Today is the 40th anniversary of the crash of G-ARPI, the BEA Trident which crashed shortly after takeoff from Heathrow, apparently because the "droop" was raised too soon after takeoff, causing it to stall.

The crash cost the lives of all 118 on board, including Capt Key and FOs Ticehurst and Keighley.

One of the major outcomes of this crash was that CVRs were mandated afterwards; the lack of cockpit voice recorders made the inquiry significantly more difficult.

Yes, that is how humans learn. Trial and Error. It is good that CVRs were made law. That and, if I recall correctly, the CRM issues on the flight deck are real gifts to the future.

I was in the tower at Glasgow when we received word of this tragedy within minutes of it happening. The thing that got me was the report on the TV news that 'only one garbled transmission was made'. When they played it, it was so clear I could even recognise who the controller was from his voice.

I recall that one of the first on the scene of this disaster was a passing nurse, who to her very great credit managed to gain access to the broken fuselage to see if she could use her nursing experience to help those trapped inside. Sadly, it transpired that the "super-stall" impact, which occurred over an area little bigger than the aircraft's planform due to the low horizontal velocity, was not survivable.

I thought at the time how noble her action was, at potentially great risk to her own life if a fire had broken out in the fully-fuelled aircraft, and in the highest traditions of her calling. I wonder whether some official recognition of her bravery was subsequently made.

603DX. Very, very brave of her, and a serious fire DID break out, whilst the rescue services were there. There is video somewhere of people running from the scene. Sad, sad day.

Remembering Jerry today.

An impossible situation, which terrified me when re-enacted in the sim.

No-one will ever know what happened, but my goodness the total lack of CRM in '72 was dreadful. Never flew with Key, but some of those BEA captains were difficult, to say the least.

My late father was one of the first handful of Police Officers to reach the scene. It was his second air crash scene he'd attended as a PO, having been an early arrival at the scene of the Viking crash at Southall some 14 years earlier. Both were pretty much the only events in 30 years of service, he never really spoke of afterwards.
My mother still vividly recalls the state of his torn, and kerosene soaked uniform when he arrived home late that night after the Trident crash.

Now that I've read this thread I wonder if the TV coverage of the crash is one of my first memories? I'm 42 now so the time frame fits with how a toddler develops. The memory I have is of an image being shown on TV of what I presume was main landing gear laying in a field of grass but I can't recall anything else.

So long ago but still in the memory bank not only for those who died , but the worry and stress of those ground engineers who serviced that aircraft the previous night .

Yes, I remember this crash very well. See this video on You Tube:

British European Airways Flight 548 Crash of a Trident airliner - YouTube (http://tinyurl.com/6pwn9c3)

603DX, The nurse was on BBC London News this evening recalling how two boys came to get her as the plane had crashed nearby. Apparently she was awarded an MBE.

I cleared it for take-off. Low cloud, not very good vis. ATC new little about it until the landlord of the Crooked Billet rang up! Dreadful.

i was a 15 year old school boy that day & saw it go down behind the trees, i was drawn away from my homework by the unusual engine noise, despite feeling the thump my parents said its a lorry passing, had to drag my dad out of the house to prove it & it was only when a neighbour from the house behind came running round because his children in the garden were screaming a planes crashed he believed me and i was despatched to a bridge to get a look , all i could see through the trees was what looked like an intact part of cabin over the wing, by the time i ran/climbed fences the 500 metre's or so to the site police were already on the scene & bodies were being laid out under what i think were tarpualins, my lasting memory was all the blue flashing lights i saw through my bedroom curtains all night and the fact we had to put furniture on our drives to stop the 'ghouls' using it as a car park! next day i cycled down during lunch break & a policeman let us in to take some photo's.

Plenty of stress for other BEA flight crew wondering just what had happened. As a 14 year old I recall many many sad days with a very concerned father spending many hours trying to go through what might have happened; then spending days at the Inquiry listening to evidence. He didn't want his next Trident flight to end up the same way.

avionic type - it wasn't engineering. I am convinced this was flight-crew error.

If you were one of the guys looking after the Tridents, then I have the most profound respect for you. This accident was not the fault of any engineer. Three guys on that flight deck messed-up. Simple as that. One was a friend.

Hard to believe it was forty years ago. I too, have a personal interest in this accident. Simon Ticehurst was a friend of mine.

Three guys on that flight deck messed-up. Simple as that.

Aileron Drag, I disagree with you, it's not simple. A primary factor was the lack of an appropriate baulk mechanism to prevent premature droop retraction. I've often wondered why there were two separate levers, rather than a single flap/droop lever.

I've just discovered that there is a transcribed copy of the report here:

http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/dvdfiles/GB/1972-06-18-UK.pdf

avionic type - it wasn't engineering. I am convinced this was flight-crew error.

If you were one of the guys looking after the Tridents, then I have the most profound respect for you. This accident was not the fault of any engineer. Three guys on that flight deck messed-up. Simple as that. One was a friend.

But none of this was known until months after the accident. Avionic type's post concerned the engineers at the time - terrified that they had stuffed up the night before.

One other thing that sticks in my mind of the coverage at the time was the news reports that traffic chaos built up very quickly in the area with loads of ghouls converging on the scene.

Any engineer who has released an aircraft that subsequently crashed will tell you what it feels like - until it is proved otherwise there is a terrible feeling of 'what did I miss,what did I forget to do?'

Engineers do feel that way. Next week, I am taking the funeral of a retired US Army aeroengine, engineer who served in Vietnam. His widow told me how sometimes they were pressured to sign off a machine quickly but unless he had checked everything - no signature. He knew that if anything went wrong he would have to carry that for all of his life. Not to mention that they would present his signature as proof that the machine was ready.

He worried that newer and younger engineers would not be able to stand up to the pressure from above. Not much changes.

It's very rare for a prang to be 'simple'. If a light single goes in, it might be simple but something like G-ARPI was not simple.

I was told Papa India was the reason BA skipped G-EUPI when they got their A319s. Oddly enough the flight number is still active with flybe, BE548 NWI-EDI.

Groundloop... of the coverage at the time was the news reports that traffic chaos built up very quickly in the area with loads of ghouls converging on the scene.I was not living in the UK when this happened (aged 14) and only know about it through PPRuNe references over the years.

From the report, linked in this thread:
The field was sufficiently inaccessible to prevent all but the most persistent sightseers from reaching it. The police were successful in controlling spectators, and contemporary reports that members of the public had impeded rescue services by their presence near the scene are not borne out by the facts.So there might have been a number of people trying to see but they did not get in the way.

Fortunatly Aileron Drag for me I was on "Days Off" those days but I remember being told that all the people who worked on it that night had their Authorisations removed and they were in limbo until the pre lim report was made known and that too took quite a while, and the thought of " had something I'd done" caused all those deaths was uppermost in their minds . On the up side A few months later after the report was made public, a printout of the whole flight taken from the F.D.R.was shown to the Ground engineers and it was then we realised how good the evidence within the F.D.R.was, as it showed the whole flight from take off to crash including the flap and droop movements . This comprehensive system was fitted to the Trident so that it was an aid to getting the Auto Land System approved by the then A.R.B.

Papa India had been damaged in a previous accident when an Ambassador crashed into it on the ground at Heathrow. It had been repaired and returned to service. I believe this event had no bearing on the Staines crash which seems to have been down to crew error in a different era for CRM and systems fail-safes.
Tragic that lives were lost but the industry learned a good deal which has no doubt saved many lives since then.

