Sikorsky S-92: Operations [Archive]

Horror box

24th Dec 2010, 22:00

AVC are generally required for high speed cruise to reduce vibration levels. They are generally poor for tranistory activities due to lag times. On takeoff there should be little vibratory forces coming down from the rotor between takeoff and climb out that would require an AVC. Also AVC's only handle one frequency (n/rev where n is the number of blades). These kind of aborts are generally 1/rev where something let go in the main or tail rotor.

Now if the AVC went ape-s**t which they can do would be an issue, but I do not see why that would happen as going to forward speed. It should show up in hover.

I would suggest that if they were at 150m (500') they would be already at 120KIAS and at this speed AVC is certainly in effect. Having flown a few trips completely without AVC as it is an MEL release item, I can tell you that whilst in theory it is only noticeable in the cruise, in reality it is noticeable in all phases of flight but particularly from about 70KIAS and up. The last flight I did without AVC we checked the vibe analysis at various phases and confirmed this, although you don't need a vibe analysis to tell you this as you teeth are working their way loose. The problem does not necessarily need to have been a full AVC fail. If the AVC computer had some kind of mismatch causing a temporary mismatch between demand and output, this will cause an increase. I do not know how many FG's they use there, but if they use 6 and one drops out temporarily they may not get an immediate indication.
If it was not an AVC fault they experienced and was indeed a 1R, then another common cause has been a RIPS harness working its way loose. Not a serious problem at all, but will cause an alarming increase in vibe, and this I also know from first hand, having RTB'd with such an incident. Either way my point remains the same. No point in getting all worked up until we know the cause, and I strongly suspect it will not be as serious as some would like to suppose. The fact they flew back the same day is a good indicator. The crew still did the right thing, and safety was an absolute first, but the cause was probably found to be insignificant and a non threat to safety, so they flew home - end of story.

zalt

24th Dec 2010, 23:20

Sultan

The Sikorsky FMOC can only give advice and there is nothing better than actually inspecting the aircraft.

All

Tonight my thoughts are with the familes of the 17 people lost on board Cougar 491 who died in a totally preventable accident.

fjrmurph

31st Dec 2010, 11:10

ZALT
Also: No CADORS report yet. Perhaps Cougar now really think that CNLOPB is now regulating them rather than TCCA as CNLOPB has formed an aviation team under a former commanding officer of 424 Squadron.

Couple of questions

Is it mandatory for this incedent be reported to CADORS ?
Is there a timeline, does the report have to filed within a certain time period.

THKS

zalt

31st Dec 2010, 16:14

fjr It is only mandated for NavCanada, full blown accidents and for airlines who have incidents.

Cougar has routinely submitted CADORS in the past, but seem to have stopped after a couple of S-92A incidents (engine shut downs and MGB mount cracks).

It is a pity, because open reporting is a fundamental part of a
good safety culture.

fjrmurph

31st Dec 2010, 19:41

If they have stopped reporting incedents and issues, this sends a clear message to me

zalt

1st Jan 2011, 23:43

Cougar management made themselved look really stupid in Oct 2009 when they dismissed the MGB foot cracks as a 'North Sea' problem (whatever that is supposed to technically mean) when the press asked and then had one in Nova Scotia a week later.

sox6

3rd Jan 2011, 09:26

Do BSP still sacrifice one passenger for a cabin attendant? If so, why?

[email protected]

12th Feb 2011, 06:14

Layperson - I'm not sure you looked very hardhttp://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/365720-helicopter-crash-off-coast-newfoundland-18-aboard.html

Ancient Mariner

12th Feb 2011, 08:43

Big story in Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet on the S-92 H&S issue.Sorry,Norwegian only, but I`m sure Norwegian pilots will chime in. References and link to pprune and this thread.
- Sjokkbølge slår inn på kapteinens side - nyheter - Dagbladet.no (http://www.dagbladet.no/2011/02/12/nyheter/innenriks/helikopter/arbeidsmiljo/15349400/)
Per

rotorknight

12th Feb 2011, 09:01

I am just happy to see that the problem is being taken up now,even though it should have been taken up by the Norwegian CAA an not the newspapers.
The worst thing is that there are noise regulations for pilots as well in Norway since last year,BUT they are being ignored since the CAA does not have a clue how to implement them,because that would mean we would mean we effectively have to stop flying the 92,

rotorknight

squib66

12th Feb 2011, 10:36

What is the union postion?

Horror box

12th Feb 2011, 12:04

Hearing problems and back problems have always plagued helicopter pilots and it is sad this has not been improved with new generation designs. What I find a little alarming though, is the increased incidence of heart problems and indeed this is mentioned in the norwegian article. Heart palpitations being caused possibly by the S92 is a new one to me, and if true, very worrying indeed. Anyone care to comment further or have any experience that sheds light on where these incidents are appearing?
It is certainly true to say that there is a marked increase in the levels of vibration and noise, especially the very heavy bass type on the right hand side, and it does not really surprise me that the levels are a cause for concern. I find the left hand side quite comfortable and no problem with the noise. Unfortunately most of my time is in the right hand side and this is a very different experience. 6 hours in the cockpit per day for a couple of weeks certainly tires me out and I feel effects in my ears, but it usually subsides after a couple of days out of the cockpit when I start my free period. As for the long term effects - well time will tell.

squib66

19th Feb 2011, 10:47

I'm amazed that this has been missed:

Posted by John Croft on February 15, 2011 8:21 PM of Flight Global Blogs:

A preliminary incident report (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20110120X65144&key=1), filed yesterday, reveals a hairy landing for the pilots of a Bistrow Sikorsky S-92A oil rig transport helicopter in Louisiana on 19 January.

A mechanical issue presented itself to the crew of three onboard N920L [actually N920AL] as it returned its 15 passengers to the Air Logistics Galliano heliport (2LS0) in Galliano, Louisiana from the Green Canyon 858 off-shore helipad in the Gulf of Mexico.

"During the initial approach into 2LS0, as airspeed reduced through approximately 70 knots, the helicopter began a right yaw of more than 100 degrees that could not be stopped by application of left pedal," the NTSB writes in the report.

"The crew immediately lowered the nose to regain airspeed and streamline the aircraft. They diverted to the South Lafourche Airport (GAO), Galliano, Louisiana and performed a successful roll on landing, touching down at approximately 72 knots, utilizing differential braking to maintain runway heading"

Wow - now that's some Chuck Yeager-type piloting under duress.
The problem doesn't appear to be linked to transmission troubles that have plagued the S-92A, as emphasized in last week's final report on the 2009 Cougar Helicopters crash (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/majeures-major/aviation/A09A0016/MI-A09A0016.asp) off of Newfoundland.

Instead, this one appears to be a case of maintenance error.

"An after landing inspection showed that the tail rotor pitch change beam retaining nut was missing. Recent maintenance had been performed," say the NTSB.

Is this not similar to the loss of TR control incident in Norway in 2007?

twisted wrench

19th Feb 2011, 12:35

Hasn´t been missed is why ASB 92-64-007 came out with a 30 day 10 hour compliance to make sure the tail rotor pitch change shaft nut has been installed correctly.

squib66

19th Feb 2011, 13:11

Is there an AD?

212man

19th Feb 2011, 13:16

No AD required. If you start a task ..........finish it! Maybe a dupe or two to assist......

SimFlightTest

19th Feb 2011, 13:34

100 degrees of yaw (sideslip?) at 70 kts!? That's Commanche terrtory. Is there any FDR or HUMS data to back this up?

maxwelg2

19th Feb 2011, 13:54

Good job by the PIC.

I'm assuming this failure mode is covered during FSI.

Just highlights how media-sensitive the S92 is right now, and rightly so.

"Trust the pilots, who trust the engineers, who trust the designers"...a wee bit of trust breakdown in this case. These maintenance "errors" are totally unacceptable, would have been more than a ASB if this had ended up in fatalities, thanks to the PIC's skills this wasn't the case.:D

What's to prevent this happening again, enhanced awareness is good but procedural auditing etc. is what's really required. This was also an issue with Cougar 491. From the TSB report, under the conclusions section:

Cougar Helicopters did not effectively implement the mandatory maintenance procedures in Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Revision 13 and, therefore, damaged studs on the filter bowl assembly were not detected or replaced.

Safe flying

Max

squib66

19th Feb 2011, 13:54

If it deserves an ASB with a 10H compliance time it surely deserves an AD?

twisted wrench

19th Feb 2011, 16:48

Squib66, you might be right about the AD . I would say Sikorsky reacted to this swiftly to head off the FAA AD, and if issued most operators should all ready be in compliance with the AD if they carried out the ASB.

The pitch change shaft has a 1250 hour replacement schedule, so many of these have been changed out with no issues. The existing Maintenance procedure is clear enough to me. I imagine with this incident will be a revision in the procedure just like the ASB to check for how much thread is showing past the nut to draw attention to be sure is actually in safety.

As 212 man says a dupe ( duplicate inspection) might have helped to catch this to?

chw

19th Feb 2011, 22:54

twisted wrench,

May be a good pilot walk around would have would have catched it.:eek:

industry insider

20th Feb 2011, 01:06

It wasn't missed.

But because it was maintenance error, an order not to discuss it outside the company was issued by the operator under the threat of termination.

Brian Abraham

20th Feb 2011, 01:47

an order not to discuss it outside the company was issued by the operator under the threat of terminationYep. You wouldn't want any other crew around the world gaining any insight as to what the crew experienced, or how they handled a particularly butt clenching emergency. Well done to the crew.

212man

20th Feb 2011, 03:01

This is some of the content from the Sikorsky Safety Advisory (SSA) that came out for operators. I don't think it takes too much reading between the lines to see that there is no need for an AD! Good job by the crew :ok:

1. Introduction

An S-92 helicopter operator reported loss of tail rotor control in flight following replacement of the Tail Rotor Pitch Change Shaft. Inspection revealed that the pitch change shaft nut and washer were missing after the flight.

WARNING

When performing maintenance manual SA S92A-AMM-000 Task 64-22-01-900-002, Installation of Tail Rotor Pitch Beam Assembly, make certain that the procedure is performed in its entirety. Failure to follow all steps may lead to loss of the pitch change shaft nut and washer and may lead to loss of tail rotor control.

2. Corrective Action
To preclude loss of tail rotor control after maintenance of the Tail Rotor Pitch Change Shaft or Tail Rotor Pitch Beam Assembly, adhere to procedures in maintenance manual SA S92A-AMM-000 Task 64-22-01-900-002, Installation of Tail Rotor Pitch Beam Assembly.

It's a pity there is such secrecy by the operator though. Hopefully in due course some of the circumstances surrounding the error will be made public and can be incorporated into Engineering Human Factors courses etc. Similar examples would be the Bond AS332 high speed shaft misassembly (leading to overspeed and shutdown while doing a topping check with the other engine in idle!) a few years ago, and the BMI A320 mag plugs with missing oil seals (leading to total oil loss on both engines.) Both of these incidents feature heavily in human factors courses, and have lead to changes in practices that are designed to prevent re-occurrence.

[email protected]

20th Feb 2011, 06:58

Both of these incidents feature heavily in human factors courses, and have lead to changes in practices that are designed to prevent re-occurrence. yet they still keep happening and this time on a 21st century helicopter!

So what is not working?
Is it the fault of the designers who after making helos for many years still can't fool-proof critical systems from poor engineering practices?

Is it the fault of the documentation?

Is the the fault of the engineers who are not trained properly?

Is it the fault of the time-pressures brought by the management to get the engineering done asap?

Is it a fault of the operators for not paying decent wages to attract quality engineers?

Is it the fault of the aircrew who should be diligent and thorough on their walkrounds?

I suspect, like all incidents, there is a mixture of more than one fault (the old swiss cheese analogy) but whatever the reason, all the corporate knowledge, the 'lessons learned', the extra training in human factors and all the other mitigation measures have failed in this case - only the skill of the pilot stopped this being a fatal accident.

squib66

20th Feb 2011, 14:09

I agree with all who think the crew did an excellent job of making a safe landing out of an engineering failure.

Industry insider

because it was maintenance error, an order not to discuss it outside the company was issued by the operator under the threat of termination.

Is that really true? If so its a scandle and would be a sign that Air Log becoming Bristow USA was just a cynical and lzay rebranding not a sign of achieving high, uniform standards. I do hope however that the Bristow CEO discusses this in his keynote speech at CHC's safety conference next month which has the conference theme of Corporate Responsibility vs. Personal Accountability: Two sides of the same Coin.

chw

I think you will find the nut was missing after the flight not before, so not detectable on a walk around. The large nut is screwed onto the pitch change shaft and forces a splined ring to engage with shallow splines in the shaft. The nut is torqued to 183-202 ft-lbs (the variation allows the holes for the secondary locking screws to align). I believe that a possible assembly effor is to have the splines misaligned.

twisted wrench

The existing Maintenance procedure is clear enough to me.

Maybe it is but Sikorsky issued a massive change last week to the procedure for the tail rotor pitch beam assembly, TREV 64-10.

I've just been shown a copy and it has 20 changes and many new illustrations designed "to ensure proper component alignment".

Brian Abraham

20th Feb 2011, 14:36

BMI A320 mag plugs with missing oil seals (leading to total oil loss on both engines.) Both of these incidents feature heavily in human factors courses, and have lead to changes in practices that are designed to prevent re-occurrence.You have to wonder some times how you can manage to prevent re-occurrences.

On May 5, 1983, Eastern Air Lines Flight 855, a L-1011 registration N334EA, while flying from Miami to Nassau, shut down the #2 engine due to low oil pressure and began a return to Miami. Both of the remaining engines later failed. Without power, flight 855 descended from 13,000 to 4,000 feet (1,200 m) before the #2 engine was restarted and the aircraft landed in Miami without injuries. Incorrect engine maintenance had led to the loss of oil on all 3 engines. (seals not put on the mag plugs)

Lessons get lost and it's why the safety people will never be without a job, and accident investigators unfortunately.

squib66

22nd Feb 2011, 19:32

A photo that shows how difficult it would be to detect problems on a walkaround.

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3590/3616517089_bb287b7a0a_z.jpg

pasptoo

22nd Feb 2011, 21:29

missing bonding strap?

chw

23rd Feb 2011, 22:28

squib66

My apology to the flight crew regarding the walk around remark earlier (I know better):\ fantastic job landing the truck !:ok:

What I should have said is, we should may be go back to have the flight crew do a pre flight/daily inspection of the Rotor craft by climbing on to the airframe look under the cowlings etc and examining the parts on which worked has been carried out.

