I think that respected MAK is not acting in this accident. I believe that special goverment board was estabilished to take a part in indonesian investigation.

Plus about hundread men from Ministry of Extraordinary Situations of Russia had arived to Indonesia to help with local works. Few days ago they leaved the crash site and fly back on their Il-76 to Russia. You can only speculate if it is only coincidence that they lived in the moment, when CVR indicated CFIT as very probably cause of accident and determine aircraft technical problems as unlikly.

grizz (#492), releasing such a statement is not unusual. Protocol requires that the investigating authority makes the statement; the manufacturer is a participant in the process, although usually requests such info to placate airworthiness authorities and operators / prospective operators at the earliest and most appropriate time.
The CVR is quite capable of determining ‘at this time’ that there were ‘no indications of …’ (details may have been lost in translation). E.g. no systems alerts or warnings heard, no crew calls for emergency procedures, and no unusual/unexpected noises.

I think that respected MAK is not acting in this accident.

Probably not. Like the An-148 test crash, the industry ministry is involved.

Also, protection provided by EGPWS/TAWS is significantly different depending on position source information. GPS direct is best.....FMS (even with GPS in the suite) is a "degraded" position.

Does anyone know.....what is the position source on the aircraft/interface on this aircraft?

The facts to date do not support this as a major factor, but.........as usual, wait for the (hopefully) unbiased factual/final report.

Has the NTSB asked to be party to this investigation?

Yes, there are representatives of MAK participating as accredited representatives in this investigation (as is the usual practice).

Safety Pee...Thanks for your comment. I am aware of the protocols in these instances; my point was that issuing a "jointly signed statement" at this juncture (if that in fact occurred) which makes statements about things that there is as yet no evidence of, is quite different than issuing updates of factual confirmed information.

I have been involved in many investigations where pressure was applied early in an investigation by interested parties for the agency to issue statements saying that so far "there is no evidence of this", or "no indication of that", etc.

Most state investigative agencies strive to avoid such statements, for several reasons, the most important of which is: The need to be (and appear to be) completely independent of any influence from any source, from the time of the accident until the release of the final report.

A second, but potentially more critical reason, is that there have been occasions wherein DFDR data added causal information not available through a CVR analysis, or a wreckage analysis.

grizzled & safetypee

we are probably dealing with a single party releasing a statement rather than joint.

The difference being that "no-objection" by an ICAO recognized investigator-in-charge

To confirm I would like to know the source of the news article

That person says that there was no sightseeing,

To clarify previous posts, there are numerous images taken by a photographer on the flight deck during a flight on 08/05 2012, the day before the crash and on 04/05/2012.

MobileMe Gallery (http://gallery.me.com/sdolya#102194/20120508_ssjroadshow_356&bgcolor=black)

There were other photographers on board I wonder if they were allowed the same access?

If flying low no better viewing/ filming viewpoint than from the cockpit.

Genlemen,


Who may, please, comment on what crew had to do and not to do in case the communications with the ground ATC was broken or delayed?


Assume that the picture drawn by Gerry Soejetman is close to reality:
http://2.bp.********.com/-cg7Nm_jPuvU/T7QEiIok4hI/AAAAAAAAAWk/gBPnrgL65A8/s1600/97004-Path-Analysis-Flight2-R2.-RZjpg.jpg


and let's consider the right point of orbit depicted in the above picture. Looks like having received OK from ATC to change the altitude to 6 Kft and make a right-hand orbit staying within Bogor training area, the crew implemented this maneuver and tried to get in contact with ATC once again requesting execution of the next step(s) of the flight plan. Most likely (at least as suggested by Gerry and it sounds reasonable) the crew was planning to make a right-hand U-turn and then continue descend towards Halim.


Assume now that the ATC did not react to the crew at that point (e.g. was busy as it was a rush hour). What the crew had to do in this situation, i.e. a demo/experimental flight, Indonesian airspace with potential specifics vs Russia, Europe, US? Repeating the right-hand orbit once again waiting until the communication is re-established? Go on implementing the flight plan (U-turn and further descend)? Keep going with the same course and altitude? If the latter, the crew would be moving towards the mountains as it likely happned. And if they were under VFR, this might not be a problem – e.g. they might be thinking «OK, let's wait for ATC and then make a turn after we pass the peak». But immideately after entering the mountains, they found themselves in a bad weather and the problems began. Perhaps, they reported change to IFR, even tried to get up to the Grid MORA, but not pulling up steep enough.


Is there anything obviously wrong in the above considerations? Sorry again if any wording sounds silly; my background is Air Force and astronaut training, too far from the civil aviation.

Having followed this thread from day one here are my observations...
First answering A Van what I would do once established in the Bogor training area and lost communications with ATC... I would maintain VFR and continue orbiting that area. From previous posts I gather that the Bogor treaining area has a ceiling of 6000' and can only be used in VMC conditions. If ATC does not respond, try approach, tower etc. Been there before.
My second observation is that fotos of the three types of data recorders were published in this thread. The two - CVR and a combined version of CVR/FDR look almost identical. I have not heard of an official anouncement that crews are still actively looking for the FDR. It also sounds very suspicious that Russia has recalled most of their search teams. After all they would be most interested in the FDR data.
As Karel X [post 493] states the Russian search team consisted of 'Ministry of Extraordinary Situations' people. Could it be they found the FDR and without fanfare delivered it to MAK. Now it would be almost impossible for MAK to admit they have it. Or maybe they just asertained that it was a combined CVR/FDR and left. I can't imagine that once one was found, the other can not.
Does anyone know how far apart they were mounted?

The datas (FDR, CVR) will hopefully show in the future, what led to the disaster.

A_Van
Assume now that the ATC did not react to the crew at that point (e.g. was busy as it was a rush hour). What the crew had to do in this situation, i.e. a demo/experimental flight, Indonesian airspace with potential specifics vs Russia, Europe, US? Repeating the right-hand orbit once again waiting until the communication is re-established? Go on implementing the flight plan (U-turn and further descend)?

Lots of assumptions here. But given they apply, then staying in the orbit, or climbing in that orbit would have been an option. To continue with further descent when unaware of the terrain is suicide.

Keep going with the same course and altitude? If the latter, the crew would be moving towards the mountains as it likely happned.

No good plan, you might hit something or run out of fuel.

And if they were under VFR, this might not be a problem – e.g. they might be thinking «OK, let's wait for ATC and then make a turn after we pass the peak». But immideately after entering the mountains, they found themselves in a bad weather and the problems began.

If flying VFR, there is no sound reason to enter IMC with an air transport aircraft in mountaneous terrain. I would try both, stay out or get out of the mountains (climbing above MSA would be apropriate, would improve communication with ATC as well) and stay VFR by all means, and continue VFR on the planned routing. until communication with ATC is established.

Perhaps, they reported change to IFR, even tried to get up to the Grid MORA, but not pulling up steep enough.

There should be no need to pull up steep. When familiar with the performance of the aircraft planning ahead, staying clear of obstacles and maintaining VMC saves the day.

We should ask the question, what the task in the Bogor training area was. It´s kind of unusual to use a training area just to reverse course. That could have been done also under IFR in a level turn.

The descent in the wrong area finally brought them down to an altitude, where hitting ground was possible.

When being checked out on a new type, my LTC likened some of the traps one could fall into as a 'long dark corridor.'

I think this was almost a literal interpretation of the analogy. A nice easy VFR flight around the mountain and a turn one ridge too early - perhaps with that orographic sheet masking the left ridge.

With the speeds and times we've suggested there could well have been just a few seconds of utter disbelief as it became apparent there was no opening ahead. No real time to do anything in an aircraft that refuses to be pointed at the stars.

Assume that the picture drawn by Gerry Soejetman is close to reality:
http://2.bp.********.com/-cg7Nm_jPuv...-R2.-RZjpg.jpg

A_Van,

Welcome to PPRuNe. For some strange reason, the word "b l o g s p o t" is banned. Here is a TinyURL pointing to the picture you refer to:

http://tinyurl.com/6m5cteu

A nice easy VFR flight around the mountain and a turn one ridge too early - perhaps with that orographic sheet masking the left ridge.

With the speeds and times we've suggested there could well have been just a few seconds of utter disbelief as it became apparent there was no opening ahead. No real time to do anything in an aircraft that refuses to be pointed at the stars.
I reckon you've nailed it.

The Australian Army lost a Twin Otter in PNG a few years ago doing exactly that. Turned up the wrong valley on a training flight and couldn't outclimb the rising terrain. Accident Report (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1122.pdf)

yep...one turn too early... kinda what I was referring to a few pages back.....

97004 wasn't registered as civil aircraft, it's experemental.
MAK is not working on this case, stop mentioning it.
It's entirely in hands of Ministry of Industry and Trade (MINPROMTORG).
MINROMTORG doesn't have expertise for such cases, so you shoudn't expect anything from them. It'll fall entirely on Sukhoi and NTSC to investigate this case.

Indeed, following my notion in 313 that both pilots might have been looking at a ridge on their side* - comfortable with the fact they were passing a solid mountain - dash8flyer presented in post 316, fine graphics of a scenario that I find the most plausible.

My recent post is really just an amplification of what I feel is still the most probable series of events, but with the image of that vertical sheet of cloud brought to the fore, allowing the logic that both pilots may have assumed the ridge on their right was the only one.


* Above, in terms of both pilots seeing a ridge on their side only, I had in mind them still having to look down slightly during the first part of the valley. Neither pilot would have been able to see the ridge on the opposite side until that terrible moment when ridge heights were visible from both sides.

Under the penalty of getting one of those Edit thingies, I must add that of course the above scenarios do imply a fairly serious limit to forward visibility.





.

Yeah, Rivets, you might have the most plausible scenario.

In a galaxy far away, we flew in similar terrain and had similar WX during half the year if we were west of the Annames Mountains. We had downward sloping terrain to the west, so flying north we were fairly sure that turning and climbing to the west would get us outta trouble. OTOH, we had terrain-following radar that looked out miles ahead. We could set a terrain clearance and get vertical guidance to use or not use. I don't foresee this in our commercial jets, and the terrain warning systems in use today don't seem to offer as much "protection/warning" until late in the game. out...

Tabloid: Superjet Downed by U.S. Industrial Sabotage | News | The Moscow Times (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/tabloid-superjet-downed-by-us-industrial-sabotage/459142.html)

:confused::rolleyes:

Leatherman

Sukhoi has already said that the 'espionage' angle is utter codswallop.

Boris Badenov is at it again.

My view of this thread has been stuck on page 25 for 30hrs or so.
The footer now indicates that this is page 25 of 27.

Any ideas? [And will I be able to see them if there are any?]

Bits clipped out by the mods don't give the page back.

More precisely:
Posts erased, either by the mods or by their author, are kept into the database (and still available to mods & admins). They also are still accounted for by the board regarding pages count but each page displays the correct number (20) of visible posts. This causes a mismatch.
As a commun user, you're not able to see thoses erased posts, nor to go to the "apparently missing" pages.
Note we're on page 26, not 25.

Published today:
House to probe Sukhoi accident - The House of Representatives' Commission V overseeing transportation arranged on Monday a meeting concerning the Sukhoi Superjet 100 accident with transportation institutions.
Officials from the Transportation Ministry and the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT) were among the participants at the meeting.
"We will require an explanation from the Transportation Minister regarding the 2009 Law on Transportation because the accident at Mt Salak, Bogor likely happened because the law was violated," Commission V chief Yasti Soepredjo Mokoagow told reporters minutes before the meeting began.
She added that the House's transportation commission would also check updates of the investigation into the accident, which claimed the lives of all of the passengers and crew on board....

Minister publishes Sukhoi accident chronology -Transportation Minister E.E. Mangindaan unveiled on Monday the chronology of the recent Sukhoi Superjet 100 accident, which killed 45 people, before the House of Representatives' Commission V overseeing transportation. The minister, along with officials from the Transportation Ministry and the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT), was among the participants at a commission meeting arranged to look into the accident.
The Russian-made, commercial airplane, which was on a promotional flight, slammed into Mt. Salak in Bogor, West Java on May 9, killing all people on board. The accident has sparked concerns about air transportation safety standards in the country.
The chronology of events was as follows:
2:21 p.m. The aircraft, which was on its second demonstration flight, flew to a height of 10,000 feet after taking off 30 minutes earlier.
2:24 p.m. The plane requested to descend to 6,000 feet.
2:28 p.m. The plane requested to turn 360 degrees above the Atang Sanjaya airbase.
2:52 p.m. Atang Sanjaya’s air traffic control (ATC) in Bogor, West Java called in the airplane, which had disappeared from the ATC’s radar.
2:55 p.m. Soekarno-Hatta airport’s ATC reported to the air traffic service coordinator that the airplane had gone missing.
3:35 p.m. The airplane’s situation was declared “uncertain”.
4:05 p.m. Soekarno-Hatta’s ATC contacted the National Search and Rescue Agency.
4:55 p.m. An alert phase for the airplane was declared.
6:22 p.m. A distress phase was declared as the airplane was thought to have run out fuel.....

24 minutes of radio silence?

