BBC News - Shell drops Bond Helicopters contract plans (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-18273824)

So the rumours were true!

I bet Bristow is cursing their luck.

I bet Bristow is cursing their luck.

:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D

Will be interesting to see what BP do... I believe they often work closely or even use the same aviation regulations and operators?!
On a recent CRM course somebody pointed out that Bond do actually have an excellent safety record - its just that the whole industry is generally "safe" and so 1 indecent becomes a big spike on anyone's graph!!

MADY

To say Bond has a good safety record might be a slight over statement.

They do seem to be Snake Bit when it comes to winding up in the water.

The question begged.....which I posed in private to some....is why Bond seems to be having these events and other Operators are not.

That is not meant to be some sort of indictment of Bond.....but rather a suggestion a comparison of the Engineering practices of the various Operators might be polled to see if there is a difference(s), and if a move to establish an improved "Industry Best Practices" set of guidelines might be in order.

As Engineers are human....and business decisions are not made by Divine Guidance.....is there something at Bond that needs to be improved?

It may not be Bond spicifically, could be an overhaul shop or the 225 in general. I know the 225 is fairly widely used by governments around the world... But who else operates them offshore? ERA has a couple in the gulf. Those are the only ones I know of in the US.

The last 2 times they ended up in the water could clearly have happened to any operator randomly, it was only the 1st one in 2009 that could be blamed on the company I think.

The oil company's like to be seen to be doing something for safety even if there is no logic to it.

The thought had occurred to me - do the individual engineering departments diagnose/forecast/guestimate HUMS data differently? It would appear that 2 of the MGB failures had 'signs' apparent on the HUMS data? This is just my recollection of events and nothing more but what is the frigging point of all these sensors if they cannot forecast/or trend such a dogostrophic situation?

I know the 225 is fairly widely used by governments around the world... But who else operates them offshore? ERA has a couple in the gulf. Those are the only ones I know of in the US.

CHC and MHS in Malaysia, CHC Vietnam and Australia (AFAIK) to name a few

In how many accidents were they involved?

Luck plays a big part in this.

In the bad old days Bond (management aviation) had two full on main gearbox failures with the 58T. One just after coasting in and one just going on to a helideck. Auto into a field and landing on the deck. 70 miles of water between these points. It was a common saying around the place that every time Bond fell into the sh*t they came out smelling of roses. Then the 105 crash nobody heard a mayday but a birdwatcher on the shore with binos saw it go in and raised the alarm. Again nobody hurt.

I for one doubt that Bonds engineering standards and practices are any different to the other operators

Chopabeefer

Most of the european offshore helicopter guys move from company to company. In my time
(30 years). I've worked for Bond, Bristow, Schreiner and BIH. I suspect you have just insulted a hell of a lot of people by suggesting that Bond have low standards in the staff they recruit. If you want to look at someone who is "truly a c*ck" try the mirror.

As someone who would have soon been crew changing on a Bond helicopter I can't say I'm unhappy with my employers decision!!

Well they do say ignorance is bliss

I know nothing about Bonds engineering dept - want to make that clear. I do know that there are other indicators that show a companies standards, direction, and intent.

I knew, and flew, with a SAR pilot/Captain/QHI in the RAF for quite a few years. To say the man was hated was an understatement - he was a moron, arrogant beyond belief, and generally despised by all he worked with. Fortunately, reputations spread, and when he left the RAf at his 38 point, 4 or 5 yrs ago, the service rejoiced- he was truly a c*ck. He wanted to go 'up north' and work the rigs. Every operator had 'heard' of him, and he was given the cold shoulder and told to 'get lost' by every company he applied to...except Bond, where he is a senior Captain and Instructor. His instructional techniques are bullying, belittling, and sarcasm.

The company like him, apparantly. Says it all to be honest - Bond love him - EVERYBODY else ran a mile. Bond appear to have VERY low standards. This is now starting to manifest in light of recent events. If they hired this 'pilot', then what engineers, techies,Ops personnel etc etc did they take on?

If I was a rig worker, I too would refuse to fly with them. Good decision chaps - stick with it.

There you have an example of PPRuNe at it's best/worst.

What a crock of sh1te. :rolleyes:

There is a problem with the EC225/AS332 Main Gear Box, not a problem with Bond or anyone else operating in the North Sea. It is ridiculos how the reputation of a prefectly good company can be tarnished by media ignorance and nonscence stories.

If they hired this 'pilot', then what engineers, techies,Ops personnel etc etc did they take on?

Absolutely ridiculous accusation.

The thought had occurred to me - do the individual engineering departments diagnose/forecast/guestimate HUMS data differently? It would appear that 2 of the MGB failures had 'signs' apparent on the HUMS data? This is just my recollection of events and nothing more but what is the frigging point of all these sensors if they cannot forecast/or trend such a dogostrophic situation?

This is a more interesting question. The Hums monitoring can be a real headache for the guys on the shop floor as the systems frequently throw up multiple spurious warnings, and often the monitoring is done late at night when the hums support team are tucked up in bed, with the aircraft due to depart again at 0645. Meanwhile the operators are busy pinning charts on the crew room walls about unsatisfactory 'on-time departure' percentages. I'm sure the events of the past 3 years have put more emphasis on the hums systems, but the reality is it's just something else for the certifying engineer to get strung up for when the shit hits the fan.

I am appalled that anyone should even think of besmerching a company and their good name just becauase they employed someone with a particular reputation in a previous career - which is probably sour grapes anyway. What illogical and inapproriate nonesense.

As for Bond... they have a generally good reputation in my opinion, although they probably have more growing pains than they would wish for given their business expansion challenges in recent years. The aircrew I know who work for them are extremely professional people - some of the industry's best - especially in Jigsaw and Air Services.

Finally, although it has no bearing on the incidents themselves, I am surprised no one has pointed out that the two Bond 225 ditchings were of Era aircraft under lease to Bond. Hope their insurers are coping then!:E

Being ERA aircraft would have nothing to do with anything based upon the testimonials from others here.....no more than having a Bond paint scheme on the outsides of the aircraft would have as I see it.