Years a go we use to have the crews do they're own daily inspections on the large offshore helicopters but than every one wanted to be like the airlines and the flight crews where more or less told to stay out of the hangar. In the long run this may disconnect the flight crew from the flying machine.

twisted wrench

24th Feb 2011, 12:36

CHW:
Hard to say if this would have helped or not having Pilots still do a more detailed walk around.

Would mean for this particular instance the maintenance stand would be needed to get close enough to the tail rotor to actually inspect it and possibly see it was not assembled correctly.

Was not normal in my past experience when pilots were doing a more
in-depth walk around to put a ladder or stand in place to check the tail rotors.

zalt

28th Feb 2011, 21:47

Thanks to 212man for posting this on the Cougar accident thread

Federal Register | Special Conditions: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-92A Helicopter; Installation of a Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) (http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/12/13/2010-31188/special-conditions-sikorsky-aircraft-corporation-model-s-92a-helicopter-installation-of-a-search-and#p-49)

Choice cuts

Intro
On July 30, 2007, Sikorsky applied for a change to Type Certificate (TC) No. R00024BO to install an optional SAR AFCS in the model S-92A helicopter.

But now, 3.5 years later
These special conditions were recently developed due to the intended function of the S-92A SAR AFCS not being completely defined until late in the certification program

So what features are not already in service with the UK Coast Guard?

Looking at the features of the AFCS I can't see anything that is not seen on other SAR helicopters.
The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes, an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled SAR functions include
(a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
(b) Ground speed hold.
(c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the navigation computer.
(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over which the helicopter has flown.
(e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
(f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the navigation computer.
(g) Monitor the preselected hover height with automatic increase in collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum height.

A sinister turn considering the MGB oil test failure just before certification of the S-92
Normally, in adopting special conditions, the FAA provides notice and an opportunity for comment before issuing the final special conditions. However, because the delivery date of the Sikorsky model S-92A helicopter is imminent, we find that it is impracticable to provide prior notice because a delay would be contrary to the public interest. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance.

maxwelg2

28th Feb 2011, 22:16

I'm assuming that the FAA has had a review of this occurrence:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Sikorsky%20S-92A,%20G-SARC%2002-11.pdf

Still other gremlins to be worked out IMO before this type is really good enough for SAR.

Safe flying

Max

500e

28th Feb 2011, 22:25

Is it the Autopilot problem?
Could not get link to load.
Thanks for new link MW have read it somewhere else, not a relaxing thing to hapen.

maxwelg2

28th Feb 2011, 22:28

Yep, try the AAIB link

Air Accidents Investigation: Sikorsky S-92A, G-SARC (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/february_2011/sikorsky_s_92a__g_sarc.cfm)

Max

maxwelg2

28th Feb 2011, 23:47

Link found on SAR-H thread, posted by Zalt recently.

Max

squib66

1st Mar 2011, 19:50

Its odd that Cougar claim (p2 below in a brochure that pre-dates there accident) to have 4-axis autopilot already.

IIRC, at the public inquiry after their accident it was said that the system was not certified and TC were waiting on the FAA.
http://www.cougar.ca/media/images/brochures/cougar-sar.pdf
Perhaps the urgency in Canada in delivering what was claimed to be in place is what is driving this.

Sikorsky seem to be well behind the competition though. The FAA Special Condition for similar capability on the EC225 went out for comment in November 2008!

TwoStep

24th Mar 2011, 12:07

Would I be right in thinking operators are still having to do the 10-hourly checks on the gearbox foot mount, and is there any update on when they will start retrofitting this new main transmission housing from the H-92 they announced a year ago?

SansAnhedral

24th Mar 2011, 17:41

The IDMGB is not finished. The H92/CH148 is flying with an interim S92A gearbox in Canada right now, likely incorporating the foot-crack-prone housing with 6-stud adapter filter bowl.

industry insider

25th Mar 2011, 03:38

Phase III MGB retrofit commencing April 2011. 1st one going onto production aircraft now. IDMGB should be ready in 2012.

squib66

27th Mar 2011, 13:56

It looks like there will be a vast range of modification states in service across the fleet for several years to come.

The Phase III housing due from this summer on still has the same 1400 hour life limit as the Phase II (i.e. just 8 or 9 months for a high usage S-92). Its installation needs a far bit of specialist work on fuselage frames at STA 328 and 361 as it is dependent on removing current bushes, drilling the frames and then installing larger press-fit bushes.

Next, in Q4 2011, come 'stronger' gears with a higher spec finish to reduce spalling damage. These will only be installed at overhaul.

Their benefit will be traded for an increase in aircraft gross weight. Time will tell what the affect of a weight increase on durability. Does any one know what Phase Housing will be a pre-requiste for the 27,700 lb gross weight?

After that is the Phase IV, or 'Improved Durability' housing (the IDMGB mentioned above). That will come in 2013, over 10 years after the original certification. Only one feature currently claimed for that unit is clearly a direct durability improvement as the others deal with known failure modes or detection problems:

Adding another means to scavange oil from the input modules to stop the build-up oil oil that caused problems in Brunei in 2008
Repostioned chip detectors
An 'integrated bypass valve' - which is seemingly different to the new bypass automation.
Stronger free wheel bearings - the one clear durability improvement
There is no talk yet of anything that would address the TSB recommendations after the Cougar accident.

At Heli-Expo there was also talk of a new filter insert this year to tackle the problem the current filter has coping with normal spec oil.

Has anyone got the automatic oil cooler bypass installed yet?

rotorknight

27th Mar 2011, 16:32

I just can´t wait for an increase in max gross weight,since it already is the smoothest helicopter on the market :ugh::{:yuk:,

Maybe they can even come with a modification for the airco/vent system,so that we get some increase in noise as well

maxwelg2

27th Mar 2011, 17:13

Here's a really radical idea...why don't SAC just take back all the S92s and give their customers nice shiny new Blackhawks in a civvie format?

And while they're at it they can give us an update on how that new teleporter system is going...beam me up Scotty...

I have a new name for the S92, it's the Elvis chopper, at least he did his shake rattle and rolling in style..."and it's one for the money, two to get ready, three to start the engines and go go go..."

I give up on this a/c, taking too long to fix what IMO is a relatively simple MRGB swap-out albeit with controlled modifications. I continue to fly in this a/c with the view that big oil doesn't give a :mad: as long as they don't fall out of the sky too often..calculated risk and loss management come to mind here, and we're the shmucks who have to accept it. What else can explain the tardiness in addressing the inherent design issues still present and by now well documented.:ugh:

Safe flying (or is that shake rattle and rolling)

Max

500e

27th Mar 2011, 17:19

I can see you drivers are going to have to turn up early to check which mod you have, then check to see if SLP are happy to fly under it. :E more to the point are you? still no mention regarding the 30 min RD I suppose ?

industry insider

27th Mar 2011, 23:52

Max

Occasionally, some of your posts have almost asked some sensible questions. This last one does you no credit, it is frivolous.

You are becoming quite an expert. Of course, its just a simple MGB swap out. Can't think why Sikorsky is making it so complicated, can you? You imply that no one is working on MGB safety improvements - wrong.

If the corrective actions are so glaringly simple, then why not email the company directly and suggest a more rapid implementation strategy or a new MGB design?

maxwelg2

28th Mar 2011, 00:14

II

My response is simple, I'm not an aviation expert, just a frustrated PAX with how long this process is taking to move things forward. Anybody with common sense can see what the issue is and the obvious way forward.

As for being friviolous i.e. unworthy of serious attention, well that's your opinion and you're entitled to it just as I am to mine. In the cold light of day we are all frivilous unless directly involved with actually fixing the issue.

You obviously missed the point I was making i.e. is this just an issue that is unworthy of serious attention, because at the progress rate to date and lack of clarity on the root cause for the MRGB cracking I would have to assume that SAC are not doing their product's reputation any good whatsoever. They may well be working diligently behind the scenes but I've been patiently waiting to see the outcome. Based on the latest future MRGB release dates and our immediate need for the upgraded MRGB I personally am extremely disappointed. We are over 2 years now from 491, coming up on 4 years since Broome, more than 9 years since SAC knew that the MRGB couldn't last more than 11 minutes.

So tell me then how is that progress?

I'm sure an e-mail from myself to SAC will have about as much effect as posting on this forum appears to have i.e. zero. I'll leave that to the industry experts and insiders to deal with and patiently wait with the rest of us for a positive way forward.

Safe flying

Max

Dan Reno

28th Mar 2011, 01:23

If you're relegated to riding in the back of most any flying contraption, perhaps your best frame of mind should be from the "Ignorance is bliss" perspective. Becoming intimately aware of the details of how you stay aloft will only destine you to be eternally "Whistling in the dark past the graveyard"' when flying.

Imagine pilots in combat losing one friend after another. Some actually do go cuckoo worrying about the aircraft's abilities AND whether there's a bullet speeding up from below with their name on it. Now then, they deserve the right to be concerned.

If your chosen career includes riding in helos that make you worry then perhaps another way to pay the light bill is called for.

For what it's worth, I can tell you from past experiences with SAC that they do have the very best folks working this issue and they certainly wouldn't allow the S-92 aloft if it wasn't safe.

500e

28th Mar 2011, 09:59

The problem stems from obfuscation, SAC using the small print to move the goal posts, then when it is found that move was suspect, not telling operators (as far as we know) the whole story, & as time goes on & further problems arise people will draw their own conclusions.
I suggest you read MWs paragraph again

"You obviously missed the point I was making i.e. is this just an issue that is unworthy of serious attention, because at the progress rate to date and lack of clarity on the root cause for the MRGB cracking I would have to assume that SAC are not doing their product's reputation any good whatsoever. They may well be working diligently behind the scenes but I've been patiently waiting to see the outcome. Based on the latest future MRGB release dates and our immediate need for the upgraded MRGB I personally am extremely disappointed. We are over 2 years now from 491, coming up on 4 years since Broome, more than 9 years since SAC knew that the MRGB couldn't last more than 11 minutes."

maxwelg2

28th Mar 2011, 13:18

Dan, appreciate your feedback and I completely understand where you're coming from, however IMHO the more information and clarity the better. It's not like flying in a plane where the general populace doesn't really know what the risks are. In that specific case it's all down to statistics and media to inform et al the percieved risk involved. How many ASBs and ADs are in effect on civilian a/c, a lot more than most people realise.

We have different rules when it comes to the workplace. Everybody likes to believe that when we go to work we'll come home safe and in one piece. People deserve to know what risk factors are involved, oil companies are legally responsible to do that and make their industry as safe as reasonably practicable, and that includes all the equipment that they use in order to operate.

Working in the oil industry has been my chosen career for nearly 20 years now, never had any real concerns about a/c type until the S92. As we advance technology you would think that we would make this industry safer, not the opposite. People make mistakes, it's learning from them that's key. As a minimum that should have occured after Broome.

I'll continue flying fully aware of the inherent risks with my chosen vocation, that's not the issue, it's the painfully slow response to addresss the S92's well-documented issues that's infuriating. If the MRGB feet cracks, run-dry time capability and inherent vibration/noise issues are resolved with this type we may actually have moved forward to a better a/c for offshore use. Until then I'm still not convinced that this is the most suitable a/c for our current working environment over here in the Grand Banks. As we further develop the oil industry into the Flemish Pass and further east in the Southern Grand Banks we're going to be asking even more from the bus. I just hope that we've moved on from the current situation before then...this could be a major limiting factor in how far we can grow this industry.

An old Texan once told me "it's the squeaky wheel that gets the oil" so I guess I'm just squeaking away here until I see progress.

Safe flying

Max

NoBiggie

28th Mar 2011, 19:55

Max,
An old Texan once told me "it's the squeaky wheel that gets the oil" so I guess I'm just squeaking away here until I see progress.

Another old Texan completed that thought . . .

"it's the squeaky wheel that gets the oil" "or replaced".

However, you're unlikely to be replaced.

I have no comment on SAC's situation except that it would seem frustration is appropriate.

industry insider

13th Apr 2011, 13:59

The Sumburgh Refueller who heard it from the Scatsta Refueller says that Bristow S-92 G-IACC has had a hard / heavy landing after an lifting off unintentionally? Aircraft has frame damage and dynamics will have to be removed and overhauled. Anyone know more?

rotordude

13th Apr 2011, 14:11

I guess that explains why there is an 92 + crew from Bristow Norway over there right now.

malabo

13th Apr 2011, 14:37

heavy landing after an lifting off unintentionally

How do you "lift off unintentionally". Even with the throttles at flight somebody has to lift up on the collective. Were there any pilots on board or had the engineers started it up and then walked out of the cockpit? Did this happen on a rig (massive gust from a Nigerian microburst) or back at the airport?

Don't think we can blame it on the MGB, maybe should be another thread.

industry insider

13th Apr 2011, 15:16

Not sure what happened exactly Malabo but the occurrence itself has been confirmed.

I don't know how you unintentionally lift off but someone nearly did it to me in an S-76 one day grabbing the collective in lieu of the parking brake. Even so, landing normally shouldn't be too hard.

Maybe someone else will have some more news soon.

Variable Load

13th Apr 2011, 15:41

grabbing the collective in lieu of the parking brake

You hit the proverbial nail on the head ;)

coning angel

13th Apr 2011, 15:49

Sumburgh S92, Bristow, incorrect application of collective, pulled up inadvertently when applying parking brake, collective released, aircraft had gotten airborne, slammed down and did untold damage. Write off? From the story I heard last night, they were lucky!

squib66

13th Apr 2011, 18:07

Are AAIB involved?

I do seem to remember a story from EC that there had been a vaguely similar incident on a EC225 a few years ago albeit control was regained while still inadvertantly airborne.

Horror box

13th Apr 2011, 18:26

incorrect application of collective, pulled up inadvertently when applying parking brake

Most definitely not the first time on the S92 (or many other types). I know of at least a couple of other similar incidents on the S92, although they were considerably more benign than this incident, but largely due to luck and good fortune. Procedures in place have in a large part prevented it happening again, whereby the co-pilot is required to cover the collective at the same time as the captain pulls the parking brake lever. This was certainly my immediate assumption of the cause when i first heard of it, so I am not surprised if this is confirmed. Perhaps new procedures or a modification or two is required. Even with good procedures in place it can still happen. Distraction, stress, tiredness, unusual or unexpected situations arise and the procedure is easily omitted, and mistakes are made. Just confirms the old theory that if "**** can happen, at some point, it will". It could probably happen to any one of us given the right set of circumstances. Perhaps a simple guarded brake lever would help, or moving the brake lever altogether.

squib66

13th Apr 2011, 19:06

From the FM:

The PARKING BRAKE handle is located to the right of the center console. This hand-operated handle allows brakes to be locked by either the pilot or copilot after brake pressure is applied. The parking brakes are applied by pressing the toe brake pedals, pulling the parking brake handle to the fully extended position, and then releasing the toe brakes while holding the handle up. An advisory illuminates indicating on. Pressing either the pilot’s or copilot’s left brake pedal releases the parking brakes; the handle returns to the retracted position and the advisory extinguishes.

