View Full Version : US Navy 7th fleet at the time of LHR disaster.


Frank Arouet
10th Apr 2012, 09:27
Given that they, The US Navy, have the ability to shut down sections of the GPS satellite system, and given that they were near there at the time, and given there was a RAIM within that time of the approach to the disaster, has anybody asked if this may have had an influence on events.

Sensitive, you betcha!

But somebody has to ask, as our government and regulatory body's won't, (because it may step on sensitive toes), Is it a factor that should be considered?

Cover up? Who said that?

Not me, just asking if this has been explored.



wishiwasupthere
10th Apr 2012, 09:34
What London Heathrow disaster?

DJ737
10th Apr 2012, 09:35
................and what exactly does this have to do with DG&P?

Howard Hughes
10th Apr 2012, 09:36
Looking for a conspiracy where I doubt one exists.

adsyj
10th Apr 2012, 09:46
Is he talking about Lockhart River???????

Capt Claret
10th Apr 2012, 10:24
Frank,

I know you're not the only person to voice such concerns. I also know an approach was made to the Aussie ABC to see if they'd be interested in investigating further (4Corners or similar) but nothing came of it.

Whilst I wasn't in the region at the time, from first hand accounts of others who were, I believe that the hypothesis is not without merit.

................and what exactly does this have to do with DG&P?

YLHR = Lockhart River, last known to be situated on Cape York Peninsula, part of the Australian mainland, or EnZed's west island. ;)

Frank Arouet
10th Apr 2012, 10:47
................and what exactly does this have to do with DG&P?

What GPS do you use in your Taxi? Think about a fare to Lockhart River.

Iron Bar
10th Apr 2012, 11:40
You been drinking Richard?

neville_nobody
10th Apr 2012, 12:36
At the end of the day even if the US was fiddling with the GPS they are never going to admit it and whatever evidence you need will be classified.

Same goes for the unusually high number of strange control issues around Exmouth area which just happens to have some US high powered secret transmitting devices around there.

Interesting stuff none the less.

Captain Gidday
10th Apr 2012, 12:36
Tell you what though, the first crew who program the wrong LHR into their GPS are going to look reeeeeeeally silly :)

PLovett
10th Apr 2012, 13:02
Given that there wasn't a war on in the area at the time of the crash and given that it is not the USN that has the ability to shut down, or actually, re-apply the fudge factor, but the Pentagon, then I think it is highly unlikely that nefarious GPS signals had anything to do with catastrophe. :mad: Furthermore, the military use a different signal to the civilian one so they had no need to mess with it at all. :=

Some people on this forum should really learn and apply Occam's Razor. It really helps in lowering the paranoia levels. :ugh:

Turkeyslapper
10th Apr 2012, 13:14
Same goes for the unusually high number of strange control issues around Exmouth area which just happens to have some US high powered secret transmitting devices around there


Don't think its too secret....Harold E Holt Comms station - pretty sure its actually an Australian facility these days.......VLF comms for subs?

Cheers

gobbledock
10th Apr 2012, 13:23
Frank, good post. Congratulations on speaking up on a topic a number of people secretly agree with you on but haven't been game to say it. I've heard the same whispers and heard anecdotal details but not seen anything on paper. Where's Julian Asange when you need him?
The possibilty exists and logic would dictate that once you rule out all the possible/likely elements then what you have left over is likely to be the cause.

Just for shits and giggles and as a true story, I have a 'friend' who used to work in Defense. He would never elaborate on what his role actually was other than to say he was a 'data analyst'. I learned years later that this specific term is often given to those with classified jobs than are not meant to be made public. I tried every trick in the book to squeeze something, anything out of him to no avail. He was as stubborn and determined as Alan Joyce in a bank vault. The only thing he ever said was once after a long long session of drinking and after simultaneously viewing a news update on TV which related to radio/bandwidth/airwave/pulse type technology was 'that he had seen things first hand, technologies, that revealed the 'powers to be' had experimented and attained technological advancement in some areas 25 years beyond where
the rest of society is current positioned'. Not to har to dismiss when you look at technology such as the SRS Blackbird and the Stealth Bomber as an example. These aircraft had been designed, created, prototyped, produced and then utilized, flown and tested to their full capacity all while the US government denied their existence. Each contained technology and capabilities many doubted was possible at the time. Who knows what else exits covertly today?
Franks theory a fantasy, lunar cycle mad ramblings or a plausible possibility??
A possibility gets my vote!