I think I mentioned it before on pprune but about 18months after the Papa India crash I watched an Iraqi Trident start dropping from about 100ft after lifting off from RWY 10R at Heathrow. Pulled the wrong lever along with undercarriage retraction , I guess, and rectified just in time. The controller in the Tower noticed though, but only got a mumble from the pilot in response to 'Iraqixxx, are you OK?'

I was told Papa India was the reason BA skipped G-EUPI when they got their A319s.

Yes, I believe that's the case, possibly as a result of criticism ten years previously when a second Whiskey Echo (a 767) was added to the fleet, the original WE (707) having been destroyed in a fatal accident at LHR about 4 years before the Trident disaster.

It wasn't a flight crew error per se.
It was definitely a management - training accident waiting to happen.
The noise abatement proceedure was contrary to the design, test pilot and BofT test pilot philosphies.
This led to the slat lever being unprotected.
The training was WRONG - P2 was taught to dump the push system as it often falsely operated - which generally was incorrect.
There wasn't a stick push proceedure in our manuals.
We weren't even legally qualified - read the argument in the report between the BofT and Holdstock and then ask why none of P2's group were called to the inquiry.
Ask why there is no reference to Davies being at the inquiry in the report -BofT test pilot and author of handling the big jets.
Eight aircraft were lost by the BEA group in six years, Papa India was the second and the first of four Tridents.
Several captains had tried to off load P2s group of co pilots because they rightly believed that they were not sufficiently trained and were threatened with dismissal.
Absolute shambles of a company and if it had not been publicly owned would have ceased to exist.

"Yes, I believe that's the case, possibly as a result of criticism ten years previously when a second Whiskey Echo (a 767) was added to the fleet, the original WE (707) having been destroyed in a fatal accident at LHR about 4 years before the Trident disaster."

Or, if you've got a longer memory, there was G-ALWE, a Viscount that crashed fatally at Manchester in 1957.

Proplinerman,

Did BA ever have another EE (Vanguard crash 1965)?

Yes, both Echo Echo and Echo Charlie (the other Vanguard that crashed in 1971) were re-used on 757s, registered around the same time as the aforesaid 767.

Scarier still, both were "papa echo charlie" and "papa echo echo" with identical last three.

At the time of the PI accident I was working in reservations. As General Sales Agents for BEA we were fielding a lot of telephone calls from locals who feared that friends or relatives might have been on board. Eventually we asked BEA to provide a pax list which they did. The time it took for that list to print out on one of those old teleprinters really brought home to us the magnitude of the tragedy.

I remember it because I had just arrived from Lisbon on another Trident, picked up a rental car and got caught in the traffic at Staines. My wife was waiting at a relative's house and heard about the crash well before I was able to contact her. Harold Wilson expressed his disgust at the legions of "ghouls". Those there were, but there were probably more just stuck in the traffic.

From my own reading, it seems that the traffic congestion was a combination of the relatively undeveloped state of the main roads in the area (mostly single carriageway and quite narrow) and the habit at the time that many families had of taking a drive on a Sunday.

Reading this thread has been very interesting, because despite considerable coverage of the G-ARPI crash in various books I had never before realised either the situation regarding suspicion of the ground engineering staff's actions or indeed that the low hours that Jeremy Keighley possessed on type were at all commonplace at the time.

My own first flight was on a Trident 3B in 1977, as a consequence I have read up on both the Staines and Zagreb incidents and as much else about the Trident as I can.

Did the droop lever on the early mark Tridents ever have a speed guard fitted? I know that there had been several incidents previous to G-ARPI's demise, at least one of which was described as "We just about managed to keep flying until droops were reselected!".

The droop lever was mechanically locked in the 'extend' position while the flap lever was in a 'flaps-selected' position. When the flaps were selected 'up', the droop-baulk was removed.

That was the only lock in place (no speed-lock), so the flaps on PI had been selected fully up before the droop was moved.

After the accident, the company painted the droop handle with red & white stripes (if memory serves), and we all became utterly paranoid about monitoring LE/TE selections!

I don't think there were many ghouls. Undoubtedly some but not in great numbers. Most simply couldn't help it.
The Trident came down just south of the A30, a road I used to use all the time. At that point the road had started to rise in preparation for a railway bridge ahead - although a dual carriageway, there were no laybys and the rise above ground level meant that any parking off the road was difficult. Thus one lane was blocked by emergency vehicles and everything stopped in the other, closely followed by the other carriageway. The view to the south was obscured by trees, so you couldn't see what was going on from a vehicle: over a short space of time the emergency services beat their own paths to the wreckage, so most of the response continued to be via the A30. This was a main route in/out of London - no M25, remember, that arrived a couple of miles away a few years later - so even then the traffic was quite heavy. From the opposite direction (inbound, or eastwards) you were up high enough that the wreckage was visible, although at a distance. The tail was the only recognisable piece: it seemed to be there for some months afterwards. Undamaged electricity cables and pylons virtually overhead bore witness to the steepness of the trajectory.

The fact that droop and flap had separate selectors moving in the same quadrant was undoubtedly a factor in the PI accident.
One of the more ludicrous "safety" features of the design was that they both had aerofoil shaped handles at the top of their levers - but the droop had a slight dip at the leading edge and the flap had a slight dip at the rear. How many actually examine the shape of a handle before they operate it?
On the Trident 1, the other lethal factor was that selection up of the leading edge device caused an immediate large increase in stalling speed. This was rectified for the later marks.

If the aircraft had been operated as designed, tested and certified it wouldn't have crashed.
Why pull off most of the power, whip the flaps up and climb at V2 + 10 at heights as low as 500 feet - bl@<hidden>@<hidden> stupid.
This left the aircraft wallowing about and the slat lever unprotected.
Rather than ommitting the foolish proceedure which didnt do much for noise abatement except spread it further BEA fitted a baulk and continued flying the same dumb NAB.
As to lack of experience P2 had more hours upon graduation from Hamble than a FO I recently met already checked out on a 737 and posted away from the main base - food for thought?
Crew were scapegoats as often happens.

With regards to the 'ghouls', see the quote from the report in my post of this thread #21. It tells us that the Prime Minister made a sweeping statement, based on poor evidence. Nothing changes then. :hmm:

The M25 was built in sections from 1973 onwards. As far as I can recall and establish (Wikipedia), the Western section including the A30 intersection was one of the last in 1985. I was able to use it for a new job that I had just moved to. The whole ring opened in 1986.

The whole ring opened in 1986.

And the design capacity was exceeded almost immediately! "Build it and they will come."

Regarding Blind Pew's comment, "Why pull off most of the power, whip the flaps up and climb at V2 + 10 at heights as low as 500 feet - bl@<hidden>@<hidden> stupid."

You speak a lot of sense, but in fairness the flaps were retracted and the power reduced at 90 seconds from start of roll. I know there was one departure which called for NA at 70 seconds (can you remember where?), but I don't recall it happening at 500feet.

Having said that, there was the infamous captain who used the flaps only to get into the air, then retraced them at 20feet or so in order to improve the climb-out gradient. Arghhh! Scary stuff.

Some of those guys were brilliant and brave ex-bomber pilots, but should never have been let loose on a swept-wing jet.

http://img207.imageshack.us/img207/5479/img025a.jpg (http://img207.imageshack.us/i/img025a.jpg/)

I stayed up late last night and read through most of the AAIB Report on the Papa India crash....what I would like to know is how the Trident compared for 'incidents' with say the 727 and the BAC-111 and how BEA's record compared with other users of the Trident particularly CAAC.