Horror box

13th Apr 2011, 19:28

Sorry to ask Sqib, but what is your point?

squib66

13th Apr 2011, 19:47

Do I need a point beyond providing a factual extract connected to one aspect of the discussion?

Horror box

13th Apr 2011, 19:54

Nope of course not. I was just wondering if I was having a slow moment and missed something and it triggered some more thought in my shell. It is worth pointing out at this point, that whilst the RFM does state that the parking brake can be operated by either pilot, reality states that it is simply not very practical nor easy to do so from the left hand seat due to the ergonomics of the cockpit in that unless you are blessed with the arms of an ape, it is quite a stretch. I believe many operators have recommended that it is only done from the right hand seat to prevent possible back injury due to the left hand seat pilot having to stretch over and pull the lever up.

zalt

24th Apr 2011, 03:45

Is the automated bypass system now in use?

Scheduled Flight Turnaround Incident April 14, 2011

Suncor has notified the C-NLOPB of a scheduled flight that turned around this morning. It was a shared flight between the Terra Nova FPSO and the MODU Henry Goodrich. The flight was approximately 86 miles offshore when they received a Main Gearbox oil by-pass indicator light. It was intermittent, however the decision was made to turnaround. They did not declare an emergency. The flight arrived at 10:15 a.m. and the passengers were briefed. The Board is following up on the incident with the Operator.

212man

25th Apr 2011, 01:49

No it is not fitted yet. There are two likely explanations: one, it is a misquote and was - perhaps - the ENG OIL BYPASS caution which refers to the engine oil filter bypass functioning (due to clogging etc.) Two, perhaps there was a fault in the MGB Oil Bypass system sensor or the test function.

The first choice would be my bet.....

squib66

27th Apr 2011, 17:01

Maybe, but the last I was told is that the automated bypass would be certified Q2, so it might just be one of the first.

zalt

29th Apr 2011, 21:01

Since then more problems for Cougar, this time with faulty engine anti-icing causing abandonded flights.

Horror box

30th Apr 2011, 09:19

Since then more problems for Cougar, this time with faulty engine anti-icing causing abandonded flights.

Hardly interesting news there. Just more random reporting of very uneventful irrelevant events by those who are hellbent on making drama. Go and find out about every minor caution on a Puma, 365, 139, 155 to find some sort of perspective. Our reporting system shows vastly more reportable events and incidents involving system malfunctions with those types than with the S92, and I mean a huge difference. Every helicopter has technical faults, and this is hardly a big problem. The system operates with in built redundancy and fail safe logic anyway, so if it fails you still have protection. If we are referring to engine anti-icing protection, then it consists of two systems - bleed air and electrical inlet heater mats. Operated using the same switch, but separate systems. If the heater mat fails, you still have bleed air feeding the inlet guide vanes. Heater mats can obviously fail, and is not fail safe, but the bleed air system, if it fails, the valve will be in the open position, so still providing protection. Not a particularly common failure in the 92 in my experience, but does happen and generally very quickly fixed. If either system fails, a warning is generated and the aircraft will be required to vacate icing conditions, and not fly again in icing until fixed, as redundancy and double protection is now lost. Not something I would lose any sleep over.

Shell Management

30th Apr 2011, 13:43

I agree the S-92 is a leap forward in technology.:)

But it pays to study ever technical malfunction in order to reduce risks to ALARP.:=

It also pays to study human errors too.;)

I see no one wants to discuss the S-92 parking break anymore.:E

The Sultan

30th Apr 2011, 17:27

Horror box

30th Apr 2011, 19:16

It has been widely reported on this thread that the S-92 vibration levels are not anything to brag about. How does the 92 handle icing conditions? Barely noticable, tolerable, or wish I was somewhere else?

In my experience, based on comparison with several other types - very well indeed. The most direct comparison I can relate to is the Puma L/L1, which had a limited icing clearance. The S92 is considerably more comfortable. With the RIPS on and functioning (which is now pretty reliable), I feel a lot more comfortable in icing conditions than I have whilst flying other types. I fly regularly in a varying degrees of icing conditions, and even in heavy icing the aircraft copes well. In heavy icing, it is noticeable but not desperately uncomfortable and I don't notice the pax waking up. There is a noticeable increase in vibration as the ice is allowed to build and a torque increase, then as the ice is shed in accordance to the calculated schedule the vibration reduces. This pattern basically continues to varying degrees depending on the level of icing. The most recent versions are reliable and work well. The ice detection is in general a good indication, but can be over-ridden if necessary. I have often landed and seen how much ice is stuck on the airframe and been pleasantly surprised at how well the machine faired and how relatively comfortable it was in flight.
Some recent studies have also been done to see how well things work without the RIPS, in order to provide some limited clearance in the event of failure. Although nothing has been officially produced in terms of results, early indications from those who flew the tests were positive indicating that it still performed pretty well.

ScotiaQ

30th Apr 2011, 21:30

It is interesting that the S92 now has Pilots pulling up the collective lever in lieu of the parking brake lever.

I say it is interesting in that this happened on the S76 in the Company for which I worked but much later in its operating life.

They were called "action slips" and what happened was that the Co-pilot reached over to select the parking brake on but actually grabbed a handful of collective. To my knowledge this happened twice in our Company and both times the helicopter got airborne and some damage was caused with the subsequent heavy landing but the bizarre aspect was that we had been operating the aircraft for some10 years before it happened at all.:(

I'm an engineer so fail to see why this should happen?

Our pilots of course wanted modifications of some kind to ensure that it couldn't happen again - what about root cause and our new Safety Management Systems? That was the route we took at the time but Pilots weren't happy - worrying that someone would do it again !!:=

212man

1st May 2011, 01:20

We have the LHS pilot guard the collective while the RHS pilot applies the brake, and have done so since we started operating this type, based on knowledge of similar S76 incidents. Perhaps this operator had the same policy but the guarding in this case was a token effort that couldn't overcome the rate and force of the application? They certainly have this policy on their S76 fleet. I agree, though, that it's not the best place for it and suggest that the centre rear of the lower console might have been a better choice.

C.C.C.

1st May 2011, 15:27

This is not the first helicopter type to get airborne inadvertently (happened on the EC225, which has a collective lock, the S76 as already mentioned, and even the Bell 212 which does not have a parking brake!).

The S92A Rotor Head is fitted with elastomeric bearings. Without hydraulic pressure the collective will rest in a mid-range position. Despite a Note in the RFM this has not prevented the helicopter 'jumping the chocks' during single pilot engaged rotor ground runs by several S92A operators, until the appropriate SMS training corrected the error of not lowering the collective as hydraulic pressure builds.

Thus a collective lock cannot be fitted to the S92A.

The operator did not have a policy of covering the collective lever whilst applying the Parking Brake on the S92A, and following this incident a Global Standard has now been adopted on all helicopter types.
From the story I heard last night, they were lucky! You were obviously told the story 'send three and four pence we're going to a dance'. The actual story was 'Send re-enforcements we're going to advance'

Shell Management

2nd May 2011, 11:42

It is great that the BSP Aviation Safety Case identified the need to take the remedial action of extra procedures.:D

I would have hoped that SAI would have ordered a change in the design and contractually required the same approach with all their contractors.:(

SansAnhedral

17th May 2011, 16:00

Google Oversetter (http://translate.google.no/translate?js=n&prev=_t&hl=no&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&sl=no&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aftenbladet.no%2Fenergi%2FHelikopter-med-motorproblemer-landet-trygt-2808440.html&act=url)

S-92 + (engine) Oil

widgeon

17th May 2011, 23:17

Well is it any surprise they had issues with oil if they were flying to the sun. I am sure Sikorsky will claim that the helicopter was not designed for such extreme temperatures :O

rotormatic

18th May 2011, 02:29

Another oil issue listed as a proposed AD:

Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company CT7-8, CT7-8A, CT7-8A1, CT7-8E, and CT7-8F5 Turboshaft Engines

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD would require the installation of an accessory gearbox (AGB) axis-A oil slinger nut to the axis-A shaft assembly. This proposed AD was prompted by four reports of unrecoverable engine stalls, during hover in a left-roll attitude. We are proposing this AD to prevent an unrecoverable engine stall, leading to a helicopter forced landing or accident.

General Electric Company CT7-8, CT7-8A, CT7-8A1, (http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgADNPRM.nsf/0/850DB2735D47A2FC86257884005593A9?OpenDocument)

Aser

19th May 2011, 17:50

Sikorsky Aircraft Delivers Three VVIP S-92 Helicopters to Royal Thai Air Force | Vertical - Helicopter News (http://www.verticalmag.com/control/news/templates/?a=16954)

http://ww.bangkokpost.com/media/content/2011/04/18/CF0DE05C2E2742D7957FB4E780571FCE.jpg

What's that on the nose? some kind of nightsun/EVS/flir ?

Regards
Aser

helisdw

19th May 2011, 22:31

Aser,

Could it be a laser wire/obstacle detection system?

Interestingly, there doesn't appear to be wire strike protection fitted (although I'm not sure if the S92 can be equipped with this option).

Simon

ironchefflay

20th May 2011, 03:14

never seen wirestrike equipment fitted but is part of the 50hr check to look at it or 'N/A if not fitted'

Ian Corrigible

20th May 2011, 04:55

helisdw is correct, it's the EADS HELLAS (HELicopter LASer Radar) (http://www.fairchild-controls.com/products/hellas-awareness.php) system already fitted to the RTAF's 412EPs.

http://www.deagel.com/library1/medium/m02010042800001.jpg

I/C

SansAnhedral

20th May 2011, 21:22

CH-148 has wirestrike protection for the FLIR

http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/navy_images/cms_images/news_photos/CycloneArrival-10_l.jpg

Jack Carson

20th May 2011, 23:12

It appears as if only parts of the WASP kit were in stalled on this aircraft. In addition to the lower cutter, there should be ramps near the base of the wind screen wipers and a cutter on the upper cowling to protect the rotor parts. In addition, there may be a requirement for additional structure between the windscreen posts left and right of the windscreen center panel.

Dan Reno

20th May 2011, 23:33

Yes, it appears so Jack as they also still have the blade droop 'indicators' on the rescue hook assembly.

The Sultan

21st May 2011, 18:35

Heli-One reports the operating cost of an S-92 at $10K per flight hour for commercial aircraft. At $100+million what is the operating costs of the Canadian military version?

The Sultan

industry insider

22nd May 2011, 01:52

Sultan

That must be an all inclusive rate with crew, capital cost, insurance, hangar, overheads etc.

The actual Nose to Tail Total Assurance Program (TAP) hourly rate for a civil S-92 is less than one quarter of that.

SansAnhedral

23rd May 2011, 15:12

In addition, I wonder how much it will cost and who will be footing the bill to replace all the MGBs out of the "interim" CH148s with the IDMGB whenever they finally manage to finish it

...and hopefully before then definitively determine the root cause of the foot cracking issue so as not to continue that problem with the new casting.

industry insider

24th May 2011, 00:14

Sans

Sikorsky has so far and I understand will continue to foot the bill for all replacement MGB and other product improvements (not options) for the S-92.

212man

24th May 2011, 00:38

and other product improvements (not options)

Like the 100 kts wipers oh, no - my mistake ;)

SansAnhedral

26th May 2011, 19:12

Well I think this has officially surpassed ridiculous

Canada reveals new delay for interim CH-148 delivery (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/05/26/357265/canada-reveals-new-delay-for-interim-ch-148-delivery.html)

Canada's top defence official said on 26 May that Sikorsky has delayed formal delivery of the first of six interim CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters to the third quarter.
The new timetable marks the latest in a long series of delays since Sikorsky was awarded the contract in 2004 to deliver 28 military derivatives of the S-92 under the maritime helicopter programme (MHP).
The original contract called for first delivery in 2009, but Canada last year agreed to accept the first six aircraft with an "interim" capability in November 2010. That schedule was further delayed to the first half of 2011.
It appeared that Sikorsky had met its obligation when the first CH-148 arrived on 13 May at Shearwater, Nova Scotia. But the aircraft has not been formally delivered because Sikorsky failed to meet all of the contractual delivery requirements, Minister of Defence Peter MacKay said in a statement.

Although the first CH-148 is now based with 12 Wing at Shearwater, the first aircraft will remain under Sikorsky's control until the contract is fulfilled, McKay said, adding that milestone is "expected later this summer". Sikorsky must clear a Canadian certification process for military airworthiness and conduct initial training for aircrew before formal delivery is declared, MacKay said.
"The arrival of this helicopter demonstrates progress with this project and brings us one step closer towards the delivery of a maritime helicopter capability," MacKay said.
It was not immediately clear when Sikorsky will deliver the five other interim helicopters, or the remaining 22 CH-148s with a full capability suite. As of last July, Sikorsky was required to deliver the CH-148s with full capability by June 2012.
The six interim helicopters are being delivered without some operational software, maximum engine power, full endurance and automated datalinks.

[email protected]

27th May 2011, 10:45

I guess the Sikorsky management must rue the day the MRGB failed its run-dry test and they decided not to redesign it, electing to push on with the 'extremely remote' fix instead - it must have cost them a fortune and badly tainted their reputation. Did anyone get fired?

squib66

2nd Jun 2011, 15:10

Crab

A few Haddon-Cave salmon letters are certainly in order me thinks.

Today there is yet another FAA AD on the S-92 Main Gear Box:

We are adopting a new AD for the Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters. This AD requires an NDI, eddy current or FPI, of each MGB upper housing assembly rib on the left, right, and forward MGB mounting foot for a crack because it cannot be detected visually.

This AD is prompted by a report of a crack found on the MGB upper housing assembly left mounting foot forward rib during removal of an MGB that had reached its life limit of 1,000 hours TIS.

The MGB mounting foot has a history of two types of cracks. The visual inspection for these two types of cracks is required in AD 2010-24-04 (75 FR 70812, November 19, 2010).

