UK AAIB(H) May 2012

[Hilico]

MD900 skid tube fractures, while it was sitting on the ground having just landed. G-CEMS (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/md900_explorer__g_cems.cfm)

R22 hover taxis back to the spot, pilot turns throttle wrong way, gets rotation under control after 6 turns, damage to tailboom. G-BXUC (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/robinson_r22_beta__g_bxuc.cfm)

R44 loss of control after unintentional entry into IMC, sad outcome. Here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/robinson_r44_ii__raven_ii__g_rotg.cfm)

Magni M24C gyroplane rolls to the right when opened up for a go-around from a low overshoot. G-ORDW (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/magni_m24c_gyroplane__g_ordw.cfm)

VPM M16 gyroplane can't be held on the brakes while pre-rotating, attempts take-off roll with lower rpm but flapback damages the tail. G-CVPM (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/vpm_m16_tandem_trainer_gyroplane__g_cvpm.cfm)

[MartinCh]

Very unusual accident, that R22 G-BXUC. Already rated PPL pilot flying solo.

I mean, all sorts of mishaps happen, but would rolling on throttle (and not noticing first second or two), with collective ALL THE WAY DOWN, make the heli light enough on skids to start spinning and scraping the ground? I haven't tried/done it myself, just wondering. Being solo and low on fuel could then be a factor.

[212man]

I'm surprised that the AAIB (in the R-44 report) do not consider the effect of being asked to set a transponder code on a pilot who has just become lost in IMC. It is not a criticism of the controller, but I can't help but think that going head down for several seconds, whilst in IMC, could not have helped the poor pilot in his attempts to reman in control. His almost total loss of airspeed could very well have been the result of inadvertently applying back pressure on the cyclic, whilst concentrating on the TXPDR settings.

[DennisK]

Sounds similar to the NI Bertie Fisher Squirrel accident report, but perhaps someone out there has more details. Can't think of an easier way to assist distraction in an inadvertant IMC situation than attempting to set a TPDR code. DRK.

[MartinCh]

ditto regarding the R44 chap.

I don't think the controller considered how disorientating it is flying solely on instruments in Robinson (44 still better than 22, though) compared to fixed wing. Add in leaning over and already being stressed.

I find it quite a difference, flying in trimmed out C172 on instruments, including in actual as opposed to being in R22 with bit of turbulence, head down looking at instrument panel. I'm still not finished with FAA IR, but when I was given sort of binocular foggles with tiny holes for panel and no outside cues, I was flying R22 like drunk and overshooting the turns constantly, including bias of turns towards one side when trying to fly straight.

Just a speculation, but the way we have to pull or push the T bar in Robinsons, just to fly S&L, depending on airspeed and CG (not just DoL), could have made the reduced turn rate for the guy, together with not being current flying on instruments. Besides, the not so instant slowing down/speeding up in 44.
I'd say it's easier to lose track of slowly bleeding off airspeed when climbing.

Losing so much airspeed and being in the soup, virtually OGE hover, that's what looks like the last step in losing control. Wonder if he had AH in the panel of VFR ship as well.

212man,
I tended to put the nose down a bit, pushing cyclic, when fiddling with instruments in Robinson. Collective may have moved slightly when it wasn't held and thus changing pitch, too. Not possible to say now. Probably similar amount of heli hood time as this guy when he did some 'instrument appreciation' training.

[stringfellow]

great debate guys.. that's exactly what jumped off the report for me... the very last thing in the world i would want to do if i went imc was to look down and left and punch in a transponder code... its tricky enough on a clear day.

[cjbiz]

A tragic and horrible way to go. Agreed that looking down towards the xpdr will make life incredibly difficult and perhaps better ATC understanding of the lack of stability a light rotary pilot faces, especially during IIMC, would be useful so that such instructions are not issued in the future.

However, just to play devils advocate one could argue that it is the pilots responsibility to maintain control of the aircraft and during a situation like this the decision could be taken to disregard the ATC request.

