The below is from a Cypriot newspaper today and basically says that three managers / manager pilots and an engineer have been found guilty for manslaughter and will be given jail sentences of about 10 years.

Interestingly it says that the First Officer was 'weak in executing procedures' and 'the accused should not let him fly the aircraft' !!! It also says something similar for the captain. :confused:



A GREEK court yesterday sentenced three executives and an engineer from defunct Helios airline to 10 years in jail – pending an appeal – for the 2005 crash, which killed all 121 passengers and crew on board.
The four, Helios’ managing director Demetris Pantazis, flight operations manager Giorgos Kikkides, Bulgarian chief pilot Ianko Stoimenov and chief British engineer Alan Irwin, were found guilty of negligent manslaughter, a misdemeanor.
The court rejected a proposal that would have allowed the defendants to buy their way out of jail. Under Greek law, people convicted of certain crimes can convert jail sentences into fines.
The defence said it appealed the verdict.
The defendants were not present yesterday but they posted a €10,000 bail each to remain free until the appeal is heard.
The trial in Greece – the site of the crash -- began in December 2011, shortly after a three-judge criminal court in Cyprus had acquitted – by majority decision -- all five defendants charged in connection with the charge.
Apart from Pantazis, Kikkides, and Stoimenov, Cypriot authorities had also charged Helios executive chairman Andreas Drakos and Helios as a legal entity with manslaughter. But they had not charged Irwin.
The Attorney-general has appealed the Criminal Court’s decision.
“It is good that there are some guilty parties here, because in Cyprus no one was found guilty,” said Sophia Charalambous, wife of the ill-fated flight’s co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, 51.
The charge sheet in Cyprus said the two pilots were unfit to fly the aircraft and that Helios knew or should have known about this.
“This did not appear (in the Greek court). For us it was good because our own was not to blame,” Charalambous said in Athens, referring to her husband. .
Charalambous suggested political interests had played a role in the decision of the Cypriot court.
“We do not think it is right to put the responsibility on two dead men,” she said.
Eleni Alexandri, the mother of one victim, appeared somewhat satisfied but said that the trial (in Greece) should have been held at a criminal court and not a magistrate’s court, which cannot impose more than 10 years.
“They know very well that all these people are guilty and it is a shame that the trial took place at a magistrate’s court,” Alexandri said.
Lawyers representing the relatives in Athens said it was a fair and correct decision, affording the bereaved some degree of satisfaction for the first time in some seven years.
“Nothing can reverse their loss, given that human life cannot be measured in money, neither can it be covered by court decisions,” said attorney Apostolos Pantos.
The defence said it would fight the verdict, which they considered “wrong”.
It was not clear yesterday if the Greek court’s decision would have any bearing on the appeal procedure here, which is set to kick off in Nicosia next month.
“If the Supreme Court rejects the Attorney-general’s appeal, then Cyprus’ decision will become irrevocable, thus various issues will come up,” with the main one being whether the Greek court’s decision could be enforced, said Constantinos Mavroides, a lawyer for the relatives.
“But that is something that we will deal with in the course of things.”
The August 14 crash of flight ZU522 was the deadliest aviation disaster in Greece and Cyprus. The Boeing 737-300 slammed into a hillside at Grammatikos, near Athens, killing all 115 passengers and six crew.
In an October 2006 report on the crash, Greek investigators cited human error as the main cause of the crash, saying the pilots had left cabin pressure controls at an incorrect setting.
Passengers and crew were starved of oxygen due to problems in the cabin pressurisation, while the aircraft subsequently crashed into the hill after running out of fuel.
The report also cited Boeing for “ineffectiveness of measures”, since the same alarm was used for two different problems, resulting in the pilots misinterpreting the information.
A 2006 independent inquiry into the crash found that although the pilots were directly responsible for the crash, the airline as well as civil aviation officers were criminally liable.
The full findings of the inquiry, carried out by former judge Panayiotis Kallis, were only made public in December last year.
The 170-page report had been placed under the care of the Cabinet, the body that appointed the panel, and kept from the public eye since.
The panel was appointed back in 2006 to investigate both the underlying and immediate causes of the crash.

More stories (http://news.google.com/news/story?hl=en&gl=uk&q=helios&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ncl=dCCAQEEcsFHhLZMjjngyH0GdbNmRM&ei=mHOST7ClH4X28gP56fHNDA&sa=X&oi=news_result&ct=more-results&resnum=2&ved=0CDQQqgIwAQ)

Interesting - neither pilot fit to fly the aircraft?? Was a transcript of the CVR released? If so, where can it be found?

Was a transcript of the CVR released?

Not sure there would be much to hear; seeing as the crew and passengers were all unconscious for much of the flight! :confused:

This may be of interest,my apologies if it has been posted before in relation to this thread."http://www.youtube.com/v/fC0aAY6oIjM?version=3&feature=player_detailpage"><param

@<hidden> Of Trim: I appreciate your point, but it was a serious question, as it would be interesting to listen to (uhh... read) how the flight preceding the excess cabin altitude was conducted (e.g. was it disorganized, organized chaos, or a textbook case of proper CRM?), particularly during the ground portion where the pressurization would be set up/checked.

A copy of the report can be read at http://homepages.pathfinder.gr/aas/Helios522.zip. (http://homepages.pathfinder.gr/aas/Helios522.zip) u

ECAM - read the thread?

Isn't only the last 30mins saved?

Recording only begins at 1st engine start, no?

I think the main issue here is whether a manager can legally assume that if the pilots have their licenses and have done their sim checks/ CRM courses/ technical questionaires and all the other staff professional pilots have to do these days, they are 'suitable' to operate an aircraft.

These pilots had some bad comments in sim checks apparently (who hasn't ?) and some unfavourable reports from their colleagues. But they had completed all the required tests succesfully in the end, i.e., no-one was flying without all the licences and signatures as far as I know.

So after the accident someone can say that they shouldn't be flying because they didn't handle a problem well and the result was an accident. But how was one to know or decide before the accident? How many bad comments can declare a pilot 'unsuitable' if he passes the test in the end?!! :confused:

EK-Professional, nowadays two hour recordings are the norm and with the right tools the investigators are often able to unearth even more. Should be in the report which version they had, 30 min or two hours.

The charge sheet in Cyprus said the two pilots were unfit to fly the aircraft and that Helios knew or should have known about this

Confusing the meaning of the intermittent horn did occur before Helios.Several times.On paper, its a surprisingly simple and basic error for a flight crew to make.But it happened.The precedents mean the crew can not be characterized as "unfit".Pilot error is pilot error.And they have already paid the ultimate price.We should leave it at that.I studied the case and saw no real indication of company malaise.It was a one-off.A freak accident.

A freak accident!? Are you mad?
The phrase "freak accident" implies that it happened by chance, out of the control of the people involved. Is that really what you are suggesting?

Leaving the controller in manual during your pre flight checks then not checking pressurization at all during the climb and misinterpreting the cabin horn for the take off config while already in flight hardly seems like a one off "freak accident" to me.
Too many crashes over the last few years caused by complete lack of airmanship and ability, this would be one of them imho.

Engineer did his job, maintenance manual at the time did not specify returning the control to Auto. "Nice to know/ please do", No more than that, I am sure he wished he had, he does not deserve a jail sentence for this.
Capt, if I remember from a previous company, was not regarded as "ace of the base", but he passed all mandatory checks, as , I assume, did the FO. The guy who employed/approved their employment ? does he deserve a jail sentence ? I think not.
Finally, we can all have a "dull" moment, or a "dull" day, I have, early in my career, f*cked up a bleeds-off TO, we felt it in our ears, these guys didn't. We retreived the situation, they didn't. . . .am I smarter than them ? nope, I was lucky, I didn't "****-up" so badly to be found out/cause the masks to drop, but I did (royally) screw up. . .not proud, hands up Mea Culpa :(


There but for the grace of God etc.

Boeing (finally) acknowledged their "imperfections", I also, acknowledged mine, hopefully the Helios accident was public enough that it will never happen again.

Met the PIC, nice guy.

I know very little about this case, but I would like to add -

Is ruining four peoples' lives really justified in this instance?

Greetings All. I was registered here as TRIM-RUN but have not logged in in a long time.I have also changes my email address so can not recover my password, apologies to the moderators.

When I was a young engineer many years ago I had the pleasure and privilege of working with Alan Irwin. I was a fresh kid with my first type rating on my ticket nervous as hell about my first day on the job in a new company and country. Alan could see this and took me under his arm and brought the best out of me just like he had done with many guys before me and no doubt after me. His understanding of aircraft systems is second to none and there is no snag he can't rectify. Anyone who knows him will agree with me.

I am sick to my stomach with todays news and really can't believe it. I hope he is not in Greece but knowing him he probably is.

Personally I would warn any young guys or girls from ever getting into aircraft maintenance, you spend your life including nights and weekends pushing tin around the pan and chasing snags just to get shafted for doing your best.

Now I sell aircraft spare parts and make more a year than I did in fifteen years swinging spanners put together and thats the truth. anyone want an A+P and Part66 ticket ? screw it I will burn them instead.

Keep the faith mate.

He "failed" to reset a switch to the normal position. It was not mentioned in the maintenance schedule he should do so, he didn't, the pilots didn't check/notice. . . . . ultimately? pilots fault . . .spoken as a pilot. (nice if he had done so, but, who flies the damn thing/breathes (or not) if it is wrongly set?)

The legal proceedings here are all a bit 'third world', as is the way with many legal actions in Greece. Rather than conduct a sensible investigation to ensure it does not happen again, the route of many third world nations is to go for litigation and 'heads on poles' - you must always have a scapegoat after all. I am reminded of a similar approach to the biz jet colliding with the 737 over Brazil as another similar example of mishandling accident investigations.

As others have stated, if a pilot has passed his checks even after remedial training then he is 'fit to fly'. We can never go down the route of canning a pilot because he failed a check in order to pre-empt a crash. Clearly if there is a pattern and the individual shows no signs of responding to training, then that is a different matter. There is always a balance here and there is no evidence that I have seen to tell me that these pilots were not competent to fly the aircraft. There is no doubt they made mistakes on the day (have we not all done that?), but that is very different to saying they were intrinsically incompetent.

The investigation itself appears to be to a 1st world-country standard. The litigation side of things is a little different.

When are management finally liable for cutting costs in every area (apart from their own bonus schemes etc)? This may well rattle their cage and be a wake up call for every other goose out there that thinks they can keep cutting costs on training and safety, get away with it and claim to have increased efficiency.

The line has to be drawn somewhere and responsibilities must be accepted by those running the system. There is so much we can do when the system lets us down... I guess we could always leave..Perhaps.

Well said Trim Run I have known And worked with Alan some 20 years and is one of the most knowledgable engineers I have meat
The Greek authorities have insufficient evidence to convict the engineer however
There has to be a scape goat for the the friends and families of the victims
This is nothing but a kangaroo court and I think time the UK CAA and the AAIB we're involved.

alan irwin ia a first class engineer who’s knowledge of aircraft is second to none. The report on the helios crash shows he did his job correctly and iaw the amm as always. It would seem he is being blamed for being there and not for any failures. this growing trend of justices systems in many different countries to persecute hard working proffesionals just to try and prove that something has been done will lead to a lowing of safty standards due to the reluctance of all aviation personnel to speak out on any safty issue before or after an incident due to fear of self incrimination.

Has any of you received an aircraft from maintenance and always found all switches in the correct position? Don't we preflight the aircraft to ensure serviceably, check switch positions and function check items? When I accept an aircraft I assume some switches that should be either off or on are incorrectly set and it's my job is to make sure they are correct. Insane to charge the engineer for this.

It was a "freak" accident because so many holes in the cheese had to line up that day;

door report---switch left in manual after maintenance action---FO misses switch setting in pre-flight scan---Captain misses the same---horn at ten thousand cabin confuses not one but BOTH pilots-Equip cooling problem that is due to lack of pressurization SIDETRACKS both pilots from the real issue---Master Caution oxygen drop annunciation is missed due masking---Plane is light and quickly climbs to its cleared level 340---Captain is EAST German native and accent is strong---FO has just failed captain upgrade and is feeling resentful---they DONT like each other---Helios FA's and flt deck didnt brief together---who knew the code???--FA's remain sitting while plane climbs and climbs---would you sit in your seat while the plane continues to climb?

Who would believe such a scenario?It sounds like science fiction.Precedents of this type of accident (insidious failure to pressurize) have happened but there was always something that broke the chain eg,one flight crew member recognizes what is going on OR FA's making their way to the flight deck regardless of SOP.

If you factor in the old design of the B737 (one horn for 2 different problems) and the fact that failure to pressurize in a climb is insidious and could be a nasty trap,theres no doubt in my mind that this was a "one off" crash and that the flight crew were responsible.Were they unfit?No,pilots have taken off without flaps and stalled.Pilots stalled a 737 on final because they werent monitoring airspeed.Mistakes are part of human nature.

If the two pilots did not get on and were both viewed as weak under pressure,then I would have some measure of agreement in the accusation that they should not have flown together as a crew.But hindsight is 20/20.

In the light of the judgement, I (as an engineer) would have to think long & hard about working either on a Greek registered aircraft or one located there.

10 years for leaving a switch in a certain position & a European arrest warrant meaning you'll probably have to try & get help from your Greek jail cell......

This has shades of the carbon monoxide case, where resort reps were held responsible for a hotel's poor boiler installation.

Many holes in the cheese, indeed...


Akrivos Tsolakis final report :

Latent causes
1. The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits.
2. The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits.
/…/

Like Trim Run and TOON737, I have known Alan Irwin for a long time - almost 20 years - and can honestly say he is one of the most professional and diligent engineers that I have had the pleasure to work with.

His knowledge and experience on the B737 (and other aircraft types) is beyond reproach and, I can only reiterate other comments made here, that he is being made a scapegoat for, what is basically, 3rd world politics.

Fight them with as much as you've got Al and prove that you are innocent in this affair. It will mean fighting at a high level but you can do it and hit these :mad: where it hurts. There must be many LAE's questioning their job right now and the only way to stop this nonsense is to prove that following AMM procedures is not an offence - my best wishes are with you in this fight!