Gruntie, agree, don't think there were all that many people just ogling and subsequently labelled ghouls by Harold Wilson. And I don't think the label ever really fit; I'm sure many of the people who left their cars on the verge were there to try to help. Many would not have known what in fact had happened other than that there had been an accident. My friends and I had heard at the car rental desk that there had been an accident but, of course, there were no details at the time. We saw many ambulances racing past us to what we eventually realised was the scene. At Staines itself all we could see was an embankment and we just sat in the car and nudged forward as we could, wondering as to what might have happened.

One of my friends was an ex USAF navigator, the other a friend who'd lived some time in South America, as I had. All of us fairly thick-skinned, through over- familiarity, with regard to crashes. Only when we reached our respective destinations did the penny sink in that this one was really bad.

And Noyade, always useful to cite the source :-)

Aileron drag.
Don't remember where but we did have a 65sec cutback. Could have been 28 in Zurich as the noise measuring point was at Rumlang.

Height obviously depended on WAT, certainly had several cutbacks by 500ft and more disturbing for a P2 only and not adequately trained was when we started descending as we hit a bubble of descending air before we flew into the associated strong thermal.

In Evans cross examination at the inquiry he was asked about the statistics that one in eight FDR showed that SOP departures were being ignored. This didn't take into account those tapes that were chucked off Eton bridge.

Had 365 knots on a Daventry one dep by three grand once; infamous Jock who had the ship clean by 1000ft on take off power and with his nose on the glare shield yanked the throttles back as he passed over the noise points- confided that he had driven around and knew precisely their locations.

In the Wardair safety digest there is a quote from BA Doc stating that pilots over 49 should not be converted to Concorde because of 25% failure rate, although the Trident wasn't droop snoop it was beyond the capabilities of many of our older skippers including Key and our training chief who rarely ever flew without George being plugged in.
BEA had this wonderful idea that everyone could be a skipper on a complicated, unstable aircraft and that is what we had to live with as SOs.

A30yoyo
Sorry but you can't compare tomatoes wiv bananas or whatever.

Would say that in my six years we destroyed eight aircraft two of which weren't pilot error.
Four of which were tridents.
And if you looked at Airtours with the hot shots they destroyed two out of ten 707s including a horrific idiotic training b@<hidden> up at Prestwick and a crash in Crete where they loaded pax onto a broken aircraft after Olympic refused to sign the Tech log and flew back to Gatwick.
Both wings were bent and one pylon bolt sheared and the wings were leaking fuel.

We had a Very dodgy command training short field landing which went wrong when I was base training and a year later one of my many trainers bent another Trident at PWK.

look at bomber command statistics you will find an unbelievable number of training casualties.

If you read the thread about gaining a RAF brevet you will see that later on in the war a specialised advanced training unit was established.

young men were frightened of the Lancaster and for an old f@<hidden> a Trident was in a whole different ball park.

AirFrance at this time would keep the older guys who couldn't cope with swept wing jets on prop aircraft - no disgrace and same salary.

But we also had many outstanding older guys who could throw the Trident around and were a pleasure to fly with and watch but there weren't that many in the training department.
One was our future queens grandad.

And Noyade, always useful to cite the source :-) Certainly mate. Take-Off - No.35. Accident Investigation : Deep Stall Disaster. Pages 942-945. It makes a lot of assumptions based on an autopsy.

Cheers.

Aileron drag,would you please elaborate about the aircraft being unstable?

Aileron Drag. If you have an axe to grind about the Duchess, this isn't the place for it.

I thought the testimonies in the BBC page on the crash were interesting,and suggest that the press/politicians manufactured the 'ghouls' notion. Capt.Key's daughter message is worth reading ...is that right about a 50-year 'block' on document release?BBC ON THIS DAY | 18 | 1972: Memories of the Staines air crash (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/witness/june/18/newsid_3001000/3001756.stm)

tubby linton - I did not make that comment. I believe that assertion was made by Blind Pew.

Herod - I don't have an axe to grind. Like Blind Pew, I worked with Pete Middleton, and I cannot believe he would have wanted his grand-daughter to achieve in life through marriage alone.

One male passenger survived I believe until the following day. This I know as I was working in the mortuary on the Northside of LHR somewhere upon the site of the hotel now.

The remains were brought to us and I found it very strange that the male passenger was wrapped up as a mummy and the face was the only visible part. I was told by a doctor that due to the broken bones that was practice then and was the same concept used at major road crashes for survivers.

To do this day I still fail to understand why there is never any mention of that survivor ?

After this there was much talk of airport centres for the remains of any future aviation incident, as that used then was a hangar which can only be described as a disgrace even then. As always nothing happened as the costs were prohibitive.

Final thought the remains were all intact with little or no visible damage which I suppose is a credit to the strength of the Trident. The crew lay in plastic bags as if in a deep sleep - haunts me even to day !

Aileron Drag
Took me thirty years before I discovered the "Masons" connection but I then left in 78!
Especially relevant when I found that the authorities test pilot appeared at the inquiry but there is no mention of him in the report and then I read his biography in handling the big jets that he is assistant master!
Sadly the little boys club didn't stop there.

The trident was speed unstable as it approached way on the backside of the drag curve.
Min drag was somewhere above 200 knots.
Had to do a go around due to an Alitalia DC 8 crew who didn't understand english, hoiked the nose up as throttles weren firewalled and the speed fell off (we were at V min app) ended up lowering the nose to accelerate and clean up.

Daren't comment on it as was having my annual route check with one of the guys who stood up against the masons at the inquiry. Didn't understand what went wrong but the proceedure was flawed as several checklists were and still were twenty years on! (cross feeding with jettison pumps and splitting the on ground emergency checklists).

We nearly lost a T three at Madrid after it lost a donk on t/o from Malaga. As usual the Madrid controllers (worst in Europe at the time) Lined up Iberia and blocked the runway. Skipper opened the taps but aircraft continues towards terra firma - he hadn't considered the WAT curves - so he pointed the nose down, cleaned up and did a very low circuit.

Blind Pew and Aileron Drag very enlightning and informative. What were your impressions of Captain Key and his allegedly highly authoritariamn manner?

Bean,

I didn't fly with Stan Key. Papa India went in while I was undergoing my Trident training course. I only knew of his reputation from mates who were a few months ahead of me.

Blind Pew was one of those mates, and he would probably have more first-hand knowledge of the guy. There were several (many!) captains on the Trident in '72 who were an absolute nightmare to fly with. I expect Blind Pew and I could write a list of names each which, if compared, would be identical !!!

I worked for BEA then BA as a mechanic at Glasgow in the 70's and found that a high percentage of Trident captains were arrogant and ill-mannered to the ground staff.It was so bad on one occasion that I complained to my shop steward and was told to inform the captain that if his manners did not improve neither he nor his aeroplane would be going anywhere. This resulted in an apology and the excuse that his flight manager was giving him a hard time.

Good for you, bcgallacher. Wish I'd been able to do that.

I remember one guy who would shake hands and introduce himself to a two-ring First Officer, but would cut the other bloke dead if he was a one-ring Second Officer. Having flown with him many times, and been ignored, I did a trip with him a few days after putting up my second ring and, guess what? Yes, he shook hands and introduced himself - as if we really had never met.

Another guy introduced himself with the immortal line, "My name is Captain ******. You can call me Sir."