Dave Gittins
10th Apr 2012, 13:23
Is this a reference to Speedbird 38 ? Last "disaster" at LHR before that was BOAC's 707 in April 1968 ... a tad previous to be GPS related.

It was suggested at one time that very high powered RF may have responsible for shutting down part of the fuel or FADEC system on BA038.... esp. as Gordon Brown (then UK PM) was due to fly from Heathrow about that time and there were concerns about RF triggered devices, so allegedly jamming was used.

Like most conspiracy theories it came to naught.

Can't see what GPS would have to do with it.

compressor stall
10th Apr 2012, 22:43
YLHR Lockhart river crash report (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2005/aair/aair200501977.aspx)

Have another read.

Whilst I can't prove there was no fault with the GPS, it was hardly a slick and well oiled flight operation.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 00:19
I don't think Frank was saying it definitely was causal to the LHR accident, more the fact that it was dismissed too easily and not properly investigated.:cool:

The LHR accident posed so many unanswered questions....like have you noticed how on the original GNSS RNAV plate there was no spot height for South Pap (near where the Metro came to grief) but on the new approach there is?:* Food for thought!:ok:

flighthappens
11th Apr 2012, 00:36
looking at the overlays on the charts on page 30/287 of the report looks like they had a good track but they descended below MDA without being visual.

Maybe the USN messed with QNH aswell?

alphacentauri
11th Apr 2012, 01:16
The LHR accident posed so many unanswered questions....like have you noticed how on the original GNSS RNAV plate there was no spot height for South Pap (near where the Metro came to grief) but on the new approach there is?http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/bah.gif Food for thought!http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

Would it have made a difference?

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 01:50
Would it have made a difference?

Probably not, but it could explain the numerous 'nuisance warnings' from GPWS units!:ouch: It also highlights one of many deficiencies of the original approach and brings into question why the approach was kept in service for a further 4 years after the accident!:{

alphacentauri
11th Apr 2012, 02:28
The approach was kept in service for another 4 years after the accident because there was nothing wrong with it. It was compliant with all IFP standards at the time of publication and for the duration of its validity.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 02:47
The approach was kept in service for another 4 years after the accident because there was nothing wrong with it.

If 'there was nothing wrong with it' how come TAWS units (compliant with ICAO approach designs) in various aircraft were pinging South Pap? See here:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1358144/ai2007010.pdf

compressor stall
11th Apr 2012, 03:59
Because the PANSOPS design requirements for instrument approaches and the various triggers for GPWS rely on different information.

An instrument approach design gives you a distance from a point (e.g. the paps) and wouldn't care if it was a 1 inch knoll on a plateau or the point of a matterhorn.

The GPWS looks at (amongst other things) closure rates on terrain, and would be looking at the rate of closure of the side of the steep mountain towards the aircraft but does not have the brains to know that the mountain will actually stop some hundreds of feet below the aircraft.

Silberfuchs
11th Apr 2012, 04:27
Navigational errors can be intentionally added to the GPS by simply adding/subtracting time from the calculation.
It was quite common to see errors of approx 75nm suddenly occur during US military ops in the mid-90's.

This was, of course, back in the days of P-Code & C-Code GPS.

I have seen these errors during joint military ops and when they happened there was no doubt what was going on. The errors were so significant that you disregarded the GPS completely.

When the US military gave the world access to P-Code (circa 1998/99) the general opinion was that they they either had something else entirely or some other version of encypted GPS data.

Can they induce errors....absolutely, but from my experience they have tended to render GPS unusable rather than deliberately mis-direct other users.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 04:38
Stallie I basically understand the principles of a GPWS/EGPWS that you are saying, although I think the 'nuisance warnings' in the ATSB report were deriving their information from the RADALT. However does that excuse leaving the approach in service for 4 more years? Maybe they were just waiting for the PAN-OPs instrument design requirements to change so they no longer had to consider the Mount Tozer spot height, who knows?

You would also think that the aircraft flown to certify the approach would be equipped with the latest and greatest for the time (1999), so at least a GPWS, they then would have had experienced the nuisance warnings themselves and adjusted the approach accordingly!

alphacentauri
11th Apr 2012, 04:48
Sarcs, Not all GPWS systems are created equal. Each manufacturer can use slightly different algorithms to interpret terrain differently. It even comes down to what terrain database they are using and and how the algorithm interprets rate of closure.

I believe at LHR quite a few GPWS were used to test the approach and only some of them sounded a warning. I am pretty sure the CASA test aircraft GPWS didn't sound a warning, but I do know that the RAAF one did.

This scenario has also causing some issues at Gladstone. This was solved with the GPWS system in question needing a terrain database update.