The discovery of a third type of crack on the left mounting foot forward rib may not be reliably detected by visual inspection.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

[email protected]

2nd Jun 2011, 16:47

And perhaps they also wish they had gone with a 5-bladed MR which seems to work so well on similar size helos produced by Sikorsky in the past;)

Although, given the cracks in the I-beams on the Sea King perhaps high levels of vibration and MRGB cracks are just a Sikorsky trademark

nimby

3rd Jun 2011, 11:00

... or perhaps the Canadians should have had the NSA/NSH, which would have meant delivery many years ago and several years of unexciting but effective service?

The Sultan

4th Jun 2011, 17:59

Industry Insider:

Heli-One was say operating cost (i.e. DOC) was 10K per flight hour. Now that we know from the latest AD that the transmission case is $500 dollars per hour that makes sense.

The Sultan

industry insider

5th Jun 2011, 04:36

Sultan

DOC? DMC? Which one do you mean?

They are very different as I am sure you know.

The Sultan

5th Jun 2011, 17:27

II

Where is the confusion. Heli-One says operating cost, not maintenance cost.

The Sultan

industry insider

6th Jun 2011, 04:16

Yes, I suppose if one includes all the costs it could be $10k per hour. It would vary depending on location I suppose but I wouldn't argue if they were using an average over all of their operations. It would be interesting to compare it against other large types.

rag it

6th Jun 2011, 04:22

I would be interested in what other operators of the same type quote as the operating cost. My guess would be that is is less than that quoted by Heli-1. This may have somethng to do with the loss/not winning of contracts by CHC.

Shell Management

6th Jun 2011, 05:29

Of course hourly rates can be misleading.:suspect:

If you compare an EC225 with an S-92 you need to compare mission performance as the 225 is faster and carries a larger payload over longer distances.:ok:

You also need to factor in the FOREX at the time of purchase.:sad:

Matthew Parsons

8th Jun 2011, 04:35

Does everyone really think the S92 is incredibly unsafe? Yes, the gearbox failed in the worst way. But that's fixed now, isn't it? Would you rather fly a sixty year old proven airframe over large distances of unwelcome ocean, or the S92? I'd pick the latter (provided the transmission is fixed).

With absolutely every airframe that's out there, the level of safety increasese with: how new the design is and how mature the airframe is. Level of safety decreases with: how old the design is and how old the airframe is. Truth is that there are growing pains to every design. Stuff that doesn't jump out of the blueprints or the flight test, but becomes obvious once the design gets used.

I know this has little to do with Nick getting a new job, but the 'spin' of the thread was that there was somehow something inherently wrong with the S92. Absolutely sucks that people lost lives to learn this (including a friend of mine) but lets try to be true to the facts and not label the aircraft nor the people involved inappropriately.

Matthew.

SansAnhedral

8th Jun 2011, 15:25

But that's fixed now, isn't it?

The cracking MGB feet? Nope. They are essentially stumped.

The ability for the aircraft to actually operate to certification without MGB oil? Nope. "Extremely remote".

The only things that have been "fixed" are the filter bowl mounting configuration and the filter bypass operation. Band-aids.

The IDMGB is in the works, but its not done, not deployed, and therefore the S92 is not even remotely "fixed". The interim CH148s in Canada dont even have the new box.

Id be willing to bet that Nick will not be working on programs like the S92 moving forward.

Hedge36

8th Jun 2011, 19:11

Does everyone really think the S92 is incredibly unsafe?

Incredibly? No. But you have to admit, the current Achilles heel is a biggie.

Would you rather fly a sixty year old proven airframe over large distances of unwelcome ocean, or the S92?

I'm former Navy. All of our airframes were older than me by far - sometimes it's better to live with the devil you know.

That said, "extremely remote" applies to most of the potential failure items on pretty much any airframe. You takes your chances.

zalt

11th Jun 2011, 20:29

You takes your chances.
A decision was made after the gear box test failed but not by the 17 people who died.

EN48

11th Jun 2011, 21:34

You takes your chances.

Aircraft are designed by humans and humans dont always grasp the implications of their design choices (and the tradeoffs inherrent in these choices). All new aircraft designs have flaws and the only way to discover some of these flaws is by accumulating operating experience. As pilots and passengers, we knowingly (or not) accept the risk that this entails. We hope that these flaws are discovered and corrected before they cause serious accidents, but history is replete with examples where this was not the case. To name a few: Comet, B737, DC-10, ATR 72, Airbus A330. These all resulted in significantly greater losses of life. Avoidable? Maybe, maybe not.

zalt

12th Jun 2011, 20:56

I hadn't realised that in the cases of the "Comet, B737, DC-10, ATR 72, Airbus A330", that each aircraft catestrophically failed a critical certification test just like the S-92, and that the OEM agreed with the certifying agency that they could ignore the failure mode because it probably wouln't happen so the aircraft were allowed to enter service anyway.

Or perhaps your hindsight is rose tinted.

EN48

12th Jun 2011, 21:06

I hadn't realised that in the cases of the "Comet, B737, DC-10, ATR 72, Airbus A330", that each aircraft catestrophically failed a critical certification test

Did you notice this? ...

Aircraft are designed by humans and humans dont always grasp the implications of their design choices (and the tradeoffs inherrent in these choices).

Read it again. Hindsight is wonderful isnt it?

zalt

12th Jun 2011, 21:17

There was no need for hindsight in this case.

In fact I suggest reading the TSB report again:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada - AVIATION REPORTS - 2009 - A09A0016 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2009/a09a0016/a09a0016.asp)

The S-92's gearbox failed dramatically during as loss of oil test in August 2002 - 6 1/2 years before it failed in Canada due to loss of oil... and the studs themselves had failed in Broome in July 2008 too.

If that was a failure of foresight it was a far more fundamental failure of technical competence and professional judgement.

Alternatively if it was a calculated choice, then there is a significant moral and ethical dimension.

EN48

12th Jun 2011, 21:27

If that was a failure of foresight it was a far more fundamental failure of technical competence and professional judgement.

Sad as the consequences of this event were, this happens all the time in almost every human endeavor involving complex technology. Almost always requires a tragic event to get on the path to doing it right.

Alternatively if it was a calculated choice, then there is a significant moral and ethical dimension.

Agree if those that made the choice KNEW that there was a significant likelihood of disaster. Hard to imagine that the culture at Sikorsky would encourage such reckless decision making, as the implications for the company are hugely negative. But, nevertheless, a possibility.

HeliComparator

12th Jun 2011, 22:30

Does everyone really think the S92 is incredibly unsafe?
No, just not as safe as all the launch hype made it out to be. Perhaps it was just desserts for trying to bolster sales by rubbishing the opposition? (but at the expense of innocent parties very unfortunately)
HC
Edited to add: some mod action going on here, hence slight non-sequeter

js0987

13th Jun 2011, 12:17

Foresight. As I recall, after the Broome incident, Sikorsky called for the titanium studs to be replaced by steel within 12 months. In hindsight, should have seen it coming; why wait.

Foresight. Bond's 332L transmission has a chip light. Clean it, flush it, run it and back to the line. A procedure done countless times was insufficient in this case. Should maintenance/manufacturer have seen it coming? In hindsight - yes.

Ironically, the spirited back and forth on this thread about which of the two big offshore helicopters was better, revolved largely around the transmissions. In both cases each had a catastrophic failure.

Dan Reno

21st Jun 2011, 13:49

Availability Rates for Sikorsky S-92® Offshore Fleet

Top 90% for Three Years in a Row

Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.

June 21, 2011 6:39am EDT

PARIS, June 21, 2011 — /PRNewswire/ -- Sikorsky's S-92® helicopter achieved an average availability rate of 96% for the offshore oil operators' fleet during the month of April, demonstrating a trend over the last few years that the aircraft are increasingly reliable for customers worldwide. Sikorsky is a subsidiary of United Technologies Corp. (NYSE: UTX).
(Photo: http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20110621/NE23251 (http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20110621/NE23251) )
(Logo: http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20080904/NETH086LOGO (http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20080904/NETH086LOGO) )
The S-92 offshore fleet has flown more than 290,000 flight hours, with 83 aircraft in the offshore mission. The April 2011 milestone in offshore aircraft availability was reached after a steady increase in aircraft availability from 92% in 2009 to 94% in 2010.
"It is clear that the S-92 helicopter continues to operate at high levels of performance and capability," said David Adler, president, Sikorsky Aerospace Services (SAS). "Sikorsky places a high value on providing exemplary customer service, and it is the combination of capability, service and customer insight with which they fly and maintain the aircraft."
The improvement in availability is due to a combination of customer support initiatives by Helicopter Support Inc. (HSI), a division of Sikorsky Aerospace Services, to balance spare parts inventory levels geographically, improve repair turnaround times, and expedite parts around the world to minimize customer downtime. In addition, Sikorsky has continued to offer product improvements to prolong component time in service. These product improvements have the added benefit of reducing customer maintenance cost per flight hour. Partnerships with offshore operators to provide specific operational performance data have enabled this availability increase.
"The S-92 helicopter program has a strong focus on reliability improvement, which has resulted in more than 20 projects certified in 2010 designed to expand mission capability and increase aircraft availability," said Spencer Elani, S-92 helicopter program manager.
S-92 helicopters perform search and rescue (SAR) mission as well as a variety of transportation missions for VIPs including Heads of State, offshore oil and gas crews, utility and airline passengers. The worldwide fleet of 137 S-92 helicopters has accumulated more than 320,000 flight hours since deliveries began in 2004.
Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., based in Stratford, Conn., USA, is a world leader in helicopter design, manufacture, and service. United Technologies Corp., based in Hartford, Conn., USA, provides a broad range of high technology products and support services to the aerospace and building systems industries.
Please visit www.utcaero.com (http://www.utcaero.com/) for Sikorsky and United Technologies news at the Paris Air Show 2011.

Read more: Availability Rates for Sikorsky S-92® Offshore Fleet - PR News Wire | Centre Daily Times - State College, PA | Penn State, Nittany Lions, weather, news, jobs, homes, apartments, real estate (http://www.centredaily.com/2011/06/21/2789311/availability-rates-for-sikorsky.html#ixzz1PuzG3c4B)

rotorknight

21st Jun 2011, 16:09

If the above advertisement for Sikorsky is supposed to impress me......,well it does not.
It is still the noisiest,most vibrating helicopter I flew,and almost nothing has changed in that department over the last 5 years :{

Dan Reno

21st Jun 2011, 18:20

I've never rode in a S-92 and wonder what the owners, versus the passengers, versus the pilots also think about its vibration and noise levels and if they were within the advertised ranges.

I'd guess the owners are delighted with the availability numbers since I don't believe those levels have ever been attained by any other airframe.

"Anybody...anybody...anybody?"

ramblingrotors

21st Jun 2011, 18:43

Only when the RTB were not done properly they are rough.

henra

21st Jun 2011, 20:52

@Dan Reno:
Looking at your constant praising of Sikorsky products and bashing of any compeptitors across the board from Bell to EC I have to ask bluntly:
Are you professionally linked to Sikorsky Aircraft´or its parent company?

Please note: That would be nothing to be embarassed about, it would just put things a bit into perspective.

The Sultan

21st Jun 2011, 21:01

Rambling,

RT&B does not impact 4/rev levels. The problem with the 92 is too long a blade, too high an rpm, etc. RT&B does not cause vibration hammers to fatique off the wall and start pounding their way into the fuel cells.

The Sultan

The Sultan

21st Jun 2011, 21:08

Availability is based upon ships posted to the line. The 96% only means 1 in 25 did not meet its mission. Does not tell you how many are sitting in the hanger getting transmission cases replace, oil filters changed, tail rotors overhauls, etc..

Note: Availability of the Cyclone at Paris is 0%.

The Sultan

Jack Carson

21st Jun 2011, 21:28

The Sultan is correct! More simply put the S-92A is short on rotor. It has been said before on this forum, “the S-92 was proposed as a growth S-70.” As the weight grew the rotor did not follow in proportion. As the gross weight grew form 22,220 lbs in 1993 to its present weight of more than 27,000 lbs. (21.5%) the rotor diameter was increased 2.66 ft. and the rotor speed was increased from 258 to 271 rpm. These fixes were aimed to expedite the fielding of the machine, but may have resulted in some of the present issues.

Dan Reno

21st Jun 2011, 22:27

henra asked:

"Are you professionally linked to Sikorsky Aircraft´or its parent company?"

No, I'm retired.

Dan Reno

21st Jun 2011, 22:28

Jack,

Would the 5th blade I've heard mentioned here resolve any of these problems?

Jack Carson

21st Jun 2011, 22:40

Dan,
I have to fall back on the CH-53A as a basic design point. It was designed as a 33,000 lb. machine with a six bladed 72 ft. diameter rotor. Anyone with experience in one of these machines will admit that it was fine aircraft. That combination resulted in a fast smooth machine with an abundance of growth potential. Using similar criteria for the S-92, I believe that a five or six bladed system with a rotor diameter similar to the S-61 would be a great starting point.

industry insider

22nd Jun 2011, 02:18

Sultan

Please clarify the Ch-148's availabilty % ? It is not actually meant to be flying so how can you calculate an availabilty rate?

Regarding wider S-92 availability, it is really dependend on how you count it. My company counts all unscheduled events in availability figures, so, an unscheduled MGB change for whatever reason would be counted in the availability statistics which in turn are reported to Sikorsky. Scheduled (1500 hour) inspections are not counted as they are predictable events.

Lonewolf_50

23rd Jun 2011, 15:43

Dan, should I understand your response to henra's question as meaning that you are retired from working at Sikorsky (or a UTC company)?

There is absolutely nothing wrong with loyalty if one had a good experience with a company. For that matter, there is nothing wrong with speaking well of Sikorsky, given how successful many Sikorsky helicopters are.

(UH-60M seems to be following in footsteps very nicely! :ok: )

zalt

8th Aug 2011, 16:30

Can any one comment on this?

Cougar helicopter cleared after offshore incident - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2011/07/25/nl-cougar-helicopter-altitude-change-725.html)

I've been told it has been treated as significant enougth to report to TSB.

Passengers on a Cougar helicopter got a rougher ride than they wanted last Saturday.

Soon after taking off from the SeaRose Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading (FPSO) facility the helicopter experienced an unplanned increase in pitch and altitude, followed by a decrease in altitude, Husky Energy told the Canada Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.