BMKG: Weather Problem Did Not Disrupt Sukhoi’s Flight
Ezra Sihite | May 28, 2012

BMKG: Weather Problem Did Not Disrupt Sukhoi?s Flight | The Jakarta Globe (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/bmkg-weather-problem-did-not-disrupt-sukhois-flight/520585)

That weather man from BKMG is off the mark.

Salak and Pangarango have their own weather. It can be sunny and clear skies in Bogor where the weather station supposedly is and heavy cloud and rain in the hills.

Just walking on Salak one never takes it's weather for granted.

24 minutes of radio silence?
Be Careful on how to read this press reslease :

Apparently the aircraft was cleared to a specific reserved area to make a demo flight that included some orbits (360s) .once the instructions to enter the area and to perfom the first orbit were issued , it is normal for ATC anf the crew not to call each other .the next calls will be when the aircraft crew request to leave the area to go back to land , or if another aircraft would enter the area . So 24 min without calling each other is normal under the circumstances . This is not a radio comm problem .

In my experience, when an aircraft is cleared by an ATC for air-work in a designated location, it is usually also asked to "report on completion" of the air-work.
"If" this aircraft was cleared for only one orbit (as stated in the quoted recent press release and as reported previously) 24-minutes-long radio silence from both sides appears to me to be rather unusual....

24 minutes of radio silence?


Not necessarily. Perhaps the authorities simply haven't released every bit of the comms data, but only the major parts.

If this aircraft was cleared for only one orbit
Does not sounds right . You do not need to go to a special area to make a single 360.

The key to this is in the pre de briefing details. I have been involved in airshows organisations and the details of every and each flight presentation or demo flight is discussed and agreed upon in a large briefing between actual Pilots , Show organisers and ATC each day . How long this particular demo was planned for is therefore recorded somewhere.
Wait a bit more for the details.

Again , this "radio silence "as you call it , is not a cause of this accident

"will be recorded somewhere"

you have never worked in Indonesia................

Again , this "radio silence "as you call it , is not a cause of this accident Silence by itself seldom is ....

"ATC allowed the pilots to descend to 6,000 feet because the plane was at the time flying in a safe area. A moment later, ATC contacted the plane but received no answer" quoting from Clouds, ATC ?Not Factors? in Sukhoi Crash | The Jakarta Globe (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/clouds-atc-not-factors-in-sukhoi-crash/520718)

This morning the information arrived that the data recorder has been just found.

Sukhoi's FDR has been found - am I reading this announcement correctly?

The National Search and Rescue Agency (Basarnas) is scheduled to submit the ill-fated Russian-made aircraft Sukhoi’s flight-data recorder (FDR) to the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT) on Thursday morning, the agency's spokesman has confirmed.
Basarnas spokesman Gagah Prakoso said the rescue agency would hand over the FDR, also known as the black box, to KNKT officials at Halim Perdanakusuma Airport in East Jakarta on Thursday morning.
“We will give the FDR to the KNKT officials at around 10 a.m.,” he told The Jakarta Post without elaborating further.
Earlier, one of the teams involved with Indonesia’s joint search and rescue mission found the plane’s voice cockpit recorder (VCR), which appeared to be damaged.
The VCR records conversations between pilots during the flight, while the FDR records the speed, pitch and altitude of a plane during a flight.
Basarnas officially ended its search and recovery efforts following the Sukhoi Superjet 100 crash on May 22 after it had recovered the remains of all 45 people who were killed in the accident.
The Russian-made aircraft was destroyed in the hills of Mt. Salak in West Java on May 9 while on a demonstration flight. (asa/dic)
Addendum: "The Jakarta Globe" now reports that FDR has indeed been found by the locals.
Sukhoi Flight Data Recorder Found by Locals | The Jakarta Globe (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/sukhoi-flight-data-recorder-found-by-locals/521268)

Sukhoi's PR twitter feed confirms FDR found. (https://twitter.com/olga_kayukova_e/status/208023460591583232)

(just to note: I typed "t w i t t e r" but the system displays it as "PPRuNe" :confused: )

Two stories on the AntaraNews web site both assert the FDR was just found.

The time notationss are within a few minutes of 11:00 p.m. May 31 Indonesian time.

As translated by Google translate, the second story asserts that the FDR was found in good condition (unlike the charred external appearance of the CVR) buried in the ground about twenty meters from the tail of the plane.

FDR story 1 (http://www.antaranews.com/berita/313436/fdr-sukhoi-akhirnya-ditemukan)

FDR story 2 (http://www.antaranews.com/berita/313439/fdr-sukhoi-ditemukan-dalam-kondisi-baik)

FDR appears fit enough:

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/FDR-Sukhoi1.jpg

No. See the Aviation Herald. This appears to be a photo of what the FDR looks like "new"-as shown at the press conference. The Aviation Herald has the pic of this next to the recovered and "burnt" and evidently smashed up, and tagged FDR, next to the orange OEM sample.
Crash: Sukhoi SU95 over Indonesia on May 9th 2012, aircraft impacted mountain (http://avherald.com/h?article=44f464f7&opt=0)

At first I was surprised that Russia gave up looking for the FDR and went home soon after the CVR was found. I even suspected they had secretly found it and taken it with them. IMHO any nation that builds a new plane and demonstrates it to the world for export purposes, would be interested primarily in the FDR for any technical defects. One could have surmised that it could not be too far from the tail and the CVR.
For the rest of us the info from the CVR is of much more interest... ATC procedures, crew coordination procedures, comments about weather etc.
Let's now wait for a word from the investigative agencies.

jnrose24:
No. See the Aviation Herald. This appears to be a photo of what the FDR looks like "new"-as shown at the press conference. The Aviation Herald has the pic of this next to the recovered and "burnt" and evidently smashed up, and tagged FDR, next to the orange OEM sample.


Yes, that IS the recovered FDR in the image I posted. The image you refer to at AH shows both the recovered FDR and throttle quadrant.

Here's another view:

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TQ-FDR-Sukhoi1.jpg

My bad, then. Aviation Herald described it as "burnt", which from the orange color it obviously is not.So I inferred that the burnt and crumpled object they were displaying was the FDR.Later posters on Aviation Herald have also noticed the misattribution.

In the AV Herald, beneath the picture referenced in post 531 is another one of a rather scorched recorder. I suspect the bright orange device is indeed an example of what they look like new. Crash: Sukhoi SU95 over Indonesia on May 9th 2012, aircraft impacted mountain (http://avherald.com/h?article=44f464f7)

I wonder what color the M-poster is about now? :)

My interpretation is that they appear to be the same design, it is entirely possible that the FDR was inadvertantly ejected on impact, whilst the voice recorder stayed with the airframe and was damaged in the ensuing fire, hence the different conditions of the two recorders.

ITAR-TASS


Parametric recorder found at the crash site of the Russian aircraft "Sukhoi Superjet-100" (Sukhoi SuperJet-100) in Indonesia. This was announced by the Indonesian representative of the search team working on the site of the fall of the liner at Mount Salak to Russian journalists.

"We managed to find a parametric recorder. External device status is good, it is orange and not burned," - he said.

In Moscow, the company "Sukhoi Civil Aircraft" (GSS), which owned the crashed plane, confirmed the information.

Remember this photograph from earlier in the thread...
http://www.pprune.org/7192673-post351.html

don't know what you are trying to say .. yes they are both orange, but if you look a bit closer ? they do not appear to be the same orange object.
Guess you are plugging a conspiracy theory ?

Bandures...

Re your post #508:

You are quite correct re this aircraft falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MINPROMTORG). And I tend to agree with your statement about their lack of expertise in such investigations.

Having said that, I sent you a PM last week regarding the presence of an Accredited Representative from MAK to this investigation.

Don't despair, there is a significant amount of international expertise now present in Jakarta and assisting the Indonesians with this investigation. I must also mention that there are several Indonesian investigators who have been very well trained abroad and worked on complex cases abroad also (in Australia for instance).

Technology ?Is Key? to Better Communications, Safer Skies | The Jakarta Globe (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/technology-is-key-to-better-communications-safer-skies/521758)

That is a fascinating article.

aterpster

Agreed -- The frequency congestion in Jakarta (especially CGK itself) is a significant matter. The absence of enforcement of frequency allocation and interference problems is a HUGE issue in Indonesia, directly related to a less than diligent regulator beset with corruption.

grizzled,

Are you saying that commercial FM stations or other radio users are using frequencies in the Aeronautical VHF spectrum?

maybe not intentionally, but poorly maintained / amateur / unlicensed transmitters can and do have sideband transmissions at different frequencies which could easily be transmitting in the aviation frequency spectrum. Without proper policing of the airwaves then this quickly becomes a real problem.

Not restricted to Indonesia. There was a well know belgian FM radio station who poisoined R/T around Brussels for years. The difficult part was identifying it . Then it took legal action and many years to fix it (force them to buy a protected better quality transmitter ) Not easy. Big money is at stake normally.

:suspect:Flying in Delhi a few years back we used to hear commercial radio over approach freq

Apollo - Zi (http://www.apollo.lv/portal/news/articles/277115/)

The Google translate for Latvian is pretty sorry, I will try to improve...

Nevertheless the human factor is to blame for the Superjet 100 crash says Russian media.
A source, close to the investigation told journalists the following: Pilot conversations [CVR] reveal that the a/c captain accomplished a „deadly maneuver”, bragging about the aircraft's capabilities. Specialists in Russian media have called this "aerial hooliganism".
In the transcripts you not only hear the warning, that the aircraft is nearing an object, but also a member of the crew trying to talk the captain out of performing risky maneuvers.
The source contends, that in the transcripts the other pilot is yelling approximately this phrase: Commander we are not allowed there, thre is a mountain.
The source also said, that the transcripts revealed that the fateful maneuver, which the pilot was not allowed to perform, was not the first during this flight.
Though temporarily/still we do not have official confirmation about this information, neither from Russian or Indonesian investigators.

Unconfirmed CVR information (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/9317070/Russian-plane-downed-after-pilots-attempts-at-aerobatics.html)

An airborne version of the Costa Concordia disaster?

An airborne version of the Costa Concordia disaster?

Maybe with a little of this thrown-in, the irony of the callsign notwithstanding...

The Crash of Czar 52 at Fairchild AFB, WA, in 1994 - YouTube

...Commander we are not allowed there, thre is a mountain...

In russian:

...командир, нам туда нельзя, там гора!

I dont trust this information too much. I have read that "source" claimed that warning was said by "navigator" по словам источника, это был штурман and SSJ is two crew member plane...

Full text abou hooliganism:


Как рассказал специалист ЦАГИ, вместе с коллегами из ЛИИ им. Громова они на основании представленных им данных неоднократно моделировали последний полет SSJ-100 и пришли к выводу: до столкновения самолет в столь же опасном сближении уже дважды облетал похожие горы, но третью обойти не смог — врезался. Как выразился эксперт: «Я с самого начала понимал, что ошибку экипажа отмести будет сложно, но то, что здесь может иметь место элемент воздушного хулиганства, — такого предположить не мог!»


Expert CAGI said that together with colleagues from the LII they simulated last flight SSJ and find out that before crash the plane twice flew around the mountain in dangerous distance and in third round crashed. Expert claimed: From the beginning I understood that to rule out the crew error will be complicated, but that in this case may take a place a element of air hooliganism - I could not imagine!"

Here is a google-translated article which quotes an "industry source"

Google Translate (http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ria.ru%2Fincidents%2F20120608%2F668134431.html)

who says it appears the pilots were convinced they were over a flat area and ignored taws warnings. There was a secondary too low gear warning

The media reports of a crew member warning of a mountain ahead are speculative and incorrect he said

There may have been a gap in communications with tower due to terrain

A gear warning makes me wonder about their airspeed.

Most gear warnings (TAWS or other) take into account thrust lever position or airspeed to only give warnings when thrust or airspeed is low, in the landing realm.

If they were slow enough to get gear warnings perhaps they didn't have the speed or power to climb safely above terrain once they spotted it?

There is earlier reference to a Navigator in the first few pages of this thread. It discusses the fact that the same Navigator was on both demo flights.

Even though the plane is 2-crew there may have been additional people on the flight deck.

Could the first 3 or 4 secs of this Sukhoi clip be considered 'aerial hooliganism ?
Sebagian Kotak Hitam Ditemukan - Antara News Video (http://www.antaranews.com/video/3912/sebagian-kotak-hitam-ditemukan)

Uh, no, don't think so...

There is earlier reference to a Navigator in the first few pages of this thread. It discusses the fact that the same Navigator was on both demo flights.
Even though the plane is 2-crew there may have been additional people on the flight deck.

There already was a third person in the cocpit - a potential customer. Reportedly he dont disturb the pilots, only from time to time he asked some question, about consumption of fuel etc. No wishes for risky maneuver or sightseeing. Hypothetical navigator shoul be a forth person in little cocpit.

adding:

There was the navigator aboard - Oleg Shvecov

Back in the 'old days' when I used to chase the pesky Reds around the airspace the 'Political Advisor' on aboard (presumably there to report on any non-acceptable politics) was always referred to as a 'navigator'.

