

If there is anyone from the MAA reading this thread, could they please print off the last two pages and present them to the DG, while expressing their deep concern and asking for his considered opinion?

thefodfather

9th Nov 2012, 18:36

Whilst I wholeheartedly agree with much, if not all that has been written on this subject, perhaps it is time to look to the future. The golden age that is discussed by many is fading into the distance fast and there will be few left in today's military who can remember it. Whilst there was a great deal about this period that was good in terms of Airworthiness, the same cannot necessarily be said about some of the cultural and human factors aspects of flight safety. Safety in civilian aviation is done very differently now compared to even 20 years ago and one of the challenges for the MAA is how to look to the future given the baggage of the past.

Many amazing people have lost their lives in military aviation for many different reasons and the vast majority involved in flight safety, past and present, do the job with the memories of lost friends in their hearts and the best of intentions. However, in an organisation with posting cycles etc it is always going to be difficult to gain the right skills to do safety/ airworthiness properly. Perhaps there is a need for a Safety Branch (or maybe a Safety stream for specific branches) with a career path from junior SFSO through Duty Holder offices, PTs, RTSAs and finally the MAA or MAAIB where a career of safety management gives them the knowledge they really need. The level of experience in civilian regulators is mind boggling when compared to the military equivalents.

So much has already been achieved compared to the system of 10+ years ago when my first safety job as an SO3 led to redicule by my peers as a dead end job with no likelihood of promotion. There is much to be encouraged about, certainly in some areas anyway. But of course, safety is a journey that never ends and to complete the clichés, it's everyone's responsibility (or was that FOD?)

Chugalug2

9th Nov 2012, 20:47

Such excellent posts above by those united in their wish to see UK Military Airworthiness Provision ensured and protected that I hesitate to put in my twopenneth. But do so I will (of course :-), so here goes:

Engines, you want to see a system that is not dominated by the RAF.

Tucumseh, you feel that those VSOs (all RAF?) responsible for the subversion of the regulations, resultant fatal accidents, and the shameful decades long cover up since, should be held legally responsible.

FodFather, you think that those serving who are involved in Flight Safety at a junior level could opt to specialise in it, rising through the various levels until becoming Inspectors or Investigators in the MAA and MAAIB respectively.

These are all laudable aims and in my view are all possible, but only if the MAA and the MAAIB are made truly independent of the MOD, and importantly of each other.
The MAA would not be, and would be keen to demonstrate itself not to be, the creature of the MOD, the RAF, or anyone else. We have already noted that the DG should be a civilian, or ex Service, or shortly to be ex-Service. Those who are still serving, at lower levels, would be answerable to the DG and not their parent Service. It sounds tricky, but the rot was never at these levels but at the top. That is why the independence has to be for real and not simply a word in a bullet point.

So, Engines, a truly independent MAA, of the RAF, the FAA, the AAC, the MOD, even of PPRuNe.

Tucumseh, an independent MAA should have no difficulty in receiving and acting upon evidence submitted to it of the systemic suborning of Airworthiness Regulations as a result of illegal orders issued by RAF VSOs aimed at subverting the Airworthiness Process. Indeed, that would be their very first test. If they won't do that then they in turn will have reneged on their duty. Assuming though that is not the case, then investigation and prosecution of the culprits should follow.

FodFather, If your aspiring Military Inspectors and Investigators want to ensure airworthy aircraft for the UK Military, and all military air accidents professionally and properly investigated to avoid recurrences, then I propose that only truly independent bodies can assure that. It is for that very reason that the CAA and AAIB are independent, including of each other. Much safety work is done by the operators but they are checked by and accountable to the Authority and their accidents investigated by the Board.

This will not be an easy solution, effective ones rarely are, but it will save lives. For that reason alone it needs to happen and happen soon.

Self Regulation Does Not Work and in Aviation It Kills!

tucumseh

10th Nov 2012, 06:53

Tucumseh, you feel that those VSOs (all RAF?)

No experience of the Army doing this.

One senior RN Captain, but he'd been lied to by a civilian non-engineer who had granted himself airworthiness delegation, and quickly withdrew the disciplinary action when told I'd been "done" for ignoring an order to commit fraud. But he wouldn't condemn the others actions. Similarly, one Commodore, but he simply couldn't grasp the concept of anyone knowingly making an aircraft unsafe, so satisfied himself with ordering the (same) civilian non-engineer to reconsider his actions. Non-eng refused, and was supported by 2 Star (DGAS2 - Nimrod, Chinook etc) and CDP. As I said, the MoD have consistently upheld this action, as have Ministers. Since the formation of the MAA, I understand all such briefings on airworthiness to Ministers come from them.

So yes, in the main RAF and civilian non-engineers; and of course senior engineers who lose the plot after becoming political animals. But invariably either suppliers (who, in 1991 were granted control over all engineering matters by the Chief Engineer) and the CE's immediate subordinate (DGSM) and three Air Cdres immediately below him, who I think were all Suppliers. They certainly toppled with blank looks when I mentioned functional safety. I cannot conceive DGSM acting in this way without his boss, Chief Engineer, knowing. You'd need serious top cover to travel down to London, gather 8 civilians in a room and threaten dismissal for refusing to commit fraud. And then, when an independent audit ruled against you, escape censure altogether and be allowed to maintain your stance.

Engines

10th Nov 2012, 11:50

Chug,

What I really want is a system that works and delivers safe and effective aircraft to the front line on time. Domination by RAF VSO aircrew is a hindrance to achieving that aim, in my view.

Conversely, if RAF VSO aircrew could be induced to hand over key aspects of safety management to their engineers, who are better 'SQEP'd' to do the job, I would be happy with the current system.

It's not colour of uniform - it's the quality of the job done.