In two out of three incidents, the aircrew had nothing do with them, the last incident showing how well trained they are in line with all three companies. The first incident involved a very experienced captain who had worked for both the other companies before coming to Bond which just goes to show what a load of nonsense is being spouted here.

As has been pointed out, I believe, the last two incidents involving the gearboxes could have happened to any company operating the 225 / 332L2

Bond have been very 'unlucky'.

As a passenger, or oil company, would you chose to fly with the 'unlucky' operator?

On paper, the last two incidents should not have had a bearing on the decision made by Shell, but human nature and emotion will have.

Some of the comments being made in this thread are showing the ignorance of the posters. The standards of engineers and aircrew in the North Sea is some of the highest in the world and we should be praising all 3 operators. Ths is a situation of the helicopter operators having to fight rumour mongers and those with "little knowledge" i.e. P&J reporters, Union Officials and a tiny minority of offshore "roughy toughy North Sea tigers" who piss their pants at the slightest turbulence but are all "aviation experts".

Come on guys let's stick together for the good of aviation, this is about the reputation of aviation professionals not ripping into a company who has had the bad luck that could have landed on one of the other 2 operators.

Fareastdriver

I bet Bristow is cursing their luck.

I think their shareholders and at-risk crews will be pleased with the business.

Jetboxer

It remains a fact that Bond have had more accidents operating from Aberdeen since they reformed than Bristow and CHC had in the previous 30 years+.

That is statistically significant fact.

Shell have the advantage of the greatest aviation advisors in the world, tough global aviation safety standards and have listened to their employees as a caring employer.

g-mady

BP have an inferior, US approach, to aviation safety and don't even have their own global standards!

Genie the Greenie

"roughy toughy North Sea tigers" who piss their pants at the slightest turbulence but are all "aviation experts"

Do you say that to their faces my any chance big man?








No I thought not.

SM

I know you find things a little tricky at times, not being a helicopter professional and all that, but I think you'll find that CHC hasn't been in the NS for 30 years and a lot of the local company are still there from the Bond buy out days - HS etc.

North Sea Tigers - there are some great characters offshore. If they weren't offshore, they wouldn't be heard. You lose your case slightly when you offer the "my dad is bigger than your dad" argument. Bless.

SM,

It remains a fact that Bond have had more accidents operating from Aberdeen since they reformed than Bristow and CHC had in the previous 30 years+.
That is statistically significant fact.

Are you statistically talking sh£t again?

I'd rather not dwell on the past, as lessons have been learned, and some of the incidents below were tragically fatal.

However, highlighting the below, may put things into perspective.

I do notice you mention Aberdeen. If you put the blinkers on and just look at Aberdeen based aircraft, off the top of my head, Bristow have had 3 serious accidents, and CHC have had 1.

If you take the blinkers off:

Cormmorant A - 1992
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGH - Fatal (Serviceable aircraft CFIT)

North Sea - 1995
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGK - No Fatalities (Aircraft ditched following lightning strike)

Aberdeen - 1996
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGT - No Injuries (Serviceable aircraft rollover rotors turning at airport)

Southern North Sea - 2002
Bristow - S76 - G-BJVX - Fatal (Blade Manufacturing Defect)

West Navion North Sea - 2004
CHC - AS332 G-BKZE - 1 Injury (Serviceable aircraft roll over Rotors turning on deck)

Morecambe Bay - 2006
CHC - AS365 G-BLUN - Fatal (Serviceable Aircraft CFIT)

Dutch Sector - 2006
Bristow - AS332L2 G-JSAR - No injuries (Serviceabe aircraft Ditched)

Nigeria - 2009
Bristow - AS332L - No fatalities (Serviceable aircraft Ditched)


Some of the above accidents: the lightning strike, rollover on deck, and the S76 blade detachment lay no blame on the operator, in a similar fashion to the way that the last 2 Bond accidents 'may' lay no blame on the operator.

As previously mentioned, unfortunately, Bond are the 'unlucky' operator at this time, and I can understand the decision made by Shell. Human factors will inevitablely take a part in these decisions

However, I don't believe this decision has been based on statistics, facts, or logic.

Didn't the AAIB report on the fatal L2 accident say that Bond failed to carry the mandatory (in the MM) inspection of the epicyclic following the epicyclic chip warning? Bond said that EC had said in a phone call not to bother, but really such a thing should not be down to phone calls between 2 people with different 1st languages. Other operators might have handled it differently.

As to the latest one, too early to comment

Possibly one of the biggest factors that influenced Shells decision was the fact that the unions were mobilising the safety officers to express their doubts about Bond. I would imagine that Shell would go a long way to avoid any industrial action on the North Sea.

A couple missing off that list

Southern North Sea- March 2008
CHC - G-BKXD's tail strike on the Leman platform. (non-fatal)

Aberdeen - October 2006
Bristow - G-PUMI's rotor blade spindle crack. (non-fatal) Reading that report sends shivers down my spine.

Alarming though PUMI's incident was, I don't think you could describe it as an accident. Just a technical problem like any other, with the heli landing normally on the airfield moments later.

HC

Using the same logic, if G-REDW had landed and the fault diagnosed by HUMS was found then it also wouldn't have been an accident. It is a case of timing, in this case about 10mins.

I respect your 225 knowledge, but your speculation as to where blame lays seems to totally ignore EC's role in this. In case you hadn't realised, EC announced the faulty batch of shafts before they had even looked at the aircraft. Whilst I think you may be trying to use this forum to take commercial advantage (which seems peculiar as I doubt you have shares in Bristow Group) then please don't try to paint Bond as the bad boy of the industry, we have the press to do that. Now if EC are blameless and it is all down to Bond's engineering processes, why are the aircraft all on 5hr monitoring and some of them on 3?

Are Bristow and CHC on similar close monitoring?

Cyclic, I already said it was too early to comment on REDW but I agree that probably the only fundamental difference between that and PUMI was the location where it happened.

