Centaurus
24th Jun 2012, 09:56
Pprune readers may remember the Air Disaster series of books first published in 1994 by the Australian author Macarthur Job. The illustrator was Martin Tesch and his graphic drawings were proof of the adage “A picture is worth a thousand words.”
Recently I was browsing Air Disaster Volume 2; the first chapter being about a DC-9 of Southern Airways (USA) that penetrated a severe thunderstorm that caused both engines to flame-out. As you can image the crew worked feverishly to get the engines started and during the many exchanges between them and ATC, one particular call chilled me. It was from the DC9 and the pilot said: “All right, listen – we’ve lost both engines and…I can’t tell you the implication of this…we’ve…only got two engines.”
Hail had caused severe damage to the engines and the crew were unable to re-start them. The aircraft forced landed on a road and was destroyed with the loss of 60 lives. That was in April 1977, the same year that I first flew the Boeing 737 which had similar Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines. Hence, the close interest on the reason for the flameouts taken by pilots of our airline. In those days the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) did not include a checklist that covered loss of both engines. While there have been cases where fuel exhaustion has caused flame-outs in jet engines, the purpose of this article is to discuss weather related flame-outs. Impending fuel exhaustion will normally give the crew time to prepare for an engine failure, but it’s a different story when heavy rain often encountered in a thunderstorm, may cause a flameout. If that happens without warning, then it may well be the professional skill on the part of both pilots that makes the difference between disaster and survival.
The most recent example of a double flameout was in January 2009 when a successful dead stick ditching made into the Hudson River New York, by Captain B. Sullenberger flying an A320. Both engines failed due to bird ingestion shortly after take off and severe engine damage prevented successful relights.
Other examples of dual engine failures caused by thunderstorm penetration include an Air Europe B737-300 in 1987 and TACA Airline Boeing 737 in 1988. In the latter the aircraft encountered heavy rain and turbulence at 16,000 feet on descent. Although the APU was started at 10,000ft and both engines relit, they would not accelerate. Advancing the throttles resulted in overheating of both engines so they were shut down to avoid catastrophic failure. The aircraft was successfully forced landed.
In January 2002, a Garuda Indonesia Boeing 737-300 inadvertently penetrated a thunderstorm cell with tops measured at 63,000ft. Both engines flamed out. Efforts to start the APU failed because unknown to the crew the aircraft battery was defective. The aircraft became clear of cloud at 8000 ft enabling the crew to conduct a no electrical power, no flaps and landing gear up ditching into a river. With a touchdown speed of 190 knots it was a miracle only one person was killed. A representative of the engine manufacturer told the investigators it would be very hard to relight an engine if the aircraft was in still in extremely heavy rain which had caused the flameout in the first place. Adverse weather and a decrease in engine rotational speed could induce more water into the engine core. Such attempts to re-start the engine would be unsuccessful. In the case of the Garuda 737 it was found the aircraft had experienced rain more than ten times the maximum tested used for certification.
Many operators meet operational regulatory requirements by cyclic training. Each non-normal checklist must be tested at least once every three years since it is not practical to cover every emergency procedure on one or two simulator sessions. Loss of both engines is one such sequence to be tested. In the case of the Boeing 737, the QRH Loss of all Engines checklist covers six pages including the first four items known as Memory Items. Pilots are expected to have a sound working knowledge of these non-normal checklists – not just the few items that constitute the immediate memory items. From simulator experience it is clear that some crews cannot be bothered to study the QRH contents unless they are coming up for a simulator session. Even then the subjects to be covered in the next simulator session are usually well known beforehand and pilots have been known to simply concentrate on only those specific subjects to be tested. Often pilots take an inordinate time to even find the required pages in the QRH and this is primarily because they are lazy in their professional duties.
Engine flameouts caused by inadvertent penetration into extremely heavy rain inside a super-cell thunderstorm are rare. Sometimes defective weather radar or lack of knowledge by the crew of optimum radar settings, can lead into flight through a severe storm. In the case of the Garuda Boeing 737 flameout mentioned previously, investigators discovered the aircraft radome had been damaged in earlier weeks and the damage remained unrectified. This reduced the radar beam efficiency to such a degree as to be virtually useless. Over many years defective weather radar was a common complaint by general aviation pilots in Australia. This was particularly noticeable in turbo-prop freight aircraft cruising in the medium altitude levels. Leaking seals or pin-hole size cracks characteristic of a poorly maintained radome, allowed moisture to freeze inside the radome, drastically affecting radar range efficiency. For various reasons, pilots seemed reluctant to write up the snags.