I agree with you that the MAA is not sufficiently independent - but conversely I'd prefer to see it headed up by a two star and made to report to the Defence Safety Board like the weapons and nuclear guys (who have just as significant risks (perhaps more significant) to regulate and manage). That would, in my view, give the MAA a better 'steer' on how to do its business, and stop it being a 'one colour' shop.

Independence would be best handled, I think, by a truly independent oversight panel reporting to Sof S - but not one headed up by yet another RAF VSO (retired).

Best Regards as ever

Engines

Chugalug2

10th Nov 2012, 13:40

Engines, that would be fine if all of this scandal could be laid solely at the feet of RAF Aircrew VSOs but as tuc has pointed out the key man, who in theory was the long stop and the professional guardian of the airworthiness process, was an engineer, indeed the Chief Engineer, albeit an RAF VSO one, who presided over the demolition of it and the replacement of the very engineers that you call for by unqualified and inexperienced suppliers.

The problem here, as has already been pointed out, is that the system could be fatally compromised by individuals, very senior ones of course, but the badges and rank that they carried is incidental to the fact that they did what they did because they could. Why they did it is equally incidental. The lesson is plain however, it must never be allowed to happen again. With all respect (and that isn't just a throw away phrase), I cannot see how your solution can do that. It might be argued that neither can mine, but I would contend that it is less likely to, just as the CAA or MAAIB are unlikely to collude with operators or manufacturers to allow unsafe practise or to cover up gross negligence, being independent of both and each other.

Perhaps the contrast with Airworthiness versus Nuclear and Weapons Safety is that the latter two are clearly capable of immediate and overwhelming disaster if not properly handled. Airworthiness is a far more amorphous concept. Many here still confuse it with serviceability, others point to allegedly unairworthy aircraft operating for years without apparent problems. Those whose job it is to ensure airworthiness is provided for are forever having to defend not it but themselves, for delaying programmes and adding unnecessarily to their cost. The connection between some troublesome code in a FADEC and the possibility of a total loss, of aircraft and occupants, can only be seen in retrospect and even then not, if the operator does not want to see it. That code should be ensured by a totally independent regulator, that possible connection by a totally independent investigator. Independence, like pregnancy, does not really allow of a degree of condition. It either is or isn't. Neither the present MAA or MAAIB are.

dragartist

10th Nov 2012, 14:21

It is no good bashingthe MAA They don’t make decisions or sign anything off. They will not be before any BoI to answer toany failings. The formation of the MAA post CH-C certainly raised awareness inthe whole community. This can only be seen as a good thing. Unfortunately westill have “operators” that do not have the appropriate knowledge andexperience. Yet they sign themselves up as SQEPs. – Yes I have first handexperience of this on many occasions. Some laughable!

Flipster is spot onabout those who “can do airworthiness properly” not being around any longer.This was the findings of the Public Accounts Committee (if I was clever likesome I would include the link to report 80 on the Govt web). Even the JuniorDefence Minister for DE&S tried to defend this until I wrote to him tellinghim that he could not defend the indefensible. He was good enough to write backto acknowledge his error. But this was never corrected publicly.

I grew up inairworthiness terms over my 35 years. I was not very proud of some of thestatements I signed off in the early days but by 1992 I had come a long way inmy understanding of my responsibility. By 1999 I saw myself as a disciple of aformer Technical Director of the MAA as he had the confidence to detach me to” Sleaford Tech” to spread themessage of the good work we were doing in motors. This work was a forerunner toCassandra. (Frankly I was not an advocate of Cassandra. I saw it to be thedomain of safety managers rather than those truly accountable)

I had many battles,particularly the last 10 years with folks that were operating outside theirperformance bracket. Due to circumstances these folks remain a menace to ourForces who continue to put themselves in harms way today. Ether flying in ordependent upon air assets.

I was prompted to jointhis forum by reading Trish Knights book. It reinforced my thoughts that Iworked in a broken organisation for so long, with so many ostriches. I hadgreat hopes for the post CH-C era. It was not to be. Under the terms of my LOAI brought concerns over the blatant breach of regulations to my seniors. Mostwere ignored. At some units JSP 553 was used to prop open the crew-room door.As for 543D, these folks who set themselves up as experts in generating SOPsand APs were not even aware of its existence. To this day, publications arebeing amended without a properly authorised F765. It is this culture the MAAwas to change. The systemic failures still remain. When the small basic thingspail into insignificance the bigger things can fall through the cracks.

I am enjoying readingthe comments from Tuc, Engines, Just this once and Chug. I must know some ofyou folks.

One of my mentors whotaught me so much (still around and doing good things) had a saying about “lean”.If we lean too far we fall over”. Have we reached that stage? I think so. On thedemise of the Harrier, Jaguar and Nimrod I expected some of the experiencedguys to be redeployed to help me out in my team that was becoming stretched. Theynever showed. Their skills and experience evaporated. There is another tread on here about staffing,or lack of.

I do believe CH-Cshould be invited back to undertake a follow up audit. Not sure what the termsshould be but we really need to root out those who continue to flout theregulations and those not even aware of the regulations because they have nothad the exposure or pre deployment training to undertake the responsibilitiesof the jobs they are posted into. Worst of all are the non aviation peopleposted into aviation jobs. Yes this happens to uniformed posts as well ascivilian posts. I wish I could exposethese folks and perhaps prevent another devastated family. Some of my funnystories are not funny at all. Perhaps I should start a misplaced humour thread.Let’s start with the PJI who was trying to inform the writing of the RTS and2Gp GASO for a large 4 engine tactical transport aircraft by suggesting thatthe limit for depressurising the aircraft to chuck things out is different atnight and day because when it is dark there is less oxygen in the air. Clearlyhe did not listen to the lectures at RAFCAM but signs himself up as competent.
By the way I don’t really dress up in women’sclothes.

thefodfather

10th Nov 2012, 15:58

Chug, whilst I support your sentiment, I still don't know how a totally independent MAA could be staffed or operated without being lacking in credibility or the skills to regulate military aviation. Over time you could build a team of enough civilians perhaps but where would the real life operational experience come from in such an organisation.