Oh dear...........don't get me going..........must take my pills.:)

Stan Key was a victim of bullying from a few cowards who wouldn't take on management or Ron Gillman who along with Stan were the reps at the Munich inquiry. Jimmy Thain was sacked, Ron had set up BEA training (real dapper figure and boys own hero as well as in the guild) whereas Stan was just a bloke helping out with BALPA and these idiots picked on Stan as a sport.
Witnessed him being set upon two days before the crash - a bl@<hidden>@<hidden> disgrace.
Didn't fly with him but know a special guy who did on vanguards (he crashed during base training and BEA nearly lost two vanguards with a very close Airmiss). He said Stan was a nice bloke but couldn't handle the Trident and developed a nervous tic the closer he got to terra firma. There was a joke that the radio alt was superfluous.
As to aileron drags comments on management he is being very generous to one individual, who if I can guess His identity was a bit naive.
For me it was the strokes these guys pulled after the accident and at the inquiry that are sickening; quite sure they would have sacrificed their own grannies if needed.
Remember the stories about Ron Collins......
Sadly the little boys club is apparently alive and kicking in BA and the CAA but it ain't any different in frog or paddy land.

Bcgallacher
You were lucky mate, no buggar stood up for us baby drivers.
Wife was sexually assaulted on the jump seat - didn't dare say anything.
A year later she threatened to miscarry in ATH - forced to work back against doctors advice then spent a week in hospital.
I was called up and threatened with the sack if I interfered again.
One skipper called us by our seat designation P2 or P3, another "John" as neither could be bothered to learn our names.
Best story was a little fight in cruise between a MENSA member and a certain S/O after a hostess had been assaulted..over the seat belts sign...

Great ship to fly after a couple of years of unlearning the rubbish we had been taught by the trainers and watching how the real pilots could fly it.
Built like a brick built sh*t house and flew a bit like one.
Official cross wind technique from the horses mouth was fly it into the runway - the aircraft can take it (which wasn't always true) - but the guy did manage to get it very close to the sound barrier with the afor mentioned lasses husbands grandmother on board - work that one out.

Blindpew, thank you for you explanation regarding the instability of the aircraft..How did it cope with a low go-around from an autoland?

Absolutely fascinating information coming out in this thread, it makes me very sad that people such as are described would pervert the course of an enquiry where the purpose is to get at the truth.

But as ever it isn't what you know, it's who you know. Politics raises its ugly head in all fields of human endeavour...

Never did a low go around except on the sim and discovered when I was researching my book from one of the PI accident investigators that the simulator did not replicate the flying characteristics of the real aircraft in pitch!
We were told that the authority insisted that the sim was more difficult to fly but I suspect it was the inverse as witnessed several older guys who couldn't cope with the aircraft.
A notable from hearsay was the chief training captain.
Suspect it performed better because of the WAT curves and maybe ground effect.
Certainly never had any problems on dark and dirty hand flown apps into Edinburg.
Somewhere in the ether is a report of the stars taking the tail off a comet during a low go around - possibly at Bedford - well incompetent.

Well there were those who claimed that the Trident could only become airborne because of the curvature of the earth, but maybe it was ground effect that helped.

tubby linton,

Did a four-sector day in foggy conditions back in the early 80s. I can't remember the details, but it was LHR-GLA-LHR-GLA-LHR. Each airfield was on-limits (75m? - so long ago), and each initial approach that day resulted in a GA from decision height.

Bearing in mind that at DH the aircraft's RoD was almost nil (we were well into the flare), when power was applied for the go-around the thing went up like a homesick angel, particularly as the fuel load was light.

Impressive. Not as impressive as the 757, but good enough. I certainly felt very safe in the Gripper in those challenging conditions, and whilst going home totally knackered that day, the whole exercise went like clockwork.

Blind Pew I am not familiar with your book, would you please supply some details?
I dug out my copy of Handling the Big Jets and I noticed that the photo of an aircraft executing a high performance go around is of a B727!
The Bedford accident report can be found here:
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/4-1972%20G-AWZA%20and%20XP%20915.pdf

Tubby Not available yet as would have stirred up a hornets nest in its original form.
W/R to the Bedford incident if you factor in a heavy crew, daytime, rest, experience etc and they still manage to smack into a parked aircraft one comes to the conclusion that management/ training were incompetent beyond belief.
One wonders the criteria used in selection for these posts - rumour has it somefink to do with bearing breasts........

They used to recut the dunlops either eight or twelve times which gave us pages of incidents in the horror comic every month - especially stupid as SR had lost an aircraft after a tyre burst and a wing falling off a few years before.

blind pew

Would be interested in knowing more about the book when it is available, I presume you'll make some sort of announcement here?

Autobiography feathers wiv a bit of everything especially controversy although my original draft will not be available....::{
Nod nod wink wink

Ok maybe a bad choice of words, which has ruffled a few feathers - for the wrong reasons. But, abuse of mods via PM's will you get you nowhere except the sin bin. Mods are here to contain dubious (or libellous) posts on behalf of the owners of the site. The rules are not made by moderators - and you signed up to them when you joined PPRuNe.

The ARPI story is well known and has been discussed here a few times before. This time around a suggestion that book research is involved. PPRuNe is not for research for books. We don't allow it.

The personal attacks via PM's is a no no, and now ignored, but should they occur again the writer will be banned without any questions or answers.

Stick to debating the subject now that I have re-opend the thread but please heed my comments.

You might care to know, or not, that I started this forum many years ago so that aviation history and its nostalgic aspects could have a place to enjoy, so in answer to one particularly offensive PM that I know nothing of aviation is mistaken. My years of flying numerous types, displaying, and running airlines adds up to knowing something of the industry in the past 50 years plus.

Going back to my post #42 in fairness to the Trident perhaps worth noting that the 727 could get into a mess on approach and (according to Wikipedia) 6 were lost on approach the 1960s. Landing (esp Autoland) was perhaps the Tridents strongpoint...I remember hearing one on VHF amaze the tower by landing so precisely on 28L it was able to take the first right turning (23L junction) (equivalent to landing at LCY :))
Were the staff relations at BEA a factor in the decision to amalgamate it with BOAC into BA?

Were the staff relations at BEA a factor in the decision to amalgamate it with BOAC into BA?

No, we have Sir Ronald Edwards and his committee to thank for that.

http://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1969/1969%20-%200831.PDF

Never flew with Key, but some of those BEA captains were difficult, to say the least.

Was this particular to the Trident fleet or was it endemic throughout BEA?

Point taken mod and likewise apology.
I have not used the site for research. Book originally finished two years ago after extensive research with former colleagues, FOI searches and delving into various archives.
As to difficult fleets generally the problems were encountered on sophistocated jets in LHR and the Airtours fleet.
Mates who went to the 111 at Man or Viscounts in Scotland had a great time.
My opinion was that many older guys could not cope with the aircraft and our management were generally incompetent.
This was reflected in the national press covering the inquiry.
I only refused to fly with one pilot in my career - he had been posted to LHR because most of the Glasgow pilots had refused to fly with him.
Especially foolish as GLA FOs had to have a minimum of two years.
I was a first year SO just after PI and my reward because of speaking out re safety was being humiliated by a guild member in the crew room, assigned P3 and told to keep my mouth shut unless spoken to.

Never had the pleasure of flying the Trident but was on the S1-11 during the corresponding period. I would not say that this was true on my fleet at all, most of the Captains I flew with in the early days were ex WWII and a real pleasure to fly with. As with any fleet or airline there were some who were less fun to be with than others but I can remember few if any that were "difficult". They had all transitioned to the 1-11 from the Viscount, Vanguard or Comet and were mostly excellent aviators.