Hi All,

This case is particularly pertinent to me and I have taught it a couple of times at work.

The fault in question was reported as "loud knocking noise heard from the aft (starboard) service door during flt" in the cabin defect log. That was transposed into the tech-log as "aft service door requires full inspection". Without getting into the nitty-gritty, the latter is a very different comment. Crew are advised to write symptoms into the log in order for the engineers to work out the cure.

This lead the engrs to carry out the incorrect task, however, the CAUSE of the pressurisation failure should have been picked up by THE FLIGHT CREW. The engineering checks do not require them to put the a/c back to a "standard flight" condition. As a consequence we (pilots) are generally pretty aware of switch positions post maintenance.

I did my training with Andreas Prodromou who was the number 4 steward and he had swapped onto the trip to be with his girlfriend who was the number 3. Andreas had a job starting with Astraeus at the end of the summer season apparently. He would have known what he was looking at when he finally got into the flight deck: we did our MCC on the 737 at Oxford.

The skipper was an incompitent autocrat who thought CRM was a hinderance.

Helios paid lip service to CRM with little formal training.

Jet2 refused to renew the skipper's contract and he ended up at Helios.

Another mate of mine flew with the skipper and when he heard who it was showed no surprise.

This accident could have been avoided had the captain (notice use of lower case "c"):

a) not had 12 jobs in 12 years. It is questionable whether-or-not the captain had covered all the a/c systems within a 3 year period as a result.
b) believed in CRM
c) levelled off when the "gear" horn sounded (the horn was in fact the cabin press warning).

The Hellenic investigators comment in the report:

"...There was such a lack of evidence of CRM that it was considered a major contributrary cause to the accident..."

Sadly, in my humble opinion, whilst there were failings with the Helios management hierarchy and it is right and proper that punative measures are taken, this accident would PROBABLY have been avoided with any other captain.

I strongly agree with all comments reference Engineers and pilots checking switches but think it is EXCEEDINGLY unfair to punish the engineers. This was solely, after the engineering checks, a flight crew related error.

My summary to the courses usually runs along the following lines:

Captains: write SYMPTOMS not the cure into the tech-log.

Cabin Crew: if the masks drop and you still carry on climbing, do what you can to get onto the flight deck

Cause: One switch was in the wrong place and it should have been picked up about 6 times before FL100.

CRM: As per the Hellenic board, "...there was such a lack of evidence of CRM that it was considered to be a major contributrary cause of the accident..."

A few facts;

the CVR was 30 minutes so the last 30 minutes was recorded

it was ASSUMED the engineer left the PMS in MAN because it was found "past MAN" having been severely damaged in the impact and he was the last person who admitted touching it

there is evidence that he did return it to AUTO

there is evidence that it was in AUTO at impact but was moved by the impact

both bleeds were OFF before impact

both audio switches were to MASK


Alan Irwins comments to the investigation were "lost" then "found" but were not considered because they had not been "adopted" by UK AAIB.

The message - be careful what you say to investigators, you can never be certain it won't be used against you

You want me to go on or do you accept someone was stitched up!

TOON737 - Alan Irwin is a first class engineer and did nothing wrong.
To answer your last remark, he did appeal to the UK AAIB for help when the Greeks "lost" his submission that showed he could not have left the PMS in MAN - unfortunately they declined to help him clear this up.
They had not appointed an accredited representative because "there was no UK involvement - Safety oversight by UK CAA/JAR 145 Maintenance organisation ATC Lasham/pilots checked out by UK TREs/Alan was a UK LAe/ etc etc - so could not participate in the investigation even though entitled.

Appears to come under the heading of all too difficult and the excuse was not getting involved in criminal proceedings - if Alan is right it is an air safety concern as the investigation has missed the real cause of this accident.

The Greek authorities have insufficient evidence to convict the engineer however

For insufficient, substitute NONE.

If the MM didn't specify that the switch should have been returned to a set position after maintenance, what can he be charged with?

Seems to me as though the Greeks have their scapegoats in a line.

This is a very interesting thread.

Very sad for all involved.

I have not read the details for a long time, but a few points that come to mind.

1. Press switch/knob not the clearest/ind/de-tents.

2. Press mode light/ind cluster as above, waiting to happen.

3. Boeing made previous hi-lights of the above. "Beware"

4. MM checks of this system did not state switch positions after checks.

From memory, some layover/nightstop aircraft would have the outflow valve closed for various reasons, I think method was often by putting selector to Man, run closed, pull aircraft power and then select mode to Auto, next power up all back to normal, no problems.

Thinking about item 2 above, did we not see a good example of this indicator type on a LH 747 at NBO (1975ish ???) that was poss external lighting issues, but even a filament or two failures may not be of help, again thinking back, I recall Green was Auto and Blue was Man ????

Lets hope some lessons are learnt and save others in the future.

I also find it hard to understand how the Engineer is finding himself in this position, what do they say about the law ??????

My last thought for the day, on turnaround/transit aircraft, check panels well, nightstop/layover aircraft check panels well, after maint performed check panels well, after cockpit cleaning check panels well. Don't use Autoscan, use Manscan and keep it interesting(rev scan using other hand works for me)

Cheers all.....

Does any one here have the original verdict by the Greek Judge, or is it not available on internet? I am really very curious to his/her motivation and the underlaying reasoning to convict these 4 seen the availability of proof in this case.
An other matter is offcourse the use of non-punitive information being transformed in punitive, a very very scary development and as such I presume a serious threat to flight safety as such. Forgive me if I am wrong, but I still did not see any evidence of gross negliance or willful misconduct in this matter by the 4 involved.

Post #27 inter alia

i) Interesting to compare this judicial decision with similar proceedings in Kingdom of Spain re Spanair accident at Madrid ?

ii) Very interesting to compare and to contrast this decision with likely outcome (no criminal proceeedings; natch?) for the yet-to-be-resolved investigation into the Cork accident, involving as it does a myriad of state supervisory and private organisations and companies [not to mention "ticket sellers"] registered in:

Kingdom of Spain
The United Kingdom
Republic of Ireland
(Banana Republic?) of Isle of Man
[plus overall "control" by the EU]

not to mention original manufacture in the US of A ?

How many "3rd world standard" procedure will that one reveal, I ask

Just to amplify a point made by Wenwe; the aircraft was neither Greek registered nor located there. It was a Cypriot registered aircraft based and operated from Larnaca.

This could happen to any of you who manage or work on any aircraft that operates into Greece from UK.

Greece was the State of Occurrence in ICAO speak and the State that conducted the investigation and the State whose legal system allows prosecution on evidence that would not apparently be acceptable in a UK ciminal court.

Airsnoop, very true! Remember the unfortunate Swissair DC8 crew at Hellenikon many years ago!

Yep, and decades later the Jepp still said "use minimum reverse consistent with safety". . . . that will be detent 3 then :D for the safety of my freedom.

I think its worth pointing out this extract from ICAO Annex 13:


5.4.1 Recommendation.— Any judicial or administrative
proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be
separate from any investigation conducted under the
provisions of this Annex.

We all need to think how we would react now if asked to 'co-operate' in an Air Accident Investigation when a European Court can take information from an Accident Investigation Report, which is not intended to apportion blame to an acceptable level to that of a criminal investigation, and use it as evidence of criminal guilt. Imagine what a Jury or non technical Judge could make from and Accident Investigation that was being used by the Prosecution and quoted from in order to apportion blame. Next then, think of the ease in which people can be extradited from the UK to another European State. Can I suggest we all lobby the BALPA and ALAE/Prospect Reps, maybe a joint BALPA/ALAE campaign might be the way forward?

Perhaps a question we should all be asking our Employers is whether the Company has us covered for Criminal Prosecution Insurance?

Many Airlines would not have this sort of cover to protect its Employees from and at around about an average of one million euros required to defend a person involved in a fatal Transport Aircraft crash its way beyond peoples personal means. Lets also not forget we are not just talking about Pilots and Engineers here but everyone involved in an Airline Operation, Managers, Trainers etc etc

Airsnoop, I know it wasn't Greek registered.

Unless I stop working for my (or probably any other UK) employer, I'm open to the same system should the unthinkabe happen.

The only thing I can control is not working on Greek aircraft.

BigFrank,

Sice when was the Isle of Man a "Banana Republic"?

Time was when the UK AAIB would have become involved in the investigation and would have protected the UK interest but it appears to be no longer the case.

Just a quick line to add my support to Alan. He was our lead ground engineer when we were operating the old BAC1-11s and B737-200s at European Air Charter. What a good time we all had with EAC . . . lovely bunch of people and Alan was a super ground engineer. Very efficient, very skilled and totally reliable from a pilot's point of view. We wish you well, Alan.

By the way, TOON737, are you our old Geordie mate from EAC days ?

Regards to all ex EAC people.

It was a "freak" accident because so many holes in the cheese had to line up that day;

"Freak accident" and its sister cliche of convenience "isolated
incident" are only heard in politics where the involvement of
politicians was the sole cause of the event (ie they cannot pin
it on anyone else), not in real life. And definitely not in aviation

Almost all aviation prangs are full of lined-up cheese holes eg
SQ006 under the same false rationale could also be classed a
"freak accident", as could Lima, Helios, etc.

Just a comment, if procedures taught by Boeing flight training are used, then the switch positions on the overhead are set/verified by the first officer, during the pre taxi check the pressurisation panel items are challenge/responded by the first officer whilst being monitored by the captain.

This procedure is based on areas or responsibility, at no point does the land. Asked engineer have any responsibility to position/verify/challenge/respond to the the status of the switches on the pressurisation panel, or indeed any other panel on the flight deck.

The incident was not the responsibility of the engineer, it was a consequence of poorly executed procedure and appalling CRM by the flight crew. Sadly, with regard to one of the crew members, this was, a known fact. Tragically when it was discovered no one had the b***s to bring the situation to a close.

After completing their O/N checks, Engineers are often expected to close the outflow valves for security and inclement weather reasons, especially for overnight parking.
Therefore, in my experience, it is not uncommon for Flight crew to find the control in manual; they are responsible to set up the pressurization panel.
Well wishes to Alan.

I hope that the aviation profession does not turn its back upon this ludicrous plan to crucify the engineer. This is not just some isolated weirdo decision emanating from an equally weirdo foreign judiciary. Not only is it blatantly wrong but it is also a wake-up call for those around the world (and closer to home!) who would espouse a continental style of justice.
I have many thousands of hours in Seat 0A in Boeings. Never, ever, have I heard it even faintly suggested that switch positions should be set by the engineers. In fact, one expects almost quite the opposite – without casting any aspersions whatsoever upon the engineers – but (especially) when an aircraft arrives from the hangar one actually expects the switches to be in anything but the correct position. If you cannot be bothered to check your switches, you should not be allowed on the airport, let alone on an aircraft.
Is it too much to expect that responsible aviation companies might show sufficient contempt for this turn of events to call a boycott of the country concerned?
Prober:ugh:

Sure it wasn't mandated by the AMM procedure, but isn't it good maintenance practice to put switches and systems configured back to the way they are found?

I agree with EK Professional

Might be good practice EK..however it isn't always done that way. In any case this had nothing to do with the engineer and everything to do with the flight crew missing the switch position. There aren't too many things that will get you in trouble, but pressurization/flaps are two that will..pretty much any professional aircrew that I know checks these things on preflight, just before t/o and through 10 000'.

Can't believe the engineer is getting any blame here at all.

I think EK Profesional is pretty accurate. Yes, the crew should have checked, but it isn't helpful to receive an aircraft back from maintenance this way. As good as the engineer is, I think he should have done better before the aircraft was released to service. A jail sentence though ? categorically no but then again Greek justice is cr*p and they are looking for their scapegoat.

Sure it wasn't mandated by the AMM procedure, but isn't it good maintenance practice to put switches and systems configured back to the way they are found?

Within the context of this thread, that is a ludicruous comment. Are we going to blame engineers for aircraft suffering loss of control because the flight crew failed to set the rudder trim properly?

The setting of any switch or control on any of the panels identified as under the responsibilty of the flight crew by the Boeing operational manuals, comprises the operational configuration for which the engineers have absolutely no responsibilty whatsoever.

Abbot and Sciolites........spot on.

We've all done first flight checks and found switches out of position after the engineers have worked on the aircraft.

Yes, it would be nice if they did put them back in the correct position but repsonsiblity for making sure that everything is in the correct position and is working when those thrust levers are moved forward rests with the flightcrew and ulitmately the person occupying the LHS.

On my current aircraft, pressurisation settings and switching is checked in the FD Safety Checks then the Before Start Checks then the ATO Checks (as well as my 'scan' after the FO has told me Safety Checks are complete and that dying 'art' called airmanship with a check of the pressurisation every 10000').

It comes down to training, supervision and company culture, all 3 of which have to be questioned in this case.

While your arguments about whether or not there is a requirement for the engineer to leave a switch in a certain position are great, please don't lose sight of the basic fact that:

---THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE LEFT IT IN MAN---

It was just assumed he must have done, because he was the last person known to have touched it before the pilots got on board!

In the Conclusions to the official report it is quite clear that the engineers actions were neither causal nor contributory to the accident.

Also the investigation found that the Flight Crew were Qualified, medically fit and well rested, and the aircraft carried no deferred defects.

It doesn't get much better than that, so where is the link between the management and the accident!

So what did cause this accident, and why were both audio switches to MASK and both air bleed switches OFF?

“It is good that there are some guilty parties here, because in Cyprus no one was found guilty,” said Sophia Charalambous, wife of the ill-fated flight’s co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, 51.


Whilst I sympathise with all the bereaved families left behind this quote more than any other really illustrates what is going on here. 'We must find scapegoats' Surely her late husband, and the Captain are the two people most culpable for the accident. Maybe the Cyprus court did not convict because nobody else could reasonably be considered criminally responsible.

Any pilot should be able to step into his aircraft type with all switches and controls randomly disorganised or even every switch in the incorrect position and set up the aircraft correctly for the flight. These are basics.