In terms of the MAAIB, given that both the Chinook and Nimrod accidents were investigated by the "independent" AAIB, I'm not sure this is the holy grail either.

For me it is more about generating a culture of safety and as a follow on from that, a bigger group of experienced safety professionals that we have already. Then, once they have the experience, there needs to be a structure that gets the most out of that experience for the good of military aviation. From what I have seen and heard, things are certainly going in the right direction. It's even cool to get an MAA job out of staff college.

Extg3

10th Nov 2012, 16:18

Gents,
I am reading this thread with great interest, but I struggle with the proliferation of MLAs. is there an online dictionary that will explain these to an interested but struggling reader.

Chugalug2

10th Nov 2012, 16:50

TFF:
In terms of the MAAIB, given that both the Chinook and Nimrod accidents were investigated by the "independent" AAIB, I'm not sure this is the holy grail either.
You are right, FodFather, there is definitely no holy grail, nor will there ever be. The MAA and the MAAIB that I seek will leave much to be desired. They will be the cause of dissatisfaction and complaint, no doubt. What they will not be though, I fervently hope, is to be at the beck and call of superiors with an agenda of their own. Such was the relationship that the AAIB had with the various Boards of Inquiry such as the two you instance. The AAIB did not investigate those accidents, their respective Boards did, "assisted" by the AAIB in only those areas requested by the Board. I do not think that Mr Cable of the AAIB felt that he ever had a free hand to investigate the loss of Chinook HC2 ZD576, for example.

I do not envisage an MAA or MAAIB staffed purely by Civilians. There will be a need in both for the operational knowledge and expertise as well as the ethos of the Armed Forces that can only come from those still serving. It seems to me that if such personnel can serve in the Armed Forces of Allies, they can certainly serve in UK bodies dedicated to the safety of our military airfleets. All it needs is the will to succeed.

I'm glad to hear that the MAA is now considered cool by those looking for a career as a senior officer, but that is not its purpose is it? If it can't be relied upon to fulfil that purpose, its reputation within the "tribe" is irrelevant. It has to ensure that our aircraft are airworthy, and I am convinced that it can only do that without of the MOD. That may not be popular, that may not be cool, but it will save lives and material. We cannot afford the unnecessary loss of either. Ditto as ever with the MAAIB.

To answer your point, we had a culture of safety, the RAF Flight Safety system was the envy of the Western Allies. It was effectively shut down by a handful of malevolent old men. No point in rebuilding it for the same thing to happen yet again is it? To lose one Flight Safety system may be regarded as a misfortune, to lose another looks like carelessness, or even Gross Negligence...?

thefodfather

10th Nov 2012, 17:46

Chug

As always I agree with much of what you say. A regulator should always provide the very checks and balances you suggest and should certainly not be at the beck and call of anyone. As you say the goal is not to be "cool", but if the right attitude to safety becomes the natural mindset of the future VSOs then that can only be a positive thing.

I do feel that it is what the MAA does and the culture in which it exists that is important rather than purely whether it is independent or not. I would prefer to allow the MAA to focus on doing the right thing rather than continually face arguments about the level of its independence. Approaches to safety have changed a great deal since the days when the system was the envy of others and I would rather the MAA prepare to meet the challenges of the future than try and emulate the past.

Either way, I'm sure what we seek is the same although we might differ in how that might be achieved.

Chugalug2

10th Nov 2012, 19:11

I don't want to unnecessarily perpetuate this dialogue when others wish to make their points,TFF, but the issue that divides us is so fundamental as to require emphasising.

You say that cultivating a safety culture is the important thing rather than continual arguments about the independence of the MAA. I'm afraid I see that as a cart before the horse argument. The very first requirement of any regulator is to be completely independent of those that it regulates.

We have seen tremendous problems recently emanating from the British love affair with self regulation; the IPPC, the PPC, even the BBC, have all been shown to have feet of clay. In the main the cost is in reputations rather than lives, though lives have indeed been lost under many of these quangos.

Aviation professionals know, or bloody well should do, that fond hopes and optimism is harshly punished in the sky. The present system of military airworthiness provision is fatally flawed, and goodwill and hoping for the best wont change that.

You say that:
Approaches to safety have changed a great deal since the days when the system was the envy of others and I would rather the MAA prepare to meet the challenges of the future than try and emulate the past.
If that is a polite way of saying that I'm out of date and the next generation are in charge now, point taken. Otherwise I don't understand what you are saying.

Of course things move on, Flight Safety included, but to succeed it must evolve. The "Year Zero" approach taken by the MAA is as doomed as Pol Pot's was. I would suggest that the best thing to do is indeed to go back, to find Terra Firma. The only guaranteed firm ground on which to build an MAA is with its foundations set in the hard rock of independence. Presently it is built on sand, and shifting sand at that. No amount of safety culture will protect it from more malevolent old men, only independence will. I'm afraid that I will go on arguing that "continually".

tucumseh

11th Nov 2012, 07:11

In terms of the MAAIB, given that both the Chinook and Nimrod accidents were investigated by the "independent" AAIB, I'm not sure this is the holy grail either. If I could just reiterate what Chug said. I have spoken to the principals on a number of occasions and the AAIB was most certainly not given a free hand to investigate ZD576, or indeed the preceding Chinook accidents caused by airworthiness failures (e.g. ZA721 in 1987). MoD actively obstructed the investigations, withholding vital information at every turn. The obvious question is, will the same happen to the MAAIB and what authority do they have if it does?

The clearest manifestation of this is the reports into the ZD576 SuperTANS and Trimble 8000 GPS.

