Max Shutterspeed
16th Jun 2012, 07:21
Next time the glass cockpit guys with the crisp white shirts are taking the piss because you fly something that needs windscreen wipers, you might like to point them here:
Not all pilots are easily startled, it seems - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2012/06/not-all-pilots-are-easily-star.html)
A phenomenon now dubbed "the startle factor" is increasingly a subject of concern among aircraft accident analysts. It describes a seemingly growing tendency for pilots to react illogically to a surprise event.
Air France 447 was an example, as was the Colgan Air Dash 8 stalling event at Buffalo and the recent incident in which an Air Canada pilot who had just woken over-reacted to the presence of nearby traffic that was not a threat.
For lack of another explanation, the current assumption is that modern flight is more rarely punctuated by the unexpected than it used to be, so pilots are more easily startled.
North Sea oil support helicopter pilots seem to be made of sterner stuff.
Consider the May ditching of a Bond Offshore Helicopters EC225LP Super Puma.
It was the right decision, and completely successful, despite the fact that the crew were suddenly bombarded with a plethora of strident warnings and alerts while en route from Aberdeen to the Maersk Resilient platform.
This, according to a UK Air Accident Investigation Branch special bulletin, is what the crew faced "almost simultaneously" while while in the cruise at 3,000ft:
WARN red light and aural gong
MGB.P caption illuminates on the central warning panel (pressure drop in main gear box oil distribution manifold)
CAUT amber light
XMSN caption illuminates on the CWP (transmission)
M.P and S/B.P illuminates on the vehicle monitoring system (oil pressure drop in both main and standby lubrication system)
SHOT illuminated on the MGB control panel (alert to operate the emergency lubrication system)
Zero indication on the MGB oil pressure gauge
CHIP illuminates on the VHM
MGB oil temperature starts to increase
Startled? I would be.
Over to the AAIB's account:
"The commander assumed control of the helicopter, reduced speed toward 80kt IAS, turned back toward the coast and initiated a descent. The crew activated the emergency lubrication system."
But their problems are not over. As the aircraft settles into the descent...
MGB EMLUBE illuminates on the CWP (the emergency MGB lubrication system had failed, for which the drill is to land immediately)
Considering that all 16 people on board a Bond AS332L2 Super Puma died in April 2009 when the MGB failed without warning and the rotor head separated, the crew could have been forgiven for having fairly high adrenaline levels.
AAIB: "The commander briefed the passengers and carried out a controlled ditching."
Easy.
Not all pilots are easily startled, it seems - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2012/06/not-all-pilots-are-easily-star.html)
A phenomenon now dubbed "the startle factor" is increasingly a subject of concern among aircraft accident analysts. It describes a seemingly growing tendency for pilots to react illogically to a surprise event.
Air France 447 was an example, as was the Colgan Air Dash 8 stalling event at Buffalo and the recent incident in which an Air Canada pilot who had just woken over-reacted to the presence of nearby traffic that was not a threat.
For lack of another explanation, the current assumption is that modern flight is more rarely punctuated by the unexpected than it used to be, so pilots are more easily startled.
North Sea oil support helicopter pilots seem to be made of sterner stuff.
Consider the May ditching of a Bond Offshore Helicopters EC225LP Super Puma.
It was the right decision, and completely successful, despite the fact that the crew were suddenly bombarded with a plethora of strident warnings and alerts while en route from Aberdeen to the Maersk Resilient platform.
This, according to a UK Air Accident Investigation Branch special bulletin, is what the crew faced "almost simultaneously" while while in the cruise at 3,000ft:
WARN red light and aural gong
MGB.P caption illuminates on the central warning panel (pressure drop in main gear box oil distribution manifold)
CAUT amber light
XMSN caption illuminates on the CWP (transmission)
M.P and S/B.P illuminates on the vehicle monitoring system (oil pressure drop in both main and standby lubrication system)
SHOT illuminated on the MGB control panel (alert to operate the emergency lubrication system)
Zero indication on the MGB oil pressure gauge
CHIP illuminates on the VHM
MGB oil temperature starts to increase
Startled? I would be.
Over to the AAIB's account:
"The commander assumed control of the helicopter, reduced speed toward 80kt IAS, turned back toward the coast and initiated a descent. The crew activated the emergency lubrication system."
But their problems are not over. As the aircraft settles into the descent...
MGB EMLUBE illuminates on the CWP (the emergency MGB lubrication system had failed, for which the drill is to land immediately)
Considering that all 16 people on board a Bond AS332L2 Super Puma died in April 2009 when the MGB failed without warning and the rotor head separated, the crew could have been forgiven for having fairly high adrenaline levels.
AAIB: "The commander briefed the passengers and carried out a controlled ditching."
Easy.