I say "too early" because we don't yet know whether it was possible for Bond to have determined before despatch whether there was an adverse HUMS trend and I think it has previously been established that Bond do not process the HUMS data on each turnaround at base (rotors running) whereas we do. This I suspect is due to Bond policy of operating L2 and 225 as one fleet (RRTR HUMS download not possible on L2). However I am happy to be corrected on that.

Clearly the primary fault lies with EC for quality control etc, but it is the Operators duty to nevertheless catch these faults before they become an accident.

On the L2 accident I have no knowledge except for what was published in the report, and am only quoting the spirit (not letter) of that report.

Much more worrying than the actual events of ETAP, L2 and REDW themselves would be if Bond really felt they were absolutely not at all to blame for any of them, for then there would be no hope.

MP

Yes they are. It depends on the serial number of the component and the number of hours flown. EC originally wanted 4hrs between HUMS downloads but one of the operators pointed out to EC that they wouldn't be able to complete one of their contracted crew change flights due to the distance and time involved so EC agreed to 5hrs.

Shell's contract with the Boeing 234 came to a grinding halt after the Sumburgh crash; almost certainly through personnel demands. The same eventually with Helicopter Service. This was despite the Chinook being recognised as one of the most safe and efficient helicopters ever built.

Recognised by Boeing perhaps! Interlocking rotor blades surely has to be a fundamental design weakness!

Jetboxer - Thanks for taking the time to prove my point!

I specifically said Aberdeen because: 1) a Safety Case should be done for each base seperately, 2) Aberdeen is also the base that the majority of all new Bond's flying has been from and 3) it is the base where the vast majority of their AS332 family flying has been from. The last two points should actually favour Bond statistically.

So in 8 years Bond have lost 3 aircraft and 17 people.

My challenge to go back 30 yeras in Aberdeen finds that Bristow have lost two AS332 in 1995/1996 and CHC (including BAH, Britintel and old Bond) hae had one substantially damaged due to a deck roll over in 2004 (and I think that was rebuilt!). Both even predate Bond's reformation.

All the other cases you bring up were not Aberdeen or even Central North Sea ops (in fact you have scrapped the ESB, SNS, Irish Sea, Dutch sector SAR and Nigeria to try to reinforce your weak case).

The fact remains that the majority of accidents to Aberdeen helicopters have involved Bond

The advantage of small operators, which is why I prefer contracting with them, is that they know (or should know) that an accident can finish them (whereas the big boys can always point to all their other accident free experience).

So the small operators (in which I include all the Norweigian operators because they never really pay attention to their owners) really have to strive to be the best and listen to experts like Shell Aircraft.

Certainly a small operator with 3 strikes against them has little to fall back on.

The arguement that the MRGB failures 'could have happened to anyone else' is unconvincing because worldwide, Bond has such a tiny percentage of AS332L2 and EC225 experience. Other posters have noted that in cases the helicopters were meant to be being 'closely monitored'. I will say no more.

Now that management changes have started I can confidentally predict that by Christmas, certainly before the next anniversaries of the three accidents that:
Bond will have been renamed (World Helicopters, INAER UK, INAER North Sea?). This is both to abandon a name that now has too much adverse baggage and to increase the association with bigger operations to use if they have another accident.
2. Their aircraft will be painted in a new colour scheme (white and orange perhaps)


I'm also sure that in 2 or 3 years, after they have built up EC225 experience in Denmark, Dancopter UK will appear. Maybe by 2020 there will by NHV UK too in Aberdeen!

If BMI Regional fold or relocate that will free up a nice new base on the east side. The old Heli-One hanger is still empty too.

Roll on some competition!

So is having only one main gearbox which takes all the flight loads.
It is perfectly possible to design a system where the main gearbox takes none of the flight loads and the flying controls are not attached to it.
Hughes 500, so not even a new concept.

HC - no more so than tail rotor blades that depart the airframe, cabin doors that fly through the main disc, in flight rotor brake applications, or perhaps more pertinently, MGB's that have inadequate oil lubrication design that leads to catastrophic failure - despite certification implying otherwise!
I think a broad survey of CH47 failures over the last 4 decades would reveal that the interlocking rotors are not the prime reason for concern.
You know as well as I that its meticulous attention to design and rigourous CAME processes that are the keys to safety, not something a little bit different about the overall design.
Bond has been undergoing significant organisational change in recent years - now that can effect flight safety just as much as any design or engineering process faults. I suspect they may about to undergo more!

meticulous attention to

flight operations, training and ground handling too

plus

SMS, QMS, EMS, SeMS, H&SMS, HEMP etc

HEMP - is that smoked or eaten?

I think SM uses both methods - frequently and simultaneously by the sound of it.

Norway Petroleum Authority Criticizes Shell Offshore Safety Issues (http://www.maintenanceandcure.com/offshore-safety-maritime-lawyers.html)

Worker Killed in Accident at Shell Refinery in Port Arthur, Texas (http://www.maintenanceandcure.com/Shell-Refinery-Worker-Death-Port-Arthur-Texas.html)

Fatal accident Enquiry - Shell (http://www.shellnews.net/brent/shell-brent-scandal-fatal-accident-report-18-july-2006.htm)

Shell Struggles to Deal with North Sea Offshore leak (http://www.themaritimelawyer.com/shell-struggles-to-deal-with-north-sea-offshore-leak/)

Need I go on :rolleyes:

I notice that SM didn't mention the incident where a Bristow S76 ONLY just made it to Nigg lighthouse because a Shell platform refused to allow him to land and refuel.

HC,

Your comment about being able to do HJMS downloads while rotors are turning rang a Bell.

What is your experience with that procedure......how many instances of HUMS analysis during a Rotor Running Turnaround where the decision was made to cancel or delay the flight dude to some HUMS abnormality have there been?

Is the number of events significant enough to warrant making either Rotors Running Turnarounds proper only if the downloading of HUMS is possible....or should aircraft that cannot do the downloading be required to shutdown to accomplish the analysis before the next flight?

Should this HUMS download be done at the end of each Sector.....done on the Rig/Platform before the aircraft departs homeward bound?

SAS

I think you have a good point. The availability of mobile HUMS stations is limited but not insurmountable. Getting data sent for analysis from remote locations is not always easy though even in this day and age.