The first was conducted by Racal themselves. The second by the AAIB. Why not Trimble? Or why not both by the AAIB? The two reports cannot be reconciled, with a glaring 34.2 second discrepancy regarding when SuperTANS was switched off. MoD chose to accept Racal’s explanation (which may be perfectly valid, it is just that it has never been independently validated) over that of the AAIB (that the Super TANS had been switched off prior to impact; say, 34.2 seconds before, about the time the Waypoint was accepted). It so happened the Racal explanation diverted attention from a system which had no operational clearance whatsoever (i.e. away from those who hid this fact from the pilots), to the alleged actions of the pilots.

MoD used Racal’s report into a single device to demonstrate the entire Nav system was both serviceable and accurate. This is ludicrous beyond words, compounded by the fact they withheld the rather important fact that their case against the pilots relied entirely on a system which the (mandated) CA Release said was not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever.
Worse, the Trimble report details at least 2 serious faults in the system (Power Supply and Time of Day) which a five year old would tell you cannot be reconciled with a claim the system was 100% serviceable. (If ToD was faulty, how can one rely on the timing “evidence”?)

In such a crucial investigation (in fact, ANY investigation), it is incumbent upon the MoD (in this case) to reconcile such conflicts. They didn’t. They consistently chose the path of least resistance that would allow them to blame the pilots. For that act alone, the only punishment is imprisonment.

Please don’t be fooled by MoD’s lies about the AAIB’s role. Mr Cable went to great lengths to clarify this with Lord Philip and other inquires, but MoD persisted in misrepresenting their role. When it suits, the AAIB either have primacy, or are a peripheral player. Which applies to the MAAIB?

Let us consider what would have occurred if a truly independent MAAIB or MAA had reported on ZD576. Fact #1 – There was no valid RTS. Fact #2 – The pilots were not permitted to rely on the entire Nav and Comms systems. If those two simple facts had been revealed up front, would anyone have dared blame the pilots in any way? Not a chance.

No apologies for using ZD576 as the prime example – it is the case where most evidence against MoD exists, and serves to emphasise the MAA are simply not addressing the true scale and scope of the failures. The only possible reason is to protect those responsible for the failings in the first place.

Chugalug2

12th Nov 2012, 08:54

Extg3:
I struggle with the proliferation of MLAs. is there an online dictionary that will explain these to an interested but struggling reader.
You and me both, Extg3. I'm sure that tuc will not mind me reminding him that I used to remonstrate with him many years ago to "de-gobbledegook" his posts. To his credit he has made great efforts to do so since, but often an exchange with others of a similar background to his soon starts to display this arcane graffiti, much as a similar exchange between pilots might, for instance.
I have long since tried instead to go with the flow of such posts. Even if such dictionaries as you suggest existed, and perhaps they do, they would soon be outdated as the MOD sheds one lot to grow another, rather like the exoskeletons shed by slimy creatures from the deep (a comparison made purely from the point of view of illustration you understand).
Instead of trying to dot every i and cross every t, you might wish to liken the systemic layout that these terms describe to the systems of an aircraft. Thus any dysfunction exhibited by some or all of these systems affects the viability, or airworthiness if you will, of the entire aircraft. It is then that you can see that the issue is not only to get those systems functioning correctly again but to ensure that they will keep on doing so.
That seems to me to be the big challenge confronting the MAA. They may just possibly be able to do the former, but I see no way that they can ensure the latter. We used to have a working system of Airworthiness Provision in my day, we even had such a system in tuc's day but all it took to stop all that was a group of malevolent old men. Why? Because they could. We have to put the system beyond their reach, which means putting the MAA beyond their reach, which means making it external to, and independent of, the MOD. Ditto with the MAAIB of course.
I think it pays not to be too closely involved in all the arcane detail of this and not get bogged down in every detail. A case perhaps of seeing the woods for the trees?
Oh, edited to add that the link posted by tuc leads to this pdf file. Go to p237, voila a dictionary, well of sorts!:-
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtaWxpdGFyeWFpcndvcnRoaW5lc3N8Z3g6NT dmZmU4YzlkMjlkOTBkNA

tucumseh

12th Nov 2012, 09:32

A simple mechanism I’d like to see in any Service Inquiry is them being required to answer a checklist of leading questions, key among them “Is the aircraft airworthy”.

At every other stage of the airworthiness process one is required to answer a similar question – that is, has materiel and financial provision been made to attain and maintain airworthiness?

What went wrong was the people who were required to answer this question had their posts cut. The Director Internal Audit report of June 1996 I speak of highlighted this failure to PUS. On MoD’s own admission, they ripped up the report in 2001 as it was marked “No Further Action”.

The reason why is very clear to me. From 1987-on (after the Services disbanded their sections which asked this question before seeking formal endorsement of any Requirement) the MoD(PE) project/programme manager, who hitherto had been a safety net for the odd slip up, became the final defence. This, of course, required him to have intimate knowledge of the Services’ requirements, which has not been a competence required of PMs since 1990. From 1989-on, AMSO staffs (suppliers) routinely sought disciplinary action against MoD(PE) staffs who tried to apply this mandated regulation (which has never been rescinded).

We ignored them as much as possible but the key event was AMSO subsuming these MoD(PE) airworthiness specialists in 1991, the same year AMSO became double hatted as RAF Chief Engineer (ACM Michael Alcock). By December 1992, his immediate subordinate had stopped seeking disciplinary action, and was applying it himself, threatening to dismiss civilian staffs who continued to implement this legal obligation.

(You’ll notice the timeframe – 1987 to 1993 was most definitely NOT the “golden period” described by Haddon-Cave).

In short order, it became the norm (a) not to conduct this Requirement Scrutiny and (b) not to see materiel and financial provision for most components of airworthiness. The latter meant, primarily, failure to maintain the Build Standard, which militates against physical and functional safety, a valid Safety Case and a valid RTS. Put another way, we (PMs) would be given money to buy something that we knew would not be fit for purpose, and that no funding would exist to make it so.