There was a customer sitting in the cockpit...

http://p.twimg.com/Au0FTRVCAAE929H.jpg

they WERE trying to sell the plane

tough to do if everyone is locked in like the SLC on BA

Demo flights can be extremely distracting. Fly the plane, show ease of operation, and entertain the prospective buyers.

Distracting is an all encompassing word... distracting from what?. The plane's captain was an experienced test pilot, used to regimen in order to accomplish his tasks. As a lifelong military pilot I can appreciate how the captain felt to 'get away' from the daily regimen of test flying. IMHO he got way too loose, disregarded basic safety, flight planning and even crew coordination, if the reports in Russian media can be believed.
I would not pretend to know how to demonstrate a civilian airliner, but even a tactical military transport, with PAX aboard, should be treated more like an airliner.

Any text (picture) without a context; is (perhaps) a pretext.

Who, what, where, when, why and how; who is the picture of (customer, maintenance person, another pilot or crewmember, avionics salesman, executive with Sukhoi, Government or Business VIP)?

What are they doing when the picture was taken, taxiing for takeoff or ground testing some piece of equipment?

Where and when was the picture taken; prior to takeoff on the last flight or on the production ramp back "home" a year ago?

Why was this person on the flight deck? And the follow up question; was the person on the flight deck normal operations for such a flight and in compliance with company and governmental regulations? Just because the flight deck is almost completely off limits in some very uptight western nations, does not mean the rest of the world has to follow the same bad example when the local conditions are different.

There already was a third person in the cocpit - a potential customer. Reportedly he dont disturb the pilots, only from time to time he asked some question, about consumption of fuel etc. No wishes for risky maneuver or sightseeing. Hypothetical navigator shoul be a forth person in little cocpit.

How did this picture happen to be taken?

I do not think there is any problem with you or anybody else posting a picture, I would just caution that the rest of us might refrain from drawing any firm conclusions as to the circumstances leading up to the cause(s) of this accident from the really nice picutre posted just a few entries prior.

That individual in the cockpit jumpseat may have been a qualified pilot for one of the air carriers planning on purchasing the SU-100. I know in the past I have sat jumpseat on demonstration flights, the company wants a pilot up front to ask questions pertinent to line operations and would know what to look for as far as performance. Last i checked this was considered perfectly legal and within the guidelines of most manufacturer's policies; though my knowledge on this matter only really applies to the US and Canada.

he plane's captain was an experienced test pilot, used to regimen in order to accomplish his tasks. As a lifelong military pilot I can appreciate how the captain felt to 'get away' from the daily regimen of test flying. IMHO he got way too loose, disregarded basic safety, flight planning and even crew coordination, if the reports in Russian media can be believed.
I agree.
As a veteran documentary cameraman I can attest that even specialists and experts get distracted by the demands and pressures of a photo or video shoot.
Weapons experts, fire specialists, race drivers to name a few have put my life at risk by "over egging it"
Pilots are not immune, outside of war zones, aerial photography claims the lives of more cameramen than any other activity, with the majority of accidents involving pilot error.

Yep, think about the Airbus low alt pass and not enough smash/power to pull up in order to miss the trees. Experienced pilot, but didn't seem to understand all the "protections" and such that was touted for the 'bus.

Any confirmation that Pelabuhan Ratu resort was in flight plan?

SSJ - Google Maps (http://goo.gl/maps/Byle)

Rencana Terbang:
- Rabu pukul 14.12: Take-off dari Halim Perdanakusuma menuju Pelabuhan Ratu, dengan ketinggian 10.000 kaki memutar di atas Pelabuhan Ratu dan kembali ke Halim Perdanakusuma dalam 28 menit.
- Rabu pukul 14.36: Seharusnya pesawat sudah mendarat kembali di Halim Perdanakusum

Rute yang Diambil Pilot:

- Rabu pukul 14.12: Take-off dari Halim Perdanakusuma menuju Pelabuhan Ratu, dengan ketinggian 10.000 kaki.

- Rabu pukul 14.21: Pilot Aleksandr Yablontsev meminta izin kepada Air Traffic Controller (ATC) Halim Perdanakusuma untuk turun ke ketinggian 6.000 kaki (1.829 meter). Izin diberikan karena pesawat terpantau berada di atas kawasan latihan Lanud Atang Sendjaja, Bogor, sekitar 12 kilometer dari area Gunung Salak

- Rabu pukul 14.33: Pilot kembali minta izin untuk berbelok (banking) ke kanan. Namun percakapan mendadak terputus dan pesawat tiba-tiba hilang dari pantauan radar.


Terbang Gembira Berujung Duka (http://www.gatra.com/nasional-cp/1-nasional/12590-terbang-gembira-berujung-duka)

Any confirmation that Pelabuhan Ratu resort was in flight plan?

SSJ - Google Maps (http://goo.gl/maps/Byle)

Rencana Terbang:
- Rabu pukul 14.12: Take-off dari Halim Perdanakusuma menuju Pelabuhan Ratu, dengan ketinggian 10.000 kaki memutar di atas Pelabuhan Ratu dan kembali ke Halim Perdanakusuma dalam 28 menit.
- Rabu pukul 14.36: Seharusnya pesawat sudah mendarat kembali di Halim Perdanakusum

Rute yang Diambil Pilot:

- Rabu pukul 14.12: Take-off dari Halim Perdanakusuma menuju Pelabuhan Ratu, dengan ketinggian 10.000 kaki.

- Rabu pukul 14.21: Pilot Aleksandr Yablontsev meminta izin kepada Air Traffic Controller (ATC) Halim Perdanakusuma untuk turun ke ketinggian 6.000 kaki (1.829 meter). Izin diberikan karena pesawat terpantau berada di atas kawasan latihan Lanud Atang Sendjaja, Bogor, sekitar 12 kilometer dari area Gunung Salak

- Rabu pukul 14.33: Pilot kembali minta izin untuk berbelok (banking) ke kanan. Namun percakapan mendadak terputus dan pesawat tiba-tiba hilang dari pantauan radar.


I guess people here can use Google Translate to know what's written above, but basically, it says that the original plan was to fly to Perlabuhan Ratu (sea port, presumably on the south coast of Java) at 10,000 ft and return to Halim airport after 28 minutes flight time.

But instead, the captain requested descent to 6,000 ft and was approved that altitude because it was believed to be in the Bogor training area about 12 km from Mt Salak. At 14:33 the captain requested to make a right turn and after that, contact was lost.


Terbang Gembira Berujung Duka (http://www.gatra.com/nasional-cp/1-nasional/12590-terbang-gembira-berujung-duka)

I can't believe someone has already written a book about this crash? :ugh:

Thank you for translation, training wheels

I can't believe someone has already written a book about this crash?

It's local newsmagazine, I guess.

Perlabuhan Ratu is a resort on the south coast - very pretty but a bugger to get to on the roads there

but a bugger to get to on the roads there
I'll second that, Harry. :)

What's bothered me with this resort - it's first time I heard that second demo flight that day was more than (like first one) just takeoff, some orbit in the Bogor training area and back to Halim. Way to this resort is right through the mountains - look at maps.

Kulverstukas
Way to this resort is right through the mountains - look at maps.

Looks like a handy plan, if you intend to do a joyride through the mountains.

Not saying that it was like that, though.

Tempointeraktif.com - Sukhoi Pilot Shouted Just Moments before Accident (http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/nasional/2012/06/18/brk,20120618-411385,uk.html)

[/URL][URL="http://translate.google.be/translate?sl=id&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=fr&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tempo.co%2Fread%2Fnews%2F2012%2F06%2F19%2F063411436%2FInvestigator-Pilot-Sukhoi-Hendak-Bermanuver&act=url"]
(http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/19/063411436/Investigator-Pilot-Sukhoi-Hendak-Bermanuver)

I wonder to what sickening depths people will sink to spread the blame to someone on the ground.

Loose rivets

Mirrors situation with Polski Tu-5 :sad:

Anyone know if the Superjet has hard or soft g limits in its flight control system?

It would be a bear to find out that you need 2.8 g to miss terrain (through faulty planning of course), and to have the system limit you 2.5 g.:{

As I suggested way back,


With the speeds and times we've suggested there could well have been just a few seconds of utter disbelief as it became apparent there was no opening ahead. No real time to do anything in an aircraft that refuses to be pointed at the stars.

However, I it does sound as though there wouldn't have been time even if the aircraft had been fully aerobatic. But you never know. With that load it might have survived 5g and with the speeds mentioned recently, it might have been possible to pull it onto its back. With that guy's background he might well have got away with what happened next.

Just a thought really, about letting the crew have the final say when all else has failed.


`

This report from Pravda from last week appears to have been missed
However it could just be the Russian authorities passing the buck...

Sukhoi Superjet crash: Pilots deactivated onboard systems - English pravda.ru (http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/disasters/08-06-2012/121355-sukhoi_superjet-0/)

"Russia's Sukhoi Superjet-100 crashed in Indonesia because of a whole complex of reasons, including the human factor, investigators said. The specialists studied the information that they could obtain from the flight recorders and came to conclusion that there was a potential customer staying in the cockpit shortly before the aircraft slammed into the mountain. However, the customer was not interfering into the actions of the crew. The person was only interested in the technical performance of the airplane.
A source close to investigation told RIA Novosti news agency on conditions of anonymity that the Terrain Awareness and Warning System was active during the demonstration flight. The pilots, investigators believe, received visual and audio signals warning of the mountain slope ahead. However, they ignored the signals because they were certain that they were flying above a valley, at a safe altitude. An Indonesian flight control officer approved a descent from 10 to 6 thousand feet. The pilots could not see the mountain on time because of thick clouds.
The crew supposedly received a signal from another onboard signal. The system said that the aircraft was flying low above the ground and prompted the extension of the landing gear. Being at a loss about the relief of the area, the commander decided to deactivate the automatic equipment to descend independently. "It could be possible that the crewmembers were certain until the very last moment that they were flying above a valley," the source said.
The pilots contacted the Indonesian flight control officer to find out whether it was possible to continue the flight as before. However, the officer did not respond. The Indonesian side had problems with either communication or location, which may often happen in mountainous areas.
Officials with Indonesian aviation authorities said that the Russian plane had all documents for demonstration flights in Jakarta. No technical malfunction was reported during the first demonstration flight of the passenger jetliner. The plane was fuelled with high-quality fuel accordingly, investigators said.
Russia's Sukhoi Superjet-100 crashed into the vertical slope of Salak Mount on May 9th. There were 45 people, including eight Russians, on board. The crash left no survivors. "

So - two ways to interpret this:

"IATCA president I Gusti Ketut Susila said the distance between the plane’s last known coordinates from Mt. Salak was 14 kilometers. At 290 knots or 450 kph, the pilot only had 9 seconds to avoid the cliff." :confused:

Either the Sukhoi was winning the speed contest at 5600 km/hour for that 9 seconds, or there was a lot more time from the last known coordinates. Of course the last known coordinates are not particularly useful in knowing when the occupants of the flight deck saw the holes in the cheese lining up.

Perhaps a translation error.

the pilot only had 9 seconds to avoid the cliff.
Either the Sukhoi was winning the speed contest at 5600 km/hour for that 9 seconds, or there was a lot more time from the last known coordinates. Of course the last known coordinates are not particularly useful in knowing when the occupants of the flight deck saw the holes in the cheese lining up.
How I understand this ...
The pilot had a visual of the obstacle (mountain or cliff)
“Oh my God, what is this?” 9 seconds before the impact

With all due respect, gentlemen, I think the nine seconds to react quoted in the news article is a red herring.

Think about what might make any of us to have our final words captured on CVR saying "Oh my God, what is this?”

It's all about what happened to create that dismal situation. We may never know the full story, but it is very very sad with such an experienced crew and a new aircraft.

And IMO any attempts to place the blame on ground controllers are total BS from someone trying to CYA. Even sadder.

Perhaps a translation error.


Perhaps. I imagine it was simply two separate statements that somehow got merged in the translation.


It sounds even more as though he was in that trough, convinced he was between the mountains.

Seems they just mixed knots with kmh's.

Nothin new in this "pravda" article. But again, can anyone confirm that there WAS flight plan, and if so, that it INCLUDED flight to the shore resort? Because if it is so, crew can't be unaware about mountains ahead.

Is this plane still missing? somebody change the title of the topic...

After dozens of pages of so many experts raising all possible explanations for his accident, it's cristal clear what really happened:
a stupid case of CFIT, nothing more than this.
It was a boysh, criminal negligence on part of this captain to take the risk of descending on an unknow terrain, flying in clouds close to mountains, unnecessarily. Just to show his 'abilities'. Nothing much different than the youngster that just soloed a Cessna 150 e go buzzing over girlfriend's house.
It was not a 'systemic failure', not a complex malfuction, it was just a reckless, complete lack of airmanship, a suicide/murder maneuver.

Unfortunately, for each Capt Sully one hundred Yablontsevs are born. The Russian astronaut medical (as well as many others) are useless to detect potential psichological and psychyatric disfunctions that could develop into dangerous behaviors.

Hope some day we'll be able to detect it as efficiently as sugar or cholesterol levels.

@<hidden>

Spot on:ok:

That's it, not more.