The engineer should not be on trial, of that there is no doubt. But all the naysayers who argue against having maintenance procedures that strive to leave cockpit controls in their normal position should read up on the phenomena of "selective perception" and "Semmelweis reflex". These are real human factors and can significantly affect how we see something, particularly when seeing it one way (i.e. normal) is routine.

It is instilled into Engineers that they must follow the Aircraft Maintenance or Troubleshooting Manual precisely & any Tech log entry should quote "IAW AMM /TSM" etc. Therefore if there was nothing in the AMM stating return switches to "normal", then how can the Engineer be blamed?
All Engineers should be made aware of this case, which highlights how they could be held accountable for their actions (whatever they might be).:confused:

Another note of support for Allan.

When I was an active mechanic (and flight instructor) we used to say that the person who died after signing the fewest things, wins (partially with this type of mess in mind, and partially with the more typical regulatory mess in mind). The corollary in General Aviation was to tell those whose planes you worked on to carry the airplane logs on board :uhoh:

Now that I'm a semi-active attorney, I see these cases on rare occasion. Should have been dismissed [at least against Allan] long before a verdict.

If the captain was well known as a CRM disaster waiting to happen [as some have implied on this forum], maybe some charges could stand against the management--that's a very fact intensive determination and tough to do in the politicized environment after a crash. I'm personally not prepared to take a stand one way or the other on the management, but the mechanic should never have been charged.

''If the captain was well known as a CRM disaster waiting to happen ...'' then he shouldn't have passed his last LPC because CRM is assessed during LPCs nowdays, isn't it??

Sure it wasn't mandated by the AMM procedure, but isn't it good maintenance practice to put switches and systems configured back to the way they are found?

Absolutely. However, how do you know in which position they were found by the Engineer?


Again, the report states that there is no evidence that the switch was left in the Manual position.

It is an assumption!:ugh:

There for the grace of...etc.

Every time I climbed into a Sim (military) the instructor had been there before me and put a fair number of the switches/dials/levers in the "wrong" positions.
Big smack on head if not picked up by me.

-sigh-

At 10,000 feet, if you have Pressurisation issues i.e., the press warning, then STOP CLIMB - Tell ATC - mayday if you will, consider: continuing the flight at that level FL100 or divert or go back. "we`re unable above FL100". Pan-pan-pan if you like, most advisable - Mayday, if you want so long as MSA is ok and FL100 is momentarily ok, Traffic, important, obviously ATC will give you a new squawk, probably, might even be 77. simples. But don`t go sailing up to cruise alt where TUC will get you. How come all the pax got the message and put their masks on but the crew did not - it did not seem to click. There is an an SOP.
Don`t climb.- and if you have to get back down again and, needless to say, get onto oxygen be as quick as possible. There is no oxygen drill in this whole flight, except from the cabin & pax who are more switched on than most. How much evidence did the crew need - "whats that?!" "Press bell/siren/noise"- "ok, stop climb, don oxygen masks and look for a lower than FL110 level, MSA? Pan or Mayday, job done - also one would be aware of what traffic is around and where it is

- again.

Gents, before we get into an engineer's vs pilots switch responsibilities, it should be noted that for the most part maintenance manual procedures are just that.

I.E they are procedures written for us maintainers to use, and very often are written with our safety in mind, hence switches do get left in positions other than normal operating position.

For example, we generally do not leave ground spoilers armed, but pilots do,
we do not leave thrust reversers armed, but pilots do. I could go on, but as others have said, ultimately the flight crew are responsible for doing their checks.

Reading some of the comments on this thread, and others, I can't say I'm tempted to throw the old 'Flightsim pilots' comment, as there are a load here who would probably be downchecked by Microsoft.

This really is a joke. In my current lot, we always laughingly say that when the 'Bus comes back from a quick MOT and oil change, if any setting is where it was before, it obviously relates to something that hasn't been checked. That's the way it's been for all my airborne life, but so what?

It's not up to the ground crew to set the flight deck up. It never has been, nor (pray God) will it ever be. Anyone who assumes every setting is going to be the way they left it is someone who has no business being there in the first place, or who has very minimal experience of real life. Switches and settings the way they were before? Before what? Quite a few would be in the wrong position for departure, as they would have been set for an approach and landing. Whose 'fault' is that then?

If an angineer has sat in the seat, do you not think to adjust it again to suit you? Or do you hit something solid, then blame the engineer because you weren't able to reach the controls?

Sympathies, as before, to everyone who suffered from this dreadful (and avoidable) tragedy. However, like it or not, the blame (as has been properly proven) lies front left and front right.

Hardly worthy of a response but yet I must.

By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't. They are human, fallible and flawed. If they weren't, systems like EGPWS, TCAS, configuration warnings, stick shakers and many, many others would not be needed. Neither would regulations - we'd only need one - thou shalt not crash.

You must be a great deal of fun to fly with - being so perfect and all. :suspect:

"By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't."

That's way God made checklists.

A little drift, but think it's worth a mention.

An old captain I used to work with many moons ago would always make sure his F/O could locate and operate the press contol panel in the correct fashion by touch/feel, no eyes allowed, his point being, vision/smoke/stress issues during flight, he wanted to know his F/O could operate panel blind.

He has long retired now, but not forgotton by many.

"Hardly worthy of a response but yet I must.

By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't. They are human, fallible and flawed. If they weren't, systems like EGPWS, TCAS, configuration warnings, stick shakers and many, many others would not be needed. Neither would regulations - we'd only need one - thou shalt not crash.

You must be a great deal of fun to fly with - being so perfect and all."


Obviously my CRM must be bad, because I never seem to be able to get my point across here.

No, we're not all perfect. I'm far from perfect, which is why I give so much credit to the right seat.

My whole point is that nobody is perfect, so to expect your steed to be delivered from engineering with the config perfect is as dumb as hell.

Just don't get some of you people. Nobody is perfect, that's my basic point. I'm sure as hell not, but nor is anyone else, that's why I take it as basic fact that I will need always to carry out standard checks.

Not bloody hard, is it?

As it has slipped back down the thread, let me remind you:

There is NO EVIDENCE that the engineer left the PMS at MAN
There is evidence that he probably didn't
There is NO EVIDENCE that the aircraft took off with the PMS in MAN
There is evidence that both Audio selectors were at MASK
There is evidence that Both engine bleed switches were OFF
There is evidence that the PMS was AUTO at impact
There is evidence that the green manual light was out at impact

What does that indicate to those of you who know the system?

At the airline I was working for at that time (B737NG fleet), there came an order after the accident that we had to use the pilot´s preflight and shut down checklists to set the switches after maintenance. Now some rather complacent pilots had the opinion that because us engineers set the switches, they wouldn´t have to check for themselves.
The order would be ok if it was for the purpose of creating another line of defence against mistakes (another layer of cheese), but it will be absolutely be no help if the pilots then think that we should set up the cockpit for them.

Edit: Spelling

Aviation Safety Suffers Further Setback Following Helios Conviction -- HOOFDDORP, The Netherlands, April 26, 2012 /PRNewswire/ -- (http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/aviation-safety-suffers-further-setback-following-helios-conviction-149080475.html)

I think this is related

No I don't know the guy...but I know many like him and I am apalled at the thought he was charged, let alone convicted....

During my Apprenticeship as a 17yr old it was a "FAIL" to not have Power On checklist switches set correctly before putting power on an aircraft...No-one assumes anything when it comes to safety...let alone something done by someone else that has not been observed and cross checked...So how a non aircrew member can be made responsible for a Cockpit Switch is simply insane...pullng the wires off...now that is an offence:ugh:

Recently I have been told I must be more tolerant of "Southern European Culture"...Probably better simply not to go there anymore....

Airsnoop...any chance of some more info/evidence of what you are implying...PM will do...

BTW...I always thought the Pressurisation Horn went off at 15,000ft....but maybe confusing different aircraft/regulations....

Wasn't a SwissAir crew jailed after they departed an Athens (old airport) wet runway, due to extreme amounts of rubber at the rollout area? This was 10-15 years ago, I think. The people making these judgements are very misguided...it seems, in Greece, someone always gets it in the end.

This was 10-15 years ago, I think.

More like 33 years ago! It occurred on the 08th October 1979.
At a trial in 1983 the Captain and First officer were found guilty of multiple charges including manslaughter with negligence, causing multiple bodily injury, and obstructing air traffic. The Captain received a sentence of 5 years and the First Officer 2.5 years. After an outcry from IALPA they were released on bail, and an appeal resulted in the prison sentences being substituted by fines.

Wow time flies! Thanks for the correction.

Hello Idle reverse Yes I can confirm I am the EAC Geordie engineer from the good old days.

Have just read the link ABAT4t2 introduced above - please go to it, read it, and take action before you find yourselves in a Greek prison.

Time for all of you who fix or fly into Greek airspace to go to your top management and get them to decide whether it's really worth it.

A last thought in this post - can someone name and shame the judge as her decision is detrimental to air safety and is a latent condition that could be causal in a future accident :=

Bigfrank Remember Alan Irwin prosecuted in a Greek court had already been aquitted in Cyprus as it was concluded that the same action and/or omission did NOT contribute to the accident is this not a case of double jeopardy?

Not exactly TOON, after a full and proper investigation by the Cypriot Police, the Prosecutor decided that there was no case against Alan so he was not brought to court.

The problem now is that because he wasn't even tried, he wasn't aquitted by another Court so still has to face the full might of the Greek legal system.

This is why he needs the full and determined backing from all in the sane side of aviation.

No I don't know the guy...but I know many like him and I am apalled at the thought he was charged, let alone convicted....

Likewise. This just bonkers.

As an aside, I don't really buy the 'lots of holes lined up' idea on this accident. In my experience the 737-300 pressurisation can be glitchy anyway, especially if you are MELing single pack. In other words I've had several occurances of failure to pressurise. Regardless of switch positions the crew did not check and then got confused by the warnings. The first is flight crew error and the second is poor training. Either way the flight ops management / training department have to shoulder some blame.

Alan Irwin is NOT at fault. The judgement is an outrage and a direct threat to every aviation professional. There are .. what? over 350,000 members of this site. How about we DO something about it?

Aviation Safety Suffers Further Setback Following Helios Conviction

HOOFDDORP, The Netherlands, April 26, 2012 /PRNewswire/ --
A Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer has received a 10 year prison sentence by an Athens court for allegedly not resetting a cockpit switch following maintenance on the Helios Airways Boeing 737 ‐300 which crashed into a mountain near Athens in 2005 after its oxygen supply failed and the pilots and most of the passengers fell unconscious.
It is difficult to grasp how aviation safety can be improved if the legal process surrounding an aircraft accident allows an engineer to be condemned to a prison sentence based on an "assumption" that a cockpit Switch (critical to flight safety) was set in the incorrect position. There was absolutely no evidence presented during the trial that the Engineers actions caused or even contributed to the accident. On the contrary, the conviction is based purely on the unproven supposition that the switch was left in the incorrect position although it was demonstrated by experts that that was unlikely. In fact some accident investigators maintain that the switch was still in AUTO (correct position) at impact. The factual evidence in the Helios case paints a rather different picture of the engineer than that suggested by this decision. The facts suggest an extremely conscientious and professional engineer performing the job at hand in an extremely professional manner.
Perhaps most importantly, the decision makes the ground engineer criminally responsible for the configuration of the controls of the aircraft, prior to the flight crew joining and carrying out their pre‐flight and post take off checks. Such a proposition runs completely counter to the core proposition of division of responsibilities that every engineer and every pilot will recognise but which sadly various engineers and pilots called as witnesses on behalf of the prosecution felt able to deny.
Once again we are witnessing a judicial process that offered an opportunity to improve aviation safety failing to meet that challenge preferring instead to allocate blame on an uninformed and irrational basis and with a mindset that someone must pay because an accident sadly causing deaths has occurred and society demands a scapegoat. The current trend of criminalising aircraft accidents serves no other purpose other than to undermine safety and will ultimately lead to more accidents. Despite all the rhetoric about aviation safety being paramount, the introduction of safety and quality management systems, the simple fact remains that due to a failure on the part of Europe to create a centre of investigatory excellence for the industry and to eliminate the inappropriate use of accident reports for criminal purposes; instead pandering to the blame culture, safety systems will fail to deliver what air travellers want - Safety in the skies.

There are .. what? over 350,000 members of this site. How about we DO something about it?


If we got 10% of the pprune members to print off a well written letter, and put it in an envelope, and post it via snail mail, I think 35,000 old school letters swamping one post office box would at least get some media attention.If we got 50% of pprune members (or sent a few letters each) it would be a really strong message.
Who would be the best political recipient for such a letter?
I think something tangable like a real letter would be much more effective than an online petition.
Your thoughts?

Sorry to say this but it's Greece we're dealing with. They'd just take your letters and toss them on the fires that are lit during the daily protests in downtown Athens.

I understand that the basic failure in this incident is the failure of the crew to carry out cockpit checks correctly and I can almost understand the pilots' mistaking the alarm horn and once having done so being of such a fixed mindset they did no further search for the correct cause. I can even understand that the pilots failed to notice a warning for the masks dropping in the cabin but I would have thought that, out of sheer self preservation, that when the aircraft continued to climb the CC would have called the cabin to draw attention to the masks. Surely you can't be CC for any length of time without getting to understand the effects of hypoxia and that time is limited?

As for the Greek courts, I have almost given up trying to understand the way other cultures work. Even within our own country assuming that other people think logically or even that the justice system is logical is to bet against the odds.

I was always taught that the prime purpose of the pilots' pre-flight check was to ensure that everything was configured correctly for a safe flight. Therefore, regardless of what had been done before, it is the pilot's responsibilty.

To hold the engineer responsible is totally against common sense, even if he had left the switch in the wrong position. I don't know anything about Greek justice but someone must intervene to prevent him being found guilty.

As others have said, the criminalisation of accident investigation flies in the face of fllght safety.

This event has highlighted the problem of using accident reports in criminal cases, especially when they are used as the only source of evidence as in the Greek Court.