The helicopter crew was able to stabilize the aircraft into a steady hover, after which they performed equipment checks before continuing their flight to St. John's.

The helicopter arrived in St. John's without further problems. It has since been checked over and returned to service.

Husky Technical Advisors are monitory Cougar's investigation into the incident.

Paddyviking

9th Aug 2011, 09:45

Hi Brian
As part of prelift checks we check "AFCS" mode so it's
unlikely but not impossible
more likely AVC has dropped offline --- sometimes happens :eek:

The question of adding a 5th or 6th blade comes up now and again
can anybody tell me why it seems to be so hard or impossible for Sikorsky to come to the same conclusion :ugh:

With the introduction in of Phase 3 gearboxes
any results/feedback come in yet ?

PV

212man

9th Aug 2011, 09:55

The AFCS is left ON throughout as it's uses WoW logic to change its status. So shouldn't be an issue. As for the AVC, can't see why that would result in drama - although it plays up, it always tells you!

500e

9th Aug 2011, 11:31

There seem to be a lot of niggles!! is this aregulatory failure, most of these faults should have been sorted before certification.

"As for the AVC, can't see why that would result in drama - although it plays up, it always tells you!

If the above advertisement for Sikorsky is supposed to impress me......,well it does not.
It is still the noisiest,most vibrating helicopter I flew,and almost nothing has changed in that department over the last 5 years http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/boohoo.gif

RT&B does not impact 4/rev levels. The problem with the 92 is too long a blade, too high an rpm, etc. RT&B does not cause vibration hammers to fatigue off the wall and start pounding their way into the fuel cells."

Gear box
Oil filter

SansAnhedral

9th Aug 2011, 13:27

You will probably see the 5-bladed S-92B or something to that effect up for the rebid on VXX. The design has been under development for years.

Where do we suppose all the CH-148 contract extension dollars were going?

I also heard rumors that there is a serious cabin-beefing mod design for the 92 in work, chasing the load path from the XMSN all the way down back through the station frames with external straps and whatnot.

I guess the cracking isnt limited to the gearbox feet and has made its way into the airframe as well if they really are going through something this involved.

maxwelg2

11th Aug 2011, 21:34

There seem to be a lot of niggles!! is this aregulatory failure, most of these faults should have been sorted before certification

Perhaps some synergy to the G-SARC Harris Hills scenario that occurred July 2010. Niggle/pilot error/design issue with the S-92A? You choose...

Note that in the NL case the A/C was returned to service the next day. I've heard that the pilots remain suspended pending a TSB investigation.

Link to AAIB report below.

Air Accidents Investigation: Sikorsky S-92A, G-SARC (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/february_2011/sikorsky_s_92a__g_sarc.cfm)

Safe flying

Max

zalt

23rd Aug 2011, 22:48

SansA

Could the external straps not just be a response to proposed upping of the max gross weight? EC did something similar with the 225.

Sea Rose Incident

Is it correct he CFD will not couple in roll or pitch if selected at below 50 kts?

I've heard that at least one of the crew is no longer with Cougar. I hope this is not true, but if so this brings the following from the TSB report into their 2009 crash into question.

Cougar Helicopters promotes a non-punitive, "just culture" within its organization as per industry recommended best practices for establishing an effective safety management system. Employees are encouraged to report any safety issue, even if it involves a personal mistake, knowing that they will not be penalized for an unintentional error.

maxwelg2

23rd Aug 2011, 23:24

I've heard that at least one of the crew is no longer with Cougar. I hope this is not true, but if so this brings the following from the TSB report into their 2009 crash into question

IMO if the PIC has indeed been fired due to a "personal mistake" then surely the July 2010 G-SARC PIC should have expected the same action, or was that incident somehow deemed different due to no PAX? So much for progress...If the pilots had survived 491 would they have been looking at law suits or would it have been deemed an equipment failure? Difficult questions to answer...even harder to see how we are going to gain progress and lessons learned based on the response to the most recent event.

Here's a link again to the AAIB incident report to refresh memories.

Air Accidents Investigation: Sikorsky S-92A, G-SARC (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/february_2011/sikorsky_s_92a__g_sarc.cfm)

Hopefully this TSB report will be produced relatively quickly and communicated to all in this industry in a proactive way.

Safe flying

Max

Variable Load

24th Aug 2011, 03:33

It is my understanding that the two incidents are not connected.

Again, it is my understanding that mishandling (or should that be handling!) of the aircraft when coupled led to the Cougar incident.

To answer Zalt's question, the only 'standard' AP coupling mode that will work in a non-SAR machine below 50 knots IAS is RadAlt. Any roll or pitch coupling will "decouple" when the aircraft is decelerated through 50 knots.

squib66

5th Nov 2011, 15:08

Any details on an incident last month in GoM involving a failure of horizontal stabilizer fitting?

zalt

5th Nov 2011, 19:50

Any details on an incident last month in GoM involving a failure of horizontal stabilizer fitting?

It was a corrosion related problem. Not sure which operator but I suspect PHI.

To prevent cracking of the tail rotor pylon and horizontal at the stabilizer mounting points there is now an ASB which calls for the machined surfaces to be painted with a Teflon coating. Bonding jumper cables are also to be added to maintain electrical bonding.

The ASB has a 250 hour / 6 month implementation period. Considerably higher priority that the infamous Boome oil filter stud ASB.

squib66

6th Nov 2011, 11:42

Zalt

Thanks for the information. Does anyone actually know what happened in the GOM? Did the stabaliser come off?

I think you will find that any future ASB on the studs would have a far more rapid compliance time.;)

squib66

6th Nov 2011, 15:48

It looks like Sikorsky have finally admitted they need to add an auxiliary lube system.

Sikorsky Upgrades Gearbox for S-92 | Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/?q=aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2011-11-01/sikorsky-upgrades-gearbox-s-92)

Sikorsky Upgrades Gearbox for S-92 by Douglas Nelms

Sikorsky is developing a next-generation main gearbox (MGB) with enhanced lubrication capabilities with built-in redundancy systems such as chip detectors and oil scavenge systems, according to Spencer Elani, Sikorsky’s S-92 program manager. “We are continuing to make a lot of improvements to the current gearbox, and to automate some of the features,” Elani said.

The new MGB is part of a program improvement plan to the oil supply system designed to prevent another catastrophic accident such the March 2009 crash of a Cougar Helicopter S-92 into the Atlantic Ocean. The aircraft crashed following oil loss due to failure of the MGB oil-filter bowl assembly.

A key change has been the replacement of the original filter bowl assembly with a new double oil-filter bowl. Six steel studs now secure the assembly to the MGB in place of three titanium studs in the original design. A higher-capacity filter is also part of the new assembly, which has been retrofitted to all S-92s, and is now standard on all new-production S-92s.

The next-generation gearbox will also feature an automatic oil-cooler bypass switch, unipleat oil filter and improved durability with redundant scavenge and an auxiliary/emergency lubrication system. “The aircraft’s gearbox today already has a lot of redundancy,” Elani said. “We’re adding to that to further improve safety.”

Visual and aural warnings of a drop in oil pressure or a failed oil pump indicator will help pilots and crew in the decision-making process.

The March 2009 crash has created an industry-wide controversy as to certification requirements for large Category A transport helicopters.

Current certification requirements of the FAA, EASA and Transport Canada require that the aircraft be able to continue safe flight for at least 30 minutes after the flight crew has detected lubrication system failure or loss of lubrication.

However, there is a provision within that regulation for all three agencies that adds the caveat “unless such failures are [determined to be] extremely remote.” This was the provision under which the S-92 was certified.

An FAA spokesman stated that Sikorsky had initially tried to show that the main gearbox would continue to produce power for 30 minutes after loss of lubrication was detected by a noticeable decrease in oil pressure. “But it failed to do so,” he said.

Sikorsky said that it identified the external oil cooler system as the one component in the main gearbox lubrication system potentially subject to a leak that was not considered extremely remote. The company said that, “with the consent of the FAA,” it incorporated a bypass valve before the oil cooler designed to maintain some oil reserve in the gearbox should that failure occur.

The FAA said that with activation of the bypass valve after sudden massive leakage was detected, “[the S-92] passed the 30-minute test.”

The 30-minute test has now created the highly ambiguous term “run-dry,” but without a clear definition as to whether “run-dry” means totally without any lubrication, or with only residual lubrication, with an auxiliary or emergency lubrication system, or with an auxiliary cooling system.

The FAA spokesman noted that the term “run-dry” is not in the regulation. Instead it states that “residual oil supply or secondary lubrication systems may be used to show compliance.” It was the complete loss of lubrication that caused the problem with the Cougar aircraft, a problem that Sikorsky and the certifying agencies had stated was “extremely remote.”

However, on July 2, 2008, approximately nine months before the Cougar accident, a CHC S-92 experienced sudden loss of oil pressure, putting the CHC crew in a “land immediately” situation. The aircraft landed safely, and an inspection of the main gearbox showed that two of the three MGB oil filter bowl studs had fractured, causing a total loss of oil.

In December 2009 Sikorsky issued an Alert Service Bulletin calling for replacement of the MGB oil filter bowl with a two-piece oil filter bowl held on by six steel studs. The FAA issued an AD effective June 21, 2010. But it still did not call for a 30-minute “run-dry” capability.

TSB Recommends Rule Changes

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada, which investigated the Cougar accident, has issued two recommendations to Transport Canada, the FAA and the EASA regarding a true 30-minute operating capability for Category A transport helicopters.

The first, A11-01, recommends that the “extremely remote” provision of the loss of lubrication certification requirement be removed “for all newly constructed Category A transport helicopters and, after a phase-in period, for all existing ones.”

The second, A11-02, recommends that the FAA “assess the adequacy of the 30-minute main gearbox run-dry requirement for Category A transport helicopters.”

In its response to these recommendations, the EASA simply stated that it acknowledges receipt of the recommendation and that it is “under consideration and the outcome will be communicated (to the TSBC) in due course.”

The FAA’s response reiterated its requirement that the MGB must be able to run for at least 30 minutes with a loss of lubricating oil, “unless a lubrication failure resulting in a loss of lubrication is determined to be ‘extremely remote.’”

It noted that the S-92A had met the 30-minute “loss of lubrication” requirement by using an oil cooler bypass valve, thereby eliminating the most likely sources of leakage. However, the agency also stated that “events that have occurred during the operational use of the Model S-92A, such as the MGB oil filter bowl failure associated with the S-92 Cougar accident, have shown that certain failures not considered during certification testing are more likely than ‘extremely remote.’ The service history therefore does not support the method of compliance that was originally accepted by the FAA at the time of the Model S-92A type certification.”

The FAA said that it will therefore propose a rule change to either clarify or eliminate the ‘extremely remote’ provision of the regulation.

Having said that, the FAA response then went on to state that the agency does not believe it is practical or necessary to require all existing and newly manufactured transport Category A helicopters to be equipped with MGBs that meet the 30-minute loss of lubrication requirement, based on the millions of cumulative flight hours on those helicopters and service histories that show they are operating at a satisfactory level of safety.

Modifying those helicopters with the new MGBs would have a “significant economic impact on the aviation community, with the cost outweighing any improvement in safety,” said the agency.

While it is working on the rule change to clarify or eliminate the ‘extremely remote’ provision, it is “revising guidance material to ensure consistent interpretation and standardized methods of compliance for the current rule,” the FAA spokesman said. The revised guidance is expected to be released for comment next spring.

In its response, Transport Canada said it has initiated with the FAA and EASA “a coordinated formal review” of the rules regarding the 30-minute requirement and the “extremely remote” provision “to reach an international agreement on what changes may be required to the rules.”

Transport Canada also stated that it is accelerating a review of the guidance material referred to in the recommendations to identify “additional direction or clarification for the Canadian certification of Category A helicopters by this fall.”

Eurocopter System

As a method of meeting the FAA and EASA certification requirement to operate 30 minutes without lubrication for its EC225, Eurocopter developed a system consisting of an 11-liter tank of glycol connected to the MGB. If the aircraft experiences a total loss of oil, the glycol will be slowly sprayed into the MGB to reduce the temperature and allow the MGB to function. Eurocopter said that during certification trials, the system demonstrated 52 minutes of operation before the MGB failed. The EC225 was certified and delivered in 2004.

Eurocopter said that its EC175 also has a 30-minute “dry run” capacity, but that MGB protection is based on specific gears treatment providing very high resistance to hot temperature, so [it] does not encompass an additional glycol tank as back-up.”

Eurocopter also noted that no EC225 has ever experienced a loss of oil pressure that would require it to activate the system.

riff_raff

6th Nov 2011, 22:49

squib66,

I think Sikorsky has realized for a while that having a main gearbox aux. lube system is currently the only practical way to meet a 30 min. loss of lube requirement. The CH-53K main gearbox design incorporates one.

js0987

7th Nov 2011, 12:10

In today's enviroment, the 30 minute requirement is already becoming obsolete. Its not uncommon to be supporting rigs that are over 200 nautical miles from shore. Hopefully Sikorsky and the industry in general will be looking towards 60 minutes or more.

zalt

7th Nov 2011, 17:45

I think you will find that any future ASB on the studs would have a far more rapid compliance time.

I realize they would. I just meant that today, Sikorsky is taking this more seriously then the studs in late 2008 / early 2009.

I also hear that Sikorsky has recently had to clarify that even the Phase 3 MGBs also need the 10 hour foot inspection.

zalt

7th Nov 2011, 17:51

There have been rumours since 2009 that Sikorsky would have to fit an extra lube system to the CH-148 MHP.

There is more on the families' letter. Mr. Lebel's spokeswoman, Vanessa Schneider, said Friday that a response to the February letter was supposed to be sent to the families in June. “Because of an administrative error, it had not gone out as we had thought,” she said in an interview. Ms. Schneider would not discuss the contents of the response, even though family members have stressed that their letter is open and they want public answers.

Hilife

7th Nov 2011, 18:30

That’s because the MM calls for a 10-hour inspection of the main gearbox mounting feet on ALL main upper housing assembly P/N’s, so clearly some confusion regarding the word ALL. ;)

zalt

7th Nov 2011, 18:33

I guess some people believed the hype that Phase 3 was an improvement!

Hilife

7th Nov 2011, 19:04

Zalt

Are you suggesting the OEM should seek approval from the FAA to increase, or even remove, any continued inspection requirements without first monitoring the latest in-service phase III housings, so as to ensure no evidence of cracking prior to seeking any amendment of the current inspection requirements?