Mods, please close thread.

fullforward, and which one of the ‘one hundred Yabs’ are you? If not, then please share with us the 'Sully-like' qualities which will enable you (and us) to avoid such circumstances.
I am surprised that you dare quote having a Captaincy when displaying such weak human factors knowledge and presenting an ill-considered view.
But in mitigation, hindsight is a powerful bias requiring strong self-control when drawing conclusions from limited facts – after the fact.
CFIT appears to be the most likely conclusion – the result. However, until we can understand what led up to this, what influenced the crew’s behaviour, and how they understood the situation at that time, there will be few opportunities for learning and improving safety from the ‘why’ aspects .
Alternatively, with a narrow, self-centred, and biased view there are limited opportunities for learning, other than perhaps how not to present safety conclusions.

Not being personal: unless somebody with a gun had forced him to go 'holliganning' at high speed on unfamiliar hilly terrain I cannot see any justifiable reason to do so.
I guess if you are a professional pilot you certainlly understand that.
Would you imagine somebody in the right mind set would ever consider doing this? It's crazy, pathetic going into 'political correctness' trying to justify this absurd. It only harms us as a professional group.
As for improving the system I was quite clear on my suggestion: the industry needs to look further on the psychological/psychiatriac factors and detect them before it's too late.
I fully stand my view.

You can psycho-analyse all you wish, but I suspect at the end of the day we will find he was in the wrong valley and cumulo-granitus outclimbed the aircraft. He certainly is not the first, and nor will he be the last, but I don't think we need to waste too much time worrying about 'opportunities for learning'.

The 'Opportunities for learning' are obvious. The lesson is simple and clear - know where you are, and if you are not sure, get the **** out of there. Try not to fly to many bystanders into the hill with you.

Point made, buddy.
Enough of b.....t!:ok:

fullforward, our views differ.
Mine may be biased, but it is formed on reflection that I flew in near identical circumstances, frighteningly similar; task, crew, objectives, and in some respects terrain. I completed my flight, but it’s ‘success’ did not qualify me as being something other than a Yab, in fact much closer to being one; nor did the safe outcome excuse the quality of judgement or minimise the risks.
Many years of reflection has enabled a view of some of the contributing factors and how humans can be adversely influenced by these. We are all very, very fallible, but the more we that we can identify the risk issues – contributions and behaviours of thought, then perhaps we can make better judgements and continue to fly safely

BOAC, “… time worrying about 'opportunities for learning'” is the most valuable time in your life.

Actually 'getting the **** out of there' is the most valuable time in anyone's life.

Canis testes.

BOAC, “… 'getting the **** out of there' is the most valuable time …”; yes, but not being there to begin with is even better. Thus time spent in assessing a situation before it deteriorates, and even more so, planning not to be in either the physical or mental situation which precedes the event, are important aspects.

With these in mind, then trying to understand this accident in this context might help us identify aspects which could enable safety lessons to be learnt, e.g. what was planned and flown on the first flight, what was the plan for the second flight?

PEI 3721

Sometimes it's just not worth the effort...

If fullforward truly believes that this accident was caused solely by the Captain's actions – and his "psychiatric factors";
and if BOAC truly believes that the lesson here “is simple and clear - know where you are, and if you are not sure, get the **** out of there”
then it’s likely nothing you or I or anyone else writes will change their minds.

The notion of accident prevention through lessons to be learned and the resulting widespread advancements in the real benefits of proactively examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind. Accident investigators, safety professionals, and most professional pilots the world over have come a long way in the years since fullforward and BOAC’s view of things was the norm.

A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).

The answers to such questions will expose factors that need to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of a similar accident. One major reason aviation is as safe as it is, is as a direct result of such processes in the review of incidents and accidents. (That fact applies equally to the medical (surgical) profession and other safety critical endeavours.)

One cannot expect to reduce incidents and accidents if one does not examine each of the factors or actions that, if removed or amended, would have prevented the accident.

veteres canes somnum ;)

A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).

Most of those "why's" were also asked after the Air New Zealand CFIT into Mt Erebus.

Why does it still happen??



BOAC, “… 'getting the **** out of there' is the most valuable time …”; yes, but not being there to begin with is even better. Thus time spent in assessing a situation before it deteriorates, and even more so, planning not to be in either the physical or mental situation which precedes the event, are important aspects.

Would appear that lesson needs to be taught many times.

According to PEI and Grizzled reasonings every rape, murder or mistake that lead to loss of life or heavy property damage is completely justifiable by the perpetrador own problems. He could be a victim of early trauma, drunken father, being bullied at school etc.
Sorry, but this is ridiculous.

If I drive my car at crazy speeds on any road I'll be taking risks, period.
If I drink and drive, even worse.
There's no room for 'whys', for God sake!

Nobody forced this Yab to do that! He, as a commander, took that risk.
If this isn't criminal negligence what else is?

It wasn't an emergency, it wasn't a complex malfunction. They plainlly ignored the "Terrain, terrain" for 11 times.

Yes, you're right: unless some proof comes that this 'commander' acted under the pressure of a gun poined to his head nothing will change my view about this crime.:eek:

He's in an area with mountains & weather is predictably unpredictable. He's flying below the height of the mountains for whatever 'look-see' reason. To an ignorant like myself the cause of this so far seems simple. Flew too low in an area with clouds & mountains.

examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind.

What culture factor would allow someone to fly into the side of a mountain breaking all sorts of rules and common sense? :sad:

How many times do you have to learn from people flying themselves into mother earth ignoring rules?:ugh:

If there's high terrain, weather, an area your not familiar with, a W.A.R.N.I.N.G. system telling you 11 TIMES to get out of there, and you continue on, what else do you need to learn from?

If there's a culture that allows that, get them out of the air.

Why is it so hard for people these days to understand the fact that individuals need to take responsibility for their own actions?

There's ALWAYS an excuse isnt there?

A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:


Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?

Because the crew placed it there intentionally?


Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)

They were aware of the situation, if they intentionally flew into it, but they recognized the the imminent danger of crashing too late, when gravity was stronger than the lifties.

If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?

Becuse it was clear to them, that it would shout all the time.

If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?

Do we know that already? They could have crashed in VFR as well, imho it is more plausible then the CFIT in IMC. They just couldn´t outclimb the terrain, an oppinion, i stated in one of my first posts on this thread. Nothing becoming known since then did change my mind on that.

If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?

Do we know the flightplan? If a former poster is correct, then it looks like they planned that thing. Fly to BOGOR training area, , descent to 6.000, fly (VFR?) to the beach resort (through the mountains), and then back for landing.

There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).

I´m seeing none with ATC what so ever.

The answers to such questions will expose factors that need to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of a similar accident.

Yes, agreed, but it does not help to close ones eyes to the obvious on hand. We are discussing here, not doing the final accident investigation. Therefore everybody is entiteled to his oppinion. People like BOAC, fullforward, others and myself have seen this stuff happening before despite all rules and regs and despite all expierience of the crew.

The notion of accident prevention through lessons to be learned and the resulting widespread advancements in the real benefits of proactively examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind.

You are dead wrong there.

One major reason aviation is as safe as it is, is as a direct result of such processes in the review of incidents and accidents. (That fact applies equally to the medical (surgical) profession and other safety critical endeavours.)

I can underwrite that statement, and we will see, what the final outcome of the investigation will show. And when it is published, we will have to accept the result and learn of it.

Thanks grizzled. :ok: It’s worth the effort as I only fly as pax now!

fullforward, “… is completely justifiable by the perpetrator …” au contraire. Exploration of ‘why’ should not seek to justify a particular view, only to provide understanding. Judgement should be considered elsewhere, and perhaps similar to Dekker’s views on just culture, it does not depend on where the line is drawn, but on who draws it.
If an accident investigation seeks justification then it risks the blindness of blame, whereas seeking understanding for the crew’s actions might enhance wisdom – or at least some safety learning.

Many apparent failings in awareness might be identified as normal human weaknesses; mental map slip, lack of emphasis on terrain (briefing), distraction, etc, but the dismissal of the TAWS warning is more disturbing.
The effectiveness of human factors training (CRM) will be limited by human variability in a given situation, thus perhaps we need to protect humans from themselves. Automatic / FD guidance demanding a pull-up after a TAWS warning; this should add further emphasis (cf Airbus studies)?

Quote:
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
I´m seeing none with ATC what so ever.
For example - Russian newspapers informed that after clearance to descent pilot get the clearance to the right turn, just against the mountains. If true, it could be a contributing factor. Aspecialy in case of Russian pilots. They are used that ATC have much more responsibility.

For example - Russian newspapers informed that after clearance to descent pilot get the clearance to the right turn, just against the mountains. If true, it could be a contributing factor. Aspecialy in case of Russian pilots. They are used that ATC have much more responsibility.

The pilots have to adopt to the rules and regualations of the country they are flying in. ATC handles every aircraft according to those rules and regs, regardless from which nation this aircraft originates.

I cannot understand the attitude of the many otherwise intelligent people, who are posting sharp responses to fullforward's, perhaps harsh, but accurate conclusions.

The pax of the Sukhoi expected that the PIC was sufficiently highly qualified and competent, to ensure that he could operate a flight from commencement to conclusion, without killing them all.

He wasn't, and he did.

What part of "situational awareness" (as applied to aviation) don't these people (who are effectively apologists for Capt. Yablontsev) understand??

He wasn't, and he did.....

and the investigation is now complete....

one track - # 606, “The pax of the Sukhoi expected that the PIC was sufficiently highly qualified and competent, to ensure that he could operate a flight from commencement to conclusion, without killing them all. He wasn't, and he did.”

Your conclusions are reasoned with knowledge of the outcome; thus if there was no accident and the flight landed safely, as did the previous one, the inference is that the PIC was qualified and proficient. So what changed between flights?

Your weak understanding of attitude is perhaps a reflection that other people are prepared to consider different situational viewpoints and alternative theories of human behaviour.
A broad spectrum of industry now recognises these alternatives as a means to progress safety, and whilst they are not a complete answer, or even provable theories, they do generate opportunity to think about issues and perhaps reflect on how some aspects might apply to themselves or be applied in their operations.

Thoughts on situational awareness:-
Critical Thinking (http://www.scribd.com/doc/73269817/Critical-Thinking)
Gaining and Maintaining Situation Awareness (http://www.scribd.com/doc/63058467/Gaining-and-Maintaining-Situation-Awareness)
Making Better Decisions (http://www.scribd.com/doc/73271746/Making-Better-Decisions)

@<hidden>

...for each Capt Sully one hundred Yablontsevs are born...

It is amazing how often xenophobia manages to creep into the subsequent pre-liminary analysis.

Your conclusions are reasoned with knowledge of the outcome; thus if there was no accident and the flight landed safely, as did the previous one, the inference is that the PIC was qualified and proficient. So what changed between flights?

No, it only means he had more luck the previous time.

Even the qualified and proficient screw up, sometimes! The accident (factory test-) pilot must have been world-class in terms of mastery of his particular aircraft. It seems he just got it a bit wrong in putting said aircraft on the wrong flight path, towards a towering obstruction he obviously knew was elsewhere. Could we sum that up as 'Jeder macht ein bisschen Dummheit'? (Everyone screws up sometimes.)

It reads, so far, like 'Duck under the clouds, give the peeps a nice ride to a remote location... Sorted!' Who among us has not done something similar?

The pilot obviously thought he knew exactly what he was doing, showing a very high level of self-confidence/low level of self-doubt; that's a typical mind-set for a test pilot with the 'Right Stuff.' Someone closer to a mere mortal might not have made the same mistake, I think. I bet when we get the final report we will see how nearly he got it right, only just managing to hit the high terrain.

Give us a break!
Are you a professional pilot? A "bit wrong"??? C'mon man, what you've been smoking/drinking?
I can't recall about any decent professional that took that kind of chances.
You put a typical case of criminal negligence like something casual.

This jerk ignored 11 times the "terrain" warning. Do you see any reason that could justify zooming at high speed, low altitude, well below MSA, close to mountains on unfamiliar area?
Enough of so much useless bs here!

I bet you posted this thrash just for fun, mate!

low level of self-doubt; that's a typical mind-set for a test pilot
Do you actually know any one real test pilot personally?

I do - one was a flight instructor of mine - and I tell you that this statement is rubbish.:ugh:

Maybe that individual was self-minded / over-confident. Maybe he wasn't. Maybe he had this as a general attitude or maybe just the last 10 seconds in his life. But that is by far no typical personality for test pilots as such. Just the opposite is true: No major aircraft developer on earth would knowingly employ any air cowboy to mess around with prototype gadgets worth years of development and billions of dollars.

Air cowboy = likely to be unemployed soon. Very simple.

Yeah, I do know a couple of test pilots! One had been asked by a potential customer to show us what an aborted take-off looked like, stopping from V1. As we were all walking out for our jolly I asked what was on offer, when I was told, 'We're going to see a V1 cut.' I took that for a joke, of course; it's the kind of thing you do in the sim, for obvious reasons. Not least, you can break stuff!