When a 'proper' police based criminal investigation was done in Cyprus, all the defendants were aquitted.

Contributers to this thread have talked a lot about preflight checks etc but the bottom line is that:

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE AIRCRAFT TOOK OFF WITH THE PMS AT MAN

The assumption that it did was based entirely on an erroneous assumption that, as the PMS was found past the MAN mark after impact it must have been there since the engineer used it to do his check.

The PMS suffered very severe damage in the impact and it is only a "cooker switch".

Subsequent examination by world class investigators demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that it was in fact at AUTO prior to being moved by the impact sequence.

The Greek Court did not accept this evidence by non-Greek aviation professionals.

Can I suggest that you send your letters/emails of protest about this miscarriage of justice to your national Accident Investigation Authority, demanding that the investigation be reopened for air safety reasons under Annex 13, 5.13 to establish the true cause of this accident.

Greek decision will complicate Helios process in Cyprus - Cyprus Mail (http://www.cyprus-mail.com/helios/greek-decision-will-complicate-helios-process-cyprus/20120425)

After reading the official accident investigation from the Greek AAIASB, I note on page 62 that all 3 bleed switches were left in the OFF position. Surely this would make the pressurisation selector position irrelevant? Why has this not been noted in the report or the court cases? I find it scandelous that the engineer is facing a 10 year sentance for simply doing his job. I agree with earlier posts both on this site, and other (engineer) sites to write to parlaiment and The House of Lords to persuade the government to dissuade the Greeks from using a UK citizen as a scapegoat for this accident. Good luck Alan, I hope it works out for you.

Have you seen this weeks Flight - good leader on the Athens farce

The underlying message is don't talk to accident investigators without your lawyer present or better still don't talk to them full stop until someone sorts this out.

ISASI has been very quiet about this verdict so presumably they don't have a problem with it :=

All 3 bleed air switches were OFF and had not been moved by the impact - expanding on this would have spoilt the tidy little scenario.

It has since come to light that the pilots had selected both audio switches to MASK implying that they probably did don their masks at some stage - going to MASK is something pilots often forget to do.

Oh yes, and it has now been shown beyond reasonable doubt that the PMS was in AUTO at impact anyway.

The Court was told all of this but it evidently didn't fit the guilty verdict neatly enough.

It may be of interest to you that the Greek investigators never bothered to access the pre-impact status of any of these switches.

It has since come to light that the pilots had selected both audio switches to MASK implying that they probably did don their masks at some stage - I either was not aware or had missed this. Why, if they had masks on, did they not retain consciousness long enough to sort it out?

They never found the pilots masks which is strange as they found both supernummary masks intact.

The Report doesn't comment on the audio switches; the Boeing man on the NTSB team noticed that they were both at MASK but that line was not pursued.

the Boeing man on the NTSB team noticed that they were both at MASK but that line was not pursued. - obviously irrelevant to a Country out for Alan's scalp.........:ugh:

Do you have a link to this ('Boeing man') observation?

Audio Control Panels: Both captain's and first officers audio control panels were contained within the pedestal control panel. Each panel has a toggle switch that can be positioned to either "mask" or "Boom". Both the captain's and first officer's audio control panels were observed to be positioned to "MASK".

It is a while since I flew the Classic, and as you say 'toggle' (as I recall it too) it must be less likely that both would have been moved by impact, I would think, so it must be significant, especially since I think the movement required was forwards to the 'MASK' position..

The flightcrew didnt switch it back to AUTO for sure.Nor did they ever press horn cutout or operate the boom/mask switch or don masks.

What the FA who was also qualified as a pilot did with these switches 2 hours later is entirely a different matter.But the passengers were already dead by then werent they?

The engineer was not responsible I agree.

This was not a CRM accident.I dont agree the accident was the result of some company/culture malaise.It was a training/mindset issue and a wake up call to all aircrew of just how lethal and insidious hypoxia really is.Civilian aircrew dont even train it.If people are teaching it as a CRM crash,I disagree....both pilots were confused by the horn and suffered the same mindset.Crew coordination is immaterial to this one(except FA's-they saw the masks but couldnt or chose not to get into the cockpit??)

Hi everybody,
Just to put some clarification, as the thread is drifting more towards protecting Irwin.
The other 3 defendants should not be prosecuted as well. The dangerous precedent that this farce is setting - to blame the management team for an yet unproven pilot error will give even more free hand to authorities and individuals to use airline employees as scapegoats.
If we do not unify and make sure the Greek government and the EU commission hear our voices a new dark age will fall upon the airline industry - nobody will be willing to share any info that might be used against him. And eventually SAFETY WILL PLUMMET!
:mad:

Wrote to my MP about this the other day.

Got the following response.

"Thankyou for your email which I am carefully considering and will write further."

I have no idea if this is a genuine response or just a standard reply sent to all who bother to write to their MP.

Either way, if more and more people contact their representative maybe someone high enough up will listen.

Watch this space.

Very nice that you wrote to your MP, he can do nothing anyway.
The only ones that can do something are the lawyers, nobody else. Let us hope that the Greek D.A. did not yet sent out an european arrest warrant!

Why don't you route your indignation by letter/email to UK AAIB or your own investigating authority, as they will be the ones whose questions you will now have to think twice about answering.

Be too helpful and they may bang you up to rights as well :ooh:

When it becomes a political issue, the truth is irrelevant.

There are families that want someone to pay for this and blaming it on dead pilots isn't going to cut it for them.

Theres an election next week too.

Supreme Court lays down Helios appeal process - Cyprus Mail (http://m.cyprus-mail.com/75-days/supreme-court-lays-down-helios-appeal-process/20120504)

Just a nasty little detail from the hearings in Athens.
The Prosecution there has used most of the Greek aviation specialists who participated in the investigation and the writing of the report, as prosecution witnesses. This is a straightforward contravention of the Chicago Convention and EU regulation 996/2010 that state that accident investigation reports should only be used to improve safety – not for criminal prosecution.

Criminal damage - Flight International Editor's Blog (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flight-international-editors-blog//2012/04/criminal-damage.html)

Why don't you route your indignation by letter/email to UK AAIB or your own investigating authority, as they will be the ones whose questions you will now have to think twice about answering.



Fair point, but my hope is that if enough MPs get mithered by enough of us the AAIB's opinion will be sought and this whole mess put to bed.


Very nice that you wrote to your MP, he can do nothing anyway.


SHE!!!!

Experience has taught me not to argue with a woman. ;)

Can I just speak up for the excellent Greek legal system, in case, as CEO, you ever have to face it because one of your engineers left the Captain's seat too far back after he had arranged the flight deck switches for the Captain, in a pleasing and eye catching manner and left the aircraft.

To alleviate the stress of waiting for a verdict, the Greek lawyers told all the defendants at the start of the trial that they would be found guilty regardless of the evidence because that's the way it works in their legal system:ugh:

could be any one of us waiting to spend the next 10 years in a Greek jail, a PILOT, a MANAGER, an ENGINEER, a CEO or any support group.

In Greece no formal criminal investigation was carried out, the main evidence is the Greek Annex 13 accident report; the main witnesses were the accident investigators.

Irwin’s formal response to the draft Final Report that showed the findings were incorrect was not considered by the Greeks because, as they state “the UK AAIB submitted them incorrectly”. This critical evidence was ignored and the UK AAIB did nothing about it.

The information I have is there are lots of facts that have not been made public yet, but they prove the switch was left in AUTO as Irwin has stated to the Cyprus police from day one and it remained there till impact.

There have been switches that where left unexplained e.g. both engine bleed switches off, both audio switches in MASK. Why were the flight crew oxy masks never found whereas the supernummary masks were found and tested?

The accident report states the cabin on the re-enactment flight pressurised to 1 psi before flight and the cabin and aircraft climbed as expected at the same rate maintaining 1 PSI pressure diff with the switch in MAN and the outflow valve at 15 degrees. Yet the accident report also states the cabin rate of climb on the accident flight recorded on the pressure controller NVM was significantly less than that of the aircraft. It clearly demonstrates the cabin and the aircraft climbed at a different rate to the re-enactment flight. The switch could not be in manual and the OFV at 15 %.

If as the report states the switch was in MAN and the aircraft pressurised to I PSI on the accident flight, how did Irwin depressurise the aircraft after the maintenance. If this was the last place the switch was left the cabin would not have gone below 1 PSI after maintenance and the engineers could not open the door to leave the aircraft.

If the crew departed with the switch in MAN the aircraft would have started to rapidly pressurise to the 1 PSI when the last door or window was closed, then at engine start the air conditioning is switched off and the cabin pressure would plummet to 0 PSI, post engine start the air cond is selected back on and the pressure rapidly rises again. The pressure changes are in the region of 2000 fpm to 4000 fpm. Is there one of us that think we could miss it. Get an aircraft and try it, just be warned it’s alarming. It all points to a failure of the pressurisation system shortly after take-off. Yet with all this and more the accident investigation world will not listen, they look at their own demise as what mad man would assist in an investigation, a system we all believed in is leading its own destruction. Let’s all mail the government to start to listen, I am sending mine to David Cameron P.M. on www.number10.gov (http://www.number10.gov/)
Why not copy this to him and the UK AAIB on kconradi@<hidden> and ask what they are doing. Remember all four of these Guys are sentenced to 123 years in a Greek prison on no real evidence. Don’t sit back; get everyone on your mailing list to send an e mail today.

TOON737. Very good facts presented there. As an engineer, I'm frightened for Irwin and I do hope that this is sorted properly once and for all.
I'm now writing to my MP.
Is there a petition running do we know?
Would it make any difference?

Seem to recall a Swissair DC 8 crew being sentenced to two years prison after running off the end of a damp runway covered with rubber deposits in Athens.

As always there were several conflicts in evidence - possible late touchdown but SR was of the opinion it was down to the airport authorities.

not quite the same. Back then there was probably an appeal then an extradition case etc. etc.. Were they ever delivered to a Greek prison?

It has been suggested to me that there is now a european arrest warrant and a conviction in a EU member state is treated no different from a conviction in your home state. You will be delivered to the prison of their choice without having the chance of Government intervention or buying more time due to an extradition process being launched.

If that is the case on top of everything else here then this becomes even more scary.

In 1968, a CAT B727 crashed on approach to Taipei. It appears it was following flase glideslope indications , probably as a result of miitary radio interference. Several other aircraft had reported problems with the ILS over the previous days, but the airport authorities did nothing to rectify the problem. Over fifty people died and the foreign pilots were charged with manslaughter. IFALPA stepped into their defence as there were a lot of irregularities, such as maintenace work done just after the crash on the ILS being recorded as happening before the accidnet. IFALPA mentioned that they would instigate a ban on their members operating ino Taiwan if the court case went ahead. The Taiwan governemnt realised that IFALPA had the power to isolate Taiwan from the air and dropped all charges.

The shining light in this travesty is the Cypriot legal system that has demonstrated how civilised European countries should behave.

Yes there was a extensive criminal investigation but it was done properly by the Cypriot police, not ICAO Annex 13 Air Safety Investigators.

Alan Irwin was interviewed at length and his actions were found not to have contributed to the accident so he was not indicted.

The airline management were indicted as was the company, but all were aquitted.

The Greek Report was admitted as evidence but any part of the content that was used had to be proven independently.

There is an appeal in Cyprus and if the verdict is upheld, it will over-ride any decision in Greece so the Helios management will be rightly aquitted there also.

The paradox now is that because Alan Irwin was not tried in Cyprus he was not aquitted and his conviction will still stand in Greece.

So in this crazy situation the one who was even "less guilty" than those aquitted will still face imprisonment in Greece.

Please keep up your presssure to overcome the inbuilt inertia of those who should be in a position to help.

So infact you only need 1 crazy judge and that is it really to set back Aviation Safety 30 years.
I presume the 4 would appeal the verdict, but seen the reputation of the Greek judicial systeem this may take many years and lots of $$$$$:\

Just heard that new and significant evidence has been sent to the Greek Investigators by the State of Cyprus with a request to reopen the investigation.

Now we will see what the Greeks care most about -

Air Safety or a Show Trial

The following is a quotation from the AIR's report.
Anybody willing to have the report, pls PM me and I will send it to you.
It is a further proof that the farce of a trial in Greece was concocted and executed with an only intention - to exercise pressure on the Supreme Court in Cyprus to overthrow the acquittal.

A.I.R.’s Independent Investigation of the Helios Boeing 737-300 – 5B-DBY Accident

Section 1 – Summary of AIR’s Main Findings

1.1 The Conclusions in the Hellenic Final Report are based upon, and are consistent with the apparent deductions in the Boeing Report and the Nord-Micro Report. All these Reports are based on an incorrect belief that the Pressurization Mode Selector had been inadvertently left in the MAN position throughout the flight. The conclusions in these Reports have been completely discredited by proving that the Pressurization Mode Selector was in the AUTO position detent at impact. The conclusions of the AAIASB in the accident report appear to be influenced by the insinuations in the Boeing and the Nord Micro Reports, neither of which actually purport to establish the pre-impact position of the Mode Selector Knob/Switch. However the accident report does not mention any further analysis carried out by AAIASB. The AAIASB accident report is based on the incorrect belief that the Pressurization Mode Selector had been left in the MAN position after maintenance action and throughout the flight. This conclusion by the
AAIASB has been completely discredited by proving that the Pressurization Mode Selector was in the AUTO position detent at impact, having been forcibly turned by impact forces through 100 degrees to the as-found position past the MAN detent at the accident scene.

1.2 The aircraft failed to pressurize properly even though the system was selected to the AUTO Mode for the entire accident flight. The analysis to date clearly shows that the failure of the aircraft to pressurize was caused by a malfunction (or malfunctions) in the pressurization control system; that is, the Nord-Micro Pressurization System Components failed during the accident flight.

These are top ISASI investigative engineers who did this report (google - AIR, Canada) and I believe it was given as evidence for the defence.

Along with evidence from other top people from UK, medical, flying, engineering, Flight Operations, Air Accident Investigation, this WAS DISCOUNTED BY THE JUDGE because it was not given by Greeks and did not agree with the Greek's idea of an Annex 13 investigation.