SM

Now that management changes have started I can confidentally predict that by Christmas, certainly before the next anniversaries of the three accidents that:
1.Bond will have been renamed (World Helicopters, INAER UK, INAER North Sea?). This is both to abandon a name that now has too much adverse baggage and to increase the association with bigger operations to use if they have another accident.
2. Their aircraft will be painted in a new colour scheme (white and orange perhaps)I'm also sure that in 2 or 3 years, after they have built up EC225 experience in Denmark, Dancopter UK will appear. Maybe by 2020 there will by NHV UK too in Aberdeen!
If BMI Regional fold or relocate that will free up a nice new base on the east side. The old Heli-One hanger is still empty too.Roll on some competition!

SM Has it taken this long for you to come up with a prediction which many others have been making these past weeks?

"Roll on some competition!" sounds exactly like the threat we've been anticipating from a representative of an exceptionally profitable oil giant, which would unhesitatingly employ the divide-and-rule tactic to force down the profitability of the sub-contractors.

Problem is that if the re-introduction of a fourth and even a fifth helicopter operator to the area should happen, as it did when BP brought in British Caledonian Helicopters, then the rivals can't afford to invest in more than the absolute minimum levels of safety as required by the authorities.

I'll probably be retired by the time that another helicopter company sets up in Aberdeen, but I hereby make a solemn declaration to our offshore-working passengers: If in the coming years after a fourth helicopter offshore operator sets up in North East Scotland, there starts to be a rise in helicopter offshore accident statistics, you should consider that investment in flight safety such as Bristow currently pours in, could have been pared back to the minimum required. This will in all likelihood have been as a consequence of one or more oil giants squeezing the operators "until the pips squeak".

In this life you "gets what you pays for" and safety costs money. I'm now going to avoid entering into further exchanges with SM since my decades in North Sea helicopter flying have shown me the truth of what I've stated and I have nothing much more to add.

Shell Management,

Just an honest and curious question....do you speak for Shell management? If so, I find it strange that you are allowed by your "management" to use such a public forum to present Shell's view of the safety records and viability of subcontractors, and make predictions on the naming of and potential business activities of Shell subcontractors.

What is your experience with that procedure......how many instances of HUMS analysis during a Rotor Running Turnaround where the decision was made to cancel or delay the flight dude to some HUMS abnormality have there been?

Is the number of events significant enough to warrant making either Rotors Running Turnarounds proper only if the downloading of HUMS is possible....or should aircraft that cannot do the downloading be required to shutdown to accomplish the analysis before the next flight?

A good point, and HUMS is only as good and useful as the user allows it to be. It is a tool and not the be all and end all, but a very useful tool at that. I believe there are companies that do a full HUMS download and analysis between every flight and it would be interesting to see their safety stats as a comparison. I am fairly sure that in Norway it is common practice and that certainly CHC HS do not do rotors running turnrounds for this very reason. Not sure about Bristow though, but quite probably the same. Perhaps someone with more info will confirm this.

I can confirm Bristow Norway do not do hot turnarounds
even when we backup operations 'short term' in ABZ we stick to shutting down between flights to let technicians check aircraft and hums before next flight
I know there are pros and cons for this procedure but,
In the recent past this has paid off when a technician found damage to a tail rotor drive shaft after a flight that would have ended up with a shaft failure :eek:

fly safe
Pv :ok:

I remember in Nigeria, (Warri), back in early 1969 Shell wanted to have Bristow and Schreiner on the same contracts, Shell would throw out a requirement and the first one airborne got paid! Alan Bristow refused point blank and threatened to withdraw his helicopters from Warri.

Shell's idea of divide and rule isn't new!

SAS, to do a rotors running download and analysis of the HUMS data on the 225 takes about 5 minutes. The output at the top level is a traffic light system, green obviously requires no further thought, amber or red and the engineers "drill down" to the problem. We have a support contract with EC (something not all operators have) and so a well defined process to determine what to do about it. There have certainly been plenty of cases where a departure is cancelled or at least delayed because of a non-green traffic light.

We can RRTR HUMS analyse on all our fleet - the old IHUMS aircraft such as 332L, S76A, S61, B214, and the new ones although I am not sure about the S92. When the L2 was introduced, with OEM HUMS system, in a typical failure to understand how oil support aircraft are operated, it did not cater for RRTR downloads but we did not operate any L2s so not a problem for us. When we were contemplating the 225 it was a stipulation that we must be able to RRTR download the M'ARMS. EC modified the design to cater for this and of course charged us a considerable sum for the pleasure. This is the kind of thing that Bristow does, that some other operators wouldn't have done. Of course the other operators now benefit from our investment since RRTR HUMS download is now standard on the 225.

There could be an argument for downloading after each landing. Crews would have to take a laptop and process the data offshore. That is fine when you get a green traffic light. If there was a slight problem then it would be difficult to despatch the a/c even though it would probably be OK, and it would be back to shore on a boat a a fairly routine occurrence! That sounds like I am saying we would rather not know that there is a problem because we want to get home, and I suppose there is some truth in that sentiment. The saviour is that in nearly every case, HUMS picks up problems many hours before a failure and to fly for say 3 hrs between downloads is quite adequate if not ideologically perfect. ALARP springs to mind.

HC

Just an honest and curious question....do you speak for Shell management?

Of course not. He has been a pain in the neck on the West African thread for years. Real Shell managers haven't got time to post on pPrune; there too busy stabbing other Shell managers in the back.

Does anyone have the factual info on what was picked up on the M-ARMS for the recent Bond drive failure.

Lots of stories about 'step changes' and upward trends, and the official preliminary report mentioned (I think) that the part was being monitored having shown an increased vibration for 6.5 hours.

I've not heard from anyone that has actually seen the data.

I am so glad to see that the EC225 is not immune against MGB failures/problems and that the 30min dry run capability is just a means of doing a controlled ditching - not an extended flight back from offshore (especially 265nm over the Atlantic at 80kts)! I flew all the AS332 types and enjoy the S92!