Without wading into the debate about the PPL(h) 5hrs instrument training requirement, with the current system in place should the CAA issue guidance to flying schools and examiners that additional emphasis should be placed on not only the importance of avoiding IMC altogether but how utterly vital it is to keep focused on the instrumentation should you find yourself caught out?

The figures for loss of life due to similar accidents are shocking and surely must be a high priority issue.

[Martin Barclay]

Was there not a very similar incident with a 44, think it had just left Manchester Barton with exactly the same, inadvertant IMC and loss of control setting a transponder code. Maybe enough of a link to offer guidelines?

[SilsoeSid]

Maybe enough of a link to offer guidelines?

I really am surprised that nobody has said it yet, especially with comments here such as;

"... the very last thing in the world i would want to do if i went imc was to look down and left and punch in a transponder code... its tricky enough on a clear day."

"Can't think of an easier way to assist distraction in an inadvertant IMC situation than attempting to set a TPDR code. DRK."

"I'm surprised that the AAIB (in the R-44 report) do not consider the effect of being asked to set a transponder code on a pilot who has just become lost in IMC. It is not a criticism of the controller, but I can't help but think that going head down for several seconds, whilst in IMC, could not have helped the poor pilot in his attempts to reman in control."


Does the phrase, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate not ring any bells?


As for comments such as;

"Agreed that looking down towards the xpdr will make life incredibly difficult and perhaps better ATC understanding of the lack of stability a light rotary pilot faces, especially during IIMC, would be useful so that such instructions are not issued in the future."

"I don't think the controller considered how disorientating it is flying solely on instruments in Robinson (44 still better than 22, though) compared to fixed wing."


I don't think the call to Newquay gave too much away. After the normal introductory call was made;
"Got myself into a bit of difficulty here and at presently 3,200 feet... and uh got lost in cloud, am climbing and uh can you give me some help here please, Tango Golf"

...is different than, for example a basic;
MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, G-ROTG, R44, in cloud, 6 miles South of Bude, 3,200ft climbing, unrated, need help.

I think to put any blame whatsoever here on a controller is deeply unfair, especially bearing in mind that many are private/commercial qualified pilots themselves and if not have a fantastic understanding of aviation and flying as a whole. Who knows, the controllers first words might have been, "Roger TG, Wings level, bar to bar, watch airspeed, control rate of climb".


Aren't we told from the very start, the first priority at all times is to fly the aircraft!

[toptobottom]

This one also jumped out at me when the report following this thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/458333-crash-near-bude-cornwall-24th-july-2011-a.html).

The poor guy was in a blind panic, brain racing, heart rate over 200bpm, squeezing the TX trigger constantly and muttering to himself, no doubt staring at the AH, too scared to blink. I'm not sure how he thought a controller could assist in getting his aircraft's attitude and speed sorted out, but he was desperate and obviously not thinking clearly. It was an unnecessary and significant distraction.

What were the controller's options though? Ignore the call? Say hello and apologise for not being able to help? The controller has to ask for a squawk, but wasn't in a position to offer any constructive help (except maybe avoid a CFIT if the pilot regained control). With the TX channel open, he couldn't have given any help even if he wanted in this case. This was another error by the pilot and not the fault of the controller. "Aviate, navigate, communicate" is another Big Boys' Rule...

[toptobottom]

SS - SNAP!! :ok:

[212man]

I think to put any blame whatsoever here on a controller is deeply unfair

I certainly wasn't - and stated as much. However, the lesson could be usefully included in ATC unit training plans, perhaps, as have many lessons in the past

[Helinut]

No one has yet said what the ATC unit should have done instead of giving a squawk code.

I am pretty sure that most ATC have enough of an appreciation to know that workload is a problem in single pilot aviation in an emergency VFR into IMC. They may not appreciate just how unstable an unstabilised helicopter is. However, what should they do different from giving a radar service?