We lined up, Mr Right Stuff gave it the berries, we got to V1 (something north of 100 kts) and then we did indeed come to a complete stop! Just at the last there was a little bit of graunching and vibrating there, but then, almost immediately, we went again, from about 1/3 down the runway. After take-off one could see four bright red bars on the EFIS screen display for the brake temperatures, when we spent a goodly while with the gear down.

Upon landing there came a 'Pop!' from somewhere underneath just as we touched down, as if a tire had blown. Hmm....

Back on terra firma it turned out upon thorough inspection that the V1 cut had made quite a mess of the brakes; the 'Pop!' had been the left outboard main blowing from a locked-up brake. I was watching over the engineer's shoulder as he pulled the left outboard wheel assembly off, when all sorts of metal shards fell out, whatever was left of the pucks, I guess.

Anyway, if a safe take-off is calculated from the full length with normal brake temperatures, how much ability to stop does one have to stop from 2/3 of the available length with red-hot brakes, hmm? That seemed like a fairly obvious point to (non-test-pilot) me!

The machine spent a few days grounded while they flew replacement parts in, a period when it was supposed to be doing numerous demo flights. They finally fixed it, but they flew it out again with no further demos flown from our airport.

I agree that there must be many test pilots with the right stuff, people who are serious, methodical and totally professional. Here I was writing about something rather different, perhaps another one of those with the 'Right Stuff,' when, as it happens, I have met a few, yes, my genius being just the first one. I am sure my guy was 'a really hot stick,' but he certainly was not thinking things through on the ride I got, although I am sure he really was focused on giving the prime customer exactly what he had wanted to see. Different pilots assign different things different priorities, don't they? And that is often done on the basis of one's self-assessment of one's own abilities.

http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/Recommendations/KNKT_001_5_VI_REK.KU_12_English.pdf

Chuck!
Would you say the same things you wrote on your post 613, if connected to a lie detector?
If you say that, you should be very grateful to the Good Lord Who has protected you from your suicidal instinct.
If anyone had ever proposed to board his plane (and not a simulator, mind you) when he was about to perform a Take Off abort at V1, I would have said that I had to go to accommodate a relative coming from very far. And if, one, whomsoever: Chuck Yeager, Alan Shepard, Yuri Gagarin, after a HIGH ENERGY ABORTED TAKE OFF, had indicated its intention to Take Off immediately, and with a third of runway behind I had also vividly expressed my intention to go down, even on the runway, to admire him doing such a maneuver.

Strewth folks - it's a bit of a worry for us mere pax that so called professional pilots (test or otherwise) carrying hundreds of passengers can decide to go rogue and kill people cause they want to do some fancy flying tricks.

This isn't something you want to appear on a thread nor is it something some of you should be trying to find a way to justify.

Load Toad wrote -

Flew too low in an area with clouds & mountains.

As humble SLF myself, I can only agree with him.

Simple, but true.

I had just landed my own aircraft, taxied in and shut down, when I saw everyone else walking out for this demo flight, so that I just fell into line. I asked one of our own Training Captains what we were going to see, when he told me about the V1 demo. I said something like, 'You must be kidding!' when he just grinned at me. I took that to mean that, yes, he was joking. Then, sat there on the numbers, Mr Right Stuff came on the PA to say something like 'Ve are now goink to attempt (!) an aborted take-off wiz simulated engine failure at V1.' So it turned out that my friend had grinned to say that no, he was not joking!

That was merely stupid, but when we came to that graunching halt and then, in the next second, the engines spooled up again, and off we went, well.... If we had had a real engine failure at V1 minus ten, say, I suppose R & N would have had a real accident to discuss. As it was, the whole kerfuffle came to a reasonably happy end, when I was about the only one bitching and whining about what went on there. Everyone else just wanted to be bezzers with Mr Right Stuff, I guess.

It might be that there's often an assumption that 'This guy is a TEST PILOT! He must be some sort of winged god!' that sometimes leads to disappointment. In the case I am writing about, well, I have never done a real V1 cut in my entire career, where Mr Right Stuff probably had done hundreds, and he almost got that one right.

Depends on the era you're in. We liked training on the real aircraft. Surely, the issue of a real V1 cut is how much concrete you have available? And I suppose an acute awareness of real mechanical issues.

And yes, many's the time I've been whisked into the air again without backtracking.

The man from the manufactures used to turn up - never a sign of a co-pilot - and the flying was just plain bewildering. Our to-be cheif training captain asked if the fire handles could be re-set in flight, and yer man just pulled one, re-set it, and pulled it again . . . several times. I looked in dismay at the engine temperatures and wondered what the long term effect on the blades might be. I was waaaaaaaay to junior to make comment.

All stalls were done to the push, and with the mental imagery of Mike Lithgow's flight still clear in our minds.

Simulators are very useful tools, but when I moved to the left, I would hate to have found myself there with nothing but simulation to found my abilities on.

Oh, I had my DC-3 checkout from one of the old school, who told me he wanted to see a full-breaking stall, none of this namby-pamby 'release of back pressure at the first burble.' Well, next thing you knew, there we were, nothing on the clock but the maker's name, headed earthwards at an angle of bank approximating 90º! No stall breaker strips on the Greasy Three, are there? Never mind, never mind... nowadays we do that sort of thing in the sim, don't we?

My point here, I suppose, is that sometimes even test pilots get carried away trying to sell airplanes, when they think showing how it can be turned inside-out is cool and sexy. Any fule can figure out, given a moment of quiet thought, that it must be deeply optimistic to do an abort and then go again from less than the full length with red-hot brakes. Or perhaps, to do some sort of cloud-break with the TAWS shouting at you, what seems to have happened here... could that not have been foreseen as likely to have ended in tears?

Once we read and understand the crash report we may well be reminded of something some of us tend to forget, that we are only as good as our last flight! I certainly have found myself in situations where I really needed to have remembered that before I got myself into said situation! I may have done something just as stupid (with much less raw flying ability) than this unfortunate crash pilot, when it was just dumb luck, blind fate or whatever that spared me to learn from my own mistake. Now we need to learn from his, yes?

The simple conclusion with regard to the Sukhoi crash, is that there was a serious lapse of aviating and navigating professionalism. There is little indication at this point, of mechanical failure being a major factor.
The snippets of information slowly being gathered - such as no pax manifest being drawn up - show a culture of "joyriding" and casualness associated with the entire flight.
I'll wager that the final report produces a record of casualness towards the flight plan on the part of the Captain and the co-pilot.

Perhaps there was no complete and utter recklessness, as fullforward is stating - but it's totally obvious that after setting a descending flight path, the Captain and crew were either unaware of the precise position of the mountain, as regards their intended path - or perhaps, because of lax cockpit drill, visitors to the cockpit distracted the Captain and co-pilot from giving their full attention to navigation, at a time when they needed 110% attention to navigation.

There is a subtle increase in complacency and a corresponding lowering of professionalism in many skilled people as they age, and as their experience, and "hours in the seat" increases.

It's a not-uncommon factor to find that many people involved in disasters involving fatalities, and serious crashes involving major injury, have good skills that should otherwise have ensured that they did not come to grief.
The old adage that "complacency breeds contempt" is an adage that is well-founded. Casualness and complacency are extremely subtle human factors that just creep up on you, when you continue to do the same complex job continuously.

I am often dumbfounded at how otherwise highly skilled, and supposedly highly professional people, with extensive experience, initiate disasters - that have as their root cause, simple acts of negligence, casualness, and complacency, that led to the disaster.

We, as humans, tend to develop habits over a long period of time, that degrade the intense professional skills levels required, when complex machines are being operated.
We have to continually guard against those habits degenerating into habits of complacency that take us into areas of extreme danger.

Machinbird 20 June:

Anyone know if the Superjet has hard or soft g limits in its flight control system?

It would be a bear to find out that you need 2.8 g to miss terrain (through faulty planning of course), and to have the system limit you 2.5 g.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/boohoo.gif


Maybe it's worth thinking about this a bit more. We were told that this was a test aircraft, substituted because of a last-minute issue with the original sales demonstration aircraft. I seem to recall reading that the cockpit was equipped with parachutes, and you can see in the video of the first flight that the cabin attendant appears apologetic about the test equipment occupying some of the seat space in the passenger cabin. So it was a somewhat more complex aircraft than normal, and a test pilot had been assigned.

Is it conceivable that software was changed for the demonstration purposes and that pilot was not aware that he did not have his usual climbing ability because of a substituted g limitation? In which case this might not be pilot error so much as a Sukhoi administrative miss.

A Boeing CEO curse on BCA presidents? - FlightBlogger - Aviation News, Commentary and Analysis (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flightblogger/2012/06/superjet-crash-probe-focuses-o.html)

Knkt 001 5 Vi Rek.ku 12 English (http://www.scribd.com/stephen_trimble_4/d/98171834-Knkt-001-5-Vi-Rek-ku-12-English)

But this is utterly stupid:

"There is a subtle increase in complacency and a corresponding lowering of professionalism in many skilled people as they age, and as their experience, and "hours in the seat" increases.":ugh:

You can speak by yourself or people that built their careers on a less than professional environment, on dated standards, bad training and such.
'Au contraire', as people age, the more they learn from mistakes, from stupid things like this one, on how expensive being casual or too relaxed can be on accomplishing our tasks.
The accident statistics aren't age related, but very linked to air safety culture and psychological/psychiatric factors.
No much different from road accidents.

There are many, many stories were the silver haired just saved the day. The reverse isn't true.

There are many, many stories were the silver haired just saved the day. The reverse isn't true.

I call Bull$hit. There have been many cases recently of elderly Captains dying or incapacitating on board and the younger first officer saves the day. :}

Don't get me wrong, I mostly agree with you. Experience does provide a bit more caution in how one operates, a caution that is not high on the priorities list when you are younger. But I think that might be more due to age than experience. It might also be due to non-aviation related issues which you experience as you grow older.

I call Bull$hit. There have been many cases recently of elderly Captains dying or incapacitating on board and the younger first officer saves the day.

Really?? Give us some examples of "Many"

Guys - this is again irrelevant to this thread .Do not waste your and our time.:ugh:

Really?? Give us some examples of "Many"


Here:

Airline captain dies while flying plane - but, after a short stop, passengers reach destination | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1320233/Airline-captain-dies-flying-plane--short-stop-passengers-reach-destination.html)

Or Here:

Czech Airlines Captain Dies During Flight - Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-15/czech-airlines-captain-dies-during-flight-from-warsaw-to-prague.html)

Or how about the one that went bonkers on the JetBlue flight just a few months ago?

Sorry, but relevant to the topic because of what was said in previous posts. :rolleyes:

Given that the age of the accident pilot doesn't seem to be a factor, why not start another thread highlighting age-related accidents, if you really need to bang that drum?

I think it would be pretty easy to shoot down your basic premise, but this probably isn't the place for that. Start another thread and then stand by for incoming!

reading a book on risk and popular delusions there was a peice on Cicero- when the great Roman was shown a shrine to a Godess whose intervention had saved a lot of sailors on a particular occasion he looked about and enquired where were the shrines to all the sailors who had been drowned when she had not intervened = don't base your decisions or argument on hear-say

Первый полет не очень понравился самому пилоту: он оказался довольно коротким, а снижаться на коротком участке с высоты 3 км пришлось слишком резко, что было некомфортно для пассажиров. Яблонцев внес изменения в план второго полета. На дальней от аэропорта Джакарты точке командир судна решил сделать не разворот, а дополнительный круг, чтобы снизиться на нем до 6 тыс. футов, «выиграв» таким образом и высоту для последующей более комфортной посадки, и общее время полета...В последнем рейсе лайнером управлял уже не экипаж, а автопилот. Сначала самолет двигался по контрольным точкам, координаты и высоты которых летчики заложили в память бортового компьютера перед началом полета. Перед вторым кругом экипажу пришлось перейти на другой режим работы автопилота - Select Heading («Выбор курса»). Поворачивая регулятор, пилот провел самолет по кругу, а при выходе из него допустил ошибку, задав курс не на север, к аэропорту Халим-Перданакусума, а на юг, к горе Салак высотой 7254 фута.

The pilot didn’t like the first flight, it was too short, and the descent from FL 100 in such short distance was too rapid and uncomfortable for passengers. Yablontsev changed plan for the second flight. ]Farthest from the airport he decided not to make a turn, but an additional circle to descent to 6 000 feet, " to gain" height for more comfortable landing and the total flight time....

In the last flight the liner was controlled by a/p. First the plane followed way points, the coordinates and altitudes given to memory of FMS by pilots before the flight. To do the circle, the crew had to switch a/p to another mode - Select Heading. Turning the knob, the pilot held the aircraft in a circle, and when exiting from it he made a mistake by setting the heading not to the north to the airport, but south to Mount Salak height of 7254 feet.

Source: Крушение SSJ-100: к ошибке привели ди�петчер и ро��ий�кий атла� - РБК daily - Статьи (http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2012/07/03/society/562949984237503)

Blimey, is this saying that the accident was caused by an old-fashioned reciprocal error??

Blimey, is this saying that the accident was caused by an old-fashioned reciprocal error??