I am so glad to see that the EC225 is not immune against MGB failures/problems and that the 30min dry run capability is just a means of doing a controlled ditching

Why would that make you glad..............:ugh::ugh::ugh:

especially 265nm over the Atlantic at 80kts

That would be the 3 hours and 20 minutes run dry time......

Chopperjog,

Remind me again of the S-92 run-dry time?

just a means of doing a controlled ditching

Or, if there is a deck within 30 miles or so, a controlled landing.

Remind me again of the S-92 run-dry time?

Is it about the same or maybe longer than a 225 gearbox with a failed emergency lube system?

Is it about the same or maybe longer than a 225 gearbox with a failed emergency lube system?

It is about the same. The difference is that there is a good chance that on the 225 the emergency lube system will not be failed (especially once the reason for the failure during the recent Bond ditching is understood and corrected). On the S92 the emergency lube system is permanently failed because it doesn't exist!

HC

FED,

Unless something changed.....the last item on the Check List says "Land Immediately" for the 92.....for the failure under discussion.

That does not equate to 30 miles.

That kind of thinking created a problem for the Cougar crew as you recall.

On the S92 the emergency lube system is permanently failed because it doesn't exist!

Yet, but it will.

Maybe I just selected the wrong choice of wording (my apology).....It is when customers want to dumb a machine in favor of another based on only one safety feature....that will most likely result in a ditching anyway! I am all in favor for an emergency design feature that will make our job safer in the offshore Industry! So the "happy"....wasn't meant to be a negative statement!

SASless. Read Chopperlog's post #53 again before you slag my answer.

Are you referring to the 92 or the 225?

I am referring to the 92....

Yet, but it will.

I am sure that you are right, in fact I am surprised it doesn't exist yet because the S92 must surely be pretty close to having its certification pulled due to obvious non-compliance with the certification rules. But the 225 will probably have 10 years head start on 30 mins run dry, which is relevant to those crews flying the aircraft for those 10 years but will eventually become irrelevant.

HC

I am sure that you are right, in fact I am surprised it doesn't exist yet because the S92 must surely be pretty close to having its certification pulled due to obvious non-compliance with the certification rules.

Not sure why you would make such a comment, as clearly the FAA/JAA felt that the S-92A was compliant with FAR/JAR 29.927(c) (1) when they certified it and still do, as it still has a ticket.

But the 225 will probably have 10 years head start on 30 mins run dry, which is relevant to those crews flying the aircraft for those 10 years but will eventually become irrelevant.

Are you suggesting that the EC225 is going to get a ‘30-minute Run-Dry’ transmission (something it currently does not have, as was evident just last month)?

It does have a 30 min run dry capability - that's what the emergency lube system is - Glycol, not oil.

As has been stated before the crew ditched because they had indications that the emergency lube system was not functioning. Had they known that is was working they would have had 30 extra minutes flight time (with no MRGB oil) to find somewhere to land.

It does have a 30 min run dry capability - that's what the emergency lube system is - Glycol, not oil.

As has been stated before the crew ditched because they had indications that the emergency lube system was not functioning. Had they known that is was working they would have had 30 extra minutes flight time (with no MRGB oil) to find somewhere to land.

As has been stated before, Epiphany, the failure of the emlub system was actually probably the occupants' saving grace. There had been a catastrophic failure (it sheared) of a major gearbox component (the main shaft). In this situation, the emlub system would not have given '30 extra minutes flight time'.

Do we bet the Farm that the 30 minute run dry promise by EC/CAA/EASA/JAR/FAA.....is Fair Dinkum?

In the latest event....the crew had cockpit indications it was not....although it appeared to be when checked afterwards. They made the right decision based upon the data they had to consider.

If the system had not been working right.....but no indication of that was evident in the cockpit....and they had decided to fly for 30 minutes.....what might have happened.

I am of the belief that when the "You are now 30 Minutes from Self Destruct...Find a place to Land!" Light/Audio/Horn goes off....I am not going to set the count down timer to "30". I don't care what the EC/CAA et al tell me. Not when it concerns the MGB!

If there isn't a warm dry place within just a very few minutes flying time....I am going to do a very controlled ditching after ever Mother's Son (and Daughter) within hearing range knows exactly where I am and that I desire a ride home.

I'm glad that a proactive decsicion to drop Bond has stimulated so much safety debate. They will be pleased over in Rotterdam!

Hilife, your head does work in a funny way. You imply that because a piece of equipment was faulty one one aircraft on one occasion, it effectively doesn't exist for any aircraft. If you are a professional pilot I do hope you don't apply the same logic to operational decisions!

Neither of us knows how close the S92 certification was to being pulled after the Cougar accident but since it hasn't happened yet it is probably not going to. FAA did accept the compliance with the certification rules on an erroneous loophole, at the time JAA didn't like it at all but it was too politically difficult to take a stance against FAA's decision.

Clearly with hindsight the aircraft does not comply with the 29.927 but it is now far too difficult to back-pedal!

I think if you know who to talk to you will know that the S-92 would not be certified today. Sikorsky are the only ones who still seem to suffer willful blindness on that.But they have been forced by people like Shell Aircraft to develop an emergency lube.:):)

HC

In order to provide balance to your postings it should be noted that the EC225 does not comply with the latest certification standards either:


EC225 Certification Standard
JAR 29, Change 1 effective December 1st, 1999,
except for the following:

• reversion to FAR 29, Amendment 24 as follows:
- FAR 29.561(b)(3) Emergency landing conditions-general (Reference CRI C-01)
• partial reversions to FAR 29, Amendment 24 as follows:
- FAR 29.571 Fatigue evaluation of structure (Reference CRI C-03)
- FAR 29.785 Seat, berth, safety belts, and harnesses (Reference CRI D-01)
• exemptions from JAR 29, Change 1 as follows:
- JAR 29.562 Emergency dynamic landing conditions (Reference CRI C-02)
- JAR 29.952(a)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g) Fuel system crash resistance (Reference CRI E-01)
- JAR 29.955(b) Fuel transfer (Reference CRI E-05)
• partial exemption from JAR 29, Change 1 as follows:
- JAR 29.963(b) Fuel tanks: general; Puncture resistance (Reference CRI E-02)

Of course certification standards don't necessarily result in a safe product. Hence the fitting of magnets to L2/EC225 MGBs until lives are lost. Or indeed the propensity for Super Pumas to fall over!