[cjbiz]

SS

I don't think (and never said) that any 'blame' should be apportioned to the controller. They seem to have followed SOP and certainly it wasn't ATC who got the poor bloke into the situation in the first place.

My question was whether or not a change in ATC policy to ensure that if a controller receives a distressed call they check to make sure the aircraft is stable before issuing further instructions would be a good idea? Of course the controller was not to know the severity of the event and while the pilot may have been in a blind panic, it MAY just have been that a calm voice telling him to go 'bar to bar' would have ASSISTED to calm him down enough to recover the situation.

Accepted that with a finger firmly help on the tx trigger no information or help will get through and hence I'm still convinced that the emphasis during the PPL/CPL(H) courses should be the training of IMC avoidance and poor weather appreciation, not the wasteful flogging around the sky with goggles on.

[Helinut]

Surely we are in the realm of wishful thinking here. If an aircraft calls up on the radio to ATC it is to request a service. From what witnesses say, the call was not even a Mayday. The instability of the aircraft is a feature that is peculiar to unstabilised helicopters, which are probably (guessing) just a few percent of the traffic any ATC works. Lets be realistic.

I recall a previous thread went on and on about this, but the solution to this is to avoid going IMC in such aircraft. In my book, this is ALWAYS possible (with the right mindset and training) except perhaps at night. We don't provide the right training at present, sadly.

[AnFI]

cjbiz:
hence I'm still convinced that the emphasis during the PPL/CPL(H) courses should be the training of IMC avoidance and poor weather appreciation,
quite right - obviously

Instrument appreciation is fun - but not the solution...

[cjbiz]

Helinutt

I agree entirely that it is possibly wishful thinking to have such a system in place and yes you are right that unstabilised rotary traffic makes up a very small percentage of the overall number of aircraft handled by our friends in ATC.

However to look at another percentage.....I'm pretty certain that the minority group above makes up the majority group in fatal accidents caused by IIMC. How many more times will we see pictures/read read reports of crumpled Robbos that had been on a private flights in sh:eek:te weather before the authorities start jumping up and down?

For what it's worth I actually think that the 'instrument appreciation' ("well done Bloggs, you can now carry out a 180 degree turn with sole reference to instruments") part of the courses leads some (not all!) trainees into a false sense of ability.....rather than have the desired effect of scaring the stuffing out of them so they never go near it!

[AnFI]

HN: the solution to this is to avoid going IMC in such aircraft. In my book, this is ALWAYS possible (with the right mindset and training) except perhaps at night quite right but it is allways possible EVEN at NIGHT - it's not about a visibility limit (which will soon be bought in for night VFR) it's about not going Inadvertently IMC.. which is ALLWAYS possible too!

[Epiphany]

"If you are risking getting into something that is possibly life-threatening then always have a plan to get out of it. Don't expect others to help you if you f*ck up"

Wise words I have not forgotten.

[Helinut]

AnFI,

We don't disagree by much but we clearly have a different view about night. My opinion is based upon over 10 years of police flying with a lot of night myself, and knowledge of a lot more by other police pilots. Inadvertent IMC at night in that group happens quite regularly (not often but regularly). Some such events are recorded in the system, but I believe most are unrecorded.

The police pilots are not permitted to fly IMC intentionally (for various reasons but mainly cos the operators with one exception don't want to pay for IR training and currency). However, many police pilots are or were IR'd (or the mil equivalent) and they fly stabilised and largely IFR equipped helicopters. Inadvertent IMC in those circs is likely to have a successful outcome.

There have been one or 2 notable "night into IMC" accidents in police flying, but the probability of survival is MUCH greater than the class of hele and operation we are considering here.

My view based on this evidence is that sometimes at night a pilot cannot see the IMC coming.

What evidence do you use to form your opinion?

[AnFI]

Good post well made.