In short, a precedure is not pulled if it satisifies the criteria of the day and is test flown as suitable. Just because some systems sound a warning doesn't mean the procedure needs to be withdrawn/redesigned. It more than likely means the system is too outdated or not refined enough to deal with these types of terrain issues. The problem is at the system end, not the procedure end.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 05:02
So alphacentauri, since you seem to know so much about this, do you know what aircraft and equipment was originally used to certify the original LHR RW12 GNSS RNAV approach?

advo-cate
11th Apr 2012, 05:06
So Alpha, what you are saying is:

There has never been an error in a plate??

Some other questions:

General Plate Design:


What is the procedure for example where there are other approaches for the missed approach
If there is a NDB and a GNSS-NPA, are the missed approach paths designed for no confliction?

alphacentauri
11th Apr 2012, 07:04
The aircraft used to validate the original procedure was a Navajo, to the best of my knowledge it was not equipped with GPWS. There was and is still no requirement in the certification process to assess GPWS warnings, although it is brought to CASA's attention if one is found to alarm during a flight test. Further investigation usually results until the regulator is satisfied for publication.

The GPWS tests I alluded to in the above post were after the incident.

There has never been an error in a plate??

Advo-cate...did I say that? Has there ever been a procedural error? I would nearly say 100% no. Has anyone ever hit something whilst flying the published IFR procedure? There are quite alot of checks and test flying of procedures before they are let loose and the current rounds of checking are flown by pilots who actively fly in GA and they have to sign the certification.

In answer to your questions, consideration is given to surrounding procedures during the design process to ensure conflicts are minimal.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 07:23
The aircraft used to validate the original procedure was a Navajo, to the best of my knowledge it was not equipped with GPWS.
Pardon my ignorance ac but how can a Navajo not equipped with GPWS, be considered appropriate to certify the approach?

Also, while we're on the subject of GPWS, consider this quote from a pilot statement in the LHR coronial inquest:Whilst on approach to Bamaga on a number of occasions, Mr ##### observed Mr ####### (as handling pilot) while in a hurry “often pull the circuit breaker on the GPWS”. This occurred when the GPWS sounded a bank angle or high descent rate warning and Mr ####### would de-activate the system, to avoid nuisance warnings, and continue with a visual approach to the airstrip; (Pg 32 of the coroner's report).
http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/86682/cif-lockhart-river-aircrash-20070817.pdf

I know your all going to say...Rogue pilot, inadequate SOPs etc but if it was known by that pilot that the LHR RW12 GNSS RNAV was known to set off the GPWS while passing over South Pap so he ignored the GPWS. Then I think we have a potentially very big hole in a lump of Swiss cheese!

waren9
11th Apr 2012, 07:26
Agree with alphacentauri

There are some less than informed digs at his posts.There's no such thing as a "nuisance" warning with GPWS, unless then unit itself is faulty, which is another argument altogether.

If a GPWS issues a warning in accordance with its design and that warning is undesirable then the way that the approach is flown for that kind of aircraft and its installation either needs to be modified such that no GPWS warnings are triggered or the approach not flown at all.

Flying your aircraft in such a way as to intentionally trigger a GPWS in IMC is a seriously bad habit.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 07:44
Flying your aircraft in such a way as to intentionally trigger a GPWS in IMC is a seriously bad habit.

waren9 from the ATSB report: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1358144/ai2007010.pdf (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1358144/ai2007010.pdf)



On 29 May 2007, the crew of a Beechcraft B300
Super Kingair reported that a Lockhart River
Runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) non-precision approach
was being conducted, via the LHRWD waypoint, in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), with
the flight management system coupled to the
autopilot:
At a point 5nm from the MAPT [LHRWM] the
Enhanced Ground Proximity and Warning
System (EGPWS)3 gave aural and visual
alerts of ‘Terrain Terrain Pull Up Pull Up’
which lasted for 1 cycle of approximately 3
seconds. No amber or red terrain indications
appeared on the EGPWS display. At the time
of the warning, the airspeed was 130 KIAS
and a rate of decent of 700 fpm in IMC at an
altitude of 2150 ft. The RADALT indicated
approximately 1600 ft just prior to the event
and decreased to 1000 ft during the event.
The crew responded to the alert, established a
positive rate of climb and conducted a missed
approach. The crew then made a second attempt
via the LHRWG entry waypoint and reported:
During the second approach, in the same
configuration and, at the same position as
the first approach, the same alerts were
produced by the EGPWS.
The terrain map showed only blue and green
terrain and the aircraft was again accurately
on both azimuth and glide path. The flying
pilot noted the RADALT height reduce from
1600' to 1000' over a period of less than 1
second before returning to 1600'. The alert
continued for 1 cycle before ceasing. The
aircraft was confirmed on FMS glide path
and a decision to continue was made…


How can that be intentional activation? I think the last thing the crew of the B300 wanted, was for the GPWS to go off!

alphacentauri
11th Apr 2012, 07:55
Pardon my ignorance ac but how can a Navajo not equipped with GPWS, be considered appropriate to certify the approach?