This failure manifests itself in many ways. At Front Line you won’t have spares, access to Design Authorities, fault investigations won’t happen (AMSO instructed they cease in 1992), tech pubs won’t be valid (ditto, 1991), obsolescence won’t be addressed (ditto, 1991). One knock-on effect is a proliferation of Service Engineered Mods which breach, in every way, the rules governing them. Another is unofficial repair schemes that cannot be verified. In other words, the system seems hostile to what you are trying to achieve, and you spend your valuable time chasing things that should be there for you, automatically. The root cause is failure to answer, honestly, one simple question. You won’t find the MAA lobbying for this systemic failure to be corrected, because any such request would be admitting WHO was to blame, and would implicate a series of Ministers as they have consistently ruled that DGSM’s threat of 1992 was perfectly in order.

The regs say you SHALL NOT proceed unless adequate provision is made. THAT is the reg we are so often instructed to ignore. Failure to implement it actually costs time and money. Getting it right, first time, was a basic competence one used to have to demonstrate before being promoted to the most junior MoD(PE) posts. Nowadays, there may, just, be a handful in DE&S who could explain this. But NONE could show you the policy directive or the mandated procedures one follows. Correct that, and extend it to SIs, and almost every accident we speak of would have been avoided.

Rigga

12th Nov 2012, 18:49

Dragartist said:
"It is no good bashing the MAA. They don’t make decisions or sign anything off. They will not be before any BoI to answer any failings."

Oh yes they will. And they should be covering the recent certification trials of A330 and any other introduction of new types into the MOD Fleets.

The Spanish MAA certified the A330 as a generic type, but it should now be re-certified to the UK specification and that (costly?) certification should be signed off by the UK MAA meaning that the type has met all the required UK specifications and is airworthy.

The MAA can't have a choice in this as they must meet (or exceed) EASA standards and requirements before operating the A330 in their full capacity (or, I assume, pay AirTanker penalty fees as failing to meet a deal/contract)

dragartist

12th Nov 2012, 20:39

Rigga, I only left at Christmas, have they added another signature block to the front page of the GARP RTS? I saw many changes in my time, perhaps I took my eye off the ball during the last round where the DH focus came to the fore.

My last rant got me thinking. I picked up on this phrase "three strikes and your out" from one of you. I wonderd what role our professional body and the Engineering Council make take in this. Do they ever stike people off like the Medical Council do. perhaps I should have a word with the Chairman of our Professional Standards Board when I see him next.

I was not supported by my IPTL when I exposed the weakness of an individual who was providing us with Airworthiness Advice. I almost went to the Engineering Council to ensure this guy really was a C Eng. He had written enough stuff to hang himself. I would have had him struck off. The point is he is still around I was on my way out by then anyway. Anything for an easy life.

The point is that there are still people that are not taking this seriously and those with Authority to change things are not doing. They don't appear to have the juristiction to hire and fire people or firing people is too difficult. not the case at the BBC!!!

tucumseh

13th Nov 2012, 06:47

I almost went to the Engineering Council to ensure this guy really was a C Eng.

A CEng doesn't guarantee anything, as I'm sure you found out! As far as I recall, there isn't a requirement for integrity, honesty, objectivity, impartiality and efficiency to be awarded one. Any one of those attributes would have been sufficient to prevent the systemic failures. After all, one of the main perpetrators has FEng FIMechE after his name.

Engines

13th Nov 2012, 08:03

Guys,

I think there are important points here that could be usefully discussed.

The first is to get clarity over the role and functions of the MAA. Their website usefully gives the following statement:

Part of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the MAA is an independent and autonomous organization responsible for the regulation, surveillance, inspection and assurance of the Defence Air operating and technical domains. It ensures the safe design and use of military air systems. As the single regulatory authority responsible for regulating all aspects of Air Safety across Defence, the MAA has full oversight of all Defence aviation activity.

So, it regulates, surveys, inspects and assures. It also 'ensures' the safe design and use of military air systems. And it has full 'oversight'. So, if it is 'ensuring' safe design, and issuing Military Type Certificates (MTCs), then they are, by my reckoning, 'certifying' safe design - which must make them potentially accountable if a design is subsequently found to be deficient.

However, the MAA publications also state:

The MAA remains, however, independent of the acquisition, operation
and capability delivery areas of military aviation. This is achieved through the establishment and maintenance of an appropriate regulatory framework that is given effect by certification, approvals and inspection processes extending across the acquisition, operation and continuing airworthiness domains within the Military Air Environment. Independent surveillance of relevant departmental
planning and programming processes is also used to support the assurance process.

So, my take is that the MAA is treading a fine line between being a regulator, surveyor and assurance authority, and a full up 'certification and approvals authority'.

That means, I reckon, that organisations such as DE&S and the FLCs, acting as Duty Holders, still retain full accountability for their activities, and that is as it should be. But if MAA issue an MTC, or provide an approval for a modification (as their own regs require them to do for, say, armament systems, then they have to be accountable for that 'approval'.

It's also interesting that the term 'Air Safety' has been defined as follows:

Air Safety is the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons, or damage, throughout the life cycle of military air systems. Its purview extends across all Defence Lines of Development and includes Airworthiness, Flight Safety, Policy, Regulation and the apportionment of Resources. It does not address survivability in a hostile environment.

The same publication also introduces a new definition of 'airworthiness'. It's interesting (and I think sensible) that Air Safety excludes operation in hostile environments. But the exclusion does open up some issues on how a design's 'fitness for purpose' is to be assessed. (Tuc makes excellent points on this one).

The hopeful thing that I draw from this lot is that the MAA is not taking over the world. PTs in the DE&S are still just as accountable as they ever were for their actions and their products. As I've posted before, in support of Tuc and others, the key to safe and effective air systems is professional delivery of projects to the front line. People need to do their jobs, drawing of collective experience, firm leadership and a good set of regulations.