However I did hear it said (on my fleet, at least), that those who needed two co-pilots to look after them went on the Trident whereas the more competent went on the 1-11. Again, I am sure that there were many exceptions to this rule - were it true - but it did make sense for the less able.

blind pew - thank you for that and for your interesting comments. I did get to have a short period in a Trident sim and found it to be somewhat of handful. However, that was for interest only.

Flight watch you might remember that there was a proposal to change the crewing on the Trident and place the captain in the P3 seat and have the two first officers up front.
Supposedly the Russians in Aeroflot did this.
It was in either 73 or 74.
Initially we thought it was an April fools but were told that it came out after a senior management meeting with some union feedback.
I thought at the time that it would be a good idea for a few of our elderly gentleman but that it would not be accepted by the majority.
The rumour disappeared after a month or so.
I still believe that the idea had merits, especially after I turned fifty.

Don't remember how you operated the 111 but we had the gear down 13 miles out and land flap down as we intercepted the glide slope at 3000ft - incredibly wasteful - and supposedly the Trident needed a long stabilised approach.

After leaving UK employment our criteria was gear down and land flap by latest 300ft.


Mod thanks, and would agree that the Trident was difficult but after a few years watching guys who could throw it about I enjoyed it BUT you had to be watch her as she bit very quickly - you couldn't let her get away from you as I found out with a lot of coloured lights and bits dangling from the cabin ceiling.

Especially difficult during turbulence on app with the auto throttle in.

We weren't allowed to fly manual throttle but engine out we weren't allowed to use it.
Some of our competent line pilots would let us use manual throttle which was far nicer.

John Cunningham made it all seem so incredibly easy!

Bearing in mind at least one problem with the Comet, such as no L/E devices and hence the ability to stall the aircraft by over rotation, the rectification of which took plenty of time even after the events of 1954, I wonder whether the aerodynamic work on the DH121 was perhaps a bit under-resourced and rushed especially as the lead customer BEA couldn't seem to decide what they wanted until pretty late on in the process. Having a very experienced pilot like Cunningham has its good and bad sides, good because he was likely to do a good development job, but then possibly leaving average pilots at a disadvantage with any tricky handling characteristics.

Maybe the Trident was not quite late enough to make use of the lessons that were being learned by all manufacturers about designing efficient swept wing commercial aircraft during the first decade of the jet age.

BP - The 1-11 was quite different. The swiftest approach was a straight in out of the Berlin corridor on 27L at HAJ. 333kts (Vno) to 1500' established on the localiser, as the glide path twitched, full speed brake, lower the gear at limiting speed and select flap with one hand whilst raising the speed brake with the other (the two were not allowed together) then the rest of the flap on schedule and engines spooled up by 300'. Even a normal approach rarely saw the gear down before 1000'.

Had QARs been in existence then, the guys at the monitoring office would have had a thrombosis at regular intervals.

The big difference was CAT2 (possibly 3a eventually?). Due to the fact that the aircraft only had one autopilot with duplex monitors a stable approach was necessary to have an even chance of the autopilot staying engaged. However it worked well in genuine conditions when I had to use it!

The training management did have some peculiar ideas though, SOPs called for a flare followed by a slight push to set the aircraft down gently. In fact this technique normally produced a gripper like arrival and pilots soon found out that it could be flared like any other type and landed smoothly.

An amusing training deficiency (possibly apocryphal) came to light when a newly converted crew both from the Viscount who had done all their line training in Berlin below FL180 launched themselves on a LHR-MUC mission around FL330. On landing they wrote in the tech log that the high speed warning bell was incorrectly set as it kept going of around 240kts instead of 333kts and the aircraft would not accelerate. They had never been mach limited before! All crews were assigned at least one "high altitude" flight thereafter on training.

Flight watch you've just blown me up.
Never new anyone else flew aircraft like we did
in Switzerland!
When I started on the DC9 they just brought out a regulation that we had to be in landing conf. By 300ft (nothing about speed nor spooling the engines up); this was because they used to do power off approaches and landing with the inevitable burst tyres, hot brakes and the occasional over run.
What we didn't do was use the PPL - poor planning lever as a South African called the air brakes.
The ROD was dialed up until the clacker sounded then backed off after the clacker was silenced.
After around four years on the gripper I was shown the stuff the stick forward at the last moment landing technique - there were only a few guys who used it - the first one being Rocky who quit to fly Hunters for airwork at Hurn.
Great greasers unless you chickened out which I never did.

Did it on the nine, close the throttles early, trim back as the elevator would loose effectiveness, late flare and stuff the nose forward at the last moment not forgetting to break the nosewheel ROD with an almighty heave.
Had to give it up as I scarred a few Swiss skippers who thought we was going to die and asked me to do a SOP landing. Shame as it gave us a short very smooth landing which was only spoilt when the dumpers deployed and the airframe settled on the dunlops.

Following the accident was there any weeding out of those who were out of their depth in the aircraft? Also was the noise abatement procedure re-examined and were sop tightened?

Some of the most interesting posts I have every seen on this site.

AA/ thank you

BB/ more please !

Following the accident was there any weeding out of those who were out of their depth in the aircraft? Also was the noise abatement procedure re-examined and were sop tightened?Tubby,

No, there was no 'weeding out' of people who couldn't cope. Nothing changed. There was a guy in the left-hand seat who rejoiced in the name "Dangerous Dave", who was only ever rostered with two senior F/Os (to look after him). A delegation of senior F/Os went to talk to a senior Training Captain about the matter, and they received an assurance that, when the Trident went out of service, this man would be removed. He would never be permitted to fly a two-crew aircraft.

A couple of years later, Dangerous Dave was flying a 737 with newly-recruited F/Os. Thank God, nothing ever happened to him that required any exceptional skill, and he retired without killing anyone.

Re NA, it remained the same, but monitoring flap and droop selections became paranoid. On a Route Check, the captain put his hand on the droop lever at 200kts. P3 said nothing. Later, the captain said, "Why didn't you stop me from grabbing the droop handle?"
P3 said, "Well, you didn't move it."
The captain said, "What if I had moved it?"
P3 replied, "If you'd tried to move it I'd have broken your f****ing wrist."

CRM really took off over the following years, but the Old Guard were allowed to see out their time and qualify for their pension.

Because of the way the inquiry was "handled" they never believed that the Noise abatement procedure was at fault.(nor some other ridiculous SOP).
They ignored Cunninghams testimony and either they didn't have enough pennies to pay for a copy of Handling the Big jets or they didn't understand it.
And obviously Davies never mentioned his recommendations over a drink at the Lodge - probably why he only made assistant master whilst Owens became grand master.

Whilst it is slightly off track the social political climate of the time needs taking into consideration.
TSR2 had been cancelled as had the Canadian Arrow because of pressure from the Yanks.
Britain was in the midst of a social revolution.
Heathrow became known as ThiefRow because of the baggage handlers love of other peoples stuff.
There were several other groups who ran a mafia style operation - all of which management would not touch.
BEA would only pay three months sick pay and after that you had to claim the dole.
Our loss of license insurance paid 10% for psychiatric problems.
An american company introduced a fairer loss of license insurance then stole our money.
Whilst the long term sick ground workers were looked after flight and cabin crew were basically sacked except if you were "one of the boys".
So the guys who couldn't cope were left with a choice, dole then a reduced pension, continue flying knowing that you were incompetent if an emergency happened and relying on our FOs and very sadly a few guys topped themselves.
Whereas SR paid your full salary for two years and any medical treatment you needed.(including alcoholics).
Gave you a fulfilling ground job.
And if you didn't recover gave you an extremely good pension - more than BA paid senior captains.