I don't like talking about my experience and prefer the logic of the argument to speak but when I was about 12years old I was flying with a then very experienced pilot on a rough dark night somewhere between Yorks and Lancs - I remember the importance attached to keeping sufficient visual references - (this had all ways been important in all my ordinary flying up until then also) - As we started to run out of 'easy cues' I started to think that it was hard to see enough to fly - he started to get impatient with my (obviously now in hindsight) ineptitude, he kept re-emphasising to keep visual refs - I could not see how - gave control back - watched carefully, asked questions and could see how it was done. Subsequently there were many more permutations which re-enforced the ABSOLUTENESS of the need and possibility to GUARANTEE keeping sufficient references.

Since then I have flown with many other pilots (professional and private) and am often surprised to find a half-arsed approach to keeping visual references... one such inadequate method is to choose an arbitrary visibility limit in which it is deemed that there is an unacceptable risk to become Inadvertently IMC. It is not Inadvertent under those circumstances it is Inevitable.

One helpful thought is that a pilot can manoeuver to determin the absence of cloud (or other obstructions) - you can't just rely on avoiding clouds you have to avoid places which could be cloud. So i agree you cannot see all IMC but you can see what is definately not IMC.

I have now since flown all over the world through most of the worst weather in the world by day and night - but I have never been 'forced' to loose Visual References.

I think the early introduction of IMC flight makes pilots casual about temporary loss of Cues - particularly since as you say the consequences are trivial in those cases you allude to. I find it hard to understand how in the Police role anyone is getting close to being unable to GUARANTEE keeping visual references other than (as you observe) it's not very important to those pilots to stay Visual since the consequences are trivial... ?

This mindset results in advice which may be inappropriate to VMC pilots... IM(H)O

[[email protected]]

AnFII find it hard to understand how in the Police role anyone is getting close to being unable to GUARANTEE keeping visual references

Imagine you are looking for a bad boy at night, you have selected what seems like a good height to keep you out of the cloud and can't operate lower or you may alert said bad boy to your presence. You may be in the hover or flying a racetrack pattern whilst the sensor operator is tracking the villain - the mobile weather system you are flying in produces a shower that drags the cloudbase down just as you turn into it - voila, instant and pretty much unavoidable IIMC.

It seems your experience of flying will remain a mystery as you have failed to give details on so many other threads but you don't appear to have done a job where IIMC is a real threat due to operational pressure.

[Epiphany]

Careful Crab I think you have met your match here. This guy has been flying helicopters NVFR since he was 12 years old when most of us were still at school. He knows a thing or two I'll warrant.

[AnFI]

just as you turn into it - voila, instant and pretty much unavoidable IIMC.
There's the thing - I don't count that as unavoidable, the pilot controls the helicopter, the helicopter goes where the pilot wants, if the pilot does not want to turn into a cloud then he should not.

There just seems to be a strange (to me) mindset that it is something that happens to you - whereas it's really something you (one) do(es)

You can't just fly where you want unconditionally - it must be conditional on an instant basis...

Anyway I don't want to demean anyone - but it has to be a half-arsed attempt to stay visual if you'll just turn into something you can't be sure is not a cloud:confused:

[[email protected]]

AnFI - as mentioned previously, your 'experience' does not extend to situations where just flying the helicopter is not the only issue - in the military, the police and other types of flying you are operating the helicopter to achieve a mission and sometimes that mission takes priority. IIMC is a risk which is why such missions are conducted in an IFR capable twin with suitably qualified pilots such that IIMC is just an inconvenience and not a drama.

No-one is being blase about entering cloud but sometimes bad things happen.

There have been several occasions when I haven't wanted to go IMC but, in trying to complete a critical mission (lifesaving) in marginal weather, it happened because the weather is unpredictable, especially in the mountains.

[toptobottom]

I can't believe this thread is still running - really. The same points have been made a dozen times by a dozen pilots and yet AnFI still won't concede to the reality of situations that catch out even the most highly trained and experienced of us.

Time to move on methinks...

[AnFI]

ttb: true!