Maybe one day the perfect rotary machine will be produced......:ok:

VL aka S92 driver (!) - the 225 is a variant of the Super Puma family and so did not need to meet all the requirements of the version of 29 extant when it was certified, only the bits that were changed. The non-compliant bits (which are nearly all about crash worthiness) are well documented in the TCDS as you have shown. I don't think that is the same as pretending to meet the certification requirements but in fact demonstrably and repeatedly demonstrating that it does not a la S92.

Personally I would prefer a heli that didn't crash in the first place, rather than one that increased my chances of survival a bit when it did.

The S92 may allegedly meet the latest standards but if you look at the history of the fleets in terms of number of scary near-disasters and actual disasters, the 92 has had far more than its fair share.

Anyway, isn't this thread about Bond and not some rehash of the endless S92 vs 225 debate which has been rather boring since Nick Lappos left!

Back to Bond, they do make some good decisions, one of which I think is an absence of S92s in their fleet!

Back to Bond, they do make some good decisions, one of which I think is an absence of S92s in their fleet!

Oh dear, HC. I thought that you would be better informed than that:

Press Story | Bond Aviation Group (http://www.bondaviationgroup.com/media/press-story?story=1984)

Oh dear, HC. I thought that you would be better informed than that:


Oh yes, I did wonder if that was a boo boo after I posted it. Well they did get it right in that no S92s flying so far, but that will clearly not be the case in the future!

Oh dear (again), HC. It must really pain you when you see your colleagues at ABZ go out flying in S92s. :rolleyes:

Oh dear (again), HC. It must really pain you when you see your colleagues at ABZ go out flying in S92s.

Not at all, they are happy and ignorance is bliss! Of course it does leave me vulnerable because if I ever fall out with the Big Bosses I know I will be put onto the 92 fleet as a punishment!

Children, children, please!

HC,


the 225 is a variant of the Super Puma family and so did not need to meet all the requirements of the version of 29 extant when it was certified, only the bits that were changed.

Is the MGB on the 225 old tech....or part of the new and improved version?

The Bond machines....the one that lost its rotor head...and the latest one...are they old tech or new tech versions of the MGB?

The other question that is begged....is why did those gear boxes have the problems they did....to the same Operator in a relatively short time period? Is it the Gear Boxes were certified to a lower standard than today and thus have a Design problem....or if a "good" design....was there a Manufacturing failure of some kind.....or if not the first two.....something done/not done in the maintenance engineering during operations?

So let's get this right-
A 225 has a problem and we start bitching about the 92 again?
Strange!

Sasless says:

The other question that is begged....is why did those gear boxes have the problems they did....to the same Operator in a relatively short time period? Is it the Gear Boxes were certified to a lower standard than today and thus have a Design problem....or if a "good" design....was there a Manufacturing failure of some kind.....

Lets just point out that certain discerning customers are happy to fly with the EC225

or if not the first two.....something done/not done in the maintenance engineering during operations?

But not with certain operators.

Kapiche!

Hi Sas

The 225 gearbox is similar in concept to the older Super Puma but different in detail, certainly the upper part. Any change requires recertification which requires compliance with the current rules, hence the need to meet 29.927 30 mins after loss of oil.

The L2 was 1992 tech so pre- requirement mentioned above. The recent one was a 225, 2004 tech so had to comply with the requirement mentioned above.

As to the rest of your questions, yes the way I read the report there did seem to be something "not done" with the L2 crash following the chip 30 or so hours earlier. For the recent one, too early to say because no report out yet!

It certainly seems as though there was a manufacturing defect in the shaft. Which can happen but should be picked up by the manufacturer's quality control system. Whether Bond failed in some way to detect the impending failure, that another operator might have picked up in time, is too early to say.

Whether Bond failed in some way to detect the impending failure, that another operator might have picked up in time, is too early to say.

Jeez, HC. You really can't help yourself (with your unnecessary attempts at point scoring), can you? :rolleyes:

B73,

HC may have been referring to a prior discussion about commonality of engineering procedures and whether in fact Bond uses different techniques than other Operators.....that may not be as effective as the other protocols.

That is not an indictment or slur on Bond....but it is a legitimate question in light of their experiences of late.

We have already seen that different models of the Puma have different capabilities re downloading of HUMS data during Rotors Running Turnarounds. Some Operators have insisted their aircraft have Mods to achieve that ability.

It stands to reason....others have not....and thus are operating to a lower standard in that regard.

HC can be a bit biased towards his 225 and prone to snipe about the 92.....but that doesn't mean every single comment he makes is an attempt to score points after the whistle has blown.

The 92 MGB situation deserves some criticism.....as does EC's gear boxes based upon Bond's experiences.

Jeez, HC. You really can't help yourself (with your unnecessary attempts at point scoring), can you?

I think you will find I was responding to SASless' question about what may have been done or not done to precipitate the accident, and I was pointing out that it was too early to say either way. In what way is that point scoring?

Epiphany

It does have a 30 min run dry capability - that's what the emergency lube system is - Glycol, not oil

Call me pedantic if you like, but complying with 29.927(c) (1) with the installation of an emergency glycol lubrication system is not a true Run Dry system - à la the AW139 (I believe?), but Run Wet, so I would disagree with you.

HC

Some might just agree with you that my head works in funny ways, but “he who lives in a glass house……..” as they say.

With the O&G industry having to drill further offshore to find new oil and gas reserves, surely the idea of a 30-minute clearance is old hat, so the O&G industry should be pushing for 45-minutes or an hour even?

HiLife

The requirement is often misquoted as "run dry" but if you bother to read the actual requirement, it is for continued operation for 30 minutes after loss of oil by whatever means, not necessarily "running dry". So I would call you an incorrect pedant!