And there was me thinking you were a champion of flight safety.

squib66

7th Nov 2011, 19:42

riff-raff

Thanks for the prompt to do some research, I'd not paid too much attention to the CH-53K.

From what I've read the auxiliary lube is for the TGB and IGB only.

The MGB is to have a 'Redundant “Dry Sump” lube system' that allegedly gives 'significant reduction in oil leak or spray' to provide a 30 min operation capability after loss of lube. Dry sumps are used in high performance engines as seen here:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/66/Dry_sump.svg/250px-Dry_sump.svg.png
I take the description to mean two sources of oil, possibly external to the MGB, with separate pumps to give the redundancy. There is however means greater complexity and associated failure modes.

Aluminium gearbox cases are also proposed for all gearboxes, for weight, corrosion protection and greater tolerance to brittle case failure. Nice to see in acknowledged that failures from other than the oil cooler aren't extremely remote.:E

Some fancy new materials are also being proposed for the bearings: Triton Systems, Inc. (http://www.tritonsys.com/products/bearingliners.html)

Lonewolf_50

7th Nov 2011, 22:02

squib:

In the Aluminum housing feature you are discussing, the US Navy seems to be moving to aluminum housings on some of their Seahawk (S-70) models in the near future as well, for the same reasons you cited.

zalt

7th Nov 2011, 22:36

No I didn't suggest that at all.

Sikorsky have already lost almost all transmission design credibility so waiting for solid proof is wise.

JohnDixson

8th Nov 2011, 11:38

Riff Raff wrote:

"I think Sikorsky has realized for a while that having a main gearbox aux. lube system is currently the only practical way to meet a 30 min. loss of lube requirement. "

Just wanted to point out that there are about 3000+ Blackhawks and Seahawks, flying around with main boxes that darn near made it to an hour during the no oil test qualification to meet the US Army 30 minute requirement.

Thanks,
John Dixson

dangermouse

8th Nov 2011, 16:20

there is another way because the EH101 managed to pass the 30 minute tests without an auxiliary lube system many years ago.

Never been needed so far but fully compliant with the rules.

here is a rheotic question. Quoted above is this..

The service history therefore does not support the method of compliance that was originally accepted by the FAA at the time of the Model S-92A type certification

doesn't that mean that the FAA now recognises that the certification basis was incorrect and if that is the case why is the S92 still flying as a Category A aircraft when it patently isn't?

DM

JohnDixson

8th Nov 2011, 18:11

Dangermouse,

I think the operative paragraph in that article is:

"The FAA’s response reiterated its requirement that the MGB must be able to run for at least 30 minutes with a loss of lubricating oil, “unless a lubrication failure resulting in a loss of lubrication is determined to be ‘extremely remote.’”"

I'm a bit remote from the specifics of what is going on daily with the S-92 program( been retired 7 years come January ) but if the FAA didn't concur that the gearbox changes were in compliance, one would assume they would pull the certification. Ergo...

Thanks,
John Dixson

squib66

8th Nov 2011, 18:59

John

if the FAA didn't concur that the gearbox changes were in compliance, one would assume they would pull the certification. Ergo...

To pull the TC the FAA would have to admit their failure plus it would be open to challenge politically because older helicopters are flying that are as bad.

Another catastrophic oil loss and that would be different.

I'd like to see the TC data sheet state the (at best) partial compliance.

Your Blackhawk claim, which AFAIK is new, that the type (the fleet size is irrelevant) made nearly an hour is interesting. If so that means the S-92, with a total oil loss is 5 or 6 times worse that the H-60. This just illustrates how big Sikorsky's S-92 design failure was.

SASless

8th Nov 2011, 21:18

Zalt,

Any final explanation about the Bond Aircraft that shucked its rotorhead? I might sugges Eurocopter might have a few issues to deal with as does Sikorsky.

At least we know what the problem with the 92 is....

Do we know what caused the Bond crash?

zalt

8th Nov 2011, 22:36

I look forward to that final report, but at least Eurocopter did not only partially redo a certification test after a failure, the failure mode is not one that has caused multiple incidents months apart or that needs daily inspections for rapid cracking.

maxwelg2

9th Nov 2011, 00:53

Just wanted to point out that there are about 3000+ Blackhawks and Seahawks, flying around with main boxes that darn near made it to an hour during the no oil test qualification to meet the US Army 30 minute requirement.

John, we PAX (and I'm sure the Cougar bus drivers) are still waiting with thinning patience on why Sikorsky could not more expediently apply the H-60 MRGB endurance capability into the S92. Surely it's not re-inventing the wheel here, or is it all down to cost?:ugh:

The current proposed modification sounds to me like a leaf out of the S61 book i.e. aux sump and backup lube oil pump...is that what they call progress in over two and a half years since 491 and over three years since Broome?

Safe flying (with HUEBA at the ready and a suit that will hopefully keep me dry)

Max

SASless

9th Nov 2011, 00:59

the failure mode is not one that has caused multiple incidents months apart or that needs daily inspections for rapid cracking.

Oh...there was some rapid cracking....but it was a failure mode that when it does happen...ends the game!

The Newfoundland crash could have resulted in a very much better outcome if the aircraft had been ditched much earlier than attempted. The folks in the Bond aircraft never had that chance.

The key Zalt is we still do not know what caused the Bond Crash....it is the not knowing that is the problem. At least with daily inspections one has a something to go on rather than riding around merely hoping all is well...what ever it was that went bad.

How long has it been since the accident occurred....and still no report? No finger pointing at a cause certain?

Ya'll keep whistling as you walk by that graveyard gate!

riff_raff

9th Nov 2011, 05:44

squib66,

As you note, the 53K aux. lube circuits are used in the MRGB, input nose GB's, and IGB/TRGB's. The aux. lube systems use a supplementary oil volume that is "misted" onto critical gear meshes and bearing using bleed air pressure from the ECS. The critical gear meshes tend to be the spiral bevels used in the nose input GB's, the IGB and the TRGB.

I believe the 53K MRGB also has switched to an aluminum housing material, since there were significant maintenance costs associated with the mag housings on the 53E's.

Lastly, the FRA MMC material you referenced from Triton is pretty neat stuff. It is used for rolling element bearing liners in mag or aluminum housings. On a big MRGB housing like the 53K's, it can probably save about 50 lbs versus carburized steel liners. But at about $300/lb, it is definitely not cheap!

riff_raff

squib66

10th Nov 2011, 19:07

SASless perhaps there is greater faith in AAIB and their issuance of prompt recommendations. At least they don't do Esquire Magazine (http://www.esquire.com/features/helicopter-crash-0909) before they report. Or perhaps they expect simple static components like studs and mounting feet to be free of potentially catastrophic failure modes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

This incident at Scatsta has been discussed before:
Air Accidents Investigation: Sikorsky S-92A, G-IACC (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/september_2011/sikorsky_s_92a__g_iacc.cfm)

Summary: The helicopter was ground taxied onto a parking spot and brought to a stop by the commander, who was the pilot flying. He then intended to apply the parking brake but inadvertently raised the collective control lever, which caused the helicopter to become airborne.

The Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot states the aircraft reached just 6ft off the ground.

He [then] released the collective control lever, which was lowered by the collective trim system to the fully down position, and the helicopter landed heavily, causing damage to the landing gear and airframe.

Damage was reported as:
deformation of the airframe structure in two places and a crack in one of the left main landing gear wheel rims, on which the tyre had deflated.

One new fact has emerged: the damage was so severe that Bristow have had to declare an extraordinary item in their accounts of a cool $0.9 million for the repair.

Geoffersincornwall

14th Nov 2011, 08:30

...... And here we are again - transmissions ??? Isn't anyone out there listening? Have all the real engineers retired already?

G.

squib66

16th Nov 2011, 18:23

Have all the real engineers retired already?

I'm reliably informed that almost all the S-76 / H-60 gearbox designers had left by the time the S-92 was underway.

There has been another AD warning of landing gear collapse.

...limiting maximum rolling groundspeed for a normal landing or takeoff from 65 knots to 50 knots for helicopters with a certain serial-numbered landing gear retract actuator (actuator).

This amendment is prompted by a report of a main landing gear that would not retract. The manufacturer reports that certain actuators were manufactured with down-lock keys that did not meet the specified minimum hardness requirements.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to a landing gear collapse following a roll-on landing that exceeds 50 knots groundspeed. These actions are intended to prevent collapse of a landing gear and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/2801de191a8c231286257936004b39b2/$FILE/2011-16-04.pdf

Nothing new but a sign of how long it takes the FAA still to issue ADs. The ASB was out in May 2008 (42 months ago). Wasn't there a run on landing at about that time in Norway too after a tail rotor failure?

If you are interested in the thinking of Sikorsky's Director of Safety look here:
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/downloadabledocs/989/J.%20Heffernan,%20Sikorsky%20Aircraft%20Corporation.pdf
I pass no comment, others might choose to share their views.

212man

16th Nov 2011, 23:18

Nothing new but a sign of how long it takes the FAA still to issue ADs

More like a reflection on how slow some operators are to implement ASBs if not mandated to!

squib66

17th Nov 2011, 19:28

Actually it seems to be pretty common that the FAA drag their heels.

See this one: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/7933d895b77cfe4286257944004e935a/$FILE/2011-22-05.pdf

ASB in Dec 2009, with an EASA AD on 7 Jan 2010 (http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/easa_ad_2010_0006.pdf/AD_2010-0006_1).

so the FAA catch up 23 months later (clearly they pulled out all the stops:E).

I wonder how long the AD would have taken for the titanium to steel stud change if 17 people hadn't have dies in the interim?

Its difficult to believe the FAA are actually in compliance with their international obligations under ICAO Annex 8.

Shell Management

19th Nov 2011, 10:09

Cougar have has another accident. Again reliving experiences that the bigger operators have had with the S-92:ugh:

Record #1Cadors Number: 2011A0961
Reporting Region: Atlantic

Occurrence InformationOccurrence Type: Accident
Occurrence Date: 2011-10-15

Occurrence Time: 2155 Z
Day Or Night: night-time

Fatalities: 0
Injuries: 0

Canadian Aerodrome ID: CYHZ
Aerodrome Name: Halifax Robert L. Stanfield international Airport

Occurrence Location: Halifax Robert L. Stanfield international Airport (CYHZ)

Province: Nova Scotia
Country: CANADA

World Area: North America

Reported By: Transportation Safety Board (TSB)
AOR Number:

TSB Class Of Investigation: 5
TSB Occurrence No: A11A0073

Aircraft InformationFlight #:

Aircraft Category: Helicopter
Country of Registration: CANADA

Make: SIKORSKY
Model: S92A

Year Built: 2009
Amateur Built: No

Engine Make: GENERAL ELECTRIC
Engine Model: CT7-8A

Engine Type: Turbo shaft
Gear Type: Land

Phase of Flight: Parked
Damage: Minor

Owner: COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Operator: COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC. (4791)

Operator Type: Commercial

Event InformationHard landing

Detail InformationUser Name: MacQuarrie, Jack

Date: 2011-10-20

Further Action Required: Yes

O.P.I.: Commercial & Business Aviation

Narrative: The Cougar Helicopters Inc. Sikorsky S-92 helicopter (registration C-GDKN) was being operated for post maintenance engine runs following routine engine washes. The collective control was not lowered during the start sequence and subsequently the rotorcraft unintentionally became airborne a few feet and drifted to the right as the rotor speed increased. The rotorcraft sustained damage to the right main landing gear when it landed hard following the brief airborne event. The operator is conducting a safety investigation into the occurrence.

TiPwEiGhT

19th Nov 2011, 10:44

Anybody know if Cougar allow engineers to do ground runs by themselves, or do they use a crew?

TiP

Gaspode the Dog

19th Nov 2011, 18:15

Hi Shell M

Are you suggesting that this incident was the product of the design of the S92? If you have ever flown an aircraft with a selectable flight drive there was always a chance that things could go wrong IF YOU DID NOT FOLLOW THE CORRECT PROCEDURE. The same applies with any aircraft/heli. The S92 check list require you to lower the lever during start, if you do not.........?

HeliComparator

19th Nov 2011, 20:39

But it is a pretty weird design on a modern helicopter where you start to start the rotors with the lever half up and have to remember to push it down as the rotors accelerate. Smacks of design cockup to me and clearly not fault tolerant.

Hilife

20th Nov 2011, 06:47

Why would you need to remember, the correct procedure and reference to monitoring collective position during initial rotor engagement is written in black and white in the RFM engine start procedure.

[email protected]

20th Nov 2011, 07:06

I think HC's point is - why would you design it like that in the first place? Was it another 'engineers don't do ergonomics' faff - why put the brake selector right by the collective? Why design a system where the collective needs to be lowered during rotor start?

212man

20th Nov 2011, 08:02

HC's point is probably further strengthened by the fact that his type has a collective lock that holds the lever at flat pitch!

Interestingly enough, there is no requirement to engage the rotor for a drying run - we do them with the rotor brake on, and have done so for a few years. Initially the GE manual said run them ABOVE Idle so there was no choice (you can't accelerate the engines below 24% Np (N2/Nf,)) but they changed the wording to AT Idle, so we adapted our drying procedure then.

Must have been a fairly vigourous throttle advancement, all the same!

js0987

20th Nov 2011, 11:01

The Bell 214ST collective needed to be lowered on start. The TT straps, while static, put pitch in the blades.

I'm surprised the Cougar AC was run up past idle. As the rotors accelerate, it quickly becomes pretty rough. I've found counting 4 blades, after the hydraulic pressure reaches green, then lowering the collective works well.

SASless

20th Nov 2011, 11:12

As I recall the Bell 412 collective has to be lowered during start as well due to the elastomerics holding a bit of pitch in the blades.

Perhaps this criticism of the 92 is a bit unfair.

Some one screws up and all of a sudden it is the aircraft's fault.:ugh:

JohnDixson

20th Nov 2011, 12:31

Just a bit of history and background:

On rotors with higher twist, it helps avoid droop stop contact on start if the collective is a bit up during start, especially in gusty wind conditions and we used to teach doing that in the CH-54B and the UH-60. Also seem to recall a 3 degree collective detent in the CH-47 with basically the same reasoning behind it( although those blades didn't have particularly high twist ( CH-47A is my reference ), but staying off the droop stops was important. In the S-92, the collective position after the backup pump is turned off results from the collective overtravel design, but it unintentionally resulted in tending to help with keeping off the droop stops during the first few rotations, thus its actually a bit helpful.