I always felt extremely sorry for the guys who couldn't cope and flew accordingly cautiously although there were a few ######## who would resort to bullying then I sailed on the other tack.
Fleet managers were play the I'm stupid card time and what a rewarding job you are doing "SIR".

blind pew, thank you for that helpful background. In another field in the 1970s and 80s, (a branch of the electronics world NOT involved with airlines) there was much 'old boy' network and favours and Lodges.

I recall (in 1984) being very puzzelled about the behaviour of a group telecomms manager and having it explained to me: "But don't you realise why he does that? It's because he can then put all the purchases of XYZ equipment, through his good friend in the City of [name of large telecomms company] who is a big friend of his and they are in the same Lodge together." It was said to me as if I should have worked out, or known, that that was how the system worked.

Just a few years ago, in an unrelated business matter, someone told me that X had only joined the Masons to get more of them using his betting shops. They said that, whilst X liked the social aspect, he certainly didn't believe in the religious part and took little interest in the charity work - it was just business as he knew the Masons would be more likely to place bets in a shop owned by a Mason.

Obviously, that era is now past ... :rolleyes:

Obviously pax boy.
Had a mate who took a security guard for a ride on the bonnet of his car which resulted in an ABH charge which was dropped after a handshake.
Trouble was he wasn't - the property speculators he moonlighted for had taught him the grip and signs. The big boys he drove for found out and sacked him. Took the threat of strike action to get him reinstated.
Conversely my neighbour used his mates to get my planning application stopped - the way of the world - did me a favour as it was the last straw so I emigrated to new horizons.

Some of the most interesting posts I have every seen on this site.

I'll second that, waco.

As I posted earlier, I knew Simon Ticehurst, so I've always had an interest in this accident.

It wasn't until I re-read the report recently after a lapse of many years, that I realized that this was a Public Inquiry report and not from the AAIB (or whatever they were called back then).

Is the testimony at the Inquiry published anywhere?

My colleagues and I, in the Steel Stockholding Industry lost a very jovial and happy colleague in that accident, he was our local contact with the British Steel Corp, he was extremely well liked and missed just for his ability to always smile and be happy.

Ironic really, for a few years later whilst I too was working for the BSC, Papa India was the subject of a Management training course, where the public enquirey details and all the faults thus found were used as examples of bad and mishandled management procceedures, sad thing is the guy who had organised the course had no idea that we all knew one of the pax, it was very quickly dropped like in 5 minutes.!!

Peter R-B
Lancashire

Julie Key - poor child. I hope justice is done, eventually.

Just spoke with keighley's dad and sister.
He flew the Whitney bomber on a virtual suicide mission and crashed on Texel. He spent the war in the great escape prison and was on the death march.
The family didn't deserve to lose their son nor go through the cr*p that certain individuals put them through.
The only question his mother asked me on every visit was did Jerry kill all of those people.

The AAIB inspector I spoke to distanced his organisation from the inquiry conclusions in his first breath of our conversation.

Having read a considerable amount of what I consider the important testimonies, having the identical training with Jerry and experiencing several different philosophies I believe I understand what I happened.
The majority of the BEA were blinkered because they had very little experience from outside of their goldfish bowl or were just plain thick.
Those who did understand some of what happened kept stumm because management with the issue of a stall procedure showed their cards.
Childs who stood up to them told me that his life was made untenable and resigned.

How long did it take for the graffiti on the P3 tables on other tridents to disappear after the accident?
How many of the other Tridents had similar graffiti?

I saw graffiti weeks b4 the accident on the inside of the lift in car park 1e- for management and pilots only in cental area -this was hastily repainted and a day afterwards it had reappeared with @<hidden>@<hidden>@<hidden>@<hidden> is still a c@<hidden>@<hidden>
I also read it in the men's bog ( left my drag gear at home) in a restaurant in dusseldorf....

Re: G-ARPI BEA Trident accident at Staines.

The book can be downloaded if you have an Amazon Kindle account, cost is£3.50.

Is it allowed to provide a link here to the publisher or is that considered advertising? (It would also reveal 'Blind Pew's' identity...)

The book contains some amusing anecdotes but is largely a rambling rant at authority, and several named or barely disguised individuals, that verges on the libellous. Many of the stories are poorly researched and several are false.

Joined BEA (as was) late 1971 as an S/O. Soon afterwards attended my first BALPA meeting. I recall the acrimonious atmosphere when the topic of industrial action was raised. Stan Key seemed to be in a tiny minority opposing IA and was vehemently shouted down by opponents. We newbies were surprised at the bitterness we witnessed. Three months later Simon Ticehurst's father-in-law (Capt Emerson, an excellent instructor) checked out my colleagues and me on the Vanguard at Luqa. One of those colleagues was one of the two Vanguard copilots positioning to BRU on PI with John Collins. (I'm not 100% sure about the Ticehurst-Emerson connection, though - might be a false memory. Apologies if I've got it wrong.)

The book can be downloaded if you have an Amazon Kindle account, cost is£3.50.

Can it be obtained in any other format by us non-Kindleites?

Can it be obtained in any other format by us non-Kindleites?

The only hardbacks I can find on Amazon re Papa India are used copies of John Godson's 1974 book, which I assume isn't what's being referred to here. I can't find any reference to an ebook at all, maybe I'm not looking in the right place.

A clue to the title would be appreciated please.

Captain Key meets Yuri Gagarin.

BEA - British European Airways Corporation photo 282 of 467 G-AHRF (http://www.vickersviscount.net/Pages_Photos/PhotosOwnerGalleryLarge.aspx)

To add to tilos' excellent link there, as it appears to send you to the beginning of the gallery, here is the photo of Gagarin and Key taken on the 12th July 1961.

http://i100.photobucket.com/albums/m12/FlipflopmanRB199/8C27A30D-DEF2-4F01-80CE-128E134B00D4-6386-00000FD7FDCE1F49.jpg


Flipflopman

It is available in hardback and paperback thro Amazon UK and Com.
I wanted the electronic version free but the publishers refused and so it is at the minimum price they allowed.
It is my story - I had a photographic memory and was the "star" on the ill fated course that produced P2 on Papa India.
The book was researched over several years included course mates of Jerry keighley (who was my best mate), His father , the best training captain (and pilot) that I have ever had the pleasure of knowing, a senior flight manager, numerous archives and several FOI requests.
I was forwarded copies of relevant newspaper articles of the time...some of my quotes are from there, but those parts of the story that I was not directly involved in came from mates that were.

There were a lot of stories that I couldn't use as the culprits would have been identified.
I deleted 50,000 words after counsel's opinion - the person advises Private Eye - not because they were not true but because of the nature of the British libel laws which Pen International are trying to change.
Sadly BEA pilots of the time believe they were the best inspite of EIGHT crashes in my six years - 248 dead.
Only two days ago a mate told me how they nearly went into the drink in a T3 off Malta with a wrong selection. I believe it wasn't reported although I didn't ask.

The book has been professionally proof read and anything possibly libellous was deleted.

For those in BEA my pprune handle gives my identity.

It is not just a "rant" about BEA but a human story about a dream to fly, overcoming fear and the reality of being a junior pilot in the 70s.

I have just read Ray Blythe's book - only the makers name - it mirrors some of my experiences.

We all have individual opinions on what is best practice... The Americans have decided that 1500 hours is a minimum to operate heavy metal with pax whereas in Europe one can be released on line with less than 250 hours.
They also fined a certain operator and threatened to withdraw their operating permit stateside for a flight which operated outside of the flight testing envelope which had certain aspects which reeked of incompetence to me.
Then we could talk about AF, DGAC and EADS.
What we need is transparency in the industry and not vague threats of laws introduced to stop the nobility killing each other in duels.