Hmmmm, somehow I'm not terribly convinced by this theory.
It would take a lot of a coincidence to err by 180° being 30nm from your airport and thereby exactly flying up a canyon and straight at the end hitting the peak :confused:.
On that planned route back to Jakarta there wouldn't have been any moutains, had they turned to the North instead of the South. So when looking out the window you should not see green on your FL.
So, according to that theory they couldn't even see the canyon walls, flew 5 miles up the canyon w/o ever coming close enough to one side of the canyon to see it ???

Occam's Razor raises some doubts with me about this theory. Looks to me a bit like the Politically Correct version. Simple mistake, no deliberate dangerous action, plane not at fault, all are happy....

I hope we get to see something more substantiated or otherwise proof of the improbable.

[QUOTE"There is a subtle increase in complacency and a corresponding lowering of professionalism in many skilled people as they age, and as their experience, and "hours in the seat" increases.[/QUOTE]

Sullenberger, De Crespigny, Haynes...........

One of the most idiotic comments in the history of PPrune.:rolleyes:

Turning the knob, the pilot held the aircraft in a circle, and when exiting from it he made a mistake by setting the heading not to the north to the airport, but south to Mount Salak height of 7254 feet.

That to me is a reciprocal error, but I can't really believe such a basic mistake could be made nowadays!

What is the source for the above quote? Is it reliable, or is it just an "I reckon this could have happened" type piece?

Afraid my Russian is not up to much!

What is the source for the above quote? Is it reliable, or is it just an "I reckon this could have happened" type piece?
This theory was published by several newspaper. It was formulated by group of specialist and coworkers of Yablontsev in UAC. It is supposed that they are informed about FDR, CVR and other results of investigation. Of course it is not official statement, but I suppose that they published it with tacit(?) consent of heads of corporation. This crash is very important and sensitive topic in Russia. I also think that Russians are little uptight to wait so long for preliminary report. But there is no second possibility, let’s wait for preliminary report too - it is too early to do final conclusions.

It is hard to believe that they did mistake like this. But this theory is not in contradiction with known facts. I thing that if CVR did not give answer why they turn against the mountains, we never be sure what theory is correct. Looking on chart, I thing that they should follow the course 020 and they flew 200. This was last 7 miles or last 2,5 minutes.

Findings from the investigation into the May 9 crash of a Sukhoi Superjet 100 will be released by the end of summer, Russian officials said.

That to me is a reciprocal error, but I can't really believe such a basic mistake could be made nowadays
It is hard to believe that they did mistake like this
A reciprocal error doesn't seem so remote to me. Is there any pilot here who can honestly say he did not make one? I surely did.
I understand from the earlier post that instead of a 180 he decided to make an extra 360; he probably rolled out after 360 instead of 540. Would confuse me...
Anyway, it is still newspaper gossip.

Reminds one of a Varig 737 some years ago, dialling in 270° instead of 027°, running out of fuel and landing in forest.

True, but they actually had tried to set 027--something strange about the nav unit, like it had four digits instead of three, can't remember exactly.

One interesting thing about that crash was that the story was that they were listening to the World Cup finals on the ADF--Brazil was playing--and got so distracted they never knew where they were.

The truth, however, turned out to be that when they did realize they were lost, the crew tried to tune in broadcast stations to get a fix, though they never could find one strong enough to use. And of course every broadcast station in Brazil was playing the finals, so when a flight attendant at some point went into the cockpit, the passengers in the front rows heard the football game and spread the story to the press.

And how would the expierienced believers in this cover up press leak explain the shouting TAWS?

Three crew members, one an expierienced test pilot, one a navigator, a brand new aircraft with all gimmicks, a demontration flight to sell the aircraft and a mountain in the way of a reciprocal navigation error when just descended below MSA enroute to a sea resort would then add up to a crew with hearing problems (TAWS).

And how would the expierienced believers in this cover up press leak explain the shouting TAWS?
That error was about how they got into the sh!t in the first place; their (in-)actions with regard to TAWS has to do why they didn't get out of it.

Семь последних миль ... по данным бортовых самописцев, система T2CAS несколько раз предупредила экипаж об опасности. Яблонцев лично испытывал работу этой системы на Северном Кавказе и, составляя руководство по летной эксплуатации SSJ-100, написал, что при срабатывании сигнализации нужно «незамедлительно начать набор высоты». Однако в Индонезии пилот почему-то не поверил системе: он был уверен, что летит над равниной к аэропорту и даже проигнорировал собственные рекомендации, снизившись на 800 футов.


7 last miles ... according to flight data recorders, T2CAS several times warned the crew about the dangers. Yablontsev personally tested this system in the North Caucasus and preparing Flight Operation Manual for SSJ-100, he wrote that reaction for the alarm should be "immediately begin to climb." However, in Indonesia for some reason the pilot did not believe the system: he was convinced that they flies over a flat terrain toward the airport and even ignored the recommendations of its own, when descenting to 800 feet.

he was convinced that they flies over a flat terrain toward the airport and even ignored the recommendations of its own, when descenting to 800 feet.

And they never saw the sides of the canyon which were maximum 3-500m away?. It would mean they accidentally and unknowingly always flew pretty much in the middle of that canyon for almost 5 miles without ever getting close enough to one side to see it and ask themselves wtf???
Plus a shouting TCAS where there should be flat terrain underneath when returning to Jakarta ?
Sorry, This sounds a bit strange for my taste.
I rather prefer to wait for the official report hoping it will be published and be objective without cover up.

hoping it will be published and be objective without cover up


I'm not concerned that there'll be any cover-up in the report, but I'm already resigned to the likelihood that - as with the Polish Tu-154 - there'll be no shortage of "experts" pompously declaring that the inquiry was biased, and that they know better. :ugh:

Henra - some of the earlier posts and pictures show how easy it is to have mist & cloud around the crash site - he could probably see the mountain out of one window and thought he was in over flat land to the north - couldn't see the other ridge coming up fast on the other side..........

Why not to put it simple?

IFR?
Check your plates for MSA.

VFR?
Have a look out, stay clear of clouds/traffic and obstacles, but don't blame any other person e.g. ATC.:=

he could probably see the mountain out of one window and thought he was in over flat land to the north - couldn't see the other ridge coming up fast on the other side..........

But there shouldn't have been any mountain to any side of the aircraft if they had just made the mentioned reciprocating error.
They would have been North of the mountain range all the time. In that scenario any green solid mass of terra firma reaching up to their flight level, be it to the left or to the right, should have initiated instant concern - and action.
As they were released to FL60 and hit the mountain at ~FL62 I see no indication for a vigorous attempt to climb until maybe the last 5 or 10 seconds.

Can we review for a moment? Looking at PJ's post #288 the crash appeared to be south to north. How does that fit with a 'reciprocal error' heading south?

Can we review for a moment? Looking at PJ's post #288 the crash appeared to be south to north. How does that fit with a 'reciprocal error' heading south?

If I remember correctly that was one of two possible scenarios proposed by him based on the originally reported coordinates which were not quite exact.
The other was North to South. The latter one seems to be the more likely and generally accepted one. That second one is also the basis for the speculation about this reciprocal error.

If this map is correct:
Файл:SSJ100 crash on Salak ru.png — Википеди� (http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:SSJ100_crash_on_Salak_ru.png)
(red point = crash site, 2211 - Mt Salak)
it is unlikely that plane flew from South to Nord. The crash site lies behind the peak in this direction. The crash site lies in the end of canyon which heading is ca 200, opposite to the direction to the airport.

henra:

Plus a shouting TCAS where there should be flat terrain underneath when returning to Jakarta ?

There was discussion much earlier that the TCAS(TAWS) may have had a regional terrain database, which did not include the area in question.

henra:
There was discussion much earlier that the TCAS(TAWS) may have had a regional terrain database, which did not include the area in question.

Agreed! As single Issue I would agree it may not have been very reliable and there could be an explanation why to diregard it.
It is just the combination with other Issues that makes it -in my Eyes- not the most likely overall scenario.
Looking back at most accidents Occam's Razor has an excellent hit rate. Maybe this is one óf the exceptions.
But I only tend to believe it if there is substantial evidence pointing in the direction of a scenario that needs (too) many assumptions. So far I don't.

....Occam's Razor has an excellent hit rate

What scenario prefers Occam's Razor in this case?

What scenario prefers Occam's Razor in this case?

CFIT - They lost situational awareness and flew into a mountain they weren't expecting to be there.

Yes, of course. Obviously they didn't expect the mountain to be there. But how did they come to lose situational awareness?

Henra, you are quite correct - my original scenario, south-to-north, is incorrect.

The flight path was north to south, striking the other side of the ridge where I thought the original site was - everything fits. This knowledge and mapping actually came from a German site and it is worth re-reading this thread to see their work, which I think is correct.

Edit - here's as good a map and theory as any, posted by mcgyvr81 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-16.html#post7190096)

Thanks for that link, PJ. We sum this up, as I and many others said earlier as
'LOST'. Why? I sure reams of PDFs can be written on the psychology of this, but I still think my post#591 says it all and we should close the folder and go 'WHAT?!!!?

BOAC;
but I still think my post#591 says it all and we should close the folder and go 'WHAT?!!!?
Yes, fully agree.

I haven't read it yet, (haven't covered all recent posts here) if the TAWS database included this area. Anyone?

What scenario prefers Occam's Razor in this case?


I really hate to say this but I honestly believe it is something along the lines: Sightseeing gone wrong.
Lost situational awareness and maybe thought they were in a different valley. One they saw before where you could fly through. Or thinking they were on the outside of the mountain range and flying alongside it (while the outer ridge being obscured).

This would explain why they did not initiate a climb once entering the canyon, without requiring total obscuration of both ridgelines while accidentally following exactly the direction of the canyon without seeing it.

Happy to stand corrected by the official report, though

The Indonesian NTSC has just released the Preliminary Report in to the investigation of this crash.

http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/Preliminary_Report_97004_Released.pdf

Re the report, ATC never delegates Responsibility for Terrain Clearance to the pilot.

The keyword "visual" is found wanting when the pilot & atc agree on 6,000'.

Also ATC doesn't give a 'clearance' to 6,000'. He says '6,000 copied'. Doesn't sound like a clearance to me. Have to say they approved the right orbit after that.

you wonder if the pilot misread the MSA as 6000 ft??

had it been 7000ft instead of 6900ft he might have noticed it ..........

A few confirmed facts but still a few questions :

Fact : Flight rules/PLN was IFR. Req alt was 10.000
MSA was 6.9 until 25 NM. Radius HLM impactwas 28 NM .
Question 1 : what was the MSA at that point ?
fact :a/c was not under radar vector : reponsibility terrain clearly PIC.
Fact : discrepancy in the report on the ATC R/T phraseology used for the a/c to descend to 6000 ( below MSA)
Question2 :was the PLN vertical request made to descend below MSA followed by an ATC instruction ( XX descent to 6000 ) or was the request made in such a way that it was understood to be going down visually ? then the " 6000 copy" mentioned at the begining of the report could be understood.

It would be nice to see the R/T transcript.

I suspect that you're asking a great deal for perfect dialogue from Jakarta Radar Control

What I'd like to see is the transcript for the 07:28 UTC conversation when the pilot asked for approval to make a right turn "the Controller approved the flight to make an orbit to the right at 6,000ft"

If he did say 6000ft then the crew probably thought (wrongly) they were OK

I suspect that you're asking a great deal for perfect dialogue from Jakarta Radar Control

yes but I fly as well, and when in IFR ( or VFR in controlled airsace ) if I request a descend and I hear back : " copied " I am never going to start decending , and would ask again if we are cleared to descend. Anywhere on the globe. Therefore I think the full exact R/T exchange would be helping us understand why ( and if) they did take this " copy" as an ATC instruction .

If he did say 6000ft then the crew probably thought (wrongly) they were OK

Normally not the kind of assumption a 57 years old test pilot with over 10.000 h would do. In this situation (outside radar vectoring) The ATC clearance / responsibilty is only with regard to separation with other traffic, not with terrain.
A guy like this would know that for sure.

The clue(s) are somewhere else I would say.

How large is an "orbit"?

if you mean orbit=2x Radius then here it is:

(Turn Radius) NM = TAS↑2 / 68652 / tg φ

( φ = Bank Angle)

What I mean is, does a large orbit explain the 11nm discrepancy between the request and the impact, or is it more likely that there was a tight orbit followed by a flightpath that hasn't been disclosed by the investigators yet?

Couple of points regarding the report...

Below is a summary of the main crash site coordinates, with sources, (copy/paste into your browser examine original sources).

Interestingly, the Indonesian NTSC has two different coordinates in their "Immediate Recommendations (http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/Recommendations/KNKT_001_5_VI_REK.KU_12_English.pdf)" document and their "Preliminary Report (http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/Preliminary_Report_97004_Released.pdf)" document.

The estimate from PPRuNe member sledge1984 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-17.html#post7190594) coincides very closely with Sergei Dolya (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-17.html#post7190904)'s estimated position and the NTSC Preliminary Report position.

The estimate from mcgyvr61 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-17.html#post7190096) which had the aircraft flying up the valley and striking the almost-vertical face is, to me, the most viable crash site estimate. I believe this because the terrain on the east side of the valley, is not an "85deg" vertical face as seen in crash-site photographs, and Google Earth images which seem to fit the site photographs.