If you are managing, fixing or flying anything that goes into Greek Airspace be warned!

I hope Alan does not go back there for the trial.

I hope Alan does not go back there for the trial.

If he UK based (or anywhere in the EU) the Greeks will probably issue a European Arrest Warrant and our government is bound (by EU legislation) to hand him over.

European Arrest Warrant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Arrest_Warrant)

Don't think it doesn't get used, in 2009 700 people from the UK were extradited using the EAW. And yes, there's many, many cases where it has been used wrongly, incorrectly or for minor things.

Finally got my reply from my MP.

The Minister for Europe at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office has also written to me via my MP. It seems the F&CO has no clout but has been made aware of Mr Irwin's plight.

It doesn't really address the nub of the problem but at least my elected representatives are showing some effort.

We will see. :(

It is time for all engineers to take action before they find themselves in prison.

The Greek judge has has given her reasons for banging up Alan Irwin for 123 years and has set the precendent that an engineer is responsible for configuring an aircraft for flight:

"Furthermore, the Court did not accept the arguments of the defendant that it was the pilot’s sole responsibility to set the switch to the AUTO position, because the pilots have a number of obligations that are also obligations of the engineer."

The reasoning is 400 pages of similar ill informed rubbish which will probably not get a public airing. Maybe someone should 'name and shame' her for putting aviation safety back 100 years.

How about boycotting all aircraft going into Greek airspace or belonging to Greek operators for a start.

What an absolute :mad: this sentence is. No wonder the Greeks are in such a mess if this is an indication of things.

Greece, you should be royally ashamed of yourself, take two demerits and leave the EU immediately!:=

The only up side to this seems to be that the Greeks like Turkeys voting for Christmas have put them selfs on a position that is going to result in them being kicked out of the EEC, so no more EEC arrest warrant, this should put a UK court between Mr Irwin and a Greek jail.

I am of the opinion that this court judgment simply shows that the Greeks are unfit to be a part of the EEC as the legal system fails to understand the complex nature of these modern technical cases and reverts to a stance of jailing the nearest person they can find in an effort to look like they are doing something.

Yes I believe engineers should leave all the controls in the "normal position"!

So when an aircraft is handed to me by an engineer I will expect the following;
Throttle levers at cruise,
QNH set to 1013,
gear selected UP,
Oh and the pressurisation SET! That should blow your hair back when you open the door!

After all that is the "normal position" isn't it?
Normal - is a relative term. Normal pressurisation at ground level (where the engineer works) is OFF.

If a switch is in a cockpit then it is there for the Pilot(s) to operate, not the engineer. If the switch was in the engine nacelle (where the pilot can't reach) then it would be the engineers responsibility!

The problem with you guys is that you don't speak Greek like real engineers!

Another little gem:

"Al*****los also testified that the door can open with 1.1 differential pressure"

He has to be right because he is Greek (and evidently very strong!):ugh:.

As has been proved many times, all things being equal, the non-Greek gets it, in the end!

Your thinking makes perfect sense to anyone in the aviation business but to a Greek judge who is looking for a head on a platter the only thing that makes any sense is the opportunity to pit the blame on the person standing nearest to the incident, if that person happens to not be Greek so much the better!

The Greek government has been proved to be corrupt from top to bottom, the way they entered the Euro is an example of this, so why should we be so suprized when a Greek court hands down a judgment that totally ignores international law, proper investigation procedure and factual evidence.

A timely reminder of a previous Greek Tragedy.... the 2001 conviction by a Hellenic court of 12 Brit plane spotters on spying charges. The moral of the story is whether you fly them, fix them or watch them, in Greek airspace watch your six.

Curious that you are found guilty in Greece for complying with the AMM... So much for jurisprudence. I manufacture flight critical products for the civil and defence industries. There are a number of countries that I preclude sale or use of these products in. The list just got one longer.

Greece has the legal system they deserve, as well as the Government to match. The question is whether the industry has the fortitude to again black ban Greece and flight operations into Greece or out of Greece due to the fact that they have shown they cannot be trusted with accounting, application of law, in fact anything outside of the eating (and probably fabrication of) Souvlaki.

IFALPA needs to react, to at least show solidarity, lord knows ICAO, EASA don't.

"in fact anything outside of the eating (and probably fabrication of) Souvlaki"

this is uncalled-for. I've worked on legal cases ( and in one case an aviation legal case ) involving both Greece and Portugal and out of all the EU countries I've had the largest problems with those two. These are countries with legal and governmental problems, but also in my experience of hospitable and generous people, and I don't see why this kind of abuse is called for.

Now now Fdr let`s not kick a dog when its down, after all just as we cannot put the blame on the Wright Bros. for all those nasty air crashes we cannot equally blame Mr.Archimides for the sinking of the Titanic now can we.

Another gem from the 3 hour lunch countries...

Forgive an intrusion from an unqualified observer - but if Mr Irwin was not in breach of any published procedures, work instructions, authorisations, etc, then does this judgement put engineers working on any aircraft that might have an accident in Greece in exactly the same position?

Have any airlines' legal departments been looking at the ramifications for their own operations? Or have any engineers within those airlines expressed their concerns to management?

And I bet people are asking whether their employers have legal assistance insurance cover!

I have just received the reply to the letter I sent to my MP on this subject, it is clear that the Forieign & commonwealth office are well aware of this case.

They are also insistent that the UK can't block a European arrest warrant despite the fact that the judgment flys in the face of both EEC and UN mandates on the subject of using accident investigation data in criminal procicutions.

What I do however read between the lines is that the UK and other states in the EEC are more than a little unhappy with the legal process in this case and are putting diplomatic pressure on the Greeks to review this case in the light of the evidence that they clearly failed to understand the first time around.

I also think that the Greeks are truly baffled by the fact that there has been so much interest in the case, as far as they were concerned they had banged up someone so the case was closed.............and now they find themselfs at the sharp end of a lot of very well directed criticism and they now have to find a face saving way out or things will just get worse for them.

I can only urge all of you to write to your MP's as each letter puts just a little more pressure on the F & C office, and that will in turn be felt in Athens.

It would also be helpfully if those not in the UK made representations to their Euro MP's as the Greek problem is not just a UK problem but one the whole of Europe needs to get a grip of.

I cannot see how further letters to MP`s will help the hapless Mr. Irwin.

On 13 May 2009 the Hon member for Mid Beds, Nadine Davies brought Mr. Irwin`s case before the House for debate. Mr.David Hanson responded on behalf of the Ministry of Justice.

I would suggest all those interested in furthering Mr.Irwin`s cause read the full text of the debate. This can be found at the following link, Columns 280WH - 287WH. It is most enlightening.

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 13 May 2009 (pt 0010) (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090513/halltext/90513h0010.htm)

Even if Mr. Irwin had left the selector in manual, which he did not, it is a basic principle in aviation that an aircraft engineer is never responsible for configuring an aircraft for flight: this is the sole responsibility of the flight crew, as part of their pre-flight checks, and the ultimate responsibility rests with the captain.


Which is why they get paid the big bucks.


Having read the report posted by Chronus I can only conclude that, as usual, the engineer will be shafted again!

If I am ever put in the same position as Mr Irwin (Gawd forbid) I for one will have one thing to say to the AAIB...

"No Comment"

I am rapidly losing any faith I may have had in the justice system. :mad:

I am rapidly losing any faith I may have had in the justice system.But the point of Chronus' link is that this is nothing to do with the British justice system. The UK government can do nothing except apply pressure to the Greeks to review the accident report, or to consider a wider range of evidence in any appeal.

That was exactly why I posed my question above - any engineers whose aircraft subsequently crash in Greece can presumably be dragged away on an EU arrest warrant and tried in the same fashion as Mr Irwin, while the UK government looks on impotently. I presume that airlines have considered that and are content with the legal basis of their engineering operations...

any engineers whose aircraft subsequently crash in Greece can presumably be dragged away on an EU arrest warrant and tried in the same fashion as Mr Irwin, while the UK government looks on impotently.

Correct. And it could be for something that is perfectly legal in the UK but illegal in Greece. They don't have to provide any evidence and they don't have to be ready to conduct a trial. They can just shove you in prison whilst they decide what to do or build their case.

Easy Street my point is not just that British Justice cannot help, it is also:

Cum Romanum venio, ieiuno Sabbato; cum hic sum, non ieiuno: sic etiam tu, ad quam forte ecclesiam veneris, eius morem serva, si cuiquam non vis esse scandalum nec quemquam tibi.

To save the trouble of rummaging through old Latin proverbs, it means when in Rome ......

Over the years I wonder how many expats have had a bitter taste of this.

Shows the farce of EASA , we are not in a harmonised system, after all look at the criminal proceedings in france ref the concorde crash !!!

It appears that, despite new and significant evidence being submitted, the Greeks have decided not to reopen the investigation.

Probably because it demonstrates beyond all reasonable doubt that the guys were NOT guilty, and they don't like that.

I know, the original evidence also demonstrated that they were NOT guilty, but they ignored that because that is how the system works.

Time to boycott all aircraft that will enter Greek Airspace or post here, what sort of cake you would like the file baked in for your stay in a Greek jail.

This is the link to to the video:
??? ? ??????????? ?????, ?????? ?? 123 ?????? ?????? ? ?????? - bTV ???????? (http://btvnews.bg/tazi-sutrin/reportazhi/blgarski-pilot-osden-na-123-godini-zatvor.html)
Unfortunately it is in Bulgarian.
I will try to obtain a transcript and translate it asap.

It will be nice if a news network officially approaches BTV in Bulgaria for a translated copy and releases it in the UK...
Any journos about?
Mr. Learmont?
:D

The Bulgarian CAA, the Transport investigation board of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Airline Pilot Union have sent an official request to the Greek authorities to reopen the investigation into the Helios crash in respect of the Bulgarian defendant, Captain Yanko Stoimenov, in the criminal case in Athens.
If the British Government reacts as well, this will increase the international pressure on the Greeks manifold!
Keep your fingers crossed guys!
:D

This is an unofficial translation of the interview of the ex-Helios CP, Captain Yanko Stoimenov shown in prime time on Bulgarian bTV some time ago:


Seven years after the tragedy there are two criminal court cases in progress - in Greece and Cyprus. Bulgarian Yanko Stoimenov who was the chief pilot of the airline "Helios", was sentenced to 123 years in prison for the crash.
Greek court of first instance held that Stoimenov, along with three representatives of Helios, is responsible for the incident. Greek investigators assume that the crash was caused by human error and Stoimenov is responsible as the Chief Pilot of the airline.
In Cyprus, the case against Yanko Stoimenov and the three other defendants was dismissed but it is under appeal by the prosecution.
"The charges against us are that we allowed incompetent pilots to operate the plane," said Stoimenov. "The copilot held an English license. To get an English and a German license and be able to maintain it before coming to "Helios" cannot be done by an incompetent person. I last checked these pilots. Before, I had dozens of tests that have confirmed their competence.
Investigations into the crash in Greece and Cyprus have reached different conclusions. It is believed that the cause of the tragedy was cabin depressurization, leading to inadequate pilots and death. According to the Greek authorities, the pilots took off with the cabin selector in the wrong position - set to manual mode.
The paradox is that in such a scenario, many hypotheses exist. What is known is that the pilots did not recognize correctly the alarm. This Boeing alarm has a double meaning that got many pilots, before those of the "Helios" flight, confused and crashes had just been avoided.
The same signal is used for decompression and wrong configuration for departure. Recommendations have been sent years before this disaster to Boeing and if they were implemented that accident might not have happened.
Yanko Stoimenov who was Chief Pilot at "Helios" admits that six months before the deadly crash the same aircraft again had a problem with pressurization.
"Then the pilots did a brilliant job and managed to land the plane safely. The system had depressurized the aircraft without any human intervention.
The manufacturer of the system is a subcontractor of Boeing - a German company. They could not find a reason why their system depressurized the aircraft.

Why was this aircraft not removed from service after such a defect six months before the crash?

"Once the manufacturer himself could not find the reason, all components were replaced with new ones. I personally flew the aircraft to the maintenance facility in England, where the system was serviced. And I ferried it back without passengers.

For you as a professional was that not strange?

"In aviation, one must rely on the expertise of others. I was calm. Now it's hard to tell because I studied the system, and it is a computer, just as vulnerable. In the investigation of the crash no one looked at the history of failures of the computer system, that for example it was liable to radio transmissions. None of the Greek team has investigated why and if the computer has allowed the depressurization only because of a change in the switch position.

Could this type of system command a depressurization so easily?

"Official information about depressurization occurrences will hardly come to light. The information we have is that it was hundreds of times and that it confused pilots. "
Two years after the crash IATA did a research on cases of decompression of Boeing 737. Information was provided only by some airlines. These statistics indicate that for a year and a half there were 62 cases of depressurization and in nearly half of the cases the reason remains unclear - these are only the cases that were reported.
A team of independent Canadian experts analyzed the physical evidence from the plane crash near Athens. The main question was – manual position of the mode switch of the pressurization system, as the Greeks claimed, or automatic. If the setting was auto, this enhances a mechanical problem in the aircraft.
The Canadian independent expert team showed that the cause of depressurization was not the pilot actions and that the pilots have put the system in normal (auto) mode, in which you operate before departure. They examined the mechanical and collision traces and calculated that the position of the switch has been auto at impact, which clears the pilots.
"They were able to study the movement of the switch at the time of the crash, which clearly shows that it was placed where it should be. They are adamant that the pilots properly did the pre-flight inspection and there was a different reason for the depressurization. Probably technical.
A contradiction exists in the study of the light on the instrument panel that would illuminate in manual mode, but we have only photos of this and other details. The switch is gone, the light - too. Nobody knows where they are. The key evidence is missing.
"We want to find an explanation of what happened. And not to speculate on the actions of the pilots, unless all available evidence is taken into account, and some of the evidence was not even requested by the court, "says Yanko Stoimenov.
The last 30 minutes of the CVR audio recording from the cockpit are available. bTV has the official recording of the last moments of flight 522 on 14 August 2005.
Throughout the recording an alarm sounds. Recording ends, for technical reasons, and presumably a few minutes later the plane crashed.
No parallel analysis of the FDR and CVR recordings was ever made. What happened at the last moment is not known. Yanko Stoimenov hopes contradictions between the Greek and Canadian independent investigation, accepted by the court in Cyprus, will provoke a reopening of the investigation in Greece. Yanko and the other three defendants face a legal battle at two more institutions in Greece and Cyprus, with the hope that nobody will be condemned as a scapegoat.