Sadly BEA pilots of the time believe they were the best inspite of EIGHT crashes in my six years - 248 dead.I can't comment on the abilities of BEA pilots, but you're surely not referring to the period 1967-1973, when the only other accidents where revenue passengers were killed involved a bomb (Comet, 1967, 66 fatalities) and structural failure (Vanguard, 1971, 63 killed) ?

Hard to see how piloting skills were relevant to those events.

I was employed by BEA then BA in the 60's and 70's and to be honest a large number of the Captains were among the most arrogant and ill-mannered aircrew I have ever worked with.Many of them seemed to think they they were still in the Airforce and that we in maintenance were some kind of serfs.On one occasion I had had enough of being screamed at and spoke to my shop steward who advised me to tell the gentleman that neither he nor his aircraft would be leaving GLA until an apology was forthcoming - it was, with the excuse that his flight manager was giving him a hard time regarding his fuel burn.I left BA in 1977 and went out into the real world where I learned how to work in the real world.

It's interesting to read your post, bcgallacher. I remember 'The Glasgow Apology' story.

Many of the 'wartime' captains were dictatorial, arrogant, superior, and worst of all - poor pilots. Oh, sure, brave as lions, but chosen to fly, originally, as cannon-fodder. Having survived the war they thought they were God's gift to aviation.

I experienced the RAF pilot training 'machine' in the 60s. Even then, the training was poor, the attitude straight out of a bullying public school prefects' mess, and the entire atmosphere unprofessional. It probably explains the dreadful accident rate in the RAF. That is, excluding the low-level FJ accidents, which of course are understandable.

Many of the 'old' BEA captains were incapable of providing leadership, setting an example, or even working with other people in any capacity. We were led, however, by their fellow-travellers 'from the old squadron', who protected their mates, whatever their inadequacies.

Some of those old captains were inspirational, but many were a nightmare to work with, and an accident waiting to happen.

My mate remembers a BOAC VC10 Captain at Manchester in the '60s. Red cap comes onto the flight deck, "papers to sign please skip". No response at all from the LH seat. He ignores the Red cap and instructs the P2 on technique instead.

"Skipper, can you sign the papers please?".

No response, even though the inter-pilot conversation has now ceased.

"scuse me skipper, can you sign the papers plese?"

Again,as far as the Captian is concerned the Red cap may as well not exist. At that point the P2 turned to the Red cap saying "I think the c*nt's waiting for you to call him 'Sir'".

On the flight deck of a Trident with my shift boss trying to de-brief a captain regarding a technical problem -young first officer keeps interrupting,in final desperation my boss turned to him and said ' Son,I'm talking to the organ grinder not his monkey'

BEA, yup only set up and trained Lufhansa, my ex boss was a team leader there just happened he was the Flight Manager of our St. Trinians outfit at our little airport in the coutry called Gatwick. Best bunch of crews I've worked with, even with shite in DAM :E

And yes I was in the office at LGW when "PI" hit the shite farm .... Want to argue ? then you can give me a call, nbr via PM...

blind pew,

You mention in post #83 that the inquiry ignored John Cunningham's testimony. Can you give some indication of what JC said or wrote?

<<And yes I was in the office at LGW when "PI" hit the shite farm>>

But it did not, did it?

merlinxx BEA, yup only set up and trained Lufhansa, my ex boss was a team leader there just happened he was the Flight Manager of our St. Trinians outfit at our little airport in the coutry called Gatwick. Best bunch of crews I've worked with, even with shite in DAM http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/evil.gif

And yes I was in the office at LGW when "PI" hit the shite farm .... Want to argue ? then you can give me a call, nbr via PM...


Merlin, I don't know what you're on, but can you please send me some? :)

I remember the PI incident well, at that time, I was a co-pilot on VC10s. Since this was also a T-tailed aircraft we were naturally also concerned about deep stalls and the effects of retracting leading edge devices by mistake. From what I have read about the Trident the VC10 was a much more forgiving aircraft - it had leading edge slats rather then droops. Furthermore, they took some 20secs to retract and the slat lever was mechanically locked to the flap lever so that in normal operation it could not be operated seperately. In abnormal conditions these levers could be unlocked and operated independently. Another advantage was the time the slats took to retract, even if they were retracted without the trailing edge flaps the aircraft was able to accelerate sufficiently rapidly to avoid the stall. Our training department undertook several tests to verify this.

I also knew Simon Ticehurt's parents who were devastated not only by the loss of their son but also by all the various issues that crept out of the woodwork after the event - as described succinctly by Blind Pew.

In the 1970s CRM had not been invented. There were good captains and there were bad ones - mostly good, but on some occasions the atmosphere on the flight deck could be distinctly icy. We had our share of bad eggs in BOAC too.

However, I think the BEA operating philosophy protected inadequate captains far too much. When later I was a training captain on 747s in the early 1980s, we had a large number of failures on conversion courses of senior Trident captains who wanted to come to 747s at the end of their careers to earn more pay and thus increase their pensions. It seemed to me that too many of them had been 'carried' by their copilots and protected by a familiar limited route structure and good ATC. Some, who had been almost exclusively flying the shuttle, knew little else other than Amber 1.

The 747 was a real pussycat to handle, but it did have multiple electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic systems, a fairly complicated fuel system, five flap settings and a poor autoland system, especially on the -100 series aircraft. Despite its very good handling qualities too many of the ex-Trident captains could not cope with the system complexities, the wide-flung route structure and the sometimes non-existant ATC. There is a substantial difference between flying in Africa, in the Arctic and over the oceans when compared to flying in well-equipped continental airspace such as Europe. The tactical issues are different and rather more complex.

Our management at the time came under considerable pressure, mainly from the ex-BEA brigade, who thought we were being unfair to these pilots. But the fact was that too many of them simply could not cope. Blind Pew has hit the nail on the head in his various posts!

Aileron Drag

You mention public schools prefects' mess. I think you are confusing military and public schools. It would be prefect's study not mess::=

Bergeire1,

You have hit the nail smack-on. I knew a Trident captain who failed his 747 conversion. He was a super guy, but had spent years flying Shuttle. The 'Shuttle Back-up' pay was outstanding, and the work almost non-existent. He had the seniority to avoid almost all other routes. Further, he needed looking after in the air.

Having switched to longhaul myself after many years being feather-bedded in radar-controlled and ILS-infested Europe, I had the biggest shock of my life. Particularly, as you say, in the Dark Continent.

I found the level of ability and professionalism in longhaul to be considerably higher than shorthaul, with obvious exceptions of course. I guess it was just a more demanding environment. I think one exception to the above were the 'Fewdals' - flat earth w dabbling at longhaul, who went to the 747-400 for their last few years. They only flew a couple of routes, spent most of the time in a bunk, and had an ILS at each terminus!

Aileron Drag,

I am so glad you back me up on this, sometimes I thought I was getting a bit paranoid. The blokes themselves were usually super guys but just couldn't cope with the change of environment. Also, in long haul flying, fuel management and tactical planning were so much more important, especially when doing re-flightplanning operations from Hong Kong to London on the 747-200 before the -400 came on line.

I have nothing against the chaps but BEA management left a lot to be desired!

Millerscourt,

Blast! I knew that I was mixing my whatsits even as I wrote it. My apologies.