The discussion on TAWS by A Van (with some contributions by others) is a must-read if only to further understand the workings and limitations of TAWS/EGPWS and T2CAS.

There are a number of theories which have been discussed in the thread concerning the TAWS - that it was intentionally ignored/turned off, that it may not have had database information for the area, or, according to A Van, may possibly not have had sufficient "granularity" to sense the mountain peak, (you have to read the post and take a look at the links to understand this interesting and important point).

The preliminary report makes no mention of the TAWS so we will have to wait for the final report.

First, a contour map supplied earlier in the thread:

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-kz6NNwg/0/L/i-kz6NNwg-L.png

Here's an image summarizing a few of the crash site estimated coordinates, with sources:

NTSC Immediate Recommendations document crash site coords (http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/Recommendations/KNKT_001_5_VI_REK.KU_12_English.pdf)

NTSC Preliminary Report crash site coords (http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/Preliminary_Report_97004_Released.pdf)

Dolya/Map crash site coords (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-14.html#post7186203)

PPRuNe mcgyvr61 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-17.html#post7190096) probable crash site coords

PPRuNe Sledge1984 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/484925-sukhoi-superjet-100-missing-17.html#post7190594) est crash site coords

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-pHpbSFx/0/L/i-pHpbSFx-L.jpg

Unfortunately you are using the map (which is pretty small scale for this sort of thing - looks like 1:100,000) as evidence for the detailed local terrain

You'll find that even the Ordnance Survey get it wrong in areas of steep terrain - it's very difficult to render accurately - if you ever read Wainwrights Lakeland Guides he points this out all the time - especially on places such as Scafell Pike or Great Gable

You'd probably have to map at 1:10000 or even 1:5000 to accurately show the terrain on Salak - note the map shows no "sharp ridges" whereas all the photographs of the mountain ( not just at the crash site) show steep ridges all over the place- essentially they are below the resolution of the mapping

which is another reason to stay clear of rapidly rising terrain :(:(

More detailed terrain on OpenStreetMap:
OpenStreetMap (http://www.openstreetmap.org/?lat=-6.71&lon=106.74&zoom=15&layers=C)

thanks - looks a horrible place to be flying around

Not necessarily related but following in Aviation News today:

Armavia cancels SuperJet order

Armavia has cancelled its order for two Sukhoi SuperJet 100 aircraft due to safety concerns. The national airline of Armenia had agreed in principle to purchase two aircraft in an agreement signed with Sukhoi in 2007.
Armavia has operated the first SuperJet 100 since April 2011 although earlier this year, the aircraft was grounded and had to undergo urgent repairs in Russia. The airline has stated that the fact the aircraft needed repairs after just one year of service casts serious doubts on its quality and technical characteristics.
Armavia has already stated that it will not be taking delivery of a second SuperJet.

I read that Armavia has financial problems and economy issues are true reason for effort to return the a/c. As far as I know, there is the only one safety issue at first several SSJ - some sensor in climatisation system - if not absolute accurate mounting an cabling it gives false alarm of dehermetisation of cabine.

There are several non technical problems for foreign air companies - for example, when flying from Armenia to Russia for technical check they reportedly wait 2 days for Russian customs formalities. Russia also have not a scheme of financing the supply of a/c to a foreign companies by providing government guarantees for lower rates for loans.

It could be only teething.

This is slightly off topic, but relevant. Sky Aviation of Indonesia who had the highest number of employees on board (the majority as flight attendants) has just acquired their first jet aircraft (https://twitter.com/Riazy_link/status/233001252244566016/photo/1) which is a B733. I wonder what the status of their Sukhoi orders are now? Will they cancel all orders and now pursue with the 737? As much as the Sukhoi aircraft itself was most probably not to be blamed for the crash, it will cause a stigma for Sky flight crew and potential passengers as well. Indonesians are quite superstitious.

Indonesians are quite superstitious. For 'quite' read 'very'. ;)

When I worked in Jakarta, one of the lifts in my office building was thought to be haunted and the local staff would not use it. As a consequence, it was the fastest and most convenient lift in the building.

if you used it I can see why the the locals gave it a wide berth.............. ;);)

Russian delegation will fly to Indonesia next Wednesday to discuss the final report. Group will be led by Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade and the visit will spend several days. Final report is supposed about half of October.

Was just on here to look for an update on this.

Thanks for the info Karel.

Russian group of specialists finished negotiations in Jakarta and together with Indonesian side signed the protocol that fixed "agreed positions about results of investigations and determines the content of the future conclusions".

Indonesian side works on the report and will negotiate it with many instances, incl. NTSB (USA) and BEA (France).

Final report is not supposed before end of October.

Given that international relations between Indonesia and Russia were fraught for many years I doubt they'll be too accomodating to any "pressure"

on the other hand they absolutely HATE a fuss so there may be some changes made

I doubt they'll be too accomodating to any "pressure"

Pressure by whom, on whom ?

Why would you think that the parties involved aren't going to agree on probable cause on this occasion ?

I believe that Russian point of view could be useful for Indonesian investigators. They know very well the aircraft, they very carefully analysed FDR and CVR records, they understand Russian mentality, they know differences in air traffic customs and rules in Russia. Let as remember that captain was not much experienced in foreign flights.

By my opinion Russians would like to read clearly in final report that there is no reason to suppose that there was any problems with SSJ. They understand that it was caused by human factor, mostly by pilots, maybe they suggest that captain was a little confused by non standard reactions by ATC. There is no conflict with known facts.

I don't think that "pressure" is the best word for discussions with Russian or with NTSB and BEA.

"Pressure by whom, on whom ?"

Dave, Dave

EVERY time there is an accident report released this forum explodes with people alleging "pressure" by one side or the other or by the Masons or the Templars or little green men from New Mexico

I just thought I'd get in first ;)

The little green men moved long ago from New Mexico to Nevada, Area 51 to be exact.

I've met people from Roswell and take it from me they haven't all moved................

For reminder:
The second demo flight is planned to last for 30 minutes. Before the plane took off, air controllers at Halim contacted ATC. They communicated closely: "Hello, approach request release, Mas. RA36801 to the Bogor Area in five minutes." The controller even joked, "RA36801 OK. Direct or through Tangerang?"

At 14:05 (0705 UTC), the second demonstration flight requested start and pushback

At 14:10 pm asking for permission to start engines

at 14:14 the flight cleared for taxi runway 06

at 14:18 ATC issued clearance to the flight that after take-off initially to maintain runway heading until passing 2000 feet, then to make a right turn to intercept radial 200 from HLM VOR and climb to 10,000 feet.

At 14:19 the flight was cleared for take-off

At 14.21 the flight was airborne and instructed to contact Jakarta Approach

14:24
SSJ: Tower 36801 good afternoon, establish Radial 200 degrees VOR 10,000 feet…
ATC: “RA36801 radar contact, maintain 10,000 feet and proceed.
SSJ: Maintain level at 10,000 feet 36801

pilots were flying IFR
14:26
SSJ: Tower, 36801 request descend 6,000 feet
ATC: 36801 say again request
SSJ repeated
ATC: Okay, 6,000 copied

As usual each afternoon, the traffic in the skies over Jakarta was hectic...ATC was personally serving 13 flights simultaneously. According to one tower worker, although five people were listed as being on duty at that hour of the day, N was alone and unassisted.

14:28
SSJ: Tower, 36801 request turn right circle present position
ATC: RA 36801 approve circle to the right 6,000

The request to turn the plane was the last communication from the pilot. Nearly five minutes later (14:33), the plane crashed into the ridge. From the black box recording, according to one Russian investigator, a moment after the request was approved, the pilot shrieked, "O Bozhe, chto eto takoe? (Oh God, what is this?)"

The controller only realized what had happened 24 minutes later. The plane was no longer on the radar screen. He tried to contact the Sukhoi three times, but there was no reply.
14:52 pm, ATC called Soekarno Hatta Airport because the plane is not visible on the radar monitor
much more here:
The ivory tower (http://asiaviews.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37582:the-ivory-tower&catid=1:headlines&Itemid=2)
and here:
Control Tower Played a Role in Sukhoi Tragedy, finds Tempo Investigation | nasional | Tempo.co (http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/18/055411384)

I suppose that report will be released soon

A Russian investigator who has knowledge of the initial analysis result of the black box said that Yablontsev was about to conduct a maneuver after his request to descend was approved by the Cengkareng tower. “He wanted to fly between two mountain peaks,” said the investigator. Mt. Salak has three peaks with deep valleys.

That's the vital or better deadly part then, isn't it?

Buyers of Russian Sukhoi Superjet-100 may use credits - Medvedev: Voice of Russia (http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_29/Buyers-of-Russian-Sukhoi-Superjet-100-may-use-credits-Medvedev/)

Russia’s Prime Minister also said earlier this month that amendments were introduced to the rules regulating the allocation of credits for technical equipment and leasing to the Russian producers of planes, helicopters and air engines.

October is passed, any news on the report ?
My ( local ) info said some time ago already that the report was ready and would be made public before end October.

October is passed, any news on the report ?

New term for publishing of final report is middle of December.
(...to be continued :))

Now Superjet obtains Indonesian type certificate and the first of twelve planes for Indonesian Sky Aviation will be prepared to deliver till the end of year. Few days ago its cabin interior was completed.

Some planes are preparing for Laos (Lao Central) and Mexican Interjet increased its order to 30 planes. Superjet (prepared for Yakutia) visited China and Russians believe in interest from this country.

In these days another Superjet flew to Iceland to do some test to increase limits for back and crosswind while landing.

Armavia (with its Superjet) is prepared for sale during few weeks (probably to Italian investor).

Thanks Karel.
In the meantime time I have been told what is on the draft, and I can understand why it is delayed . some paras are quite clear. Not sure they will remain in the final published issue though, but leaking them now makes sure the lessons will not be lost for everyone, or on the futility to try to hide things in this time and age... Good move.

But from what I heard and saw this accident has nothing to do with the aircraft, or its avionics, and a lot to do on what I would call " sloppyness" , from really all sides...that is why everyone is against the report basically...

Waiting until it comes out to comment further..

I also was told that the Controller involved will be re-installed this week ( he was suspended until now) Good move too, he was just caught in the middle..

The Sukhoi Superjet 100 obtains Indonesian Type Certificate
On November 22, 2012 the Indonesian General Directorate of Civil Aviation validated the Type Certificate for the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft (RRJ-95B).

This validation confirms compliance of the SSJ100 to the certification requirements of the Indonesian Aviation Authority, allowing its export to Indonesia and operation by Indonesian airlines without restrictions.

“The validation process has been completed through a long and careful work resulting in the obtainment of the SSJ100 Type Certificate by the Indonesian Authority. This will allow to deliver the aircraft to the first customer in the Southeast Asian market, the Indonesian airline Sky Aviation”, said Igor Vinogradov, SCAC First Vice-President for Development and Certification.

In June 2011 during Farnborough International Airshow JSC “Sukhoi Civil Aircraft” (SCAC) and Indonesian carrier Sky Aviation signed a contract for 12 SSJ100 to be delivered in 2012-2015. The first delivery of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft is expected by the end of this year.

Superjet 100 Type Certificate validation process was started in February 2012 with an application for certification.

In July 2012 on the occasion of the visit of the Indonesian Ministry of Transport to Russia the document defining the scope and procedure of works to validate the Type Certificate for SSJ100 in Indonesia was signed.

In January 2011 the SSJ100 obtained the Type Certificate by the Russian Certification Authority IAC AR. In February 2012 the aircraft achieved the EASA Type Certificate, followed by the validation of Mexican Aviation Authority in April 2012.

Aviatime ...Source: Sukhoi

...this accident has nothing to do with the aircraft, or its avionics...
I agree ... but some families of victims filled the lawsuit against Boeing (!) company at Chicago court two weeks ago. They declared that the T2CAS was delivered by Boeing and it did not work properly.

No comment.

Suit: Faulty Boeing equipment caused (http://www.suntimes.com/business/16261634-420/suit-faulty-boeing-equipment-caused-violent-indonesian-plane-crash.html)

Some vultures lawyers exploiting greiving families again .
2 quotes :

The plane, which was built by Boeing
I think the judges will have it easy with that one

did not activate when the plane approached the mountain.
When the judges will hear /see the CVR that one may be an easy one too.

But I am not a Judge.

If I was the families I would rather question those who authorised (or not) an unregistered prototype to carry passengers. ( that info is on the preliminary report) . But those were not Americans, so little or no money to be made there I guess ...

As far as I know, ACSS makes T2CAS systems for SSJ100
and I didn't know that Boeing makes any T2CAS.

Instead, boeing is responsible for doors, pilot seats and overall supervision and consultations for the project, if I am correct.

I will be surprised if judge decides to give those poor people some money. Just don't see any reason apart from the fact it would not be fair! :sad:

This money they theoretically can get from russian agency that crashed plane belonged to. So, relatives could go to the Indonesian government and ask about money. That government could ask....firmly....Russians to pay.
I am sure they will pay. You know, they still want to sell planes at least to somebody. :E

But, for some reason I think two governments will decide this under the carpet, with some bribes. :(
Both governments have really extensive practice with that.