Is it true that the related incident involved a crew chief doing a ground run? Used to be a standard but very closely controlled procedure at SA. There was one instance of a crew chief ( who was still there when I hired on in 1966 ) who was doing a compass swing on an H-19 ( S-55 ) with the rotor turning, and when completed, rather than shutting down, he air taxied back to his spot. Got him in a bit of trouble, but he was very happy if you asked him about it.

Thanks,
John Dixson

inputshaft

20th Nov 2011, 13:49

The Cougar incident would have had a pilot doing the runup. My take on this incident is that 92s are normally started with 2 pilots present. One monitors the engine start up, the other looks after the collective/rotor position. Maintenance ground runs, however, are often single pilot and if tired or distracted it would be easy to focus only on the engine side of the start up procedure and forget about the collective.

Looked for a "been there, almost done that" smilie, but there doesn't seem to be one. As js0987 said, it's pretty obvious that the collective hasn't been lowered in a timely fashion once you get used to the aircraft.

JohnDixson

20th Nov 2011, 14:38

From Input Shaft,

" As js0987 said, it's pretty obvious that the collective hasn't been lowered in a timely fashion once you get used to the aircraft."

One thing that is quite likely to occur if one does not lower the collective is that eventually, as the blade lift increases, one may very well beat up the anti-flap stops before they come out. Pretty hard to miss that 4P banging going on! As in: Duh.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Dan Reno

20th Nov 2011, 14:59

You have those here who are jealous they're not flying the H-92 and will “nit-pick” everything about the bird and then those who have been flying them and whistling in the dark ever since one went in the drink and wanting more attention.

I love the S-92 and all other Sikorsky products and can only find fault with the ASH receptacles being too small on all of them.

Geoffersincornwall

20th Nov 2011, 15:01

There is such a thing as safety by design. If I run a cable across the office floor and stick a notice up saying BEWARE THE CABLE you can better your bottom dollar that one day somebody will trip over it. Better to get it right from the get-go.

G :ugh:

HeliComparator

20th Nov 2011, 15:18

Well despite all the waffle about how wonderful it is that you start with the lever half up, it is funny how the a/c I fly, with it's elastomeric head, is started with the lever locked down, which I suggest is intrinsically safer.

That waffle is a great indicator of the culture in US helicopter design. One day they will learn about designing in error tolerance!

SASless

20th Nov 2011, 15:42

HC....I suppose there is a reason the Eurocopter folks "lock" the collective down in their designs...and of course....nothing ever...ever...ever goes wrong if that "Lock" gets released prematurely...by accident...or somehow gets confused with any other lever right next to it!

Do I need to refer you to a Thread in this very Forum to suggest there is some flaws in that system as well?

Please note the Bright Red borders to the document....It is supposed to imply a certain amount of significance to the contents of the page I would suggest.

http://amd.nbc.gov/safety/library/alerts/Alert03-01.pdf

JohnDixson

20th Nov 2011, 16:36

HC,

Hiding behind the " Waffle " term to express displeasure with a non Eurocopter design just leads to endless debate regarding design choices that individual OEM's make based upon their own trade-offs.

Thus we have such differences as a wider landing gear tread on the S-92 for easier taxi and resistance to rollover. Fairly significant larger flapping hinge offset which results in higher hinge moment, thus a better slope landing capability and higher main rotor control power ( slightly higher gust sensitivity but that is easily handled by the AFCS) for better manuevering. And the differences go on. I notice the newest AW machine looks like it has a canted tail rotor-I bet that decision came after some interesting internal meetings at AW. Some are hardly esoteric, as in what the president of the company likes!

At the 1991 Paris Airshow Guy Dabadie gave Nick Lappos and I demo rides in the prototype Super Puma MkII and I gave him and extended ride in a new UH-60 ( had to make up for the two rides he gave us ). Nick and I were very impressed with what Eurocopter had come up with and I know that Guy was similarly impressed with the Blackhawk. Different machines with different basic missions, but one could still evaluate the underlying technology, and the different design choices. ( Suffice to say we didn't see anywhere near 193 KIAS or +3.5 G in the Puma but Guy certainly did in the Hawk. I had an old fashioned G-meter installed in the blank space below the blade de-ice panel. ).

After the flight I asked Guy what he thought of the Hawk and he said " C'est formidable". That about sums up our report on his new Super Puma as well.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

20th Nov 2011, 17:56

I want to meet the Design Team that can make the "perfect" helicopter.:rolleyes:

There are very successful machines out there built by many different teams...all who have different but successful design philosophies.

The one thing they all have in common are sorry excuses for Pilot Seats.

The seat in my old Ford pickup with over 300,000 miles on it....beat the hell out any helicopter seat I ever sat upon....even if brand new.

Geoffersincornwall

20th Nov 2011, 18:22

The famous cartoon of a helicopter pilot at work in the cockpit shows the seat manufacturer's data plate. It says.

THE ACME SCREEN DOOR AND WINDOW COMPANY
Serial number 6100001234

That anecdote says it all.

G, :)

HeliComparator

20th Nov 2011, 18:34

SAS - Yes both 92 and 225 have had "handbrake" incidents, and I would be the first to say that it was only luck that the 225 came out of it completely unscathed, whereas the 92 was moderately trashed. I was talking about "foolproof design" if that is a technical term? With anything as complex as a helicopter, it is very difficult to design it so that an incorrect action by the pilot is not catastrophic. However it is somewhat easier to design so that in some cases an inaction by the pilot is not catestrophic. Put it another way, a heli designed so that something MUST be done by the pilots at a critical time, when other similar helis don't require this, is the poorer design from a safety point of view. There are a number of examples of this in the 92 vs 225 debate.

It stems from the belief by EC that pilots only recently evolved from chimpanzees, they design accordingly. Our American cousins of course don't even believe in evolution, but assume that all heli pilots are descended from Chuck Yeager or his relatives. Any that are not steely superheroes have no business flying their products. Personally, being closer to a chimp than a Yeager, I prefer EC's philosophy.

John - the point of my "waffle" comment was that an argument that having such a limitation built into the design of a commercial heli is a "good thing", is a poor argument in my view.

I agree that both manufacturers have good and bad points, stemming to some extent from where they are starting from (viz my second para)

HC

SASless

20th Nov 2011, 22:28

It stems from the belief by EC that pilots only recently evolved from chimpanzees

I suppose the French might be a bit closer to the tree than most.....thus there may be merit to their thinking that.:E

JohnDixson

21st Nov 2011, 01:07

Hc,

You wrote:

" John - the point of my "waffle" comment was that an argument that having such a limitation built into the design of a commercial heli is a "good thing", is a poor argument in my view."

The point of my observations was to suggest that " things " such as narrow gear tread and low flapping hinge offset were not necessarily " good " attributes to incorporate in any helicopter.

HC, you may be a bit too harsh on the EC designers. They may have had my first superior at SA in mind. That person had, in his flying CV, both an S-58 brake handle assembly and an H-3 brake handle assembly, both of which he removed, in toto, during normal brake applications. We used to wonder how on earth he did that!

SAS, your point on seats is on target. I think, over the years, only three seats impressed me as being comfortable: CH-53E, CH-47A and the CH-21C. And nowadays, even the aces like Martin-Baker, who made the original S-92 seats, seemed unable to follow simple requests like " Make it like the 53E seat and everyone will be ecstatic".

Lastly a note re chimpanzees, et al..Perhaps some of the EC designers infiltrated SA early on, as the S-61 models had 14 inch fore/aft stick throws and it was commonly observed that a simian must have been used as a design model. Led to problems if a short armed pilot adjusted his seat forward in cruise, to make his flying arm position more comfortable, forgot he had done so, and if at near the forward CG limit, had to really scramble coming into a hover.

Thanks,
John Dixson

212man

21st Nov 2011, 06:07

Tip for pilots. watch out when doing anything that interupts the power supply. eg forgetting to start the apu after doing cross bleed start checks and trying to shut down! ive had to run away a couple of times because of that!

Yes - the trim loses power and the collective rises markedl

HeliComparator

21st Nov 2011, 07:01

incase it wasnt clear to you.

It was quite clear. In case it wasn't clear to you, my point was that the competition also has an elastomeric head but doesn't suffer from this complication.

SASless

21st Nov 2011, 12:31

John,

Re Chinook seats....if you recall there were too MK cushions...one which was a solid red color and one that was a dark red in some kind of material that could have been used for Window Curtains or a very cheap Marks and Sparks suit. The solid red cushion was comfortable....and the other an Engineers revenge for a pilot having stolen his wife and had an intimate relationship with his daughter in the passing. Horrible things they were!

The Chinook seat was the most comfortable of all the helicopter seats I sat in...Bell Seats purely sucked and ruined more backs than any other torture device ever made.

JohnDixson

21st Nov 2011, 12:49

SAS, I only flew 4 CH-47A's: 3 were production prototypes ( 414, 450, 451 ) and one a new 1964 production machine, in which we put a 2000 gal pillow tank and flew it non-stop over a 1000 mile closed course. Very good seats in all, so must have been the good ones you referred to.

Thanks,
John

SASless

21st Nov 2011, 13:12

A couple of design aspects of the Chinook stick with me...

The Cyclic Stick Postioning system....that trim wheel device that allowed you to position the cyclic to a comfortable position. Which one had to remember to center again prior to ground ops.

The other was the ability for the old Girl to jack the Aft Pylon off the airframe if the FE left the Ramp Control lever in the down position and the Pilots forgot to re-engage the Cyclic Force Trim. The problem occurred when the cyclic moved forward...the ramp went down as the tail rose....and the Pilot finally waking up and realizing a problem existed....pulled the Cyclic back to where it should have been all along.....to discover the ramp was firmly planted on Planet Earth which was not going to shift out of its orbit despite the pilot trying to make it do so with the cyclic pull.

squib66

22nd Nov 2011, 20:50

From the thread on the failure of the IHST:

Sikorsky safety specialist Steve Gleason summed up the data-driven conclusions: "We're not finding new ways to crash helicopters. We're just doing the same thing over and over."

Isn't that a good reason for better design rather than OEMs just sitting back and hoping that Darwinian selection will make pilots more error tolerant but in the meantime sending arrogant recommendations to their customers to do better?

SASless

22nd Nov 2011, 21:48

Squibb,

Gleason summed up the data-driven conclusions

Having been involved in efforts to improve the safety record of the American EMS industry....the one thing that became very plain is helicopter pilots are not very innovative in the ways they kill themselves, their med crew,. and their patients.

OEM organizations are not able to correct "Judgement" issues and poor airmanship.

All one has to do is throw in night flight in marginal weather conditions over inhospitable terrain....and the best designed helicopter often comes to grief because of the lack of brains between the headset found in some many aircraft.

Perhaps if we converted to UAV's....which would be a technical solution to a human failure....the OEM's could have a huge role to play.

I hold little hope of that ever happening as the human pilot is much cheaper than the digital version that would be required.

We all know the "system" would never allow that.

squib66

22nd Nov 2011, 21:53

So perhaps the OEMs should concentrate on what they can influence, like cockpit design and f----ing fliter studs.

SansAnhedral

23rd Nov 2011, 13:18

Yes one could argue the stud issue has been solved.

But interestingly, with the underlying complete failure of the gearbox when any lubrication component on the MGB side of the cooler fails and subsequently leaks, the s92 is still to this day a certified part 29 helicopter. It really looks as if there is nothing that could happen to revoke that certification at this point.

Gaspode the Dog

23rd Nov 2011, 19:44

I think you will find that the stud issue was sorted a long time ago.

The S 92 is a positive step forward in heli design and a lot of pilots prefer it to EC products. I fly it and did not design it!

squib66

23rd Nov 2011, 20:03

I think you will find that the stud issue was sorted a long time ago.

I think you will find after preventable 17 deaths.

So whats your take then on gearbox bypass, foot cracking, cockpit ergonomics and noise?

Gaspode the Dog

23rd Nov 2011, 20:47

I agree that the tragic loss should not have happened, but other current types also have a Land Immediately instruction following a total MGB oil pressure loss. Emergency Checklists like Normal Checklists are written to cover the operating issues with that type. There is no perfect heli design. How many helicopters can you think of with a single stop go switch to make life easy? You pay a lot of money for a car and expect perfection, you pay many times that for a helicopter and they still leak water when it rains and no carpets as standard! There has always been a EC and SK divide, what about slagging off the EC product after the tragic North Sea crash? Sincere apologies to any families or friends of the people involved in that sad incident who may be reading this post.

On the ergonomics seems ok to me but then I am used to SK aircraft, cockpit noise yes but a good fitting headset or flying helmet?? helps. However, the autopilot and other advantages make up for the noise for me.

maxwelg2

31st Dec 2011, 15:56

Seasons greeting to all

Question for the AMEs, is it normal to see both engine #1 and # 2 chip detection on the same aircraft within the space of one week?

We've just had one of our buses over here get two chip faults, engine #2 on Dec 27, was changed out and placed back in service, then engine #1 had a chip fault two days later (Dec 29). Splinters were deemed within limits for a serviceability check. From what I've read in the customer flight notification bulletin the serviceability check will take approximately 4 hours after which the aircraft will require a ½ hr ground run, ½ hour hover check followed by an inspection of the chip detector.

I would have assumed that engines are ran to stagger operational hours, so is there a shared lubrication system on the S92 that could cause cross-contamination, I would have assumed not?

Safe flying

Max

SASless

31st Dec 2011, 16:48

Gaspode,

Bad seats, rainwater leaks, and spartan upholstry is just a fact of life in the helicopter world!

If it is glitzy and glitter you want....get your MBA from Wharton or Havard and work your way up to the Gulfstream Jet world.

Max,

Engine chips can be caused by any number of things and usually are benign events. As the aircraft are flown...over time a new aircraft will encounter a need to change one engine ahead of the other and thus a find itself with different hours on the engines.

I am not knowing of the 92 design in particular...but I would imagine the two engine lubrication systems are completely separate and even if they shared a common cooler...it would be partitioned so the oils did not mix and in reality be a single unit but made up of independent modules.

Engine chips are not something to get too concerned about as the magnetic plugs are designed to discover "wear" kinds of material. It is the gear boxes that are the more important concern than the engines re potential failures as the 92 is designed to fly well on a single engine.

Jim L has provided statistical data that shows two engines failing almost simultaneously is so remote a possibility as to be of almost no concern.

Shell Management

31st Dec 2011, 17:51

The engine oil systems are separate from each other and the MRGB.

Probably debris from the last overhaul.