Of course it would be nice to have longer "run dry" time (yes, I am falling for it too!) but even 45 mins - 1hr doesn't take you very far at Vy. I am inclined to agree with the sentiments expressed by others here that one should only contemplate using the full "dry run" time if the option to land/ditch immediately looks unsurvivable, or if there is a solid landing site quite near. Would you really be happy trundling along for 1 hr not knowing whether the failure mode the gearbox is experiencing is one that the designers had thought of, or one that they had not thought of!

HC can be a bit biased towards his 225 and prone to snipe about the 92
Who me? I am totally neutral of course!

You are never going to get any gearbox system running 2,000 hp through it to run for 45 minutes dry and still be of a reasonable weight. You could piggyback two smaller gearboxes, with seperate lubrication systems; with both working in normal conditions. In an emergency one could run at a lighter load with the other, failed, freewheeling but it would take years to design, build and certify it. Even so, you would still have people dumping it into the sea at the first sign of trouble, so what's the point.

With the L2 accident as far as I understand the catastrophy happened when the gearbox case broke up. Some of the early helicopters had seperate support system for the main rotor so even if the gearbox dissassembled the aircraft was still supported and had managable Rrpm.

I wonder why the gearbox designers haven't repeated the emergency lube system in the S61, which had a separate sump of oil under the main gearbox. If the pilot operated a switch, it used an electric pump if I recall correctly to send oil to the high-speed hot gears/bearings at the input side.

Obviously such a separate reservoir of oil could be located anywhere in the vicinity of the gearbox and metered to supply just enough oil to critical areas to keep them from disintegrating for half an hour or longer while operating at reduced power.

Why use glycol? Is it lighter than oil? I believe that its main function is to cool; not to lubricate. Just curious.

It must be remembered that Shell Aircraft International are the world leaders in aviation safety and the driving force behind all major safety successess of the last 20 years.

As ICAO run to catch up with SAI, the 7/7=1 initiative is the bedrock of the hole IHST initiative to reduce accidents globally by 80% in 10 years just as Shell has done:
Rotor & Wing Magazine :: 7/7=1 (http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/products/engines/771_1369.html)

Or see more of SAI's industry leadership here:
on maintaining a safety case to show you are safe: http://www.caa.lv/upload/userfiles/files/SMS/Read%20first%20quick%20overview/SHELL%20Safety%20Cases%20C%20J%20Edwards.pdf
and
On making use of data like HUMS to prevent accidents: http://www.raes-hfg.com/reports/08dec00-businesscase/comp-mon.pdf and http://www.hfdm.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Aja%2BDkVrox8%3D&tabid=2889&mid=4398&language=es-MX
and finally, most relavent here on monitoring compliance: http://www.ebace.aero/2011/archives/presentations/20110517-sheffield-is-bao-industry-standards.pdf

Safety initiatives like requiring companies to meet constantly changing requirements at the lowest possible cost and then, just when they have established themselves and proven themselves to be safe, reliable and consistent, taking the contract away and giving it to another operator just to save a few dollars - way to improve safety Mr Shell Management! :D

Don't kid yourself - these improvements in safety have been brought about despite companies like Shell, not because of them! :ugh: Safety happens when good operators can run stable operations with sensible budgets and decent support form the client - it doesn't happen because some suit brings out a flashy brochure with some flow-charts and buzz-words in it.

Oh

You understimate the value of SAI in developing the new small operators of tomorrow.:)
Look at Caverton:ok:

Of course there are new operators - you incentivise them into the marketplace to drive down costs, load contract terms to favour them at the expense of established operators, award the contract and then shaft them three years later in the same manner!

There is an argument for it making good commercial sense, but the suggestion that it is good for safety makes me want to puke! :\

When helicopters are about 2% of the oil company's transportation budget....which is a very small portion of their operating budget....and some are making Tens of Billions of Dollars in profit.....and the shoddy way they treat the Helicopter Operators.....it just shows what their priorities are....and it isn't about fostering improved safety and good vender relationships.

Every oil company is the same in that regard.

When Chevron took over Texaco....where Texaco required twin engined aircraft....Chevron did not. Needless to say the standard did not go up during or after the take over. The Escravos operation was just GOM Africa.

Mind you some of the Operators need to take a hard look in the mirror as well.

Some one has to lead the process and do a marketing pitch to convince the customer of the financial benefit and operational efficiencies that can be brought about by improving the way they do business. Granted the Customer has to at least give the Operator a chance to make that pitch. We know how that game is played!

A while back someone noted smaller sized operators had far more to risk in the event of a fatal crash than did larger operators and thus smaller operators might tend to be more attentive to their engineering and operational procedures.

I guess we could say the same about the Oil Companies.....they have very deep pockets and a few fatalities now and then just don't amount to much in the way of Risk to the business and its profitability.....so they have a much more casual view of the odd crash now and then.

Every oil company is the same in that regard.

Clearly not true. I recently read:
When Chevron took over Texaco....where Texaco required twin engined aircraft....Chevron did not.

Who siad that now?:E

SM.

I'd like to see you take your smart-mouth comments into a North-sea crew-room where i'm pretty sure you'd be given the treatment you so richly deserve.

Well obviously most North Sea crews appreciate all the hard work that has gone into reducing the risk to them.:)

In fact I'm sure all SAI advisors would appreciate more feedback on how much their tireless work is appreciated.:ok:

I've often heard fellow pilots complimenting Shell and commenting on how much better the industry is and how much safer they feel thanks to them :mad:

Thats good to hear.:ok:

If this idiot is anything to go by, "Shell Management" are not very professional

Welcome to PPRuNe:yuk:
Two posts in three years - whose the busy beaver.

Just spreading the gospel!:)

Shows how busy Shell Management are with concerned matters and safety if they have so much time to post on here... :hmm:

If only SM would learn to use a spell checker or learn some grammar his obnoxious posts might be more readable:
most relavent here on monitoring compliance
Thats good
whose the busy beaver
... just to quote from a few of his inane posts

Not to mention Kapiche!

Don't worry about SM. Trolls can't spell.

SM

It must be remembered that Shell Aircraft International are the world leaders in aviation safety and the driving force behind all major safety successess of the last 20 years.

The driving force hey! A rather arrogant statement!
I was under the impression there were several professional bodies that strived to improve aviation safety!