Russians pay $ 140.000 to each of 35 families of Indonesian victims.

just hope they got it................

i love this aircraft but after this crash :( 6 months ago i wanted to start this airplane type rating and line training in armavia airline

Researching (googling) for more information on Embraer's having received certification for the 190 and 195, I stumbled across this surprising August article in Pravda. Russia's Sukhoi Superjet-100 completely hopeless - English pravda.ru (http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/04-09-2012/122071-sukhoi_superjet-0/)

Researching (googling) for more information on Embraer's having received certification for the 190 and 195, I stumbled across this surprising August article in Pravda. Russia's Sukhoi Superjet-100 completely hopeless - English pravda.ru

Certification of EMB in Russia is not big problem for SSJ. There are import taxes for EMB to Russia (maybe 20%) and even EMB has higher catalogue price. It is also more easy to get leasing for SSJ then EMB. And many years, most of companies even register foreign planes abroad.

I don't agree with that linked article. There are much inaccuracies and it is not written in objective manner.

The Sukhoi Superjet-100 does not sell abroad. Aircrafts for Mexico, Laos, Indonesia are already made and will be delivered till the end of this year

The only one jetliner, which was used by Armenian airline Armavia has already been returned to Russia Now it flies for Armavia and will be sold with the company. In September, only negotiations was done between UAC and Armavia.

etc. etc.



On tomorrow some information of final report should be published.

well said. :ok:

...this accident has nothing to do with the aircraft, or its avionics... I agree ... but some families of victims filled the lawsuit against Boeing (!) company at Chicago court two weeks ago. They declared that the T2CAS was delivered by Boeing and it did not work properly.

No comment.

That's my reply as well !

PS There're sheister lawyers everywhere looking for a buck.:ugh:

PS There're sheister lawyers everywhere looking for a buck.:ugh:

Probably the same lawyers who represented the families of the Silk Air 185 which crashed in Indonesia in 1997. :rolleyes:

On another note, a few of my colleagues who have since changed airlines and now flying for Sky Aviation in Indonesia, have just completed the simulator training on the SSJ 100. They are soon to start line training as captains in the next few months, if not weeks. Seems like it's all systems go here in Indonesia for the SSJ 100.

Pilot Error Blamed for Sukhoi crash

AAP December 18, 2012

INDONESIAN investigators have blamed pilot error for a Sukhoi Superjet crash that killed all 45 on board an exhibition flight that slammed into a Javanese volcano in May.

The National Transport Safety Committee (KNKT) found that the terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) was functioning and that the pilot had switched it off before the crash.
"The TAWS had sent a 'terrain ahead' warning before the crash, followed by six 'avoid terrain' warnings. The pilot in command switched the TAWS off as he assumed there was a database problem," KNKT chief Tatang Kurniadi said on Tuesday.
He said there was a "diversion of attention" in the cockpit before the Sukhoi Superjet 100 crashed into the 2200-metre dormant Mount Salak volcano.
"The crash could have been avoided if a recovery action was carried out within 24 seconds from the first warning," he told reporters.
The flight was scheduled to be a 40-minute hop to showcase the new Russian plane to prospective buyers in Indonesia, where the aviation industry is booming.
The Superjet accident was taken as a blow to the Russian aviation industry, which was hoping the twin-engine plane, the first new civilian aircraft built in post-Soviet Russia, would improve its image.


Pilot error blamed for Sukhoi crash | News.com.au (http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/pilot-error-blamed-for-sukhoi-crash/story-e6frfkui-1226539818849#ixzz2FNkI3oxo)

Final report has been published and could be found at

AAIC (http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/aaic.htm)

Looks like further discussion could be based more on facts rather than on rumors.

Sometimes you gotta wonder:

Crashed Superjet's pilot silenced terrain-warning system (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/crashed-superjets-pilot-silenced-terrain-warning-system-380320/)

:(

Waiting to read the official report to comment in depth ( if necessary).

The main points I was shown last month are apparently there according this news report (e.g. the 7 "Terrain" warnings prior CFIT) , confusion, lots of people in cockpit, etc.. I hope the details of flight plan/planning history which explains many of the errors subsequently made will still be there.

Here's the final report from the Indonesian NTSC website.

http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/Final%20Report_97004_Release.pdf

Russian media exploded today with SSJ report theme. Headlines varied from "Pilot blamed for catastrophe" (Echo Msk) through "Sides agreed on Human Factor" to "Moscow blamed Jacarta ATC for catastrophe" (NTV)

Human error caused fatal Sukhoi crash: Report | The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/18/human-error-caused-fatal-sukhoi-crash-report.html)

Yes everything is there , but a bit diluted , so you have to look for the interesting bits..

One of the main cause can be found in para 1.18.1 page 39. if you read carefully.
Many errors , asumptions , a fatal one was to change the aircraft type on the plan sent to Jakarta APP to a SU30 ( A military jet fighter used by the Indonesian air force)
Halim is a joint military airbase, so for the APP controller everything looked like a Military fighter going to a training area.
Rate of climb of the aircraft was in excess of 3000ft/min up to 10.000 ft and very fast, plus a Russian accent,(instructors were russians on the SU-30s) it all fitted.

The maps used by the crew did not contain the training area, no published MSAs, a handling agent not used to those demo flights, local staff not briefed as to what was expected, etc..
Everyone asumed things , while others, incl crew , asumed different ones ( training areas, radials/headings, orbits to loose alt , etc..)

From the crew side, we have a test pilot of an unregistered proptotype flying pax , and playing salesman in cockpit while flying in a unknown area low level in bad weather . A F/O who did not know what was the plan (if there was a plan , see CVR between 07:31 and 07:33 ) confused, maybe even lost (CVR 07:32:22 ) , bad teamwork , then finally disregarding 7 Terrain warnings.

No a bright day for Russia and Indonesia Aviation .
But a good and fair final report. Congratulations to the NTSC.

PS : For my ATC friends here, have a good look at page 46 , para 2.5 , especially the part about working alone on the sector with no assistant and no supervisor . Rings a bell ?

Many errors , asumptions , a fatal one was to change the aircraft type on the plan sent to Jakarta APP to a SU30

That's what this report says too:

Crashed Superjet was coded as fighter: investigators (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/crashed-superjet-was-coded-as-fighter-investigators-380349/)

Many errors , asumptions , a fatal one was to change the aircraft type on the plan sent to Jakarta APP to a SU30 That's what this report says too:

Crashed Superjet was coded as fighter: investigators (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/crashed-superjet-was-coded-as-fighter-investigators-380349/)

Come on! What a rubbish.

The pilots goofed it!

Simple, but true.....

Karel_x,

Thank you and, as I said, I was surprised to read the Pravda article. Now that the report is out, confirming there was nothing wrong with the aircraft itself, best wishes to Sukhoi in putting this accident behind them. Btw, I have no bias for/against Sukhoi, Embraer or Bombardier; the competition between them can only make for better and safer airplanes. Hopefully this accident will make for safer demo piloting.

Hetfield :The pilots goofed it! Simple, but true.....

Perhaps, but an accident never has a single cause. Had Jakarta ATC the correct a/c type and flight plan , the aircraft would have never been cleared to descend to 6000 ft in that area, and be left alone after that. . A decend on a return leg to land , yes but that would have been on a different course/heading.

These errors, or rather asumptions that led to errors, explains the ATC involvment discussed ( and speculated) at length at the begining of this thread.

ATC Watcher, :ok:

For thought; was the use of 'SU30' a mistake, perhaps aggravated by language? Or perhaps there was no ICAO coding for the SU100 before final certification, thus the choice appeared logical?

“Accidents arise from the unforeseen and often unforeseeable concatenation (linking) of diverse events, each one necessary, but singularly insufficient”. J Reason

alf5071h :
There is an ICAO code for the SSJ, it is SU95 . (there since more than a year )
interestingly there is no SU30 in ICAO, the SU-30 ICAO type designator is SU27, to complicate things many Suhkoi type designators do not follow common ICAO designations , (do not ask me why they do this :hmm:) hence adding another possible layer of confusion , (e.g. a SU-39 is for ICAO code a SU25 , a SU-47 is for ICAO SU37 , while the real SU-37 is for ICAO a SU27.. etc)
Search (http://www.icao.int/publications/DOC8643/Pages/Search.aspx)

It would appear that the ATS system (the computer software used) aircraft types database was not ICAO , but rather local, and that unknown types for the system could not be entered. Hence the " logical choice" to enter another Sukhoi type .

For a low trained, low pay assistant entering flight plans in a computer , a Sukhoi is a Sukhoi. To his defense, and if you type Sukhoi in google you get fighters, not civil airliners.
Interestingly during the debrief, , nobody in Jakarta ACC said they knew Sukhoi was making civil airplanes and that one was in the country.

A classic case of the holes in the cheese lining up I think

IF the ATC controller had known about the Sukhoi demo flight

IF the weather had been marginally better

IF the pilot had taken the same route as he did in the morning

IF they'd flown from Sukarno-hata and not Halim......

etc ewtc

any one of the above could have saved them

actually looks like quite a good report as well -I thought they'd at least whitewash local control.......

A thorough report but poorly written with much duplication. I read it right through and I read the same things three times under three different headings. I am a trifle unfair though because it is written in a second language (English)!

It's actually not so easy to translate Bahasa Indonesia precisely into English - it lacks precision with regard to time and dates - the classic is the word "waktu" which can be translated as "when" but generally means "if" - a good translator therefore repeates dates and times for example just to make sure you know where and when you are

Thanks for that clarification, HH - that makes the apparent duplication much more understandable.

I'm pretty sure the report is not a translation, and was probably not written by an Indonesian (I live in a country that also speaks Malay.)

With respect, the grammar of the report suggests that it is indeed a translation.

Lets wish much success for Sukhoi in Indonesia. May the SSJ prove its value well.

Sky Aviation to receive first SSJ-100 in January | The Jakarta Post (http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/30/sky-aviation-receive-first-ssj-100-january.html-0)

With respect, the grammar of the report suggests that it is indeed a translation.

I can assure you that it's not a translation. There is only one final report released and it's in English. All of the aviation accident reports produced by the NTSC in recent times have been in English, even domestic accidents and incidents.

I can assure you that it's not a translation. There is only one final report released and it's in English. All of the aviation accident reports produced by the NTSC in recent times have been in English, even domestic accidents and incidents. I can assure you that it's a translation of a draft (not published) written in the native language of the country
Or .. if it's not a translation .. this mean that all the investigators and administrative personnel involved have english as mother language ... and this is practically impossible

Hi,
Or .. if it's not a translation .. this mean that all the investigators and administrative personnel involved have english as mother language ... and this is practically impossible

Going by your own logic, since you are from Germany, then, did you write your reply to this post in German and then translate it to English before posting? Or did you learn how to speak English and therefore are capable of independently reading and writing in English? Anyway, this is getting off topic. The fact of the matter is, the NTSC has published one report and it is in English. And the same goes for all other aviation incident and accident reports I've read from the NTSC in recent times.

IF the pilot had taken the same route as he did in the morning

IF they'd flown from Sukarno-hata and not Halim......
Actually I would replace those with something a lot more basic - something not connected with a mere 'chance':

If the crew had a map of terrain they were flying over. There was a navigator aboard and he did not even bother to have an aeronautical chart of the area, makes you wonder what he was paid for. :\

plus the fact that they'd been in the same rough area earlier in the day - those volcanoes are BIG and can be seen in the morning fro well over 100 kms away

to go low level in cloudy conditions when you know there are big mountains around is pretty stupid

I can assure you that it's not a translation. There is only one final report released and it's in English.

Once again my apologies, although, with respect, the grammar is somewhat wanting.

to go low level in cloudy conditions when you know there are big mountains around is pretty stupid
I was wondering that one too, as the report indicates they had only an High altitude en route IFR map not showing terrain, and not a visual map .

But if you read the CVR carefully , from 07:30 44 the Capt says " No problem with terrain at this moment " the guest replies : yeah , it is flat " could indicate the Capt knew there was terrain around.
They only planned to fly 20NM around the VOR and there is indeed no problem in that area.
What was not planned is the fact that the aircraft left the plannned orbit which was above flat ground unoticed by the crew.(demonstrating a Holding input on the FMC ) and headed towards teh mountain.
The rest of the conversations show a crew confused as to which heading they should take to return to Halim , which ironically is also the location of the VOR they are tuned on !
Difficult to understand .

Difficult to understand . No!

Not at all.

Can't maintain VFR?

Pull up.

Hetfield : You mean VMC surely. But it is irrelevant as they were flying IFR and never announced/requested to continue visually.

What I meant by "Difficult to understand" was in relation to my last sentence : Why they were confused as to where to go to get back and did not notice the aircraft flew the opposite direction they wanted to with a VOR tuned on the airfield.

Why the accident occurred is obvious and easy to understand after reading the report

"Once again my apologies, although, with respect, the grammar is somewhat wanting."

so is my Indonesian.............