One thing is for sure. A dual flameout in adverse weather is no laughing matter. It does not help if the crew waste valuable time trying to find the right pages in the QRH while the aircraft is gliding in turbulence at 2000 feet per minute in a thunderstorm. Leaving the study of the QRH and associated operational manuals only when the next cyclic simulator session is due, is certainly not the wisest decision and displays a slack professional attitude.
Enough said of the grim stuff. Allow me to finish off with the story of an RAAF Lincoln bomber that in 1955 lost all four engines over the Arafura Sea at night. The captain was Flight Lieutenant Rick Tate. In later years he became a DCA Examiner of Airmen based at Moorabbin. Ppruners of that vintage would remember him well and with great affection. Here is the story as it happened:
On 29th May 1955, our crew took part in an anti-submarine exercise in the Arafura Sea. On board that night were navigators Warren Agnew, Ash Clarke and Len McTaggert. Peter Hays was second pilot, while Alf Harrison, Des Barratt, John Nicholson, Nat Thompson and John Edmonds were the signallers. With the exception of Warren "Bunny"Agnew, we were all non-commissioned officers (NCO's). Bunny had previously flown in Beaufighters on operations against Japanese forces in Timor during the war.
Two RAN submarines and three frigates also took part in the exercise which was code named Operation Anzex. Our job was to hunt the submarines, while their job was to attack a convoy of ships escorted by the frigates. Our search pattern took us within 50 miles of Timor.
There were several Lincolns involved, one of which was flown by Flight Lieutenant Ricky Tate. These aircraft were equipped with additional fuel tanks in the bomb bay, giving the aircraft 14 hours endurance. These bomb bay tanks required fancy plumbing and it was the job of the duty signaller to keep an eye on the fuel tank contents gauges. He would then manipulate the various cross-feed cocks under the wing spar near his radio operator position. On this occasion, due to an oversight by the ground staff at Darwin, and unknown to the crew, the bomb bay tanks had not been filled.
Students undergoing RAAF pilot training at No 1 Advanced Flying Training School at Point Cook were taught to avoid changing fuel tanks when flying on low level (200 ft) cross-country flights. Good airmanship dictated a climb to at least 1500 feet before changing fuel cocks to a fresh tank. This would give more time to cope with any engine failure caused by air in the fuel lines, or simply because of faulty fuel cock selection. For this reason at midnight during the anti-submarine patrol, Ricky Tate increased power to the four engines and climbed from 500 feet to 1500 feet prior to fuel transfer from the bomb bay tanks. The duty signaller was then directed by the captain to commence fuel feed from the bomb bay tanks. This was done by switching on the high pressure fuel pump switches situated on the cockpit wall behind the navigator. These switches were out of reach of the pilot.
Shortly afterwards one engine stopped, quickly followed by the remaining three engines. Tate called that all four engines had failed and ordered his crew to take up ditching stations. Meanwhile the Lincoln had rapidly become a 30 ton glider and began to lose height towards the sea. Sergeant Jim Chataway (the second pilot), who had been on rest next to the signaller, leapt to his feet and headed for the cockpit where Rick Tate was preparing for ditching. There was no checklist or QRH to cover four engines failing at once.
Behind the pilot was the navigator and radar operator positions. The radar screen is viewed from under a canvas cover similar to that used by photographers in the old days. Ray Parkin was the radar operator and as he attempted to take up ditching positions he found his face being un-ceremoniously pushed into the radar screen by Chataway's size 10 boot. The signaller meanwhile tapped out a fast Mayday on HF with his morse key.
Chataway managed to turn off the high pressure fuel pump switches situated out of reach of the captain. Meanwhile Rick Tate while still hand flying, attempted to re-start the engines. Once the fuel pump switches were turned off, each engine slowly came back to life - the last one at 500 feet above the waves. No one knew why the engines had failed and it was a relieved crew that finally touched down at Darwin two hours later. An inquiry revealed that the two bomb bay fuel tank contents gauges were unserviceable with their needles stuck at full. When the ground staff went to fill the fuel tanks prior to the flight they first checked the fuel gauges in the cockpit. On seeing that both tanks indicated full capacity, they decided the tanks must have already been filled. In fact, both tanks were empty, and the engines had failed when air from these tanks was drawn into the fuel system by the high pressure pumps.