For the relatives of the 115 people killed, including about 50 children, the question is no less painful?

"At the beginning of the case in Cyprus the mood was very hostile. We were physically abused, but then our embassy reacted and security measures were taken. It never happened again, but for two years we went to court with an escort. In court, I saw people who had lost their entire family. The pain was incredible, but pain is not always the best advisor. They were looking just for a victim, to direct their vengeance at, "said the Bulgarian.
Since he was sentenced for the plane crash Yanko Stoimenov cannot fly. He is working as a consultant and simulator instructor.
"This is the fourth year that I have to bear this stress, if I succumb to emotions, I won’t last a year. I do not want to go back to what I went through. I never thought that could happen and how it affected my health and my family. I would not go into details. But at one point ... There are many incentives that make me fight. "
"It is sad, because it is a year now, that I have not flown a plane," admits Yanko. "The good thing is that many people around the world are grateful I helped them learn to fly."

This fiasco has taken it's toll on all the accused, aviation people with years of experience who did nothing wrong, but in the Greek system heads must roll.

The First Instance court was a farce, and there is little hope that the Appeal will be any better. Unlike UK Courts the evidence is not important; the prosecution evidence is all from the accident report, but the defence is by non-Greek experts, all with years of experience but who are wrong because they have the temerity to question the Report.

Great that Ianko's Government has stood up and been counted. The UK Government has done nothing and is unlikely to.

The Greek AAI&ASB are not going to Re-open the investigation.

The UK AAIB has stood up and been counted, and they have told AAI&ASB that they consider that the original Report is flawed and the investigation should be Re-opened.

However, NTSB/Boeing don't want it Re-opened; I wonder why:rolleyes: and it is to their tune that the Greeks will dance.

Surely this has absolutely nothing to do with the UK AAIB ???

It has.
Alan Irwin, the Helios engineer and a UK citizen, is also a target of the Greek and Cypriot courts...

IN FOCUS: The criminalisation of air accidents threatens safety management philosophy (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-the-criminalisation-of-air-accidents-threatens-safety-management-philosophy-373858/)

A sombre example of life imitating art. The first version of the novel 'Flight 935 Do You Read' (in which an aircraft comes to grief after the death by hypoxia of all persons on board) was written two decades before the Helios accident. In the original version the flight engineer was (falsely) blamed for the accident. In the final version the pilots are (falsely) blamed.

They should all take it in turns, not to turn up, citing health reasons. If they can drag it out until Aug 2013, they're free. Helios appeal hearing delayed - Cyprus Mail (http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/helios-appeal-hearing-delayed/20120911)

It took 13 years to move a certain other person recently. Perhaps they could use some of the same tactics.

I sounds to me as if the Greeks know that they have got this one wrong in a big way so to save face they will let the whole thing drag on until it times out.

That way they don't have to jail people and have the whole of The aviation industry demanding the release of these people and the Greek legal system does not have the embaressment of having a case overturned in open court.

I believe, A & C, you have hit the nail square on the head.

Will there even be a 'Greek legal system' in Aug 2013?

The Cypriot courts have ordered a retrial, it would appear.

Supreme Court orders retrial in Helios case - Cyprus Mail (http://m.cyprus-mail.com/attorney-general/supreme-court-orders-retrial-helios-case/20121212)

Firstly I have known Alan for a number of years and can again only say he is a great Engineer
Its an outrage that this witchhunt went this far , over the last 35 years , I have seen switches left in the wrong position from crew rushing off to Hotels or Home, 1000s of times , even a crew leaving an aircraft with the no 2 engine still running .
At least on 3 occasions the FLT/GND switch selected by crew to the wrong position - SELECTED !!!
How can the industry tolerate legal action against the Engineers - the very people who stop accidents before they happen on a daily basis , for doing nothing wrong
So how can any engineer ever fill out any incident , delay or technical report without legal caveats , in fact every tech log entry would need a legal caveat .
Given the unbelievable stupidity of some crew entries in the tech log just how could some of them ever be certified ?
Someone in Greece needs to look up negligence in the dictionary - this was not negligence
If we can be blamed for aircrew going wrong or poor crew systems knowledge
- We are all going to need seriously good lawyers!!

It appears that from the link above that the entire reason for continuing with this judicial farce is for a 'moral victory' on behalf of the victim's families. I'm also pretty disturbed by the fact that the Cypriots have reopened the issue with a new trial. I can only assume that this is due to Greek political pressure as Cyprus will fall if the Greeks economy does eventually sink without being propped up by the Eurozone.
In that case they may attempt to prosecute everybody on duty in the respective jurisdictions of departure, overflight and impact right down to the baggage handlers.
Obviously we all feel sorry for the victims and their families but they're looking for their 'moral victory' at too high a cost.

Obviously we are seeing the result of a Kangaroo Court.

The real culprits i.e. murderers (due to Sept 11 hysteria) hide among Greek Air Force personnel.
:suspect:

To all Aviation professionals out there - We need your help.

As a family member of one of the accused. I am posting the below letter that one of the accused pilots wife wrote and was published by the Cyprus Mail. It's time to release the truth as to what these pilots / Engineer are going through. There is quite a lot that I would like to say but I believe that the below letter gives a good outline of what is going on. At the moment the defendants are being tried simultaneously in Cyprus and Greece. (2 EU countries) for the same incident?! Human Rights violations are beyond belief with translators failing to translate the simplest sections of such a technical case. Recently the Initial accident investigation report being used in the trial has been retracted by the 2 investigators who wrote it due to New physical evidence which counteracts their report. They requested that the case be reopened however this was rejected. Direct breach of ICAO Annex 13.

Please read it and pass this information on. Pilots and Engineers should not be tried in civil courts and treated like criminals especially when the physical evidence proves they are innocent!

Why is new evidence in the Helios crash being ignored? - Cyprus Mail (http://www.cyprus-mail.com/letters/why-new-evidence-helios-crash-being-ignored/20121218)


''I am shocked that the Cypriot press is mute about the new evidence regarding the causes of the Helios air crash as well as the proceedings in the criminal action in Greece.
As the wife of an innocent man - a professional pilot and extremely responsible person who was at the time the chief pilot of the company; an individual who has been wrongfully prosecuted, I believe I must speak up and make the public aware of the brutal violations of all professional ethics and fundamental human rights during the court proceedings in Greece.
For years the media, and the higher levels of power, speculated about the causes of the crash top appease the discontent of the public. At the end, through manipulation of public opinion they succeeded in creating the ‘villains’ destined to be used as scapegoats for the rage of all who suffered the unbearable losses in the crash.
In its final report, the Greek Board of Investigation (AAIASB) threw the whole blame on the two pilots wjp were portrayed as incompetent suicidal idiots. The sequence of their alleged actions, as detailed in the official report of Mr Tsolakis, which was not supported with any evidence, is a hypothesis that will not stand the test of the new findings of independent experts.
According to the official report’s hypothesis, the pressurisation system mode switch was ‘forgotten’ in the ‘manual’ position after the pre-flight check and inspection of the aircraft, and was left in that same position throughout the flight. Under the said scenario, everybody on the plane but one steward suffered hypoxia due to the slow depressurisation of the aircraft.
It is unacceptable, but a fact, that the switch at issue mysteriously disappeared. Other important components of the plane were manipulated or destroyed as was proven in the court in Cyprus. Until this day, there is no explanation why only one-third of the 256 parameters recording the condition of all major aircraft systems and flight data of the recovered “black box”, were decoded and analysed.
It is also inexplicable why the professional investigators failed to notice that a great number of the analysed parameters did not match or make sense at all. According to the data provided in the report, the passenger aircraft must have flown at supersonic speed while keeping its fuel consumption at the levels of a luxury limousine.
These astounding irregularities were discovered five years after the crash and were submitted during the proceedings in Cyprus. As a result of the discovered omissions Ajet, the company-successor of Helios assigned AIR - a team of independent Canadian experts, the task of analysing elements of the pressurisation system. The experts’ scientifically based conclusion is that the mode switch of the pressurisation system was in position ‘auto’ and not ‘manual’, as the Greek Board alleged. The logical question then is: what happened at the beginning of the flight that led to its fatal end? Why were the masks of the pilots never found but at the same time the communication switch was in the ‘mask’ position?
The standard practice in similar cases is to re-open the case/investigation and find the real causes. Contrary to the recommendations of numerous aviation organizations and investigation boards, the Greek board (AAIASB) refused to re-open the investigation referring to a consultation with Boeing, who are a party to the case. At a hearing of the Court of Appeal in Athens, Mr Tsolakis as witness and seeking to defend his report mentioned that in the course of the investigation he relied on the assistance of two prominent NTSB experts whose competence he had no doubt about. Later, it emerged that those same experts, Mr Caj Frostell and Mr Ron Schleede, sent an official letter in which they confirmed the substance of AIR’s evidence and recommended the re-opening of the investigation for the purposes of aviation safety.
The “hypothesis” report of the Greek board (AAIASB) became grounds for two parallel criminal lawsuits, which although not barred in the EU, is profound in its deliberate cruelty.
The lawsuit in Cyprus was based on an independent police investigation. The judges had time and opportunity to get acquainted with the complicated technical documentation of the case and to ultimately hold, despite political pressure, that the evidence submitted was such that no fair and reasonable court could convict a person. All prosecution witnesses, who could competently evaluate pilots and their performance, unequivocally stated that the pilots of the fateful flight were competent and there was no basis for them to be grounded before the flight.
In contrast to Cyprus, the magistrate's court in Greece accepted the AAIASB report as gospel, and with no second thought hastily sentenced four innocent people to 123 years jail. The news flashed around the world, bringing joy and satisfaction to some, pain and anguish from the obvious injustice to others.
1. Greece refused the defendants presentation of certain important exhibits related to the pressurisation system of the plane that were available in the Cyprus court proceedings.
2. The prosecution relied heavily for its case on the official accident report of the Greek investigators (AAIASB), notwithstanding the prohibition on this in the Chicago Convention of 1944 and European Regulation 996/2010 . They used it as a road map for the prosecution despite the new evidence provided by independent accident investigation experts from Canada, UK and USA, that challenged the conclusions in the final report.
3. Important exhibits that would have demonstrated the errors in the official report have been lost while in the keeping of the Greek Accident Investigation Board (AAIASB).
4. The Court failed in its obligation to provide adequate translation. The interpreter was not sufficiently competent to deal with the complex technical issues raised, but the request for proper interpreter, made evident from two of the defendants, who were foreigners, was rejected.
5. During the course of the hearings in Greece, the Bar council called on lawyers to strike. The court was requested to adjourn the hearing, but in flagrant breach of custom and practice, denied the defendants their basic right to representation and the trial continued in the absence of defence counsel. During these days a series of important witnesses testified, but the defence was not able to examine them.
6. The court also refused the defendants a request to allow a simple reconstruction of the workings of the pressurizsation system of a similar aircraft which would have demonstrated the impossibility of certain key findings in the official report.
7. The court exerted pressure on proceedings, and the defendants were not given time or opportunity to call a substantial number of their witnesses, most of which are experts who do not live in Greece and are engaged in professional duties in different parts of the world.
After many international institutions were notified about the numerous procedural and other violations during the investigation and trial, we believed that the Court of Appeal in Athens would proceed in a way consistent with the principles of European legislation, which allows for a fair trial. On October 26, 2012, the appellate trial began. The judges, entrusted with this technically complex case and supposed to start from the very beginning according to the Greek law, heard a total of three witnesses, whose competency to evaluate pilots’ performance is doubtful, and surprisingly concluded after the testimonies that the prosecution could rest. While the defence was provided a single day to summon all its witnesses, the Court announced that it would be ready with its opinion within three days. Aviation experts from all over the world readily flew in from thousands of miles to defend the truth. All of them unanimously stated that the pilots of the ill-fated Helios flight had been competent.
The experts proved that the conclusions of the official report were faulty and that the investigation must be re-opened in order to find the real causes of the crash.
It is more detrimental to society to convict innocent people than not to have a conviction. If today, despite the pain, accumulated wrath and thirst for redemption, we allow this judicial farce to victimise innocent people and to add to the number of the victims of the tragic crash, it will rest upon our own conscience''

I am not familiar with the 73 but have many hours on the 75. I have had two occasions when, due to freezing slush, the outflow valve stuck, thus cutting out the auto pressurization. I was fully aware of what had happened even before all the various warnings manifested themselves. Ears can tell a story very quickly.
Were the 73’s pressurization not set, what would have been the cabin rate of climb and would it not have been apparent even before 1,000ft, let alone 10 or 20?

Prober, just caught this at a late stage & I have not read through all of the previous. Apologies now for re-stating what might have already been discussed. I too flew 737,757 & 767. Pressurisation systems were similar if not identical. AUTO is a setting which permits fully automatic control of the dump valve. It is the normal ops setting. MANUAL was really meant for use if the auto system had failed. Manual gives electrically AC or DC control of the valve but through pilot inputs on the CLB/DEC rotary control. You are absolutely correct in stating that flight at any point in MANUAL would be easily detected by human sensing. The ears take a real wallop with insensitive use of the CLB/DEC control in MANUAL. Take off in the MANUAL position would have been instantly recognised as the cabin would climb / descend (whatever) at the same rate as the AIRCRAFT rate.

If the crew took off in MANUAL, they will have noticed immediately and switched to AUTO or at least manipulated the CLB/DEC facility in order to stabalise the situation in MANUAL & then go to AUTO. If, however, all was normal & the flight was conducted in AUTO, a failure, sometimes subtle, would in all probabilty still be "sensed" by the pilots and switching to MANUAL in order to attempt control of the dump valve would be a standard 'non -normal' procedure.