That last one is where I do have some concerns. The MAA regulatory set is, in some important areas, deficient. In many areas, it is just a 'cut and paste' of what was already a badly damaged set of standards and regs, and there are some nasty gaps that need filling. The best way is for those that find them to let the MAA know as soon as possible. Hopefully, the chains of command can facilitate that.

For my part, I'd like to see the MAA aligned with other MoD Safety regulators, who have done a good job over the years, headed by a 2 star and reporting into the Defence Safety Board. I don't think this would damage their 'independence'. (For example, while Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance (CINO) was definitely part of the Navy, they always operated in an extremely independent way - the same went for the old Ordnance Board).

The thing that, in my view, really hazards MAA's independence is by drawing their leaders from the same organisations that they also regulate. Having given this some thought, I think MAA should be headed by a suitably qualified (non-MoD) civilian, preferably from a safety related background.

I know that many will disagree with these ideas, but, hey, that's the idea of a forum.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

tucumseh

13th Nov 2012, 09:31

Engines

Excellent, as ever.

One point I’d make is that MoD don’t approve designs, they accept them. This places huge emphasis on the selection and approval of Contractors who approve designs. Generally, this works fine. (e.g. the DAOS scheme).

But if we examine the criteria Contractors are examined against before being approved, MoD is actually responsible for providing important services, or facilitating them. For example (I’m quoting from the regs that were issued after the Crown Proceedings Act Sect 10 was repealed);

12 e. “The ability to investigate and remedy design defects or service faults”.

A Contractor may be perfectly capable of doing this; it was seldom, if ever, the problem. I came across one example (on Secondary Transponders) and promptly sacked the PDSO at the company. (Oh yes, MoD have that power, but seldom use it and, anyway, have scrapped the Def Stan that outlines it. Believe me, it is – or was – a powerful weapon). The problem was that the RAF Chief Engineer decided, in 1991, to slash the funding for the necessary contracts and instructed Engineering Authorities that, under pain of death, they SHALL NOT raise MF760As (request for Fault Investigation). And, MoD Technical Agencies (named MoD individual responsible for delivering maintained build standard, safety case etc) shall NOT waste money on investigations. The result, of course, was while Contractors were desperate to do this work and avoid accidents, MoD was seen to be actively preventing them from doing so. This is not unrelated to BAeS's performance on the Nimrod Safety Case. The fact is, if you're not contracted to do something, you'll soon go bankrupt if you carry on doing it.

This “defect” and “fault” business also raises the concept of integrity, honesty, etc I mentioned above. Very few in MoD know the difference between a defect and a fault. From MoD’s viewpoint, a Fault Investigation is essentially a technical process. But to MoD a Defect Investigation is essentially a commercial exercise, but requiring the Technical Agency or Quality Assurance Officer to act as front man. MoD don’t “do” TAs or QAOs (especially Resident officers) these days.

The practical test of a good Contractor is his performance when conducting a Defect Investigation, when by definition he is being asked to criticise his own design or workmanship.

Shades of Chinook ZA721 again! (DASH Actuator and Aft LCT). Crap Quality Control at Contractors, but conveniently ignored to avoid upsetting them. (Evidence raised, but not explored, at the ZD576 BoI). The resultant recommended design changes had still not been implemented in October 1993, which was one reason why Boscombe stated the Mk1 and Mk2 were not airworthy.

As I’ve said, the system, it’s regulations, processes, procedures and their implementation were all perfectly adequate (although in need of updating) – until a small cadre of VSOs decided to ignore them. Nothing the MAA is doing would have prevented the latter culture.

threeputt

13th Nov 2012, 09:36

Just had this emailed to me. I retired 7 years ago after a 40 year career in the RAF aviation industry; never ejected, crashed or f****d up. Am I the right man for the job, what do you think?

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3P:ok:

Engines

13th Nov 2012, 09:47

Tuc,

Yes, absolutely right - it's the DA who 'approve' designs, MoD accepts - my apologies for any confusion.

The supervision and control of contractors is a key point, and you are right to raise it. Current PMs have had their hands tied by the sort of stuff you describe, but at the end of the day, they chair the PDRs and CDRs and have the power to call the contractor to account. The problem is that to do so you need be be technically well equipped.

On my recent project in was lucky - I had an absolutely outstanding Chief Tech who acted as my Tech lead and worked with the contractor to get the design right. I was also helped by a good set of requirements, thanks to valuable help from Dstl and QinetiQ.

At the end of the day, you need the confidence (and mutual trust) to work with the contractor to get the right result. Again, I was lucky, I had an excellent prime - Agusta Westland. They don't get the credit they should at times. And I had an equally excellent system integrator - Selex. Again, British and excellent.

Your points about defect and fault investigations are again well made - the new MAA occurrence reporting system hasn't really helped much, and as ever the onus is on the PMs to make sure that any faults are properly reported, assigned the proper hazard assessment and then worked through the system. I do have concerns that the 'organisational trauma' that Haddon-Cave did a good job of exposing is still happening, especially at the 'safety coal face'. There is a tendency to look to 'the Safety Manager' to do a lot of the stuff that a standard Engineering Authority SO2 used to do.

Safety should be an integral part of everything that aviation people do. It should be as natural as breathing and walking around. It should be happening all the time. The MAA is doing what it can to reinforce that culture, but at the end of the day, my own view is that a successful safety culture will only take root when managers at the 'coal face' level, and by that I mean SO1 and SO2, take charge and drive their staffs accordingly.

Best Regards as ever to all those out there trying to do the right things,

Engines

Best Regards as ever

Engines

tucumseh

13th Nov 2012, 10:25

3Phttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

If you take up the post you'll soon be

4P:{

thefodfather

13th Nov 2012, 14:00

The question of defect and fault investigations is an interesting one and in many cases something that started off being reported as an Occurrence Report would historically have then been upgraded. This of course assumes that the reporting culture exists for the reports to be raised in the first place, investigated correctly and then escalted accordingly.