The wise precaution by the captain to gain height before switching fuel tanks, almost certainly saved the aircraft from the perils of a black night ditching. Nearly 60 years later, for the crew of a jet transport experiencing a simultaneous failure of all engines, good knowledge of the QRH might also do the trick and save aircraft and passengers from disaster. It is worth thinking about
Recently I was browsing Air Disaster Volume 2; the first chapter being about a DC-9 of Southern Airways (USA) that penetrated a severe thunderstorm that caused both engines to flame-out. As you can image the crew worked feverishly to get the engines started and during the many exchanges between them and ATC, one particular call chilled me. It was from the DC9 and the pilot said: “All right, listen – we’ve lost both engines and…I can’t tell you the implication of this…we’ve…only got two engines.”
Hail had caused severe damage to the engines and the crew were unable to re-start them. The aircraft forced landed on a road and was destroyed with the loss of 60 lives. That was in April 1977, the same year that I first flew the Boeing 737 which had similar Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines. Hence, the close interest on the reason for the flameouts taken by pilots of our airline. In those days the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) did not include a checklist that covered loss of both engines. While there have been cases where fuel exhaustion has caused flame-outs in jet engines, the purpose of this article is to discuss weather related flame-outs. Impending fuel exhaustion will normally give the crew time to prepare for an engine failure, but it’s a different story when heavy rain often encountered in a thunderstorm, may cause a flameout. If that happens without warning, then it may well be the professional skill on the part of both pilots that makes the difference between disaster and survival.
The most recent example of a double flameout was in January 2009 when a successful dead stick ditching made into the Hudson River New York, by Captain B. Sullenberger flying an A320. Both engines failed due to bird ingestion shortly after take off and severe engine damage prevented successful relights.
Other examples of dual engine failures caused by thunderstorm penetration include an Air Europe B737-300 in 1987 and TACA Airline Boeing 737 in 1988. In the latter the aircraft encountered heavy rain and turbulence at 16,000 feet on descent. Although the APU was started at 10,000ft and both engines relit, they would not accelerate. Advancing the throttles resulted in overheating of both engines so they were shut down to avoid catastrophic failure. The aircraft was successfully forced landed.
In January 2002, a Garuda Indonesia Boeing 737-300 inadvertently penetrated a thunderstorm cell with tops measured at 63,000ft. Both engines flamed out. Efforts to start the APU failed because unknown to the crew the aircraft battery was defective. The aircraft became clear of cloud at 8000 ft enabling the crew to conduct a no electrical power, no flaps and landing gear up ditching into a river. With a touchdown speed of 190 knots it was a miracle only one person was killed. A representative of the engine manufacturer told the investigators it would be very hard to relight an engine if the aircraft was in still in extremely heavy rain which had caused the flameout in the first place. Adverse weather and a decrease in engine rotational speed could induce more water into the engine core. Such attempts to re-start the engine would be unsuccessful. In the case of the Garuda 737 it was found the aircraft had experienced rain more than ten times the maximum tested used for certification.
Many operators meet operational regulatory requirements by cyclic training. Each non-normal checklist must be tested at least once every three years since it is not practical to cover every emergency procedure on one or two simulator sessions. Loss of both engines is one such sequence to be tested. In the case of the Boeing 737, the QRH Loss of all Engines checklist covers six pages including the first four items known as Memory Items. Pilots are expected to have a sound working knowledge of these non-normal checklists – not just the few items that constitute the immediate memory items. From simulator experience it is clear that some crews cannot be bothered to study the QRH contents unless they are coming up for a simulator session. Even then the subjects to be covered in the next simulator session are usually well known beforehand and pilots have been known to simply concentrate on only those specific subjects to be tested. Often pilots take an inordinate time to even find the required pages in the QRH and this is primarily because they are lazy in their professional duties.
Engine flameouts caused by inadvertent penetration into extremely heavy rain inside a super-cell thunderstorm are rare. Sometimes defective weather radar or lack of knowledge by the crew of optimum radar settings, can lead into flight through a severe storm. In the case of the Garuda Boeing 737 flameout mentioned previously, investigators discovered the aircraft radome had been damaged in earlier weeks and the damage remained unrectified. This reduced the radar beam efficiency to such a degree as to be virtually useless. Over many years defective weather radar was a common complaint by general aviation pilots in Australia. This was particularly noticeable in turbo-prop freight aircraft cruising in the medium altitude levels. Leaking seals or pin-hole size cracks characteristic of a poorly maintained radome, allowed moisture to freeze inside the radome, drastically affecting radar range efficiency. For various reasons, pilots seemed reluctant to write up the snags.