I think you mean "Capiche"! You really are sticking the knife in aren't you!:

Gentlemen

Shell Management, BP Management, ExxonMobile Management, Statoil Management, Super Duper Management....would real life management staff be posting here using such nick names?


Entertainment value of the so called Shell Management is undeniable, but please get a grip on how our customers operate when it comes to public affairs.

Poor ol' box'ead SM. I got to feeling sorry about him. Thought I'd relay for him that even Aussies can show great tact when it is required. Here is a story that floated across my desk while I was out.



Three Aussie blokes working up on an outback mobile phone tower:
Mongrel, Coot and Bluey.
As they start their descent, Coot slips, falls off the tower and is killed
instantly.
As the ambulance takes the body away,
Bluey says, 'Well, bugger me, someone's gotta go and tell Coot's wife.
Mongrel says, 'OK, I'm pretty good at that sensitive stuff, I'll do it.'
Two hours later, he comes back carrying a carton of Beer.
Bluey says, 'Where'd you get the grog, Mongrel?'
'Coot's wife gave it to me,' Mongrel replies.
'That's unbelievable, you told the Missus her husband was dead and she gave
you a carton of beer?'
'Well, not exactly', Mongrel says.
'When she answered the door, I said to her, 'You must be Coot's widow.'
She said, 'You must be mistaken. I'm not a widow.'
Then I said, 'I'll betcha a carton of beer you are.'


Aussies are good at that sensitive stuff

Press and Journal - Article - Bond cleared of blame for helicopter ditching (http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/2813812)

Helicopter manufacturer Eurocopter has cleared operator Bond of any blame for a ditching incident in the North Sea last month.
The aviation giant – which built the Super Puma which had to make an emergency landing on the sea off Aberdeen last month – said Bond was not responsible for the accident.
Two crew and 12 passengers had to be rescued in what was the third serious incident involving a Bond Super Puma in three years.
Eurocopter said the skill of the Bond pilots and the design of the aircraft saved their lives.

So EC is taking sole blame for the failed shaft then!

This will make their (EC) Insurance company feel all warm and fuzzy!

Dancopter have a system where engines and transmission systems are monitored electronically for changes in vibrations and analyzed before every flight take off.:ok:

Interesting. How is this displayed to the pilot????

Probably something borrowed from the Shell EC-155 and Dornier fleet in Nigeria.....as that was the previous center of excellence there.

How do they manage that offshore, then? Is there a M'ARMS station at every installation?

you would need an engineer to sign the CRS to say its ok to fly. cant have one of those on every rig.

Beside all "technical" problems already discussed here, does anybody of you know about the start date of the fresh or extended Shell contract were Bond was droped in the bidding phase? Seems like Bristow and CHC in Aberdeen are busy with preparations... and also looking out for additional engineers and pilots with Shell qualifications...

Well CHC are doing the Shell flights today. (Monday 2nd )

CHC doing Shell flights? Rumour has it that this is not just a short term contract. Don't know any details, I'm too far away from Aberdeen these days. :)

Interesting that CHC was Shells' third preference, and yet that's who they've ended up with. Funny old world huh?

unstable load

Its on their website - Dancopter are clearly an innovative company:ok:

As I've said elsewhere, Shell only fly aircraft and operators that are Shell Aircraft approved:)

As Shell are not using Bond, CHC can't be third choice. Do the maths:E

Off course next time we may have NHV, Bancopter or HeliHolland in Aberdeen bidding.:D

Bancopter

You got it right there SM !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11

Shell Baffon:-

from Dancopter...

The safety accomplishment is measured and secured by auditing the technical and operational organization regularly. This includes monitoring every flight through an anonymous analysis of the "flight data" from "the black box" with the purpose of optimizing the training of pilots. The helicopter's motor and transmission systems are monitored electronically for changes in vibrations - these are being analyzed before every flight take off.

Its HUMS / MARMS and HOMP The same as everybody else...

I bet you think electricity is white man's Magic?

NHV, Bancopter or HeliHolland in Aberdeen bidding


Not if they have to bring their aircraft on to the British register you won't, may not be commercially viable for them to try and operate to the Shell rigs from over the other side, unless Shell are prepared to pick up the tab for re-registration or extended flights and higher flying hours.

Why would these company's have to bring their aircraft onto the British system?:confused:

Possibly the rules have changed under JAA but there was, I believe, a time when, if engaged in a commercial operation, based in the UK, you would be given a date by which time you had to have your a/c on the British register, can't remember how long was allowed, I do remember a USA registered B737-200 operating out of LGW for about six months at a time, so maybe just a permit is required.

With judicious swapping of a/c probably get away with it and at the risk of repeating myself, under JAA it is probably all different now, just one big, happy family!;)

This is EASA land.

The only reason they would reregister is IF the customer specified a
UK AOC. eg the Bond Irish contract that required a Irish AOC and reg of the heli.

quite possibly true actually. Danish 92's flying from aberdeen have to be re registered within 6 months i believe.

The freedom for an European AOC holder to operate within any other European country is not as simple as many think. The flights have to be to/from a "community airport", with offshore installations and mobiles not qualifying.
So this means national boundaries still count for offshore support flights i.e. offshore flights are still subject to the rules of "cabotage".
The only way around this is if a national regulator grants permission for these rules to be varied e.g. the Dutch and British regulators have had a long running reciprocity arrangement. The allows for the current plan for the CHC AOCs in the Netherlands and UK to be merged.
What is very interesting with the Dancopter contract is that the Danish regulator has always refused CHC's requests for the UK AOC to be recognised in Denmark, hence the continued existence of CHC Denmark. The CHC Denmark S92s in Aberdeen at the moment are there under a short term "wet lease" basis.
I do hope the UK CAA are insisting that Dancopter establish a UK AOC. Or will they take the typical weak "British" viewpoint and feel like the have to "do the right thing" and follow the Europeans at the expense of UK PLC. :ugh:

When are Conocophillips going to return to Bond?

at the expense of UK PLC

Whats UK PLC about Bristow, CHC or Bond for that matter?