Again, deep apologies if this has all been discussed previously.

If the crew took off in MANUAL, they will have noticed immediately - I'm afraid I disagree. Remember 'going up' has far less effect on the ears than coming down'. I suggest 'may'? I had to depart INN once unpressurised until around 6000' due to a tech issue and I do not recall noticing anything 'unusual' on the ears. No comments from c/crew or pax either.

I cannot remember the detail of the Helios but I'm sure the 'implication' is that the crew did NOT notice the lack of pressurisation even when the horn went off.

This case stinks. The Greek investigators obviously messed up with the report and their efforts to cover it led to some aviation professionals to be prosecuted for one and the same thing three times.

Hi everyb!
I would like to post the link to the letter by the wife of Mr. Stoimenov again:

Why is new evidence in the Helios crash being ignored? - Cyprus Mail (http://www.cyprus-mail.com/letters/why-new-evidence-helios-crash-being-ignored/20121218)

Please make your position known by commenting on the article.
Let the press in Cyprus know how we all feel about this farce!
:mad:

Maybe the time has come to stop flying or working on aircraft that are to enter Greek airspace. 123 years in a Greek jail can't be a whole lot of fun.

And if you are not getting support from your management just remind them that the Accountable Manager will also be sharing your cell!

Whilst we should all be reminding our Accountable Managers they would join us in a Greek Jail ask him or her if your Company Insurers would cover the cost of a decent Defense team ie a cool few million euros, my advice here is don't listen to answers like ''Of course we wouldn't leave in the lurch'' or ''my goodness me of course every help would be offered to you'' It would be nice to see proof of help direct from the Insurers but don't hold your breath whilst waiting.

Well said Marvo, I suspect that even Insurers run out of money in cases that go on as long as this one.

At least you will have 123 years together in which you can say "I told you so" to any accountable manager who accuses you of scaremongering and doesn't act.

Greece is still an EU member. Greece is apparently being financed by EU taxpayers. Can this not be brought before an EU court??

I have followed this case for a few years. It is not the first, or last, aviation crash where criminal charges will be brought against aviation professionals. AF447 grinds on in front of Mdme Zimmerman as we speak. BUT, you won't get any aviation insurer or airline to give you the comfort you deserve.

The aviation insurers of any airline have zero obligation to pay any criminal legal defence fees, under any circumstances. The aviation insurers are there to bail out the airline for compensation claims by the families of the dead and injured, and that includes expensive aviation lawyers to defend the airline for those civil claims.

Aviation Insurers only ever start to fork out for criminal lawyers, if they think it is expedient to their financial interests in the civil compensation claims. Put another way, if criminal charges/convictions somehow make the civil claims more expensive, this is bad for the aviation insurers as their bill goes up. Then there is a clear financial interest on the insurers behalf in paying less: so it then only makes sense to spend money on criminal lawyers, as well as civil lawyers, in an attempt to reduce the total bill.

So, money seems to trump human rights or air safety in certain situations.

All rather unsettling, and unsatisfactory.

Tomorrow, Thursday 7 February 2013, is the day the Greek Court's verdict will be announced.

The sad thing is that there is nothing anyone can do about it. :ugh:

Greek justice has always been rather different to our understanding.

An aquaintance of mine bought a holiday froman established operator to go plane spotting in Greece. While parked in a viewing spot near an airfield spotting except for one of the wives who was not interested and sat in the bus doing puzzles. The cops turned up and arrest them all for spying. They must not take photographs or note plane numbers.

At the court case they point out that the airfield features in an evening soap opera about the Greek air force at which many photographs and aircraft numbers may be seen... not relevant says the court. They describe the process of aircraft spotting... all lies says the prosecutor there is no such hobby as plane spotting. They produce plane spotting magazine printed in Greece and bought at airport that morning.. All fabricated says prosecutor... they say lets go airport buy more magazines... court adjourns Garry given bail of £10K which he borrows....

Garry told not to attend net court hearing but can't afford to lose the money so turns up... found not guilty..... eight years later still can't get the bail money back is told has been forfeit

If you go the Greece you must obey the rules and laws of that sovereign country, they may not be what you expect.. Greece is fully entitled to make it's own laws but we may be ignorant of them and should not expect allowance for our ignorance

I have no problems obeying the "law of the land".
I do have a problem with people who are supposed to make evidence based judgements refusing to even accept that evidence and make a judgement anyway regardless.

Court today announced its verdict. Alan is found NOT GUILTY.

That's wonderful!

Finally! After so many years of worry. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes as they say. So pleased for Alan but deeply concerned about the possible ramifications of operating in Greek airspace.

Wonderful news. I sincerely hope he can try to put this behind him. (as much as is possible)

It would appear justice does prevail after all, even in Greece. It just takes a long long long time.

Here's hoping he can rebuild his life after this dreadful period.

Helios convictions upheld in Greece - Cyprus Mail (http://m.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/helios-convictions-upheld-greece/20130208)

Common sense finally prevails as far as the engineer is concerned! For chief pilots and executives however the message is clear, the buck for corporate responsibility stops with you. We are quick to criticize them. But as this case shows their positions are not without risk.

It is great news that Alan was found Not Guilty, but then he wasn't guilty anyway was he.

It was very heartening for him to have been given the overwhelming support of his fellow licensed engineers both in this forum and elsewhere. Even pilots joined in to wish him well!

The CEO, Operations Manager and Chief Pilot are found Guilty but also did nothing wrong. The big difference is that they got little or no support from fellow management types who kept their corporate heads below the parapet.

But would we expect anything else:sad:

History would seem to indicate that the Greek Legal system is about as competent as the Greek Economic system...

"It would appear justice does prevail after all, even in Greece. It just takes a long long long time."

You are having a laugh aren't you ?

Helios convictions upheld in Greece - Cyprus Mail (http://m.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/helios-convictions-upheld-greece/20130208)

Bulgaria: Greek Appeals Court Upholds Bulgarian Pilot Guilty Verdict - Novinite.com - Sofia News Agency (http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=147650)

No it's not great news. You are all professional pilots where on earth is the uproar in the pilot community. 2 of the 4 chaps charged are pilots!!!

The air accident report used in the Greek trial was FALSE. The report was initiated by the air accident investigator Mr Tsolaskis AAIASB and it was written by 2 world leading air accident investigators - Caj Frostell and Ron Schleede. They based the report on Tsolakis information and data.

Physical evidence provided by the Canadians was brought forward confirming that the aircraft sustained a Catastrophic pressurisation failure and therefore the pilots would not of regained control.

Ron and Caj RETRACTED their report agreeing with the infallible Canadians findings and demanded that the case be reopened as the report was FALSE. The Greek rejected! NTSB turned the other way and Boeing after paying the ''Hush'' money to the relatives have not said a word..

The Greeks continue to use the Initial report!!!!! :ugh:

Now where the hell is the justice! This is detrimental to Air safety. ICAO is a farse and this is in direct breech of Annex 13. Allowing Boeing to continue to cover up the real reason why that aircraft went down. For a kangaroo court who has no clue on the technicalities in this case to pass verdict.

You are all pilots entrusting your lives in such organisations. Good luck in Greek airspace

Firstly may I state that I believe the findings of the Greek courts are outrageous.

I know one of the accused personally and be assured I find this outcome a complete travesty of justice.

However I do find this statement of yours odd:
Physical evidence provided by the Canadians was brought forward confirming that the aircraft sustained a Catastrophic pressurisation failure and therefore the pilots would not of regained control.

I have personally experienced a complete pressurisation failure in a B737 (as well as partial failures in B747's).

In the B737 failure at cruise altitude we did not regain control of the pressurisation but took the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of the pax , crew and aircraft. We donned oxygen masks, attempted to identify and fix the problem, and when we were unable executed an emergency decent.

Whilst I would never suggest that my S/F/O and I carried out the 'perfect' response to the situation we were presented with, I do believe that the basic actions were in general compliance with SOP's at the time.

Evidence would suggest that the actions of the crew of the ill fated aircraft were not in general compliance with SOP's at the time.

To put it in very blunt terms:
The Pilots may not have been able to control this 'catasprophic' pressurisation failure, but they were qualified and therefore should have been able to execute control of the aircraft subsequently to a safe landing. It would seem that they failed to do this.

May I also say that a pressurisation failure should never be decribed as catastrophic. Events leading up to a pressurisation failure could be 'catastrophic'
These events could be things such as a bomb which brought down Pan Am over Lockerbie. In this case the bomb led to a pressurisation failure (to say the least!), and the rest is very unpleasant history.

Pressurisation failures are not that common (one for me in 37 years), but do occur. Most result in a normal landing with no significant injuries.

As I recall maintenance was trouble shooting an air leak in one of the doors the night before and left the pressurization in manual open. The pilots missed seeing it and ignored the cabin altitude warning and continued flying on autopilot until fuel starvation in a holding pattern at altitude at Athens. Fighter jets went up to assist them but both pilots were passed out. It probably has been posted before in the hundreds of posts.

Bubbers - read the link in Post 165

Why do people still continue with the accusations that the switch was left in manual. It was proven that the switch was in auto. The engineers thread has a couple of posts by asheng who attended the trial as a professional witness. It's quite interesting reading and should make everyone fearful of the Greek justice system.

Dear All,
Let me put one thing clear:
This thread is supposed to be about the court case, do not go into the pressurization issue again (discussed at length here and elsewhere).
The essence is that the defendants were tried and sentenced based on:

- a mistaken report
- a misrepresentation of facts
- a misinterpreted responsibility

The court in Athens should have made its own investigation, like the one in Cyprus did (although also based on a wrong hypothesis drawn from the Greek investigation report).
Capt. Stoimenov and the other 2 defendants should have never been brought to court, more so - for manslaughter.
Finally, as Greece in general and the Greek Judiciary are bankrupt, the judge replaced the sentence that he upheld with a "ransom" of 76650 EUR. The money had to be deposited in 7 days - by 14/02/2013.

The management of Helios Airways were found guilty; check out your own favourite airline against this.

The AAIASB Report found that the Flight and Cabin crew were medically fit, well rested and qualified (OED - trained and competent) to conduct the flight.

The aircraft had a current C of A and carried no defects.

Safety oversight was by UK CAA

No significant deficiencies were noted in audits and the UK CAA Inspector recommended continuance of the Helios Airways AOC on 5 June 2005.

It doesn't get much better than that, so what are they guilty of?

Thanks for the link,sj. Last time I followed up on this was a couple years ago.


I picked up a 737 about 30 years ago and flew it all afternoon into the evening. The next morning I got the same plane and on first flight of day checks had no oxygen flow. Found the oxygen bottle replaced the day before before we got it had not been turned on so we were reading trapped pressure in the line.

Interesting about their mike selectors being in mask position and they passed out. That is probably what would have happened in our case.

Our opspecs requiring quick turn arounds only required flow checks on oxygen on initial flights on first flight of the day. We flew the whole day with no crew oxygen and didn't know it. The pressure was right but the bottle was turned off. If we had depressurized we would have had no oxygen. I don't know what their opspecs were but putting people in jail is not right. Mistakes were made but they put the wrong people in jail. Hopefully they will rectify this. It is embarassing to think Greece can not understand this.

Interesting exchange re O2. The audio selectors were found by the Boeing adviser to NTSB - both undamaged by the impact, not even dusty, and both at MASK.

The Flight Deck valve was about half open. I was taught to fully open it and then turn it back a 1/4 turn (Gorilla avoidance!); am I right in thinking that the flow is quite severely restricted if the valve is only partially open?

Also interesting that the pilot's masks were never found but the supernummary ones were easily located in the flight deck area and in reasonable condition.

The management of Helios Airways were found guilty; check out your own favourite airline against this.

The AAIASB Report found that the Flight and Cabin crew were medically fit, well rested and qualified (OED - trained and competent) to conduct the flight.

The aircraft had a current C of A and carried no defects.

Safety oversight was by UK CAA

No significant deficiencies were noted in audits and the UK CAA Inspector recommended continuance of the Helios Airways AOC on 5 June 2005.

It doesn't get much better than that, so what are they guilty of?


probably guilty of nothing more than having an insurance policy that could pay out.

a criminal sentence and corporate negligence, *PAYDAY* !


unfortunately situations like this are nothing to do with safety, responsibility or justice it is about squeaking money out of a policy..

Greece and as Cyprus are both fairly small, you can bet that lawyers and judges are to some degree related or interconnected, heck i'm related to about a third of cyprus.. so lawyers need to get paid, they sure as s**t dont work pro-bono all the time so each settlement will have a percentage going for legal fees, get a criminal conviction and that new house, swimming pool or g-wagen is paid for.

outcomes like this actually set flight safety backwards as well as industry progression and development, that is the travesty following the tragedy!

Actually I think there are some aspects of this tragic case that airline management should have a think about. The captain was a well known 'character' over here, who appears to have changed jobs a lot (so recruitment and supervision may be an issue). Whilst certain elements of the accident will never be known for sure, there were reports of a very poor working atmosphere on the flight deck. Nobody comes out of this particularly well, so suggesting everything was fine and this is just a money grabbing exercise is a little simplistic.

I didn't know the oxygen bottle was not fully on, just partially opened. Rarely do both pilots check flow at the same time so a partially open oxygen bottle wouldn't be detected. Was it even half way open? They probably don't know. All we know is they selected their com to mask so must have had masks on.

They lost consciousness so must have not had oxygen sufficient for both pilots. They must. Have considered this in the investigation.

If true, the mechanic who didn't properly open the valve would be the only person at fault. Flying a lot of corporate jets long ago I knew you opened it all the way and backed it up a touch so it wouldn't jam at the wide open position. You never leave it only partially open. I'm just a pilot and know that.

Did they bother to find out what mechanic installed or operated the last oxygen bottle? Why didn't he open it properly?

Oxygen is either on or off. Half on doesn't count.