One thing is for sure. A dual flameout in adverse weather is no laughing matter. It does not help if the crew waste valuable time trying to find the right pages in the QRH while the aircraft is gliding in turbulence at 2000 feet per minute in a thunderstorm. Leaving the study of the QRH and associated operational manuals only when the next cyclic simulator session is due, is certainly not the wisest decision and displays a slack professional attitude.
Enough said of the grim stuff. Allow me to finish off with the story of an RAAF Lincoln bomber that in 1955 lost all four engines over the Arafura Sea at night. The captain was Flight Lieutenant Rick Tate. In later years he became a DCA Examiner of Airmen based at Moorabbin. Ppruners of that vintage would remember him well and with great affection. Here is the story as it happened:
On 29th May 1955, our crew took part in an anti-submarine exercise in the Arafura Sea. On board that night were navigators Warren Agnew, Ash Clarke and Len McTaggert. Peter Hays was second pilot, while Alf Harrison, Des Barratt, John Nicholson, Nat Thompson and John Edmonds were the signallers. With the exception of Warren "Bunny"Agnew, we were all non-commissioned officers (NCO's). Bunny had previously flown in Beaufighters on operations against Japanese forces in Timor during the war.
Two RAN submarines and three frigates also took part in the exercise which was code named Operation Anzex. Our job was to hunt the submarines, while their job was to attack a convoy of ships escorted by the frigates. Our search pattern took us within 50 miles of Timor.
There were several Lincolns involved, one of which was flown by Flight Lieutenant Ricky Tate. These aircraft were equipped with additional fuel tanks in the bomb bay, giving the aircraft 14 hours endurance. These bomb bay tanks required fancy plumbing and it was the job of the duty signaller to keep an eye on the fuel tank contents gauges. He would then manipulate the various cross-feed cocks under the wing spar near his radio operator position. On this occasion, due to an oversight by the ground staff at Darwin, and unknown to the crew, the bomb bay tanks had not been filled.
Students undergoing RAAF pilot training at No 1 Advanced Flying Training School at Point Cook were taught to avoid changing fuel tanks when flying on low level (200 ft) cross-country flights. Good airmanship dictated a climb to at least 1500 feet before changing fuel cocks to a fresh tank. This would give more time to cope with any engine failure caused by air in the fuel lines, or simply because of faulty fuel cock selection. For this reason at midnight during the anti-submarine patrol, Ricky Tate increased power to the four engines and climbed from 500 feet to 1500 feet prior to fuel transfer from the bomb bay tanks. The duty signaller was then directed by the captain to commence fuel feed from the bomb bay tanks. This was done by switching on the high pressure fuel pump switches situated on the cockpit wall behind the navigator. These switches were out of reach of the pilot.
Shortly afterwards one engine stopped, quickly followed by the remaining three engines. Tate called that all four engines had failed and ordered his crew to take up ditching stations. Meanwhile the Lincoln had rapidly become a 30 ton glider and began to lose height towards the sea. Sergeant Jim Chataway (the second pilot), who had been on rest next to the signaller, leapt to his feet and headed for the cockpit where Rick Tate was preparing for ditching. There was no checklist or QRH to cover four engines failing at once.
Behind the pilot was the navigator and radar operator positions. The radar screen is viewed from under a canvas cover similar to that used by photographers in the old days. Ray Parkin was the radar operator and as he attempted to take up ditching positions he found his face being un-ceremoniously pushed into the radar screen by Chataway's size 10 boot. The signaller meanwhile tapped out a fast Mayday on HF with his morse key.
Chataway managed to turn off the high pressure fuel pump switches situated out of reach of the captain. Meanwhile Rick Tate while still hand flying, attempted to re-start the engines. Once the fuel pump switches were turned off, each engine slowly came back to life - the last one at 500 feet above the waves. No one knew why the engines had failed and it was a relieved crew that finally touched down at Darwin two hours later. An inquiry revealed that the two bomb bay fuel tank contents gauges were unserviceable with their needles stuck at full. When the ground staff went to fill the fuel tanks prior to the flight they first checked the fuel gauges in the cockpit. On seeing that both tanks indicated full capacity, they decided the tanks must have already been filled. In fact, both tanks were empty, and the engines had failed when air from these tanks was drawn into the fuel system by the high pressure pumps.
The wise precaution by the captain to gain height before switching fuel tanks, almost certainly saved the aircraft from the perils of a black night ditching. Nearly 60 years later, for the crew of a jet transport experiencing a simultaneous failure of all engines, good knowledge of the QRH might also do the trick and save aircraft and passengers from disaster. It is worth thinking about