Because there wasn't a requirement to test GPWS on instrument approaches. There still is no requirement to do this, however the procedures are now flown using a GPWS fitted Conquest.

waren9
11th Apr 2012, 08:01
Sorry Sarcs, I thought this was a thread about a Metro prang and a crew/company that actively flew their aircraft without due regard to the design limitations of the equipment they were using.

LeadSled
11th Apr 2012, 08:03
It was quite common to see errors of approx 75nm suddenly occur during US military ops in the mid-90's.
Folks,
I would have thought it was reasonably common knowledge that the US military (and, I assume, others) have the ability to effectively disable GPS signals over a geographical area.
After all, NOTAMs have been issued when this ability is going to be used, when in US airspace.
I have not seen such a NOTAM for exercises outside US territory, but I would be surprised if this ability was not used during exercises, as the logic is that most large aircraft rely on INS with GPS updates, not just GPS.
If there was a fleet exercise anywhere in the vicinity of the Australian east coast, no way would AU "authorities" ruffle any feathers by even hinting it played any part.
Personally, I don't believe it was an issue, "the" issue was a very unstable approach.
Tootle pip!!

Frank Arouet
11th Apr 2012, 08:31
Metro prang and a crew/company that actively flew their aircraft without due regard

And what Company it was, is still an outstanding question.

Can anybody remember the large signwriting on both sides of the aircraft, what the tickets read, and factor that into who got the blame and paid the penalty?

But that should also be disregarded, as was the fact the US Navy was in the vicinity at the time.

It's just that too many things were dismissed.

CaptainMidnight
11th Apr 2012, 09:51
The US Navy <snip> given that they were near there at the time, What evidence is there for this? Facts please (name of military exercise underway, or vessel name, or port visited)?

first hand accounts of others who were, I believe that the hypothesis is not without merit.What were the reports?

I have not seen such a NOTAM for exercises outside US territory,GPS jamming takes place from time to time and NOTAM issued. If there is an AIP SUPP for a major exercise, it's covered in that also, in addition to NOTAM.

Oktas8
11th Apr 2012, 09:55
I don't think that GPS (in)accuracy had much to do with the catastrophic sequence of events. They were on track after all. Unless you think they were using GPS altitude as the primary height reference. Surely not?

GNSS uses complicated high technology, and the US armed forces are a secretive bunch. This does not logically lead to the conclusion that you are implying.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 10:08
A friend of mine was tasked to a active beacon 200-250nm East of LHR, anyway he homed to the beacon and was initially on top of 8/8ths. When he finally busted through the cloud there was a massive carrier and entourage..i.e. the 7th Fleet!

He made contact with the yanks and they were none to happy he was there...they denied that the beacon was in amongst the fleet and it was subsequently turned off. So he bugged out of there back to Cairns....

Frank Arouet
11th Apr 2012, 10:27
I understand there was another tasked to the LHR site, in fact was first there, who suffered a signal loss around the same time.

They were on track after all

"On track" is three dimensional. It's obvious they weren't on a vertical track.

InTheWeeds
11th Apr 2012, 10:31
I thought they would have been too busy shooting down TWA800...:}

thorn bird
11th Apr 2012, 10:32
Your mate was lucky not to have a missile up his a...s Sarcs!
busting out over the fleet unannounced, big No No.
No sense of humour the Yanks.
Had them threaten to fire on me unless I got off the airway
I was cleared on.

Sarcs
11th Apr 2012, 10:52
I guess they were probably a bit miffed by the inadvertant beacon activation! :{

He was also the pilot who reported the GPS outage, which was noted in the original ATSB report.

Iron Bar
11th Apr 2012, 11:44
"Frank Arouet" is an ill informed, ill qualified and opportunistic individual, who's unsustainable babbling should be given no attention. He is not a professional aviator.

This is nothing but a bullshit wind up and in the interests of those close to the victims of this accident should be put to an end.

Please lock it.

Tidbinbilla
11th Apr 2012, 11:46
Request granted.