Having been away for a few days, I'll quickly come to my earlier discussion with Chug. Whilst I see totally see your point of view concerning independance (and the fundamental nature of the chicken vs egg scenario), I worry that the independance argument sometimes takes over the point on what the MAA actual does. The MAA is organisational where it is and the debate about what it can achieve given its current organisational situation is interesting in itself.

As for the point about being out of date, that wasn't my point. Only by merging the experience/ lessons learnt from the past with some modern approaches to SMS etc can the best future be achieved. We are both right, and the best bits of both our thoughts would be the best of both worlds.

Just This Once...

13th Nov 2012, 17:25

threeputt:

Just had this emailed to me. I retired 7 years ago after a 40 year career in the RAF aviation industry; never ejected, crashed or f****d up. Am I the right man for the job, what do you think?

I've known you for a number of years so you would get my vote!

dragartist

13th Nov 2012, 21:06

Thanx Tuc, So my observation was about right.There does not appear to be much Honesty and integrity around the bazars anymore. let us hope that the people who really need to take the temperature of the water read this forum and consider their positions and actions a little more seriously.

Don't get me going on F760s, Faults and Defects on this thread. My Prime wanted me done for treason almost when I started getting other agencies to invesigate his faults. You see it was a good income stream to him and employed a full time staff against my PDS budget. Absolutly no incentive to get it right as more often than not they would get paid again for investigating the fault, devising a fix and rolling out a mod. My Commercial team just rolled over and let them tickle their tums. The arguments I had over liability for design faults!!!

Pleased to hear of the good experiences with Agusta Westland and Selex but it really would be good if we could bring back the AEDITs in the original form before they became the subsitute SRIM design agencies.

I really am enjoying some of the articles on here and being amongst like minded people

tucumseh

13th Nov 2012, 21:48

dragartist

You see it was a good income stream to him and employed a full time staff against my PDS budget.

Your PDS Officer (PDSO) at the Design Authority is an MoD appointee. The Company propose him to you (or the TA), you approve the appointment. If he ***** up, or otherwise tries it on, you withdraw the appointment.

The main reason for this unique situation is that PDSOs are granted financial delegation to commit MoD money, up to a stated limit, to initiate fault investigations; thus avoiding the admin lead time. The underlying reason is safety. You have to be able to trust PDSOs implicitly.

It sounds like your commercial people have been brainwashed by the oft stated nonsense that only commercial can commit MoD to contract. Point the above out to them and tell them to wind it in.

All the best

Chugalug2

14th Nov 2012, 10:56

Fodfather:
Chug. Whilst I see totally see your point of view concerning independance (and the fundamental nature of the chicken vs egg scenario), I worry that the independance argument sometimes takes over the point on what the MAA actual does. The MAA is organisational where it is and the debate about what it can achieve given its current organisational situation is interesting in itself.
Interesting perhaps, tff, but aren't we about something rather more than interesting? 62 people have died in airworthiness related fatal accidents featured in this forum alone. Proof positive has been published in the link posted above by tuc of unlawful interference in the airworthiness process by RAF VSOs preceding those deaths. That unlawful interference was possible because the airworthiness regulations were subject to their subversion. No matter how strenuously the MAA proclaims itself to be independent, while it is part of the MOD it is still prone to such interference. I see no point in rearranging the deck chairs while the helm can still be accessed by those with a fatal attraction for icebergs. Independence is the sine qua non if we wish to truly avoid needless loss of life and materiel. Then and only then should the interesting ways of how to go about that be entered upon and, make no mistake, I agree that process of complete reform is long overdue.

thefodfather

14th Nov 2012, 14:05

Again, I do see your point. But at the moment, and for the forseeable future, it isn't independent. Given that to be the case, how can the deckchairs be re-arranged to achieve the best possible outcome. Despite the failings of the past, I hope (and believe) that the situation is very different now and that such a situation could not occur in the same way again. Surely what matters is to do the right thing, not to appear to do the right thing.

By that I mean that physical independance for an authority or an investigation body can be achieved without actually happening in reality.

tucumseh

14th Nov 2012, 14:32

Fodfather

I’m afraid the reality, based on what was said at the MAA conference and in formal briefings to Ministers (which became official answers to PQs), the MAA (and D/Air Staffs and their retired predecessors in particular, which some would say is essentially the same thing at a senior level) remain in a state of denial over key points.

In summary, they perpetuate the notion that XV230 was a one-off (i.e. there were no systemic failures) and that this failure had its root in something (unspecified) that occurred in 1998. In maintaining this stance, they completely ignore verified and irrefutable evidence that has not only been submitted to inquiries and published, but was literally stuck under their nose by one Minister. Given the officer in question at that meeting is well known for his integrity and competence, I can only imagine the conflicts that exist within the MAA and MoD. I sincerely hope the appointment of ACM North brings an openness and honesty which has hitherto obviously been frowned upon.

Engines

14th Nov 2012, 16:17

Tuc and Others,

What I'm going to say here might attract some flak, but the point of this forum is to air a range of views for people to think about and comment on on. So here goes....

First, let me be clear. If personnel (senior, junior, or of any colour uniform) have acted in a way so as to cause the deaths of serving personnel, they should be pursued in all ways possible - as I've said before, the law may be the only recourse. The 'court of public opinion' is not sufficiently bothered, and the 'court of political opinion' is sewn up by the same people who may have been party to those same actions.

But I am becoming less convinced that pursuing those who made those errors before 1998 is an essential precondition to achieving a safe and effective 'Air Safety environment' to use the MAA term. Let me repeat - they should be exposed and if necessary prosecuted. What I think the 'system' (and by that I mean the key players - FLCs, Duty Holders, DE&S, contractors, and the MAA) must do now is move to a solid and sensible set of regulations backed up by a good assurance system, which are then fully implemented and used by all the players.