I will attend the Prefects' Study immediately for my well-deserved thrashing! :(

Sorry to see that this thread is deteriorating into the old BOAC versus BEA debate which some of us tried to leave behind in the 70s.
There was a significant difference in the training philosophy of the ex components of BA. BEA philosophy on conversions was to teach at the beginning of the course and gradually withdraw support with progress. There seemed to be more of a "You prove to me you can do it and I point out where you go wrong" approach from too many trainers on the other side - which some short haul candidates (used to a different approach) found intimidating and confidence-sapping.
For what it is worth, I came to longhaul in the twilight of my career and found it much more relaxing than hectic four (sometimes five) sector days in Europe. And yes - that did include Lagos as well as JFK and O' Hare etc.
Pilots are much of a muchness wherever - so let's give the tribalism a rest.

Well, Scotbill, you sure can't call me tribal. I'm yer actual hybrid or, if you prefer, mongrel. First 18 years BEA/BAED/Shorthaul, then longhaul (via what was in reality still BCal.)

I found it a very big challenge having to make the tactical decisions mentioned by Bergerie1, and even Lagos had a (wonky) ILS and half-a-dozen runway lights! At quite a few destinations you were lucky if you had a VOR or NDB. It was just so basic - that was what caused my own culture-shock.

However, you're quite right to point out the essential 'sameness' of pilots. The ill-feeling that existed back then was very unpleasant.

For old time's sake, have a pint of heavy and a chix vindaloo for me, preferably at the Koh-i-Noor!

'Fewdals'

I think a Fewdal would be called a Figjam these days. F**k, I'm good, just ask me!!

I thought it might be helpful to post a link to a photo of a Trident cockpit:

DSC_0333 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/48975048@<hidden>/8302350559/)

It's a Trident Two rather than the One that PI was, so maybe there are some differences-I don't know, as I'm not a pilot. And if anyone can add to the fascinating first comment on the photo, I'd be very interested to read that.

What were the Trident 's autoland minima?

75m RVR and 14' DH for Cat III

The 75m RVR was not an aircraft limitation but dictated by the Fire Service at LHR as they could not guarantee finding an aircraft in less.

The Trident also could take off in 75m - being fitted with rolling horizontal barber pole indicators (PVD) linked to the ILS

Was it 12 feet?

Been a long time..............

Scotbill,

I am sorry if I gave the impression of being tribal, that was not my intention. I understand the underlying philosophy behind the monitored approach and have no doubt it worked well. My point is that, in a way that is similar to the 'overuse' of automatics on modern aircraft today, where pilots have insufficient practice hand flying, the BEA handover of control for most of the flight allowed some captains on Tridents to be too easily 'carried' by their co-pilots. And if this was compounded by too much time on Shuttle backup the results were plain to see.

I also fully accept that the 'old style' training methods being used on the 747 fleet at that time needed to be much improved - and they were, but it took time. In addition, I query the wisdom of changing types when nearing the end of one's flying carreer. A number of the older BOAC pilots failed the Concorde course because the were unable to adapt. This is no reflection on any of these pilots as people. As Scotbill says 'pilots are much of a muchness wherever' they are.

More to the point, knowing Simon Ticehurst's parents as I did, it made me acutely aware of how many people well beyond those immediately involved are affected by any accident.

Finally, as always, accidents have multiple contributory causes - the Swiss cheese effect. I have little doubt that BEA's management processes were a major contributory factor and this was not fully explored in the inquiry afterwards.

Was it 12 feet?You may be right - it was indeed a long time ago. What I do remember at base training was that the Trident could make an auto go around from that DH without the wheels touching the ground.

Shuttle back up might have created a problem but loss of handling skills cannot be blamed on the monitored approach as roles were reversed with P2 handling. Bear in mind that those transferring to long haul were all of the Hamble/Oxford generation.
In BEA the general expectation on command conversion for a pilot of reasonable track record was that he would pass. Thus the early part of the course was devoted to teaching and that support gradually reduced to the dumb FO role.

One of my Senior Training Managers enunciated a simple philosophy:
a) If anyone has trouble the first step is to change the Training Captain
b) There is no point in telling an experienced pilot he has done something wrong unless you can tell him why he got it wrong and, more importantly, what he can do to make it better.
(Ace pilots do not necessarily make good trainers because they may not even understand the problem).

By contrast, a 747 "trainer" said in the bar to one of my colleagues, "I would not presume to tell another pilot how to fly!" and another was reported as having said to a command conversion on his first line sector LHR - Anchorage, "You're a captain, get on with it."
We had incompetent trainers in BEA too - completely bereft of that ability to diagnose another pilot's problem which to me is a fundamental requirement in a trainer.

I have never believed that there is any point in having a court of enquiry into an accident. The truth is likely to be the first casualty as lawyers attempt to cover their respective clients' asses.

Many people quote the misselection of the droops by one of the pilots in this accident and forget that the handling pilot failing to fly the appropriate speed by 20 knots was also a contributory factor.

Been travelling which included taking Jerry keighley's dad to lunch in Swalesdale where his family had built a house in the 30s. Bill had been shot down on a suicide mission in 1940 and spent the war in Stalag Luft Drei and participated in the death march. His son was P2 in papa Inida.

If Hamble boy cares to read my blog - trustthepilot.blog.com - he will understand that he is 100% wrong re research.
The accident period I refer to was Novemeber 1971 until I joined the VC-10 which was 1977.

Vanguard known corrosion ignored. all dead.
Papa india.
What became X-ray mike - training Nicosia.
707 at Prestwick - training!
707 Heraklion - written off on landing but flown back to Gatwick with pax without engineering clearance.
T3 mid air - atc but some criticism of crew lookout.
Viscount on air test flew into cloud with hard centre.
1E at Bilbao - hit puddle.
Not exactly in chronological order.
And a steward who fell to his death from incorrectly installed Airstairs in Rome. (FR aren't whiter than driven snow in this respect).

There were so many other near disasters - many I haven't written about but one was when the crew apparently went the wrong side of the checker board and nearly took out downtown HKG.

Agree with Aileron drag re the huge difference in changing from BEA to BOAC - I was nearly chopped.

Cunningham stated that the Trident was designed, tested and certified to carry out a standard take off climb to an acceleration altitude. A continuous acceleration at this altitude and flap retraction at requisite speeds in one go.
This was carried out at climb power.

It was also Davies recommended procedure in Handling the big jets. He gave evidence but I didn't read the file and there is no mention of it in the report.

I flew six different airliners for three companies - about another six variants and no one bar BEA did such a foolish noise abatement.
Throttle back sometimes at 500ft, set a dangerously low amount of power, whip up the flaps and fly around V2+10 on the backside of the drag curve.

Whilst we had some fantastically skilled pilots in BEA there was what we called a significant "pony express" mentality - get the mail through whatever.
It didn't matter what the book says or airmanship - my job is to get the pax to X even if I don't take prisoners.
We called it "cowboys" although the modern term is apparently "cavalier" so I suppose that excludes the circumcised amongst us. (and Les on the grounds of size). - private joke to another pruner.
Safe flying.

Roverman, Yes PI was badly damaged but was declared salvageable, incredible considering the carnage on the stands after G-AMAD (BKS) Take a look at this pic of PT which was near-by at the time.
http://i1016.photobucket.com/albums/af283/AirforceAnimal/Heathowcrashes.jpg

blind pew


"whip up the flaps and fly around V2+10 on the backside of the drag curve." ???????

Not after whipping up the flaps I hope!

This is all fascinating stuff and brings back many memories of my days as an ex-apprentice working in Tech 1 at LHR, on Tridents and L1011s in the late 70s. While I enjoyed working on the Tridents, it's true that some of the old-school captains could be a bit challenging at times.