I am SLF and a (now retired) legal academic with some publications in the criminal aspects of safety in aviation -- an interest I still feed by lurking on PPRuNe and being grateful for the hospitality of the professionals it serves.

I beg patience, seek clarity, and apologise if I have mis-understood something.

Is it correct to state that, had the valve on the flight deck been set in the correct position for flight, then the tragedy would not have happened in the normal course of events (ie, in the absence of other unrelated causes)?

Is it correct to state that the routine pre-takeoff check list on that a/c includes ensuring that the valve is set in the correct position for flight?

Would it then be correct to conclude that the position in which the valve had been left by the maintenance engineer, who was convicted, would have been irrelevant if the flight crew had correctly and conscientiously carried out the necessary routine checks and acted on what they found -- ie, either set it appropriately for flight, or confirmed that it was already appropriately set?

Would it be correct to say that in principle this analysis could be extended to any other safety-critical switch or valve or lever etc etc forming an item in the routine and prescribed pre-flight checks?

bubbers is spot on The check on the first flight of the day can be assumed ok with just residual pressure. I know, i checked just after this incident. From memory not all aircraft had the shut off valve in the flight deck but it should be wire locked open and function checked.

An accident waiting to happen in my book.

Oxygen systems should be checked for pressure and flow before each flight.If the engineers have to top it up now and then ,so be it.

Is it correct to state that, had the valve on the flight deck been set in the correct position for flight, then the tragedy would not have happened in the normal course of events (ie, in the absence of other unrelated causes)?

Is it correct to state that the routine pre-takeoff check list on that a/c includes ensuring that the valve is set in the correct position for flight?

Would it then be correct to conclude that the position in which the valve had been left by the maintenance engineer, who was convicted, would have been irrelevant if the flight crew had correctly and conscientiously carried out the necessary routine checks and acted on what they found -- ie, either set it appropriately for flight, or confirmed that it was already appropriately set?
Connetts is bang on with this statement. Almost every time I receive an aircraft from maintenance I find switches in the wrong position or just turned off, it is my responsibility to set the panel in the correct configuration, that is why I do a preflight.

Apologies for dragging this back to the piloting side from the very important legal issues - the other thread appears to have 'faded':

I see reference to the 3 bleed switches being found 'OFF' - where is this documented and what do folk offer as an explanation?

Some reference to the oxy valve being 'OFF' or 'half-open' - again, is this investigation evidence or gossip?

I personally discount as inconclusive the fact that the pres valve was in 'AUTO' and the 'MAN' light out at impact. We need to remember we had a 737 MCC trained steward in the cockpit at the end.

It seems the CVR would tell the story if all bleeds were off because at 10,000 ft cabin altitude high warning, if the same model 737 I flew, went off you get the takeoff warning horn as I did once. Outflow valve in manual or no bleed air would cause this but why would they continue to climb. The oxygen bottle would only be a factor if they continued climbing without rectifying the cabin alt high warning and ignoring the passenger masks dropping which seems highly unlikely. They should have been fine until over 20,000 ft before any hypoxia symptoms set in.

The only thing that makes sense to me is they depressurized at altitude and had no oxygen. If the bottle was only part way on the mechanic who didn't properly turn it full open was at fault. Cracking it open will give you pressure but no volume of flow when you need oxygen. I have no proof of this but it is the only thing that makes any sense.

What an MCC trained steward?

The only thing that makes sense to me is they depressurized at altitude and had no oxygen. - I recall the report saying they were discussing the horn at around 10,000' with company?

MCC - bugspeed post #27 refers to it. It is a mandatory part of EU pilot training - 'Multi-crew Cooperation' course. It would have given the steward several 737 sim training hours.

Edit to say that from a report they appear to have been discussing an E&EE cooling failure at 12000' with maintrol. It is worth trying to follow the erratic reports as they flow though the old thread http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/202591-cypriot-airliner-crash-accident-investigation.html

"The cabin altitude warning horn sounded at 12,000 feet, four minutes from takeoff. A few seconds later (09.11.50), the captain reported an air-conditioning problem and requested clearance from ATC to hold at 16,000 feet, which happens to be the maximum for APU bleed supply. "

The accident still remains a mystery to me. Has anyone seen ANY of the Canadian/Boeing or other reports (with links?)

Connets, this should be good. Refresh my glass memsahib & some crispies to accompany would delight. Damn, I told myself not to start like this. Look, I love the legal take but it really starts to complicate in the search for clarity. You throw in the words routine and routinely. Boy, open the flood-gates for discussion. We have, in professional Air Transport Aviation a set of guidelines in our Operations Manual. Normal, Supplementary Normal, Non-Normal and Emergency. Since we study, get regularly checked, have the opportunity to regularly practice most considered events, one might venture to question what is considered to be routine.

For example, a critical failure is the loss of a powerplant at Decision speed on a limiting runway. I was thrown this failure routinely on every check I ever had to perform. It was a failure that would be routinely briefed for & even rehearsed in the form of briefing & touch drills to the point that it was almost expected on take-off & should not cause surprise.

As others have expressed, it is our responsibility to check that the aircraft is correctly configured & switches are in the normal position as a matter of routine. If we are presented with an aircraft that is being dispatched by Engineers in accordance with the Minimum Equipment List for any number of reasons, we are, again, responsible for total understanding & accepting the aircraft with a full brief as to what is expected of us. see what I mean Connets ? It might be routine to accept a supplimentary non-normal or even non-normal configuration of switches.

Most pilots would not expect to see the Px control in Manual during pre-take off checks. If it was, we would ask Engineers to explain. Manual would require manual control of the outflowvalve through the Clb/Dec switch & requires practiced and even artful technique. I would not consider this to be a routine practice.

Loss of PX at any stage requires the operating crew to don Oxy masks & regulators & establish communications (with each other) . That part is a memory drill. We would then try to establish the cause & take manual control of the outflow valve, if that was the problem, by first, placing the PX Control switch to MANUAL.

BOAC, all bleeds off wouldn't half be felt in most ears. Engine bleeds off might be used in the supplementary normal case where max thrust from the engines is required. Remember the old Boeing procedures of configuring the system in the form of a letter "C" & then re-configuring, after take-off in the "reverse C" ? Switches, definitely in a non -normal position but, from Connet's point of view (legal-eagle), possibly a routine event outa some airfileds ?

Trust that might help clarify your question Connets.

I had an E&E outflow valve stick open the day I was operating on one air conditioning pack because of a write up and got the intermittent horn, same as take off warning horn, once in a B737. It took a few seconds to realize that the warning was also for cabin altitude above 10,000 ft which it was at idle thrust descending. Adding a little power and putting on the second pack fixed it. I remember a couple of years ago the crew talking to their maintenance people about the beeping but seems they would have figured it out as we did. I don't believe they would have continued climbing to high altitude with pressurization inop. Also why call maintenance unless you just thought it was an inop takeoff warning horn?

BOAC, all bleeds off wouldn't half be felt in most ears. - yes, but we have at least one poster 'claiming' all bleed switches were in the off position in the wreckage (don't know the 'provenance' for this statement) and another that Helios commonly used bleeds off or APU for this trip as a tanker.

This is why some links to some sort of 'official' investigation/s would be really useful.

If all the bleeds were off would that include APU? Maybe they made a bleeds off take off and forgot to switch bleeds. Quito was where we made bleeds off takeoffs but once in climb you had to switch to engine bleed on the 757.

All three bleeds - check the reports in the link. We do not even know if the APU was serviceable for starters. We know very little.

Back to the 'what if', 'maybe they were ?' 'Poster "claims" ' , etc. BOAC you are right in stating that we know very little & I wonder how much more the Courts knew ? Bubs, I am doing it now (!); if the crew were in contact with control & discussing the situation, they might have responded to Control asking them to "try " this or "try" that to resolve a developing situation. That can lead to all sorts of non-normal switch positions and failure to re-configur after resolution was not effected.

My input was more to demonstrate to our Lawyer associate that once in the leagal arena, Lawyers can have a field day with words like "routine" .
Don't you love it when they come out with stuff like " Is it not true.........?" ! No disrespect intended Conetts.

All three bleeds - check the reports in the link. - I have just revisited the Greek accident report and there is a puzzle. The report states that the APU bleed was off, but the picture at page 50 clearly shows the APU bleed switch at 'ON' while the text says

"The left engine bleed toggle switch (BLEED 1) was found in the OFF position. The right engine bleed toggle switch (BLEED 2) was visually found in the OFF position. The APU toggle switch was found in the OFF Position. The isolation valve toggle switch was found in the AUTO Position. The left air conditioning pack switch appeared to be in the AUTO position. The position of the right pack switch could not be determined because of impact damage. The air conditioning panel was packaged and shipped to the Boeing Company, along with other systems components, for additional examinations (See section 1.16 for additional information)."

Edited to note: The report also confirms (I think!) that the Outflow Valve WAS in manual at impact based on the bulb filaments.

No offence taken, Slowjet.

However, your answer raises questions for me but I will not --at least, for the moment -- pursue the point as I feel that I may be thought to be intruding. Following up what you have written might look as if I am cross-examining, and this might not be appropriate conduct for an outsider.

I shall continue lurking and trying to learn...... and thank you all for tolerating this.

Connetts, don't be too self demeaning. You were never considered to be "lurking" and your input would always be interesting to us professional pilots. I got my Law degree from Oxford but never practiced. Became a self appointed Perry Mason, Armchair Lawyer & professional Air Transport Pilot. Very dangerous Debating Society position. Trust that you appreciated the diffuculty we have with court-room banter and fact. This Greek case stinks. Any legal system that finds guilt, administers punishment but then offers a cash for walk-away deal is stomach churning.

Keep looking at this case. It is FULL of anomolies & contradictions. Just look at BOAC's latest offering. Puzzling indeed. I like photographic evidence over written reports but both can be interfered with.

As pilots, we are all interested in knowing what exactly happened so that any similar disaster can be avoided. The Lawyers must keep looking at the legal implications and methods used to extract the truth.

For the time being, as I said to the Easyjet Check-in popsy as I weighed in my carry-on................" I rest my case".

So now going full circle was the pressurization in auto or manual. Were the proper bleeds on. Did the CVR have the 10,000 ft cabin altitude beeping, same as take off warning horn recorded. What did they talk about with their engineers about the problem and what did they say. Why did they continue climbing if the cabin altitude dropped the masks? Did they just depressurize at altitude and the oxygen bottle wasn't turned fully on? It must be in the report somewhere. It probably is somewhere in these hundreds of posts. I will not spend hours going through them again but something doesn't make sense.

My guess is the mechanic opened the oxygen bottle just enough to show pressure and didn't open it fully as required. Just my opinion but only thing that makes sense. Please, anybody that has a better opinion join in.

It must be in the report somewhere. - have you read it? (You will see the CVR is a 'standard' 30min recorder.)

something doesn't make sense. - you are correct there

Welcome to the mystery.

Bubbers 44. The problem with this system is that residual pressure in the oxygen line can produce a brief satisfactory flow test. Regardless of that, the valve in question is positioned on the flight deck and is an item in the pre-flight checklist for the flightcrew to check regardless of what the engineer may or may not have done.

Im a friend and colleague with one of those charged from our Eva days . I lost touch with him when we went our seperate ways. Ive only just learnt hes in the fix hes in. I would like to get in touch to offer my support. Id hope he may read this and reply. Can anyone offer how i may be able to make some contact.

Its not a mystery although there are aspects that will never be known.
It was crew error.Mis-identification of the intermittent warning horn whilst airborne(from the report).Light aircraft climbing @<hidden> 3000fpm so hypoxia onset was quick.Crew-training error also.Rapid depressurization is only scenario trained.No hypoxia training(alt chamber) either for civilian crews,only military.No dissemination of data from similar incidents(lingus etc) to B737 operators.Use of master caution system.Identify,priority to most crucial NNC,RESET.Risk of masking etc etc.It was a crew training accident,not CRM.The role language played in the crash.The role SOP's played in the crash.Slavish obedience of procedure over airmanship favored by modern airlines due poor training,invasive in-flight FDM,pressure from insurance companies,wrong guys becoming trainers etc etc.Its one of the misunderstood crashes of our time.

Forget all the myths;the engineer asking them if AUTO was selected.The discussion with Maintrol centered on equip cooling.Switch(es) position at impact...the male FA was a licensed pilot,he may have changed switch positions after everyone was already dead.Its immaterial.The rubbish about the airline and the country's CAA being unsafe to operate in EU.All red herrings.The crew Oxygen setting..doesnt matter,they never donned masks.

Keep it simple.Aircraft climbs,horn sounds,Captain retards thrust lever(s) to silence horn(wrong mindset-training issue),horn is never RESET,the first action(yes even before masks) to a cabin pressure problem.Horns,bells whistles quickly scramble the brain,especially so if theyre unidentified by the crew.Captain focuses on equip cooling and talks to Maintrol while plane climbs at 3000fpm and everyone dies.Master caution never reset seals their fate.FA's sit there while plane climbs,waiting to die.Weak Captain?Weak FO?(both very contentious issues because other crews have been caught in same trap-hypoxia onset is insidious killer)Boeing design?changes were made(red CAB ALT light,change to pre-flight checklist etc) but master caution system,if used properly,would have identified the problem.FA's were the last chance but acted in accordance with SOP's.

None of these guys should be on trial.For what?The system is what should be on trial.Airmanship,good training etc sacrificed at the altar of political correctness,SOP's and modern-day rote flying.Good airmanship and training saves lives,nothing else.CRM,SOP's etc,are very over-rated.Useful tools and they make the insurance companies and the politically-correct managers happy but both are of very little help when chips are down.Knowledge,judgment,experience..thats what counts.

Try a search on 'Linked in' and send a message. Worked for me.

I took off from San Diego once and the outflow valve in the 737 went full closed as we were saturated with clearance info so opened up the outflow valve fully to comply with ATC instructions with turn and altitude changes. since we were taking off to the east. Finally when we had time we used manual pressurization to complete our flight. My FO just looked at the ceiling so lost him for a few minutes. If you are below 10,000 ft just shut pressurization down and aviate.