Jim L has provided statistical data that shows two engines failing almost simultaneously is so remote a possibility as to be of almost no concern.

Except for common mode failures like fuel contamination. Max You might want to ask how well fuel QC / fuel system maintenance is done at your installation.

the 92 is designed to fly well on a single engine

Max Ae Cougar flying PC2e to reduce exposure to hitting the deck or sea when an engine fails during offshore take off?

ROTERMINATOR

3rd Jan 2012, 13:45

I have heard from a friend that a CHC S92 is stuck on a deck offshore in the Danish sector with a crack in the gearbox. They are sending it to Esbjerg by boat.

http://helicrew.dk/distribution/download/file.php?id=404

Horror box

3rd Jan 2012, 14:25

Anyone know if this aircraft had a phase 2 or 3 gearbox?

Paddyviking

3rd Jan 2012, 16:44

I have heard ( not sure if it's true or not ) that it's a phase 3 with only 36 hours of service

Horror box

3rd Jan 2012, 18:13

Oh dear! Thats that (rather expensive) experiment up the spout if it is indeed a phase 3.

Shell Management

3rd Jan 2012, 18:20

Perhaps we should wait until the aircraft is ashore at least.

Horror box

3rd Jan 2012, 19:13

But it wont be a rumour anymore once it is ashore!

maxwelg2

3rd Jan 2012, 20:04

Thanks for the feedback guys, much appreciated. I still find it strange for both engines to have chip issues so close together, perhaps a bizarre co-incidence.

Wrt. PC2e utilization I have no information on that, I did a quick search of the TSB report and safety inquiry reports on 491 and there is no mention of PC2e. Perhaps one for the more learned and informed members of this forum to respond to.

Wrt. fuel QA/QC, again I trust the oil companies and fuel suppliers to ensure that QA/QC within acceptable tolerances is achieved. Using my layman's perspective I would assume that it is cost advantageous to maintain high fuel quality in order to minimize operational wear on the engines as well as maximize operational life.

This specific a/c (call sign KKN) was flying around all weekend most likely on test runs (the airport is quite close to my house and adjacent to the golf course where I walk my dog). I'm heading back offshore soon so will have a chat with the Cougar lads when I'm up at the heliport, they are really good at answering PAX questions.

Safe flying

Max

farsouth

3rd Jan 2012, 23:45

I have heard from a friend that a CHC S92 is stuck on a deck offshore in the Danish sector with a crack in the gearbox.

Must be a pretty serious crack to have been detected while offshore (-as a pilot, rotors running turnround or even with a shutdown offshore I don't think my pre-flight inspection would pick up something like that)

Paddyviking

4th Jan 2012, 13:38

I think some smoke/vapour was seen first by HLO then shown to crew who then shutdown and inspected

PV

Variable Load

4th Jan 2012, 17:31

Probably not a foot crack then ;)

Horror box will be disappointed :E

Paddyviking

4th Jan 2012, 17:40

I have 2 pics but having a little trouble putting on forum
it's on the upper part of the mgb
Pv

Horror box

4th Jan 2012, 18:15

I am very glad it was not a foot crack. That would have been a difficult one. it was confirmed to me today that it was not a foot crack so we will wait for the official report. I also believe it is not a completely new fault.

zalt

5th Jan 2012, 00:08

This was in the papers the other day on the maritime helicopter program and the contractual penalties for the ongoing delays.

Sikorsky hasn (http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Sikorsky+hasn+paid+fine+late+helicopter+delivery/5941311/story.html)

What is unclear is when the first interim helicopter will be delivered to the Defence Department.

In its attempts to help Sikorsky along, DND officials reduced the criteria for the interim aircraft to receive a military airworthiness certification. But even with that Sikorsky failed to meet its delivery timetable, according to a November 2010 briefing note for Defence Minister Peter MacKay.

The Citizen obtained that note through the Access to Information law.

The reduced criteria would have allowed for safe flying of the aircraft but the helicopter would have been restricted in what it could do. It would not have been allowed to fly over water or at night, according to the briefing note.

squib66

6th Jan 2012, 08:43

Any more news on the Danish 92?

Ian Corrigible

6th Jan 2012, 14:57

The pilot of the S-92 which performed a 74 kt run-on landing at Galliano after suffering LTE (see post #1977 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163206-sikorsky-s-92-design-operations-99.html#post6256551)) has been selected to receive one of the HAI's 2012 Salute to Excellence awards (http://rotor.com/Publications/RotorNewssupregsup/tabid/177/newsid1237/74494/mid/1237/Default.aspx):

Pilot of the Year Award: Jay Slagle, Captain, Bristow Group.
Jay Slagle is recognized with the 2012 HAI Pilot of the Year award for his efforts to successfully land an eleven ton helicopter after loss of tailrotor effectiveness. Inbound to Bristow’s Galliano Base, a Sikorsky S-92 with 14 souls aboard began an uncommanded nose-right turn as the aircraft slowed, and which worsened as power was reapplied. Recognizing an imminent emergency, Slagle and fellow Captain Chuck Melton diverted to a nearby airport with a 6,500’x100’ runway where, while maintaining 80 knots, they flew the S-92 onto the runway without an effective tailrotor, using differential braking once on the ground to bring their aircraft to a controlled stop.

I/C

squib66

6th Jan 2012, 18:59

Very well done!

The NTSB have yet to issue a probable cause:
CEN11IA156 (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20110120X65144&key=1)

Looking back I see there was a claim that the US operator was being secretive about the cause & lessons:
http://www.pprune.org/6257963-post1988.html

Any more information on that?

JohnDixson

7th Jan 2012, 14:26

Just an observation re the S-92 behavior in the conditions cited:

The tail rotor was still rotating at proper rpm, and because of the inherent cross beam design, and the way the airfoils are mounted to the composite beams, and mindful that there is no pitch change hinge ( pitch change occurs thru physically bending the crossbeam ), the tail rotor is not at zero thrust. (Yes, I realize that the centering spring is not in the loop in this condition ).

Thanks,
John Dixson

Lonewolf_50

9th Jan 2012, 20:45

Tip of the cap to the crew running it on. :ok:

For what it's worth (John Dixson already knows this) LTE and loss of thrust are not one and the same.

Chopper Jog

29th Jan 2012, 21:49

Hi there,

I am working on a PPT presentation for a ground school initial training program on the S92.

Does anyone in here have jpegs pictures of all the different displays that can be selected on all the MFD pages?

I have tried to take a few pictures of our machines (on the ground and in flight), but the quality was not that great!

Thank you for the support!

Chopper Jog!

Horror box

30th Jan 2012, 07:03

Have you tried the RFM? There are some pretty good, clear annotated pics there if you have access to it.

212man

30th Jan 2012, 08:05

When you say "all the pages" do you mean that, or just the basic menus? The RFM Part 2 has a pretty good selection of illustrations If you send me (PM) a file sharing link I can upload a certain well known training provider's training manual which also has a pretty good selection of pictures - and a whole lot more!

Failing that, have you tried the Simulator? Setting up a camera on a tripod looking at the centre MFD, off motion, should give you a good opportunity to get what you want.

JohnDixson

30th Jan 2012, 16:07

212,

Just a note of caution. If your material comes from that well known training provider by the name of Flight Safety, my recollection, confirmed by a call this morning to a person that is in a position to know, is that they copyright their training materials, so if Chopper Jog is doing this as a business proposition, there could be some legal ramifications. My guess is that Flight Safety looks in on this forum from time to time.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Thridle Op Des

31st Jan 2012, 04:04

The sim is your best proposition, you will find exposure a bit of a pain because of the contrast, you will need surprisingly short exposure times because of the nature of the lit LEDs versus unlit (LEDs emit coherent light). This comes from hours of cursing. It is possible that you will need to de-moire some images and there will be a slight curvature at the corners which can be corrected with a 'photo editing program'.

Another method is to reconstruct them from scratch using word, another one of my specialities - I have high OCD as the rest of the forum will attest to. The advantage of the word method is that once you have established your master frame, all others are relatively simple to construct with simple editing.

http://i197.photobucket.com/albums/aa266/thridleopdes/_MRC0952.jpg

http://i197.photobucket.com/albums/aa266/thridleopdes/BleedSDNormal2.jpg

TOD

Aser

31st Jan 2012, 05:04

Whats the orange and red on the airspeed tape??

212man

31st Jan 2012, 06:41

Another method is to reconstruct them from scratch using word

That's actually what Sikorsky do with their RFM images, I believe, and T.O.D is right - once done it is easy to amend them (especially if you use tables to create the fields.)

I have high OCD as the rest of the forum will attest to

No - just keen! :ok:

Whats the orange and red on the airspeed tape??

they relate to the Alpha protection

Red is V Alpha Max which I believe corresponds to maximum aft stick
The orange dashes are when V Alpha protection begins
The Amber line is VLS - which I think corresponds to the minimum speed that auto thrust will allow

Something like that - Mr OCD will give you chapter and verse I'm sure! :ok:

Thridle Op Des

31st Jan 2012, 06:54

Hi 212, your explanation will suffice though to be exactly precise, V alpha max can be achieved in other sidestick positions apart from fully aft. I must say I hadn't thought of the table idea, very nice, I will explore it for my A380 dual engine rollback in flight project!:eek:

Chopper Jog

31st Jan 2012, 07:34

Our Company (Privately owned) is already in contact with Flight Safety, Rockwell Collins and Sikorsky to discuss the copyright and legal issues with the development of this project.

HeliComparator

1st Feb 2012, 22:21

they relate to the Alpha protection

Red is V Alpha Max which I believe corresponds to maximum aft stick
The orange dashes are when V Alpha protection begins
The Amber line is VLS - which I think corresponds to the minimum speed that auto thrust will allow

One of my pet hates - linking angle of attack and airspeed which as we all know, are only related at a fixed amount of g. So you could be well above the markings at max alpha, or well below the markings and not yet reached max alpha.

Oh sorry, thought this was a fixed wing forum for a moment!!!

HC

maxwelg2

26th Mar 2012, 15:27

Hi all

It's been a while since I posted here. We recently had a input module chip #2 detect that would not clear on Cougar airframe KKN, resulting in the AC requiring a sleepover offshore and servicablility checks prior to being flown back by Cougar. There's a brief synopsis of chip detects over here included in the attached blog entry:

http://bondpapers.********.com/2012/03/s-92-incident-march-2012-newfoundland.html

From what I've been told the MRGB has been changed out on this AC as a proactive measure based on HUMS data trend analysis. Just curious as to what other operators have seen since changeout to the Phase III MRGB wrt. chip failure frequency versus TIS as this issue has not been seen on Cougar's local S-92 fleet HUMS trend data.

Safe flying

Max

Variable Load

27th Mar 2012, 02:50

Max,

The "paper" you highlight is of no value and the author is simply showing his ignorance. Such uninformed diatribe is dangerous! For example, included in this wonderful mess are a number of engine chip lights! The engine lube system is totally separate from the MGB lube system.

The input chip detection system has also been subject to a number of modifications over the years to improve the reliability and accuracy of the information given to the crews. Spurious warnings used to be quite common.

The detector itself is both a temp sensor and chip detector. Initially the crew indications didn't differentiate between an input hot or input chip scenario - this was corrected with updates to the aircraft software.

I would be very surprised if there is any correlation between a change of MGB casing design (Phase 3 MGB) and the generation of an input module chip indication.

Edit: Max, I see this is actually "your" list first posted here some time ago. Your original post was immediately followed by someone highlighting the errors in your list that I also mention above. What a shame you decided to ignore the professional advice offered by wrencheli in 2009!

VL

212man

27th Mar 2012, 03:53

The only relationship with the MGB change, I can think of, is that new gearboxes do routinely make some metal in their early life, and this could have been such an activity - if the input modules were new too. It would not be readily possible for the flight crew to do anything about it, if the chip light didn't clear.

maxwelg2

27th Mar 2012, 09:42

VL

Don't quite understand your reply wrt my "list" post or the "paper", The link I included was to a blog entry that came up when I Googled S92 input chip. The point in case you missed it was wrt. the potential correlation between MRGB changeouts and chip detect/HUMS data signature change which we've seen over here recently on only one airframe. Sorry if i have somehow offended you. I don't recall the 2009 post, can you please provide the post # and I'll go back and take a look.

Safe flying

Max

Variable Load

27th Mar 2012, 13:42

Max, I will try and make this simple - hopefully you can follow :ugh:

You posted a link to a blog as though it was something that was of value. The blog is full of errors, however quite ironically the majority of the information in the blog is referring to a post you made on this thread in 2009. Go to the blog and follow the link "helicopter pilots' discussion site" and you will find yourself at message #1291 on this thread. So your uninformed postings are now being transformed into "professional pilot" comments!

I do hope that you realise that the handful of Cougar S92s are not the only S92s being used out there and that with over 150 airframes in service that a chip light on one machine flying out of St Johns does not really warrant any discussion at all!

Let go and move on...... :mad:

VL

maxwelg2

27th Mar 2012, 19:10

OK VL, let's try and move on with constructive discussion on this public forum...the fact of the matter is that the data referred to in my referenced post is from CADORS and is publicly available information. I didn't even realize that the author had referred to the PPRuNe forum until you mentioned it. Please explain how that can be construed as "un-informed"?

Also, the context is perfectly applicable even if the author of the blog has in your opinion misconstrued certain facts. Please elaborate on what exactly the author stated as incorrect. That in itself highlights the lack of clarity present in this industry to the public. Nobody expects people outwith this industry to fully understand all the technical data and interpretations, however is it too much to expect a "laymans" terms announcement to be made that all can understand?

As an engineer in the industry I fully understand the implications of mis-information, that is ultimately how we ended up with 491. Sikorsky even admitted this via out of court settlements. I also understand the fact that nothing happens without a reason, so for a relatively new MRGB and engine set to have chip generation there must be a root cause issue when other airframes as you pointed out do not appear to have this issue. Or is it just not being publicly aired elsewhere, in which case should we not just request less information? Well, the offshore industry over here do not see that as a proactive way forward and the more information released the better, however I do take your point on mis-information.

We are all entitled to our own opinion, I frankly disagree with yours, specifically in reference to your statement that "with over 150 airframes in service that a chip light on one machine flying out of St Johns does not really warrant any discussion at all". IMHO that is how the Broome incident ended up being swept under the carpet and we all know the outcome of that only too well.

We are meant to learn from our mistakes, not bury our head in the sand and introduce complacence. That would be a dis-service to our lost colleagues in this industry.

Safe flying

Max