My first concern that the current MAA regulations are not sufficiently 'right', given the time and expense incurred in preparing them. There are too many gaps, errors and omissions, (e.g. duties of the RTSA) while in some areas there is a proliferation of 'process' at the expense of common sense. That can be fixed, but the MAA need to realise that it needs doing.

My second concern is that organisations like DE&S have been too badly 'hollowed out' of experience and leadership (not, by the way, resources) to reliably implement a good regulation set. They've lost a lot of experienced people (like Tuc) and also lost a lot of their 'shared corporate memory' that helps younger PMs to avoid going wrong. This one can't be easily fixed, and I'm coming round to the idea that a 'GOCO' (Govt Owned Contractor Operated) model ( as being pursued by Hammond) may be the only real way forward.

My final concern is that a culture of 'schedule first and schedule only' has taken root in some areas, so that PMs who want to do the right thing are bullied (and I use that term with some care and deliberation) into doing things that are plain wrong. Tuc has provided many examples of this, and I'm sorry to say that it is still around. (Happens in industry too by the way). Brave leadership at the middle levels is needed here.

I have said in clear that I think an MoD owned MAA is probably the best way forward, in that the MoD has a duty to properly regulate and oversee its safety management organisations, and it needs something like the MAA to do that. (Sorry, Chug) The MAA should, however, be aligned with other MoD safety management organisations (Nuclear, DOSG) and cut down to a two star head so that it doesn't go off and become a very senior staffed self licking lollipop.

Finally, I think that the current systems for oversight of the MAA are too cosy, in that too many of the people concerned are of one service, and have shared cultures, aims and objectives, not to say backgrounds. That is where I'd aim to add in some true 'independence' by use of a truly 'outside' body to moderate and examine the MAA on a regular basis.

Again, for the avoidance of doubt. I absolutely support bringing those who deliberately broke the rules to book. But I think that the time may have come to separate that from the effort now needed to move forward and build the system that our people at the front line deserve.

And with that, I think I'm done - but happy to respond (via PMs or the thread) if anyone thinks these comments worth discussion.

Never forgetting the young and quite excellent people actually doing the business day and night out there

Engines

Chugalug2

14th Nov 2012, 16:21

TFF:
Surely what matters is to do the right thing, not to appear to do the right thing.
By that I mean that physical independance for an authority or an investigation body can be achieved without actually happening in reality.
I completely agree with your first sentence,FF, but am completely mystified by the second. Could you please expand on that as I'm sure that we would all like to know how such a seemingly contradictory idea could ever work. When I was a Squadron FSO I drew comfort from the oft repeated notion that the FS system was entirely separate from the CoC. What a false sense of security that was, given the disasters that beset it in later years.
You are possibly right when you say:
...that such a situation could not occur in the same way again.
Unfortunately though it is still possible for it to happen again, just not in exactly the same way. Evolution is the key to survival. If UK Military Airworthiness is to survive it needs to change to avoid unlawful interference. It needs to be independent. What happened in the past has to be faced up to. If it is not, then the MAA is based on a lie and still subject to subversion. Scarcely the basis for starting out:
to do the right thing, not to appear to do the right thing.

tucumseh

14th Nov 2012, 18:38

Engines

But I am becoming less convinced that pursuing those who made those errors before 1998 is an essential precondition to achieving a safe and effective 'Air Safety environment' to use the MAA term. Let me repeat - they should be exposed and if necessary prosecuted. I totally agree. What concerns me most is the mentality of those VSOs who, despite knowing that the failures commenced over 10 years previously, supported Haddon-Cave to knowingly name and shame the wrong (MoD) people and said nothing. And continue to do so.

Furthermore, the same serving and retired VSOs permitted and perpetuated vindictive and false accusations against both Service pilots and civilian staffs.

In the interests of natural justice, I’d like to see them publicly exposed; but more importantly the wrongly accused publicly exonerated. MoD HAS to get rid of this culture, and that MUST mean identifying the weeds and killing them off. But, as you say, this should not distract the MAA.

But the problem we face is that the MAA/MoD and Haddon-Cave publicly support the guilty, and they cite this support at every turn. They are not “honourable men”, as Liam Fox was briefed to say. They are despicable and utterly dishonourable. It is not a case of them not being named, while other guilty men were.

General Sir Sam Cowan, for example, was 100% innocent of the charges laid against him. Haddon-Cave had irrefutable evidence, in the form of both external and internal reports, that Cowan’s predecessors (especially the 4 AMSOs/AMLs from 1985-96) were actually guilty of the charges laid against Cowan, to a degree unimaginable to the layman. (Read the critique of the HEART report. The quite deliberate waste, of hundreds of millions in a year or so, was criminal). That is, Cowan was criticised for allegedly cutting support funding by 5% per year for 4 years; but no evidence was presented this affected airworthiness in any way. Yet, Haddon-Cave refused to publish the evidence that AMSOs made 28% cuts per year for 3 years, directly targeting airworthiness. And that these cuts were cited in internal MoD audit reports in 1992 and 1996 as savings at the expense of safety. Haddon-Cave used the catchphrase, but protected the guilty.

I think it absolutely essential the MAA acknowledge these facts. THAT is an essential precondition to them moving forward effectively. I would cite two main reasons. First, MAA staff MUST understand what it is they are trying to correct. Some may know what they are trying to achieve in simple terms, but they need to know how they got where they are in order to truly understand. Secondly, the systematic rundown of airworthiness means, by definition, legacy aircraft fleets are, to a greater or lesser extent, lacking. Regression is necessary to plug the gaps in, for example, Safety Case audit trails. How far are the MAA regressing? 14 years it seems, to 1998. The problem is that leaves (at least) an 11 year gap from 1987 to 1998. They are totally ignoring, for example, the Chief of Defence Procurement’s own admission to the Public Accounts Committee in 1999 that the systemic failures (i.e. not just Chinook) noted in the 1992 CHART report remain extant. If they don’t get that baseline right, then how can they bid for sufficient funding?